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ARMY CODE No. 70516 (part 1)





The information given in this document is Dot to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it.


AJ26/GS Trg Publications/3011





By Command of the Defence Council

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 29th August, 1969





(Applicable to copies supplied with Ministry of Defence approval to Common-

weal~ ~nd Foreign ~ovemments) .. . I

1. ThIS information IS released by the United Kingdom Government to the

recipient Government for Defence purposes only. I

2. This information must be accorded the same degree of security protection as that accorded thereto by the United Kingdom Government.

3. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of I the recipient Government, except as otherwise authorized by the Ministry of Defence.


I Amendment Number By whom amended Date amended


(see Catalogue of Army publications. Part IT)

(other than those mentioned below and Women's

Regular Army


Staff College ..

Joint Services Staff College ..


RMA ..

Arms Schools

Scale D
Scale A ~.
Scale C
I 100
• i" 100
·1· 200
50 , .

. ,






Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Mao Tse Tung 1938 If you wish for peace, understand war, particularly the guerilla and subversive forms of war.

B. H. Liddell Hart 1961

1. Between the end of World War II and 1st January 1969, Britain's forces have had to undertake a wide variety of military commitments and only in Europe, after the formation of NATO, has there been real stability. Fiftythree of these commitments have been operations of the counter revolutionary

1 type with only Korea and the short Suez campaign falling. outside this cate• gory.

2. As far as can be foreseen, Britain will continue to have the following military commitments outside Europe:

a. The internal security and external defence of British dependencies overseas.

b. The support of Commonwealth or friendly independent states, when this help is specifically asked for in compliance with treaty obligations.' This support may be required to resist an internal or an external threat or a mixture of both.

c. Provision of a military contribution to a United Nations force.

Pattern of Revolutionary War

3. a. The communists have evolved a technique of revolutionary warfare which relies mainly 011 popular support for its success. This technique has proved successful when it has been correctly used. The principles on which it is based have been described by the communist leaders and the pattern is there for all to study. It is, therefore, understandably attractive to nationalist leaders who aspire to promote revolution in their own countries. They may not be avowed communists and may not follow communist doctrine exactly, but the invitation to imitate successful revolutionary methods is tempting. For this reason much of this Volume has been set against a communist threat

b. A diagrammatic illustration of the pattern of revolutionary warfare is at Annex A.

South Vietnam


4. The doctrine set out in this Volume is designed to cover the broadest

range of possible counter revolutionary operations. The tactics differ in many ways from those adopted by the United States in South Vietnam, where the largest counter revolutionary war in the world is now in progress. The






problems that confront the United States in South Vietnam, however, have special characteristics :

a. South Vietnam is completely independent and the United States does not exercise the authority of a colonial power.

b. The communists have had total control over some parts of South Vietnam for about 25 years and their structure has never been dismantled. It is not, therefore, a question of re-establishing the legitimate government in these areas but of building, imposing and maintaining a new administration.

c. The Viet Cong have safe sanctuaries in all neighbouring countries which are impossible to seal off. They thus have guaranteed sources of supply and reinforcement and uninterrupted training facilities.

d. There is no joint HQ and no director of operations has been appointed.

There is no effective Civil Service throughout the provinces and the police are little more than a traffic branch. The police are unable to provide either security for the individual or worthwhile intelligence. There is no scope therefore to implement our fundamental concept of the working of the triumvirate, civil, military and police as a joint and integrated organization from the highest to the lowest level of policy making, planning and administration.

Contents of Volume

5. Counter revolutionary operations are covered in Volume III as under:

Part 1 Principles, general aspects and definitions. Part 2 Internal security.

Part 3 Counterinsurgency.

