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Economy of the Soviet Union


Economy of the Soviet Union
DneproGES hydro-electric power plant, one of the symbols of Soviet
economic power, was completed in 1932.

Currency
Fiscal year
Trade
organisations

Soviet ruble (SUR)[1]


1 January 31 December ( calendar year)[1]
Comecon, ESCAP and others[1]
Statistics

GDP

GDP rank

$820 billion in 1977 (Nominal; 2nd)


$1.212 trillion in 1980 (Nominal; 2nd)
$1.57 trillion in 1982 (Nominal; 2nd)
$2.2 trillion in 1985 (Nominal; 2nd)
$2.6595 trillion (1989 est.) (PPP; 2nd)[2]
3rd (Nominal) / 2nd (PPP) (1989 est.) [2] (economic and political collapse in 1991) [3]

GDP per capita

$5,800 (1982 est.) (Nominal; 32nd)


$9,130 (1991 est.) (PPP; 33rd)[4]

GDP by sector

agriculture: (12%, 1991), industry: (2.4%, 1991)(1991 est.) [1]

Inflation (CPI)

14% (43rd) (1991)[5]

Gini coefficient
Labour force
Labour force
by occupation

Low
152.3 million (3rd) (1989 est.) [6]
80% in industry and other non-agricultural sectors; 20% in agriculture; shortage of skilled
labor (1989 est.)[1]

Unemployment 12%[1]
Main
industries

petroleum, steel, motor vehicles, aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals, heavy


industries, electronics, food processing, lumber, mining, and the defense (1989 est.)[1]
External

Exports
Export goods

$110.7 billion (9th) (1989 est.) [7]


petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a
wide variety of manufactured goods (1989 est.) [1]

Main export
partners
Imports
Import goods
Main import
partners
Gross external
debt

Eastern Bloc 49%, European Community 14%, Cuba 5%, US, Afghanistan (1988)[1]
$114.7 billion (10th) (1989 est.) [8]
grain and other agricultural products, machinery and equipment, steel products (including
large-diameter pipe), consumer manufactures[1]
Eastern Bloc 54%, European Community 11%, Cuba, China, US (1988 est.)[1]
$55 billion (11th) (1989 est.) [9] $27.3 billion (1988 est.) [10]
Public finances

Revenues

$422 billion (5th) (1990 est.) [11]

Expenses

$510 billion (1989 est.) [1]


53 million (2nd, capital expenditures) (1991 est.) [12]

Economic aid

$147.6 billion (195488) [1]

All values, unless otherwise stated, are in US dollars.


The economy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was based on a system of state ownership of the
means of production, collective farming, industrial manufacturing and centralized administrative planning. The
economy was characterised by state control of investment, public ownership of industrial assets, macroeconomic
stability, negligible unemployment and high job security,[13] and during the last 13 years (197385) before the
implementation of Perestroika and Glasnost (198687) by economic stagnation. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power, he began a process of economic liberalisation that moved the economy towards a market-oriented
socialist economy. At its dissolution at the end of 1991, the Soviet Union begat a Russian Federation with a
growing pile of $66 billion in external debt, and with barely a few billion dollars in net gold and foreign exchange
reserves. [14]
Beginning in 1928, the entire course of the economy was guided by a series of Five-Year Plans. By the 1950s, the
Soviet Union had, during the preceding few decades, evolved from a mainly agrarian society into a major
industrial power. Its transformative capacitywhat the US National Security Council described as a "proven ability
to carry backward countries speedily through the crisis of modernization and industrialization"meant
communism consistently appealed to the intellectuals of developing countries in Asia. [16] Impressive growth rates
during the first three Five-Year Plans (192840) are particularly notable given that this period is nearly congruent
with the Great Depression. Nevertheless, the impoverished base upon which the Five-Year Plans sought to build
meant that, at the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, the country was still poor. While legitimate strictly in
terms of growth and industrialisation, the death toll attributable to Stalinist economic development has been
estimated at 10 million, much of which comprises famine victims.
The complex demands of the modern economy and inflexible administration overwhelmed and constrained the
central planners. Corruption and data fiddling became common practice among the bureaucracy by reporting
fulfilled targets and quotas, thus entrenching the crisis. From the Stalin-era to the early Brezhnev-era, the Soviet
economy grew much slower than Japan and slightly faster than the U.S. GDP levels in 1950 (in billion 1990
dollars) were 510 (100%) in the USSR, 161 (100%) in Japan and 1456 (100%) in the US. By 1965 the
corresponding values were 1011 (198%), 587 (365%), and 2607 (179%).[20] The Soviet Union maintained itself as
the second largest economy in both nominal and purchasing power parity values for much of the Cold War until
1988, when Japan's economy exceeded $3 trillion in nominal value.[21]
The USSR's relatively small consumer sector accounted for just under 60% of the country's GDP in 1990, while

