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Contention One: The Status Quo


The United States embargo uses food as a weapon against Cuba
while constructing a narrative of Cuban moral inferiority and
American dominance
Fazzino, 10 - Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks. M.S., Sustainable
Systems, Slippery Rock University, December 1999; J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2007; and Ph.D.,
Anthropology, University of Florida, 2008 (David V., WHOSE FOOD SECURITY? CONFRONTING EXPANDING COMMODITY
PRODUCTION AND THE OBESITY AND DIABETES EPIDEMICS, Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 15 Drake J. Agric. L. 393,
LexisNexis)//HAL
It's important for our nation to build--to grow foodstuffs, to feed our people. Can you imagine a country that was unable to
grow enough food to feed the people? It would be a nation that would be subject to international pressure. It would be a

when we're talking about American agriculture, we're really


talking about a national security issue. This concern over the relationship between food security
and national security by the former President is obvious, considering that the United States has utilized
food as a weapon; perhaps the most notable example is the embargo
on Cuba. n24 The Cuban embargo has forced individual families and the Cuban
government to make due with fewer ties to global circuits of food production
and distribution. n25 The embargo led to an increase in the number of policies,
programs, and measures to enhance food security by relying on local and
national food production programs. n26 Similarly, the United States has been responsible for the
nation at risk. And so

imposition of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 in Iraq, which imposes World Trade Organization-friendly intellectual
property rights, including limitations on the rights of farmers to use seeds from the previous
season's [*400] harvest. n27 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 could undermine food security for farmers unable
to afford required seed purchases if patented material is found among seeds which have been saved from the previous

When the operational definitions of food security are limited to


measuring how much food is created and distributed, then the United States
emerges as a superior nation in terms of its overall food security and food
surpluses. n29 At the same time, the relative inability of so-called less developed
countries to meet the caloric needs of their populace--due to chronic or acute
instability in environmental, economic or political sectors--is described as
vulnerability and reflective of their inferiority. n30 Those in international development circles
season.

would also point to the poor transportation infrastructure in these less developed countries, which limits the distribution of

In the United States, the


temporal unfolding of science and technology is perceived as leading directly
to the continual emergence of progress. n32 Notions of this superiority are
reflected in the literature concerning food production and security where the
locus of food insecurity is consistently placed in the so-called less developed
world, while the United States occupies the role of provider and breadbasket
of the world. n33 The stated superiority of the U.S. international agro-industrial
complex is intimately connected with economics and politics; it is a
historically produced discourse. n34
food to areas that may be in the greatest need of food assistance. n31

Access to food is a moral responsibilitywe are obligated to ensure


it even in the face of human extinction
WATSON 1977 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation,
p. 118-119)
These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human
individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life. The
moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The

the moral action is to distribute all


food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by
such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky but then, morality is hard. The conclusion
may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously
higher moral principle is of human equity per se. Consequently,

moral.

claims of moralityif
those of conflicting reason. One may even have to
sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations where practical
behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead)
Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the

taken seriouslysupersede

patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral,

one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies ).

That
an action is necessary to save ones life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot
or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save ones life or nation. There is a strict
analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the

The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the
The ultimate test always harks to the highest principlerecant or
dieand it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets
rough. I have put aside many questions of detailsuch as the mechanical
problems of distributing foodbecause detail does not alter the stark
conclusion. If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution
of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high
enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose ones life. But many people cannot accept
the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies,
then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can
adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle
of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity . And though one might not be
sake of being Christian.
highest light.

able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nationfor nations can come and goone might well argue that
unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large groupsay one-third of

However, from an
individual standpoint, the human species like the nationis of no moral relevance.
From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpointas indicated above
survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial
whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior.
present world populationshould be at least well-nourished for human survival.

This equality is a side constraintregardless of consequences, we


cannot take any course of action if it is unjust
RAWLS 1971 (John, philosopher, A Theory of Justice, p. 3-4)
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of thought.
A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue ;
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must
be reformed or abolished if they are unjust . Each person possesses an
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is
made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the
sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages
enjoyed by the many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the
calculus of social interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack
of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice.

Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising .
We must refuse to sacrifice one group to prevent a bad consequence
intervening actors mean that our responsibility does not extend to
the efects of the planonly the moral act of feeding hungry people
GEWIRTH 1983 (Alan, philosopher, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, p 230-231)
A third distinction is between respecting other persons and avoiding bad consequences. Respect for persons
is an obligation so fundamental that it cannot be overridden even to prevent
evil consequences from befalling some persons. If such prevention requires an action

whereby respect is withheld from persons, then that action must not be
performed, whatever the consequences . One of the difficulties with this important distinction is
that it is unclear. May not respect be withheld from a person by failing to avert from
him some evil consequence? How can Abrams be held to respect the thousands of innocent persons or their
rights if he lets them die when he could have prevented this? The distinction also fails to provide for degrees of moral
urgency. One fails to respect a person if one lies to him or steals from him; but sometimes the only way to prevent the

In such a
case, respect for one person may lead to disrespect of a more serious kind
from some other innocent person . 7. None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose
death of one innocent person may be by stealing from or telling a lie to some other innocent person.

of defending the absolutist against the consequentialist. They do not show that the sons refusal to tortures his mother to
death does not violate the other persons rights to life and that hes is not morally responsible for their deaths.

The
required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action .
According to this principle, when there is a causal connection between some person As
performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person Cs incurring a
certain harm Z, As moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there
intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and
who intends to produce Z or show produces Z through recklessness. The reasons for this removal is
that Bs intervening action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike As
action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this principle may
help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told
that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally
responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the
American Republic to its foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it
was Kings opponents who were responsible because their intervention
operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also
have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had
to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the
rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that
these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks .
Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does serve to establish these conclusions.

Intervening actors will solve their impact but not ours


SHIELDS 1995

(David, research associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, The Color of
Hunger: Race and Hunger in National and International Perspective, p. 1-2)

Imagine, for a moment, that unknown terrorists have detonated a crude atomic device in
a large urban area. One hundred and fifty thousand people are instantly incinerated, about the same number that died in
the bombing of Hiroshima. Moreover, immediate death is only the tip of the tragic iceberg; hundreds of thousands more
are left with various debilitating injuries and diseases.

Then, just three days later, a second

atomic device is detonated spreading a similar level of death and destruction to another city.

And then,
after three more days, yet another bomb explodes. Let us take our thought experiment one step further. Imagine, now,

Picture the massive human and


economic resources that would be marshaled . A monumental, highly coordinated, and
how the world would respond to such an unparalleled crisis.

unanimously supported effort would be galvanized, aimed at achieving one goalfinding and eliminating the terrorists.

World attention would be riveted to the crisis; a massive public outcry would
demand effective action and would settle for nothing less than an end to the
threat. Politicians the world over would talk of little else. The above scenario, of course, is fiction. Well,
partly. It is fiction only with respect to the instrument of death and the quality of
the response. In reality, hunger is the weapon, and it claims the lives of more people every three to
four days than died in the bombing of Hiroshima. But the response to this massive crisis is
shocking in its near nonexistence, leading some to refer to hunger as the
silent emergency. Despite its unparalleled infliction of misery , suffering, and death,

hunger is calmly dispassionately accepted within the citadels and cathedrals of power as
simply part of the present world order.
Even if consequentialism is generally good, we must have moral side
constraintssome immoral actions must never be allowed no matter
what the consequences are
NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 58-59)
Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that something has gone seriously
wrong when certain measures are admitted into consideration in the first
place. The fundamental mistake is made there, rather than at the point
where the overall benefit of some monstrous measure is judged to outweigh
its disadvantages, and it is adopted. An account of absolutism might help us to understand this. If it is not
allowable to do certain things, such as killing unarmed prisoners or civilians, then no argument
about what will happen if one does not do them can show that doing them
would be all right. Absolutism does not, of course, require one to ignore the
consequences of ones acts. It operates as a limitation on utlitiarian
reasoning, not as a substitute for it. An absolutist can be expected to try to
maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not require him to
transgress an absolute prohibition like that against murder. But when such a conflict
occurs, the prohibition takes complete precedence over any consideration of
consequences. Some of the results of this view are clear enough. It requires us to forgo certain potentially useful
military measures, such as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to reduce the enemy
population by starvation, epidemic infectious diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means

we cannot deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the fact


that they will avert still greater evils, for as intentional measures they cannot be
justified in terms of any consequences whatever . Someone unfamiliar with the events of
this century might imagine that utilitarian arguments , or arguments of national interest, would
suffice to deter measures of this sort. But it has become evident that such
considerations are insufficient to prevent the adoption and employment of
enormous antipopulation weapons once their use is considered a serious
moral possibility. The same is true of the piecemeal wiping out of rural civilian
populations in airborne antiguerrilla warfare. Once the door is opened to calculations of
utility and national interest, the usual speculations about the future of
freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the
consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies .
that

Utilitarianism may be generally correct, but moral side constraints


are critical for the theory to workotherwise it violates its own
framework by descending into large-scale murder
NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 56)
In the final analysis, I believe that the dilemma cannot always be resolved. While not
every conflict between absolutism and utilitarianism creates an insoluble
dilemma, and while it seems to me certainly right to adhere to absolutist
restrictions unless the utilitarian considerations favoring violation are
overpoweringly weighty and extremely certain nevertheless, when that
special condition is met, it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist
position. What I shall offer, therefore, is a somewhat qualified defense of
absolutism. I believe it underlies a valid and fundamental type of moral
judgment which cannot be reduced to or overridden by other principles just
as fundamental, it is particularly important not to lose confidence in our

absolutist intuitions, for they are often the only barrier before the abyss of
utilitarian apologetics for large-scale murder.
The argument that survival outweighs sharing food relies on a
misunderstanding of moral agency and justifies infinite atrocities
because no such agent as the human species exists, we are
responsible only to individuals who are starving
WATSON 1977 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation,
p. 121-123)

it would seem
to be rational to place the right of survival of the species above that of
individuals. Unless the species survives, no individual will survive , and thus an
Given that the human species has rights as a fictional person on the analogy of corporate rights,

individuals right to life is subordinate to the species right to survival. If species survival depends on the unequal
distribution of food to maintain a healthy breeding stock, then it is morally right for some people to have plenty while
others starve. Only if there is enough food to nourish everyone well does it follow that food should be shared equally.

This might be true if corporate entities actually do have moral status and
moral rights. But obviously, the legal status of corporate entities as fictional
persons does not make them moral equals or superiors of actual human persons.
Legislators might profess astonishment that anyone would think that a corporate person is a person as people are, let
alone a moral person. However, because the legal rights of corporate entities are based on individual rights, and because
corporate entities are treated so much like persons, the transition is often made. Few theorists today would argue that the
state of the human species is a personal agent. But all this means is that idealism is dead in theory. Unfortunately, its

Corporate
entities are not persons as you and I are in the explicit sense that we are selfconscious agents and they are not. Corporate entities are not agents at all,
let alone moral agents. This is a good reason for not treating corporate entities even as fictional persons.
The distinction between people and other things , to generalize, is that people are
self-conscious agents, whereas things are not. The possession of rights essentially depends on
influence lives, so it is worth giving an argument to show that corporate entities are not real persons.

an entitys being self-conscious, i.e., on its actually being a person. If it is self-conscious, then it has a right to life. Selfconsciousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an entitys being a moral equal of human beings; moral
equality depends on the entitys also being a responsible moral agent as most human beings are.

