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BPI V.

CASA MONTESORRI INTERNATIONALE


430 SCRA 261
FACTS:
CASA has a current account with BPI. It was discovered that for a material period of time, several
checks were encashed by a certain Sonny Santos, who eventually was known to be a fictitious
name used by the external auditor of CASA. The external auditor admitted forging the
signature of CASAs president to be able to encash the checks. The trial court held the bank liable
but this was modified. The modified decision apportioned the loss between BPI and CASA.

HELD:
A forged signature is a real and absolute defense, and a person whose signature appears on
a negotiable instrument is forged is deemed to never have become a party thereto and to have
never consented to the contract that allegedly gave rise to it.
The counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the signing of anothers name with intent to
defraud, is forgery.
First, there was really a finding of forgery. The forger admitted even in his affidavit of his forgery.
Second, there was a finding by the police laboratory that indeed the signatures were forged.
Furthermore, the negligence is attributable to BPI alone. Its negligence consisted in the
omission of the degree of diligence required of a bank.
*Loss borne by proximate cause of negligence
Philippine Commercial International Bank vs Court of Appeals (2001)
350 SCRA 446 Mercantile Law Negotiable Instruments Law Rights of the Holder What
Constitutes a Holder in Due Course Negligence of the Collecting Bank and the Drawee Bank
There are three cases consolidated here: G.R. No. 121413 (PCIB vs CA and Ford and Citibank), G.R.
No. 121479 (Ford vs CA and Citibank and PCIB), and G.R. No. 128604 (Ford vs Citibank and PCIB and
CA).
G.R. No. 121413/G.R. No. 121479
In October 1977, Ford Philippines drew a Citibank check in the amount of P4,746,114.41 in favor of
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue (CIR). The check represents Fords tax payment for the
third quarter of 1977. On the face of the check was written Payees account only which means that
the check cannot be encashed and can only be deposited with the CIRs savings account (which is
with Metrobank). The said check was however presented to PCIB and PCIB accepted the same. PCIB
then indorsed the check for clearing to Citibank. Citibank cleared the check and paid PCIB
P4,746,114.41. CIR later informed Ford that it never received the tax payment.
An investigation ensued and it was discovered that Fords accountant Godofredo Rivera, when the
check was deposited with PCIB, recalled the check since there was allegedly an error in the
computation of the tax to be paid. PCIB, as instructed by Rivera, replaced the check with two of its
managers checks.

It was further discovered that Rivera was actually a member of a syndicate and the managers
checks were subsequently deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation by other members of the
syndicate. Thereafter, Rivera and the other members became fugitives of justice.
G.R. No. 128604
In July 1978 and in April 1979, Ford drew two checks in the amounts of P5,851,706.37 and
P6,311,591.73 respectively. Both checks are again for tax payments. Both checks are for Payees
account only or for the CIRs bank savings account only with Metrobank. Again, these checks never
reached the CIR.
In an investigation, it was found that these checks were embezzled by the same syndicate to which
Rivera was a member. It was established that an employee of PCIB, also a member of the syndicate,
created a PCIB account under a fictitious name upon which the two checks, through high end
manipulation, were deposited. PCIB unwittingly endorsed the checks to Citibank which the latter
cleared. Upon clearing, the amount was withdrawn from the fictitious account by syndicate
members.
ISSUE: What are the liabilities of each party?
HELD: G.R. No. 121413/G.R. No. 121479
PCIB is liable for the amount of the check (P4,746,114.41). PCIB, as a collecting bank has been
negligent in verifying the authority of Rivera to negotiate the check. It failed to ascertain whether or
not Rivera can validly recall the check and have them be replaced with PCIBs managers checks as
in fact, Ford has no knowledge and did not authorize such. A bank (in this case PCIB) which cashes a
check drawn upon another bank (in this case Citibank), without requiring proof as to the identity of
persons presenting it, or making inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the
drawee when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party.
Hence, PCIB is liable for the amount of the embezzled check.
G.R. No. 128604
PCIB and Citibank are liable for the amount of the checks on a 50-50 basis.
As a general rule, a bank is liable for the negligent or tortuous act of its employees within the course
and apparent scope of their employment or authority. Hence, PCIB is liable for the fraudulent act of
its employee who set up the savings account under a fictitious name.
Citibank is likewise liable because it was negligent in the performance of its obligations with respect
to its agreement with Ford. The checks which were drawn against Fords account with Citibank
clearly states that they are payable to the CIR only yet Citibank delivered said payments to PCIB.
Citibank however argues that the checks were indorsed by PCIB to Citibank and that the latter has
nothing to do but to pay it. The Supreme Court cited Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which mandates the Citibank, as an acceptor of the checks, to engage in paying the checks
according to the tenor of the acceptance which is to deliver the payment to the payees account
only.
But the Supreme Court ruled that in the consolidated cases, that PCIB and Citibank are not the only
negligent parties. Ford is also negligent for failing to examine its passbook in a timely manner which

