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Draw and explain the exact business model of Amazon from its original

model until now which has been through several evolving models.
Our argument in this paper is that it is useful to view a business model is an
abstract representation of some aspect of a firms strategy; strategy being as defin
ed by Porter
(1996, 2001). Such abstractions are valuable, we argue, because they enable thos
e thinking about building new businesses to think in high-level terms as they a
ttempt to visualize new
possibilities.
How does Porters (1996, 2001) definition of strategy compare to a business model? T
o answer this question, we examine three authoritative definitions of business mo
del, from
Magretta (2002), Weill and Vitale (2000), and Applegate (2000, 2003).
First, according to Magretta (2002) business models are, at heart, stories stories
that explain how enterprises work. A good business model answers Peter Druckers
age-old questions: Who is the customer? And what does the customer value? It al
so answers the fundamental questions every manager must ask: How do we make mone
y in this business? What is the underlying economic logic that explains how we c
an deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? (p.92)
Few would disagree that these same questions could be asked of a firms strategy,
which suggests that business models and strategy are conceptually very similar.
But Magretta goes on to say: But a business model isnt the same thing as strategy
, even though many people use the terms interchangeably today. Business models d
escribe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they dont fa
ctor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. Sooner or laterand it
is usually soonerevery enterprise runs into competitors. Dealing with that real
ity is strategys job. A competitive strategy explains how you will do better than
your rivals. (p.94)
Saying that business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business f
it together is so close to point 5 from the above summary of Porter, i.e., how all
the elements of what a company does fit together as to be indistinguishable. How
ever, Magretta also says that business models do not consider competition. Combi
ning these two ideas, Figure 1D would appear to be the best description of Magre
ttas view of business models. But Figure 2 is also consistent with Magretta. In t
he Figure 2 view, one simply chooses not to model the firms competitive-position
information (and possibly many other details as well) in constructing Magrettas
interpretation of a business model. For reasons that will become clearer as we w
ork through the next two examples, we believe that Figure 2 is the more helpful
view.
Second, Weill and Vitales(2001) book on eBusiness models presents much more detai
led descriptions and examples of business models than most authors. Weill and Vi
tale explain their eight atomic e-business models using a specially-developed d
iagramming technique called e-business model schematics, such as the example i
n Figure 5 (which is a business model schematic for an eMarketplace such as eBay
). In these diagrams, Weill and Vitale (2001) focus on stakeholdersand product
and information flows, but make no mention of strategy. Combining atomic model
s into molecular models, they suggest, provides a convenient shorthand for quick
ly considering a wide range of possible e-business opportunities.
The common characteristics of all these models are summarized in Applegate et al
.s (2003, p.47) Figure 2.1, which describes a business model as having three comp
onents:
the concept, which describes the opportunity and strategy;
capabilities, which define resources necessary to execute strategy ;
the valueproposition, which explains the benefits to investors and other stakeh
olders
Note that the notion of business model as modelis absent from the above descrip
tion. Note also that in a concept-by-concept comparison, there is little to dist
inguish Applegate et al.s (2003) business model from Porters strategy. In fact, the tw

o definitions correspond so closely that we seem to have a Figure 1C situation.


