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[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]



The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not selfexecuting but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they
ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered
by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -


1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October
23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other
type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner

and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad x x x x which respondent GSIS refused to accept.


On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded

the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it
was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos
who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it
has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a
part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock
of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.


It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the
bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
in terms of price per share.

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a selfexecuting provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which
business may be done.

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial
sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2,
Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of

the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not
to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from
the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51%
of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting
a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a
matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a
matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail
since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly,
the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it
demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system
of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and
all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether


promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private

persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental
and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.


As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally

drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic.That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that [14]

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather

than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-avis Filipinos who are not qualified.So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty
for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily
an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-

executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on
the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.


Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions
are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing
and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, the
sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building, the promotion of
social justice, and the values of education. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance refers
to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights and on education.
Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, the sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
the promotion of total human liberation and development. A reading of these
provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest
that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.














On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos,it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be

preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy.Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission explains [34]

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers
not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore,
we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine

heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who
are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The
Heart and Memory of a City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the
Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces
returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with
Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand.Thereafter, in the 1950s and
1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This
is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And
the amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have
to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we
not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about
a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may
refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will
include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities
fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise,
will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE
the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given
preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding

the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo [43]

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision
was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be
chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
respondent GSIS and selected as one of thequalified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here
is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in
the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it
has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel.

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that
the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government
itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty
to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal

standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or
perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the

State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of
51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a state action.In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under
the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also
to the government as elements of the State.After all, government is composed of three
(3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference onqualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder.Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the

provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a
basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the
foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution.For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be
always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to
do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is
presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale
only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid

tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate,
petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have
the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly,
only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is
to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic
conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily
to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding
the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that
it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever
such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter
could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility
of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in

connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.Indeed, the Court will always defer to
the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing
sosacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved.

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic

and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the
people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot
override the demands of nationalism.

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to
be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking
about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a
historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of
the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would
prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has
played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of
the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has
played a part in the shaping of a country.

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a
total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche
to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed,
a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask:
What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained
by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How
much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of theFilipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation atP44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements
and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.

Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.