6. To avoid repetition and because of the inter-relationship between internal security and counter insurgency operations, details of the following, which may apply in all phases of counter revolutionary operations, have been included in Part 1 :

a. The threat and the insurgent. b •. Intelligence.

c. Civil affairs.

d. Psychological operations. ... e. Training aspects.

f. Air s~port. . Ic._'~~~' De1initioDs

7. The Opposition. The terms guerilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident and rioter are used on occasion to indicate differences in the opposition. When it has not been necessary to indicate specific differences, however, insurgent has been used to cover all the roles implied by the foregoing terms. It also embraces such additional terms as saboteur, enemy, insurrectionist or rebel when

applicable. .

8. Definitions used throughout the three parts of this Volume are at pages 310 6.





1. The definitions below are placed at the beginning of this Pamphlet so that the reader will be in no doubt as to their meaning in the text. The agreed joint service definitions have been taken . from the Joint Service Glossary (JSP 110) and are shown in quotes .

2. Base Area. "The area, virtually free from guerilla interference, that has a defensive perimeter, and from which offensive operations may be mounted and supported." It will normally be based on a port and/or strategic transport terminal airfield. In some circumstances a tactical transport (medium range) (Tao T(MR» airfield may have to be used initially, but it should be developed as soon as possible.

3. Civil Disturbance. "Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order." These will necessitate police and possibly military intervention.

4. Cold War. "The continuing world-wide struggle in peace time between communism and the free world waged by all means short of international armed conflict." Certain non-aligned countries also wage a type of cold war to foster their own militant ideological or nationalistic aims; 'in many oases these are countries which have accepted, at least temporarily, communist aid and support. Cold war covers propaganda, . subversion, economic sanctions, civil wars, military confrontations, revolts and rebellions inspired by a basic ideological conflict.

5. Controlled Area. "An area not entirely free from the enemy in which conditions permit the civil administration and police to work effectively in co-operation with military forces." Although insurgent .infiltration into the controlled area is possible, the civil administration supported by military and/ or para-military forces is capable of limiting insurgent activity, thereby separating the insurgents from. the local population.

6. Counter Insurgency. "Those military, para-military, political, economic, psychological and sociological activities undertaken by a government, independently or with the assi$Jtance. of . friendly nations, to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency, and restore the authority of the central government."

7. Counter Intelligence. U That phase of. intelligence activity devoted to destroying the. effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to • the protection of information against espionage, of individuals against subversion, and of installa tions and material against sabotage."

8. Guerilla War/are. "Military or para-military operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces." Guerilla warfare will be the main preoccupation of security forces in counter Insurgency.






9. Insurgency. "A form of rebellion in which a dissident faction that has the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population instigates the commission of widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages guerilla warfare in order to overthrow a government." A state of insurgency implies that the insurgents have control of sizeable areas of the country and that it will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war on the communist pattern.

10. Internal Security. "Any military role which involves primarily the maintenance and restoration of law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience, using minimum force. It covers action dealing with minor civil disorders with no political undertones as well as riots savouring of revolt and even the early stages of rebellion."

11. Limited War. "International armed conflict, short of general war." It may be limited geographically, by the scale of forces or by the weapons employed but will be conducted overtly by formations of regular troops.

12. Psychological Operations. "The planned use of propaganda or other means, in support of our military action or presence, designed to influence to our advantage the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of enemy, neutral or friendly groups."

13. Sabotage." An act, excluding a normal military operation, or an omission calculated to cause physical damage in the interests of a foreign power or subversive organization."

14. Security Forces. "All indigenous and allied police, military and paramilitary forces used by a government to maintain law and order."

15. Subversion. "Action taken to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale or political strength of a nation and the loyalty of the subjects. "

16. Terrorism. '" A resort to violence by a dissident faction in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends." This may manifest itself in sabotage and assassination by individuals or small groups, or in the form of ambushes or attacks on civilians or police by large bodies of terrorists. It can takeplace in either urban or rural areas.


17. Battalion/Company Bases. Temporary bases set up when establishing or expanding controlled areas. Such bases may be located alongside civil/ police HQ, near defended villages, or in the countryside. Defence arrangements must allow for a large proportion of the force to be out of the base on offensive operations.