Again, however, we argue that the concept-by-concept approach to understanding t
he relationship between business model and strategy, as depicted in Figure 1, is
not helpful.
Rather, Figure 2 provides a much more helpful perspective. From a Figure 2 persp
ective, the close correspondence between Applegates definition of business model an
d Porters definition of strategy is because one is just an abstraction of the other
. What Applegate et al.s (2003) tables provide are groups of abstractions of vari
ous organizations core logic for creating value (Linder and Cantrell 2000). We know
from data modelling (Simsion, 2000) that hierarchies of abstractions are alway
s linked by the term is-a relationship. For example, a researcher is-a person, and
a person is-a living thing. Similarly, in Applegates example of eBay above, the
business model of eBay.com is-aExchange business model, which in turn, is-aFoc
used Distributor business model. These is-a relationships are simply signals of i
ncreasing levels of abstraction.
Summarizing, it would seem to be in accord with all the thinking above if a busi
ness model were defined as an abstract representation of a firms strategy. What i
s not clear what levels of abstraction are useful, what sort of representations
should be used, and how business models should be used. These questions are so c
entral to the question of What is a business model?, and so difficult to answer, t
hat they are the topic for the next section.
Amazon and the "profitless business model" fallacy
[DISCLOSURE: As always when I write about Amazon, I ll note I worked there from
1997-2004 and that I still own some shares in the company. I still have many fri
ends who work there, though I have no more idea what Amazon is working on now th
an any of you in the public.]
With every quarterly earnings call, my Twitter feed lights up with jokes about h
ow Amazon continues to grow its revenue and make no profits and how trusting inv
estors continue to rewards the company for it. The apotheosis of that line of th
oughts is a quote from Slate s Matthew Yglesias earlier this year: "Amazon, as b
est I can tell, is a charitable organization being run by elements of the invest
ment community for the benefit of consumers."
It s a great quote, one that got so much play Amazon even featured it in its Ann
ual Letter to Shareholders. But like much of the commentary about Amazon, it s a
misreading of Amazon s business model.
Amazon is a classic fixed cost business model, it uses the internet to get maxim
um leverage out of its fixed assets, and once it achieves enough volume of sales
, the sum total of profits from all those sales exceed its fixed cost base, and
it turns a profit. It already has exceeded this hurdle in its past.
I m fairly certain most of Amazon s retail businesses remain quite profitable. S
ome may not be, but they help to reinforce Amazon as the retail site of first re
sort. By the time I left Amazon in 2004 many of its retail businesses were alrea
dy spinning off healthy profits. It is much harder to tell now from the outside
because Amazon doesn t present a full P&L by business line to the outside world.
You can see revenue by broad categories of the business, but most of its costs
are lumped together in one giant blob on the income statement.
Very early in my career at Amazon, we could already easily model out and see whe
n our revenue would give us enough income to exceed our fixed cost base. We coul
d adjust when that would happen by choosing to invest more or less aggressively,
but given our growth rates, it was always just felt like a matter of when, not
if, we d turn a profit. Besides, we were most obsessed with free cash flow. Mos
t armchair analysts love to dissect gross margin and net income because those ar

e simpler to understand and easier to compute from public financial statements,


but there are many problems with just looking at gross margin that any analyst w
orth their paycheck should understand.
Does Amazon lose money on sales of some individual items? For sure. The first Ki
ndle ebooks that were priced at $9.99 when Amazon had to pay more than that per
copy to publisher were one example. Giant, heavy electronics items that Amazon s
ometimes ships for free when the shipping cost is clearly non-trivial and cost m
ore than the usual thin margins on such goods are another.
But while such exceptions in the catalog make for great copy (it s fun to link t
o such items in your story and let users see the evidence firsthand, especially
when the item is some strange piece of machinery that maybe a handful of people
in the world would ever order), but don t be mistaken. The vast vast majority of
products Amazon sells it makes a profit on. Over time, more of these products t
hat inadvertently sell at a loss will be corrected so that no longer happens, an
d what remains will be products Amazon intentionally uses as loss leaders.
The platform of Amazon is profitable, too. When other people sell products on Am
azon Marketplace the gross margin is huge. I sell a used book on Amazon, it take
s a cut of the transaction, I am the one packing and shipping that item to the b
uyer. You don t have to be a financial whiz to understand the cost of that trans
action to Amazon is minimal.
If Amazon has so many businesses that do make a profit, then why is it still sho
wing quarterly losses, and why has even free cash flow decreased in recent years
?
Because Amazon has boundless ambition. It wants to eat global retail. This is on
e area where the press and pundits accept Amazon s statements at face value.
Given that giant mission, Amazon has decided to continue to invest to arm itself
for a much larger scale of business. If it were purely a software business, its
fixed cost investments for this journey would be lower, but the amount of capit
al required to grow a business that has to ship millions of packages to customer
s all over the world quickly is something only a handful of companies in the wor
ld could even afford. Joey Chestnut doesn t just wake up one day and win the Con
ey Island hot dog eating contest every year, he has to spend months of training
to prepare his digestive system for the feat.
Amazon has seen that lowering its shipping costs and increasing the speed of shi
pping items to customers is like a shot of adrenaline to customer s propensity t
o buy from them, and so it has doubled down on building more and more fulfillmen
t centers around the world. When I joined Amazon it had one fulfillment center.
Today it has dozens just in the US alone, and I would not be surprised if it has
more than 100 fulfillment centers worldwide now.
That is a gargantuan investment, billions of dollars worth, and it takes a signi
ficant bite out of Amazon s free cash flow. Add in its investments in infrastruc
ture to support a growing AWS client base, and Amazon has again hiked its fixed
cost base to a higher plateau. But for Amazon this is nothing new, it s just the
same typeface bolded.
I m convinced Amazon could easily turn a quarterly profit now. Many times in its
history, it could have been content to stop investing in new product lines, new
fulfillment centers, new countries. The fixed cost base would flatten out, its
sales would continue growing for some period of time and then flatten out, and i
t would harvest some annuity of profits. Even the first year I joined Amazon in
1997, when it was just a domestic book business, it could have been content to r
est on its laurels.