could have avoided further loss. But this negligence is not the proximate cause of the loss but is
merely contributory. Nevertheless, this mitigates the liability of PCIB and Citibank hence the rate of
interest, with which PCIB and Citibank is to pay Ford, is lowered from 12% to 6% per annum.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62943.
July 14, 1986]
FACTS
Twenty three (23) personalized checks drawn by petitioner were paid by respondent bank and
debited against petitioner after they were deposited in collection banks.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is barred from setting up the defense of forgery on the ground of gross
negligence.
RULING
YES. Respondent drawee Bank for not having detected the fraudulent encashment of the checks
because the printing of the petitioners personalized checks was not done under the supervision and
control of the Bank. There is no evidence on record indicating that because of this private printing
the petitioner furnished the respondent Bank with samples of checks, pens, and inks or took other
precautionary measures with the PNB to safeguard its interests.

International Corporate Bank vs. Gueco (351 SCRA 516)


FACTS:
The respondents obtained a loan from the petitioner to purchase a motor vehicle (car). The
respondents defaulted in payment of installments. A civil case was filed by the petitioner which
resulted later into negotiations in lowering the remaining unpaid balance from P184,000.00 to
P150,000.00, detaining the car until payment thereof. Respondent delivered a managers check but
petitioner insisted on the signing of Joint Motion to Dismiss, still holding the motor vehicle.
Respondent initiated civil action for damages before MTC but the case was dismissed for lack of
merit. On appeal to RTC, the decision of MTC was reversed ordering herein petitioners to indemnify
the respondents. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled of indemnification for damages.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners act of requiring respondents to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss can not be said to be
a deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the
parties. The law presumes good faith. In fact, the act of petitioner bank in lowering the debt of
respondent from P184,000.00 to P150,000.00 is indicative of its good faith and sincere desire to
settle the case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC was set aside. Respondents
were ordered to pay the original obligation amounting to P150,000.00 to the petitioner upon
surrender or cancellation of the managers check in the latters possession, afterwhich, petitioner is
to return the subject motor vehicle in good working condition.
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK V. SPOUSES GUECO

351 SCRA 516

FACTS:
Gueco spouses obtained a loan from ICB (now Union Bank) to purchase a car. In consideration
thereof, the debtors executed PNs, and a chattel mortgage was made over the car. As the
usual story goes, the spouses defaulted in payment of their obligations and despite the
lowering of the amount to be paid, they still failed to pay. Thereafter, they tendered a
managers check in favor of the bank. Nonetheless, the car was still detained for the
spouses refused to sign the joint motion to dismiss. The bank averred that the joint motion to
dismiss is part of standard office procedure to preclude the filing of other claims. Because
of this, the spouses filed an action for damages against the bank. And by the time the case was
instituted, the check had become stale in the hands of the bank.

HELD:
The main issue though unrelated to Negotiable Instruments Law in this case was whether or not the
signing of the joint motion to dismiss a part of the compromise agreement between the spouses and
the bank. The answer is no, it is not a part of the compromise agreement entered by the parties.
And thus, the signing is dispensible in releasing the car to the spouses. And on the ancillary issue of
the case, which is the relevant issue for the subject, whether or not the spouses should replace the
check they paid to the bank after it became stale, the answer is yes. It appeared that the
check has not been encashed. The delivery of the managers check did not constitute payment. The
original obligation to pay still exists. Indeed, the circumstances that caused the non-presentment
of the check should be considered to determine who should bear the loss. In this case, ICB held
on the check and refused to encash the same because of the controversy surrounding the signing of
the joint motion to dismiss. There is no bad faith
or negligence on the part of ICB.
A stale check is one which has not been presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its issue. It is valueless and, therefore, should not be paid. A check should be presented for
payment within a reasonable time after its issue. Here, what is involved is a managers
check, which is
essentially a banks own check and may be treated as a PN with the bank as a maker. Even
assuming that presentment is needed, failure to present for payment within a reasonable time
will result to the discharge of the drawer only to the extent of the loss caused by the delaybut
here there is
no loss sustained. Still, such failure to present on time does not wipe out liability.