A moral agent

must have the capacity to be responsible, i.e., the capacity to choose and to act freely with
respect to consequences that the agent does or can recognize and accept as its own choice and doing. Only a being who
knows himself as a person, and who can effect choices and accept consequences, is a responsible moral agent. On these

moral equality rests on the actuality of moral agency based on


reciprocal rights and responsibilities. One is responsible to something only if
it can be responsible in return. Thus, we have responsibilities to other people ,
grounds,

and they have reciprocal rights. If we care for things, it is because people have interests in them, not because things in
themselves impose responsibilities on us. That is, as stated early in this essay, morality essentially has to do with relations
among people, among persons. It is nonsense to talk of things that cannot be moral agents as having responsibilities;
consequently,

rights.

it is nonsense to talk of whatever is not actually a person as having

It is deceptive even to talk of legal rights of a corporate entity. Those rights (and reciprocal responsibilities)

The State or the


human species have no rights at all, let alone rights superior to those of individuals. The basic
reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the
milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true
that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However, although moral
behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of
morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that
peoples interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the
interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of
equity is morally superior to the principle of survival , we can conclude again that food
should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race .
actually pertain to individual human beings who have an interest in the corporate entity.

Is there no way to produce enough food to nourish everyone well? Besides cutting down to the minimum, people in the
West might quit feeding such nonhuman animals as cats and dogs. However, some people (e.g., Peter Singer) argue that
mere sentiencethe capacity to suffer painmeans that an animal is the moral equal of human beings. I argue that
because nonhuman animals are not moral agents, they do not share the rights of self-conscious responsible persons. And

considering the profligacy of nature, it is rational to argue that if nonhuman animals have any rights at all, they include
not the right to life, but merely the right to fight for life. In fact, if people in the West did not feed grain to cattle, sheep,
and hogs, a considerable amount of food would be freed for human consumption. Even then, there might not be enough
to nourish everyone. Let me remark that Stone and Singer attempt to break down the distinction between people on the
one hand, and certain things (corporate entities) and nonhuman animals on the other, out of moral concern. However,,

All over
the world, heirs of Gobineau, Goebbels, and Hitler practice genocide and otherwise
treat people as non-human animals and things in the name of the State . I am afraid that the
consequences of treating entities such as corporations and nonhuman animalsthat are not
moral agentsas persons with rights will not be that we will treat national
parks and chickens the way we treat people, but that we will have provided
support for those who would treat people the way we now treat nonhuman
animals and things. The benefits of modern society depend in no small part on the institution of corporate law.
there is another, profoundly antihumanitarian movement also attempting to break down the distinction.

Even if the majority of these benefits are to the goodof which I am by no means surethe legal fiction of corporate

reverence for
corporate entities leads to the spurious argument that the present world
imbalance of food and resources is morally justified in the name of the higher
rights of sovereign nations, or even of the human species, the survival of which is said to be more
important than the right of any individual to life. This conclusion is morally absurd . This is not,
personhood still elevates corporate needs above the needs of people. In the present context,

however, the fault of morality. We should share all food equally, at least until everyone is well-nourished. Besides food,
all the necessities of life should be shared, at least until everyone is adequately supplied with a humane minimum. The

we should share all food equally even if this means that


everyone starves and the human species becomes extinct . But, of course, the human
hard conclusion remains that

race would survive even equal sharing, for after enough people died, the remained could be well-nourished on the food

this grisly prospect does not show that anything is wrong with
the principle of equity. Instead, it shows that something is profoundly wrong
with the social institutions in which sharing the necessities of life equally is
impractical and irrational.
that remained. But

Utilitarianism does not apply to hungeraccepting


starvation undermines our status as moral actors
SHIELDS 1995

(David, research associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, The Color of
Hunger: Race and Hunger in National and International Perspective, p. 49)
One of the great myths about hunger is that it can be adequately studied objectively. In the academic halls of the great
universities, hunger, when it is not ignored, is turned into a topic, a problem to be investigated. It is subjected to
theoretical analysis, statistical manipulation, and policy review. Scientific papers are delivered at professional meetings,
dissertations are written, and careers are made in the study of hunger. In the corridors of government, hunger, when it is
not ignored, is turned into a topic for partisan debate. Politicians issue position statements, bureaucrats
shuffle papers and people, and technocrats design assistance programs like an architect designs a building. I am not

they fail to come to grips with the


most basic challenge posed by the existence of hunger. To genuinely know hunger, one
must break with the objectivist mode of knowing, returning to it only after
experiencing the subjective immediacy of hungers threat . Hunger is ugly and tragic.
The hungry person, simply by virtue of his or her existence, is a fundamental protest against
the moral integrity of our society and culture . More basic yet, the ravaged bodies of
the hungry call into question our own humanity. How can we claim full
personhood when we have allowed such a situation of massive suffering to go
uncorrected? Hunger cannot be studied objectively because our very soul is called into question by the
suggesting that these are entirely barren efforts, but by themselves

approaching victim of hunger. Until we are grasped in our innermost core by the wrenching protest of the walking death

until we are pulled into a struggle of solidarity and militant resistance, until
we are ready to burst with an anguished outcry of Stop, this cant go on!
then we cannot understand hunger. We misunderstand hunger when we turn the hungry person into
called hunger,

one more object of study.

The threat of extinction cannot outweigh morality


CALLAHAN 1973 (Daniel, institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its
evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner
of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of
individuals, including the right to life . The purported threat of Communist domination has for over
two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs.
During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy
was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to

The survival of the Aryan race was


one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the
government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid , heedless of the most
national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable.

elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the
name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has
been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for
the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival

In genetics, the
survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a
forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and
bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical
requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system.

efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a
normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than

in its holy name a


willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of
food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted populationcontrol policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over
against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no
imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake
of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is
to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and

easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about
their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its

my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for
survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would
ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The
potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely,
of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a
disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing .
enemies. But

We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic

if no other rights make


much sense without the premise of a right to lifethen how will it be possible
to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process,
destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival .
To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no
moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would
be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories .
to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and

Number of people killed is a bad ethical calculus


HOLT 2006 (Jim, frequent NYT contributor, Math Murders, New York Times, March 12)
Counting the dead is a paradoxical business. Suppose I told you that around 150 million people have died over
the last century in wars, genocides, man-made famines and other atrocities. This number might evoke in you a certain

only a wild guess. Its very vagueness lends it an air of


unreality. Yet what purpose would be served by making it more precise?
Where mass death is concerned, the moral significance of scale seems to be
one of those things that our brains aren't equipped to handle. A single life
may have infinite value, but the difference between a million deaths and a
million and one strikes us as negligible . The moral meaning of death counts is further obscured by
horror. But it is, of course,

their apparent lack of objectivity. Take the war in Iraq. How many Iraqi civilians have died as a consequence of the
American invasion? Supporters of the war say 30,000, a number that even President Bush finally brought himself to utter
late last year. Opponents of the war say more than 100,000. Surely there must be a fact of the matter. In practice, though,

competing methodologies and assumptions , all of which yield different


numbers. Even if we could put politics aside and agree on one, it would be hard to say what it meant. Does it matter,
there are only

for instance, that the higher estimate of 100,000 is the same order of magnitude as the number of Iraqi Kurds that
Saddam Hussein is reckoned to have killed in 1987 and 1988, in a genocidal campaign that, it has been claimed, justified
his forcible removal? ''It is painful to contemplate that despite our technologies of assurance and mathematics of

such a fundamental index of reality as numbers of the dead is a


nightmarish muddle,'' wrote Gil Elliot in his 1972 volume, ''The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead.'' Figuring
certainty,

out the number of man-caused deaths is rarely as straightforward as counting skulls in a mass grave. You can kill people
with bombs, guns and machetes, but there are also more indirect ways: causing them to die of starvation, say, or of
exposure or disease. (The disease need not be indirect -- witness the radiation victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) Of the
nearly two million Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge, for instance, perhaps half were executed outright. By contrast,
in the ongoing civil war in the Congo -- the deadliest conflict since World War II -- 2 percent of the estimated 3.9 million
victims have died of direct violence; the rest perished when their subsistence-level lives were disrupted by the war.

Quantifying man-made death thus means, at the very least, having an idea of the rate at
which people die naturally. And that entails recordkeeping. In 17th-century Europe, registers kept by
church parishes -- dates of baptisms, marriages and burials -- made it possible to gauge the devastation caused by the
Thirty Years' War, which was deadlier for civilians than for soldiers. The last century, strange to say, has not always

Even in the case of Nazi Germany, supposedly a


the Final Solution was so chaotic that the number
of victims can be known only to the nearest million . If our methodology of
counting man-made deaths is crude, our moral calculus for weighing the resulting
numbers is even cruder. Quantification, it is often thought, confers precision
and objectivity. Yet it tells us very little about comparative evil. We feel that
Hitler was every bit as evil as Stalin, even though Stalin was far more
successful in murdering people (in part because he had a longer run). Mao may have been
more successful still; in their recent book, ''Mao: The Unknown Story,'' Jung Chang and Jon Halliday estimate
matched this level of demographic sophistication.
model of efficiency, the implementation of

that the Chinese leader was responsible for ''well over 70 million deaths,'' which would come to nearly half of the total

In relative terms, however, Mao is easily


eclipsed by Pol Pot, who directed the killing of more than a quarter of his fellow Cambodians. Raw death
numbers may not be a reliable index of evil, but they still have value as a
guide to action. That, at least, is the common-sense view. It is also part of the ethical
theory known as utilitarianism, which holds that sacrificing x lives to save y lives is always justified as long as y is
number of man-made deaths in the 20th century.

greater than x. This utilitarian principle is often invoked, for example, in defense of President Truman's decision to drop
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed between 120,000 and 250,000 Japanese civilians, on the

Yet some thinkers (like the


have questioned whether, morally speaking,
numbers really count. In a choice between saving 5 lives and saving 10, they ask,
why should we be dutybound to act in behalf of the greater number?
Because, you say, it would be worse for 10 people to die than for 5 people.
They reply: Worse for whom? Arithmetic misleads us into thinking that deaths
aggregate the way numbers do. Yet in reality there are only individuals
suffering. In a dilemma where the deaths of one group of people or another is
unavoidable, why should someone have to die merely by reason of being in
the smaller group? This sort of skepticism about the significance of numbers has some perverse consequences.
It implies that all atrocities have an equal command on our moral attention, regardless of scale. Yet a refusal to
aggregate deaths can also be ethically salubrious. It helps us realize that the
evil of each additional death is in no way diluted by the number of deaths
that may have preceded it. The ongoing bloodbath in Darfur has, all agree, claimed an
enormous number of victims. Saying just how many is a methodological nightmare; a ballpark figure is a
quarter of a million, but estimates range up to 400,000 and beyond. Quantitatively, the new deaths
that each day brings are absorbed into this vast, indeterminate number.
Morally, they ought to be as urgent as those on the first day of the slaughter .
assumption that the death toll would have been worse had the war been prolonged.
British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe)

''What is the moral context in which we should see those killed by violence? There exists a view that one violent death has
the same moral value as a thousand or a million deaths. . . .

