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The Roles of Dynamic Simulation in Airliner MANPADS Protection

IDGA MANPADS Seminar March 2006
Dr. T.W. Tucker Tactical Technologies Inc. 356 Woodroffe Ave. Ottawa, Ontario, K2A 3V6 Tel: (613) 828-0775, e-mail: info@tti.on.ca URL: www.tti.on.ca

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Presentation Outline
• Self Protection Evaluation
– Static Analysis of Threat Parameters – Missile Miss Distance as a Primary MOE – Impact of Non-Linear Interactions (Chaotic Behavior) on Missile Miss Distance

• Dynamic Simulation of Tactical
Engagements
– Several Classes (Generations) of Missiles – Vs Jammer and Flare Airliner Protection Options

• The Roles of Dynamic Software Simulation
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Evaluation Methodology

Was stimulated by the need to understand the effectiveness of “off the shelf” self protection (ECM) systems - in relation to specific threat weapons and engagement geometries Was stimulated by the high cost of field trials and the availability of airliners Was stimulated by the need for a systematic & repeatable analytical approach resulting in a documented self protection effectiveness audit trail

• •

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ECM Effectiveness Evaluation
At End Game: What is the Miss Distance?

Flare Signature vs Time Pos’n vs Time

Aircraft Signature vs Aspect Pos’n vs Time

Autopilot PN Coeff. Seeker Detector, ECCMs, Tracker

Airframe Mass, Length, Wing Config.

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Focus On Missile Miss Distance
• Survivability of the airliner is assured if the miss
distance is sufficiently large that the missile does not impact the target or trigger the fuse - the warhead does not detonate • Avoids the complex characterization of target hardness and missile warhead fragmentation • The probability of survival is based on a simple characterization of target hardness and missile warhead as a relative measure only - not an absolute measure

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The Determination Of Miss Distance
Miss Distance is determined by integrating incremental flight path errors over the entire missile’s flight

Countermeasure May Generate Angle Track Error In Seeker Angle Track Error May Generate Steering Error In Autopilot Steering Error May Generate Flight Path Error In Missile Flight

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Evaluation Methodology
• Step 1- Static Analysis:
– Characterize the threat weapon system using a standardized parameter set - EWIRDB

• Step 2 - Static Analysis:
– Determine optimum electronic countermeasure parameters based on weapon system parameters

• Step 3 - Dynamic Engagement Simulation:
– Determine over-all effectiveness of the self protection in tactical engagements - Missile miss distance or probability of survival

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Engagement Characterization
• • • • • • •
Target Platform - Signature and Maneuver Threat Weapon - Guidance and Dynamics Countermeasures - Techniques and Tactics Propagation - Attenuation vs Wavelength Background Clutter Engagement Geometry Characterizing all systems involves more than 250 parameters

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Threat Weapon System Analysis
• For self protection (ECM) effectiveness
evaluation, the weapon system analysis must focus on the system’s aerodynamic, guidance, tracking & control subsystems • The most important weapon parameters describe the time response and target discrimination characteristics of various missile subsystems (eg. servo bandwidths and ECCMs) • Using standardized weapon parameters such as EWIRDB facilitate this process • Analysis methods are available for computing estimated values for parameters unavailable from EW Databases or exploitation reports
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IR Seeker Basic Characteristics
• Passive infra-red angle only tracking • Many angular scanning/tracking techniques
– Spin scan, conscan, rosette, FPA • Some possible ECCM discrimination techniques – Narrow optical field-of-view – Spectral filtering (two or more color/bands) – Sudden increase in signal power/intensity – Sudden change in rate of line of sight (angle) • Angle servo electronics determine tracking and maneuver responsive of threat missile
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Threat Evolution
Threats Exceed 500,000 Missiles World-wide 2010 2005
1st Generation Imagers 2nd Generation Spectral Imagers

2000
Scanning Imagers

1980s/90s
Cross Array/Rosette Flare CCMs

1970/80
Cooled

1960s
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Con Scan Courtesy LAIRCM SPO, AFRL
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Uncooled Spin Scan

