Poli Case Digests 1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, July 21, 2006.
(CRUZ)
DOCTRINE:
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and
the Office of the Ombudsman; CHR is not one of them.
FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers
the appropriations of the CHR.
On the strength of these special provisions, CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of
ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position,
with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security
Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary
Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing
for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the several positions in
the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the
CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a
commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel
Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November
1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the

positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one
Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one
accounting Clerk II.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme
to the Department of Budget and Management [DBM] with a request
for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the
request on the following grounds:
It involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to
services.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be
used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a
bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, such
scheme should be denied.
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational
unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the
creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs
Office cannot be given favorable recommendation.
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law,
the Department of Budget and Management is directed to
establish and administer a unified compensation and position
classification system in the government. The Supreme Court
ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that DBM the sole power
and discretion to administer the compensation and position
classification system of the National Government.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the
members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within
1 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through
a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended to the CSCCentral Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the
DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human Rights
Employees Association [CHREA], in representation of the rank and
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central office to affirm
the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its
ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate
authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of
reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated
16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. Petitioner
CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the
ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.
Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and successfully
obtained the favorable action in its Decision dated 25 November
2004. Respondent then filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
CONTENTION:
** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that there is no legal basis to
support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
** Supreme Court erred in stating that the special provision of the
RA No. 8522 did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices
to which the special provision to formulate and implement
organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to
include constitutional commissions and offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy;
** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the CHR although
admittedly a constitutional creation is nonetheless not included in the
genus of the offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
** Supreme Court erred in deciding to reinstate the ruling dated 29
march 1999 of the civil service commission national capital region;
** Supreme Court erred in deciding to disallow the Commission On
Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated September 04, 1998,
Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 october 1998 and Resolution No.
A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the
department of budget and management.
ISSUES:
1. WON CHREA has the capacity to sue and/or the proper party
2. WON CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed with
fiscal autonomy
3. WON approval of DBM is a condition precedent to the approval
of the scheme
HELD:
1. YES.
On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or
is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the
act complained of.13 Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and
file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading
and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the
upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently
meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's upgrading scheme, if
found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission's
savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for

Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees,
including those in the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized
by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA's request to affirm
the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office.
CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of
Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither
should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is
settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the
complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process.
2. NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously
grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As already
settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of
respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in
the strict sense, a constitutional commission. The creation of
respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in
the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the
1987
Constitution,
plainly
entitled
Constitutional
Commissions, identifies only the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The
mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section
17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its
benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or
statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim
of fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution extends to
respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the
privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released
automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from
respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense,
as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and
the Office of the Ombudsman.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary
in Article VIII, Section 3. Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal
autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a
provision applied in common to all constitutional commissions. The
Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue of Article
XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating
that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2)
its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly
released. The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the
fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, which provides that the
approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
As compared to Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A, Section 5;
and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution on the Judiciary,
the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human
Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the
express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second
sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations.
Fiscal Autonomy defined. It means independence or freedom
regarding financial matters from outside control and is characterized
by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere
automatic and regular release of approved appropriations to agencies
vested with such power in a very real sense, the fiscal autonomy
contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even before and, with
more reasons, after the release of the appropriations.
Fiscal
autonomy encompasses, among others, budget preparation and
implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts.

This Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to
respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege
of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically
and regularly.
However, it withholds from respondent fiscal
autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the
Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the
Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule of statutory construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or in this
case, the ConCom) would not have made specific enumerations in a
statute (or the Constitution) had the intention not been to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
DOCTRINE:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.
3. YES. This Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the

legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the
assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be
sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). He is currently holding the
position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth
Regional Office CARAGA.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this

Court shares the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to
the Salary Standardization Law.
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the
Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other
benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the
Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its
standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines
(Senate) conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported
excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and
government financial institutions (GFIs).
The Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The
assailed Decision of this Court dated 25 November 2004 is hereby
MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a constitutional body
enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the
automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations;
nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary
Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme
remains subject to the approval of the DBM.
GALICIO VS. AQUINO ET AL.
G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy

by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.
EO 7 is constitutional. The question as to constitutionality of EO 7
serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of
the enactment of R.A. No. 10149.
Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various

[GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves
unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and
other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices, the
Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order
the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of

members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010,
issued EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the
Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and
[GFIs], and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding
principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and
position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. It ordered (1) a
moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900,
of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by
the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and
incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010.
It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of
Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and
releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or
additional benefits and allowances to their employees.
CONTENTIONS:
**The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected
by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contended
that:
1. EO 7 is null and void for lack of legal basis. PD 985 is not
applicable as its basis because the GOCCs were subsequently
granted the power to fix compensation long after such power
has been revoked by PD 1597 and RA 6758. GOCCs do not
need to have its compensation plans, rates and policies
reviewed by the DBM and approved by the President because
PD 1597 requires only the GOCCs to report to the President
their plans and rates but the same does not give the President
the power of control over the fiscal power of the GOCCs. JR
No. 4, Series of 2009 is not applicable as legal basis because it
had not ripened into law.

2. EO 7 is invalid for divesting the Board of Directors of the
GOCCs of their power to fix the compensation, a power which
is a legislative grant and which could not be revoked or
modified by an executive fiat.
3. EO 7 is by substance a law which is a derogation of
congressional prerogative and is therefore unconstitutional.
4. The acts of suspending and imposing moratorium are ultra
vires acts because JR No. 4 does not expressly authorize the
President to exercise such powers.
5. EO 7 is an invalid issuance because it has no sufficient
standards and is therefore arbitrary, unreasonable and a
violaton of substantive due process.
6. EO 7 involves the determination and discretion as to what the
law shall be and is therefore invalid for its usurpation of
legislative power.
7. Consistent with the decision of the SC in Pimentel vs Aguirre
Case, EO 7 is only directory and not mandatory.
**As defense of respondents, the following are procedural defects as
grounds for the dismissal of the petition:
1. the petitioner lacks locus standi;
2. the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or secretarys
certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in behalf of
PhilHealth;
3. the petitioners signature does not indicate his PTR Number,
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance
Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Number;
4. the jurat of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification card as
provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC;
5. the President should be dropped as a party respondent as he
is immune from suit; and
6. certiorari is not applicable to this case.
7. They claim that the President exercises control over the
governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix
their compensation packages. In addition, EO 7 was issued in

accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of
excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to
GOCC and GFI employees. They also advocate the validity of
Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the
authority for issuing EO 7.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10149,[15] otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of
2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to
fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has locus standi.
2. Whether or not EO 7 is valid.
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioner lacks locus standi.
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner
has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material
interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if
any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this
case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and
other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent
events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights
to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right
deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. We
note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and
statutory questions concerning the power of the President to
fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with
possible implications on their officials and employees, the
same cannot infuse or give the petitioner locus standi under
the transcendental importance or paramount public interest
doctrine.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. This requirement of standing relates to the
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional
question when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest."
To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present
petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he
stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a
moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased
benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the
prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation. The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a
member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring
that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and
validly issued and implemented.
The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real
party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits

are merely contingent events or expectancies. The petitioner, too, is
not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial
protection.
It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not
something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert.
It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the courts time,
as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of
another department of government. If the asserted injury is more
imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the
courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not
really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication. The
rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no
means trifle.
Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary
presentation of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant
the Judiciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate,
democratically elected organ of government, such as the President,
and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale
goes to the very essence of representative democracies.
Since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal
interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have
filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In this
regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the
petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate
from PhilHealth to act as its representative.
2. YES. The issue is rendered moot.
The petition was dismissed for its patent formal and procedural
infirmities and for having been mooted by subsequent events. With
the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is
now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and
GFIs. The new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that
enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation
frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the
compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and
GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that,
the President can now reissue an EO containing these same
provisions without any legal constraints. Congress, thru R.A. No.
10149, has expressly empowered the President to establish the
compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule
upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an
academic exercise
The petition has been mooted by supervening events. Because of the
transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present
case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events:
(1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that
suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees
of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149
amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs
empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own
compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the
President to perform this act.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the
President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of
GOCCs and GFIs.
As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A.
No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix
their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the
President to fix the compensation and position classification system
for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law.
This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing
these same provisions without any legal constraints.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. [A]n action is considered moot
when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter
in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to

judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x
x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
This is the present situation here. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is
moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the
words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on an
issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no
longer x x x a flesh and blood case for the Court to resolve.
Petition was DISMISSED.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS ET AL.
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997
DOCTRINE:
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
Manila Hotel is part of our national patrimony. National patrimony
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986, GSIS decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18

September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: (1.) Petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered
to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and (2.) Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%
of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
CONTENTION:
**Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of
the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is

unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction
involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by
the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies.
Since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For
the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.
**Respondents contended that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it
is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s). Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be
done.
Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not
fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
While petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and
the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the
nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed
to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of
its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is

being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid
has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a
matching bid had not yet taken place.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the provisions of the constitution is selfexecuting
2. Whether or not the shares of Manila Hotel is part of the
national national economy and patrimony covered by the
protective mantle of the Constitution.
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence,
mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII
of the Constitution
4. Whether or not the Filipino First policy should be applied
HELD:
1. YES. The prevailing view is that in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing unless the contrary is clearly intended.
A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right

it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
Apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such
a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature
is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of
such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection
of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that
it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further
the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from
which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES. As regards our national patrimony, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission explained
(1) The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to
our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore,
we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the

Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
(2) Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial
of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It
was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the
site of the festivities during the inauguration of the
Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality.
(3) For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
NOTE: The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference
shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to
the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential
treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when

a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with
its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has
been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel
company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency
to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
3. YES. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone
makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
state action. When the Constitution addresses the State it
refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government.
In this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered state action covered by
the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public
function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved
with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent
GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of state action.

Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.
4. YES. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is
not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely
for the sake of privatization. The patrimony of the Nation that
should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.
It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains
to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution,
i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos is invoked by petitioner in its
bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.
Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not selfexecuting but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares
form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by
the protective mantle of the Constitution.
In the present case, it should be stressed that while the Malaysian
firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.
For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
GSIS was directed to cease and desist from selling the shares of
Manila Hotel Corporation and to accept the matching bid of petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation to purchase the subject shares.
KILOSBAYAN ET AL. VS. GUINGONA ET AL.
G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
GATACELO
DOCTRINE:
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised.
FACTS:
PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose
of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
After learning of the same, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational
company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an
initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino
investors a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the
medium through which the technical and management services
required for the project would be offered and delivered to
PCSO. Considering the Constitutions citizenship requirement, the
PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity
stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75%
foreign stockholdings to local investors.
Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent
PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line lottery system

and that the corresponding implementing contract would be
submitted thereafter. KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential
Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system
on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Nevertheless,
an agreement denominated as "Contract of Lease" was finally
executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC. The President,
per the press statement issued by the Office of the President,
approved it on 20 December 1993.
KILOSBAYAN, a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civicspirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal, along
with Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Joker Arroyo
acting in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers
and concerned citizens of the Philippines, want to nullify the said
contract. They claim that the Office of the President, acting through
Executive Secretary Guingona and/or Assistant Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs Corona, and the PCSO gravely abused their discretion
and/or functions tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and/or authority in
respectively. Moreover, they alleged that PCSO is prohibited from
holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity" pursuant to
its charter, a Congressional franchise is required before any person
may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications
system, among others.
Meanwhile, PGMC asserts that it is merely an independent contractor
for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery
system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise)
and not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO
sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture'
with PGMC; and that the petitioners do not appear to have the legal
standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the
reliefs sought. Guingona, Corona, and PCSO assert similar counterarguments.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have locus standi.
HELD:
Yes. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned,
this Court had declared that it is not devoid of discretion as to
whether or not it should be entertained, or that it enjoys an open
discretion to entertain the same or not. Several cases were cited to
bolster this claim, and one of those was from Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform .
It declared:
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in
the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is
in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the

Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers

were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The Court dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties
and ruled that the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then
applied this exception in many other cases.

Likewise, SC finds the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the
remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE
APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE
RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT
A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and
benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal
autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches
upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
FACTS:
Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA)
found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted
when five retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to
the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.
According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the
subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in
compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 0312-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA
Memorandum No. 98-569-A4.

Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative
Officer, recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the
in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this
was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court
in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the
appraisal and disposal of government property since these were
issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances
involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA
upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the
formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the
Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling
of its budget and resources.
ISSUE:
WON COAs interference, in this case, violates the judiciarys
autonomy.
HELD:
Yes. The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under
Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority,
however, must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on
judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings
on these matters. The concept of the independence of the three
branches of government extends from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers
in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded
by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of
another or others.

Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two distinct
concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence.
Decisional independence refers to a judges ability to render
decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the
individual facts and applicable law.On the other hand, institutional
independence describes the separation of the judicial branch from
the executive and legislative branches of government.
deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement

benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the
exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this
administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the
Judiciarys internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle
and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its
personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.
While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control

the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of
interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys
fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch
of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function
of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for
that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of)
legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears
to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of
legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence
and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of
fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula
provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts
exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the
granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind
of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are
exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme
Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the

Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the
exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its
personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution reflects, the fiscal
autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of
the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court
and the appellate courts. The Judiciary has full flexibility to allocate
and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its)
needs require.
DOCTRINE:
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question.
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to

reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of
specifically designated properties that they used during their
incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit.
This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that
even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-44640 OCTOBER 12, 1976
FACTS:
President Marcos issued PD. No. 991 calling for a national referendum
on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of
his present powers. Thereafter, the President issued PD No. 1031,
amending PD No. 991, by providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.

Soon, the President issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to be
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16. The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to
be continued? (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be
continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum
shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution. And some of the proposed
amendments were: 1) In lieu of the interim National Assembly, an
interim Batasang Pambansa shall be established; 2) Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have
the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the members thereof; 3) The incumbent
President shall convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside
over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The
incumbent President shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue
to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa
is organized and ready to discharge its functions...; and among
others.
Pablo and Pablito Sanidad, father and son, commenced a suit for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16. They contend that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments
to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite
on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General principally maintains that
petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in
nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the

transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.
Issues:
1. WON Pablo and Pablito Sanidad have locus standi.
2. WON the amendment process is justiciable.
3. WON President Marcos can propose amendments to
the Constitution.
Held:
1. Yes. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad possess locus standi. It is now
an ancient rule that Presidential Decrees may be contested by
one who will sustain direct injuries as a result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of
Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five
Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes.
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight
Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the
petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that
personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating
said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court
enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. For
the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed
Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.

2. Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification raises a judicial question. Under the terms of the
1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the
period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session,
the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1
and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has
not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly
to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments,
written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation
are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said
Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of
this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new
Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard
and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members." The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only
of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution,
is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act
of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such
act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.

Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen
[empty threat]. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution,
can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.
3. Yes. There are two periods contemplated in the constitutional
life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be
initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all
the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of
a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the
electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all
the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister.
The power then to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the
interim National Assembly during the transition period.
However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter
fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President.
And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the
people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President
(See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the
dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call
the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the
bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to

assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-avis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The
answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly,
there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its
gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the
President has converted his office into a constituent assembly
of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather,
with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the
Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of
absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to
act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to
propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For
the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to
undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding
the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and
restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential
initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of
the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere
agents of the people.
LAMP vs. SEC. OF DBM
G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012
LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
In order for a court to exercise the power of judicial review, the four
requisites must be present.
FACTS:
The GAA of 2004 provides, among others, the use and release of
priority development assistance fund in the amount of
8,327,000,000.00. According to LAMP (LAWYERS AGAINST
MONOPOLY AND POVERTY), the General Appropriations Act of 2004
(GAA) is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for
the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
funded out of PDAF.
In previous GAAs, said allocation and
identification of projects were the main features of the pork barrel
system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund (CDF).
Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of
CY 2004). The omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as
allocations to individual Members of Congress is a casus omissus
signifying an omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court
is forbidden to supply. Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion that the
pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of
GAA 2004.
Respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and
factual grounds. Without probative value, media reports cited by the
petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that
corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their
pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners plea to
take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is
no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a source
of dirty money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who
tend to misuse their allocations.
ISSUE:
WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are
met in this case.
RULING:
Yes.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an

actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally
treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an
alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According
to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the
Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and
select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a
serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public
funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely
affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be
tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause
injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present
controversy.
Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In public suits,
the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a
person who is affected no differently from any other person, and
could be suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer. Thus,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to