18. Civil Disobedience. Active or passive resistance of the civil population to the authority or policies of a government, by such means as unlawful strikes.




19. Clandestine Operations. Activities sponsored or conducted by government departments or agencies in such a way as to maintain secrecy by concealment or stealth, ie, concealed but not disguised.

20. Communist Revolutionary War. The process, which includes the use of political, economic and military measures, that militant communists, working mainly within the country, employ to weaken and . overthrow a non-communist government. Its military measures include sabotage, terrorism and insurgency with the accompaniment of guerilla warfare. In its most intense form the fighting will take on the characteristics of a limited war, but with the complication of having no front or rear and having guerilla activity in all areas. The.communist concept has three merging phases-e-" Passive ", " Active "and "Counter Offensive". Four different degrees of activity/intensity are recognized in this Volume but to refer to them numerically causes confusion with our allies and in relation to the three communist phases. They have therefore been referred to as Preparatory, Active Resistance, Insurgency and Open Offensive phases. In effect the communists' first phase and the Preparatory phase are one and the same: the communists' second phase is split by us into two; and finally the communists' third phase and our fourth phase are identical. A diagrammatic illustration of these phases is at Annex A.

21. Community Relations. The use of mili-tary forces on projects contributing to economic and social development useful to the local population at all levels, in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health and others. It serves to improve the standingot the military forces and the administration with the population. It is known as " The Battle for Hearts and Minds ".

22. Counter Revolutionary Operations. A generic term to describe the operations which British forces may have to undertake, when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government, in order to counter the threats in an internal security or revolutionary war setting. These threats include civil disturbances, terrorism and organized insurgency, irrespective of whether these are nationalist, communist or racially inspired or directed from within or outside the threatened territory concerned.

23. Covert Operations. Operations which are so planned and executed 81 to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation: ie disguised but not concealed.

24. Defended Villages. Villages in controlled areas which have been o.rganized for defence with a view to giving the inhabitants security from insurgent action, preventing subversive elements assisting the insurgents and encouraging the provision of information. Initially, defended villages may ha ve to be manned by military forces but in the long term the aim must be to train and organize horne guards so that they and the police are able to take over the static defence from military forces.

25. Forward Operational Base. An area providing a semi-permanent firm base from which offensive action against the insurgents can be developed. It





should be established at a seat of local government as a formation base, usually at brigade level, and will normally have a Tac T(MR) airfield, or a Tac T(SR) airfield capable of quick development.

; 26. Guerilla. A combat participant in guerilla warfare. When used in the context of communist revolutionary war the word describes the communist village militia, to differentiate it from the regional .and regular soldier of the insurgent forces. Guerillas will invariably have a measure of support from the populace.

27. Insurgent. The terms guerilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident and rioter are used on occasions to indicate differences in the opposition. When it has notbeen necessaryto indicate specific differences, however, insurgent has been used to cover all .the roles implied by the foregoing terms. It has also

been taken to includesuch additional terms as saboteur, enemy, insurrectionist •

or rebel' when applicable.

28. Insurrection (Revolt) and Rebellion. When subjects revolt they openly express their dissatisfaction with the established government or its policies. When such an expression is armed and organized it becomes a rebellion. When a rebellion has a large measure of support and aims to overthrow the government a state of insurgency exists.

29. Operations in Depth. Operations designed to locate, disrupt and destroy hardcore insurgents outside controlled areas, with a view to relieving insurgent pressure on the latter and thereby giving pacification operations abetter chance of success. Operations in depth may be launched, from temporary bases established in the area of operations, or they may take the, form of "in and out " operations launched direct from a main or forward operational


30. Pacification Operations. Military operations designed to clear and hold an' area of immediate insurgent influence and re-establish. civil control, Military forces will continue to provide security until para-military and police forces can accept responsibility.

31. Para-military Forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resemble them in organization and training and in the missions they undertake.