Spinning Reticle AM Tracker – 1st Gen
AKA Spin Scan

Graphic: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt

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Spinning Optics FM Tracker – 2nd Gen
AKA Con Scan

Graphic: “Surface Based Air Defense System Analysis” By. H.M. Macfadzeqn
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Multiple Spinning Optics - 3rd Gen
Aka Rosette Scans

Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis
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Angle Tracking Servo Loop
Reticule
Detector IR Radiation Telescope Light Collector Error Signal Tracker Electronics

Position Drive
Detector Preamp BandPass Filter AGC

Demod

BandPass Filter

Phase Detector

Error Signal

Scanning Phase Reference

• Seeker field-of-view determined by optics and reticule • Tracking (Servo) loop response determined by filter
bandwidths and amplifier gains
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Sample SA-7 Parameter Data

Track Technique

Spin Scan

Data From “Soviet Air Defence Missiles” by S. Zaloga
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Analyzed SA-7 Parameters
• Physical Parameters
– – – – – – – – Mass: 5.5 to 9.2 kg Length: 1.42 m Diameter: 0.07 m Altitude: 0 to 4.5 km Analytic Models Velocity: 580 m/sec Wing Span: 0.14 m Mean Chord: .08 m Configuration: Cruciform

• Response Parameters
– Airframe Natural Frequency: 14.9 to 21.6 rad/sec – Airframe Damping Coefficient: .06 to .09 – Airframe Maximum Latax: 12.1 to 30.3 g’s – Autopilot PN Constant (Tail-on): 1.7 – Seeker Servo Bandwidth: 1.1 to 1.9 Hz

• Other (Zaloga)
Graphic: “High-Tech Warfare” by D. Richardson, et al.
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– Field Of View : 1.9 degrees – Spectral Band : 1.7 to 2.8 microns
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MANPADS/ECM Expectations
• ECM Characteristics - Tactics, Maneuvers and Timing - will all affect engagement outcomes as measured by missile miss distance • Virtually an infinite number of threat parameter, ECM parameter and engagement geometry combinations are possible - only select combinations result in aircraft survivability - Miss Distance >> Warhead Fuse Distance • Threat characterization, parameter certification and data management may have major impact on outcomes • Management of each engagement’s results, in relation to the associated input parameter combinations, is essential • Calls for database management
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Data Management Complexity
(Seeker Search and Track Parameters)

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Aerodynamic and Autopilot Parameters
Zipfel’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters

Zarchan’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters

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Typical Jet A/C & Flare Signatures

Turbo-Jet Aircraft Radiant Intensity, Military Power, 150 o Aspect at 300 m

Typical Flare Radiant Intensity

From:”Sources Of Radiation” Vol 1 IR/EO Systems Handbook, Ed G. Zissis

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Aircraft & Flare Signatures
Radiant Intensity vs Wavelength vs Aspect Angle

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Target & Flare Signatures
IR Radiant Intensities In 1.7 to 2.8 Micron Band
(dBw/sr)

vs Aspect Angle
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Flare Radiant Intensity (dBw/sr)
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Flare Radiant Intensity Vs Time

20

20
15

10

10

5

1
Aircraft Flare Peak 0

3 2 Time (sec)

4

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Flare Signature Control

The Dark Flare

A Standard Flare

The Dark Flare By Aircraft Protections Systems

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Atmospheric Transmission
Visible IR IR IR

40.0

30.0

Attentuation (dB/Km)

20.0

10.0

0.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Wavelength (micrometers)

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Jammer & DIRCM Parameters

Modulation Scheme Radiant Intensity Vs Wavelength
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Time Sequence
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IR Seeking Missile Reality
AN/AIM 9 Sidewinder Characteristics Length: 2.89 meters Diameter: 0.13 meters Fin Span: 0.63 meters Speed: Supersonic Warhead: 9.36 kg blast fragmentation Launch Weight: 85.5 kg Range: 16+ km Guidance System: Solid-state infrared homing

From: “Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability & Design” R. E. Ball, AIAA Press, Second Edition (CD-ROM)

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DHL A300 vs Igla (SA-14) in Baghdad,
Nov 22, 2003

