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107 PHIL 830
FACTS: The main respondent herein, Magdalena Ramirez, instituted a civil case
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against the Magdalena Estate Inc.
for the purpose of requiring the latter to deliver and surrender the Transfer of
Certificate of Title No. 6947 covering a parcel of land located in Cubao, Quezon City.
In the said complaint, Ramirez alleged that after she had paid the full purchase
price of the lot, the Incorporation refused to deliver to her the Certificate of Title. In
its Answer, the Incorporation states that its refusal was due to the adverse claim of
herein Petitioner Espineli, who had similarly demanded delivery of the Certificate of
Thereafter, Petitioner Espineli filed a motion to intervene which was granted.
Espineli then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint upon the ground that the
venue is improperly laid, the property being located in Quezon City. The Trial Court
denied the motion and ruled that the present case involved a personal action, hence
the venue does not affect the merits of the case.
Issue: WON the CFI of Pangasinan may take cognizance of the present case.
Held: NO. The Court ruled that the present action is a real action and the rule as to
where to file the action is laid down under Section 3, Rule 5 of ROC (now Rule 4 Sec
1) which provides:
"Real action. Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.
In the case at bar, since the property in dispute is located in Quezon City, it is not
possible for the CFI of Pangasinan to decide the case.
Facts: Plaintiff Marcelo, an attorney-in-fact of the real owner of the land, filed a
complaint in order to recover possession of the said land from Respondent De Leon.
The Justice of the Peace of Court where the complaint was filed dismissed the same.
One of the grounds for the dismissal is that, as an attorney-in-fact of the true owner
of the land, he has no personal capacity to sue.
Issue: WON an attorney-in-fact has a personal capacity to sue.
Ruling: The Court upheld the dismissal of the case. It ruled in accordance to the Rule
Provided under Rule 3 Section of the Rules of Court stating that every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Since the present action is
not in the name of the Plaintiffs Principal, the dismissal was proper.


FACTS: Plaintiff Capati, a resident of Pampanga, was the contractor of a construction
of building situated in Camariner Sur. Later, the plaintiff ented into a sub-contract
with the Defendant Ocampo, a resident of Naga City. In their express written
agreement, they both agreed that in all actions arising out or relating to their
contract, said action may be instituted in the CFI of City of Naga. Thereafter, upon
defendants failure to comply with his obligation to finish his undertakings in due
time, the plaintiff filed a Complaint before the CFI of Pampanga. Defendant filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the venue of action was improperly laid, and
not in accordance with their agreement.
ISSUE: WON the agreement of the parties as to the Venue of Action is merely
optional and permissive
HELD: YES. The Court held that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates
to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be"
connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. Applying this in the case at
bar, the express agreement of the parties is permissive thus, they may submit their
disputes not only in Naga City but also in the Court where defendant or the plaintiff
resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as provided for by Section 2 Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where
the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2
(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Facts: Private Respondent Pambuan filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and
Damage against herein Petitioners for an alleged wrongful sale at public auction a
certain real property. In its Answer, the petitioners likewise filed their counterclaim
o account of malicious and unfounded action, for moral damages, compensatory
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees plus its cost per appearance and
raveling expenses. At the day they field their Answer and Conuterclaim, the
petitioners also filed an ex-parte Motion for exemption from payment of legal fees
on their counterclaim alleging that it was compulsory in nature and that under
section 5(a), Rule 141, only a permissive counterclaim is subject to payment of legal
The respondent judge denied the petitioners Motion on the ground that the
counterclaim is permissive and compulsory. Hence, this instant action.

ISSUE: WON the Counterclaim is compulsory in nature

HELD: YES. The Court ruled that Petitioners' counterclaim for damages fulfills the
necessary requisites of a compulsory counterclaim.
Under section 4, Rule 9 (ngayon, Rule 6 Section 7 na), a counterclaim is compulsory
in nature 1) if it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; 2) if it does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the Court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and 3) if the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
In the case at bar, the counterclaim includes damages claimed to have been
suffered by petitioners as a consequence of the action filed against them. They
have to be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, petitioners would be precluded
by the judgment from invoking the same in an independent action.
We see no circumvention of this rationale if the certificate was signed by the
corporations specifically authorized counsel, who had personal knowledge of the
matters required in the Circular.
**Rule 7
FACTS: Petitioner BA Savings Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. However, it was denied on the ground that the Certification on anti-forum
shopping incorporated in the petition was signed not by the duly authorized
representative of the petitioner, as required under Supreme Court Circular No. 2891, but by its counsel, in contravention of said circular. A motion for Reconsideration
was subsequently filed by the petitioner, attached with it is a Resolution passed by
the Petitioners Board of Directors, authorizing its lawyers to represent it in any
action or proceeding before any court, tribunal or agency; and to sign, execute and
deliver the Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, among others.
However, the said Motion for Recon was likewise denied by the CA on the ground
that Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 requires that it is the petitioner, not
the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the facts and undertakings
required therein. Hence, the present action.
ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 allows a corporation to
authorize its counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping for and on its
HELD: YES. The Court held that a certificate which was signed by the Corporations
specifically authorized counsel, who had personal knowledge of the matters
required in the circular, is proper and not in violation of the SC Circular No. 28-91.

In the present case, where the Petitioner is a Corporation, a Resolution was passed
by the Petitioners Board of Directors specifically authorizing its lawyers to act as
their agents in any action or proceeding and to sign, execute and deliver in
connection therewith the necessary pleadings, motions, verification, affidavit of
merit, certificate of non-forum shopping and other instruments necessary for such
action and proceeding. The Resolution was sufficient to vest such persons with the
authority to bind the corporation and was specific enough as to the acts they were
empowered to do. On the other hand, in the case of natural persons, Circular 28-91
requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.
However, such requirement cannot be imposed on artificial persons, like
corporations, for the simple reason that they cannot personally do the task
themselves. As already stated, corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents. In fact, physical actions, like the signing and the delivery of
documents, may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by
specifically authorized individuals.
Wherefore, the Petition is Granted.