Santos III vs.

Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256

FACTS: Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In
October 1986, he bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines
(NOA) in San Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via
Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight was in December. A
day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he made no
reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident,
he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that complaints against
international carriers can only be instituted in:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOAs domicile is in the USA);
2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had
been made (ticket was purchased in San Francisco so thats where the
contract was made);
4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket
which final destination is San Francisco).
The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine
courts have jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the constitutionality
of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to
conduct judicial review.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter
for the SC is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was
ratified by the Senate. Until & unless there would be amendment to the
Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the
place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the
legislative and the executive. The presumption is that it was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given
the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer any
compelling argument to overcome the presumption.

Reyes v. Bagatsing, 25 SCRA 553 (1983)

FACTS: Petitioners request for a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally
was denied by respondent mayor due to police intelligence reports affirming
plans of criminal intent to disrupt the assembly. Respondent recommended
that the permit may be issued if said rally is to be held at any other enclosed
area where safety is ensured.
ISSUE: Whether or not denial of a permit to rally violates freedom of speech.
HELD: Yes. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right,
is the danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil public
safety, public morals, or any other legitimate public interest. Peaceful
assemblies are guaranteed in freedom of speech.

Tanada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18

FACTS: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the
concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via
signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving
its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
HELD: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.
Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be
considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations
among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty
as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is
not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should
this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a

limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure

for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 346 (1994)

FACTS: Australia and the Government of the Philippines, in the suppression
of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The
said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on
September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified
each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force
of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision
of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an
ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the
prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial
rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in
petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the
Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to
the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted
for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already
committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

Arthur Lim et.al., vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11,
2002
FACTS: Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan-02-1. They were
subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both
party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando
filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS
and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their
organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly
affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.
The petitioners alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by the Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States.
Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance
in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or
the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does
not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine
Territory.
ISSUE: Is the Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?
HELD: The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the
Philippines and the US and it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to
it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercise.
The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from
engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for
in the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were
raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the
Terms of Reference.
Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of
Balikatan-02-1 joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra
of error that would otherwise call for the correction on its part.
The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

BAYAN et al., vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10,

2000 [342 SCRA 449]
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional?
HELD: NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18
is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in
[in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as
a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America

in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is
to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds
itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality
of the VFA.]

Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438 [2009]

FACTS: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of
rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by
the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a
crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the
countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and
Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole,
together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the
validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US
senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is selfexecuting.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry
out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As
a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US
faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court
during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered
under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need
implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the
implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through
implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of
its provisions.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005

FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of
the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit
the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to
the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute.
The Philippines through the Charge de Affairs in UN. The provisions of the
Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory state.
Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and
international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of
the President.
HELD: No.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with
foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign
affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the
Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for
the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive
in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political
maturity and growth.

Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064. October 13, 2005

FACTS: During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with
a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was
to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate
the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs and
bond-conversion programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes
Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children who are
Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do
not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20,
Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power,
unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the
power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the
person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank
Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines or such
power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that the gravity by
which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that
the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the
requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the
country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the
said scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate
her debt power to the respondents.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers
and that the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of
this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is
irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can delegate this power to her
direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance
implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts
is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the
expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required
amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other
sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to
pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of timeconsuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,

studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward
this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate,
obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending
the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the
agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The
act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by
subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other
person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative
of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.