, ' 32. Patrol Bases. Temporary bases to provide a comparatively secure area •

in which patrols can rest and recuperate, and from which patrol activities can

be launched .

. 33. Prohibited Area. The definition will vary as it depends upon the terms of the enactment or regulation etc which creates such an area. Generally it is automatically an offence to enter or be in a prohibited area and security forces are given power over and ab.ove the general law in relation to using force to repel or apprehend anyone in the area.




Preface to Volume III





1. Likely Military Tasks General

Types of Operations

Characteristics of British Intervention Operations under United Nations Auspices


2. Types of Unrest General Categories

3. Revolutionary War Aim

Methods Characteristics Significance

Pre-requisites for Success

4. Communist Pattern of Revofutionary War General

Communist Aim

Protracted Warfare ...

Co-ordination of Political and Military Action Phases of Revolutionary War

Preparatory Phase

Active Resistance Phase .....

Insurgency Phase

Open Offensive Phase Summary



13 13

13 14


17 17 17


.19 19 20 21 21

22 22 22 23 23


23 25 25 26 21









5. The Revolutionary Soldier General

Village and Urban Cells Village Guerillas Regional Soldiers Regular Soldiers Commanders

6. Insurgent Command and Staff Organization Intelligence and Propaganda

Administration and the Formation of an Insurgent

7. Tactics of Revolutionary War General



Guerilla Tactics

Firm Base 32
33 •

8. General Principles of Government Action Aim


National Plan

Co-ordinated Government Action Public Opinion and Popular Support Security Intelligence

Strong and Popular Security Forces Summary

9. Organization for Co-ordinated Civil and Military Action ...

General Principles Political Aspects

Joint Tasks

High Command Control of Operations

46 •

10. Pollee and Local Armed Forces Police Forces

Regular Police

Special Constabulary

Other Forms of Police Organization Local Military Forces

51 51 51 52 52 53





11. The Roles of Arms






Army Aviation Specialized Units

12. Naval Support

13. Air Support




Command and Control

Air Transport and Logistic Support Offensive Air Operations

Air Reconnaissance and Observation

Assistance by Aircraft in Command and Control Special Tasks

, .. 59
67 ...


14. Introduction


69 70 70 71 71 72 74 74 75 75 75 76

76 77 77 77 77

77 78 79


15. InteUigence Functions

16. Principles

17. Organization General

Composition of the Military Intelligence Organization Integration with other Intelligence Organizations ... Dependent Territories

Foreign Countries

Intelligence Committees

Special Branch or Equivalent

Joint Intelligence Centres

Military Intelligence Officers and Military Intelligence Liaison Officers

18. Planning

Action in the United Kingdom

Pre-emergency Action in the Area of Operations Provision of Interpreters

19. Research and Liaison, Communications and Security

20. Operational Intelligence Sources of Information




21. Counter Intelligence Tasks

Principles Protective Security Civil Security

22. Conclusion


23. The Pattern of Internal Security Operations General


Operating Principles

Types of Operation

24. The Pattern of Counter Insurgency Operations Establishment of a Base

Securing and Enlargement of Controlled Areas Operations in Depth ...

Border Protection

25. The Training Requirement General

Common Aspects Internal Security

Training in a Police Role Counter Insurgency


26. Special· Factors Affecting Administration

27. Main Factors in Logistic Planning


28. Objectives, Functions, Principles and Responsibility Introduction




Responsibility for Civil Affairs



_' .. 81
... , 83 •

85 •
92 93 93

97 97 97 98 98 99



34. Introduction and Aim Introduction

Aim ...

113 113 113

• •

Arndt I/Nov./71



29. The Protection and Control of the People General


Protection ...

Food Control and Denial. .. Public Information Summary ...