As Filmed by French Reporters

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a picture of the actual attack on the DH

DHL A300 On Fire

The second missile missed
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DHL A300 Aftermath

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Key ECM Effectiveness Issues
• Countermeasure effectiveness measured by
missile miss distance at end game
– Large missile miss distance = effective countermeasure – Successful velocity or range deception does not normally cause a large missile miss distance – Successful steady angle error deception against proportional navigation guidance does not normally cause a large missile miss distance

• Missile miss distance measurement requires

complete closed-loop dynamic missile fly-out, including:
– Missile and target aerodynamics and kinematics – Threat missile guidance and control including non-linearities – Threat radar/seeker and electronic countermeasure interactions
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Repeat: Miss Distance Determination
Miss Distance Is Determined By Integrating Incremental Flight Path Errors Over Entire Missile Flight

Countermeasure May Generate Angle Track Error In Seeker Angle Track Error May Generate Steering Error In Autopilot Steering Error May Generate Flight Path Error In Missile Flight

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Required Simulation Features
• Dynamic closed-loop missile fly-out engagements • Various missile seeker tracking types required •
– Spin Scan, Con Scan, Rosette, Quadrant, Array Various countermeasure types required – On-Board Omni-directional and Directed (DIRCM) – Off-Board Flares and Towed Decoys Non-linear interactions between seeker and ECM IR signatures vs aspect angle and wavelength Atmospheric propagation and background Engagement geometry and target aircraft tactics Output result includes missile miss distance
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• • • • •

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Simulation Engagement Control

Systems’ Data Management

Engagement Scenario Management
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Miss Distance vs IR Flares

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Non-linear interactions & miss distance
• Missile miss distance occurs after extended dynamic
• • • •
interactions between ECM and Missile’s Seeker Seeker contains many non-linear functions and components, such as steering surface limits, saturating amplifiers and S-shaped tracking discriminators ECM signals inherently cause seekers to operate in nonlinear regions and with non-linear logic and functions Extended dynamic interactions between non-linear systems inherently gives rise to chaotic behavior Chaotic behavior means a small change in an input condition or parameter can lead to a large change in missile miss distance

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What Is Chaotic Behavior?
• Noticed By Lorenz In Weather Prediction Studies • Plot Trajectory Depends On
Initial Conditions

• May Possess “Quasi- Stable
Regions

• Plot Trajectory Is Not
Repetitive

• May Possess Multiple
“Strange Attractors”

• Final Result Depends On

Duration Of Interaction Caused By Non-Linearities In Extended Dynamic Interactions
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Simulating Chaotic Behavior
For realistic and valid simulation the threat subsystems must include appropriate non-linearities and narrow threat parameter ranges Simulation models and input parameter values must be validated to confirm they include key non-linear interactions and models and parameters together generate realistic chaotic behavior Multiple simulation runs (Batch Runs) of engagements, using Monte Carlo selection of expected threat, ECM and engagement parameter values, should be performed The chaotic scatter results from individual runs in the batch should be collected to establish statistical distributions

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Sample MANPADS Batch Result:
Miss Distance vs Missile Launch Azimuth Miss distance scatter vs missile launch azimuth for a particular flare deployment pattern
1000 900

Fixed Parameters A/C IR Rad Int
800 w/str

800 700

Flare IR Rad Int
4000 w/str

Miss Distance (m) Miss Distance

600 500 400

Flare Deployment
6 flares 0.5 sec spacing

Random Parameters
300 200

(Monte Carlo Selection)

Launch Distance
2000 to 4000 m

100

Missile Velocity
0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Launch Angle (deg) Missile Launch Angle (deg)

600 to 1000 m/s

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Probability Miss Exceeds Threshold
Probability Miss Distance Exceeds Indicated Thresholds
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Fixed Parameters 100 m 200 m 300 m A/C IR Rad Int 800 w/str Flare IR Rad Int 4000 w/str

Flare Deployment 100 m6 flares 0.5 200 msec spacing
300 m

Random Parameters
(Monte Carlo Selection)