The killer cannot add to his sin by

committing more than one murder. However, every victim of murder would
claim, if he could, that his death had a separate moral value .'' Source: ''The Twentieth Century
Book of the Dead,'' by Gil Elliot (1972)

These ethical rules apply to states, not just individuals


NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 89-90)
Both of these sources of public morality generate limits to what a public official may do in
the conduct of his office, even if he is serving institutional interests. It is easy to forget about those
limits, for three reasons. First, restrictions against the use of public power for private gain can seem like a moral cushion

the fact that the holder of a


public office takes on an obligation to a particular group may foster the idea
that he is obliged not to consider anything except the interest of that group .
that insulates whatever else is done officially from moral reproach. Second,

Third, the impersonal morality of public institutions, and the moral specialization that inevitably arises given the
complexity of public actions, lead naturally to the establishment of many roles whose terms of reference are primarily
consequentialist. Lack of attention to the context that is necessary to make these roles legitimate can lead to a rejection
of all limits on the means thought to be justified by ever greater ends. I have argued that these are all errors. It is
important to remember that they are moral views: the opinion that in certain conditions a certain type of conduct is
permissible has to be criticized and defended by moral argument. Let me return finally to the individuals who occupy

Even if public morality is not substantively derivable from private, it


applies to individuals. If one of them takes on a public role , he accepts certain
limitations on what he may do. As with any obligation, this step involves a risk that he
will be required to act in ways incompatible with other obligations or
principles that he accepts. Sometimes he will have to act anyway. But sometimes, if he can remember them,
he will see that the limits imposed by public morality itself are being transgressed ,
and he is being asked to carry out a judicial murder or a war of unjust aggression. At this point there is no
substitute for refusal and, if possible, resistance. Despite the impersonal
character of public morality and its complex application to institutions in
which responsibility is partly absorbed by the moral defects of the institution
through which he acts; but the plausibility of that excuse is inversely proportional to
the power and independence of the actor . Unfortunately this is not reflected in our treatment of
public roles.

former public servants who have often done far worse than take bribes.

This is particularly true in the case of food

KENT 2005 (George, Freedom From Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food, p 1)
People have a right to adequate food, and to be free from hunger, as a matter of
international law. The right is articulated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights
of the Child; and several other international instruments. States and the
governments that represent them, and other parties as well, have obligations
to ensure that the right is realized. States that are parties to these
agreements have made a commitment to ensure the realization of the right .
War is particularly unpredictable
FONT AND RGIS 2006 (Joan Pere Plaza i Font UAB Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona Spain Dandoy
Rgis UCL University of Louvain Belgium Chaos Theory and its Application in Political Science IPSA AISP Congress
Fukuoka, 9 13 July 2006 http://www.sciencespo.site.ulb.ac.be/dossiers_membres/dandoy-regis/fichiers/dandoy-regispublication18.pdf)

doubts about
governments capacity to cause intended effects through strategy are
reinforced by the chaos theory, given the fact that the strategy results do not
follow plans. The complexity and the contingency preclude controlling causes
well enough to produce desired effects and little connection between the
design and the denouement of strategies is observed . The author stressed that, in this
Betts (2000) observed a useful application of chaos to strategy and international security. In his view,

small, untraceable events produce major changes ,


the butterfly effect characteristic. Chaos theory sees war as a nonlinear
system that produces erratic behaviour, through disproportionate
relationships between inputs and outputs or synergies, and in which the
whole is not equal to the sum of the parts (Beyerchen, 1992). However, Betts conceded that
case, the chaos theory emphasizes how
referring to

chaotic nonlinearity is common in war strategies, but neither absolute nor pervasive. If chaos theory meant that no
prediction is possible, there would be no point in any analysis of the conduct of the war (Betts, 2000: 20). Those who
criticize social science approaches to strategy for false confidence in predictability cannot rest on a rejection of prediction
altogether without negating all rationale for strategy. Finally, one should mention that the nonlinear perspective
misrepresents the structure of the problem as the military strategy seeks disequilibrium, a way to defeat the enemy
rather than to find a mutually acceptable price for exchange. More precise but still rhetorical examples of the application
of the chaos theory in the field of the international relations can be found in the example of the spontaneous and mass
revolutions as the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 that is considered a massive rupture of chaotic uncertainties and
bifurcations into unpredictable dynamical changes in a political system (Farazmand, 2003:341), similarly to the predictions

A single man Adolf Hilter was


considered as the butterflys wing that could cause the German system to
bifurcate from democracy to totalitarism (Peled, 2000:31). Similarly, the events of
September 2001 in the United States, the appearance of the Macedonian Alexander that ruled
the Persian Empire are assessed as good examples of how small scale chaotic events can
lead to large scale chaotic consequences with far reaching implications .
made on the post-castro environment in Cuba (Radu, 2000).

(Farazmand, 2003:353). But political scientists do not only use metaphors for describing political and IR phenomena. For

example, Saperstein (1988) studied empirically whether the development of SDI in the United States would lead to
a transition from an offensive to a defensive mode of strategy from ICBM attacks. His complex model appears to be

The outcomes of the system clearly show erratic


oscillations and predict an undesired escalation of risk of strategic
intercontinental nuclear war in the case of the development of SDI. They confirmed that, in the political
sensitive to noise and even chaotic.

science field, the transition from predictability to chaos in deterministic mathematical system is possible.

Contention Four: No Impact


Great power war is obsolete and small conflicts will not escalate
MANDELBAUM 1999 (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director,
Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Transcript: is Major War Obsolete? Transcript of debate with
John Mearsheimer, CFR,
Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there
are reasons to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I
mean war waged by the most powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted
period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the
wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been, their
consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history
which can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the
motor of political history for the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue,

this kind of war,

is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the
article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, Major war is obsolete in a way
that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present

Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or footbinding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that
demand for it.

now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once
regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have

costs have risen and


the benefits of major war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because
of the advent in the middle of this century of nuclear weapons, but they would have been high even had
mankind never split the atom. As for the benefits, these now seem, at least from the point of view of the major
powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare are in retreat, if not
extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone , probably not even Saddam Hussein after his
unhappy experience, as a paying proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major
wars have been waged in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the collapse of communism
made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst. Why is this so? Most simply, the

was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the

the ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own,


liberalism, tends to be pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War
developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of these is
the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion,
end of ideology; quite the contrary. But

this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one
another. I wouldnt go that far. I dont believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are
no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in
democracy. Now its true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the
structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John
Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the
moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to

a post-Cold War
innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The
Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms
limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know
what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of
defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military
forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack . Some caveats
defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that

are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. Its not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is
certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of
the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have
already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War

the novel distinction between the


powerful states and the less powerful ones . This was
previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article again, While for much
of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War,
with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China
international system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is
periphery and the core, between the

preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict into which


the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed. The great chess
game of international politics is finished, or at least suspended. A pawn is now just a
pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king .
No accidental wars and irrationality doesnt support their impact
MUELLER 2009 (John, prof of poli sci at Ohio State, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from
Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, p. 101)
Robert Jervis points out that "when

critics talk of the impact of irrationality


they imply that all such deviations will be in the direction of emotional
impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are terribly risky. But
irrationality could also lead a state to passive acquiescence." In
moments of high stress and threat, people can be said to have three
psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm and rational, (2) to refuse to
believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or (3) to panic, lashing out frantically and
incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways.
In her classic study of disaster behavior, Martha Wolfenstein
concludes, "The usual reaction is one of being unworried ."52
In addition, the historical record suggests that wars simply do not begin
by accident. In his extensive survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian
Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a single case in which it
can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war
broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geofrey Blainey, after

although many have discussed "accidental" or


"unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a war which on
investigation fits this description." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, " Despite
popular myths, large military units do not fight by accident ."33
similar study, very much agrees:

Embargo is the cause


The US caused the food crisis in Cuba- even before the
embargo US policies created dependence that structurally
decimated the country (read the right to food includes
domestic ability card)
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on
agrarian reform and director of overseas programs for Oxfam
America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba
today, Institute for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989,
11-24, jld)
Dependence on the United States
Up to now we have only hinted at what was a major stumbling block for Cubas
development: its extreme dependency on the United States. The Platt Amendment,
forced into the Cuban constitution in 1901 during U.S. military occupation, gave the United
States the right to intervene whenever it decided a government was
not adequate. The United States landed troops in Cuba in 1906, 1912, and 1917. Even alter the
Platt Amendment was eliminated from the constitution in 1934, the U.S. government
remained the dominant influence in internal Cuban politics, Until the
advent of Castro, the United States was so overwhelmingly influential that [ . . the American Ambassador
was the second most Important man in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the president Cuban

Much of the Cuban


economy was in the hands of U.S. companies and U.S. investments ran the gamut:
manufacturing, commerce, petroleum refining, agriculture, mining,
transportation, electricity, tourism. On the eve of the revolution, there were over one
dictator Batista], former Ambassador Farl E. T. Smith later testified.

billion dollars in U.S. corporate holdings In Cubaor one-eighth of the total U.S. investment in Latin
America, making Cuba second only to Venezuela. U.S. firms directly employed about 160,000 workers in
Cuba itself. Americans owned nine of Cubas ten largest sugar mills in 1955, produced 40 percent of the
islands sugar, and controlled 54 percent of the total grinding capacity. Cuban branches of U.S. banks
held almost a quarter of all bank deposits. The telephone service was a monopoly of American Telephone
and Tele graph. The U.S-owned Cuban Electric Company had a virtual monopoly on electric powerand
charged rates even higher than those in the United States. Standard Oil, Shell. and Texaco refined
imported crude ail. Procter and Gamble. Colgate-Palmolive, Firestone. Good1 Goodyear. Coca-Cola, PepsiCola, Canada Dry, and Orange Crus1 all had subsidiaries in Cuba. U.S. citizens, often connected to the
Mafia, also owned many of the islands hotels and ran the thriving gambling casinos and drug trade. A

relatively small group of American businessmen have In their grasp


vast economic power by the mere act of making business decisions,
declared a study of U.S. investments in Cuba on the eve of the revolution, Every year the U.S. Congress
made the single most important decision to the Cuban economythe quota of Cuban sugar that could

Over a 35
year period, Cuba exported about 60 percent of its sugar production
to the United States. Cubas economy was not only dependent on a
single crop but on a single customer. Cubas potential to produce
consumer goods for its own people was undercut by the U.S. sugar
quota. Cuba was granted preferred entry into the US. market for some of its sugar, its rum, and its leaf
tobacco; in exchange, Cuba had to open its doors to US. goods. Duties were abolished for
be imported into the U.S. market at the relatively high prices of tJ.S. domestic producers.

many U.S. goods and lowered on many more; internal taxes on


goods of U.S. origin were lowered or lifted; and quantity restrictions
on imports of US. goods were virtually eliminated. Restrictions on the
conversion of pesos into dollars were prohibited so that profits made on the Cuban market could readily be

Not only did an average of 80 percent of


Cubas imports come from a single trading partner, but the Cuban
economy also became totally dependent on imports . Every
conceivable type of goods was imported, noted OflC LIS, economist, from corn
taken home to the United States.5

flakes to tomato paste; from nails and tacks to tractors, trucks. and automobiles; from thread to all types
of clothing; from goods for Sears and other department stores to accessories for the home, fertilizers and
insecticides for agriculture, and materials and equipment for Industry and construction. A 1934

U.S. policy should actively


discourage Cubas agricultural diversification in order to maintain it
as a favorable market for U.S. foods and raw materials. But the subsequent
memorandum by liS. Secretary of State C4rdell Hull argued that

U.S. sugar quota system made active discouragement unnecessary for the realization of Hulls goal.