the industrial and agricultural sectors contributed 22% and 20% respectively in 1991. Agriculture was the
predominant occupation in the USSR before the massive industrialization under Joseph Stalin. The service sector
was of low importance in the USSR, with the majority of the labor force employed in the industrial sector. The
labor force totaled 152.3 million people. Major industrial products included petroleum, steel, motor vehicles,
aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals, electronics, food processing, lumber, mining, and defense industry.

Contents
[hide]

Planning[edit]
See also: Analysis of Soviet-type economic planning
Based on a system of state ownership, the Soviet economy was managed through Gosplan (the State Planning
Commission), Gosbank (the State Bank) and the Gossnab (State Commission for Materials and Equipment
Supply). Beginning in 1928, the economy was directed by a series of five-year plans, with a brief attempt at
seven-year planning. For every enterprise, planning ministries (also known as the "fund holders" or
fondoderzhateli) defined the mix of economic inputs (e.g., labor and raw materials), a schedule for completion, all
wholesale prices and almost all retail prices. The planning process was based around material balances balancing economic inputs with planned output targets for the planning period.
Industry was long concentrated after 1928 on the production of capital goods through metallurgy, machine
manufacture, and chemical industry. In Soviet terminology, the capital goods were known as group A goods , or
means of production. This emphasis was based on the perceived necessity for a very fast industrialization and
modernization of the Soviet Union. After the death of Stalin in 1953, consumer goods (group B goods) received
somewhat more emphasis due to efforts of Malenkov. However when Khrushchev consolidated his power by
sacking Malenkov, one of the accusations against Malenkov was that he permitted "theoretically incorrect and
politically harmful opposition to the rate of development of heavy industry in favor of the rate of development of
light and food industry".[22] Therefore since 1955 the priorities again were given to capital goods, which was
expressed in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956).[23] For further details see consumer goods
in the Soviet Union.
Most information in the Soviet economy flowed from the top down. There were several mechanisms in place for
producers and consumers to provide input and information that would help in the drafting of economic plans (as
detailed below), but the political climate was such that few people ever provided negative input or criticism of the
plan.[citation needed] Thus, Soviet planners had very little reliable feedback that they could use to determine the
success of their plans. This meant that economic planning was often done based on faulty or outdated
information, particularly in sectors with large numbers of consumers. As a result, some goods tended to be
underproduced, leading to shortages, while other goods were overproduced and accumulated in storage. Lowlevel managers often did not report such problems to their superiors, relying instead on each other for support.
Some factories developed a system of barter and either exchanged or shared raw materials and parts without the
knowledge of the authorities and outside the parameters of the economic plan.[citation needed]
Heavy industry was always the focus of the Soviet economy, even in its later years. The fact that it received
special attention from the planners, combined with the fact that industrial production was relatively easy to plan
even without minute feedback, led to significant growth in that sector. The Soviet Union became one of the leading
industrial nations of the world. Industrial production was disproportionately high in the Soviet Union compared to
Western economies. However, the production of consumer goods was disproportionately low. Economic planners
made little effort to determine the wishes of household consumers, resulting in severe shortages of many
consumer goods. Whenever these consumer goods would become available on the market, consumers routinely
had to stand in long lines (queues) to buy them.[citation needed] A black market developed for goods that were
particularly sought after but constantly underproduced (such as cigarettes).

Drafting the five-year plans[edit]


Under Stalin's tutelage, a complex system of planning arrangements had developed since the introduction of the
first five-year plan in 1928. Until the late-1980s and early-1990s, when economic reforms backed by Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev introduced significant changes in the traditional system (see Perestroika), the allocation of
resources was directed by a planning apparatus rather than through the interplay of market forces.