Launch Distance • 2000 to 4000 m
Missile Velocity • 600 to 1000 m/s

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Plotting CM Effectiveness
• Plot miss distance scatter data so that the probability (Percentage Of Runs) miss distance exceeds pre-selected thresholds as a function of missile azimuth launch angle. • Provides a means to:
 Develop Effectiveness Requirements Specifications  Develop Equipment Test Procedures Based on Effectiveness Specifications  Develop Countermeasure Deployment Tactics  Develop Aircraft Maneuver Timings And Strategies

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MANPADS/Airliner/CM Engagements
• Wide Body Aircraft
– – – – – Four Engines In Take-off, Climbing at 100 Speed 100 m/sec, AC Altitude at Missile Launch: 400 m Demos Of Both Flare and DIRCM Protection

• Missile Launch
– Launch Range 1.5 Km – Demos Of First (One Color, Spin Scan Tracking) and Third Generation (Two Colour, Rosette Tracking) Missiles
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MANPADS Characteristics
Threat Wave Band (microns) 1.9-2.8 (uncooled) 1.9-4.1 (cooled) 2-3 & 3-5 (two colour discrimination) Tracking Technique Spin Scan (AM) Con Scan (FM) Con Scan? (FM) Reference

SA-7 Grail SA-14 Gremlin SA-18 Grouse

Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04 Zaloga, Janes Pub, 1988 Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04 http://encyclopedia.thefreedictio nary.com/SA-14 Grossman et al, Rand Study, #1713

Stinger Post

IR/UV dual (ECCM - colour discrimination)

Rosette

http://www.redstone.army.mil/ Systems/STINGER.html

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Countering A Spin Scan Tracker
Target Detection and Tracking Spinning Reticle

Graphics: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt

Relative Phase Determines Target Angle

Counter-Phase ECM Amplitude Modulation Causes Angle Error Sweeping ECM AM Frequency Can Ensure Counter-Phasing
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Directed IR CM Protection
• Miss Distance Created By Anti-Phase Amplitude
Modulated Jamming That Introduces:
– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout The Missile’s Flight, Or – Rapid Angle Track Error Sufficiently Large To Cause Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-Acquisition

• Directed Jammer Beam Offers Large Jam to

Signal Ratio and Large Angle Track Error Normally (vs Omni-Directional Shuttered Heat Sources) • Requires Detection and Closed Loop Tracking Of Attacking Missile Signature (Body/Plume) To Direct The Focused IR Beam
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DIRCM Simulation Features
• Directed Jamming Beam
– Laser or High Intensity Lamp – Radiant Intensity vs Beamwidth & Wavelength – Programmable Amplitude Modulation Sequences

• Closed-loop Servo Controlled Beam
Steering

• Missile IR/UV Signatures vs Time, Aspect
Angle and Wavelengths

– Quadrant Array, Two Color Missile Tracking

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DIRCM Swept AM vs Spin Scan

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Role Of Dynamic Simulation
• Provides scopes of primary seeker
subsystem responses to ECM stimuli enabling analysts to understand key interactions • Provides graphics of missile and aircraft trajectories and end-game miss distance • Batch simulation runs collect statistics of engagement outcomes (miss distance) for a wide range of engagement scenarios

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Swept AM vs Spin Scan
Batch Run Effectiveness Results
Average Miss Distance (m)
120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0

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Swept AM vs Spin Scan
Miss distance dependence on relative AM & Spin Scan Phase (by varying missile launch range in a tail chase geometry)
Swept AM vs Spin Scan
100.0

Missile Miss Distance (m)

90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 Outboard Inboard 10.0 0.0 1200 1250 1300 Missile Launch Range (m) 1350 1400

Miss Distance: Average = 57.9 m

Last Mode: 100% In Search

Miss Distance Depends Somewhat on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Spin Scan Phase)
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Typical Rosette Scans (Multiple Spinning Optics)
• • • • •
Scans While Tracks Digital Tracking Spatial Sampling Quasi-Imaging ECM Generation Of Angle Error May Be Difficult
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Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis
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Swept AM vs Rosette Engagement

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Rosette AM Deception Analysis
13 13 2 10 10 7