Enforced dependency on the United States gave rise to a number of


the ironies of underdevelopment that marked pre- revoluton Cuba .
An exporter of raw sugar, Cuba imported candy. Cuba exported
tomatoes but imported virtually all its tomato paste . Cuba exported fresh fruit
and imported canned fruit, exported rawhide but imported shoes. It produced vast quantities of tobacco
but imported cigarettes. (So many Ameri can brands were imported that in 1959, nine of Cubas twentyfour cigarette factories were not functioning. ) To add insult to injury, even Havana cigars were
increasingly manufactured in the United States; Cuba exported leaf tobacco as raw material for the US.
cigar companies that shifted manufacturing operations from Cuba to Florida in part because of high US.

Rather than develop Its productive


capabilities, investments shifted to nonproductive areas like
tourism, real estate, and import-export. Cuba became a market to be
milked for all it was worth. Little was invested in its future ; In fact,
tariffs on Cuban manufactured cigars.

between 1952 and 1958 there was a net disinvestment of $370 million and the per capita gross national
product declined. Under the US. quota system Cuba received a comparatively good price for its sugar
(though for only a part of its total production). But there was little prospect that Cubas share of the US.
market would grow. Indeed, throughout the l940s and 1950s, the amount of Cuban sugar purchased by the

the quota system undercut any


movement toward food self-reliance. More impor tant, the concentration of
control over the nations agricultural resources, as well as the
economy as a whole, prevented the creation of jobs that could have
meant food security for the hun dreds of thousands of poor Cuban
families.
United States consistently declined. At the same time,

The US created the condition for a food crisis- supply


cycles, sabotage, structural capacity
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on
agrarian reform and director of overseas programs for Oxfam
America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba
today, Institute for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989,
11-24, jld)
Supply Lags Behind Demand

But supply failed to keep pace with the growing demand. Overall
agricultural production was handicapped by the flight to the United
States of administrative and technical personnel, an elite unwilling
to adjust to the new changes. The consequent lack of organization
and technical experience on the newly created peoples (arms and cooperatives lowered
production. The Eisen howcr administrations 1960 embargo on most exports to Cuba seriously
disrupted the islands agriculture, which had become dependent on the United
States for farm machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and other
inputs. In addition, the Central Intel ligence Agency fostered acts of
sabotage, including burning fields and slaughtering cattle , Such
sabotage, as well as repeated military attacks culminating In the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961,
forced Cuba to divert scarce human and material re sources into
defense, exacting a toll on production. As if all nus were flot enough, a severe
drought in 1962 rurttier aggravated food production problems (See chapter 9 for further discussion of
production problems in the early years.) In a reversal of the pre- 19i9 pattern, shortages became more

Finding ever fewer consumer goods to


buy, especially imports from the United States, tenants and
sharecroppers had little need for cash and thus produced less for
the market. Consequently, there was less food In the cities. Viandas in
chronic in the cities than in the cournryside.

particular began disappearing from city marketplaces. Plantains (cooking bananas) were no longer trucked

Shortages
often triggered more shortages since the lack of one item meant
greater demand for others. By mid-1961. when taro, a usually abundant root crop, became
in daily to Havana bw consumed in the eastern provinces where they were grown.

scarce, people bought out sweet potatoes, putting pressure on the supply of white pota toes, and so on.
The disruption of normal imports further aggravated supply problems, As we discussed in chapter 1, Cuba
had bccome de pendent on the import of large quantities of foodwheat, rice, beans, lard, poultry, dairy

With over 70 percent of these imports


coming from the United States.2 the abrupt embargo on U.S. trade
with Cuba left the country in dire straits. Taicc the case of pork lard. While such an
products, and eggs. even onions and garlic.

example might seem odd, the fact is that Cuba consumed prodigious quantities of lard, importing about 85
percent of it from the United States.2 In a desperate search for substitute suppliers, the Cuban govern.
ment found to its dismay that not only were prices significantly higher elsewhere (partly due to steeper
transpon costs) but no where outside of the United States could enough lard be found On such short

Cuba as so chj to the


ports and Warehouses had been designed for frequent
short hauls by small ferryboats from florida and New Orleans. Once
those sources of SuPply were cut of, Cuba found itself ill-equipped
for trans oceanic trade.
notice!2 The U.S. embargo created a myriad of additional import prob. ems. Since
United States, its

The US blockade is responsible for rationing and


destruction of food choices in Cuba
Alvarez, 2k, University of Florida, Department of Food and Resource
Economics (Jose Alvarez Overview of Cuba's Food Rationing System
10/28/00 http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/cubanag/sugar.php) //NG

While many supporters of the Cuban regime blame the U.S. economic sanctions (that the Cubans refer to
as a blockade) against Cuba as the main culprit, almost all of the detractors place the burden on the
inefficiencies of the socialist system. Given the importance of this issue in terms of the hardships it has
represented to the population on the island for more than 40 years, the two points of view deserve careful
analysis. As stated above, for supporters of the Cuban regime, the United States is the culprit. The
following quote is very revealing because it blames the United States for the suffering of the Cuban people
under the rationing system, and because it states (for the first time, to our knowledge) the cost of
administering such a system:

As a consequence of the U.S.-imposed economic

blockade, Cuba was forced to establish a rationing system for basic


food and industrial products. This has brought serious limitations to
consumers and their choice availability. Since the establishment of the economic
blockade, consumers have had to adapt themselves to the limits of
quantity and of choice ofers that are available, instead of choosing
according to preference and custom. Cuba also had to establish a
whole Government-agency organization, called Consumer's Register Control
Office, to keep accurate records of consumers, quotas and ration
booklets all over the country. The operation of this control system results in an increase in
annual budget expenditures of 7,000,000 Cuban pesos, not including control expenditures over wholesale
and retail commerce, to ensure compliance with the established regulations (Len Cotayo, 1991, pp. 5960). Thus, the cost of administering the food rationing system around 1990 is set at seven million Cuban
pesos (around US$300,000), which must be larger now. At any rate, the figure represents a high monetary
price the Cubans have to pay to support a rationing system that has been in effect for more than 40 years.
In terms of the additional costs of the economic sanctions, the Cuban government has provided some
figures. For example, in an official report submitted to the United Nations, it is reported that, in the year
2000, Cuba had to pay an additional 38 million dollars to purchase food as a result of the price differentials
between the United States and alternative markets. In addition, the costs of financing around 63% of the
food imports in the same year demanded expenses greater than $50 million. Under normal conditions,
these expenses would not have been greater than $19 million (this information is contained in a report the
Cuban government sent to the United Nations on July 17, 2001, and placed on the La Nueva Cuba
website). The previous report was rebutted by a Cuban independent journalist (Espinosa Chepe, 2001).
According to him, Cuba devotes between $800 million and $900 million, more than 20% of its import
capacity, to the purchase of food that could be very easily produced in the country. Such purchases, which
do not satisfy the needs of the population, are made abroad as the result of the inefficiency that exists in
the agricultural sector. That state of affairs, he says, is not the result of any embargo but a consequence of
the commanding incompetence. There is no question about the unequivocal damage that U.S. economic
sanctions have had on the Cuban economy. However, they are far from being the main reason for the
current state of affairs. One has to distinguish between the Cuban economy in general and a rationing
system for basic food and industrial products as quoted above. To blame U.S. economic sanctions for the
existence of a rationing system of basic food products is not a very sound argument to justify Cuba's
socialist system. It is an admission that Cubans cannot even produce what grows very easily on Cuban soil.
If one lists the food products that have been rationed since 1962, it becomes evident that almost all of
them were in abundance before the 1959 revolution and were produced domestically. Granted, some

Cubans have been unable to consume a wide variety of food


products because of the high prices under the rationing system, but
there have been periods in which the abundance of several products
have demonstrated the feasibility of returning to a stable and ample
food supply. Examples include the proliferation of FrutiCub a (a chain of
government stores) which was devoted exclusively to selling fruits and
vegetables in the mid-1960s, free farmers' markets in the 1980s, the
free agricultural markets after 1994, and the new food outlets . These
testify to the ability of Cuban farmers to produce abundant food supplies despite U.S. economic sanctions.

Domestic production could do away with the food rationing system. It


is very relevant to recall that, when the Soviet bloc was subsidizing the Cuban economy to the tune of five
billion dollars per year, food was still rationed in Cuba.

Status quo ensures Cubans starve


Roman, 13 (Alexis Romay, Translating Cuba provides translation of Cuba

blogs 4/11/13 The Cuban Diet and the Politics of Hunger


http://translatingcuba.com/the-cuban-diet-and-the-politics-of-hunger-alexisromay/ )//NG
Today I didnt need my morning coffee. I woke up to a pair of articles about the
profound socio-economic crisis in Cuba, which became acute in the
early nineties with the collapse of the socialist bloc. What those champions of euphemism called
The Special Period. One of the articles, in Spanish, was published by that usually faithful friend of Cubas
Granma newspaper, El Pas, from Madrid; the other, in English, appeared in The Independent, from
London.

Both were based on a study published today by the British

Medical Journal. About what? Hunger. But not the infamy of starving a population.
Thats in poor taste. About hunger as a cure for obesity. The thesis that unites them is
simple: while we ate cabbage as appetizer, main course and dessert the
first person plural is intentional: I experienced this first-hand, we were doing a favor to the nutritionists
and cardiologists of the first world, who then would go around shouting to the four winds that the lower the
body weight, the lower the cardiovascular mortality. A textbook example in real life, declared a Spanish
scientist who wasnt part of the experiment, although what he really wanted to say is: they were dying

It turns out that when Cubans were fainting


on their bikes, or being overcome by polyneuritis a severe
inflammation of multiple nerves or simply dying from lack of food,
this was part of a long-range plan: to demonstrate to the British
Medical Journal, to the international press and to the world at
large that if you take food and transportation away from a population, the trouser sizes of men and
of hunger, but not of heart disease.

women will be drastically reduced. One cant but wonder why they dont also recommend trying bulimia
and anorexia. Although separated by language, both articles have in common a contempt for the Cuban

The Castro
brothers have not only created a theme park so that those who love far off utopia have an island as a
point of reference and place to visit; even before that, they have made Cuba into a giant
laboratory where every human being is a guinea pig.
people, and they remind one of the great achievements of tropical totalitarianism:

Current food sanctions are wreaking havoc on Cuba


Alternative Insight, 7 - presents articles on world issues, (The Politics
of Starvation: An Updated Survey July 2007
http://www.alternativeinsight.com/Politics_of_Starvation-Recent.html)//NG

The United States imposed an embargo against Cuba almost immediately after the 1960 Cuban revolution.

Forty plus years of embargo have not succeeded in accomplishing


the policies for which the United States claims it instituted the embargo compensation to U.S. firms nationalized by Cuba and the overthrow of the Castro regime. The only
result of the embargo has been deprivation of the unfortunate
Cuban people. Cuban expropriation of American property and its land
reform policies motivated the United States into decreasing Cuba's sugar
subsidy and implementing an embargo that intended to deny Cuba of spare parts for the U.S.
machinery that powered the Cuban economy. The Soviet Union aided Cuba in these
unfortunate years by purchasing sugar at inflated market prices and
forwarding strategic materials to the island. Cuba's alliance with the
Soviet Union strengthened Uncle Sam's determination to cripple
Cuba by the use of embargo. Although the reasons for the embargo faded with the years
and became totally unnecessary after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States'
determination to overthrow the Castro government increased its
economic warfare. In 1992, congress passed The Cuba Democracy
Act, which forbade United States subsidiaries to trade with Cuba and
deprived the island of $700 million in trade, 70% of which had been
in food and medicine. The Act also prohibited U.S. citizens to spend money in Cuba, but allowed
private groups to deliver food and medicine. Although the United Nations General Assembly on November
2, 1995, voted 117 to 3 to recommend an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba, President Clinton on
March 12, 1996 signed into law The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, otherwise known as The
Helms-Burton Act. This Act imposed penalties on foreign companies doing business in Cuba, permitted U.S.
citizens to sue foreign investors who make use of American-owned property seized by the Cuban
government and denied investors in Cuba all entry into the U.S. A tightened embargo reinforced Cuba's
suffering after Russia withdrew subsidies. The pre-90's Cuba has been credited with eliminating hunger
and malnutrition and wiping out infectious diseases. The World Health Organization (WHO) complimented

The American
Association for World Health and the American Public Health
Cuba for its public health system. Cuba of the mid-90's portrayed another image.

Association determined that the embargo caused significant


deterioration in Cuba's food production and health care :
Cuba was banned from purchasing nearly 1/2 of new drugs on the
market.
Physicians had access to only 890 medications, down from 1,300
in 1989.
Deterioration of water supply increased water borne diseases.
Daily caloric intake dropped by 33% between 1989 and 1993.
New Jersey Congressman Torricelli predicted that his Cuban Democracy Act
would bring Castro's downfall within one year. That did not happen.
Humanitarians, such as Congressman Torricelli, have been eager to take advantage of the sufferings of the
Cuban people for political purposes rather than affording the people a means to recover from their tragedy.

No alt causes The Cuban embargo is the biggest


contributor to starvation
Kirkpatrick 96, MD; 32 years of experience and practices in Anesthesiology - Pain Medicine;
(Anthony F. Kirkpatrick, November 30, 1996, The Lancet Role of the USA in shortage of food and medicine
in Cuba Vol. 348, Pg. 1491)//JES

This argument rings hollow. First, even if Cuba can buy food elsewhere,
the inclusion of food in the US trade embargo remains in violation of
international law. Second, a small amount of food is donated by US
organisations, 4.10 but that is a poor substitute for removing
provisions that prohibit its sale. Third, although Cuba can buy food
elsewhere, it must often pay higher transportation costs than would
be the case with the nearby USA. Fourth, in 1992, the US Government
ignored the warning of the American Public Health Association that
the tightening of the embargo would lead to an abrupt cessation of
supplies of food and medicine to Cuba resulting in widespread
famines.4 In fact, 5 months after the passage of the Act the worst
epidemic of neurological disease this century due to a food shortage
became widespread in Cuba.12 More than 50 000 of the 11 million
inhabitants were sufering from optic neuropathy, deafness, loss of
sensation and pain in the extremities, and a spinal disorder that
impaired walking and bladder control. 1113 Furthermore, as recently as
November, 1995, WHO reported more people with neurological
disease in Cuba due to malnutrition.14

Embargo causes food shortages in Cuba and increases


costs of medicine
Garfield 97 - the American game designer who created Magic: The Gathering; professor of

public health and nursing at Columbia University; visiting professor at the


London School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene in the U.K. and Karolinska
Institutet in Sweden (Richard Garfield, February 1 st 1997, The Lancet USA
and shortage of food and medicine in Cuba Volume 349, Issue 9048, Page
363 http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736%2805%2962871-1/fulltext)//JES
Kirkpatrick (Nov 30, p 1489)1 outlines the difficulties of economic
embargoes, which have been much used in hostile foreign policy

since the end of the Cold War. Although humanitarian exemptions to most
embargoes exist on paper, they are seldom observed. Most globalised
drugs, as Kirkpatrick points out, are available only from US sources.
More pervasively, transport and market dislocations cause increased
costs for all medicines that are purchased: in Cuba this is calculated
to be equivalent to a 30% surcharge than if there were no embargo.
US and Cuban-American groups claim that it is not the embargo but Cuba's
economic limitations that reduce access to medical supplies. If this were
the case, they would not demand on-site verification or prosecute
pharmaceutical companies that provide humanitarian goods to Cuba.
The burden of proof is not on Cuba that the embargo threatens
health and wellbeing. The chain of events that results in unnecessary
deaths is long and no so-called smoking gun may exist to prove an embargo
to be the sole cause. We did not wait for proof of deaths to act in the
embargo against the regime in Haiti. The USA provided food and medicines
for up to a quarter of all Haitians at the height of that embargo. If an embargo
is the right tool in the USA's fight against Cuba, then the USA should
demonstrate that it is doing everything possible to limit collateral effects
among the general population.

Even if food restrictions dont directly cause crisis Other


embargo aspects make them even worse
Garfield and Santana 97 professor of public health and nursing at
Columbia University.[1] He has been visiting professor at the London School
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene in the U.K. and Karolinska Institutet in
Sweden AND Sarah gets to write with the guy who made magic the gathering
(Richard Garfield & Sarah Santana, January 1997, American Journal of Public
Health, The Impact of the Economic Crisis and the US Embargo on Health in
Cuba Vol. 87, No. 1
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1380757/pdf/amjph005000017.pdf)//JES
We examined trends in health and health care in Cuba during the 1990s. Only changes in the
cost of medicine and the unavailability of medicines produced in the
United States can specifically be ascribed to the embargo. However,
there are temporal trends that further suggest that the embargo
contributes to increasing health threats and the decline of some
health indicators. While not the sole cause of these ills, the embargo
is shown to make the supply of essential goods more costly, more
difficult, and more time- consuming to procure and maintain.

The Cuban embargo is a has promoted sufering and


death for decades
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization,
and serves as the US. Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are to inform the American public about major health
challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote cooperative solutions
thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human
Services/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is
provided by the associations officers and board of directors (American Association for World Health,
March 1997, Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On The Health And Nutrition In
Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES

the American Association for World Health has


determined that the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed
the health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens.
As documented by the attached report, it is our expert medical opinion that the
U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in sufering-and even
deaths-in Cuba. For several decades the U.S. embargo has imposed significant financial burdens
After a year-long investigation,

on the Cuban health care system. But since 1992 the number of unmet medical needs patients going
without essential drugs or doctors performing medical procedures without adequate equipment-has

the U.S. trade


embargo-one of the most stringent embargoes of its kind,
prohibiting the sale of food and sharply restricting the sale of
medicines and medical equipment-was further tightened by the 1992
Cuban Democracy Act.
sharply accelerated. This trend is directly linked to the fact that in 1992

State key
The state is key to take action
Knnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 Rolf is the Human Rights Director
of FIAN International Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN
International (Rolf, Sandra, The Right to Food: A Resource Manual for NGOs,
AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Fulfilment-bound obligations require the state to take necessary
measures to guarantee deprived groups access to adequate food
and food-producing resources. Obligations to fulfil therefore come into
play in situations where individuals and/or communities lack adequate food
or food-producing resources. Part A dealt with people who are vulnerable because their access to food or

The
absence of hunger and malnutrition was identified as the core
content of the right to food. There is every reason to give them priority in the struggle for
the right to food. In most cases, hunger and malnutrition are the results of
povertynot of a general lack of food in a country or area. India, for example, the nation with the
resources is threatened. Part Be now enters the realm of the (already) hungry and malnourished.

largest number of malnourishedhas huge amounts of grain rotting in the godowns, because the starving
people next door cannot buy them. People could, of course, plant food for themselvesbut they lack the
resources: Land, inputs and an agrarian policies supporting small holder agriculture. Instead agribusiness
is about to displace even more peasant farmers. People could, of course, work to earn money. In most
countries, however, jobs providing a decent pay are lacking. Moreover, some people wont be able (or
should not be expected) to work even if they had the chance to do so (the elderly, children, labor-scarce
households)and therefore need transfers. This background is the reason why the following section deals
with income poverty much more than with the general availability of food. General availability of food is, of

there is more
than enough food available in generalbut not for the poor who lack the
land, the capital, the jobs and the state policies which would allow them to feed
themselves. Ultimately the human right to food includes guaranteeing
access to food for each person. For persons and groups who cannot
provide for themselves this implies a states obligation to provide
food orbetterincome which buys whatever is needed most, including food. The right to food
implies moreit implies providing access to land and other resources, and
it requires in addition facilitating policies so that people can make use of
these resources to feed themselves. Human rights are an individual concept. For this
matter judges must eventually be able to adjudicate to an individual
malnourished claimant access to food and resources and provide
immediate relief. This implies the existence of specific transfer programsin terms of land, work,
course, a human rights issue as well, but it is secondary in the current context, as

income and food. These programs are a necessary part of implementing the human right to food for the
largest and most severely affected vulnerable groupthe hundreds of millions of landless and jobless.

Considering the necessity and urgency of the task the state is under
an obligation to organize society-wide sharing of food and
resources.