Time frame[edit]
From the Joseph Stalin era through the late 1980s, the five-year plan integrated short-range planning into a
longer time frame. It delineated the chief thrust of the country's economic development and specified the way the
economy could meet the desired goals of the Communist Party. Although the five-year plan was enacted into law,
it contained a series of guidelines rather than a set of direct orders.
Periods covered by the five-year plans coincided with those covered by the gatherings of the CPSU Party
Congress. At each CPSU Congress, the party leadership presented the targets for the next five-year plan. Thus,
each plan had the approval of the most authoritative body of the country's leading political institution.

Guidelines for the plan[edit]


The Central Committee of the CPSU and, more specifically, its Politburo, set basic guidelines for planning. The
Politburo determined the general direction of the economy via control figures (preliminary plan targets), major
investment projects (capacity creation), and general economic policies. These guidelines were submitted as a
report of the Central Committee to the Congress of the CPSU to be approved there.
After the approval at the congress, the list of priorities for the five-year plan was processed by the Council of
Ministers, which constituted the government of the USSR. The Council of Ministers was composed of industrial
ministers, chairmen of various state committees, and chairmen of agencies with ministerial status. This committee
stood at the apex of the vast economic administration, including the state planning apparatus, the industrial
ministries, the trusts (the intermediate level between the ministries and the enterprises), and finally, the state
enterprises. The Council of Ministers elaborated on Politburo plan targets and sent them to Gosplan, which
gathered data on plan fulfillment.

Gosplan[edit]
Main article: Gosplan
Combining the broad goals laid out by the Council of Ministers with data supplied by lower administrative levels
regarding the current state of the economy, Gosplan worked out, through trial and error, a set of preliminary plan
targets. Among more than twenty state committees, Gosplan headed the government's planning apparatus and
was by far the most important agency in the economic administration. The task of planners was to balance
resources and requirements to ensure that the necessary inputs were provided for the planned output. The
planning apparatus alone was a vast organizational arrangement consisting of councils, commissions,
governmental officials, specialists, etc. charged with executing and monitoring economic policy.
The state planning agency was subdivided into its own industrial departments, such as coal, iron, and machine
building. It also had summary departments such as finance, dealing with issues that crossed functional
boundaries. With the exception of a brief experiment with regional planning during the Khrushchev era in the
1950s, Soviet planning was done on a sectoral basis rather than on a regional basis. The departments of the
state planning agency aided the agency's development of a full set of plan targets along with input requirements,
a process involving bargaining between the ministries and their superiors.

Planning ministries[edit]

Economic ministries performed key roles in the Soviet organizational structure. When the planning goals had
been established by Gosplan, economic ministries drafted plans within their jurisdictions and disseminated
planning data to the subordinate enterprises. The planning data were sent downward through the planning
hierarchy for progressively more detailed elaboration. The ministry received its control targets, which were then
disaggregated by branches within the ministry, then by lower units, eventually until each enterprise received its
own control figures (production targets).

Enterprises[edit]
Enterprises were called upon to develop in the final period of state planning in the late-1980s and early-1990s
(even though such participation was mostly limited to a rubber-stamping of prepared statements during huge prestaged meetings). The enterprises' draft plans were then sent back up through the planning ministries for review.
This process entailed intensive bargaining, with all parties seeking the target levels and input figures that best
suited their interests.

Redrafting the plan[edit]


After this bargaining process, Gosplan received the revised estimates and re-aggregated them as it saw fit. Then,
the redrafted plan was sent to the Council of Ministers and the Party's Politburo and Central Committee
Secretariat for approval. The Council of Ministers submitted the Plan to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union
and the Central Committee submitted the plan to the Party Congress, both for rubber stamp approval. By this time,
the process had been completed and the plan became law.

Approval of the plan[edit]


The review, revision, and approval of the five-year plan were followed by another downward flow of information,
this time with the amended and final plans containing the specific targets for each sector of the economy.
Implementation began at this point, and was largely the responsibility of enterprise managers.

