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[A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]



In a letter to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof
furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC
judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as
member, Philippine Bar, expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of
and the manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:


UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.
G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the
dismissal on February 7, 2000 of the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse
ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter dated April 2, 2001
addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court,
the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as


Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the
aforesaid case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty
and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason
or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from

whom might is right. I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a
hapless suitors throat a ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001,
required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly disciplined for
degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile, offensive,
intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it.

In response to the show cause order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters
to the Court dated December 2, 2001 and June 16, 2002, arguing for the propriety of
his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics
and Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15, 2002 and August 27, 2002 ,
the Court merely noted said two letters.




Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty.
Sorreda disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory
language, to wit:







I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations
as the Honorable Court has displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship
or authoritarian regime.

Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks,
Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:




Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably
meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court
of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for
the Sollegue miscounting, and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least some
of these ten cases would have met with entirely different endings, so obvious and
patent are their merits to any reasonable and impartial mind.
In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it
personally against me. To the detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.

Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood
ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one
communication[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Courts position, it is that x x
x if indeed I had wronged the Court in the way it had described, and if indeed my
explanations and arguments lack merit, I should indeed be disciplined; and surely
no less than DISBARMENT will do. It should also be done as swiftly as possible,
given the gravity of the charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution
attacked. Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to deny
to the undersigned the full opportunity for self-defense that he request therefore
he is now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction has come
down until the present time.
Might it be because I had continued, Of course, I shall also only expect that such
judgment, when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed
perhaps as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the proper guidance of all
concerned- and the Court knows that it is not able to give such a fully-reasoned
judgment as I ask? But rather than admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it
would rather get back at me by means of unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate
to it- let the innocent litigants, whose only mistake was to hire me as their counsel,
and the cause of justice suffer as they may.
Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with
an adversary like that. It is not something I would have expected from the
supreme judges of the land.
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same
verifications that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal.
What other interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run out of excuses to
dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged shortcomings;
and was now scrounging every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to
get my comeuppance.
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to
the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled
the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice, to whom I have
directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely
explanation that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get
favorable ruling? Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillos
retirement on November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the nations
judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way beyond the

constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so much mystery and intrigue
has surrounded the appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In
fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new
retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this
latest retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to other than
the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of the
Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
had redoubtable reputations for independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in
the court exercised their utmost influence to at least prevent the both of them sitting in
the bench at the same time, lest together they should buck the system and divide the
Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably rule on the undersigned
counsels cases before it?



But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the
court is in the wrong. I cannot but thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning
indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization that the high
institution of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a
citizen, that the public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find
justice, should instead give judgments that so insult the intelligence and glare
with iniquity.
Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days
as greater than 60 days, and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the
supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the land, would miss seeing grave abuse of
discretion in the actions of an agency that directly contravened numerous laws and
rules all at once? How could democracys vaunted last bulwark suffer a widow and
her children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and
illegal demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the court pause for even three
minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept locked up for three
years now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its
discretion not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the Court get such
brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that the docket
fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact were? What
manner of men are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt,
and the bar to become like Frodo in the fight against societys evils in your
public speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils
when hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the
clearest manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the Whatare-we-in-power-for mentality? (Underscoring ours)

Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorredas aforesaid letter of 21 February
2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.
In an en banc Resolution dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty.
Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt
for maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.

By way of compliance to the second show cause order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter
of May 10, 2005 , again with copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers
thereunder listed, states that he does not see the need to say any more because the
cause has already been shown as clear as day in his earlier letter of 21 February
2005, adding that [T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly
and decisively. While admitting the great seriousness of the statements and
imputations I have leveled against the Court, he dared the Court whether it is capable
of a judgment that will be upheld by the Supreme Judge.

After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court
of being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty.
Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does not know how to count when it dismissed
the Sollegue case on ground of failure to file the petition therein within the reglementary
period. For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition
in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65
but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or certified true copy of the
questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with
Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56. In another
case,Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was dismissed on the
mere ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that the
petition was dismissed not merely for defective verification but more so because the
petition was evidently used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. We see no
need to belabor the grounds for the dismissal of the other cases enumerated by
counsel, said grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions which
were plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even to those who do
not have a formal education in law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal of those petitions
was the result of a thorough deliberation among members of this Court.


Atty. Sorredas imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is

utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to
bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful
purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt
in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In Ang vs. Castro , this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory,
offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.


Atty Sorredas conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,

specifically -

CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or having no materiality to the case.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
clients genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyers fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense.



Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the
rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error.
But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court
and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound to act to
preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could
hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of the lawyer
to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorney's
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity xxx to the
courts. Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be

maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office

which he is bound to uphold.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, Justice Sanchez further

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, we held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No

one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirement of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antimony
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general community.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. No less
must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the countrys highest court, the
Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy

Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, to which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it
have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.

Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free

expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession
to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member
of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile, we imposed on
the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as
in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a fitting sanction until he
proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is
imperative to instill in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done
outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return
only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds.


WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court

and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby indefinitely
SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of
law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed
to all courts for their information. This Resolution shall be spread in his personal record
and is immediately executory.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.


Rollo, pp. 2-16.


Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 175.


See 2nd Indorsement dated 13 July 2001 of the former 2 nd Division of the Court; Rollo of UDK-12854, pp.


Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 211.


Rollo of UDK-12854, pp. 218-309


Rollo of UDK-12854, pp. 324-396.


Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 310.


Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 398.


Stated in Atty. Sorredas letter addressed to the Chief Justice when his petition in the case of Artemio
Dalsen vs. Comelec, G. R. No. 149334 was denied.


Stated in Atty. Sorredas letter addressed to the Chief Justice when his petition in the case of Lilia
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148440 was denied.


Rollo, p. 17.


Rollo, pp. 18-26.


SC Minute Resolutions dated February 7, 2000 and June 19, 2000.


SC Minute Resolution dated January 27, 2003.


136 SCRA 453 [1985].


Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.


Chao vs. Chiongson, 329 Phil 270 [1996] citing Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91133, March
22, 1993, 220 SCRA 274 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.


Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.




In re: Wenceslao Laureta, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382.


No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441.


No. L-27072, 31 SCRA 1 [1990], citing People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855; In re
Sotto, 82 Phil. 595; Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160; and People vs. Carillo,
77 Phil. 572.


No. L-79690, 166 SCRA 316 [1988].


In re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty.
Leonardo De Vera, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, 385 SCRA 285 [2002].


Alonte vs. Savellano, et al., 350 Phil 700 [1998].


Ariosa vs. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798, 344 SCRA 589 [2000].


Sebastian vs. Calis, A.C.No. 5118, Sept. 9, 1999.


G.R. No. 159286, April 5, 2005.


In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.