Taada vs. Angara, G.R. No.

118295, May 2, 1997

The Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to
the Senate of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of
"new opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and
(the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter,
the Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession will benefit from the WTO system of dispute
settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels
and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived
at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at
a disadvantage.
Samson vs. Daway
G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004
Facts:
Samson, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinsons Galleria, EDSA
corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for
sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely
identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or
designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of
CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following internationally: CATERPILLAR, CAT,
CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, CAT AND DESIGN, WALKING MACHINES and TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.
Caterpillar Inc. sued Samson for unfair competition in RTC. Samson filed a motion to for the quashal of information for lack
of jurisdiction. Samson contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair
competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial
Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
xxx
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment
from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. (jurisdiction of Municipal
Trial Courts)
xxx
Under Section 27 of of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law)
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair
Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before
the Court of First Instance.
Issues:
Whether or not R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293?
Held:

No, R.A. No. 8293 does not expressly repealed R.A. 166.
SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as
amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree
No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed.
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the
phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith; and it would have simply stated Republic Act No. 165, as amended;
Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49,
including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed. It would have removed all doubts that said
specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith
only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No.
8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No.
8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would
have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. vs. Aiken
422 U.S. 151
Facts
20Th Century Music Corporation copyrighted songs were received on the radio in Aikens food shop from a local
broadcasting station, which was licensed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers to perform the
songs, but Aiken had no such license. 20th Century Music then sued Aikenfor copyright infringement. The District Court
granted awards, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue Whether the reception of a radio broadcast of a copyrighted musical composition can constitute copyright
infringement when the copyright owner has licensed the broadcaster to perform the composition publicly for profit?
Held
Aiken did not infringe upon 20th Century exclusive right, under the Copyright Act, "[t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly
for profit," since the radio reception did not constitute a "performance" of the copyrighted songs.
To hold that Aiken "performed" the copyrighted works would obviously result in a wholly unenforceable regime of copyright
law, and would also be highly inequitable, since (short of keeping his radio turned off) one in Aiken's position would be
unable to protect himself from infringement liability. Such a ruling, moreover, would authorize the sale of an untold number
of licenses for what is basically a single rendition of a copyrighted work, thus conflicting with the balanced purpose of the
Copyright Act of assuring the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition while, at the same time,
protecting the public from oppressive monopolies.
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the
Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. "The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors." When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act
must be construed in light of this basic purpose.
Feist Publications, Inc. vs. Rural Television Services Company
499 U.S. 340, 1991

Facts:
Rural Telephone Service Company is a certified public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in
northwest Kansas. It is subject to a state regulation that requires all telephone companies operating in Kansas to issue
annually an updated telephone directory. Accordingly, as a condition of its monopoly franchise, Rural publishes a typical
telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages. The white pages list in alphabetical order the names of
Rural's subscribers, together with their towns and telephone numbers. The yellow pages list Rural's business subscribers
alphabetically by category and feature classified advertisements of various sizes. Rural distributes its directory free of
charge to its subscribers, but earns revenue by selling yellow pages advertisements.
Feist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories. Unlike a typical
directory, which covers only a particular calling area, Feist's area-wide directories cover a much larger geographical range,
reducing the need to call directory assistance or consult multiple directories.
The Feist directory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 different telephone service areas in 15 counties and
contains 46,878 white pages listings -- compared to Rural's approximately 7,700 listings. Like Rural's directory, Feist's is
distributed free of charge and includes both white pages and yellow pages. Feist and Rural compete vigorously for yellow
pages advertising.
As the sole provider of telephone service in its service area, Rural obtains subscriber information quite easily. Persons
desiring telephone service must apply to Rural and provide their names and addresses; Rural then assigns them a
telephone number. Feist is not a telephone company, let alone one with monopoly status, and therefore lacks independent
access to any subscriber information. To obtain white pages listings for its area-wide directory, Feist approached each of the
11 telephone companies operating in northwest Kansas and offered to pay for the right to use its white pages listings.
Of the 11 telephone companies, only Rural refused to license its listings to Feist. Rural's refusal created a problem for Feist,
as omitting these listings would have left a gaping hole in its area-wide directory, rendering it less attractive to potential
yellow pages advertisers.
Unable to license Rural's white pages listings, Feist used them without Rural's consent. Feist began by removing several
thousand listings that fell outside the geographic range of its area-wide directory, then hired personnel to investigate the
4,935 that remained. These employees verified [p*344] the data reported by Rural and sought to obtain additional
information. As a result, a typical Feist listing includes the individual's street address; most of Rural's listings do not.
Notwithstanding these additions, however, 1,309 of the 46,878 listings in Feist's 1983 directory were identical to listings in
Rural's 1982-1983 white pages. Four of these were fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to detect
copying.
Rural sued for copyright infringement in the District Court for the District of Kansas taking the position that Feist, in
compiling its own directory, could not use the information contained in Rural's white pages. Rural asserted that Feist's
employees were obliged to travel door-to-door or conduct a telephone survey to discover the same information for
themselves. Feist responded that such efforts were economically impractical and, in any event, unnecessary because the
information copied was beyond the scope of copyright protection.
Issues:
Whether or not Telephone directories are copyrightable or not?
Held:
The court rule that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are. There can be no valid
copyright in facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that "no author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates." Rural wisely concedes this point, noting in its brief that "facts and discoveries, of course,
are not themselves subject to copyright protection." However, it is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within the
subject matter of copyright. Compilations were expressly mentioned in the Copyright Act of 1909, and again in the Copyright
Act of 1976.