But Jeff is not wired that way. There are very few people in technology and busi
ness who are what I d call apex predators. Jeff is one of them, the most patient
and intelligent one I ve met in my life. An apex predator doesn t wake up one d
ay and decide it is done hunting. Right now I envision only one throttle to Jeff
s ambitions and it is human mortality, but I would not be surprised if one day
he announced he d started another side project with Peter Thiel to work on a met
hod of achieving immortality.
One popular thesis among Amazon profitability skeptics is that Amazon can t "fli
p a switch" and become profitable. The most common guess as to how Amazon flips
the switch is that it will wait until it is the last retailer standing and then
raise prices across the board, so Amazon skeptics argue against that narrative p
ossibility.
But "flipping a switch" is the wrong analogy because Amazon s core business mode
l does generate a profit with most every transaction at its current price level.
The reason it isn t showing a profit is because it s undertaken a massive inves
tment to support an even larger sales base. How does Amazon turn a profit? Not b
y flipping a switch but by waiting, once again, until its transaction volume gro
ws and income exceeds its fixed cost base again. It can choose to reach that poi
nt faster or slower depending on how quickly it continues to grow its fixed cost
base, but a simple way to accelerate that would be to stop investing in so many
new fulfillment centers.
One argument against Amazon is that it is investing for a revenue volume that wi
ll never come. That s a different argument, to me, than saying its business mode
l isn t profitable. And even on that point, you can chart its quarterly revenue
for yourself and tell me if it looks like it s flattening out. Though it has no
t always been on an exact upward sloping curve (we can expect the curve s slope
to adjust up or down as various lines of its retail business mature or accelerat
e depending on Amazon s market share and traction in each line), the long term a
rc bends up like the corner of a world-dominating smile.
Part of this problem comes from the limited visibility into the dynamics of its
business finances. Why doesn t Amazon break out more detail in its financial rep
orting to help the external world understand all these intricacies? How many sub
scribers to Amazon Prime, how many Kindles have sold, what s the net income from
different lines of business, how much of its asset base investment is for fulfi
llment centers versus technology infrastructure for AWS? Why doesn t Google brea
k out its lines of business in more detail in its financials? Why doesn t Apple
reveal more detail about exact sales of the various models of its iPads and iPho
nes?
Tech companies, in general, have dealt with the press, investors, and public lon
g enough now to have decided that for the most part, disclosing less buys them t
he most strategic flexibility with the least amount of pain. Tech companies have
an interesting ambivalence towards the public capital markets. They rebel again
st resource dependence theory because they don t believe their investors know ho
w to run their businesses better than they do, but on the other hand, being publ
ic is a great boon to compensating knowledge workers who have a lot of job optio
ns.
Based on its stock price, more investors seem willing to buy Amazon s business s
tory that they ll be able to replicate their historical playbook on a larger sca
le.
You could argue that a business that has to invest so much of its free cash flow
to grow is inherently a profitless business model. However, Amazon has known fr
om its very earliest days that selling commodities, the core of Amazon s busines