4

5 8 8 11 11

5 2 1 3 4

7

6

• 15 • 1 • • 12 • 12

Rosette Characteristics Two Counter-Rotating Mirrors Rotation Rates =15 & 27 Hz Petal Frequency = 42 Hz Rosette Frequency = 3 Hz Number of Petals = 14 Sequence As Shown AM ECM Characteristics

14
14 3 6

9

9

• AM Center Frequency = 43.5 Hz
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Angle Error vs AM Frequency
AM Freq 42.0 Hz
1.000 0.500 0.000 0 -0.500 -1.000
1.000 0.500

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Angle Errors
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

43.5 Hz

0.000 -0.500 -1.000
1.000 0.500

45.0 Hz

0.000 0 -0.500 -1.000 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Time (Sec)

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Swept AM vs Rosette
Miss distance dependence on missile launch range in tail chase geometry
Swept AM vs Rosette
160.0 140.0

Missile Miss Distance (m)

120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0
Outboard Inboard

Miss Distance: Average = 27.5 m

20.0

0.0 1200 -20.0

Last Mode: 50% In Search
1250 1300 Missile Launch Range (m) 1350 1400

Miss Distance Depends Substantially on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Rosette Phase)
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Swept AM vs Rosette Effectiveness
Average Missile Miss Distance (m)
350.0 300.0 250.0 200.0 150.0 100.0 50.0 0.0

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IR Jammer Protection
• Directional AM Jamming Offers Large A Jam to
Signal Ratio That Is Normally Required To Generate A Large Angle Track Error • Anti-Phase Amplitude Modulated Jamming May Create A Large Missile Miss Distance By :
– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout Missile Flight, Or – Introducing a Sufficiently Rapid Large Angle Track Error Causing Seeker Break-Lock And No ReAcquisition (ie Missile Flies and Unguided, Ballistic Trajectory for a Portion of Its Flight)

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Flares vs Rosette Engagement

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Flares vs Rosette Effectiveness

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Flares vs Spin Scan Effectiveness

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Flare Protection
• Factors Affecting Missile Miss Distance:
– Ejection Time Relative To Missile End Game – Ignition and Burn Out Times – Ejection Velocity, Direction, Kinematics » Flare Velocity Dynamics Seeker Discrimination – IR Signature (Radiant Intensity) » Two Colour Seeker Discrimination – Physical Extent Of Flare Cluster » Spatial Seeker Discrimination (Imaging)
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Airliner MANPADS Protection
• On-Board (DIRCM)
– Modulation’s Success Depends on Threat’s Tracking Technique – Requires Threat Analysis Capabilities

• Off-Board (Flares)
– Deployment Sequence Relative to End Game (Timing) Is Important For Success – Success Is Engagement Geometry Dependent

• Defeat of Advanced Trackers
May Be Difficult if DIRCM Power Is Not Sufficient to Cause Damage

• Success Is Relatively
Independent Of Threat’s Tracking Technique

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The Roles Of Dynamic Simulation In Airliner MANPADS Protection
• Single simulation runs enable the analyst to understand the countermeasure characteristics required to produce large miss distances in various missiles and engagement geometries by viewing embedded seeker scopes • Batch simulation runs produce operationally significant statistical effectiveness data and plots • Simulations are critical for planning, conducting and analyzing expensive and limited field trials

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Dynamic Simulation Properties Required to Fulfill this Role
• Simulations must be high fidelity and replicate the seeker’s responsiveness
and primary non-linearities - tracking discriminators, amplifiers, ECCM logic, and gimbal and control surface limits and physics based interactions with countermeasures Simulations must compute miss distance for effectiveness evaluations by integration of incremental flight path errors, including the influence of nonlinearities Simulations must run batches quickly for efficient statistical data collection Simulations should possess one-for-one mapping of hardware seeker subsystems to software subsystems for validation - hierarchical system of systems Simulations must possess scopes and graphics embedded at various test points for engineering analysis
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• •

The Role of Dynamic Simulation In Airliner MANPADS Protection
IDGA MANPADS Seminar March 2006
Questions?

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