State budget[edit]
The national state budget was prepared by the Ministry of Finance of the USSR by negotiating with its all-Union
local organizations. If the state budget was accepted by the Soviet Union, to then get adopted.[24]

Agriculture[edit]
Main article: Agriculture in the Soviet Union
Agriculture was organized into a system of collective farms ( kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes). Organized
on a large scale and highly mechanized, the Soviet Union was one of the world's leading producers of cereals,
although bad harvests (as in 1972 and 1975) necessitated imports and slowed the economy. The 1976-1980 fiveyear plan shifted resources to agriculture, and 1978 saw a record harvest followed by another drop in overall
production in 1979 and 1980 back to levels attained in 1975. Cotton, sugar beets, potatoes, and flax were also
major crops.
However, despite immense land resources, extensive machinery and chemical industries, and a large rural work
force, Soviet agriculture was relatively unproductive,[original research?] hampered in many areas by the climate
(only 10 percent of the Soviet Union's land was arable), and poor worker productivity since the collectivization in
the 1930s.[citation needed] Lack of transport infrastructure also caused much waste.
A view of poor performance of Soviet collective farms is provided by two historians, M. Heller and A. Nekich
("Utopia in Power, History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to Present," Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986). The authors
report that in 1979, 28% of the Soviet agricultural production was from small plots of private citizens, which

represented less than 1% of the cultivated land. So according to them, collective farms operated very inefficiently.

Foreign trade and currency[edit]


Main article: Foreign trade of the Soviet Union
Largely self-sufficient, the Soviet Union traded little in comparison to its economic strength. However, trade with
noncommunist countries increased in the 1970s as the government sought to compensate gaps in domestic
production with imports.
In general, fuels, metals, and timber were exported. Machinery, consumer goods, and sometimes grain were
imported. In the 1980s trade with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) member states
accounted for about half the country's volume of trade. Although often associated with alcohol production, such as
that of vodka, none of these were leading Soviet exports.
The Soviet currency (ruble) was non-convertible after 1932 (when trade in gold-convertible " chervonets",
introduced by Lenin in NEP years, was suspended) until the late eighties. It was impossible (both for citizens and
state-owned businesses) to freely buy or sell foreign currency even though the "exchange rate" was set and
published regularly. Buying or selling foreign currency on a black market was a serious crime until the late
eighties. Individuals who were paid from abroad (for example writers whose books were published abroad)
normally had to spend their currency in a foreign-currency-only chain of state-owned "Beryozka" ("Birch-tree")
stores. Once a free conversion of currency was allowed, the exchange rate plummeted from its official values by
almost a factor of 10.
Overall, the banking system was highly centralized and fully controlled by a single state-owned Gosbank,
responsive to the fulfillment of the government's economic plans. Soviet banks furnished short-term credit to
state-owned enterprises.

Forms of property[edit]
There were two basic forms of property in the Soviet Union: individual property and collective property. These
differed greatly in their content and legal status. According to communist theory, capital (means of production)
should not be individually owned, with certain negligible exceptions. In particular, after the end of a short period of
the New Economic Policy and with collectivization completed, all industrial property and virtually all land were
collective.
Land in rural areas was allotted for housing and some sustenance farming, and persons had certain rights to it,
but it was not their property in full. In particular, in kolkhozes and sovkhozes there was a practice to rotate
individual farming lots with collective lots. This resulted in situations where people would ameliorate, till and
cultivate their lots carefully, adapting them to small-scale farming, and in 57 years those lots would be swapped
for kolkhoz ones, typically with exhausted soil due to intensive, large-scale agriculture. There was an extremely
small number of remaining individual farmsteads (khutors ), located in isolated rural areas in the Baltic
states, Ukraine, Siberia and cossack lands.

Individual property[edit]
To distinguish "capitalist" and "socialist" types of property ownership further, two different forms of individual
property were recognized: private property ( , chastnaya sobstvennost) and personal
property ( , lichnaya sobstvennost). The former encompassed capital (means of
production), while the latter described everything else in a person's possession. This distinction has been a
source of confusion when interpreting phrases such as "socialism (communism) abolished private property"; one
might conclude that all individual property was abolished, when this was in fact not the case.

Collective property[edit]
There were several forms of collective ownership, the most significant being state property, kolkhoz property, and

cooperative property. The most common forms of cooperative property were housing cooperatives (
) in urban areas, consumer cooperatives ( , ), and
rural consumer societies ( , ).