Page 100 100 100 100 101 102 102

30. Community Relations Purpose

Principles ... Command and Control Projects

Individual Actions

103 103 103 104 105 105



32. Conduct of Psyops ...

General Tasks

Pre-requisite for Psyops

Methods and Resources Available Jamming

107 107 107 109 109 111

33. Command and Control Overall Direction ... Co-ordination

Responsibility of Military Psyops Staff and Units

111 111 111 111

35. Deployment of a UN Force Decision to Deploy a UN Force Composition of the Force Appointment of a Commander Commander's Directive ... Multi-National Headquarters Command and Control ...

113 113 113 114 114 115 116


. ..

Arndt 1/Nov./71



36. Peacekeeping at Contingent/Unit Level ..

Contingent/Unit Commander's Directive Preparation of Units


Zones and Boundaries Use of Force


Legal Status

Element of Success Conclusion ..

Page .. 116 ..116

· . 117

· • 117

· . 118 .. 118

· . 118 .. 118 .. 118 .. 118A


37. Introduction

.• 118C .. 118C .. 118D .. 118D .. 118D ..118D .. 118E .. lISE

38. The Requirement

39. Assistance to the Press

Access to Information by the Press

Comment by Officers and Soldiers during Operations .. Release of Information at Briefings and Press Conferences Statements to the Press, Radio and Television ..

The Value of Community Relations



A Diagrammatic Pattern of Revolutionary Warfare

B A Synopsis of Some Past Counter Insurgency Operations C Typical Organization of a Regional Insurgent Battalion

D Chain of Command of Security Forces and Civil Administration E Financial Aspects ..

F Resettlement

.. l1~F .. 119 .. 131 .. 132 .. 133 .. 135


1. Diagrammatic Layout of Typical Defences of a Fortified Village .. 38







1. The aim of this Pamphlet is to give general guidance on. the conduct of counter revolutionary operations, whether they are concerned with civil disturbances, terrorism or insurgency in the pattern of revolutionary war. It examines the methods most likely to be used by the instigators of disorders, revolts and insurgency, be they nationalist or communist inspired or based within or outside the territory concerned, and it sets out the general principles on which the security forces, working in close concert with the appropriate civil power, should base their operations.



2. As indicated in the Preface to this Pamphlet, Britain's overseas commitments since World War II have been primarily concerned with operations of the counter revolutionary type.

3. A synopsis of some past counter revolutionary operations is given in Annex B.

Types of Operations

4. As a result of our commitments British forces may be faced with having to carry out one, or any combination of three main types of operations:

a. Internal Security. Covers any military role which involves primarily the maintenance and restoration, using minimum force, of law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience. This could include:

(1) Dealing with civil disturbances resulting from labour disputes, racial and religious antagonism and tension or social unrest.

(2) . Dealing with riots and civil disobedience, with or without the political undertones which savour of revolt or even rebellion.

(3) Countering terrorism by individuals and small groups in the form of sabotage and assassinations, particularly in urban areas.

(4) Peace keeping under United Nations auspices involving any of the above operations, or more commonly the keeping apart of two belligerent or hostile factions.

b. Counter Insurgency. This will be in areas where we are directly responsible for law and order or where we have been asked for help. Insurgency is a more serious state of affairs, for it implies that a rebellion




has the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population, has achieved physical control over parts of the country, and that guerilla warfare is being waged in order to set up an alternative administration. Insurgency will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war in the communist pattern. Counter insurgency therefore covers the full range of measures which must be taken by the government and security forces to defeat the insurgents and restore government authority. This could include:

(1) Countering attacks and ambushes by formed bodies of terrorists on communications, installations, and isolated police and military posts. These are more likely to occur in rural areas.

(Z) Countering guerilla warfare.

c. Limited War. This will be against well equipped units committed by one country against another in overt aggression, covertly to reinforce insurgents, or in a combination of both. In these conditions limited war will have the added complication of guerilla warfare continuing at the same time.

5. The more serious operations will of course .. contain elements of the less serious ones. For example, although civil disturbances and riots could be of no special political significance, they could also be a prelude to, or part of, a more serious threat such as a rebellion; while a rebellion, with its accompaniment of terrorism perhaps aided from outside the threatened country, could be part of a revolutionary war on the communist pattern, and be a prelude to or even part of a more intense phase of such a war. Insurgency will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war pattern. The degree of force necessary and justified in dealing with an incident will therefore to some extent depend on the context in which that incident occurs.

6. Between internal security and counter insurgency operations there is the anti-terrorist category of operations. Terrorism, when it is manifested by sabotage and assassination by individuals or small groups, may represent an advanced stage of a locally inspired and controlled rebellion, or could be part of the first phase of revolutionary war. When it has somewhat escalated and formed bodies of terrorists are carrying out ambushes and attacks on civilians and police, which is more likely in rural areas, it must inevitably be looked at in a revolutionary context. Measures against urban terrorism will be considered under the heading of internal security, while those in rural areas which impinge on controlled area operations will be covered under counter Insurgency.

7. In their extreme form counter revolutionary operations may have many of the characteristics of limited war, from which they may differ only because they are directed against an essentially internal threat.

Characteristics of British Intervention

8. It is particularly important in counter revolutionary operations for our strategic reserve forces to arrive quickly and act effectively immediately after arrival, since the normal pattern of events is such that outside assistance is




rarely called for by other governments until the situation in the threatened country has become serious. Indeed British forces may not be called in by a friendly administration until at least a state of insurgency exists.

9. The arrival of British and Allied forces should have the following beneficial effects:

a. The standing of the indigenous government should be improved within and outside its own country.

b. The morale of the police, local armed forces and government organizations should improve. Where morale is excessively low, local forces may have to be relieved so that they can be reorganized and regain their confidence.

c. Those sections of the local population not yet subverted may be prevented from acquiescent acceptance of the insurgents.

10. Against this it must be recognized that with the arrival of foreign troops the dissident factions will try to pursue their terrorism and insurgency with even greater determination and fanaticism, and they will .exploit any local or external misgivings at foreign intervention to the greatest degree possible. This may make them a more popular movement.

11. The. aim of British forces in the first instance must be to prevent further escalation of the conflict. Thereafter they must act offensively against the whole structure of the insurgent movement, in full co-operation with the civilian authorities and in such a way as to create the conditions in which the confidence of the people is restored and effective civil government becomes possible.

12. British forces will have to meet the additional problems of climate, terrain, hazards to health, difficulties of language and the taboos and customs of indigenous peoples. No two tasks will be similar.

13. The Law and Members of the Armed Forces. British Forces will operate under the law of the country concerned. In British dependencies and Commonwealth territories this will be based on English law. In other countries there may be considerable variations which must be fully understood by our troops. The legal aspects are particularly relevant to the handling of civil disturbances and riots and are covered in Part 2. It is the duty of the commander to clarify and get agreement upon the standing of his troops under the local ordnance or current law.

Operations under United Nations Auspices

14. Operations with international backing under United Nations auspices are. for the time being, likely to be confined to a strictly peace keeping role designed to restore order and national cohesion. The examples of the Congo in 1960-64 and Cyprus in 1964 best illustrates this role. The special problems involved in United Nations operations are covered in Chapter 10.

15-19. Reserved.









20. Each pattern of unrest is generally based upon at least one of the follow-

ing main issues which provoke severe discontent:

a. Nationalism.

b. Communism.

c. Racial or tribal rivalry.

d. Religious differences .

e. Maladministration and corruption of government.

f. Famine and poverty.

g. Lack of agricultural, educational and social planning.

h. Eviction of foreign troops and bases.

21. These issues are the most obvious and exploitable. The mass of the population of emerging nations is generally poorly educated and indifferent to problems outside its daily environment. The individual does not always realize the main reason for his misery or poverty and is thus easy prey for a well trained subversive organization. No two situations will be similar, but the resulting unrest will normally fall into one of the categories of unrest outlined below.