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK V. SPS. GUECO


G.R. No.141968 February 12, 2001
Facts: Spouses Gueco obtained a loan from petitioner International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank
of Philippines) to purchase a car. Respondent spouses executed a promissory note in consideration,
which were payable in monthly installment and chattel mortgage over the car.
The spouses however, defaulted payment. The car was detained by the bank. When Dr. Gueco
delivered the mangers check of P150,000, the car was not released because of his refusal to sign
the Joint Motion to Dismiss (JMD).
The bank insisted that the JMD is a standard operating procedure to effect a compromise and to

preclude future filing of claims or suits for damages. Gueco spouses filed an action against the bank
for fraud, failing to inform them regarding JMD during the meeting & for not releasing the car if they
do not sign the said motion.
Issue: Whether or not International Corporate Bank was guilty of fraud.
Ruling: No. Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. It is the
voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which
naturally and necessarily arise from such act or omission. The fraud referred to in Article 1170 of the
Civil Code is the deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of obligation. The court
fails to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to
dismiss could constitute as fraud.
The joint motion to dismiss cannot in any way have prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The motion to dismiss was
in fact also for the benefit of Dr. Gueco, as the case filed by petitioner against it before the lower
court would be dismissed with prejudice.
The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the compromise agreement and
simply stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case.
Petitioners act of requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss cannot be said to be a
deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties.
Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals
360 SCRA 127 Mercantile Law Negotiable Instruments Law Check Payments Due Diligence in
Presenting Checks for Payment
Honor Moslares and Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation are disputing over the estate of
Nicolai Drepin, represented by Atty. Tomas Trinidad. To settle the dispute, and while the case was in
court, they entered into a Compromise Agreement by which they agreed to have the estate in
dispute be sold; that in case Moslares was able to buy the property first, he should pay
P3,000,000.00 to Barretto Realty (representing the amount of investments by Barretto Realty in the
estate); that should Barretto Realty buy the property first, it should pay P1,000,000.00 to Moslares
(representing interest). The compromise agreement was approved by the judge (Judge Perfecto
Laguio).
Barretto Realty was able to buy the property first hence it delivered a managers check worth
P1,000,000.00 to Moslares but the latter refused to accept the same. Barretto Realty filed a petition
before the trial court to direct Moslares to comply with the Compromise Agreement. Barretto Realty
also consigned the check payment with the court. The judge issued a writ of execution against
Moslares and the sheriff also delivered the check to Moslares which the latter accepted. However,
three years later, Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the check payment did not
amount to legal tender and that he never even encashed the check. The judge agreed with
Moslares.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge was correct.
HELD: No. There was already a final and executory order issued by the same judge three years
prior. The same may no longer be amended regardless of any claim or error or incorrectness (save
for clerical errors only). It is true that a check is not a legal tender and while delivery of a check
produces the effect of payment only when it is encashed, the rule is otherwise if the debtor (Barretto
Realty) was prejudiced by the creditors (Moslares) unreasonable delay in presentment. Acceptance
of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment. If no such
presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury sustained by

the payee. Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as
conditional payment will be discharged.

People vs Nitafan Digest


Filed Under: BP 22, Memorandum Check, Non-imprisonment for Debt
Facts:
Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to quash the
Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was
unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of
a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the
Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Wether a memorandum check is within the coverage of B.P. 22
Held:
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo"
or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide
holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of
debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as
an ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.
A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. A memorandum
check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the
check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was
issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance
itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing
debt, is malum prohibitum.
A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the bank
but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. However, with the promulgation
of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal
sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be
first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the
basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was
enacted to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the
incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless
circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered
exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to
require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine
the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will

greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. (People vs.
Judge Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992)
People v. Nitafan

G.R. No. 75954 October 22, 1992

Facts:

On January 20, 1985, aid accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 in the
amount of P143,000.00
He knew that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank.
The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay Sasaki the amount of
said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five banking days
after receiving said notice.
Private respondent, Mariano Lim moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he
issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note in thus, is
civil in nature.
On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was
based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government.

Issues:

W/N B.P. 22 is unconstitutional

W/N a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is


within the coverage of B.P. 22.