History[edit]
Early development[edit]
Both the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and later, the Soviet Union, were countries in the process
of industrialization. For both, this development occurred slowly and from a low initial starting point. Because of
World War I, the Russian Revolution and the ensuing Russian Civil War industrial production had only managed to
barely recover its 1913 level by 1926.[25] By this time about 18% of the population lived in non-rural areas,
although only about 7.5% were employed in the non-agricultural sector. The remainder were stuck in the low
productivity agriculture.[26]
According to David A. Dyker , the Soviet Union of the 1930s can be regarded as a typical developing country,
characterized by low capital investment and most of its population resident in the countryside. Part of the reason
for low investment rates lay in the inability to acquire capital from abroad. This in turn, was the result of the
repudiation of the debts of the Russian Empire by the Bolsheviks, as well as the world wide financial troubles.
Consequently, any kind of economic growth had to be financed by domestic savings.[26]
The economic problems in agriculture were further exacerbated by natural conditions, such as long cold winters
across the country, droughts in the south and acidic soils in the north. However, according to Dyker, the Soviet
economy did have "extremely good" potential in the area of raw materials and mineral extraction, for example in
the oil fields in Transcaucasia, and this, along with a small but growing manufacturing base, helped the USSR
avoid any kind of balance of payments problems.[26]

New Economic Policy (19219)[edit]


Main article: New Economic Policy
By early 1921 it became apparent to the Bolsheviks that forced requisitioning
of grain had resulted in low agricultural production and widespread
opposition. As a result, the decision was made by Lenin and the Politburo to
try an alternative approach. The so-called New Economic Policy (NEP) was
approved at the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party
(Bolsheviks)[29]
Everything except "the commanding heights", as Lenin put it, of the economy
would be privatized. "The commanding heights" included foreign trade,
heavy industry, communication and transport among others. In practice this
limited the private sector to artisan and agricultural production/trade.[30] The
NEP encountered strong resistance within the Bolshevik party. Lenin had to
persuade communist skeptics that "state capitalism" was a necessary step in
achieving communism, while he himself harbored suspicions that the policy
could be abused by private businessmen ("NEPmen").

Manipulated[27] photo intended to show


the two major economic policy makers of
the USSR together, Lenin (left) who
created the NEP and Stalin (right) who
created the planned economy.

As novelist Andrei Platonov, among others, noted, the improvements were


immediate. Rationing cards and queues, which had become hallmarks of war communism, had disappeared.
However, due to prolonged war, low harvests, and several natural disasters the Soviet economy was still in
trouble, particularly its agricultural sector. In 1921 widespread famine broke out in the Volga-Ural region. The
Soviet government changed its previous course and allowed international relief to come in from abroad, and
established a special committee chaired by prominent communists and non-communists alike. Despite this, an
estimated five million people died in the famine.[32]

Stalinism[edit]
Starting in 1928, the five-year plans began building a heavy industrial base at once in an underdeveloped
economy without waiting years for capital to accumulate through the expansion of light industry, and without
reliance on external financing. The country now became industrialized at a hitherto unprecedented pace,
surpassing Germany's pace of industrialization in the 19th century and Japan's earlier in the 20th century.
After the reconstruction of the economy (in the wake of the destruction caused by the Russian Civil War) was
completed, and after the initial plans of further industrialisation were fulfilled, the explosive growth slowed down
until the period of Brezhnev stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s.
Led by the creation of NAMI, and by the GAZ copy of the Ford Model A in 1929,[33][34] industrialization came with
the extension of medical services, which improved labor productivity. Campaigns were carried out against typhus,
cholera, and malaria; the number of physicians increased as rapidly as facilities and training would permit; and
death and infant mortality rates steadily decreased.

19301970[edit]
As weighed growth rates, economic planning performed very well during the early and
mid-1930s, World War II-era mobilization, and for the first two decades of the postwar era.
The Soviet Union became the world's leading producer of oil, coal, iron ore, and cement;
manganese, gold, natural gas and other minerals were also of major importance.
However, information about the Soviet famine of 19321933 was suppressed by the
Soviet authorities until perestroika. In 1933 workers' real earnings sank to about one-tenth
of the 1926 level. [35] Common and political prisoners in labor camps were forced to do
unpaid labor, and communists and Komsomol members were frequently "mobilized" for
various construction projects.
The German invasion of World War II inflicted punishing blows to the economy of the
Soviet Union, with Soviet GDP falling 34% between 1940 and 1942. Industrial output did
not recover to its 1940 level for almost a decade.