any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is
the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Here, the sufficient interest
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that
PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be
allowed to sue. Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues
impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues
involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction
over the petition.
(ADDITIONAL INFO)
The petition was dismissed by the court. The petition is seriously
wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of
this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises
and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down
the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the
authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select
projects was already upheld in Philconsa case. This remains as valid
case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing
pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget,
the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
DOCTRINE:
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition).
The Delfin Petition alleged, among others, that the provisions sought
to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article
VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"
embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion
from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits,
and with the following proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING
THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? After complying with the order of
the COMELEC, the petition was set for hearing. After hearing their
arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
The petitioners herein (Santiago, Padilla, Ongpin) filed a special civil
action for prohibition for the ff. reasons: (1) The constitutional
provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on
local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III; (3) Republic
Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon

ratification and not after publication; (4) COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 adopted to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
law; (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits
constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative; (6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated
funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the
purpose.
ISSUE:
WON RA 6735 is sufficient insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
RULING:
No.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides for the exercise
of the right of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative.The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-executory. The
Court agrees that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
However, it is not in full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right. First, contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,

ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section
is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do
so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not
include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted
or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a

law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. Hence, to complete the
classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. As to initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twentythree sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in
Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in
the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for
the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was,
therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the
paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 5
SALONGA vs. PAO
134 SCRA 438 G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
DOCTRINE:
The Court exercised the power of judicial review even if the issue had
become moot and academic since it has the duty to formulate guiding
and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.
FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months
of August, September and October of 1980. One Victor Burns Lovely,
Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California,
almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a
result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA
building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military
authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the
birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's

residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and
his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group
pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. Mr. Lovely and
his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with
subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio
press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor
Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his
interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor,
to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time
was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any
bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence
and did not carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the
afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate
of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's
residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his brother. The
next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines
stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various
bombings in Metro Manila. Arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs)
were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor
Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was
herein petitioner. Elements of the military went to the hospital room
of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined
due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and
placed him under arrest. The petitioner was transferred against his
objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without
windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The
petitioner states that he was not informed why he was transferred
and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any
military or civil authority. Subsequently, the petitioner was released
for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under
house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the
benefit of any investigation or charges. The counsel for petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. The
respondent judge denied the motion. He issued a resolution ordering
the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including

herein petitioner. The resolutions of the respondent judge are now
the subject of the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that
no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify
the filing of an information against him.
ISSUE:
WON the Court in this case may still exercise the power of judicial
review even if the issue has become moot and academic.
RULING:
Yes.
This case falls under the exception that the Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a draft
ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if
any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop
the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of
the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and
decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of
the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's
crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. Recent
developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well
known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of
State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the

individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the
awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the
totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. In this case, the
respondents agree with the Courts earlier finding that the prosecution
evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against the
petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to
overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive
organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges
against the petitioner. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that
this Court will not validate the filing of an information based
on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the
records.
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The duty to adjudicate
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the
concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its

Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, Rizalino Navarro,
signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to
its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December
14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to
ratify
the
WTO
Agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that
limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the WTO
agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the
development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted
as it gives foreign trading intervention.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION INVOLVES A POLITICAL
QUESTION.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE WTO AGREEMENT CONTRAVENE SEC.
19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petition raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The duty to adjudicate remains to

assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a
controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating

the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and
(3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither
will it rule on the propriety of the governments economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions,
and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty to determine whether or not there had been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its
three annexes.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.

Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it
(2) NO. Article II of the Constitution, declaration of principles and

state policies, are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by
the legislature in its enactment of laws. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation. Broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive
and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the
available remedy was not judicial but political.
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify

the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that
there are.
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely
laying down general principles relating to the national economy and
patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other
sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof. With these
goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic
nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos
in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor,
is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and

concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to
every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather
than the rule. The issue here whether, as a rule, there are enough
The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did

not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does
not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 159085 February 3, 2004
DOCTRINE:
Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may
be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even
in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and

controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision
making in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments
of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of
Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion.
Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.
435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to
call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the
report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that
the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President.
(3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of
the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issues:
(1) WON Petitioners have legal standing.
(2) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are
constitutional?
Held:
(1) No. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
a. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank
in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend,
protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the
people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert
human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens.
b. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and
mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably
assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under
Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to
publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to
mobilize public opinion to support the same.
Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations," this
status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question
the validity of the presidential issuances
Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may
be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even

in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates
decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just
any party.
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does
not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit
where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation. No such illegal disbursement is
alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional
question only when he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.
(2) Yes. The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President
in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President
has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the
Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or
that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts.
The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of

no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may
be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. NO. 171396 May 3, 2006
DOCTRINE:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review
Facts:
PGMA, declaring that Communist insurgents as well as political
opponents have conspired in order to bring down her government,
issued Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and
calling out the Armed Forces to suppress lawless violence and
rebellion and enforce obedience to laws and decrees. She issued
General Order 5 to implement the said PP, instructing the armed
forces to carry out the necessary measures to prevent and suppress
terrorism and violence. One week later, she issued PP 1021 lifting the
declaration of the state of national emergency. Seven suits were filed
contesting the validity of the said proclamations.

Issues:
1) Are PP 1017 and GO 5 unconstitutional?
2) Did the issuance of PP 1021 render PP1017 and GO 5 moot and
academic?
Held:
1) Partly. While the Constitution grants the President the take care
power under 17, Art. VII, which provides that The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, this does not grant
the President the authority to make decrees, which is essentially a
legislative function. Thus, the assailed PP is PARTLY
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it calls out the Armed Forces, and
PARTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it allows the President to
promulgate decrees, thereby encroaching on a legislative function.
2) A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
mootness.
present a
so that a
Generally,
ground of
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners
alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect
the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the

Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military
and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions
are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.
An otherwise "moot" case may still be decided " provided the party
raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced

or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. " The present case falls
right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the
Chief Justice.
Additional Info:
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is
but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial
power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on
legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017
and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount
importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the
whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of
this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the
application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation
of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017
cases."
FORTUN VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO
GR NO. 190293 MARCH 20, 2012
MURILLO
DOCTRINE:
Impose martial law for flimsy reasons and revoke the same before the
Congress acts on it. Youll be off the hook. Joke. Kidding aside, the
existence of an actual case/controversy is an essential requisite of
judicial review. The issues raised must not be moot and academic.
FACTS:
These cases are about the constitutionality of a presidential
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after
just eight days.
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, allegedly led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57
innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this,
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946 on November
24, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified
areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Two days later (December
6, 2009), President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit
to that body a report of her action. On December 9, 2009 Congress,
in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action.
However, two days later (December 12) before Congress could even
act on the issue, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963,
lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R.
190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380
brought the present actions to still challenge the constitutionality of
President Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao.
ISSUE:
W/N the courts can still pass upon the constitutionality of the
Presidential Proclamation
HELD:
NO. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the
joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on
the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become
moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law
and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that removed any justiciable
controversy. The court dismissed the consolidated petitions on the
ground that the same have become moot and academic.
P.S.
Theres a lengthy dissenting opinion from Justice Antonio Carpio,

which seems, personally, to be more sound and logical. Basically, he
argued that the case must not be considered moot and academic just
because the President already lifted the proclamation before the
Congress can even have the chance to act on it. And I quote:
I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions as moot. I find
Proclamation No. 1959 unconstitutional for lack of factual basis as
required in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.
Moreover, given the transcendental importance of the issues raised in
the present
petitions, the Court may relax the standing
requirement and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct
injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
In David v. Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic"
principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts
in resolving a case. Courts are not prevented from deciding cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and of
paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
Failing to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959 by
dismissing the cases on the ground of mootness sets a very
dangerous precedent to the leaders of this country that they could
easily impose martial law or suspend the writ without any factual or
legal basis at all, and before this Court could review such declaration,
they would simply lift the same and escape possible judicial
rebuke.
BAYAN VS SECRETARY ERMITA
GR NO. 169838 APRIL 25, 2006
DOCTRINE:
In a judicial review, a proper party is one who has sustained or is in

imminent danger of sustaining injury as a result of the act/law
complained of.
FACTS:
The case concerns the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880,
which regulates the rights of people to peaceably assemble and
organize. The first petitioners (Bayan, et al.) allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing BP 880. The second group consists of 26
individual petitioners (Jess del Prado, et al.) who allege that they were
injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held
on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the
police. The third group (Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al.) alleges that
they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as
organizations and those of their individual members as citizens,
specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and
the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed
to implement it. All petitioners assail BP 880, some of them in toto
and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the
policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the
"no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioners have no
standing because they have not presented any evidence that they had
been "injured, arrested or detained because of BP 880 and the CPR,"
and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating BP 880
and other offenses."
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners have legal standing to file the case in court
HELD:
YES. Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right
as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P.