s, is inherently a low margin scale business. It won t ever approach the margins
of, say, Apple s hardware business.
But to me, a profitless business model is one in which it costs you $2 to make a
glass of lemonade but you have to sell it for $1 a glass at your lemonade stand
. But if you sell a glass of lemonade for $2 and it only costs you $1 to make it
, and you decide business is so great you re going to build a lemonade stand on
every street corner in the world so you can eventually afford to move humanity i
nto outer space or buy a newspaper in your spare time, and that requires you to
invest all your profits in buying up some lemon fields and timber to set up lemo
nade franchises on every street corner, that sounds like a many things to me, bu
t it doesn t sound like a charitable organization.
Some people get it. When I had most of this post written, I started searching f
or articles analyzing Amazon s business model, and I found this fantastic post b
y Benedict Evans which already states much of what I ve written above. He unders
tands Amazon to be a portfolio of businesses of varied maturity. But Evans is th
e exception, and so you can continue to expect a torrent of jokes each time Amaz
on releases its earnings and shows revenue growth but a negative net income. I d
love to see more external analysis of Amazon begin to focus on trying to break
down its various investments in more detail and less time spent arguing whether
its basic business model is profitable. Does the world need another story marvel
ling at how much Jeff can invest in his business? Is it that difficult to fathom
that investing to try to be the largest retailer in the history of the world ta
kes billions of dollars in investment?
The irony of all this is that while Amazon s public financial statements make it
extremely difficult to parse out its various businesses, it is extremely forthr
ight and honest about its business plans and strategy. It s the reason Jeff cont
inues to reprint its first ever letter to shareholders from 1997 in its annual r
eport every year. The plan is right there before our eyes, but so many continue
to refuse to take it at face value. As a reporter, it must be so boring to parro
t the same thing from Jeff and his team year after year, so different narratives
must be spun when the overall plan has not changed.
Take this most recent article in The Atlantic, from Derek Thompson. It s a good
read, comparing Amazon to Sears, but it s also a great example of how Amazon s b
asic strategy is always couched the same way, with a general veneer of skepticis
m.
At least, thats the vision. Defenders say Amazon is trading the present for the f
uture, spending all its revenue on a global scatter plot of warehouses that will
make the company indomitable. Eventually, the theory goes, investors expect Ama
zon to complete its construction project and, having swayed enough customers and
destroyed enough rivals, to flip the switch, raising prices and profits greatly.
In the meantime, theyre happy to keep buying stock, offering an unqualified thumb
s-up for heavy spending.
But this theory assumes a practically infinite life span for Amazon. The modern
history of retail innovation suggests that even the behemoths can be overtaken s
uddenly. Sears was still Americas largest retailer in 1982, but just nine years l
ater, its annual revenues were barely half those of Walmart. The economic country
side is littered with the carcasses of companies that thought they had a [durabl
e] competitive advantage, says Alex Field, an economic historian at Santa Clara U
niversity. Just look at BlackBerry or AOL.
Amazon is not as insulated from its rivals as some think it is. Walmart, eBay, a
nd a bounty of upstarts are all in the race to dominate online retail. Amazons fu
rious spending on new buildings and equipment isnt an elective measure; its a surv
ival plan. The truth is that the company benefits from a beautiful but delicate

