Luciano Ladano vs. Felino Neri et.al.

GR 178622, 12 November 2012

[indirect contempt cannot be initiated by motion; initiated either motu propio or by
formal charge

FACTS: The case before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
decision of the CA and its resolution which denied the reconsideration of its decision
reversing the Decision of Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
The case originated from a complaint filed by Petitioner Luciano against Respondent
s Neri et. al for entering forcibly in the two-hectare land, asking him to vacate the
same, and claiming as the owner of the land. Unheeded, respondents fenced the
property and destroyed some incidents to it. Ladano prayed to be declared as
rightful owner and maintained that he has been a possessor in good faith for 30
years. The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the complaint. On appeal to DARAB
Central Office, it reversed the latter decision. Respondents filed an MR which was
likewise denied. On appeal, CA reversed the DARAB Decision. A reconsideration was
filed by Ladano but was denied. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Motion for Urgent
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order TRO before the Court. He alleged that,
despite the pendency of his appeal, respondents bulldozed the subject
land and destroyed petitioners trees. Since respondents did not deny
petitioners factual allegations, the Court granted petitioners motion and
issued a TRO. Subsequently, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Cite
Private Respondents Felino Neri and Edwin Soto in Contempt of Court . He
alleged that these respondents defied the Courts TRO by bulldozing the
subject property. He had the incident blottered with the Office of the
Barangay Captain and with Precinct 2 of the Philippine National Police in
Antipolo City. He attached pictures of bulldozed earth to his motion.
Respondents denied the allegations. They maintained that the pictures attached to
petitioners motion were taken way back in 2003 and were not truthful
representations of the current state of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt
RULING: NO. A charge for indirect contempt, such as disobedience to a
courts lawful order,54 is initiated either motu proprio by order of or a
formal charge by the offended court, or by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.55 It cannot be
initiated by a mere motion,56 such as the one that petitioner filed.
Further, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that respondents violated the
TRO. The entries in the barangay and police blotters attached to his motion carry
little weight or probative value as they are not conclusive evidence of the truth
thereof but merely of the fact that these entries were made. 57 The pictures depicting
bulldozing activities likewise contained no indication that they were taken after the

Courts issuance of the restraining order. Simply, the Court has no way of gauging
the veracity of petitioners factual allegations. On the basis of the foregoing, the
Court resolves to deny petitioners motion.
The CA rightfully reversed this conclusion. The DARAB failed to consider that ones
occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso
facto make him a de jure tenant. 69 It should not have considered such occupation as
a basis for assuming the landowners consent, especially when the occupant himself
never alleged that he obtained the landowners consent.
Petitioner never alleged that he had any agreement with the landowner of the
subject property. Indeed Ladanos Complaint did not assert any right that arises
from agrarian laws. He asserted his rights based on his prior physical possession of
the two-hectare property and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The issues
that he wanted resolved are who between himself and the respondents have a
better right to possess the property, and whether he has a right to be compensated
for the improvements he introduced on the property. Clearly, the nature of the case
be filed is one for forcible entry 72 and for indemnification,73 neither of which is
cognizable by the DARAB, but by the regular courts. While neither of the parties
challenged the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court can consider the issue of
jurisdiction motu proprio.
PETITION DENIED.

Lipata vs. Tutaan, GR L-16643, September 1983 [Contempt to whom order is given]

FACTS: In a decision of Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan (Tutaan), he ordered to

Luzviminda Lipatan (Lipatan) and her stepmother to deliver the two-storey house
to alleged vendees, spouses Agcaoili, and to pay the latter P800 a month as
rental. This decision became final and executory. Their two petitions for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals, assailing the disallowance of their appeal, were dismissed. In an
unverified motion, the Agcaoili spouses prayed that Luzviminda and her stepmother
be cited or declared in contempt of court and committed to prison until they
complied with the decision because, according to the deputy sheriffs return of
the alias writ of execution, they failed to obey the decision of Judge Tutaan.
Accordingly, Judge Tutaan adjudged Luzviminda in contempt of court because she
failed to comply with the writ of execution. She was "sentenced to be confined to the
city jail of Quezon City until she shall have complied with the decision". Patrolman Valle
was directed to serve the warrant of arrest. She was arrested but released
allegedly upon her oral request for an extension. She was re-arrested and
confined in jail. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: whether failure of Lipata (judgment debtor) on the writ of execution merits her to be
in contempt of court as such order is valid.
RULING: NO. We hold that the contempt order is void. It is not sanctioned by the Rules
of Court. It is not contempt of court for a judgment debtor to disobey the writ of
execution. It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ. He did not perform his duty,
as ordained in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt because of his alleged

disobedience of an order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution issued by
a justice of the peace to the sheriff, directing the latter to place the plaintiff in possession of
property held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the defendant. The delivery
of the real property pertains to the sheriff alone to whom the law entrusts the
execution of judgments.