Ratio:

The constitutionality of the Bouncing Check Law has already been sustained by the SC
through jurisprudence in Lozano v. Martinez, and the seven other cases decided jointly with
it.
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum",
"memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay
the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment.
Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to
be presented has the same effect as an ordinary check and if passed to the third person will
be valid in his hands like any other check.
A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand."
A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not
distinguish but merely provides that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank which check is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment"
A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does
not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of
indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for
what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for
which it was issuance.

The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as
an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 1 September 1986 is
SET ASIDE. Consequently, respondent Judge, or whoever presides over the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 52, is hereby directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing of the case until
terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 557, GR No. 49188, January 30,
1990, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 30, 2011
(Civil Procedure Alias Writ of Execution; Civil Law Payment; Commercial Law Check)
THE FACTS:
Amelia Tan commenced a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance against Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL). The Court rendered a judgment in favor of the former and against the latter.
PAL filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), and the appellate court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court with the modification that PAL is condemned to pay the latter the sum of P25, 000.00
as damages and P5, 000.00 as attorneys fee.
Judgment became final and executory and was correspondingly entered in the case, which was
remanded to the trial court for execution. The trial court upon the motion of Amelia Tan issued an
order of execution with the corresponding writ in favor of the respondent. Said writ was duly referred
to Deputy Sheriff Reyes for enforcement.
Four months later, Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, stating that the
judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the CA, remained
unsatisfied. PAL opposed the motion, stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to plaintiff
through the issuance of checks payable to the deputy sheriff who later did not appear with his return
and instead absconded.
The CA denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature. After two months the CA granted
her an alias writ of execution for the full satisfaction of the judgment rendered, when she filed
another motion. Deputy Sheriff del Rosario is appointed special sheriff for enforcement thereof.
PAL filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return of the writ had
as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff Reyes and that judgment debt had already been fully satisfied
by the former as evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and received by the executing sheriff.
Deputy Sheriff del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of PAL, through its
manager and garnished the latters deposit. Hence, PAL brought the case to the Supreme Court and
filed a petition for certiorari.
THE ISSUES:
WON an alias writ of execution can be issued without prior return of the original writ by the
implementing officer.
WON payment of judgment to the implementing officer as directed in the writ of execution
constitutes satisfaction of judgment.

WON payment made in checks to the sheriff and under his name is a valid payment to extinguish
judgment of debt.
THE RULING:
1. Affirmative. Technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for
execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. A judgment
cannot be rendered nugatory by unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested right
were never intended to rest on the requirement of a return. So long as judgment is not satisfied, a
plaintiff is entitled to other writs of execution.
2. Negative. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be
made to the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides:
Payment made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff
should be valid payment to extinguish judgment of debt.
However, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by
check in his name did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.
3. Negative. Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to
deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
Unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee, a public officer has no authority to
accept anything other than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being executed.
Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioners checks does not, per se, operate
as a discharge of the judgment of debt.
A check, whether managers check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender or payment and may be refused receipt by the oblige or
creditor. Hence, the obligation is not extinguished.
THE TWIST: Payment in cash is logical, but it was not proper.
Payment in cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of judgment debt
but the Court has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors should settle their
obligations by turning over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to the executing officers. Payment
in cash would result in damage or endless litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash
in his hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, the courts encourage the practice of payment of check provided adequate
controls are instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or disbursement of funds.
However, in the case at bar, it is out of the ordinary that checks intended for a particular payee are
made out in the name of another. The issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made
possible the misappropriation of the funds that were withdrawn.
The Court of Appeals explained:
Knowing as it does that the intended payment was for the respondent Amelia Tan, the petitioner
corporation, utilizing the services of its personnel who are or should be knowledgeable about the
accepted procedure and resulting consequences of the checks drawn, nevertheless, in this instance,
without prudence, departed from what is generally observed and done, and placed as payee in the

checks the name of the errant Sheriff and not the name of the rightful payee. Petitioner thereby
created a situation which permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash said checks and
misappropriate the proceeds thereof to his exclusive benefit. For the prejudice that resulted, the
petitioner himself must bear the fault
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself, the judgment debtor whose act
made possible the loss had but itself to blame.

Doctrine:
The payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.

Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment.

A check, whether a managers check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment
and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial
document is actually realized.

As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of
confidence must bear the loss.

Execution is for the sheriff to accomplish while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve the implementing officers duty should not stop
at his receipt of payments but must continue until payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.

Laws are to be interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth. Logic has its limits in decision making. We should not follow
rulings to their logical extremes if in doing so we arrive at unjust or absurd results.