Kho vs. CA,

G.R. No. 115758, March 19, 2002
Facts
Kho is doing business under the name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, the registered owner of the copyrights Chin
Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream Container/Case, that she also has patent rights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun
Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner thereof in the Supplemental
Register of the Philippine Patent Office.
Summerville advertised and sold Khos cream products under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that Kho
uses, thereby misleading the public, and resulting in the decline in the Khos business sales and income; and, that the
Summerville should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the Kho.
Summerville on the other hand, alleged as their defense that they are the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and
distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing
company authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent
Office and other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the of Kho obtained the copyrights
through misrepresentation and falsification; and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration
certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines had already been terminated by the said
Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.
On December 20, 1991, Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, against the Summerville General Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang
Tiam Chay.
Issues
Whether the copyright and patent over the name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the registrant to the
use and ownership over the same to the exclusion of others?
Held
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A
trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and
shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation
identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works
which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation.
Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is
new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable.
Kho has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its container. The name and
container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its
definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must
sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioners copyright and patent registration of
the name and container would not guarantee her right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not
appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the
reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of
others, not having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.
Pest Management Association of the Philippines vs. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007
Facts

The case commenced upon PMAPs filing of a Petition For Declaratory Relief With Prayer For Issuance Of A Writ Of
Preliminary Injunction And/Or Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC on January 4, 2002.
Petitioner, a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, is an
association of pesticide handlers duly licensed by respondent Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA ). It questioned the
validity of Section 3.12 of the 1987 Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines, which provides thus:
3.12 Protection of Proprietary Data
Data submitted to support the first full or conditional registration of a pesticide active ingredient in the Philippines will be
granted proprietary protection for a period of seven years from the date of such registration. During this period subsequent
registrants may rely on these data only with third party authorization or otherwise must submit their own data. After this
period, all data may be freely cited in support of registration by any applicant, provided convincing proof is submitted that
the product being registered is identical or substantially similar to any current registered pesticide, or differs only in ways
that would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects.
Issues
Whether or not FPA encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Office?
Held
There is no encroachment upon the powers of the IPO granted under R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines. Section 5 thereof enumerates the functions of the IPO. Nowhere in said provision does it
state nor can it be inferred that the law intended the IPO to have the exclusive authority to protect or promote intellectual
property rights in the Philippines. On the contrary, paragraph (g) of said Section even provides that the IPO shall
"[c]oordinate with other government agencies and the private sector efforts to formulate and implement plans and policies to
strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights in the country." Clearly, R.A. No. 8293 recognizes that efforts to fully
protect intellectual property rights cannot be undertaken by the IPO alone. Other agencies dealing with intellectual property
rights are, therefore, not precluded from issuing policies, guidelines and regulations to give protection to such rights.
Lastly, FPA emphasize that the provision on protection of proprietary data does not usurp the functions of the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) since a patent and data protection are two different matters. A patent prohibits all unlicensed making,
using and selling of a particular product, while data protection accorded by the FPA merely prevents copying or
unauthorized use of an applicant's data, but any other party may independently generate and use his own data. It is further
argued that under Republic Act No. 8293 (R.A. No. 8293), the grant of power to the IPO to administer and implement State
policies on intellectual property is not exclusionary as the IPO is even allowed to coordinate with other government agencies
to formulate and implement plans and policies to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights.