SHINULEAKS

- de waarheid over SHINU –

TrialCollective

print:

/ 499

TrialCollective:

SHINU :

.. [ ʃi nu ]
.. Japans werkwoord: “sterven ”
.. eerst: technologie die de dag berekent waar op je sterft
.. tweede: het moment waarop je sterft
.. gekend als het SHINU-uur / SHINU-getal
.. weergegeven als een getallenreeks: eg. 3711.6

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

2

Inleidend Voorwoord
Al sinds het na-oorlogse tijdperk is het menselijk genoom aan het imploderen, waardoor de levensverwachting van de
mens globaal gehalveerd wordt. Hierdoor zullen 90% van de kinderen geboren na 2005 nooit ouder worden dan 40
jaar.
Dit betekent dat tegen 2045 meer dan 50% van de huidige wereldbevolking uitgestorven zal zijn ten gevolge van
“natuurlijke” oorzaken.

Global World Population

SHINU adjusted Global Life Expectancy
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

projected Life Expectancy

0
1950
1957
1964
1971
1978
1985
1992
1999
2006
2013
2020
2027
2034
2041
2048
2055
2062
2069
2076
2083

1889
1897
1905
1913
1921
1929
1937
1945
1953
1961
1969
1977
1985
1993
2001
2009
2017
2025
2033
2041
2049
2057
2065

10

SHINU Life Expectancy

T-VOL

S-VOL

Dit zijn de conclusies van een geheime studie gebaseerd op de zogenaamde SHINU technologie; deze analyseert het
menselijk DNA in de witte bloedcellen en kan zo accuraat de levensverwachting van ieder proefpersoon meten.
Al sinds 2002 is Japan (en later de VS en Duitsland) bezig met een gericht en clandestien onderzoek om de SHINU van
hun bevolking en daarna ook de hele wereld in kaart te brengen. Het doel was om een oplossing te vinden voor het
probleem van hun verouderende werkbevolking, om zo hun competitief voordeel in de globale economie te
behouden. De resultaten van de studies waren echter even onverwacht als destructief en dwong hen om op korte tijd
en ondoordacht een nieuw plan te smeden. Een nieuwe wereldmacht werd ingericht op basis van SHINU, een
wereldorde waar hun suprematie centraal staat; door:
a) globale onrust te creëren met destabilisatie van de internationale economieën en samenlevingen door het
uitspelen van bestaande geopolitieke, economische en klimatologische spanningen
b) het creëren van een mondiale crisis door het selectief en precies laten uitlekken van de SHINU resultaten
c) hun voorsprong in SHINU kennis en inzichten exclusief te exploiteren en ten volle te benutten om tactisch
eigen bestuur te plannen en strategisch internationale posities te claimen
Het doel van deze onderneming was niets minder dan een nieuwe samenleving gebaseerd op de logica en efficiëntie
dat wie een hoge SHINU heeft en lang zal leven de enige garantie op een toekomst is voor de mensheid, terwijl een
lage SHINU vooral een bedreiging vormt.
Voor meer informatie, data en discussie kan je terecht op http://SHINULEAKS.com of SHINU@TrialCollective.com.
TrialCollective
there are no excuses left
SHINULEAKS – sept2015

3

INHOUD
1.

2.

3.

HET ONTSTAAN VAN SHINU....................................................................................................................................... 5
1.A.

DE ZOEKTOCHT NAAR SHINU TECHNOLOGY...................................................................................................... 5

1.B.

EEN LEEFTIJDS EFFICIËNTE SAMENLEVING ........................................................................................................ 6

1.C.

SCHERPSTELLEN VAN DE SHINU ANALYSE ......................................................................................................... 9

EEN HALF LEVEN ...................................................................................................................................................... 13
2.A.

WAAR GINGEN WE VERKEERD ......................................................................................................................... 13

2.B.

BEDREIGINGEN VOOR HET MENSELIJK LEVEN ................................................................................................. 17

2.B.1.

INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITEIT & PRODUCTIE .................................................................................................... 18

2.B.2.

CONSUMPTIE ........................................................................................................................................... 20

2.B.3.

MILIEU ..................................................................................................................................................... 25

HET NETWERK VAN BEDROG ................................................................................................................................... 26
3.A.

DE RAMP RESULTATEN .................................................................................................................................... 26

3.B.

DE PACIFISCHE OCEAAN OVER......................................................................................................................... 28

3.C.

SHINU IN DE VS ................................................................................................................................................ 30

3.D.

EEN GLOBALE OPLOSSING ............................................................................................................................... 35

3.E.

HET EURO BEDROG.......................................................................................................................................... 38

4.

HET EFFICIËNTIE MANDAAT..................................................................................................................................... 43

5.

DE TOEKOMST ......................................................................................................................................................... 44

6.

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................................. 45

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

4

1. HET ONTSTAAN VAN SHINU
1.A.

DE ZOEKTOCHT NAAR SHINU TECHNOLOGY
Op het einde van de 20ste eeuw, na jaren van spectaculaire, magische groei werd Japan getroffen
door een gigantische economische ramp 1, die later “The Lost Decade” genoemd zou worden. En
omdat Japan tot de dag van vandaag nog steeds lijdt onder deze crisis, is hij ondertussen verlengd met
tien jaar naar “The Lost Two Decades” (失われた20年, Ushinawareta Nijūnen) 2 . Reeds in het begin
van de jaren ’90 stond Eerste minister Kiichi Miyazawa onder internationale druk 3 om de
onafhankelijke denktanks van Japan te hervormen om een oplossing voor de crisis te vinden via
economische en maatschappelijke maatregelen. De Eerste Minister vreesde dat de crisis heel lang zou
aanslepen als gevolg van de bestaande economische uitdagingen van Japan zoals de beperkte grootte
van het eiland, een tekort aan eigen natuurlijke grondstoffen 4 en een verouderende werkbevolking 5.
De hervormingen moesten gefocust zijn op het optimaliseren van de ROI van de Japanse bevolking en
het verhogen van de export en services markten.
Gebaseerd op eerder onderzoek uit 1985 6, werd de semi gouvernementele organisatie NIRA (the
National Institute for Research Advancement) opgedragen om zich te richten op een financiële en
economische hervorming. Hun “uitgebreid onderzoek naar sociale, economische en lifestyle
problemen” 7 bracht het theoretische concept van SHINU naar voren: het gedetailleerd in kaart
brengen van de levensverwachting van de bevolking moest de oplossing vormen voor het
toenemende risico op een verouderende en (later) imploderende arbeidersbezetting.
In 1995 werd met de Science and Technology Basic Law 8 een mandaat gecreëerd voor alle Japanse
onderzoekers om een SHINU technologie te ontwikkelen die accuraat de levensverwachting van de
bevolking in kaart kon brengen. De piek in patent-aanvragen in de periode 1995-2000 (fig. 1) hint op een
echte “gold rush” tussen de onderzoekers en ingenieurs om tegen het einde van de 20ste eeuw een
oplossing bedacht te hebben en SHINU te claimen.

Fig. 1: Statistical Handbook of Japan 2009 9

1

https://mises.org/library/explaining-japans-recession
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lost_Decade_(Japan)
3
Think Tanks & Civil Societies - p227 - https://books.google.be/books?id=KEsr4yEGZEsC
4
http://www.countriesquest.com/asia/japan/land_and_resources/natural_resources.htm
5
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/07/japans-birth-rate-problem-is-way-worse-than-anyoneimagined/
6
Aging and Health - http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/output/2007.html
7
APPENDIX 1.A.1 : NIRA Research Activities - http://www.nira.or.jp/english/about/research_a.html
8
APPENDIX 1.A.2 : The Science and Technology Basic Law (Unofficial Translation)
http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/law/law.html
9
Statistical Handbook of Japan 2009 – p92 - http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2009all.pdf
2

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

5

Tegen de millennium wissel was het doel bereikt en zakten de research subsidies weer in elkaar.(fig. 2)
Nu een stabiele SHINU technologie ontworpen was, ondernam Japan de volgende stap in het plan: het
screenen. Het NIRA dat aan de basis lag van de theorie achter SHINU werd nu opgedragen om hun
theoretische modellen verder uit te werken naar een arbeidersmarkt gebaseerd op ouderdom. 10, 11

5.000
4.500
4.000

Research Funding in Japan
1991 - 2005

3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000

Intramural expenditure on R&D
R&D funds received
R&D funds paid outside

1.500
1.000
500
-

Fig. 2: Research Activities of Research Institutions, Universities and Colleges by Kind of Organization and Field of Science (F.Y. 1959--2010) 12

1.B.

EEN LEEFTIJDSEFFICIËNTE SAMENLEVING
Vertrouwend op hun nieuw gevonden technologie en herschikking van de maatschappij, begon Japan
de 21ste eeuw met een vernieuwd optimisme. Dit optimisme was zodanig groot dat het zelfs
weerstond aan de negatieve, zelfs desastreuze voorspelling van het NIRA:
“Given current trends, by 2040 the number of employees Japan would fall by about 1/4. No threat to
the Japanese economy is greater. This is much more dramatic than the projected 1/8 decline in the
population, itself unprecedented in the modern era.” 13

10

Towards the Market-oriented Aging Society - http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/output/5439.html
The Economic Effects of an Aging Population and Shifts in the Fertility Rate; Economy and Demographic Changes http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/output/3304.html
12
APPENDIX 1.A.3 : Research Activities of Research Institutions, Universities and Colleges by Kind of Organization and Field of
Science (F.Y. 1959--2010) - http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/17-07.xls
13
Changing Policy Priorities in an Aging Society - http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/houko/i20030030.html
11

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

6

Fig. 3: Trends in the number of the major age composition, 1950-2050 14

De tegenvallende theoretische modellen dwongen het NIRA ertoe hun plannen verder te ontwikkelen
tot een oplossing werd gevonden. De volgende stap in het theoretisch model was simpel, maar zou de
hele wereld hertekenen. Er werd niet langer enkel gefocust op de herstructurering van de
arbeidersmarkt, men zou de hele samenleving herstructureren naar bevolkingsrollen gebaseerd op
levensverwachting. Die kleine shift in perceptie zou grote gevolgen hebben. Er werd gevreesd dat –
zelfs in Japans hoge eer-cultuur - deze theoretische modellen zware tegenstand zouden krijgen, ook al
waren ze de enige uitweg. Dit moment zou een mijlpaal blijken te zijn: SHINU dook onder; alle
plannen, theorieën en metingen gebeurden vanaf toen door een select elitair clubje zonder enige
publieke verantwoording of zin voor realiteit. De enige realiteit die overbleef was SHINU: wie lang
leefde, was interessant, de rest waardeloos. Er werden clandestiene screenings opgezet, topposities
in de regering werden systematisch ingenomen door vertrouwelingen met een hoge SHINU en er
werd voor het eerst begonnen aan het Efficiëntie Plan. Want eens je de logica van SHINU aanvaardt
en voor waar neemt, is kille efficiëntie al wat rest.
Op 1 oktober 2003 werd het Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT) 15 opgericht als een
onafhankelijke, administratie met een helder objectief:
“… to contribute to the planning of labor policies and work toward their effective and efficient
implementation. In addition, we seek to promote the livelihood of workers and develop the
national economy by conducting comprehensive research projects on labor issues and policies,
both domestically and internationally, and use the fruits of such research to sponsor training
programs for administrative officials.” 16

14

15

Trends in the number of the major age composition, 1950-2050 - http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/f_3_e.html
http://www.jil.go.jp/index.html

16

The Mechanism for Establishing and Changing Terms and Conditions of Employment / The Scope of Labor Law and the Notion of
Employees - http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no1.pdf

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

7

Zes maanden later organiseerde het JILPT haar eerste seminarie op 9 maart 2004 The Mechanism for
Establishing and Changing Terms and Conditions of Employment / The Scope of Labor Law and the
Notion of Employees. 17 Het programma werd omschreven als:
“…through concentrated and intensive discussion on specific topics using comparative
analysis, to produce something fruitful that can be used in future academic research as well as
in developing labor policy. The session on the first day focused on legal framework, actual
situations and trends regarding mechanisms used to establish and change the terms and
conditions of employment; the second session was devoted to tackling the definition of a
“worker” as covered under labor laws.”
Het volledig omgooien van de Japanse arbeidswetten, vakbondsregulaties en werkgeversafspraken
zou een meerjarenplan blijken te zijn. Tussen maart 2004 en december 2008 organiseerde,
participeerde of attendeerde het JIPLT in meer dan 20 seminaries en symposia, waarbij tientallen
scripties gepubliceerd werden, gericht op de hervorming van de Japanse arbeidersmarkt. 18
De meest opvallende hiervan waren:
Jun, 2004:
Jan, 2005:
Nov, 2005:
Feb, 2007:
Jan, 2009:

Diversification of Work Arrangements and Decent Work: The Japanese Experience 19
Japan Labor Review: Special Edition: Changing Corporate Governance and Labormanagement Relations 20
Major Challenges Facing a Society with a Declining Population 21
JILPT International Workshop 2007: Transition Support Policy for Young People with
Low Educational Background 22
JILPT International Seminar 2009: Working Time —In Search of New Research
Territories Beyond Flexibility Debates 23

Tegen midden 2008 werd echter duidelijk dat Japan bondgenoten nodig zou hebben om hun SHINUarbeidersplan te implementeren. De nog steeds verslechterende economische toestand fig.4, de
verouderende bevolking en de tegenvallende resultaten uit de eerste SHINU metingen (zie: EEN HALF
LEVEN) dwongen Japan er toe om buiten hun grenzen op zoek te gaan naar een alliantie.

17

The Mechanism for Establishing and Changing Terms and Conditions of Employment / The Scope of Labor Law and the Notion of
Employees - http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no1.pdf
18
Important Events - http://www.jil.go.jp/english/events/index.html
19
http://www.jil.go.jp/institute/kokusai/documents/iwata%20paper.pdf
20
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/JLR/backissues/2005.html#no1
21
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/events/051124_info.html
22
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/events/07_0226_report.html
23
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/events/09_0121_report.html

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

8

Fig. 4:Nominal GDP Japan, 1994 - 2012 24

Om deze reden organiseerde het JILPT op donderdag 22 januari een seminarie in hun Liaison Office te
Kasumigaseki. Dit seminarie werd bijgewoond door een vertegenwoordiging van de VS, Duitsland,
Frankrijk, Zweden en Groot-Brittannië. 25
Wat besproken werd tijdens dit seminarie zou uiteindelijk leiden tot een internationale samenwerking
van landen gebaseerd op de technologie en efficiëntie inherent aan SHINU. Hierdoor zou men de
geopolitieke agenda domineren om naties en culturen te destabiliseren als momentum voor een
nieuwe totalitair regime (zie: HET NETWERK VAN BEDROG).

1.C.

SCHERPSTELLEN VAN DE SHINU ANALYSE
Essentieel in de ontdekking en het onderzoek naar SHINU was het werk van de gerenommeerde
moleculaire bioloog Reiji Okazaki 26 (Professor aan de Universiteit van Nagoya) en zijn vrouw Tsuneko 27
(Professor Emeritus aan de Universiteit van Nagoya). Als briljante wetenschappers stonden zij beide
aan de wieg van het onderzoek naar DNA replicatie. De SHINU technologie is dan ook volledig
gebaseerd op hun werken en onderzoek en de bijhorende ontdekking uit 1966 van de “Okazaki
Fragments” 28.
De SHINU theorie concludeerde dat een meting van de lengte van de Telomeren en het in kaart
brengen van hun slijtage zou resulteren in een berekening van de levensverwachting van een persoon.

24

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/there-is-only-one-thing-that-can-save-japan-now-inflation/265421/

25

Program - http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/No.7_program.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reiji_Okazaki
27
http://www.brh.co.jp/s_library/j_site/scientistweb/no32/index.html
28
http://sandwalk.blogspot.be/2007/10/dna-polymerase-i-and-synthesis-of.html
26

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

9

Tijdens het einde van de jaren ‘90 werd die theorie zwaar bediscussieerd, berekend en getest tijdens
de “SHINU gold rush”. Eens die theorie op punt stond en bewezen was, richtte het tweede deel van
het onderzoek zich op het finaliseren van de technologie. Deze moest draagbaar zijn en snel
resultaten kunnen produceren. Net als bij de gold rush daarvoor is er in de eerste jaren van de 21ste
eeuw een duidelijke parallel te zien met de opkomst van robottechnologie in Japan, zeker in medische
faciliteiten en ziekenhuizen. Het zou echter duren tot eind 2004 vooraleer er systematisch SHINU
“doordruk-screenings” genomen werden van elk bloedstaal dat werd afgenomen in Japan. Tot dan
werden enkel gerichte en clandestiene monstercollecties gepland.
Er werd geopteerd voor een afdalende onderzoeksmethodologie: allereerst werden de alleroudsten
gescreend en vervolgens zou men afdalen naar jongere generaties. Deze screenings gebeurden
zonder enige toestemming, inspraak of inzage: noch vooraf, noch achteraf. Er wordt aangenomen dat
deze screenings nog steeds anoniem verliepen aangezien ze enkel dienden voor het scherpstellen van
de berekeningen. [noot: later, wanneer SHINU volledig op punt staat, zullen we meerdere instanties
opmerken waarbij personen wel degelijk en onwetend beïnvloed werden door hun SHINU, zoals bij
politieke aanstellingen, sollicitaties voor management functies, medische verzorging en één geval zelfs
bij het zich verloven met de dochter van grote ondernemersbankier.]
De keuze voor een afdalende onderzoeksmethode was duidelijk bedoeld om de foutenmarge van de
technologie in kaart te brengen. Duizenden senioren werden gescreend, zelfs op hun sterfbed,
sommigen nog minder dan een uur vooraleer ze stierven. Uiteindelijk kreeg men een duidelijk inzicht
en definitie van de SHINU berekening en konden de externe factoren in kaart gebracht worden
gebracht die impact hadden op de metingen.
Het werd duidelijk dat:
. SHINU de lengte van de telomeren in de chromosomen analyseert 29
. De lengte van de telomeren inkort als gevolg van het verouderingsproces 30
. Hoe korter de lengte van de telomeren is, des te korter de levensverwachting
. Hoe korter de lengte van de telomerenis , des te accurater de meting
. Pas vanaf 2 jaar de metingen representatief bleken
. Niet enkel veroudering impact had op de slijtage van de T-lengte, er waren ook:
.. medische aandoeningen zoals kanker, TBC, influenza,…
.. levensstijl: roken, alcohol, overgewicht en algemene fysiek conditie 31
.. omgeving: luchtkwaliteit, stress, vervuiling, bestraling 32
.. voeding

29

Are Telomeres The Key To Aging And Cancer? http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/chromosomes/telomeres/
Telomeres, lifestyle, cancer, and aging http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3370421/
31
Impact of smoking and obesity on telomeres and aging http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3370421/#S9title
32
Impact of environment, nature of work, and stress on telomeres
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3370421/#S12title
30

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

10

De SHINU-meting bleek een theoretisch, maximale levensverwachting. Deze bevindingen zouden een
set aan aanbevelingen, wetten, programma’s en incentives veroorzaken waarmee de overheid de
algemene gezondheid van haar bevolking wilde opkrikken om het verlies ten opzichte van de
theoretische waarden te minimaliseren. Waaronder verhoogde subsidies voor gezondheidszorg en het
bannen van roken 33, 34 en alcohol 35.
Die intentie om te streven naar een maximale SHINU en de link met de promotie van nationale
gezondheidszorg werd duidelijk toen het Japanse parlement, de Diet, op 26 juli 2002 de Public Health
Law goedkeurde36.
“Part of a major framework on Health Care Reform, it aims to provide a basic framework for
recognizing overall promotion of public health improvement, enhancing the importance of
public health in the light of demographic change and a changing pattern of disease. The Law
also attempts to improve public health promoting healthy eating habits and other public
health measures.”
Als gevolg daarvan werd Japan op 27 Februari 2005 ook lid van de WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control. 37
In de komende jaren zou Japan steeds meer en zwaarder investeren in gezondheidszorg,
geneeskunde, technologie, sport, voeding en klimaat. Het bereiken van de maximale SHINU zou de
komende jaren een obsessie worden voor een land met een verouderende bevolking.

11

Japan

10,5
10
9,5
9
8,5
8
7,5
7
6,5
6

Fig. 5: Health Expenditure in Japan 1995 – 2013, total (% of GDP) 38

33

Smoking ban on Tokyo's streets http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2292007.stm
Report on passive smoking prevention measures in Kyoto http://www.pref.kyoto.jp/tobacco/21bukai.html
35
Japan’s tougher drinking, driving laws take effect http://www.stripes.com/news/japan-s-tougher-drinking-driving-laws-takeeffect-1.68979
36
http://hpm.org/en/Surveys/IPSS_-_Japan/02/Implementing_the_Health_Promotion_Law.html
37
Country details for Japan http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/legislation/country/japan/summary
38
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS
34

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

11

Deze inspanningen zouden, gecombineerd met een arbeidsbeleid gebaseerd op een efficiënte
planning van middelen per leeftijd, de oplossing moeten zijn waarmee Japan zich zodanig kan
herstructureren dat het het juk van de economische crisis die haar al sinds 1989 in de ban heeft van
zich af kan schudden.
Met de theoretische modellen op punt gesteld, de berekeningen en computermodellen aangepast en
de technologie op zijn plaats in hospitalen en medische centra, was Japan klaar voor de volgende stap:
het volledig in kaart brengen van de SHINU van de bevolking.
Tegen 2010 moesten de eerste conclusies klaar zijn samen met aangepaste arbeidswetten en
ruimtelijke ordening. Wanneer men echter begon met steeds jongere generaties te screenen volgens
de aflopende methodologie, toonden de resultaten een veel groter probleem aan dan verwacht.

Life Expectation Japan
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013

0

T-LE

S-LE

Fig. 6: Theoretical Life Expectation 39 vs SHINU registered Life Expectation 1961 – 2013

39

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

12

2. EEN HALF LEVEN

2.A.

WAAR GINGEN WE VERKEERD
De vraag die de mensheid voor de rest van haar bestaan zal achtervolgen is even oud als zij zelf: “Wat
hebben we fout gedaan?”

Hoewel we ongeveer weten welke factoren impact hebben op de lengte van de Telomeren, en dus de
levensverwachting, blijft het gissen welke factoren diezelfde impact hebben gehad op de nog
ongeboren lengte, diegene die verankerd ligt in ons DNA 40. In de kern gaat het namelijk eerder over
een exponentiële combinatie van oorzaken, gaande van ecologische, industriële en nucleaire tot
maatschappelijke factoren zoals levensstijl en voedingsgewoonten.

Over de jaren heen is er echter wel een duidelijke correlatie te zien met het Gouden Tijdperk van het
Kapitalisme 41 dat meteen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog tot stand kwam en een nadrukkelijke impact
had op de wereld, het milieu en de mensheid:

“A fundamentally new development of the post-war period was that the massive
growth in production was counterbalanced by an equal growth of consumption... The
significance of the growth of consumption lay not only in the impact on mass living
standards but on the assurance it gave to those taking investment decisions of a
steadily growing market. This together with the maintenance of what was frequently
an already very high profit rate, in relatively tranquil political conditions, provided the
essential conditions for the perpetuation of the very high accumulation rates which
had seemed likely to fade with the accomplishment of the tasks of post-war
reconstruction.” 42

40

http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/mutations_04
http://www.amazon.com/The-Golden-Age-Capitalism-Reinterpreting/dp/0198287410
42
The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age – p10 – http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/previous/en_GB/wp43/_files/82530823382895079/default/WP43.pdf
41

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

13

Growth GDP Japan vs SHINU decline
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40

1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

GDP growth

SHINU LE

Fig. 7: total GDP Japan (in 1000 B$) 43 vs SHINU calculated Life Expectancy 1962 -1995

Gedurende deze periode van welvaart geraakte de samenleving in de grip van een oncontroleerbare
spiraal van groei: steeds toenemende consumptie zou meer productieactiviteit vereisen wat
resulteerde in een constante, gegarandeerde en planbare economische groei. Maar zo’n proces heeft
ook zijn limieten en een economie gebaseerd op eindeloze groei is onhoudbaar. Het Gouden Tijdperk
zou duren tot midden de jaren ‘70 44 wanneer de eerste economische crisis sinds WO II een abrupt
einde maakte aan de fantasie van overconsumptie. Tegen dan was het echter te laat, de wereld was
een gijzelaar van haar eigen gecreëerde levensstijl van overvloed en arrogantie; dit werd
verpersoonlijkt door plagen van de moderne tijd zoals drugsmisbruik, toenemende depressie en een
ongezonde afhankelijkheid van technologie.

Een economie gebaseerd op consumptiegroei gedraagt zich als een verslaving: hoe verslaafder men
wordt, hoe minder bewust men er van is. Of wil zijn. De echte tragedie van een verslaving is dat men
zich ten volle bewust is van het eigen falen, maar niet in staat is het een halt toe te roepen. Terwijl de
morele kost van de verslaving steeds toeneemt, neemt het genot evenredig af. Zo is het ook met een
economie gebaseerd op groei. Maar waar de financiële markten zichzelf vaak gered zien door een
crisis die alles reset [noot: en we zien de frequentie van de crisissen toenemen 45] blijven de gevolgen
voor de maatschappij zich manifesteren over de crisis heen.

43

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/JP?display=graph
The Recession of 1973-75 in the U.S. - http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/rec1974.htm
45
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2001/jul/10/globalrecession
44

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

14

Sinds het begin van het Gouden Tijdperk zijn er tientallen bedreigingen en aanvallen geweest op het
klimaat, de samenleving en de mensheid in het algemeen die samen uiteindelijk geleid hebben tot een
gebroken leven. Aangezien levensverwachtingen zeer hard gebonden zijn aan een regionaal karakter
(ontwikkeling van de welvaart, gezondheidszorg, toegang tot medische faciliteiten,…) is het trekken
van globale conclusies over levensverwachting kort door de bocht. Toch, waar een regionale analyse
van de SHINU levensverwachtingen jaren aan testing en onderzoek zou vereisen, is de finale conclusie
nu reeds duidelijk: de levensverwachting over de gehele wereld is ingestort.

SHINU corrected vs Global Life Expectancy
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
2055
2060
2065

10

projected Life Expectancy

0

SHINU Life Expectancy

Fig. 8:theoretical projected Life Expectancy 46 vs SHINU corrected Life Expectancy 1885 – 2065

Dat een regio-specifieke waarde zoals levensverwachting geleden heeft onder globale factoren, komt
doordat deze verschillende factoren telkens een op maat gemaakte mix veroorzaakt hebben. Zo zullen
in de westerse wereld ziektes zoals obesitas, alcohol en drugsverslaving meer impact hebben dan in
de Derde Wereld, maar die landen zullen op hun beurt meer getroffen zijn door klimatologische
aspecten zoals droogte en straling Fig.09.

46

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

15

correlation impact SHINU
vs
increase in CO2 emissions
increase nuclear energy

Nuclear En.
CO2
SHINU %decay

Fig. 09: correlation between the SHINU %discrepancy and CO2 emission + nuclear power 1961 – 2000 47

En hoewel sommige bedreigingen over de jaren heen afgezwakt zijn (zoals het testen van nucleaire
wapens en de uitstoot van sulfur), is hun impact op het menselijk genoom slechts vervangen door
nieuwe technologieën zoals elektromagnetische straling 48 door mobiele telefoons en Wi-Fi routers,
voedingssupplementen 49 - 50 en een duidelijke verhoging in industriële Fig.10 en natuurlijke rampen Fig.11.

Andere bedreigingen echter, hebben de tijd overleefd en kunnen gegroepeerd worden onder
industriële productiviteit; consumptie & milieu.

47

http://data.worldbank.org/topic/climate-change

48

European Commission - Preliminary Opinion on Possible effects of Electromagnetic Fields (EMF) on Human Health
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_006.pdf
49
Reported Aspartame Toxicity Effects http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/jan03/012203/02p-0317_emc-000199.txt
50
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

16

2.B.

BEDREIGINGEN VOOR HET MENSELIJK LEVEN

Fig. 10: reported technological disasters 1900 – 2009 51

Fig. 11: reported natural disaster 1900 – 2010 52

51

http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesglassman/2011/03/21/the-new-uncertainty/
http://www.supplychainquarterly.com/figures/?filename=20131104reduce_risk_ex1.jpg&article=20131104-how-to-recognizeand-reduce-risk
52

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

17

Fig. 12: worldwide nuclear testing, 1945 – 2013 53

2.B.1. INDUSTRIËLE ACTIVITEIT & PRODUCTIE
2.B.1.1.

ENERGIE PRODUCTIE

Fig. 13: crude oil production in thousand ton of oil equivalent (1.000 TOE) from 1960 – 2014 54

53
54

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing
https://data.oecd.org/energy/crude-oil-production.htm

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

18

Fig. 14: history of the global nuclear power industry 55

2.B.1.2.

VERVUILING

Fig. 15: carbon dioxide emisssions (teragrams CO2)
56

55
56

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

19

Fig. 16: Sulfur dioxide emissions from fuel combustion and process emissions with central value
(solid line) and upper and lower uncertainty bounds (dotted lines). (graphs exclude shipping emissions) 57

2.B.2. CONSUMPTIE
2.B.2.1.

VOEDING

Fig. 17: global pork meat consumption kilogram/capita (1995-2014) *no data prior to 1995 58
57
58

http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/11/1101/2011/acp-11-1101-2011.pdf p1107
https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

20

Fig. 18: global crop consumption kilogram/capita (1995-2014) *no data prior to 1995 59

Fig. 19: catches from world fisheries by source 60

59
60

https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm
http://www.iccs.org.uk/fisheries-statistics-where-are-we-now/

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

21

2.B.2.2.

(SUBSTANCE) ABUSE

Fig. 20: overweight children worldwide 61

Fig. 21: overweight or obese population 1978 – 2012, US, NL, FI (self-reported) 62

61
62

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7151813.stm
https://data.oecd.org/healthrisk/overweight-or-obese-population.htm#indicator-chart

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

22

Fig. 22: alcohol consumption US, Germany & Japan, Total litres/capita 1960 - 1990 63

Fig. 23: % of population smoking daily in 1965, US & Japan 64

63
64

https://data.oecd.org/healthrisk/alcohol-consumption.htm
https://data.oecd.org/healthrisk/daily-smokers.htm#indicator-chart

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

23

Fig. 24: share of cigarette production and consumption in developing countries, % 65

Fig. 25: Illicit drug use among adults aged 50 to 64 66

65
66

http://www.economist.com/node/10653774
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/nationwide-trends

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

24

2.B.3. MILIEU

Fig. 26: Solar Radiation 67

Fig. 27: Global Mean Surface Temperature 68

67
68

http://lasp.colorado.edu/home/sorce/data/tsi-data/
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/GlobalWarming/page2.php

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

25

3. HET NETWERK VAN BEDROG
3.A.

DE RAMP RESULTATEN
Er hangt een bittere ironie aan de eerste jaren van het SHINU onderzoek. Hoe dichter het onderzoek
kwam bij jongere generaties, des te groter werd de foutenmarge tussen de verwachte
levensverwachting en de SHINU resultaten.
Die discrepantie was dusdanig groot en consistent dat alle screenings minstens vijf opeenvolgende
keren werden geannuleerd wat een vertraging van minstens 3 jaar in het uitrollen van de technologie
veroorzaakte. De technologie, het onderzoek en alle theoretische modellen werden verschillende
keren overgedaan en herberekend tot maar één antwoord de waarheid bleek te zijn: de theoretische
modellen waren fout en SHINU zat juist: de mensheid was aan het uitsterven.

Life Expectation Japan
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013

0

T-LE

S-LE

Fig. 6: Theoretical Life Expectation 69 vs SHINU registered Life Expectation 1961 – 2013

69

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

26

Niet enkel was de crash in levensverwachting heel zorgwekkend, nog veel erger was de impact die dit
zou hebben op de actieve bevolking. Tegen 2064 zou 50% van de Japanse bevolking dood zijn.

T-P

2065

2062

2059

2056

2053

2050

2047

2044

2041

2038

2035

2032

2029

2026

2023

2020

2017

2014

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

Native Population Japan

S-P

Fig. 28: Theoretical Population 70 vs SHINU calculations 1990 - 2065

De levensverwachting bleek in een totale vrije val te zitten:
. baby’s geboren in 2000 hadden slechts een levensverwachting van 41,4 jaar
. zij zouden met gemak overleefd worden door senioren geboren in 1974
. ouders geboren in 1980 zullen hun eigen kinderen begraven
Er was gegronde hoop dat de slechte resultaten van Japan een geïsoleerd event zouden zijn. Het
eiland had al een paar rampen achter de rug, niet in het minst de Hiroshima bombardementen.
Meteen werd een volgende stap ondernomen om globale resultaten te verkrijgen. Expats en reizigers
werden gescreend telkens ze het land binnenkwamen.
Hoewel deze screenings statistisch niet representatief waren, bewezen ze meteen dat de Japanse
resultaten een globale trend bleken te zijn. Dit was het moment dat Japan zijn trouwe partner sinds
jaren, de VS, mee rond de tafel nam.

70

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

27

3.B.

DE PACIFISCHE OCEAAN OVER
Sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog is het lot van de Verenigde Staten van Amerika en Japan diep met
elkaar verbonden. Toen de VS na de oorlog in 1952 71 als bezetter het land verliet en de macht terug
overdroeg aan de Japanse bevolking was de intentie van een samenwerking duidelijk:
“The U.S.-Japan economic relationship is strong and mutually advantageous. The two
economies are highly integrated via trade in goods and services—they are large markets for
each other’s exports and important sources of imports. More importantly, Japan and the
United States are closely connected via capital flows. Japan is a major foreign source of
financing of the U.S. national debt and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future, as the
mounting U.S. public debt needs to be financed and the stock of U.S. domestic savings remains
insufficient to meet the investment needs. Japan is also a significant source of foreign private
portfolio and direct investment in the United States, and the United States is the origin of
much of the foreign investment in Japan.” 72

Als onderdeel van de heropbouw na de oorlog, begon de VS dan ook heel nauw samen te werken met
de Japanse autoriteiten 73. Kernprojecten waren het delen van technologie, handelsakkoorden
opstellen en gezamenlijke militaire allianties vormen 74 . Dit resulteerde in een periode van ongeziene
economische groei voor Japan - de zogenaamde Miracle Growth - tot en met het einde van Koude
Oorlog. Gedurende deze periode groeide Japan tegen de jaren ‘80 uit tot ‘s werelds tweede grootste
economie, na de VS.

real GDP Japan
3.000.000
2.500.000
2.000.000
1.500.000
1.000.000
500.000

1925
1928
1931
1934
1937
1940
1943
1946
1949
1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000

0

Fig. 29: Japanese Real GDP Growth, 1925–2001 75

71

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf
U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32649.pdf
73
Chronology of U.S.-Japan Relations - http://aboutusa.japan.usembassy.gov/e/jusa-usj-chronology.html
74
January 19th 1960 - Japan-U.S. Security Treaty - http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html
75
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2013/01/japanese-real-gdp-growth-19252001.html
72

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

28

Bij Japan, dat vooral uitblonk in Westerse voertuigen en elektronica, kan het belang van de naoorlogse
groei en de rol die de VS daarin gespeeld heeft niet onderschat worden.

“Most analysis’ attribute Japan’s postwar prosperity to Japanese policies. Our study, by
contrast, suggests that such factors were necessary but insufficient: Japan rose in part because
of its institutions and policies, but the effectiveness of those institutions and policies was, in
turn, enhanced by Japan’s privileged geopolitical environment. Specifically, Japan had the
good fortune to rebuild its economy during the Cold War when the most powerful country in
the world needed strong allies. The U.S. not only absorbed Japan’s exports and tolerated
Japanese protectionism but also subsidized the Japanese economy and transferred technology
to Japanese firms. Without such advantages, Japan might still have achieved solid economic
growth, but probably not an economic miracle.” 76
Het motief van de VS was duidelijk: met Japan waren ze een stevige bondgenoot aan het creëren aan
de andere kant van de Pacifische Oceaan. De VS en Japan onderhouden zo een zeer politieke,
economische en militair actieve relatie waarbij de VS Japan beschouwt als één van hun trouwste
bondgenoten en partners. 77
Deze samenwerking zou zelfs tot over the “Lost Decades” reiken waarin Japan worstelde om op alle
manieren hun competitief voordeel terug te winnen. Uiteindelijk zouden het de bedreiging van de
opkomst van China Fig 6, de natuurlijke78 en nucleaire 79 rampen en de schok van een totale crash in
levensverwachting zijn dat deze naties verbond tot een nieuwe wereldmacht.

GDP growth US, CHINA, JAPAN

China

Japan

2015

2012

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

1961

20.000.000
18.000.000
16.000.000
14.000.000
12.000.000
10.000.000
8.000.000
6.000.000
4.000.000
2.000.000
0

United States

Fig. 30: Real GDP Growth US, China, Japan, 19615–2015 80
76

America's Role in the Making of Japan's Economic Miracle http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2299948
Japan to become 'Britain of the Far East' http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GB24Dh03.html
78
APPENDIX 3.B.1: RECENT DISASTERS JAPAN
79
http://fukushimaupdate.com/
80
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
77

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

29

3.C.

SHINU IN DE VS
Er is een algehele modus operandi voor elk land dat zich aansluit bij de SHINU samenzwering.
Allereerst wordt er door middel van clandestiene screenings doorheen het hele land een vluchtige
SHINU-mapping gemaakt. In tegenstelling tot de aflopende methodologie, opteert men meteen voor
het screenen van peuters. Dit volgt het klassieke patroon van ontkenning en bevestiging, waarbij men
resultaten nodig heeft om overtuigd te geraken dat ook dat specifieke land getroffen is en niet enkel
Japan.

SHINU adjusted Life Expectancy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1890
1897
1904
1911
1918
1925
1932
1939
1946
1953
1960
1967
1974
1981
1988
1995
2002
2009
2016
2023
2030
2037
2044
2051
2058
2065

0

T-LE

S-LE

Fig. 31: Theoretical US Life Expectancy vs SHINU LE 1885 - 2065 81

De resultaten voor de VS lopen gelijk aan die van Japan, het was pas na de Fukushima ramp in 2011
waarbij de levensverwachting in Japan nog harder werd getroffenFig6, dat er een verschil in de
resultaten opgemerkt werd. Dit zou Japan er toe aanzetten – uit schrik om uit haar eigen coalitie
buitengesloten te worden - om alle SHINU technologie en resultaten exclusief te beheren en als haar
eigendom te beschouwen. Door alle data en analyse in eigen handen te houden, wilde Japan zich
onmisbaar maken in de coalitie.

81

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

30

US native population
300.000.000
250.000.000
200.000.000
150.000.000
100.000.000
50.000.000
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
2046
2048
2050

0

Tvol population

Svol population

Fig. 32: Theoretical native US population 82 volume vs SHINU adjusted 1990 - 2050

Nadat de eerste golf aan willekeurige screenings vergeleken werden met de Japanse resultaten, werd
er een meer gestructureerde samenwerking opgesteld door een gezamenlijk research center op te
zetten. Via deze dekmantel werd de gehele screening van de bevolking ingepland en zouden alle
census data, research inzetten, beleidsplannen en best practices gedeeld worden.
Zo werd op woensdag 14 april 2009 het U.S.-Japan Research Institute 83, een VS-geregistreerde NGO,
opgericht met als doel een samenwerking op te zetten tegen de opkomende overmacht van China.

“The structure of the international community has changed significantly in the past ten years.
The relative standing of Japan has declined rapidly, and despite its overwhelming military
strength, the influence of the U.S. on the international community has clearly declined.
Meanwhile, China’s influence continues to rise as a result of its economic development, and it
is garnering interest from countries worldwide. Considering the decline in the standing of the
U.S. and Japan, it is unacceptable to restrict future American and Japanese research to a single
country, and if we fail to conduct research U.S.-Japan relations that integrates the relative
viewpoint of U.S.-China relations from the perspective of the U.S. and Japan in the world and
Eastern Asia, we will no longer be able to deal with the problems facing us.” 84

82

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
http://www.us-jpri.org/en/index.html
84
http://www.us-jpri.org/en/greeting.html
83

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

31

Als derde stap begon men zich te focussen op het beperken van de schade aan de bevolking door de
implementatie van een nationale stimulans voor gezondheidszorg. Dit was cruciaal aangezien het een
dubbel effect had: de gezondheid van de bevolking zou er op vooruit gaan en dichter bij de
theoretische maximale SHINU leeftijd komen. Anderzijds werd de toegang tot medische centra
vergemakkelijkt waardoor meer screenings en patiënteninformatie verzameld werden voor een
nationale SHINU database. In de VS viel ook dit patroon op wanneer gezondheid-apps en gadgets de
markt veroverden 85 en toen – net als in 2003 in Japan 86 - de VS haar eigen gezondheidszorg
verbeterde met the Affordable Care Act 87.

Health Expenditure per Capita
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

Switzerland

Germany

New Zealand

United States

Netherlands

Fig. 33: Health Expenditure per Capita 1995 - 2013 88
85

https://pando.com/2014/10/30/the-tech-industry-is-turning-health-trackers-into-commodities-before-they-even-gomainstream/
86
http://hpm.org/en/Surveys/IPSS_-_Japan/02/Implementing_the_Health_Promotion_Law.html
87
http://www.medicaid.gov/affordablecareact/affordable-care-act.html
88
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP/countries/1W-US?display=graph

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

32

Hoewel de vierde stap niet het einde is, is het zeker het begin van het einde: het herstructureren van
wetten en beleid om de lage SHINU-bevolking in het Efficiëntiemodel te duwen. Dit is een zeer
delicaat en gevaarlijk proces aangezien het de staat van een democratie naar een totalitair regime
transitioneert. Binnen de SHINU logica is een democratie onhoudbaar, aangezien het volume bij de
kort-levenden ligt die uiteindelijk voor zelfbehoud zouden kiezen. Als in een schaakspel moest men zet
voor zet een plan uitrollen om zoveel mogelijk verandering en macht geconsolideerd te hebben
vooraleer de waarheid naar boven zou komen.

Dit begon met het aanpassen van bestaande reglementering van arbeid, vakbonds- en burgerrechten
en economische wetten. In de VS gebeurde dit op 4 januari 2011 met het tekenen van de GPRA
Modernization Act 89 door president Obama. 90

Fig 34: President Barack Obama signs the GPRA Modernization bill into law.
With him is Chief Performance Officer/OMB Deputy Director for Management Jeff Zients and
OMB Associate Director for Performance and Personnel Management, Shelley Metzenbaum. 90

De GPRA Modernization Act 91 was ontworpen om alle overheidsinstanties te dwingen zich te
organiseren naar een cultuur waarbij [SHINU] data en onderzoek de doorslaggevende factor zou zijn
voor beslissingen aangaande beleid, budget en bestuur..

89

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr2142enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr2142enr.pdf
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/performance/president-signs-gprma
91
APPENDIX 3.C.1: GPRA Modernization Act
90

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

33

Het doel van de GPRA Modernization Act was helder 92:
.. Modernize and refine the requirements established by GPRA in order to produce more
frequent, relevant data which can then inform decision makers and agency operations;
.. Codify and strengthen existing resources for performance management, including the Chief
Operating Officer (COO), Performance Improvement Officers (PIOs) within the federal agencies
and the interagency Performance Improvement Council (PIC);
… Apply the latest technologies and lessons learned from nearly two decades of GPRA
implementation;
..Lead to more effective management of government agencies at a reduced cost.

Deze doelen werden op hun beurt verzameld in de zogenaamde “Cross-Agency Priority Goals” 93 met
als doel “accelerate progress on a limited number of Presidential priority areas where implementation
requires active collaboration between multiple agencies.” 94:
.. Cybersecurity
.. Climate Change (Federal Actions)
.. Insider Threat and Security Clearance Reform
.. Job-Creating Investment
.. Infrastructure Permitting Modernization
.. STEM Education [note: science, technology, engineering, mathematics]
.. Service Members and Veterans Mental Health
.. Customer Service
.. Smarter IT Delivery
.. Strategic Sourcing
.. Shared Services
.. Benchmark and Improve Mission-Support Operations
.. Open Data
.. Lab-To-Market
.. People And Culture

Tekenend voor deze fase is ook het verzekeren van stabiel bestuur gedurende de SHINU overgang.
Aangezien dit handelt over zeer gevoelige informatie, vereist dit een totale vervanging van laag SHINU
personeel door op voorhand gescreende kandidaten in een top-down aanpak, beginnende met de
hoogte in bestuur:
“the Presidential Personnel Office and Office of Personnel Management are teaming
up to strengthen our Federal workforce through data-driven efforts to improve
employee engagement, hiring reform, and improving our management cadre.”94

92

http://www.performance.gov/faq#Q4
http://www.performance.gov/clear_goals
94
http://www.performance.gov/cap-goals-list?view=public
93

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

34

Hoewel de volgende golven nog steeds dienen uit te rollen is het veilig aan te nemen dat deze zich
meer gaan richten op infrastructuur, ruimtelijke planning, zware economische hervormingen en
militaire ontplooiing. Het einddoel is duidelijk: klaarstaan met een nieuw bestuur zowel fysiek als in
bestuursvorm om meteen de controle te grijpen wanneer de implosie van de natie wordt ingezet.
Een verzekerde, stabiele vorm van bestuur zou de primordiale voorwaarde zijn om in de
internationale, militaire SHINU alliantie te stappen.

3.D.

EEN GLOBALE OPLOSSING

Met gelijkaardige resultaten doorheen Japan en de VS was de grootte van de SHINU crisis van die aard
dat de impact van de dalende levensverwachting een duidelijke globale bedreiging was. Vooral de
impact die de resultaten van SHINU zouden hebben, baarden velen zorgen. Hoe zou de massa
reageren? Men vreesde voor een globale crisis: van burgeronrusten tot verzet, tot het instorten van
instituties, economieën, landen en gehele culturen. Temidden van alle doemscenario’s werd een
internationaal seminarie georganiseerd voor een select publiek.

Op 22 januari 2009 organiseerde het Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training een internationale
bijeenkomst in hun Liaison Office te Kasumigaseki. Die werd bijgewoond door afgevaardigden (met
een hoge SHINU) van de VS, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Zweden en Groot-Brittannië 95. Gedurende dit
seminarie werden de efficiëntieplannen die het JILPT had bedacht tussen 2004 en 2008 naar een
globale schaal geprojecteerd.

De inzet voor deze landen was hoog. Zelfs voor het seminarie hadden zij al problemen met een
verouderende bevolking 96. Als snel werd de utopische ambitie om een globale oplossing te vinden,
een oplossing dat iedereen ter hulp zou schieten, verlaten. Het was duidelijk dat het seminarie
draaide om zelfbehoud en niet om globale verantwoordelijkheid.

Ook hier valt de impact van de SHINU Efficiëntie op: in de Derde Wereld bleek de terugval van de
levensverwachting minder drastisch te zijn. Dit komt voornamelijk doordat zij reeds een lagere
levensverwachting hadden dan de Westerse Wereld. Deze kortere SHINU zou een zware tactische
waarde hebben: een eerdere crisis in het buitenland zou de impact aan het thuisfront draaglijker

95
96

Program - http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/No.7_program.pdf
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/21/americans-are-aging-but-not-as-fast-as-people-in-germany-italy-and-japan/

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

35

maken, terwijl tegelijkertijd het militaire voordeel groots was: men kon plannen wanneer de vijandige
troepen van nature uitgedund zouden worden.

SHINU adjusted Life Expectancy MEA
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

1885
1891
1897
1903
1909
1915
1921
1927
1933
1939
1945
1951
1957
1963
1969
1975
1981
1987
1993
1999
2005
2011
2017
2023
2029
2035
2041
2047
2053
2059
2065

0

projected Life Expectancy

SHINU Life Expectancy

1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
2052
2055
2058
2061
2064

Fig. 35: SHINU adjusted Life Expectancy MEA-region 1885 - 2065

T-P

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

S-P

36

Fig. 36: Theoretical vs SHINU population MEA region

Het resultaat van het seminarie was het Global Preparation Plan gevormd tussen de VS, Japan en de
EU-elite, waarbij :
.. elk land verantwoordelijk was voor de stabiliteit en controle in zijn eigen regio door:
… het screenen en in kaart brengen van de SHINU van de bevolking
… het plaatsen van vertrouwde, hoge-SHINU leiders in bestuursposities
gaande van overheid, wetenschap, financiën, business en militair
… het aanpassen van beleid, wetten en zelfs grondwetten om een legitiem kader te
creëren voor het Efficiëntieplan
… het verhogen van de militaire paraatheid, budgetten, troepen en training

De daaruit voortschrijdende strategie bestond uit het a) optimaliseren van de bescherming van Japan
door het vormen een Oceanic Partnership met Australië en Nieuw Zeeland; b) het versleutelen van
het Noord-Amerikaans continent door een VS/Canadees partnership en c) de destabilisatie van
Europa om een sterkere kern van controle te vormen.
Binnen de alliantie droeg elk continent ook haar eigen takenpakket:
Zo werd Japan verantwoordelijk voor het verder ontwikkelen van de technologie, de wetenschap en
het onderzoek naar SHINU. Door het creëren van een globale database met metingen en het mappen
van SHINU per regio, leeftijd, ras, geslacht, en andere factoren hoopte men een duidelijker zicht op de
oorzaken en dus de remedies – of op z’n minst een optimalisatie - voor de crash in levensverwachting
te vinden.
Het insluitende karakter van het Noord-Amerikaanse continent, hun vergevorderde research, ervaring
en grootte van hun militaire macht en de algehele rijkdom van de Amerikaanse bevolking bevestigde
de militaire dominantie van de VS in de alliantie. Zij namen het voortouw in alle militaire planning,
spionage en informatieverzameling en het ontwikkelen van tactische scenario’s.

De grootste uitdaging echter was Europa. Centraal gepositioneerd tussen Afrika, Rusland en het
Midden-Oosten zou Europa de meest kwetsbare schakel in de nieuwe coalitie zijn. Zeker indien de
nodige voorbereidingen niet tijdig klaar waren, wanneer SHINU bekend zou worden. Tegenstrijdig
genoeg was het ook net die centrale rol die de waarde van Europa bevestigde. Het was een centrale,
welvarende hub vanwaar testing en screening tot ver buiten de grenzen kon gebeuren en men
langlevenden kon beschermen. Tegelijk vormde het de ideale tactische brug tussen de VS en Japan.
Er was weinig interesse om nog andere landen rond de tafel te krijgen. Niemand vertrouwde
Rusland 97 en de VS vertrouwden noch Zuid-Amerika noch het Midden-Oosten. De coalitie vertrouwde
op haar SHINU-kennis en voorsprong in militaire paraatheid om ofwel ieder conflict in hun voordeel te
kunnen beslechten of elke tegenstander te kunnen overhalen zich te willen aansluiten.
97

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

37

Het is duidelijk dat de strategie en tactieken bedacht om een SHINU dominantie neer te zetten, zeer
snel en amateuristisch in elkaar zijn gezet. Niet alleen getuigen ze van een oncontroleerbare
megalomanie en totalitaire gedachte, ze schenden ook elke wet, grondwet of internationaal recht
zoals de conventie van Genève over de mensenrechten. Verder hielden deze plannen geen rekening
met externe factoren zoals klimaat (droogte, overstromingen), technologische ontwikkelingen,
epidemies en onvoorspelbare reacties wanneer de waarheid, al dan niet gepland, naar boven zou
komen.
Dit is een duidelijk teken van de arrogantie van de SHINU-elite die hun lang leven beschouwden als
een teken van privilege, suprematie en uitverkorenheid.

3.E.

HET EURO BEDROG
Omwille van haar dominante positie in de Europese Unie, zowel economisch als demografisch, was
Duitsland perfect geplaatst om het Europees SHINU-plan uit te rollen. Toen kort na het Kasumigaseki
seminarie de Eurozone crisis uitbrak, was het moment meteen daar om toe te slaan.
Eén van de oorzaken van die crisis, of zelfs dé oorzaak van de crisis 98, was de schuldenlast die de
perifere landen van de EU-zone (Griekenland, Ierland, Spanje en Italië) hadden ten opzichte van de
kernlanden (Duitsland, Frankrijk, Benelux, Oostenrijk, Denemarken) Fig37. Toen die laatste de impact
voelden van de globale schuldencrisis begonnen ook zij hun budgettering te verstrengen waardoor de
perifere landen in problemen kwamen. Dit veroorzaakte een paniekreactie die de crisis escaleerde tot
op vandaag.
Het wees echter ook de kernlanden aan welke macht ze hadden over de perifere landen.

Fig. 37: total lending from core countries’ banks into the periphery (billion euros) 99

98

The Eurozone Crisis: A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Solutions - http://www.voxeu.org/content/eurozonecrisis-consensus-view-causes-and-few-possible-solutions
99
http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/reboot_upload_0.pdf p34

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

38

Dit zou het momentum zijn dat de EU-SHINU landen zochten. Er werd een dubbele tactiek bedacht
om zoveel mogelijk rendement uit de Eurozone-crisis te halen.
Allereerst, het verstrengen van de buitenlandse politiek en grenzen van Europa om zich zo te
distantiëren van mogelijke tegenstanders. Aangezien Europa langs één kant gevrijwaard was door
water, wou men langs de andere kant een gordel van bufferlanden tussen hen en Rusland; de meest
efficiënte aanpak betrof slechts drie landen: Polen, Oekraïne en Turkije.

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

39

1) Polen
Hoewel slechts lid van de Europese Unie sinds mei 2004 100, heeft Polen het zesde hoogste aantal
zetels in het Europees Parlement 101 en heeft het sinds zijn toetreding een constante verhoging van
haar Europese dotatie gezienFig38 die zelfs de dotatie van elk ander land in de Europese Unie overstijgt
Fig39
. Wanneer op 1 december 2014, Donald Tusk benoemd werd tot President of the European
Council was Polen volledig verankerd in de geplande alliantie. Dit zou de relatie van Polen met Rusland
nog verder onder druk zetten met het meest recente dieptepunt op 27 september 2015 102.

expenditure Poland
20.000,0
18.000,0
16.000,0
14.000,0
12.000,0
10.000,0
8.000,0
6.000,0
4.000,0
2.000,0
0,0
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Fig. 38: EU-expenditure Poland 2002 – 2014 103

expenditure 2014 per EU country
20.000,0
18.000,0
16.000,0
14.000,0
12.000,0
10.000,0
8.000,0
6.000,0
4.000,0
2.000,0
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK

0,0

Fig. 39: EU-expenditure per EU-member 104
100

http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/poland/index_en.htm
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/infographics/abc_eu_institutions_large_en.jpg
102
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20150927_01889834
103
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2007-2013/index_en.cfm
101

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

40

2) Oekraïne
In 2011 koppelde de Europese Unie extra voorwaarden aan de toetreding van Oekraïne 105. Hierdoor
dwong men het land in een split tussen de pro-Russische facties en de pro-Westerse. Dit zou
uiteindelijk tot een totale uitsluiting en isolatie van de Russische Federatie met als doel interne
destabilisatie en institutioneel bankroet:
“At an extraordinary meeting on 20 February, EU foreign ministers decided to introduce
sanctions against those responsible for violence and the use of excessive force in Ukraine.
The restrictive measures include an asset freeze and visa ban on individuals responsible for
human rights violations, violence and use of excessive force. The EU member states also
agreed to suspend export licenses for equipment which might be used for internal repression
and to reassess export licenses for equipment covered by Common Position
2008/944/CFSP.” 106

Hoe willekeurig en onvoorspelbaar de geopolitieke zetten van de Russische Federatie steeds geweest
zijn, lijkt het toch hoogstwaarschijnlijk dat Moskou in zekere mate op de hoogte was van een
samenzwering waarbij zij niet aan tafel waren uitgenodigd. Dit onderlijnt hoe gevoelig, sinecuur en
geheim de SHINU-plannen waren.

3) Turkije
Met een buffer in het Noord-Oosten van Europa met Polen en Oekraïne, is Turkije de enige buffer
tegen de druk uit het Midden Oosten en Afrika. Hoewel een aansluiting bij de Europese Unie
uitgesloten blijft 107:
“.. while restating Turkey’s importance to the EU and offering a few positive conclusions, [the
European Commission]expressed overall disappointment with Turkey’s progress on a number
of issues including judicial reform, media freedom, freedom of expression, Turkey’s continued
refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, and Turkey’s position on the
Cyprus EU presidency. All three institutions urged Turkey to achieve more reforms.” 108

104

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2007-2013/index_en.cfm
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-662_en.htm?locale=en
106
Press release – 3300th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting – Brussels, 20 February 2014
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/02/20/
107
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Turkey_to_the_European_Union#Negotiation_progress
108
European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdf
105

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

41

Doordat de Europese Unie door haar eigen wetten niet dieper kan samenwerken met Turkije, is het
de VS die hier de brug maakt met Turkije als militaire bondgenoot.:

“The U.S.-Turkey partnership is based on mutual interests and mutual respect and is focused
on areas such as regional security and stability, as well as economic cooperation. The United
States also stands in solidarity with Turkey in the fight against terrorism. Counterterrorism
cooperation is a key element of our strategic partnership.” 109

Na het versleutelen van de buitengrenzen, bestaat de tweede poot van de tactiek uit het
vergrendelen van de binnengrenzen: de SHINU-elite plant zich terug te trekken op haar eigen
grondgebied terwijl de perifere landen voor een veilige buffer zorgen; hun militaire dienstbetoon aan
Europa vormt de basis van hun lidmaatschap. Hiertoe zal Duitsland haar controle op de EURO-munt
nog versterken en zo de facto eigenaar van de schulden (en de landen) worden. Dit moet – in
combinatie met het sluiten van de nationale grenzen - zorgen voor meer stabiliteit en economische en
militaire overmacht.
Het opblazen van de Schengen-akkoorden door Duitsland is hier slechts de eerste stap 110.

109

European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm
110
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/13/germany-to-close-borders-exit-schengen-emergency-measures

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

42

4. HET EFFICIËNTIE MANDAAT

Sinds het begin van de mensheid zijn de meest onmenselijke verschrikkingen een ander aangedaan onder het
mandaat van een zogenaamde hogere macht; de één had een visie of een droom, de ander had een bepaalde
tekst geïnterpreteerd, nog een ander had geluk met de kleur van darmen van een gans of de uitlijning van de
sterren en nog een ander had het geluk om in het juiste nest geboren te worden. Al deze mandaten, al deze
gruwelijkheden uit het verleden verbleken bij het mandaat van SHINU.
Dankzij SHINU is het mogelijk om een waarde te plakken op een mens en die ook naar die waarde te
rangschikken. Er is slechts onderscheid in één ding: de levensverwachting; alle andere verschillen zoals ras of
geslacht telden niet meer mee.
Aanvankelijk werd SHINU voornamelijk gebruikt als middel tot zelfbescherming door gemachtigden, politici en
hoger management systematisch te screenen en hun SHINU te mappen. Dit zou echter al heel snel uitgroeien
tot een elitair clubje waar enkel die met een hoge SHINU geaccepteerd werden. Een clubje dat steeds
exclusiever werd, wanneer duidelijk werd hoezeer de levensverwachting wereldwijd in een vrije val zat.

Het bereiken van een lang leven en de theoretische maximale SHINU werd niets minder dan een fetish waarbij
de rijken minutieus hun lichaam probeerden te verzorgen door correcte voeding, sport en verzorging; waarbij
sommigen zich zelfs meer dan dagelijks lieten screenen. Aangezien belangrijke posities systematisch werden
toegewezen aan leden met een hoge SHINU konden zij hierdoor gemakkelijk een fortuin vergaren waarmee al
hun excessen betaald werden. Er zijn zelfs rapporten van wedstrijden die in de clubs gehouden werden
waarbij men iemand met een zo laag mogelijke SHINU diende mee te brengen; sommige telden zelfs in groep
af tot wanneer die hun tijd afgelopen was.

In dat onderste SHINU-spectrum werden mensen gecategoriseerd en gelabeld volgens hun levensverwachting.
Hoewel zij in het ongewisse gehouden werden over de ware toedracht van de screenings, zou er een nieuwe
onderlaag ontstaan die geen aanspraak op iets kon maken. Algemeen werd aangenomen dat iedereen
opofferingen zou moeten maken zodat de mensheid kon overleven; wat betekende het opofferen van velen
voor de toekomst van enkelen. Door het afschaffen van de gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, huisvesting en
algehele welzijnszorg voor iedereen die geen zestien jaar zou worden, werden budgetten vrijgemaakt ter
bescherming van zij die wel eeuwig leken te leven.
Vanaf zestien jaar werden duidelijke taken en rollen in de maatschappij toegewezen per SHINU: alle fysieke
taken gaande van zwaar werk zoals werken in de mijnen, energie en industrie tot constructie en productie
werden toegewezen aan het blok SHINU 16-40.
Wie langer zou leven dan 40 jaar, kreeg een degelijke opleiding en belandde in een service georiënteerde
richting gaande van IT tot security tot geneeskunde. Het waren slechts de enkelingen die ouder zouden
worden dan 55 jaar die toegang hadden tot planning, controle en andere bestuursvormen.

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

43

5. DE TOEKOMST
Het meest verontrustende aan al deze feiten is het bankroet van de menselijke moraal. De snelheid en
vanzelfsprekendheid waarmee personen benoemd en gerangschikt worden, brengt de ergste doembeelden
uit onze geschiedenis naar voren. Er is een neerwaartse spiraal ingezet die niet te stoppen lijkt.
Een levensvisie gebaseerd op SHINU, gecombineerd met een dalende levensverwachting van de mens volstaat
als mandaat voor een kille en logische efficiëntie. Die logica triggert een gedachtegang die niet te stoppen is
en waarvan het einde niet te voorspellen is. 111

Het is dan ook zeer de vraag hoe deze ontwikkelingen zich de komende jaren verder gaan uitrollen.
Aangezien de SHINU-coalitie reeds op een punt van no-return gekomen is en zich gesteund voelt door de
resultaten van haar eigen studie, is het zeer waarschijnlijk dat zij zich onder geen enkele voorwaarde gaat
terugtrekken.
Integendeel, elke vorm van verzet zal een nog krachtigere tegenreactie krijgen waardoor zij hun voorsprong
militair, institutioneel en op SHINU willen vrijwaren.
Het enige mogelijke antwoord is echter onmiddellijke actie door hier tegen in opstand te komen, de waarheid
te delen vooraleer hun plan volledige vorm kan aannemen en de universele waarden en rechten van het
leven te verdedigen.
Want terwijl SHINU meer onder de publieke aandacht komt, gaat het verhaal gewoon verder.

- - -

111

http://www.demorgen.be/lifestyle/de-leeftijdstest-heeft-het-potentieel-om-onze-samenleving-te-ontwrichten-a2447942/

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

44

6. APPENDICES
1.

SHINU ORIGIN

6.A.1.1.

NIRA Research Activities

source: http://www.nira.or.jp/english/about/research_a.html
Introduction
Since its establishment in 1974 as a semi-governmental organization under the National Institute for Research Advancement Act, the
National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) has conducted comprehensive research in order to contribute to the resolution
of a variety of complex contemporary social, economic and lifestyle issues. As a result of government reform initiatives, NIRA
changed its juridical status in November 29, 2007, becoming an incorporated foundation. NIRA’s aims, however, remain unchanged,
and the institute will continue to conduct its activities for the public interest.
In its new form, NIRA seeks to present bolder policy proposals and to make information available in a timely fashion in order to
stimulate policy discussion and contribute more actively to the policy-making process. As globalization advances and the nation’s
population ages, Japanese society is facing profound structural changes, a situation that urgently requires the nation’s research
institutes to adopt new roles. NIRA therefore views its change in organizational status as an opportunity to reform its research
system to meet the demands of a new era.
Research Activities
Japanese society is facing enormous changes, and Japan as a nation is under pressure to respond to a variety of issues, including the
aging of the population, future arrangements for medical treatment and pension payments for the elderly, the status of the
economy, increasing economic disparity, the revitalization of regional economies, and the problems associated with globalization. It
is essential that we rapidly identify the implications of these issues for public policy on the basis of comprehensive, independent and
interdisciplinary analysis and propose appropriate policy responses.
NIRA attempts to stimulate policy discussion and contribute to the policy-making process through timely analysis of issues and the
dissemination of results in an easily comprehensible form. Using networks of scholars, researchers and specialists in a diverse range
of fields, NIRA endeavors to rapidly grasp the essentials of issues, and to outline concrete policy proposals in response to them.
Areas of Research
With a focus on the three areas of domestic social and economic policy, international relations, and regional issues, NIRA will attempt
to clarify the issues confronting Japan and formulate appropriate policy proposals.
Japan is facing large-scale structural changes proceeding from the aging of its population. This is generating a variety of issues, one of
the most urgent of which is a decline in the working population. NIRA will analyze and present proposals concerning the changes in
institutional design required in a wide range of fields, including the reform of social systems in response to the diversification of
forms of employment, the reform of the pension and medical care systems, and reforms necessary from the perspective of achieving
sustainable medium- and long-term growth and sound finances.
Looking internationally, NIRA will analyze the progress of globalization and propose relevant measures for Japan. From the domestic
perspective, we will study regional needs, analyze mechanisms of regional development with consideration of the viewpoints of the
major regional actors, and propose measures for the revitalization of regional economies.
Style of Research
NIRA will function as the core of a research network, enabling individuals with specialized knowledge in diverse fields to come
together to conduct research and share information.
We will identify the policy issues that are most urgent from the perspective of the Japanese public, and will expedite their analysis in
order to enable the formulation of policy proposals.
In addition, we will attempt to disseminate information to the public in a timely manner and an easily comprehensible form in order
to stimulate policy discussion.

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

45

6.A.1.2.
The Science and Technology Basic Law (Unofficial Translation)
source: http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/law/law.html

(Law No. 130 of 1995. Effective on November 15, 1995)
Chapter 1 General Provisions (Articles 1 - 8)
Chapter 2 Science and Technology Basic Plan(Article 9)
Chapter 3 Promotion of Research and Development (Articles 10 - 17)
Chapter 4 Promotion of International Exchange (Article 18)
Chapter 5 Promotion of Learning on S&T (Article 19)
Supplementary Provision
Chapter 1 General Provisions (Objective) Article 1
The objective of this law is to achieve a higher standard of science and technology (hereinafter referred to as "S&T"), to contribute to
the development of the economy and society in Japan and to the improvement of the welfare of the nation, as well as to contribute
to the progress of S&T in the world and the sustainable development of human society, through prescribing the basic policy
requirements for the promotion of S&T (excluding those relevant only to the humanities in this law) and comprehensively and
systematically promoting policies for the progress of S&T.
(Guidelines for Promotion of S&T) Article 2
S&T shall be actively promoted in harmony with human life, society and nature with the recognition that the creativity of researchers
and technicians (hereinafter referred to as "Researchers") can be fully developed, in consideration of the fact that S&T provides the
basis for the future development of Japan and human society and that the accumulation of knowledge on S&T is the intellectual
asset common for all mankind.

2 In the promotion of S&T, the improvement of balanced ability of research and development (hereinafter referred to as "R&D") in
various fields, harmonized development among basic research, applied research and development and organic cooperation of
national research institutes, universities (including graduate schools in this law.) and private sector etc. should be considered, and in
consideration of the fact that the mutual connection between natural science and the humanities is essential for the progress of S&T,
attention should be paid to the balanced development of both.
(Responsibility of the Nation) Article 3
The nation is responsible for formulating and implementing comprehensive policies with regard to the promotion of S&T.
(Responsibility of Local Governments) Article 4
The local governments are responsible for formulating and implementing policies with regard to the promotion of S&T corresponding
to national policies and policies of their own initiatives in accordance with the characteristics of their jurisdictions.
(Necessary Consideration to be given by the Nation and Local Governments in Formulating Policies) Article 5
In formulating and implementing policies with regard to the promotion of S&T, the nation and local governments shall pay attention
to the importance of their roles in promoting basic research and consider that basic research has the following characteristics:
(i) It could bring about discovery and elucidation of new phenomena and make the creation of novel technologies possible;
(ii) Forecasting its results at the outset of research is difficult; and
(iii) The results are not necessarily directly connected to practical applications.
(Necessary Consideration in Policies with regard to universities) Article 6
In formulating and implementing policies related to universities and Inter-university Research Institutes (hereinafter referred to as
"Universities"), with regard to the promotion of S&T, the local and national governments shall make an effort to activate research in
Universities, respect the autonomy of Researchers and consider the characteristics of research in Universities.
(Legislative and other Measures) Article 7
The Government shall take the appropriate legislative, fiscal, financial and other necessary measures required to implement the
policies with regard to the promotion of S&T.
(Annual Report) Article 8
The Government shall annually submit a report on the policy measures implemented with regard to the promotion of S&T to the
National Diet.
Chapter 2 S&T Basic Plan Article 9
The Government shall establish a basic plan for the promotion of S&T (hereinafter referred to as "Basic Plan") in order to
comprehensively and systematically implement policies with regard to the promotion of S&T.
2 The Basic Plan shall stipulate the following matters:
(i) The comprehensive plans for the promotion of R&D (the term "R&D" means basic, applied and developmental researches and
includes technology development in this law.);
(ii) The policies taken comprehensively and systematically by the Government with regard to the installation of R&D facilities and
equipment (hereinafter referred to as "Facilities"), the promotion of information intensive R&D activities and the maintenance of the
necessary environment for the promotion of R&D; and
(iii) Other matters required to promote S&T.
3 The Government shall consult the Council for Science and Technology Policy on the Basic Plan prior to formulation.

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

46

4 The Government shall consider the progress of S&T and the effect of policies taken by the Government with regard to the
promotion of S&T, examine the Basic Plan properly, and revise it if necessary. The preceding paragraph shall apply in the case of
revisions.
5 When formulating the Basic Plan in accordance with paragraph 1 above or revising it in accordance with the preceding paragraph,
the Government shall publish the summary of the Basic Plan.
6 In order to secure necessary funds for the implementation of the Basic Plan, every fiscal year the Government shall take the
necessary measures for the smooth implementation of the Basic Plan such as including the necessary fund in the budget within the
limits of national financial status.
Chapter 3 Promotion of R&D (Balanced Promotion of various levels of R&D) Article 10
The nation should implement necessary policy measures for the balanced promotion of various levels of R&D in comprehensive fields
as well as take necessary measures for the planning and implementation of R&D in the specific fields of S&T where the nation
considers further promotion important.
(Securing Researchers) Article 11
The nation should implement necessary policy measures to improve education and research in graduate schools, to secure and train
Researchers and to improve their quality in order to promote R&D corresponding to the progress of S&T.
2 The nation should implement necessary policy measures to improve the occupational conditions of Researchers in order for their
positions to be attractive commensurate with their importance.
3 In consideration of the fact that R&D supporting personnel are essential for the smooth promotion of R&D, the nation should
implement necessary policy measures corresponding to the preceding two paragraphs in order to secure and train them and to
improve their quality of service along with their occupational conditions.
(Improvement of Facilities) Article 12
The nation should implement necessary policy measures to improve research facilities of R&D institutions (the term "R&D
institutions" is defined as national research institutes and institutions for R&D in Universities, private sector and so on in this law) in
order to promote R&D corresponding to the progress of S&T.
2 The nation should implement necessary policy measures to upgrade supporting R&D functions such as supplying research materials
smoothly in order to promote R&D effectively.
(Promotion of Information Intensive R&D) Article 13
The nation should take necessary policies to promote information intensive R&D activities such as the advancement of information
processing in S&T, the maintenance of databases on S&T and the construction of information networks among R&D institutions in
order to promote R&D effectively.
(Promotion of Exchange in R&D) Article 14
The nation should implement necessary policy measures for the promotion of R&D to enhance various exchanges such as the
exchange of Researchers, joint R&D of R&D institutions and joint use of Facilities of R&D institutions, in consideration of the fact that
promoting the fusion of various Researchers' knowledge through exchanges between R&D institutions and/or Researchers is the
source of new R&D progress and that this exchange is essential for the effective promotion of R&D.
(Effective use of R&D funds) Article 15
The nation should implement necessary policy measures to use R&D funds effectively corresponding to the progress of R&D in order
to promote R&D smoothly.
(Making public the results of R&D) Article 16
The nation should implement necessary policy measures to diffuse the results of R&D, such as the publication of the results of R&D
and the provision of the information on R&D and measures to promote appropriate practical applications of them.
(Support of efforts by private enterprises) Article 17
In consideration of the importance of the role played by the private sector in S&T activities in Japan, the nation should implement
necessary policy measures to promote private sector R&D by encouraging initiatives in the private sector.
Chapter 4 Promotion of International Exchange Article 18
The nation should implement necessary policy measures to promote international exchange such as international exchange of
Researchers, international joint R&D and international distribution of information on S&T, in order to play an active role in
international society, as well as to contribute to further progress in S&T in Japan, by intensely promoting international S&T activities.
Chapter 5 Promotion of Learning on S&T Article 19
The nation should implement necessary policy measures to promote the learning of S&T in school and social education, to enlighten
the people in S&T and to disseminate knowledge on S&T, so that all Japanese people including the young can deepen their
understanding of and interest in S&T with every opportunity.
Supplementary Provision
This law shall enter into force on the day of its promulgation.
This English language version of this law is a translation of an original document produced in Japanese. Any questions that may arise
about the interpretation of the law shall be resolved with regard to the original Japanese document.

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

47

6.A.1.3.
Research Activities of Research Institutions, Universities and Colleges by Kind of Organization
and Field of Science (F.Y. 1959--2010) source http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/17-07.xls

17-7 組織,学問別研究機関及び大学等の研究活動(昭和34年度~平成22年度)
(単位 金額 10億円)
(Value in billions of yen)
組織,学問,年
研究機関又は大
従業者総数
研究関係従業者
内部使用研究費

学等の数
(1,000人)

# 研究者
Organization,
field of science
and fiscal year

Number of
research
institutions or
universities and
colleges

Total number of
persons
employed
(1,000 persons)

Number of
persons
employed in
R&D

Researchers

研究機関
総数

昭和34
年度
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
平成元年度
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

研究本務者1人
当たりの内部使
用研究費 (100万
円)

Intramural
expenditure on
R&D

自己負担研究費

受入研究費

Intramural
expenditure on
R&D per
regular
researcher(milli
on yen)

Self-financed
R&D fund

R&D funds
received

外部支出研究費

R&D funds paid
outside

Research institutes
Total

F.Y. 1959

663

43

37.370

15.808

27

...

...

3,5

1,3

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

1.052
1.100
1.079
1.065
1.118
1.187
1.231
1.204
1.250
1.259
1.282
1.321
1.348
1.396
1.425
1.437
1.442
1.452
1.442
1.430
1.408
1.408
1.377
1.370
1.319
1.245
1.203
1.183
1.172
1.152
1.198
1.131
1.129
1.096
1.096
1.067

83
87
87
87
88
94
102
104
107
109
111
116
118
121
125
126
129
131
136
134
135
138
138
141
140
142
114
114
122
167
170
169
172
172
174
177

71.013
72.752
72.209
72.217
71.030
76.113
81.654
83.325
86.041
87.645
89.950
93.568
94.406
96.211
99.895
100.143
102.729
103.958
106.624
105.326
105.523
106.788
105.813
108.999
107.533
108.714
90.273
91.633
91.736
77.249
77.313
77.185
76.929
75.529
76.502
74.832

39.332
41.816
41.666
41.608
41.273
42.436
47.024
48.227
49.977
51.260
53.179
55.289
56.595
57.882
61.182
60.456
62.813
63.943
66.341
67.996
68.157
69.041
67.368
68.792
67.241
68.563
50.027
49.867
48.595
43.917
42.959
42.033
41.071
40.322
40.812
40.231

450
504
530
604
660
764
907
949
971
1.033
1.161
1.240
1.384
1.394
1.452
1.514
1.621
1.773
1.897
1.863
2.030
2.008
2.024
2.117
2.171
2.221
1.844
1.816
1.782
1.796
1.692
1.753
1.690
1.721
1.713
1.666

15
16
17
20
21
23
25
27
27
29
32
33
36
35
36
36
38
40
42
40
44
43
43
45
46
47
41
40
40
41
39
42
41
43
42
41

264
269
300
334
370
400
469
449
458
454
518
540
595
585
636
714
760
796
862
852
900
880
892
884
879
943
768
781
840
964
914
639
608
659
623
620

220
267
281
310
344
438
578
632
664
746
822
874
984
1.074
1.138
1.131
1.180
1.312
1.401
1.360
1.497
1.539
1.533
1.746
1.802
1.895
1.578
1.425
1.406
1.323
1.218
1.674
1.643
1.557
1.570
1.515

13
17
22
22
37
46
79
91
107
108
123
124
142
160
189
221
248
288
297
292
313
360
359
391
381
434
337
289
329
407
342
483
453
426
434
400

(1) 研究機関及び大学等数,従業者総数,研究関係従事者数及び研究者は,3月31日現在。
ただし,平成12年度以前は4月1日現在。内部使用研究費等は3月31日又は直近の決算日から遡る1年間の数値。
(2) 平成14年調査から,従来の「研究機関」について「非営利団体・公的機関」とするとともに,従来「会社等」に含まれていた特殊法人の一部が加えられた。
(1) "Number of research institutions or universities and colleges", "Total number of persons employed" and "Number of persons engaged in R&D" as of March 31. However, until F.Y. 2000, as of April 1. "Intramural expenditure on
R&D" is for one year from March 31 or the closest settling day.
(2) From the 2002 survey, the former category of "research organizations" was renamed as "non-profit institutions and public organizations," including parts of special corporations that have been formerly categorized under "companies,
etc."
〔資料〕 総務省統計局統計調査部経済統計課「科学技術研究調査報告」(刊行物)
総務省統計局統計調査部経済統計課「科学技術研究調査」Source: Statistical Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

48

6.3.B.1 RECENT DISASTERS JAPAN
Volcanic Eruptions
Location
Mount Sakura-jima, Kyushu
Suwanose-jima, Ryukyu Islands
Shinmoe-dake, Kyushu
Miyake-jima, Izu Islands
Fukutoku-Okanoba, Bonin Islands
Mount Asama, Honshu
Mount Meakan, Hokkaido
Mount Oyama, Miyake-jima
Mount Aso, Kyushu
Kikai Caldera, Osumi Islands
Tori-shima, Izu Islands
Mount Usu, Hokkaido
Hokkaido Koma-ga-take, Hokkaido
Mount Niigatayake, Honshu
Mount Hakkoda, Honshu
Iwo Jima
Mount Kuju, Kyushu
Mount Unzen, Kyushu
Mount Yake, Honshu
Oshima, Izu Islands

Last eruption
2012
2012
2011
2010
2010
2009
2008
2005
2004
2004
2002
2001
2000
1998
1997
1997
1996
1996
1995
1990

Typhoons
Name of Typhoon
Typhoon Bolaven
Typhoon Damrey
Typhoon Guchol
Typhoon Haikui
Typhoon Jelawat
Tropical Storm Aere
Typhoon Chaba
Tropical Storm Etau
Typhoon Jangmi
Tropical Storm Faxai
Typhoon Fitow
Typhoon Ewiniar
Typhoon Conson
Typhoon Dianmu
Typhoon Chataan
Typhoon Fengshen
Typhoon Bart

Year
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2007
2006
2004
2004
2002
2002
1999

Damage
$475 million
$636 million
$100 million
$2.09 billion
$27.4 million
$31 million
$87.5 million
$240.4 million
$1.5 million
$1 billion
$1.4 billion
$3.8 million
$68.5 million
$500 million
$4 million
$5 billion

Earthquakes
Location
Kamaishi Earthquake

Date
2012, 7 December

Estimated deaths
0

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

Estimated death
59
14
3
105
3
35
28
6
1
3
141
2
6
54
5
16

49

Chiba Earthquake
Izu Islands earthquake
Miyagi Earthquake Aftershock
Tohoku Earthquake
Fukushima Earthquake
Fukushima Earthquake Aftershock
Ryukyu Islands Earthquake
Bonin Islands Earthquake
Izu Islands Earthquake
Shizuoka Earthquake
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake
Noto Earthquake
Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake
Kuril Islands Earthquake
Kuril Islands Earthquake
Fukuoka Earthquake
Miyagi Earthquake
Chuetsu Earthquake
Hokkaido Earthquake
Geiyo Earthquake
Ryukyu Islands Earthquake
Kobe Earthquake
Offshore Sanriku Earthquake
Hokkaido Earthquake

2012, 14 March
2012, 1 January
2011, 7 April
2011, 11 March
2011, 11 April
2011, 10 July
2010, 26 February
2010, 21 December
2009, 9 August
2009, 11 August
2008, 14 June
2007, 25 March
2007, 16 July
2007, 13 January
2006, 15 November
2005, 20 March
2005, 16 August
2004, 23 October
2003, 25 September
2001, 24 March
1998, 4 May
1995, 17 January
1994, 28 December
1993, 12 July

0
0
4
15,881
6
0
1
0
0
1
12
1
11
0
0
1
0
40
1
2
0
6,434
3
202

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_disasters_in_Japan

6.3.C.1

GPRA MODERNIZATION ACT

SHINULEAKS – sept2015

50

H. R. 2142

One Hundred Eleventh Congress
of the
United States of America
AT T H E S E C O N D S E S S I O N
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
the fifth day of January, two thousand and ten

An Act
To require quarterly performance assessments of Government programs for purposes
of assessing agency performance and improvement, and to establish agency performance improvement officers and the Performance Improvement Council.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘GPRA Modernization Act of 2010’’.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Short title; table of contents.
Strategic planning amendments.
Performance planning amendments.
Performance reporting amendments.
Federal Government and agency priority goals.
Quarterly priority progress reviews and use of performance information.
Transparency of Federal Government programs, priority goals, and results.
Agency Chief Operating Officers.
Agency Performance Improvement Officers and the Performance Improvement Council.
10. Format of performance plans and reports.
11. Reducing duplicative and outdated agency reporting.
12. Performance management skills and competencies.
13. Technical and conforming amendments.
14. Implementation of this Act.
15. Congressional oversight and legislation.

SEC. 2. STRATEGIC PLANNING AMENDMENTS.

Chapter 3 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking
section 306 and inserting the following:
‘‘§ 306. Agency strategic plans
‘‘(a) Not later than the first Monday in February of any year
following the year in which the term of the President commences
under section 101 of title 3, the head of each agency shall make
available on the public website of the agency a strategic plan
and notify the President and Congress of its availability. Such
plan shall contain—
‘‘(1) a comprehensive mission statement covering the major
functions and operations of the agency;
‘‘(2) general goals and objectives, including outcome-oriented goals, for the major functions and operations of the
agency;
‘‘(3) a description of how any goals and objectives contribute
to the Federal Government priority goals required by section
1120(a) of title 31;

H. R. 2142—2
‘‘(4) a description of how the goals and objectives are to
be achieved, including—
‘‘(A) a description of the operational processes, skills
and technology, and the human, capital, information, and
other resources required to achieve those goals and objectives; and
‘‘(B) a description of how the agency is working with
other agencies to achieve its goals and objectives as well
as relevant Federal Government priority goals;
‘‘(5) a description of how the goals and objectives incorporate views and suggestions obtained through congressional
consultations required under subsection (d);
‘‘(6) a description of how the performance goals provided
in the plan required by section 1115(a) of title 31, including
the agency priority goals required by section 1120(b) of title
31, if applicable, contribute to the general goals and objectives
in the strategic plan;
‘‘(7) an identification of those key factors external to the
agency and beyond its control that could significantly affect
the achievement of the general goals and objectives; and
‘‘(8) a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule
for future program evaluations to be conducted.
‘‘(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than
4 years following the fiscal year in which the plan is submitted.
As needed, the head of the agency may make adjustments to the
strategic plan to reflect significant changes in the environment
in which the agency is operating, with appropriate notification
of Congress.
‘‘(c) The performance plan required by section 1115(b) of title
31 shall be consistent with the agency’s strategic plan. A performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not covered
by a current strategic plan under this section.
‘‘(d) When developing or making adjustments to a strategic
plan, the agency shall consult periodically with the Congress,
including majority and minority views from the appropriate authorizing, appropriations, and oversight committees, and shall solicit
and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially
affected by or interested in such a plan. The agency shall consult
with the appropriate committees of Congress at least once every
2 years.
‘‘(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently governmental functions. The drafting of strategic plans under this section shall be performed only by Federal
employees.
‘‘(f) For purposes of this section the term ‘agency’ means an
Executive agency defined under section 105, but does not include
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Government Accountability
Office, the United States Postal Service, and the Postal Regulatory
Commission.’’.
SEC. 3. PERFORMANCE PLANNING AMENDMENTS.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
striking section 1115 and inserting the following:

H. R. 2142—3
‘‘§ 1115. Federal Government and agency performance plans
‘‘(a) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PLANS.—In carrying
out the provisions of section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall coordinate with agencies to
develop the Federal Government performance plan. In addition
to the submission of such plan with each budget of the United
States Government, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall ensure that all information required by this subsection
is concurrently made available on the website provided under section 1122 and updated periodically, but no less than annually.
The Federal Government performance plan shall—
‘‘(1) establish Federal Government performance goals to
define the level of performance to be achieved during the year
in which the plan is submitted and the next fiscal year for
each of the Federal Government priority goals required under
section 1120(a) of this title;
‘‘(2) identify the agencies, organizations, program activities,
regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities
contributing to each Federal Government performance goal
during the current fiscal year;
‘‘(3) for each Federal Government performance goal, identify a lead Government official who shall be responsible for
coordinating the efforts to achieve the goal;
‘‘(4) establish common Federal Government performance
indicators with quarterly targets to be used in measuring or
assessing—
‘‘(A) overall progress toward each Federal Government
performance goal; and
‘‘(B) the individual contribution of each agency,
organization, program activity, regulation, tax expenditure,
policy, and other activity identified under paragraph (2);
‘‘(5) establish clearly defined quarterly milestones; and
‘‘(6) identify major management challenges that are
Governmentwide or crosscutting in nature and describe plans
to address such challenges, including relevant performance
goals, performance indicators, and milestones.
‘‘(b) AGENCY PERFORMANCE PLANS.—Not later than the first
Monday in February of each year, the head of each agency shall
make available on a public website of the agency, and notify the
President and the Congress of its availability, a performance plan
covering each program activity set forth in the budget of such
agency. Such plan shall—
‘‘(1) establish performance goals to define the level of
performance to be achieved during the year in which the plan
is submitted and the next fiscal year;
‘‘(2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and
measurable form unless authorized to be in an alternative
form under subsection (c);
‘‘(3) describe how the performance goals contribute to—
‘‘(A) the general goals and objectives established in
the agency’s strategic plan required by section 306(a)(2)
of title 5; and
‘‘(B) any of the Federal Government performance goals
established in the Federal Government performance plan
required by subsection (a)(1);

H. R. 2142—4
‘‘(4) identify among the performance goals those which
are designated as agency priority goals as required by section
1120(b) of this title, if applicable;
‘‘(5) provide a description of how the performance goals
are to be achieved, including—
‘‘(A) the operation processes, training, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other
resources and strategies required to meet those performance goals;
‘‘(B) clearly defined milestones;
‘‘(C) an identification of the organizations, program
activities, regulations, policies, and other activities that
contribute to each performance goal, both within and
external to the agency;
‘‘(D) a description of how the agency is working with
other agencies to achieve its performance goals as well
as relevant Federal Government performance goals; and
‘‘(E) an identification of the agency officials responsible
for the achievement of each performance goal, who shall
be known as goal leaders;
‘‘(6) establish a balanced set of performance indicators to
be used in measuring or assessing progress toward each
performance goal, including, as appropriate, customer service,
efficiency, output, and outcome indicators;
‘‘(7) provide a basis for comparing actual program results
with the established performance goals;
‘‘(8) a description of how the agency will ensure the
accuracy and reliability of the data used to measure progress
towards its performance goals, including an identification of—
‘‘(A) the means to be used to verify and validate measured values;
‘‘(B) the sources for the data;
‘‘(C) the level of accuracy required for the intended
use of the data;
‘‘(D) any limitations to the data at the required level
of accuracy; and
‘‘(E) how the agency will compensate for such limitations if needed to reach the required level of accuracy;
‘‘(9) describe major management challenges the agency
faces and identify—
‘‘(A) planned actions to address such challenges;
‘‘(B) performance goals, performance indicators, and
milestones to measure progress toward resolving such challenges; and
‘‘(C) the agency official responsible for resolving such
challenges; and
‘‘(10) identify low-priority program activities based on an
analysis of their contribution to the mission and goals of the
agency and include an evidence-based justification for designating a program activity as low priority.
‘‘(c) ALTERNATIVE FORM.—If an agency, in consultation with
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines
that it is not feasible to express the performance goals for a particular program activity in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
may authorize an alternative form. Such alternative form shall—
‘‘(1) include separate descriptive statements of—

H. R. 2142—5
‘‘(A)(i) a minimally effective program; and
‘‘(ii) a successful program; or
‘‘(B) such alternative as authorized by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, with sufficient
precision and in such terms that would allow for an
accurate, independent determination of whether the program activity’s performance meets the criteria of the
description; or
‘‘(2) state why it is infeasible or impractical to express
a performance goal in any form for the program activity.
‘‘(d) TREATMENT OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES.—For the purpose of
complying with this section, an agency may aggregate, disaggregate,
or consolidate program activities, except that any aggregation or
consolidation may not omit or minimize the significance of any
program activity constituting a major function or operation for
the agency.
‘‘(e) APPENDIX.—An agency may submit with an annual
performance plan an appendix covering any portion of the plan
that—
‘‘(1) is specifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy; and
‘‘(2) is properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
‘‘(f) INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS.—The functions
and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently
governmental functions. The drafting of performance plans under
this section shall be performed only by Federal employees.
‘‘(g) CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS.—With respect to each
agency with a Chief Human Capital Officer, the Chief Human
Capital Officer shall prepare that portion of the annual performance
plan described under subsection (b)(5)(A).
‘‘(h) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section and sections
1116 through 1125, and sections 9703 and 9704, the term—
‘‘(1) ‘agency’ has the same meaning as such term is defined
under section 306(f) of title 5;
‘‘(2) ‘crosscutting’ means across organizational (such as
agency) boundaries;
‘‘(3) ‘customer service measure’ means an assessment of
service delivery to a customer, client, citizen, or other recipient,
which can include an assessment of quality, timeliness, and
satisfaction among other factors;
‘‘(4) ‘efficiency measure’ means a ratio of a program
activity’s inputs (such as costs or hours worked by employees)
to its outputs (amount of products or services delivered) or
outcomes (the desired results of a program);
‘‘(5) ‘major management challenge’ means programs or
management functions, within or across agencies, that have
greater vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement (such as issues identified by the Government Accountability Office as high risk or issues identified by an Inspector
General) where a failure to perform well could seriously affect
the ability of an agency or the Government to achieve its
mission or goals;
‘‘(6) ‘milestone’ means a scheduled event signifying the
completion of a major deliverable or a set of related deliverables
or a phase of work;

H. R. 2142—6
‘‘(7) ‘outcome measure’ means an assessment of the results
of a program activity compared to its intended purpose;
‘‘(8) ‘output measure’ means the tabulation, calculation,
or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a
quantitative or qualitative manner;
‘‘(9) ‘performance goal’ means a target level of performance
expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which
actual achievement can be compared, including a goal expressed
as a quantitative standard, value, or rate;
‘‘(10) ‘performance indicator’ means a particular value or
characteristic used to measure output or outcome;
‘‘(11) ‘program activity’ means a specific activity or project
as listed in the program and financing schedules of the annual
budget of the United States Government; and
‘‘(12) ‘program evaluation’ means an assessment, through
objective measurement and systematic analysis, of the manner
and extent to which Federal programs achieve intended objectives.’’.
SEC. 4. PERFORMANCE REPORTING AMENDMENTS.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
striking section 1116 and inserting the following:
‘‘§ 1116. Agency performance reporting
‘‘(a) The head of each agency shall make available on a public
website of the agency and to the Office of Management and Budget
an update on agency performance.
‘‘(b)(1) Each update shall compare actual performance achieved
with the performance goals established in the agency performance
plan under section 1115(b) and shall occur no less than 150 days
after the end of each fiscal year, with more frequent updates of
actual performance on indicators that provide data of significant
value to the Government, Congress, or program partners at a
reasonable level of administrative burden.
‘‘(2) If performance goals are specified in an alternative form
under section 1115(c), the results shall be described in relation
to such specifications, including whether the performance failed
to meet the criteria of a minimally effective or successful program.
‘‘(c) Each update shall—
‘‘(1) review the success of achieving the performance goals
and include actual results for the 5 preceding fiscal years;
‘‘(2) evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal
year relative to the performance achieved toward the performance goals during the period covered by the update;
‘‘(3) explain and describe where a performance goal has
not been met (including when a program activity’s performance
is determined not to have met the criteria of a successful
program activity under section 1115(c)(1)(A)(ii) or a corresponding level of achievement if another alternative form
is used)—
‘‘(A) why the goal was not met;
‘‘(B) those plans and schedules for achieving the established performance goal; and
‘‘(C) if the performance goal is impractical or infeasible,
why that is the case and what action is recommended;

H. R. 2142—7
‘‘(4) describe the use and assess the effectiveness in
achieving performance goals of any waiver under section 9703
of this title;
‘‘(5) include a review of the performance goals and evaluation of the performance plan relative to the agency’s strategic
human capital management;
‘‘(6) describe how the agency ensures the accuracy and
reliability of the data used to measure progress towards its
performance goals, including an identification of—
‘‘(A) the means used to verify and validate measured
values;
‘‘(B) the sources for the data;
‘‘(C) the level of accuracy required for the intended
use of the data;
‘‘(D) any limitations to the data at the required level
of accuracy; and
‘‘(E) how the agency has compensated for such limitations if needed to reach the required level of accuracy;
and
‘‘(7) include the summary findings of those program evaluations completed during the period covered by the update.
‘‘(d) If an agency performance update includes any program
activity or information that is specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense or foreign policy and is properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order, the head of the agency shall make
such information available in the classified appendix provided under
section 1115(e).
‘‘(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently governmental functions. The drafting of agency
performance updates under this section shall be performed only
by Federal employees.
‘‘(f) Each fiscal year, the Office of Management and Budget
shall determine whether the agency programs or activities meet
performance goals and objectives outlined in the agency performance plans and submit a report on unmet goals to—
‘‘(1) the head of the agency;
‘‘(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
‘‘(3) the Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform
of the House of Representatives; and
‘‘(4) the Government Accountability Office.
‘‘(g) If an agency’s programs or activities have not met performance goals as determined by the Office of Management and Budget
for 1 fiscal year, the head of the agency shall submit a performance
improvement plan to the Office of Management and Budget to
increase program effectiveness for each unmet goal with measurable
milestones. The agency shall designate a senior official who shall
oversee the performance improvement strategies for each unmet
goal.
‘‘(h)(1) If the Office of Management and Budget determines
that agency programs or activities have unmet performance goals
for 2 consecutive fiscal years, the head of the agency shall—
‘‘(A) submit to Congress a description of the actions the
Administration will take to improve performance, including
proposed statutory changes or planned executive actions; and

H. R. 2142—8
‘‘(B) describe any additional funding the agency will obligate to achieve the goal, if such an action is determined appropriate in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, for an amount determined appropriate by
the Director.
‘‘(2) In providing additional funding described under paragraph
(1)(B), the head of the agency shall use any reprogramming or
transfer authority available to the agency. If after exercising such
authority additional funding is necessary to achieve the level determined appropriate by the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, the head of the agency shall submit a request to
Congress for additional reprogramming or transfer authority.
‘‘(i) If an agency’s programs or activities have not met performance goals as determined by the Office of Management and Budget
for 3 consecutive fiscal years, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit recommendations to Congress on
actions to improve performance not later than 60 days after that
determination, including—
‘‘(1) reauthorization proposals for each program or activity
that has not met performance goals;
‘‘(2) proposed statutory changes necessary for the program
activities to achieve the proposed level of performance on each
performance goal; and
‘‘(3) planned executive actions or identification of the program for termination or reduction in the President’s budget.’’.
SEC. 5. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND AGENCY PRIORITY GOALS.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 1119 the following:
‘‘§ 1120. Federal Government and agency priority goals
‘‘(a) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRIORITY GOALS.—
‘‘(1) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall coordinate with agencies to develop priority goals to
improve the performance and management of the Federal
Government. Such Federal Government priority goals shall
include—
‘‘(A) outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number
of crosscutting policy areas; and
‘‘(B) goals for management improvements needed
across the Federal Government, including—
‘‘(i) financial management;
‘‘(ii) human capital management;
‘‘(iii) information technology management;
‘‘(iv) procurement and acquisition management;
and
‘‘(v) real property management;
‘‘(2) The Federal Government priority goals shall be longterm in nature. At a minimum, the Federal Government priority
goals shall be updated or revised every 4 years and made
publicly available concurrently with the submission of the
budget of the United States Government made in the first
full fiscal year following any year in which the term of the
President commences under section 101 of title 3. As needed,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may
make adjustments to the Federal Government priority goals
to reflect significant changes in the environment in which the

H. R. 2142—9
Federal Government is operating, with appropriate notification
of Congress.
‘‘(3) When developing or making adjustments to Federal
Government priority goals, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall consult periodically with the Congress,
including obtaining majority and minority views from—
‘‘(A) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives;
‘‘(B) the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and
the House of Representatives;
‘‘(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
‘‘(D) the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives;
‘‘(E) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
‘‘(F) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives; and
‘‘(G) any other committees as determined appropriate;
‘‘(4) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress at
least once every 2 years.
‘‘(5) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall make information about the Federal Government priority
goals available on the website described under section 1122
of this title.
‘‘(6) The Federal Government performance plan required
under section 1115(a) of this title shall be consistent with
the Federal Government priority goals.
‘‘(b) AGENCY PRIORITY GOALS.—
‘‘(1) Every 2 years, the head of each agency listed in section
901(b) of this title, or as otherwise determined by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, shall identify agency
priority goals from among the performance goals of the agency.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
determine the total number of agency priority goals across
the Government, and the number to be developed by each
agency. The agency priority goals shall—
‘‘(A) reflect the highest priorities of the agency, as
determined by the head of the agency and informed by
the Federal Government priority goals provided under subsection (a) and the consultations with Congress and other
interested parties required by section 306(d) of title 5;
‘‘(B) have ambitious targets that can be achieved within
a 2-year period;
‘‘(C) have a clearly identified agency official, known
as a goal leader, who is responsible for the achievement
of each agency priority goal;
‘‘(D) have interim quarterly targets for performance
indicators if more frequent updates of actual performance
provides data of significant value to the Government, Congress, or program partners at a reasonable level of administrative burden; and
‘‘(E) have clearly defined quarterly milestones.
‘‘(2) If an agency priority goal includes any program activity
or information that is specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and is properly

H. R. 2142—10
classified pursuant to such Executive order, the head of the
agency shall make such information available in the classified
appendix provided under section 1115(e).
‘‘(c) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently governmental functions. The development
of Federal Government and agency priority goals shall be performed
only by Federal employees.’’.
SEC. 6. QUARTERLY PRIORITY PROGRESS REVIEWS AND USE OF
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 1120 (as added by section 5 of this Act) the
following:
‘‘§ 1121. Quarterly priority progress reviews and use of
performance information
‘‘(a) USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION TO ACHIEVE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT PRIORITY GOALS.—Not less than quarterly, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, with the support
of the Performance Improvement Council, shall—
‘‘(1) for each Federal Government priority goal required
by section 1120(a) of this title, review with the appropriate
lead Government official the progress achieved during the most
recent quarter, overall trend data, and the likelihood of meeting
the planned level of performance;
‘‘(2) include in such reviews officials from the agencies,
organizations, and program activities that contribute to the
accomplishment of each Federal Government priority goal;
‘‘(3) assess whether agencies, organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities
are contributing as planned to each Federal Government priority goal;
‘‘(4) categorize the Federal Government priority goals by
risk of not achieving the planned level of performance; and
‘‘(5) for the Federal Government priority goals at greatest
risk of not meeting the planned level of performance, identify
prospects and strategies for performance improvement,
including any needed changes to agencies, organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies or other
activities.
‘‘(b) AGENCY USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION TO ACHIEVE
AGENCY PRIORITY GOALS.—Not less than quarterly, at each agency
required to develop agency priority goals required by section 1120(b)
of this title, the head of the agency and Chief Operating Officer,
with the support of the agency Performance Improvement Officer,
shall—
‘‘(1) for each agency priority goal, review with the appropriate goal leader the progress achieved during the most recent
quarter, overall trend data, and the likelihood of meeting the
planned level of performance;
‘‘(2) coordinate with relevant personnel within and outside
the agency who contribute to the accomplishment of each
agency priority goal;
‘‘(3) assess whether relevant organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and other activities are contributing
as planned to the agency priority goals;

H. R. 2142—11
‘‘(4) categorize agency priority goals by risk of not achieving
the planned level of performance; and
‘‘(5) for agency priority goals at greatest risk of not meeting
the planned level of performance, identify prospects and strategies for performance improvement, including any needed
changes to agency program activities, regulations, policies, or
other activities.’’.
SEC. 7. TRANSPARENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, PRIORITY GOALS, AND RESULTS.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 1121 (as added by section 6 of this Act) the
following:
‘‘§ 1122. Transparency of programs, priority goals, and results
‘‘(a) TRANSPARENCY OF AGENCY PROGRAMS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than October 1, 2012, the
Office of Management and Budget shall—
‘‘(A) ensure the effective operation of a single website;
‘‘(B) at a minimum, update the website on a quarterly
basis; and
‘‘(C) include on the website information about each
program identified by the agencies.
‘‘(2) INFORMATION.—Information for each program described
under paragraph (1) shall include—
‘‘(A) an identification of how the agency defines the
term ‘program’, consistent with guidance provided by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, including
the program activities that are aggregated, disaggregated,
or consolidated to be considered a program by the agency;
‘‘(B) a description of the purposes of the program and
the contribution of the program to the mission and goals
of the agency; and
‘‘(C) an identification of funding for the current fiscal
year and previous 2 fiscal years.
‘‘(b) TRANSPARENCY OF AGENCY PRIORITY GOALS AND
RESULTS.—The head of each agency required to develop agency
priority goals shall make information about each agency priority
goal available to the Office of Management and Budget for publication on the website, with the exception of any information covered
by section 1120(b)(2) of this title. In addition to an identification
of each agency priority goal, the website shall also consolidate
information about each agency priority goal, including—
‘‘(1) a description of how the agency incorporated any views
and suggestions obtained through congressional consultations
about the agency priority goal;
‘‘(2) an identification of key factors external to the agency
and beyond its control that could significantly affect the
achievement of the agency priority goal;
‘‘(3) a description of how each agency priority goal will
be achieved, including—
‘‘(A) the strategies and resources required to meet the
priority goal;
‘‘(B) clearly defined milestones;
‘‘(C) the organizations, program activities, regulations,
policies, and other activities that contribute to each goal,
both within and external to the agency;

H. R. 2142—12
‘‘(D) how the agency is working with other agencies
to achieve the goal; and
‘‘(E) an identification of the agency official responsible
for achieving the priority goal;
‘‘(4) the performance indicators to be used in measuring
or assessing progress;
‘‘(5) a description of how the agency ensures the accuracy
and reliability of the data used to measure progress towards
the priority goal, including an identification of—
‘‘(A) the means used to verify and validate measured
values;
‘‘(B) the sources for the data;
‘‘(C) the level of accuracy required for the intended
use of the data;
‘‘(D) any limitations to the data at the required level
of accuracy; and
‘‘(E) how the agency has compensated for such limitations if needed to reach the required level of accuracy;
‘‘(6) the results achieved during the most recent quarter
and overall trend data compared to the planned level of
performance;
‘‘(7) an assessment of whether relevant organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and other activities are
contributing as planned;
‘‘(8) an identification of the agency priority goals at risk
of not achieving the planned level of performance; and
‘‘(9) any prospects or strategies for performance improvement.
‘‘(c) TRANSPARENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRIORITY GOALS
AND RESULTS.—The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall also make available on the website—
‘‘(1) a brief description of each of the Federal Government
priority goals required by section 1120(a) of this title;
‘‘(2) a description of how the Federal Government priority
goals incorporate views and suggestions obtained through
congressional consultations;
‘‘(3) the Federal Government performance goals and
performance indicators associated with each Federal Government priority goal as required by section 1115(a) of this title;
‘‘(4) an identification of the lead Government official for
each Federal Government performance goal;
‘‘(5) the results achieved during the most recent quarter
and overall trend data compared to the planned level of
performance;
‘‘(6) an identification of the agencies, organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and
other activities that contribute to each Federal Government
priority goal;
‘‘(7) an assessment of whether relevant agencies, organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies,
and other activities are contributing as planned;
‘‘(8) an identification of the Federal Government priority
goals at risk of not achieving the planned level of performance;
and
‘‘(9) any prospects or strategies for performance improvement.

H. R. 2142—13
‘‘(d) INFORMATION ON WEBSITE.—The information made available on the website under this section shall be readily accessible
and easily found on the Internet by the public and members and
committees of Congress. Such information shall also be presented
in a searchable, machine-readable format. The Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall issue guidance to ensure that
such information is provided in a way that presents a coherent
picture of all Federal programs, and the performance of the Federal
Government as well as individual agencies.’’.
SEC. 8. AGENCY CHIEF OPERATING OFFICERS.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 1122 (as added by section 7 of this Act) the
following:
‘‘§ 1123. Chief Operating Officers
‘‘(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—At each agency, the deputy head of
agency, or equivalent, shall be the Chief Operating Officer of the
agency.
‘‘(b) FUNCTION.—Each Chief Operating Officer shall be responsible for improving the management and performance of the agency,
and shall—
‘‘(1) provide overall organization management to improve
agency performance and achieve the mission and goals of the
agency through the use of strategic and performance planning,
measurement, analysis, regular assessment of progress, and
use of performance information to improve the results achieved;
‘‘(2) advise and assist the head of agency in carrying out
the requirements of sections 1115 through 1122 of this title
and section 306 of title 5;
‘‘(3) oversee agency-specific efforts to improve management
functions within the agency and across Government; and
‘‘(4) coordinate and collaborate with relevant personnel
within and external to the agency who have a significant role
in contributing to and achieving the mission and goals of the
agency, such as the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Human Capital Officer, Chief Acquisition Officer/Senior Procurement
Executive, Chief Information Officer, and other line of business
chiefs at the agency.’’.
SEC. 9. AGENCY PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OFFICERS AND THE
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL.

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 1123 (as added by section 8 of this Act) the
following:
‘‘§ 1124. Performance Improvement Officers and the Performance Improvement Council
‘‘(a) PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OFFICERS.—
‘‘(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—At each agency, the head of the
agency, in consultation with the agency Chief Operating Officer,
shall designate a senior executive of the agency as the agency
Performance Improvement Officer.
‘‘(2) FUNCTION.—Each Performance Improvement Officer
shall report directly to the Chief Operating Officer. Subject
to the direction of the Chief Operating Officer, each Performance Improvement Officer shall—

H. R. 2142—14
‘‘(A) advise and assist the head of the agency and
the Chief Operating Officer to ensure that the mission
and goals of the agency are achieved through strategic
and performance planning, measurement, analysis, regular
assessment of progress, and use of performance information
to improve the results achieved;
‘‘(B) advise the head of the agency and the Chief Operating Officer on the selection of agency goals, including
opportunities to collaborate with other agencies on common
goals;
‘‘(C) assist the head of the agency and the Chief Operating Officer in overseeing the implementation of the
agency strategic planning, performance planning, and
reporting requirements provided under sections 1115
through 1122 of this title and sections 306 of title 5,
including the contributions of the agency to the Federal
Government priority goals;
‘‘(D) support the head of agency and the Chief Operating Officer in the conduct of regular reviews of agency
performance, including at least quarterly reviews of
progress achieved toward agency priority goals, if
applicable;
‘‘(E) assist the head of the agency and the Chief Operating Officer in the development and use within the agency
of performance measures in personnel performance
appraisals, and, as appropriate, other agency personnel
and planning processes and assessments; and
‘‘(F) ensure that agency progress toward the achievement of all goals is communicated to leaders, managers,
and employees in the agency and Congress, and made
available on a public website of the agency.
‘‘(b) PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL.—
‘‘(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a Performance
Improvement Council, consisting of—
‘‘(A) the Deputy Director for Management of the Office
of Management and Budget, who shall act as chairperson
of the Council;
‘‘(B) the Performance Improvement Officer from each
agency defined in section 901(b) of this title;
‘‘(C) other Performance Improvement Officers as determined appropriate by the chairperson; and
‘‘(D) other individuals as determined appropriate by
the chairperson.
‘‘(2) FUNCTION.—The Performance Improvement Council
shall—
‘‘(A) be convened by the chairperson or the designee
of the chairperson, who shall preside at the meetings of
the Performance Improvement Council, determine its
agenda, direct its work, and establish and direct subgroups
of the Performance Improvement Council, as appropriate,
to deal with particular subject matters;
‘‘(B) assist the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget to improve the performance of the Federal
Government and achieve the Federal Government priority
goals;
‘‘(C) assist the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget in implementing the planning, reporting, and

H. R. 2142—15
use of performance information requirements related to
the Federal Government priority goals provided under sections 1115, 1120, 1121, and 1122 of this title;
‘‘(D) work to resolve specific Governmentwide or crosscutting performance issues, as necessary;
‘‘(E) facilitate the exchange among agencies of practices
that have led to performance improvements within specific
programs, agencies, or across agencies;
‘‘(F) coordinate with other interagency management
councils;
‘‘(G) seek advice and information as appropriate from
nonmember agencies, particularly smaller agencies;
‘‘(H) consider the performance improvement experiences of corporations, nonprofit organizations, foreign,
State, and local governments, Government employees,
public sector unions, and customers of Government services;
‘‘(I) receive such assistance, information and advice
from agencies as the Council may request, which agencies
shall provide to the extent permitted by law; and
‘‘(J) develop and submit to the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, or when appropriate to the
President through the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, at times and in such formats as the chairperson may specify, recommendations to streamline and
improve performance management policies and requirements.
‘‘(3) SUPPORT.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of General Services shall provide administrative and other support for
the Council to implement this section.
‘‘(B) PERSONNEL.—The heads of agencies with Performance Improvement Officers serving on the Council shall,
as appropriate and to the extent permitted by law, provide
at the request of the chairperson of the Performance
Improvement Council up to 2 personnel authorizations to
serve at the direction of the chairperson.’’.
SEC. 10. FORMAT OF PERFORMANCE PLANS AND REPORTS.

(a) SEARCHABLE, MACHINE-READABLE PLANS AND REPORTS.—
For fiscal year 2012 and each fiscal year thereafter, each agency
required to produce strategic plans, performance plans, and
performance updates in accordance with the amendments made
by this Act shall—
(1) not incur expenses for the printing of strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports for release external
to the agency, except when providing such documents to the
Congress;
(2) produce such plans and reports in searchable, machinereadable formats; and
(3) make such plans and reports available on the website
described under section 1122 of title 31, United States Code.
(b) WEB-BASED PERFORMANCE PLANNING AND REPORTING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than June 1, 2012, the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget shall issue guidance
to agencies to provide concise and timely performance information for publication on the website described under section

H. R. 2142—16
1122 of title 31, United States Code, including, at a minimum,
all requirements of sections 1115 and 1116 of title 31, United
States Code, except for section 1115(e).
(2) HIGH-PRIORITY GOALS.—For agencies required to develop
agency priority goals under section 1120(b) of title 31, United
States Code, the performance information required under this
section shall be merged with the existing information required
under section 1122 of title 31, United States Code.
(3) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing guidance under this
subsection, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall take into consideration the experiences of agencies
in making consolidated performance planning and reporting
information available on the website as required under section
1122 of title 31, United States Code.
SEC.

11.

REDUCING
REPORTING.

DUPLICATIVE

AND

OUTDATED

AGENCY

(a) BUDGET CONTENTS.—Section 1105(a) of title 31, United
States Code, is amended—
(1) by redesignating second paragraph (33) as paragraph
(35); and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(37) the list of plans and reports, as provided for under
section 1125, that agencies identified for elimination or consolidation because the plans and reports are determined outdated
or duplicative of other required plans and reports.’’.
(b) ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY AGENCY REPORTING.—
Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is further amended
by adding after section 1124 (as added by section 9 of this Act)
the following:
‘‘§ 1125. Elimination of unnecessary agency reporting
‘‘(a) AGENCY IDENTIFICATION OF UNNECESSARY REPORTS.—
Annually, based on guidance provided by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, the Chief Operating Officer at each
agency shall—
‘‘(1) compile a list that identifies all plans and reports
the agency produces for Congress, in accordance with statutory
requirements or as directed in congressional reports;
‘‘(2) analyze the list compiled under paragraph (1), identify
which plans and reports are outdated or duplicative of other
required plans and reports, and refine the list to include only
the plans and reports identified to be outdated or duplicative;
‘‘(3) consult with the congressional committees that receive
the plans and reports identified under paragraph (2) to determine whether those plans and reports are no longer useful
to the committees and could be eliminated or consolidated
with other plans and reports; and
‘‘(4) provide a total count of plans and reports compiled
under paragraph (1) and the list of outdated and duplicative
reports identified under paragraph (2) to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget.
‘‘(b) PLANS AND REPORTS.—
‘‘(1) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of implementation
of this section, the list of plans and reports identified by each
agency as outdated or duplicative shall be not less than 10

H. R. 2142—17
percent of all plans and reports identified under subsection
(a)(1).
‘‘(2) SUBSEQUENT YEARS.—In each year following the first
year described under paragraph (1), the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall determine the minimum percent of plans and reports to be identified as outdated or duplicative on each list of plans and reports.
‘‘(c) REQUEST FOR ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY REPORTS.—
In addition to including the list of plans and reports determined
to be outdated or duplicative by each agency in the budget of
the United States Government, as provided by section 1105(a)(37),
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may concurrently submit to Congress legislation to eliminate or consolidate
such plans and reports.’’.
SEC. 12. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES.

(a) PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES.—
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation
with the Performance Improvement Council, shall identify the key
skills and competencies needed by Federal Government personnel
for developing goals, evaluating programs, and analyzing and using
performance information for the purpose of improving Government
efficiency and effectiveness.
(b) POSITION CLASSIFICATIONS.—Not later than 2 years after
the date of enactment of this Act, based on the identifications
under subsection (a), the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall incorporate, as appropriate, such key skills and competencies into relevant position classifications.
(c) INCORPORATION INTO EXISTING AGENCY TRAINING.—Not later
than 2 years after the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management shall work with each agency, as
defined under section 306(f) of title 5, United States Code, to
incorporate the key skills identified under subsection (a) into
training for relevant employees at each agency.
SEC. 13. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) The table of contents for chapter 3 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 306
and inserting the following:
‘‘306. Agency strategic plans.’’.

(b) The table of contents for chapter 11 of title 31, United
States Code, is amended by striking the items relating to section
1115 and 1116 and inserting the following:
‘‘1115. Federal Government and agency performance plans.
‘‘1116. Agency performance reporting.’’.

(c) The table of contents for chapter 11 of title 31, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘1120.
‘‘1121.
‘‘1122.
‘‘1123.
‘‘1124.

Federal Government and agency priority goals.
Quarterly priority progress reviews and use of performance information.
Transparency of programs, priority goals, and results.
Chief Operating Officers.
Performance Improvement Officers and the Performance Improvement Council.
‘‘1125. Elimination of unnecessary agency reporting.’’.

H. R. 2142—18
SEC. 14. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACT.

(a) INTERIM PLANNING AND REPORTING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall coordinate with agencies to develop interim
Federal Government priority goals and submit interim Federal
Government performance plans consistent with the requirements of this Act beginning with the submission of the fiscal
year 2013 Budget of the United States Government.
(2) REQUIREMENTS.—Each agency shall—
(A) not later than February 6, 2012, make adjustments
to its strategic plan to make the plan consistent with
the requirements of this Act;
(B) prepare and submit performance plans consistent
with the requirements of this Act, including the identification of agency priority goals, beginning with the performance plan for fiscal year 2013; and
(C) make performance reporting updates consistent
with the requirements of this Act beginning in fiscal year
2012.
(3) QUARTERLY REVIEWS.—The quarterly priority progress
reviews required under this Act shall begin—
(A) with the first full quarter beginning on or after
the date of enactment of this Act for agencies based on
the agency priority goals contained in the Analytical
Perspectives volume of the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget of
the United States Government; and
(B) with the quarter ending June 30, 2012 for the
interim Federal Government priority goals.
(b) GUIDANCE.—The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall prepare guidance for agencies in carrying out the
interim planning and reporting activities required under subsection
(a), in addition to other guidance as required for implementation
of this Act.
SEC. 15. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
limiting the ability of Congress to establish, amend, suspend, or
annul a goal of the Federal Government or an agency.
(b) GAO REVIEWS.—
(1) INTERIM PLANNING AND REPORTING EVALUATION.—Not
later than June 30, 2013, the Comptroller General shall submit
a report to Congress that includes—
(A) an evaluation of the implementation of the interim
planning and reporting activities conducted under section
14 of this Act; and
(B) any recommendations for improving implementation of this Act as determined appropriate.
(2) IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATIONS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General shall
evaluate the implementation of this Act subsequent to the
interim planning and reporting activities evaluated in the
report submitted to Congress under paragraph (1).
(B) AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION.—
(i) EVALUATIONS.—The Comptroller General shall
evaluate how implementation of this Act is affecting
performance management at the agencies described
in section 901(b) of title 31, United States Code,

H. R. 2142—19
including whether performance management is being
used by those agencies to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of agency programs.
(ii) REPORTS.—The Comptroller General shall
submit to Congress—
(I) an initial report on the evaluation under
clause (i), not later than September 30, 2015; and
(II) a subsequent report on the evaluation
under clause (i), not later than September 30,
2017.
(C) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING AND REPORTING
IMPLEMENTATION.—
(i) EVALUATIONS.—The Comptroller General shall
evaluate the implementation of the Federal Government priority goals, Federal Government performance
plans and related reporting required by this Act.
(ii) REPORTS.—The Comptroller General shall
submit to Congress—
(I) an initial report on the evaluation under
clause (i), not later than September 30, 2015; and
(II) subsequent reports on the evaluation
under clause (i), not later than September 30, 2017
and every 4 years thereafter.
(D) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The Comptroller General
shall include in the reports required by subparagraphs
(B) and (C) any recommendations for improving
implementation of this Act and for streamlining the planning and reporting requirements of the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.