tautology: Amazon has won investors trust with a reputation for spending everybod
y to death, and it can spend everybody to death because it has won investors trus
t. For now.
Amazon, as best I can tell, is a charitable organization being run by elements of
the investment community for the benefit of consumers, Slates Matthew Yglesias jo
ked earlier this year.
It has every element of the classic Amazon coverage story. "Flip the switch." Th
e faceless community of Amazon s naive and trusting investors. The charitable
organization quote, Yglesias 2013. And above all, a fairly clear and accurate sta
tement of Amazon s actual business strategy.
What a wonderful feeling, to be able to conceal a secret in plain sight. Laid ba
re before its competitors, its investors, the press, is the recipe and the bluep
rint, in plain language. I agree with Thompson and others that it is increasingl
y difficult to find real business moats or competitive advantages in the modern
world, what with the internet eliminating many previous physical moats of time a
nd space. What remains , though, is a footrace of beautiful simplicity, one in w
hich Amazon is both tortoise and hare. It is patient, it plays for the long-term
like no other company, it will take failure after failure and never lose heart,
and yet it will sprint when it picks up a scent. And it will take the race to a
n arena with the thinnest of air.
If I were an Amazon competitor, I d actually regard Amazon s current run of quar
terly losses as a terrifying signal. It means Amazon is arming itself to take th
e contest to higher ground. The retail game is about to become more, not less, p
unishing.
Analysis of the Amazon Business Model
Retailer, Service Provider, and Hardware Innovator
Known best as the largest internet retailer in the world, Amazon.com is not a si
mple case study in terms of business model analysis. Even if we begin by looking
at it s consumer retail business, it quickly becomes clear that the company is
anything but a traditional retailer. While Amazon does sell products at a standa
rd mark-up, it has also pioneered alternate retail strategies by acting as the g
ateway for other retailers and a very robust marketplace for used goods. But ret
ail is only part of the picture when it comes to Amazon.com.
Lines of Business
The company itself defines its lines of business in terms of product sales, serv
ice sales, AWS, fulfillment, publishing, digital content subscriptions, advertis
ing, and co-branded credit cards. For our purposes, I ll define Amazon s lines o
f businesses as 1) online retail, 2) internet services, and 3) the Kindle ecosys
tem.
Online Retail
The online retail line of business includes those products sold by Amazon as a t
raditional retailer, most commonly as a low-cost retailer. Amazon claims to have
"Earth s Biggest Selection" of products available through its family of website
s, sold at the lowest cost at a small profit. The company started as an online b
ook seller, rapidly expanding into music and movies, and ultimately into electro
nics and household goods.
But Amazon doesn t stock everything that is sold through its website. Another pa
rt of its retail strategy is to serve as the channel for other retailers to sell
their products and taking a cut of every purchase. Amazon maintains its status
as a destination website, but does not have to maintain inventory on slower-sell
ing products. This strategy has made Amazon a leading long-tail retailer, expand

ing its available selection without a corresponding increase in overhead costs.


