League of Cities v.

Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in
the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the
Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from
the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of
the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause.

Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts
in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October
2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district

municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were

combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely
on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of
a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General
15 SCRA 569 Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The

President

may

by

executive

order

define

the

boundary

of

any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil
action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios
were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt
from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios
to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a

violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be

complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate

and (b) fix a standard the

limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the

delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec.
68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public
welfare may require which would mean that the President may exercise
such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the
text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government
may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT
the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is
essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not
executive).
Padilla vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7155, creating the Municipality of Tulay na Lupa in the province of Camarines Norte to be
composed of Barangays Tulay-naLupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Bayan-bayn, Mataulang, Pag-asa,
Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipalty of Labo, some province, COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite was
conducted throughout the municipality of Labo and majority voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulayna-Lupa. Petitioner prayed that the plebiscite conducted to set aside with the contention that such plebiscite was a
complete failure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay na Lupa and
the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
RULING:
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the result of the plebiscite rejecting the creation of the
new municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa is valid.
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly
affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase political units
directly affected is the plurality of the political units which would participate in the plebiscite.

G.R.No.73155,July11,1986
NOTABENE:Thiscaseisrelevanttothecurrentbuzzregardingthe"Sugbuak."Theissueinthiscase,
however,isabitonthetechnicalside.
whentheboundariesofaLGUissubstantiallyaltered,therearenecessarilymorethanoneunitaffected
theparentLGUandthenewLGUthatwascreatedasaresultofthealteration
FACTS:
ThiscasewaspromptedbytheenactmentofBatasPambansaBlg.885,AnActCreatingaNewProvincein
theIslandofNegrostobeknownastheProvinceofNegrosdelNorte,effectiveDec.3,1985.(Citiesof
Silay,CadizandSanCarlosandthemunicipalitiesofCalatrava,Taboso,Escalante,Sagay,Manapla,
Victorias,E.R.Magalona,andSalvadorBenedicto.
Pursuanttoandinimplementationofthislaw,theCOMELECscheduledaplebisciteforJanuary3,1986.
Petitionersopposed,filingacaseforProhibitionandcontendingthattheB.P.885isunconstitutionaland
notincompleteaccordwiththeLocalGovernmentCodebecause:

(1)ThevotersoftheparentprovinceofNegrosOccidental,otherthanthoselivingwithintheterritoryof
thenewprovinceofNegrosdelNorte,werenotincludedintheplebiscite
(2)TheareawhichwouldcomprisethenewprovincofNegrosdelNortewouldonlybeabout2,856.56sq.
km.,whichislesserthantheminimumareaprescribedbythegoverningstatute
TheSupremeCourtwasinrecessatthetimesothepetitionwasnottimelyconsidered.Consequently,
petitionersfiledasupplementalpleadingonJanuary4,1986,aftertheplebiscitesoughttoberestrainedwas
heldthepreviousday,January3.
ISSUE:
W/NtheplebiscitewaslegalandcompliedwiththeconstitutionalrequisitesunderArticleXI,Sec.3ofthe
Consititution,whichstatesthat
"Sec.3.Noprovince,city,municipalityorbarriomaybecreated,divided,merged,abolished,orits
boundarysubstantiallyalteredexceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedintheLocalGovernment
Code,andsubjecttotheapprovalbyamajorityofthevotesinaplebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected."
HELD:
Ininterpretingtheaboveprovision,theSupremeCourtheldthatwheneveraprovinceiscreated,dividedor
mergedandthereissubstantialalterationoftheboundaries,"theapprovalofamajorityofvotesinthe
plebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected"mustfirstbeobtained.
ThecreationoftheproposednewprovinceofNegrosdelNortewillnecessarilyresultinthedivisionand
alterationoftheexistingboundariesofNegrosOccidental.
"Plainandsimplelogicwilldemonstratethattwopoliticalunitswouldbeaffected.Thefirstwouldbethe
parentprovinceofNegrosOccidentalbecauseitsboundarieswouldbesubstantiallyaltered.Theother
affectedentitywouldbecomposedofthoseintheareasubtractedfromthemotherprovincetoconstitute
theproposedprovinceofNegrosdelNorte."
TheSupremeCourtfurtherheldthatthecaseofGovernorZosimoParedesversustheHonorableExecutive
SecretarytothePresident,etal.,G.R.No.55628,March2,1984(128SCRA6),whichtherespondents
usedtosupporttheircase,shouldnotbetakenasadoctrinalorcompellingprecedent.Rather,itheldthat
thedissentingviewofJusticeVicenteAbadSantosintheaforementionedcaseistheforerunnerofthe
applicableruling,quotingthat:
"...whentheConstitutionspeaksof"theunitorunitsaffected"itmeansallofthepeopleofthemunicipality
ifthemunicipalityistobedividedsuchasinthecaseatbarorofthepeopleoftwoormoremunicipalities
iftherebeamerger.IseenoambiguityintheConstitutionalprovision."
ItappearedthatwhenParliamentaryBillNO.3644whichproposedthecreationofthenewprovinceof
NegrosdelNortewaspassedforapproval,itrecitedthereinthat"theplebisciteshallbeconductedinthe
areasaffectedwithinaperiodofonehundredandtwentydaysfromtheapprovalofthisAct."However,
whenthebillwasenactedintoB.P.885,tehrewasanunexplainedchangefrom"areasaffecte"to"the
proposednewprovince,whicharetheareasaffected."TheSupremeCourtheldthatitwasaselfserving
phrasetostatethatthenewprovinceconstitutestheareaaffected.
"Suchadditionalstatementservesnousefulpurposeforthesameismisleading,erroneous,andfarfrom
truth.Theremainingportionoftheparentprovinceisasmuchanareaaffected.Thesubstantialalterationof
theboundariesoftheparentprovince,nottomentiontheadverseeconomiceffectsitmightsuffer,

eloquentlyarguethepointsraisedbythepetitioners."
Consequently,theSupremeCourtpronouncedthattheplebsciteheldonJanuary3,1986hasnolegaleffect
forbeingapatentnullity.
"WHEREFORE,BatasPambansaBlg.885isherebydeclaredunconstitutional.Theproclamationofthe
newprovinceofNegrosdelNorte,aswellastheappointmentoftheofficialsthereofarealsodeclarednull
andvoid.
SOORDERED."

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local
Government Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite
for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending
that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living
within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be
about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or
units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing
boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The
first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would
be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the
area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of
Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is
applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at
bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No.
7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA
No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the
people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that
the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued
that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at
bar.
RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has

the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political
question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could
decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is
mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of
the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all
residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard
in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by
the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them
proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.
ROBERT

V.

TOBIAS,

ET

AL.

vs.

BENJAMIN

S.

ABALOS,

ET

AL.

Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking
their

right

as

tax

payers

and

residents

of

Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of
Mandaluyong

to

highly

urbanized

city

ratifying

RA 7675

and

making

it

in

effect.

Issues:
WON

RA

7675

is

in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250
and

reappropriating

the

legislative

districts.

Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining
to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions

are

germane

to

that

general

subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act
of

the

legislature

to

increase

the

number

of

the

members

of

the

congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning

the

legislative

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

district.