The State Quality


Mark of the USSR,
introduced in 1967,
was used to certify
that goods met quality
standards, and to
improve the efficiency
of production

In 1961, a new redenominated Soviet ruble was issued. It maintained exchange parity with the Pound Sterling
until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. After a new leadership, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, had come to
power, attempts were made to revitalize the economy through economic reform. Starting in 1965, enterprises and
organizations were made to rely on economic methods of profitable production, rather than follow orders from the
state administration. By 1970, the Soviet economy had reached its zenith and was estimated at about 60 percent
of the size of the USA[37] in terms of the estimated commodities (like steel and coal). In 1989, the official GDP of
the Soviet Union was $2,500 Billion[38] while the GDP of the United States was $4,862 Billion [39] with per capita
income figures as $8,700 and $19,800 respectively.
This article's factual accuracy is disputed. Please help to ensure that disputed statements are reliably
sourced. See the relevant discussion on the talk page. (June 2011)

19701990[edit]

The Era of Stagnation in the mid-1970s was


triggered by the Nixon Shock and aggravated by
the war in Afghanistan in 1979 and led to a period
of economic standstill between 1979 and 1985.
Soviet military buildup at the expense of domestic
development kept the USSR's GDP at the same
level during the first half of the 1980s.[citation
needed] The Soviet planned economy was not

structured to respond adequately to the demands


of the complex modern economy it had helped to
forge. The massive quantities of goods produced
often did not meet the needs or tastes of
consumers.[40] The volume of decisions facing
planners in Moscow became overwhelming. The
Soviet National Income 1928-1987 growth in %. Estimates of the official
cumbersome procedures for bureaucratic
statistical agency of the SU (TsSU), the CIA and revised estimates by G. I.
Khanin.
administration foreclosed the free communication
and flexible response required at the enterprise
level for dealing with worker alienation, innovation, customers, and suppliers. During 197585, corruption and
data fiddling became common practice among bureaucracy to report satisfied targets and quotas thus
entrenching the crisis.
Awareness of the growing crisis arose initially within the KGB which with its extensive network of informants in
every region and institution had its finger on the pulse of the nation. Yuri Andropov , director of the KGB, created a
secret department during the 1970s within the KGB devoted to economic analysis, and when he succeeded
Brezhnev in 1982 sounded the alarm forcefully to the Soviet leadership. Andropov's remedy of increased
discipline, however, proved ineffective. It was only when Andropov's protege Gorbachev assumed power that a
determined, but ultimately unsuccessful, assault on the economic crisis was undertaken.[41]
According to CIA estimates by 1989 the size of the
Soviet economy was roughly half that in the United
States of America.[10] According to the European

Comparison between USSR and US economies (1989)


according to 1990 CIA The World Factbook [10]

Comparison Program, administered by the U.N, the


size of the Soviet Economy was 36% of that in the
United States in 1990.[42]

USSR

US

GDP(PPP)(1989 - millions $)

2,659,500

5,233,300

Population (July 1990)

290,938,469

250,410,000

GDP Per Capita(PPP)($)

9,211

21,082

Labor force (1989)

152,300,000

125,557,000

Sector (Distribution of Soviet workforce)

1940

1965

1970

1979

1984

Primary (agriculture and forestry)

54%

31%

25%

21%

20%

Secondary (including construction, transport and communication)

28%

44%

46%

48%

47%

Tertiary (including trade, finance, health, education, science and


administration

18%

25%

29%

31%

33%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

[43]

See also[edit]

General
Organisations
Post-Soviet era
Economy of post-Soviet Russia
History of post-Soviet Russia
Classifications of Soviet economy