Extending this long tail retail model further, Amazon introduced the sale of use
d products through its seller marketplace. Originally developed to compete with
eBay, the seller marketplace provides another retail revenue stream for the comp
any without the need to stock products in its warehouses. Advertising and shippi
ng are handled exclusively by sellers, with Amazon taking a cut of every sale si
mply for providing the channel.
Internet Services
Amazon s internet services cannot easily be discussed as a standalone line of bu
siness because it is deeply intertwined with both its retail business and the Ki
ndle ecosystem. From the consumer perspective, Amazon has begun to provide servi
ces like Amazon Prime, which provides free two-day shipping on retail purchases,
on-demand video streaming, and free access to the Kindle library, all for an an
nual fee. Amazon Prime overlays the subscription and all you can eat business mo
dels with the retail model to provide additional customer value.
Unknown to most Amazon customers, however, are the other internet services provi
ded by Amazon, referred to as AWS (Amazon Web Services). Originally developed as
a side business, Amazon decided to lease out its own server space to other comp
anies and individuals. While not a core part of the company s strategy, Amazon f
ound itself managing a large number of servers and internet services, and it was
a fairly small effort to manage those services for others.
Kindle Ecosystem
Amazon has expanded its business into manufacturing and distributing the family
of Kindle tablets. Originally designed as an electronic book reader (supplementi
ng its online book seller business), the Kindle has become a fully functional ta
blet and media device. With the Kindle, Amazon serves as both manufacturer and t
raditional retailer (and also wholesaler by selling the device through other ret
ailers).
While the company does not admit as much, it is assumed that the Kindle devices
are sold at a loss, which would more correctly put this line of business into th
e razors & blades category of business model. By selling the hardware at a loss,
Amazon is betting that customers will purchase enough electronic books, games,
and videos to justify the initial loss.
The Amazon Business Model Canvas
Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur, authors of Business Model Generation, ha
ve developed the popular business model canvas. The canvas is described as "a sh
ared language for describing, visualizing, assessing, and changing business mode
ls." Its made up of nine building blocks that help focus attention on key attribu
tes of a business. What follows is an attempt at a business model canvas for Ama
zon.
What s Next for Amazon?
Notable in the canvas above is that, regardless of line of business, Amazon keep
s some things consistent. Its value proposition remains price and convenience no
matter the product or service, and low prices can be sustained by ensuring its
customer relationships continue to be mostly automated and self-service. Expect
the company to continue its expansion into new areas while continuing to focus o
n these two building blocks.
Amazon Publishing is one of the company s more recent ventures, providing the to
ols for on demand publishing and giving new (or established) authors access to t
he Amazon store. This extends Amazon s roots within the publishing industry, lik
ely disrupting the industry permanently.

Another recent service that Amazon has launched is referred to as AutoRip. With
AutoRip, a customer s music purchases from the past become immediately available
digitally and through the cloud. Expect this service to be expanded to movies a
nd books, allowing any purchase of the actual product to translate to digital ve
rsions automatically.
The latest rumors surrounding Amazon revolve around same day delivery in some pa
rts of the U.S. It s a challenge that many e-commerce companies have tried and f
ailed at, but which Amazon may be able to execute on. It s likely that the servi
ce will be limited to the largest metropolitan areas or those areas in closest p
roximity to its warehouses. But same day delivery would permit Amazon to conquer
one more category that has yet to successfully translate to the internet: the g
rocery business.
The Amazon value propositions of price and convenience hold true in all of its p
roduct categories, allowing it to extend itself into new markets and deepen its
customer relationships. The company has dominated online retail with a fairly st
andard traditional retail business model over the internet, using its buying pow
er and financial resources to dominate the marketplace.
This dominance will continue well into the future as Amazon continues to explore
new product and service categories. What we shouldn t necessarily expect out of
Amazon are unique business models. The company has developed clear expertise in
e-commerce innovation, which it has applied to a variety of traditional busines
s models. The key lesson to be learned from Amazon is that to thrive in the digi
tal era, it s often better to execute your business model well than to invent ne
w business models from scratch.
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Posted 8th July 2013 by Eric Noren
Jadi, menurut Applegate, model bisnis terdiri atas 3 aspek :
1. Strategi
Strategi merupakan rangkaian pilihan yang menentukan peluang (opprtunities) yang
dikejar dan potensi pasar dari peluang-peluang tersebut. Hal ini mencakup pilih
an produk yang dijual, pasar yang disasar, dan bagaimana perusahaan mendiferensi
asikan produknya dari produk saingan (alternatif).
Cara pandang mudahnya adalah hal-hal yang berkaitan dengan faktor -faktor ekster
nal perusahaan dalam menjalankan bisnisnya.
Bagaimana kita menganalisis strategi dalam model bisnis ? Terdapat 4 area dalam
cakupan strategi, antara lain :
a. Konteks Bisnis (bisnis apa yang sedang kita jalankan dan apa yang akan kita l
akukan)
b. Customer (bagaimana segmentasi pasar kita dan apa yang kita lakukan dengan pr
oduk kita)
c. Kompetitor & Produk Pengganti (bagaimana kita mengatasi kompetitor dan produk
pengganti yang menjadi ancaman)
d. Jaringan Bisnis (aktivitas dan sumber daya apa saja yang akan kita butuhkan,
termasuk supplier, distributor, dll)
2. Kapabilitas
Kapabilitas memungkinkan perusahaan untuk mengeksekusi strategi yang sekarang se
mentara menyediakan platform untuk perkembangan di masa depan. Hal ini juga mend
efinisikan sumber daya yang dibutuhkan, model pembiayaan, aset perusahaan, serta
efisiensi dari aset yang digunakan.
Cara pandang mudahnya tentang kapabilitas adalah faktor-faktor internal yang dim