No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble
in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press
their claim that no such permit can be validly required without
violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other
hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed
the public assemblies held without the permit. the petitions are
granted in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Governments, are directed to take all necessary
steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of BP 880
through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
The petitions are dismissed in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of BP 880 is sustained.
ROQUE VS COMELEC
GR NO. 188456 SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The existence of an actual case or controversy is essential for judicial
review. Mere speculations and conjectures cannot be the basis of a
sound judgment.
FACTS:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the
September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, denying the petition
of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic).
Petitioners aver that the contract was made in violation of the
Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner also
interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of
Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the
printing and electronic transmission of the election returns. Petitioners
seek a reconsideration of the September 10, 2009 Decision on many

issues or grounds, one of which is:
1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there is a
"high probability" that there will be failure of automated
elections; X X X
Both public and private respondents, upon the other hand, insist that
petitioners motion for reconsideration should be held devoid of merit,
because the motion, for the most part, either advances issues or
theories not raised in the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, and argues along speculative and conjectural lines.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court should grant the said motion for reconsideration
HELD:
NO. Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters
that may or may not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of
the first issue raised is reflected in the very manner of its formulation
and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public
respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a high
probability that there will be automated failure of elections"; "there is
a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010
elections will result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical
nightmaresand the lack of contingency plans that should have been
crafted as a result of a pilot testmake an automated failure of
elections very probable"; and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x
despite the likelihood of a failure of elections ." Speculations and
conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any,
probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues
already resolved in the decision sought to be reconsideredand this
should not be an obstacle for a reconsiderationthe hard reality is
that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or

compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.
Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very
strong indications that Private Respondents will not be able to provide
for telecommunication facilities for areas without these facilities." This
argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value
and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation
contract. Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a
legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.
Motion for reconsideration was, therefore, denied.
GONZALES III VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GR NO. 196231-32 SEPTEMBER 4, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The laws have to be interpreted as a
whole.
Ration legis et anima. The laws have to be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of the framers.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231: The case deals with the Manila hostage crisis
committed by Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza
- foreigners and tourists as his victims. Apparently, the hostage drama
was ignited by Mendozas frustration regarding the case filed against
him which warranted his removal from office. Mendoza has a pending
motion for reconsideration before Deputy Ombudsman Gozales III
(petitioner) which dragged on for nine months (without any justifiable
reason for the long delay). This was seen by the IIRC as one of the
main reasons why Mendoza became motivated to hostage innocent
tourists. In a way, Gonzales negligence was blamed. Due to this, the
Office of the President recommended his removal from office as
Deputy Ombudsman.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife
Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia, and several unknown persons, with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. At the conclusion of
these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted
Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the
dismissal of petitioner from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions
tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman Act.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seek to
declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives
the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the
Office of the Ombudsman. They aver that only the Ombudsman has
the power to impose sanctions on them.
ISSUE:
W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of
the Ombudsman
HELD:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a
DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the
Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and
covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with
the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power

of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A
harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting
provisions in R.A. No 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the
manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that would
exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing
the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply
a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers'
real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try
to protect one another from administrative liabilities. By granting
express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an
obvious gap inthe law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself
is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however,
no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from
office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that
matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled
a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the
Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor,
who
are
not
subject
to
impeachment.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act is, thus, denied.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the

1 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

2 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

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the Office of the Ombudsman.

3 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

3. YES. This Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the

Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this

The Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy

Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various

4 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

had not ripened into law.

5 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

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6 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

7 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18

8 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

10 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when

11 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

12 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers

13 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Memorandum No. 98-569-A4.

14 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement

While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control

The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

15 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the

16 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

18 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to

19 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon

20 CRUZ, GATACELO, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a