Withholding food is morally intolerable


Pefer, 3 Professor in Philosophy from UC San Diego, PhD from University
of Arizona in Moral, Social and Political philosophy (Rodney, WORLD
HUNGER, MORAL THEORY, AND RADICAL RAWLSIANISM, Special Issue:
Topics in International Moral Theory, International Journal of Politics and
Ethics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2003)//HAL

Hunger, starvation, malnutrition, under-nutrition, and absolute


poverty are widespread phenomena on our planet. Recent estimates
are that, on average, each year about one million people (mostly children) starve
to death, about 10 million succumb to complications from severe
malnutrition or under-nutrition (often dying from infections easily warded off when not
malnourished or under-nourished), and some 1.2 billion people live in absolute
poverty (i.e. poverty so severe that their basic needs for adequate nutrition, potable water, minimally
decent housing and clothing, and basic health care and sanitation are not met on a continuing basis).

But, by all reliable accounts, there is presently more than enough food to
feed everyone on our planet and in almost all cases of large-scale
famine more than enough food to meet everyone's nutritional
needs in the very countries or areas sufering famine.i Yet people
continue to starve, to be malnourished, and otherwise to live in absolute poverty. This is
morally appalling - and intolerable.

The food restrictions on Cuba are an act of using food as a


weaponit is imperialistic
Fazzino, 10 - Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University
of Alaska Fairbanks. M.S., Sustainable Systems, Slippery Rock University,
December 1999; J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2007; and
Ph.D., Anthropology, University of Florida, 2008 (David V., WHOSE FOOD
SECURITY? CONFRONTING EXPANDING COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND THE
OBESITY AND DIABETES EPIDEMICS, Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 15
Drake J. Agric. L. 393, LexisNexis)//HAL
It's important for our nation to build--to grow foodstuffs, to feed our people. Can you imagine a country
that was unable to grow enough food to feed the people? It would be a nation that would be subject to

when we're talking about


American agriculture, we're really talking about a national security
issue. This concern over the relationship between food security and national security by the former
President is obvious, considering that the United States has utilized food as a
weapon; perhaps the most notable example is the embargo
on Cuba. n24 The Cuban embargo has forced individual families and
the Cuban government to make due with fewer ties to global circuits
of food production and distribution. n25 The embargo led to an
increase in the number of policies, programs, and measures to
enhance food security by relying on local and national food
production programs. n26 Similarly, the United States has been responsible for the imposition
international pressure. It would be a nation at risk. And so

of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 in Iraq, which imposes World Trade Organization-friendly
intellectual property rights, including limitations on the rights of farmers to use seeds from the previous
season's [*400] harvest. n27 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 could undermine food security for
farmers unable to afford required seed purchases if patented material is found among seeds which have

When the operational definitions of food


security are limited to measuring how much food is created and
distributed, then the United States emerges as a superior nation in
terms of its overall food security and food surpluses. n29 At the same time,
the relative inability of so-called less developed countries to meet
the caloric needs of their populace--due to chronic or acute
instability in environmental, economic or political sectors--is
described as vulnerability and reflective of their inferiority. n30 Those in
been saved from the previous season.

international development circles would also point to the poor transportation infrastructure in these less
developed countries, which limits the distribution of food to areas that may be in the greatest need of food

In the United States, the temporal unfolding of science


and technology is perceived as leading directly to the continual
emergence of progress. n32 Notions of this superiority are reflected in
the literature concerning food production and security where the
locus of food insecurity is consistently placed in the so-called less
developed world, while the United States occupies the role of
provider and breadbasket of the world. n33 The stated superiority of
the U.S. international agro-industrial complex is intimately
connected with economics and politics; it is a historically produced
discourse. n34
assistance. n31

Carrying capacity
Carrying capacity is fundamentally inaccurateproves life
boat ethics are morally wrong
Pefer, 3 Professor in Philosophy from UC San Diego, PhD from University
of Arizona in Moral, Social and Political philosophy (Rodney, WORLD
HUNGER, MORAL THEORY, AND RADICAL RAWLSIANISM, Special Issue:
Topics in International Moral Theory, International Journal of Politics and
Ethics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2003)//HAL
[1]Although "carrying capacity" is ambiguous, I believe that on any coherent rendering of the
concept it is demonstrably false that the earth has exceeded its carrying capacity or will do so
in the near future (barring some unforeseen catastrophe), as Garrett Hardin and other Neo-Malthusians

the most devastating argument against the NeoMalthusians' position, however, exposes a crucial blurring of a vital
distinction from which they illegitimately proceed to derive their
conclusion that wealthier countries ought not to aid starving people
in the poorest societies (since they have exceeded their "carrying
capacity"). As William Aiken has elegantly argued, the position often fails to distinguish between the
"biological limit" definition of this expression and the "socio-economic limit" definition. While there
is a strongly established and relatively clear "carrying capacity" thesis in population
dynamics theory within the discipline of biology, this cannot be directly extended
to the "carrying capacity" of humans since human survival and health
are vastly efected by the overall socio-economic arrangements
within which they live: from the local village or neighborhood to international social, economic,
contend.ii Perhaps

and political arrangements. As Aiken states: International purchasing power extends a nation's carrying
capacity because this is not a biological limit it is a complex social, economic and political limit. It is not
fixed by "nature" but by trade practices (for example, protective tariffs, currency exchange rates,
concessionary prices, multinational corporation interests, militarily motivated "loans") by the international
market in terms of who has what to sell (goods, resources, alliances), who wants to buy it, what price you
can get for what you have to sell, and by the influence of international interests on indigenous production
and distribution (for example, neo-colonialism with its emphasis upon the mass production of nonfood

If oil is discovered within its territory, the supposed limit


on population suddenly bolts upward to whatever extent the oil
reserves last. A nation's carrying capacity is a by-product of the
market [or other prevailing economic arrangements] nothing more. It is never merely a
biological limit.iv Moreover, as Amartya Sen and others have demonstrated, it is hardly ever the
export crops).iii

case that mass starvation occurs from a literal lack of food within particular societies. v As they argue,

famines and starvations are not the consequence of lack of food but
of lack of social entitlements to food; i.e. the lack of an adequate entitlement system
to adequate nutrition. In fact, many countries have actually exported significant
amounts of food during the very periods in which starvation was
occurring.vi These facts are extremely important since they disprove Hardin's
argument that we on this planet are now in a "lifeboat" situation and
that "lifeboat ethics" permits (or even requires) those who are fortunate
enough to be in the lifeboats i.e. those in the wealthy countries (or, more accurately, the
wealthy wherever they may live) not to aid the starving, especially the starving
in the worst-of nations.

Providing food is an a-priori integration of food ethics


into politics is necessary to move towards a world worth
living in
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He
has published widely in the fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey Centre
for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth Chadwick Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central
Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for
Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb Ghebremeskel
studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry
at the University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle
upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977
he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy
at Sussex University. Food Ethics 1996)//NG

It is hardly a matter of contention that there are ethical issues


related to food. We all need food, in adequate quantity and of adequate
quality, to survive and maintain health. The fact that millions of people in
the world are severely malnourished, often to the point of starvation, while
others devote substantial time and efort to losing weight by dieting, is
evidence enough that something is awry with the ethics of food
provisioning. But ethical concerns are by no means confined to such striking examples of injustice.
The production of food in modern agricultural practice often has damaging effects on the environment, in
terms of soil erosion, chemical pollution and loss of species. The exploitation of animals for food is thought
by some to be ethically unacceptable under any conditions and by others to seriously infringe their welfare
when animals are reared in intensive systems. Food production, processing and marketing also have
significant effects on its safety for human consumption, and such concerns are compounded by the

Food is so basic a
human need that it readily becomes the focus or means of
expression of a whole range of other human concerns, both
beneficent and maleficent. Thus, food habits serve both to strengthen
cultural bonds and to emphasize intercultural diferences: food
supply is an important element of foreign aid, but trade in food can
also be a means of subordination, or even a weapon of war. Food is
essential to the sustenance of life, but it can be a source of disease
and death. The underlying assumption motivating the compilation of this collection of essays is that
adoption of modem biotechnologies which offend the public sense of propriety.

the interrelatedness of such concerns and their centrality to human well-being merits the promotion of an

Consideration of
'food ethics` might thus promote more appropriate ways of thinking
about human well-being and autonomy, and facilitate the practical
and political changes which need to be introduced if we are not only
to achieve a more just global society, but indeed if we are to hand
onto our successors a world which is worth inheriting . Each of the chapter
interdisciplinary approach to food which has an explicitly normative objective.

authors has addressed his subject by first identifying the social, economic or scientific issues and then
proceeding to analyse their ethical dimensions. (The absence of women authors is incidental: none of
those invited to contribute was able to accept.) All authors have concluded their chapters with suggestions
for changes in line with the ethical principles discussed. Readers are not. However, presented with a set of
codes of ethical practice'. Rather, they are encouraged to reflect on the ethical implications of those
aspects of the food industry with which they are most directly concerned, and with their relationships to
other aspects of the food chain, with a view to informing sound ethical judgements. Ethics can be
considered at several levels, from abstruse meta-ethical theory, at one extreme, to codes of practice, at
the other. The aim here is to occupy the middle ground in which ethical theory is applied to practical
concerns: but such insights need to be interpreted more explicitly in the contexts of professional practice.
Nigel Dower considers the question of global hunger from the perspective of people in Western developed

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation) predictions that by


2010 AD chronic malnutrition will continue to afflict over 600 million
people. The persistence of hunger presents a major moral challenge
not only because it undermines human welfare and dignity, but
countries, and in the light of

because its existence is clearly avoidable. Dower examines several


theories of obligation , each of which supports the claim that we have a moral duty to
ameliorate world hunger. However, as indicated by John Marsh, the ways in which we address that task are

Food trade, being perceived as a largely selfserving activity, might seem to be ethically less worthy than
provision of aid, which ostensibly expresses altruistic motives . In
practice, the complications of both aid and trade undermine this simple
distinction and imply that there is need for close analysis of the
motives and efects of both, if we are to make progress in the
alleviation of world hunger.
by no means unproblematical.

Starvation is inevitable but we have an obligation to act


the 1ACs public sharing of values creates moral
education
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He
has published widely in the fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey Centre
for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth Chadwick Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central
Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for
Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb Ghebremeskel
studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry
at the University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle
upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977
he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy
at Sussex University. Food Ethics 1996)//NG

prediction was made that in 2010 AD chronic


malnutrition in the 93 developing countries would afflict about 637
million people. This was seen as an improvement on the figure of 781 million in 1988/9 (and 941
million in 1969/71). It is, in fact, a quite shocking statistic. It represents an awful lot of people
At a recent conference, the

who in the next fifteen years will be malnourished or starving, many dying prematurely of these causes.