22. Non-political Civil Disturbances. In many cases unrest will take the form of provocation of the population to anger and to demonstrations against authority. Some of these demonstrations could be purely regional and come as spontaneous outbursts of dissatisfaction among the people against the local administration and government. Such disturbances would not savour of rebellion but would merely be attempts to rouse the government to improve social conditions. If properly handled and if steps are taken to remove the dissatisfaction these outbursts present little danger. If, on the other hand, they are brutally and unintelligently suppressed and nothing is done to remove the causes of the unrest the ground may be prepared for further trouble and a section of the community may have been permanently alienated against the administration. Noone should imagine that winning back the population will be easy if there are dissident and subversive elements at work. Propaganda and the spreading of lies or half-truths will be ceaseless and true social progress will be misrepresented and even actively resisted in order to retain popular dissatisfaction. Firmness, combined with humanity, a readiness to work with responsible elements for social progress and a virile and intelligent government information service are required.

23. Internal Revolt and Rebellion. A continuing pattern of civil unrest and disturbance will throw up its own leaders and organizers. Amongst them




may be men of goodwill who are primarily concerned in removing the causes of unrest, but there will be others who are agitators with long term political objectives and with no intention of being appeased. Failure to pick out and do business at an early stage with popular and militant bodies who are at the same time responsible and truly representative will only escalate the disturbances into a revolt and ultimately into a rebellion involving terrorism. This stage could well be reached without any control or assistance from external agencies although the communists will always be ready to profit from, and if possible to guide, any revolt which is working to their advantage.

24. Mutiny by the Armed or Security Forces.

a. Mutinies can be caused by subversive political influences or by the failure

of the authorities to introduce long overdue improvements, or both. The •

armed services or police can also become the private force of a particular individual.

b. In many cases mutiny can be prevented by: (1) Penetrating the mutineer's organization.

(2) Introducing reforms which eradicate the cause of grievance.

(3) Arresting ringleaders and bringing the proposed mutiny into the open.

c. If it is feared that a mutiny may take place the strictest control must be . placed on the issue of arms and ammunition. When necessary, stocks of arms and ammunition should be removed and/or guarded by troops whose loyalty is unquestioned. The location of all armouries and ammunition compounds must be accurately known.

d. When a mutiny has taken place it must be suppressed in the shortest possible time in order to prevent it spreading like a contagious disease throughout the other elements of the force. Whilst the need for the minimum use of force must be appreciated a short, sharp action to suppress the mutiny is better than a long drawn out one, since the latter tends to enhance the status and strength of the mutineers and their determination to continue resistance.

e. There must be. no parleying with mutineers unless the lives of hostages are at stake.

f. Once the mutineers have been overwhelmed, the various categories of • mutineers. should be quickly segregated and their custody entrusted to loyal elements as soon as possible.

25. Civil War. The distinction between a rebellion and civil war is difficult to define, being to a certain extent the degree of involvement of the population in hostilities. The former is organized armed resistance to established government, and the latter a conflict which splits a country into warring factions. We are unlikely to become involved in a civil war between rival supporters of political or religious beliefs except possibly as part of a Commonwealth or United Nations force responsible for restoring law and order.




26. Confrontation. This isa form of warfare in which raids and infiltration occur across another country's frontier without any, declaration of war. It will be part of a broader design by one. country to bring about the downfall of its neighbour and in this context it may be closely linked. with subversion, terrorism and even insurgency in rear areas. Jjf it is conducted on any scale the campaign is likely to have some of the characteristics of counter insurgency and, although with more restrictions than usual, some of limited war. Terrorism and guerilla activity may be less intense than in a revolutionary war which has originated inside the threatened country. In both confrontation and in an externally controlled rebellion on the revolutionary war pattern there will be internal and external threat. British forces may be involved in this conflict, either to help protect an ally or as part of a United Nations force to stand between the adversaries and maintain the sanctity of a frontier.