References[edit]
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2. ^ Jump up to: a b GDP Million 1990 . CIA Factbook. 1991. Retrieved June 12, 2010.
3. Jump up ^ GDP Million 1991 . KayLee: CIA Factbook. 1992. Retrieved June 12, 2010.
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5. Jump up ^ Inflation Rate % 1991. CIA Factbook. 1992. Retrieved June 12, 2010.
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14. Jump up ^ Boughton 2012, p. 288.
15. Jump up ^ Peck 2006, p. 47.
One notable person in this regard was Nehru, "who visited the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and was
deeply impressed by Soviet industrial progress." See Bradley 2010, pp. 4756.
16. Jump up ^ Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (2001) pp 274, 275, 298
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18. Jump up ^ " . 50 ", Radio Liberty
19. Jump up ^ . . "" : 19531964, Olma-Press, 2002 ISBN 5-224033356-
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ISBN 92-64-13468-9.
21. Jump up ^ Dyker 1992, p. 2.
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25. Jump up ^ Carr, E.H. and Davies, R.W, (1988), Foundations of a Planned Economy, Vol. 1

26. Jump up ^ Hosking 1993, p. 120.


27. Jump up ^ G.N. Georgano Cars: Early and Vintage, 1886-1930. (London: Grange-Universal, 1985)
28. Jump up ^ Wikipedia, GAZ
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31. Jump up ^ [1]
32. Jump up ^ [2]
33. Jump up ^ Shane, Scott (1994). "What Price Socialism? An Economy Without Information". Dismantling
Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. pp. 75 to 98. ISBN 1-56663-0487. "It was not the gas pedal but the steering wheel that was failing"
34. Jump up ^ Shane, Scott (1994). "The KGB, Father of Perestroika". Dismantling Utopia: How Information
Ended the Soviet Union. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. pp. 59, 60, 99 to 120. ISBN 1-56663-048-7. "When he
spoke to the leadership circle he said the country was faced with a question of survival"
35. Jump up ^ http://www.allbusiness.com/government/630097-1.html
36. Jump up ^ Churchwood, L. G. (1987). Soviet Socialism: Social and Political Essays. London: Routledge.
p. 30.

Further reading[edit]
Allen, Robert C. (2003). Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution . Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Boughton, James M. (2012). Tearing Down Walls: The International Monetary Fund, 19901999.
Washington, DC: IMF. ISBN 978-1-616-35084-0.
Bradley, Mark Philip (2010). "Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 19191962". In Melvyn P.
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins (pp. 464
485). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83719-4.
Daniels, Robert Vince (1993). The End of the Communist Revolution. London: Routledge.
Davies, R.W. (1998). Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Davies, R. W. ed. From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy: Continuity and Change in the Economy of
the USSR (London, 1990)
Davies, R. W. ed. The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 19131945 (Cambridge, 1994)
Goldman, Marshall (1991). What Went Wrong With Perestroika. New York: W. W. Norton.
Goldman, Marshall (1994). Lost Opportunity: Why Economic Reforms in Russia Have Not Worked. New
York: W. W. Norton.
Gregory, Paul; Stuart, Robert (2001). Soviet and Post Soviet Economic Structure and Performance (7th
ed.). Boston: Addison Wesley.
Harrison, Mark (1996). Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defense Burden,
19401945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harrison, Mark. "The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression," Past &
Present (2011 Supplement 6) Vol. 210 Issue suppl_6, p103-120.
Moss, Walter Gerald (2004). A History Of Russia, Volume 2: Since 1855 (2nd ed.). London: Anthem Press.
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).

Peck, James (2006). Washington's China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of
Globalism. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
Pravda, Alex (2010). "The collapse of the Soviet Union, 19901991". In Leffler, Melvyn P.; Westad, Odd
Arne. The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 3: Findings . Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. pp. 356377.
Rutland, Robert (1985). The Myth of the Plan: Lessons of Soviet Planning Experience. London:
Hutchinson.

in Russian[edit]
Kara-Murza, Sergey (2004). Soviet Civilization: From 1917 to the Great Victory (in Russian) =
-. . . ISBN 5-699-07590-9.
Kara-Murza, Sergey (2004). Soviet Civilization: From the Great Victory Till Our Time (in Russian) =
-. . . ISBN 5-699-07591-7.

External links[edit]
Andre Gunder Frank, "What Went Wrong in the 'Socialist' East?"
Douglas B. Reynolds, "Soviet Economic Decline: Did an Oil Crisis Cause the Transition in the Soviet
Union?"
Paul Craig Roberts, "My Time With Soviet Economics."