We have to ask ourselves the following question: if this level of


malnutrition remains in fifteen years time, will it be there because
we cannot avoid it, or because we allow it to continue? To put it in away

reminiscent of Augustine`s question about God and the existence of evil in the world: will it exist because
we cannot prevent it or because we will not prevent it? By will here I do not mean deliberately aim at, of
course, but more modestly *allow to happen because of policies which we know have unwanted but

I am not saying that all poverty and hunger in the


future could be prevented. But insofar as the trends in the future
depend upon earlier decisions-individual, institutional, political-we
have to ask: could those decisions have been diferent so that there
would have been less hunger? If they could have been, should they
have been? In this chapter, I suggest that the prediction above relies on an unduly pessimistic
preventable consequences`.

assessment of the possibility of generous human motivation. Delegates at the United Nations Summit in
Copenhagen (March l995) on "social development` agreed, since they adopted a ten-year plan to meet
the basic needs of virtually every human being on earth. The prediction is based on a number of
assumptions-about food production, new methods of agriculture, new areas of co-operation, inputs from
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and levels of giving by private individuals. Reductions in global
hunger will certainly be seen as the goal of many agents, for example, food scientists and aid officials, but
also the general outcome of other developments, economic and technological. The key question to be
asked is: in addition to the efforts already being made to reduce world hunger, and assumed in the
prediction, by governments, agencies, international bodies, NGOs and concerned individuals, could

much more
could be done and given that it could be done, ought to be done,
Governments, international organisations and businesses could do a lot more. But,
significantly more be done to bring about further reductions? I want to argue that

beyond a small but significant degree of latitude within which officials can work, what they can do depends
upon certain conditions.

International organisations could make

hunger/poverty reduction an even higher priority in their activities if


governments agreed that they should. Governments could do a lot
more if their citizens wanted them to do so. Business companies could do a lot
more (for example. to make sure that their economic activities did not causes poverty or hunger) if those
they are answerable to-their shareholders-determined that they should do so, and consumers of their

Can people, then, act in ways that


will improve on the prediction above? I suggest that they can. because the
prediction is based on the premise that, whatever eforts are
currently envisaged for reducing hunger, there is a continued
commitment to affluence in the North. i.e. in the rich countries of the
world, and thus to levels and kinds of aid programme consistent
with this commitment. But if people were to accept the following three propositions, then there
could be significant action (beyond that assumed in the prediction).3 The three propositions
are:
that as moral beings we have significant duties to help other
people who sufer:
that hunger is a particularly extreme form of sufering; and
that we should see the scope of our obligations as global.
This chapter defends these three propositions. But, it may be thought, almost everyone
already accepts all three, and as a result of this a certain amount is done and supported, as
indicated above. This, however, is questionable. First, to the extent that we
accept them, we may still for a variety of reasons show moral
weakness and do nothing or very little. Whatever theorists may say about the nature
and reality of "free will`, there is an obvious sense in which people choose whether to act
morally or to act otherwise, out of self-interest or immediate
inclination. Second, we may not have fully grasped the implications of
our moral ideas. And this is partly why an explicit enquiry such as
this is of use in sharpening our understanding. Both moral motivation
and moral understanding are, in any case, strengthened by reciprocity, solidarity
and publicly shared values. Third, there are a significant number of
thinkers who do not accept one or other of the propositions, who reject or
marginalise the duty to help others, who do not see hunger as of
particular moral importance, or who deny the global scope of our
obligations. Whether we see such views as false or as merely unacceptable, the point remains that
if such thinkers were persuaded otherwise, the potentiality for
action would be much improved. The practical importance of moral
education for global citizenship needs to be recognized, not just
because of global poverty but because of the need for peace and sustained
environmental protection.
products sent signals by their consumer preferences.

Starvation dehumanizes
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He
has published widely in the fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey Centre
for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth Chadwick Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central
Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for
Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb Ghebremeskel
studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry
at the University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle
upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977
he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy
at Sussex University. Food Ethics 1996)//NG

Before we look directly at the question of why we ought to do something


about hunger, we need to consider a prior question: what is it about
hunger which makes it a bad state of affairs to be in? The evils of
hunger We can identify the following factors, all of which are bad. Hunger
involves physical pain and sufering, loss of vitality and energy, lack
of health in the body, in particular current illnesses and diseases,
and a proneness to these conditions. It leads to maldevelopment,
physically and mentally, especially in children, early death, directly
or via diseases and illness or greater proneness to accidents, loss (or
lack) of control over ones life to a high degree, plus associated
feelings of helplessness. Because of its primacy in terms of the need to
avoid hunger, it involves an extreme form of poverty through lack of
resources for pursuing meaningful activities in life. It involves loss/
lack of dignity/self-respect.

Hunger is a unique form of sufering the fact that its


avoidable and a pre-requisite to wellbeing makes it a
moral imperative
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He
has published widely in the fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey Centre
for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth Chadwick Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central
Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for
Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb Ghebremeskel
studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry
at the University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle
upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977
he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy
at Sussex University. Food Ethics 1996)//NG
Reasons for the special status of alleviating hunger

hunger has a special moral status.


the
combination gives it a special status so far as the normal setting of priorities for action
ought to be concerned. First, if people are hungry, they are in a condition
which undermines the possibility, or at least the likelihood, of their achieving
other aspects of human well-being; that is, not being hungry is one of
the preconditions (normally) of achieving other aspects of human well-beingenjoyable activities, control, relatively little sufering and the
exercise of choices. Second, there is an important sense in which the evil of
hunger is more readily avoidable than most other evils. If a person is
hungry because he or she does not have access to food, it only takes
others to provide it. Except for famine situations lifeboat scarcity situations or other forms of
isolation, it takes only the intervention of others who are aware of the
situation to enable a person to have food. Within a community where there is
enough food for all, and an awareness of who is or may be going hungry, the
evil of hunger can be alleviated by the actions of others: indeed in most
Two kinds of reason may be given for saying that

Neither, on its own, shows hunger to be uniquely different from other kinds of evil, but

societies in the past, which by modern standards were not materially affluent, that at least would have

The irony is
that in the modern world, with our extensive knowledge of global
hunger, our extensive communication and transportation systems
and the existence of food surpluses, we do not seem to be able to
replicate the practices of past smaller societies of at least trying to
ensure that everyone has enough of the one crucial thing it is in the
been done, however much uncontrollable diseases may have afflicted and killed many.

power of others to providenamely food. It is as though we have the


technical ability to do so, but lack the psychological and institutional capacities. This is, of
course, an over-simplification, but it suggests that there are two related factors which are missing. We
do not see ourselves morally as a global community or society in
which those who are well-of have at least a minimum commitment
to ensure, as far as is possible, that all have access to this precondition of
human well-beingadequate food. Second, the reason why we are psychologically and
institutionally unable to meet the challenge is because most of us are not sufficiently persuaded by a

What we need is a global


ethic which spells out the idea that we have serious obligations
towards all other human beings, obligations which cross societal and
national frontiers.7
moral vision that tells us that this is really a pressing thing to do.

Starvation decimates agency


Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He
has published widely in the fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey Centre
for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth Chadwick Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central
Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for
Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb Ghebremeskel
studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry
at the University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle
upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977
he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy
at Sussex University. Food Ethics 1996)//NG

hunger
and extreme poverty undermine the proper development and
exercise of rational agency.8 They do so because the very poor are often
subject to coercion and deception (which fails to respect their
rational agency) and more generally because extreme poverty deprives the
poor of real autonomy. This requires us as moral beings to respect
the poor as fellow rational agents in two ways: first, we must not
deceive or coerce them, or be beneficiaries of others (such as multi-national
companies) who deceive or coerce them, and we must take action to
prevent such coercion and deception (via, for example. political action). Second.
we must act so as to enable the poor to develop and exercise their
rational autonomy by appropriate action (political as well as
individual acts of helping) this is what is required by material justice. The difficulty with
this appealing position is that it locates the evil of hunger in the lack or loss of rational agency. Now this
is clearly an important part of what hunger does to the poor (a part
often neglected), but it is equally distorting to omit mention of the
sheer physical sufering, disease, physical malfunctioning and
disability, which are themselves also inherently evil.
Onora ONeill has presented a modern Kantian approach which can be summed up as follows:

Food is a fundamental right and restriction of food is


immoral
Islam, 81 Associate Professor at the Faculty of Administration, University
of Ottawa (Nasir, Food Aid: Conscience, Morality, and Politics, :
International Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Food and Fuel (Spring, 1981), pp. 353370, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40201960)//HAL

starving people (particularly in distant lands) have a moral right to


food and whether the rich have a moral obligation to provide it are very complex questions. The
Whether

literature on the moral aspects of food scarcity tends to be vague, confusing, and often rhetorical. The
fundamental problem as posed by Regan applies as well to food aid decisions: what are the correct moral
principles which might guide the decisions (or actions) of free, rational beings?8 The question has
preoccupied philosophers and moralists since the dawn of civilization, and it is not possible to deal with it
here in any truly satisfactory manner. At the risk of being overly simplistic, however, it could be said that
this fundamental question of normative ethics has been dealt with from two basically different
philosophical approaches: the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist. The former, which is also
called the technological approach, emphasizes the results of an action and regards an action to be wrong
only if its consequences are wrong or harmful to someone. There are at least three types of technological
ethical theories: ethical egoism in which the only consequences that should be taken into consideration
are those for the actor himself; ethical altruism where moral right or wrong depends on consequences to
others (not the actor); and utilitarianism where the consequences to everyone concerned are the
determinant of a moral act. The utilitarian principle calls for the greatest pos- sible balance of intrinsic
good over intrinsic evil for everyone concerned.9 Non-consequentialist theories are often referred to as

moral right or wrong is


not determined solely by results or consequences. Adherents of these theories
point out that the consequentialist approach does not deal with injustice the wrong done to the individual (or a particular group) - in putting emphasis on the
deontological because they emphasize duty (deon). They state that

balance of intrinsic good as compared to intrinsic evil. Many deontologists, following Kant, have argued

when someone is treated as a means and not an end, injustice is


being done. Others simply be- lieve that injustice involves violation of basic moral rights. Moral
that

rights are distinguished from legal rights in terms of their univer- sality, inalienability, and equality. Laws
may be unjust, consequent- ly legal justice (enforcement of laws) is different from moral justice. Different
concepts or rights, for example, rights as entitlements or claims, imply a justified constraint upon how
others may act.10 Freedom from hunger is frequently regarded as a basic moral right which is not derived

'Food is the most


fundamental human need. Its availability to all persons is a basic
tenet of civilization/ Nick Eberstadt maintains that freedom from hunger is
essential for global food security. It must therefore be considered as
the most basic of human rights. Although the consequent alleviation of hunger may give
from any other moral principle. A World Food Council document declares:

some satisfaction to the donors, it must be considered as an altruistic act without its reinforcing consequences. According to William Aiken, dire needs create rights. Involuntary deprivation must be
mitigated particularly when the means to do so are available. This right may only be denied if the costs

no other rights can exist prior to freedom


from hunger. Starving people cannot think of any other rights and
duties.11 The affluent also have rights. They have a right to pursue their own goals and not provide
are unreasonable. It is evident that

aid. Aiken responds that the duty to benevolence is overriding, and consequently the right of the starving to be aided takes precedence. Even if failing to help does not violate the right of the starving the
affluent are obligated to do so.12 This emphasis on rights alone sometimes appears to be rather

People tend to ignore that rights entail duties and


obligations. When rights are violated, conscience becomes
indignant, but the duties and responsibilities which must be fulfilled
to alleviate the conditions that lead to violation of rights are
forgotten. Humanity does not have a good record of respecting moral rights. The mere
misplaced.

establishment of freedom from starvation as a moral right without any mechanism of enforcement will
not, in my opinion, help the starving people. Because moral rights, even if established, are difficult to enforce, some writers have focussed on the moral obligations of the affluent to the starving poor.