iliki oleh perusahaan.


Terdapat 4 area dalam menganalisis kapabilitas :
a. Proses & Infrastruktur (kemampuan internal apa saja yang kita butuhkan berdas
arkan analisis jaringan bisnis)
b. People & Partner (tim yang bagaimana yang kita butuhkan dan apa yang kita lak
ukan untuk mencapainya)
c. Organisasi & Culture (budaya kerja bagaimana yang kita kembangkan untuk organ
isasi kita)
d. Kepemimpinan & Tata Kelola (tipe kepemimpinan bagaimana yang kita terapkan da
lam organisasi)
3. Nilai / value
Analisi nilai bisnis biasanya dilihat dari angka finansial perusahaan, karena pa
da akhirnya nilai di atas kertas tentang keuntungan/laba, harga saham, pasar, da
n sebagainya yang mengukur besaran value dari suatu bisnis.
Tiga area dalam menganalisis value dari model bisnis adalah :
a. Identifikasi Internal & External Stakeholders (perlu didapatkan keuntungan ob
yektif & subyektif yang diharapkan oleh para stakeholder)
b. Identifikasi Pendorong & Keselarasan Model Bisnis (Business Model Drivers & A
lignment) (analisis SWOT untuk mengidentifikasi pendorong pemasukan/biaya/efisie
nsi aset dan mengembangkan model bisnis yang selaras dengan berbagai komponen)
c. Pengembangan model finansial dan penentuan kebutuhan keuangan (dalam perusaha
an yang berorientasi keuntungan model finansial dapat dimodelkan dalam 3 kompone
n : profit margin, efisiensi aset, dan leverage untuk kemudian dikalkulasi ROE-n
ya)
Selain model bisnis Applegate seperti di atas, sebenarnya masih banyak cara untu
k menganalisis atau membentuk model bisnis.
Salah satu di antaranya yang sedang marak saat ini adalah Business Model Canvas,
atau seperti yang banyak dijelaskan oleh para rekan2 Kaskuser di sini.
Semoga bermanfaat :)
Source : Applegate.M, Austin.R.D., Soule.D.L. (2009). Corporate Information Stra
tegy and Management. New York : Mcgraw Hill

Magretta, J. (2002) Why Business Models Matter, Harvard Business Review, May: 86
-92
Applegate, L.M., Austin, R.D, and McFarlan, F.W. (2003), Corporate Information S
trategy and Management: Text and Cases, 6th edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin
Simsion, G. (2000), Data Modeling Essentials 2nd Edition: A Comprehensive Guide
to Data Analysis, Design, and Innovation, Coriolis Technology Press
Linder, J.C. and Cantrell, S. (2000), Changing Business Models: Surveying the La
ndscape, Institute for Strategic Change, Accenture. May 24, 2000 http://www.acce
nture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/isc/pdf/Surveying_the_Landscape_WP.pdf(viewed April 2003
)
Weill, P. and Vitale, M.R. (2001), Place to Space: Migrating to eBusiness Models
, Harvard Business School Press.
Strategy and Business Models: Whats the Difference. Peter B. Seddon
and Geof
frey P . Lewis . 7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July
2003, Adelaide, South Australia Melbourne Business School, 200 Leicester St. Ca
rlton, Victoria