Inonog vs. Ibay, AM RTJ-09-2715, 28 July 2009 [act to delay the

proceedings must be with malice or bad faith for indirect contempt to lie]
BRIEF FACTS: The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in
the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited
complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his superiors vehicle
at the parking space reserved for respondent judge. Respondent judge initiated the
proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an order dated March 18, 2005 in
Criminal Cases, directing the complainant to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt. That same day, respondent judge issued another order,
finding complainant guilty of contempt for failure of Inonong to appear and issued a
warrant of arrest.
FACTS: Complainant was the security-driver of the Chief of Business Permit
Division of Makati City. On March 18, 2005, at aroung 1:00 a.am. Unknown to him,
He parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss at the slot of Judge Francisco Ibay
(Judge). During that time, the slot that he usually parked was already occupied and
that only numbers were indicated. Thereafter, he left the vehicle in the basement,
went home because his not feeling well and did not report that day. Later that
morning, complainant received a call from his brother, also an employee of the City
Government of Makati, informing him that he should appear before the sala
of respondent judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should
not be cited for contempt of court for parking his vehicle at the space
reserved for respondent judge. He was informed that the respondent
judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the
promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case because the latter had a hard time
looking for another parking space. Complainant was also informed that if he failed to
appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued. He immediately went left
home in Tanay to go to Makati despite of not feeling well. He arrived there only at
around 1:00 p.m. He found out that by then he had already been adjudged guilty of
contempt of court by respondent judge for delaying in the administration of justice. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00). A warrant for his arrest was also issued.
On March 21, 2005,
Reconsideration

complainant

and/or

to

Lift

through
Order

counsel
of

filed

Arrest,

an

but

Urgent
said

Motion
motion

for
was

denied. Subsequently, complainant filed an Amended Urgent Motion for Reconsideration

and/or To Lift the Order of Arrest, attaching proof of payment of the fine in the amount
of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). In his motions, complainant explained that he did not
know that the parking space was reserved for the respondent judge. He also begged for
forgiveness and promised not to repeat the incident. Acting on the said amended motion,
respondent judge issued an Order dated March 30, 2005 finding complainants explanation to
be unsatisfactory. However, respondent judge modified his previous order by deleting the
sentence for imprisonment for five (5) days but the fine of P1,000.00 was increased
toP2,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint.
According to respondent judge, complainant knew that the parking slot was reserved for
him because it bore his name. He emphasized that prior to the incident, he already had his
name indicated at the said slot precisely because there had been previous occasions when
other vehicles would occupy his parking space and he had been forced to park at the public
parking area.

OCA penalized Judge Ibay to pay a fine of P5,000.

ISSUE: Whether the act of Venancio Inonong is with malice or bad faith as such the
contempt order of Judge Ibay is proper and he shall not be administratively liable.
RULING: NO. The phrase improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice is so broad and general that it encompasses
wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant
in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this
category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was
improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking
slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of
complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too
flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
We held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or
prohibited by the order of the Court.In Lu Ym v. Mahinay (491 SCRA 253 [2006]), we held
that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order
of the Court. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which
is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Here,
the act of complainant is not contrary or clearly prohibited by an order of the court. The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial

proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise
the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended
as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have,
time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with
utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation
of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. Respondent judges act of
unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of
the authority vested upon him by law.

JUDGE IBAY WSS FOUND GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE

ANDORDERED TO PAY A FINE OF P40 000.

OF

AUTHORITY

IF EVER KAYLANGAN LANG PO. DISCUSSION PO NG OCA SA

RECOMMENDATION NILA. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND REQUIREMENTS.
Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation
(Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57).

Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect. Direct contempt,
which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe
an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so (Section 1, Rule 71).

Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can
be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558).Undoubtedly,
Judge Ibay cited the complainant for indirect contempt of court since the subject incident
transpired not in the courts presence.

In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant
when he parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the respondent judge. The incident is
too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor
inconvenience on the part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the
administration of justice. Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his vehicle at the
spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously
in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation
rather than upholding of the courts honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming, without conceding, that the complainant had committed indirect contempt of court,
he was nonetheless entitled to be charged in writing and given an opportunity to be heard by
himself or counsel. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the
procedural requisites before a person may be punished for indirect contempt, thus: (1) a
complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order
issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an
opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct (Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275
SCRA 543). Proceedings against persons charged with contempt of court are commonly treated
as criminal in nature, thus this mode of procedure should be strictly followed.