The af is a prerequisite to any impactfood distribution


comes prior to survival
Watson, 77 - Professor of Philosophy @ Washington U, PhD from
University of Iowa (Richard, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118119)//HAL

food sufficient for well-nourished


survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a
specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to
the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is
primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral
principle is of human equity per se. Consequently, the moral action is to distribute all
food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by
such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomskybut then, morality is hard. The conclusion
may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously
moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of
moralityif taken seriouslysupersede those of conflicting reason. One may
These arguments are morally spurious. That

even have to sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would
preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even

if one is to
be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if
everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save ones life is
no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to
be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to
when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly,

save ones life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake
of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world
contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the
highest principlerecant or dieand it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets
rough. I have put aside many questions of detailsuch as the mechanical problems of distributing food

If every human life is equal in


value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an
extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to
because detail does not alter the stark conclusion.

override the excuse that by doing it one would lose ones life. But many people cannot accept the view
that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then
there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the
principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally
higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of
food to save a nationfor nations can come and goone might well argue that unequal distribution is
necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large groupsay one-third of present world
populationshould be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an individual standpoint,

the human specieslike the nationis of no moral relevance. From a


naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpointas indicated
abovesurvival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is
immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of
individual behavior.

Food key to VTL


Knnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 Rolf is the Human Rights Director

of FIAN International Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN


International (Rolf, Sandra, The Right to Food: A Resource Manual for NGOs,
AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Lack of access to adequate food is one of the most fundamental
forms of human deprivation. An individual can survive its worst formthe complete lack of
foodfor only a few weeks. In the case of lack of water, death will occur within a few days. Providing
oneself with access to food has therefore always been one of the most fundamental human activities.

Secure access to adequate food and food-producing resources is a


basic standard to which every human being is entitled . Hunger and
malnutrition are the worst forms of severe food deprivation. There are
less extreme forms as well. Consuming food that is inadequate food in quantity or quality can ruin ones

health and lead to premature death.

Inadequate food makes people unhappy, and

unable to lead active and fruitful lives. Food, moreover, is a source of pleasure. No wonder
most people want not just food, but also good food. They want secure and sustainable access to this food
to protect them from the horrifying prospect of hunger and food borne diseases. Access to food on a
strictly individual basis, as was the case for Robinson Crusoe, alone on his desert island, is something that
almost never happens. This is an individualistic myth celebrating the self-made man, who, in reality,

Access to food is part of


the life of ones family, group, community, society, and state, and of
global society and the community of states. Therefore, there is always a lot of
consumes the products of current society and earlier generations.

interference with the food and food-producing resources of other people.

Willingly withholding food is oppressionit kills individual


liberty
Knnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 Rolf is the Human Rights Director

of FIAN International Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN


International (Rolf, Sandra, The Right to Food: A Resource Manual for NGOs,
AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
On the one hand people co-operate and assist one another to obtain access to food and food-producing
resources. On the other hand there is negative interference when people are in competition to feed

In the worst case some people or groups push others into


food deprivation or keep them there: This is a form of food-related
oppression. Control over the access to food and food-producing
resources of other people and peoples is one of the most
fundamental sources of power over them. For an act to be called
oppressive, however, it is not necessary that deprivation be its
purpose. It is sufficient that the actors could reasonably be expected
to foresee the resulting deprivation and could have known that
deprivation was the likely result or by-product . People experience
food-related oppression diferently from food deprivation, which
results from natural calamities or resource limitations . Deprivation that is
themselves.

free of oppression does not necessarily affect peoples dignity. This usually not the case for food-related

Freedom refers to the


absence of oppressionand, in the context of this manual, it means
the absence of foodrelated oppression. Oppression refers to pushing people down to
oppression. Oppression is usually experienced as demeaning.

a point below the minimum human standard and/or keeping them there. Food-related oppression therefore
comes in two different categories. The first category entails concerns acts that destroy peoples access to
food or food-producing resources. The second category refers to acts or omissions that keep people
excluded from food or food-producing resources. These two forms of food-related oppression are described
in the sections that follow.

The rich and powerful continue to suppress food


destroying libertythe DA is an excuse for continued
oppression
Knnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 Rolf is the Human Rights Director
of FIAN International Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN
International (Rolf, Sandra, The Right to Food: A Resource Manual for NGOs,
AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Many people in the South, and also to some extent in the North, continually lack
access to food and foodproducing resources. Their access to adequate food and

To satisfy their food


needs, they require access to the food available within the society
as a whole. Beyond that, they need to be able to access food-producing resources, in the form of
natural resources, capital, and skills, in order to feed themselves. For people living in
hunger and destitution, or forced to consume unhealthy or otherwise
inadequate food, this is one of the most essential freedoms. The
freedom of the hungry and malnourished and other deprived people
to gain access to food and food-producing resources is all too often
rejected and suppressed by the rich and powerful. Usually this is done
in the name of efficiency, productivity, development and growth.
resources cannot be destroyed because it does not exist in the first place.

Resources which would allow people to feed themselves are withheld from them, using the argument that
poor and deprived people make inefficient use of these resources, and that granting them this access such

Excluding
deprived people from the freedom to access food and resources
existing elsewhere in society is an act of oppressionit means
keeping them in a state of deprivation.
moves would lower the overall productivity of society, and slow down growth.

A utopian view of food ethics generates political


innovation
Meinhardt and Ingensiep, 10 (Marc, Hans Werner, Food
Ethics -Food Ethics in a Globalized World Reality and Utopia,
April 15, 2010, pgs 1-14, SpringerLink, jld)
it is obvious that we need something like an utopian
view concerning global food problems. The word utopia leaves a bitter taste in a
world of around a billion starving people. It is time to remember that utopias were and still
are timeless generators for future societies. Utopia delivers political
innovation and ethical impulses for reflection. Therefore, in the second part of this
On the other hand

contribution we will review some utopian seeds and dreams by authors stretching from the past to the

contributions enable heuristic comparisons for students


and experts and allow constructive criticisms based on real facts . The
present. Their

third part gives a short reflection on the special problem of justice from a modern philosophical point of
view. But now we introduce with a summary of the contributions to this book into the wide field of real
problems in Food Ethics in a globalized world.

The right to food is distinct from being fed


Hirsch et al., 10 (Armin Paasch, Frank Garbers, and Thomas
Hirsch, Food Ethics- Agricultural Trade and the Human Right to
Food: The Case of Small Rice Producers in Ghana, Honduras, and
Indonesia, April 15, 2010, pgs 119-135, SpringerLink, jld)
Access to adequate food is a basic human right for every person . It is
enshrined in article 25 of the General Declaration of Human Rights and article 11 of the International

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UN 1976). The right to food,
according to the authoritative interpretation of the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

is not to be inter- preted in the narrow sense of being fed, but


rather means access at all times physical and economic to
adequate food and the ability to procure it. Food must be
adequate in terms of quantity and quality, as well as being culturally
accept- able. And the enjoyment of the right to food must not threaten
(CESCR),

the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs such as


health, housing, and education (UN 1999).

Food Ethics

Bad
Food ethics invite moral regression to the point of
absurdity endangering all of humanity
Hardin, 74 received a B.S. in zoology from the University of Chicago in

1936 and a PhD in microbiology from Stanford University in 1941. Moving to


the University of California, Santa Barbara in 1946, he served there as
Professor of Human Ecology from 1963 (Garret Hardin, 1974, "Lifeboat Ethics:
the Case Against Helping the Poor" pgs. 86-76)//JES
Clearly, the concept of pure justice produces an infinite regression to
absurdity. Centuries ago, wise men invented statutes of limitations to
justify the rejection of such pure justice, in the interest of
preventing continual disorder. The law zealously defends property rights, but only
relatively recent property rights. Drawing a line after an arbitrary time has
elapsed may be unjust, but the alternatives are worse. We are all the
descendants of thieves, and the world's resources are inequitably
distributed. But we must begin the journey to tomorrow from the point where we are today. We
cannot remake the past. We cannot safely divide the wealth equitably among
all peoples so long as people reproduce at diferent rates. To do so
would guarantee that our grandchildren and everyone else's
grandchildren, would have only a ruined world to inhabit. To be generous
with one's own possessions is quite different from being generous with those of posterity. We should
call this point to the attention of those who from a commendable
love of justice and equality, would institute a system of the
commons, either in the form of a world food bank, or of unrestricted
immigration. We must convince them if we wish to save at least
some parts of the world from environmental ruin.

Single Instances bad


Single instances of ethical action only serve to satisfy
guilt-addicts while reducing the need to change the ethics
of the environment
Hardin, 74 received a B.S. in zoology from the University of Chicago in
1936 and a PhD in microbiology from Stanford University in 1941. Moving to
the University of California, Santa Barbara in 1946, he served there as
Professor of Human Ecology from 1963 (Garret Hardin, 1974, "Lifeboat Ethics:
the Case Against Helping the Poor" pgs. 86-76)//JES
I feel guilty about my good luck, say some. The reply to this is simple: Get out and
yield your place to others. Such a selfless action might satisfy the
conscience of those who are addicted to guilt but it would not
change the ethics of the lifeboat. The needy person to whom a guiltaddict yields his place will not himself feel guilt about his sudden
good luck. (If he did he would not climb aboard.) The net result of consciencestricken people relinquishing their unjustly held positions is the
elimination of their kind of conscience from the lifeboat. The
lifeboat, as it were, purifies itself of guilt. The ethics of the lifeboat,
persist, unchanged by the momentary aberrations.

i See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, Hunger and Public Action
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, The Political Economy of
Hunger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and Frances Moore Lappe, et al., World Hunger:
Twelve Myths, 2nd ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1998).
ii See Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," in William
Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op. cit. and "Carrying
Capacity as an Ethical Concept," in George Lucas and Thomas Olgetree (eds.), The Moral
Dilemmas of World Hunger (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
iii William Aiken, "The 'Carrying Capacity' Equivocation," in William Aiken and Hugh
LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
iv Ibid., p. 20.
v See the works cited in n. 1, especially Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, op. cit.,
pp. 160-188.
vi See Sen, Poverty and Famines, op cit., p. 161 on Bangladesh's exports during the 1973
famine and pp.131-153 for his analysis of that famine which, among other things, notes
that the United States stopped food aid shipments to Bangladesh on the grounds that
Bangladesh was selling jute (used to make gunny sacks) to Cuba. As Sen states, "only
after Bangladesh gave in and sacrificed its trade with Cuba was the flow of American food
resumed. By then the autumn famine was largely over": p. 136. Although this probably
was a relatively small contributory cause of the starvation that occurred at that time, it
does seem to have been part of the cause, with whatever moral culpability that may
imply.