27. Externally Controlled Rebellion. Any type of unrest can be, and often is, aided from outside, but one that is specifically sponsored and almost totally organized by external agencies who wish to overthrow a government of a different political complexion to their own, is in a different category. These agencies will seek to establish in its place an alternative. government favourable to them and which will, in effect, allow them to control the policy of the country concerned. When this happens action is likely to develop along the lines of revolutionary war on the communist pattern.

28-29. Reserved.



30. The aim of all revolutionary wars will be to overthrow a government by the use of political and economic, as well as military measures. Although this pamphlet naturally concentrates on the military side, it must be appreciated that the pattern with which he have to deal will always include political economic and sociological aspects, which may be more important and absorb more of the enemy's. effort than the military aspect. All four activities should be conducted in harmony as part of a co-ordinatedand carefully controlled plan .


31. The basic methods of revolutionary warfare can best be analysed in its two components which take place concurrently. They are:

a. Destructive. Attacking the established order and its supporters.

h. Constructive. Building up the will to fight, the means of fighting and

the alternative government structure and organization.

32. Destructive methods include:

a. Anti-government propaganda and demoralization.

h. Subversion and penetration of the security forces, government departments and agencies and established trade unions.




c. Intimidation, blackmail, terrorism and assassination.

d. Sabotage and destruction of the economic framework, including agri-

culture, but not so as to create mass unemployment.

e. Guerilla operations.

f. Full scale military operations.

33. Constructive methods include:

B. Expansion of a live political organization.

b. Creation of movements, organizations and fronts such as new trade unions, youth movements and ex-service groups, with a view to fostering popular support.

c. Creation of police and military forces in preparation for the take-over and control of areas.

d. Creation of an alternative administration parallel at all levels to the existing government administration.

e. The building up of insurgent training cadres.

34. Within the scope of both the destructive and the constructive components, the aim is the involvement of the whole population of the country. This involvement will take no account of sex, age, colour or class nor will it allow any neutrals. Although both the government and the insurgents will be trying to secure the support or acquiescence of the people, the insurgents may well have the initial advantage because they will be prepared to use brutality and terror-methods which a government may decline to use.


35. The characteristics of a revolutionary war can be summarized as follows:

a. It is primarily an internal struggle without fronts or rear areas and is often covertly assisted.

b. It has two complementary arms-political and military. Each will have its own chain of command and HQ, the political side following closely the pattern of the existing local government. Counter revolutionary operations must therefore be concurrently political and military in nature. There can be no purely military solution.

c. It is invariably waged by trained and ruthless professionals who employ the techniques of guerilla war to achieve their political aims, and have infinite patience and the ability to sustain a protracted struggle. When conditions are favourable the insurgents will seek quick victory by the use of overwhelming force and will attempt to dissipate their opponent's strength before making an outright bid for military victory. It is their inherent flexibility which makes the insurgents a stubborn and difficult enemy to defeat.

d. It is deeply concerned with the aspirations of the people; its breeding ground is communism, social discontent, racial antagonism and nationalistic fervour, all of whioh are characteristic of this century.





36. Although revolutionary war was originally a communist term and it is the communists who have thought the most about, and most clearly demonstrated, the process and methods of inducing a state of insurgency, they are not alone in using this technique. Similar methods have been and are likely to be increasingly used by leaders of all those who have shown their readiness to aid dissidence in order to hamper British and Western interests. The leaders of these movements may be inspired by a variety of motives but they will all rely on gaining, by fair means or foul, the fullest measure of popular support. They will very likely have received training and indoctrination in a communist country. They have, therefore, tended to copy communist methods which have proved successful elsewhere and have often adopted the term revolutionary war to describe their own partie ular struggle .

37. Those newly emerging and under-developed states with weak and untried administrations and with unreliable and poorly trained military forces are most easily overcome by such warfare. Indeed they may not be able to ward off such threats to their existence without the political, economic and, in the most serious cases, military assistance from Western Allies. Revolutionary war therefore poses the most serious challenge to peace today, which is why it is used as the main background to this pamphlet.

Pre-requisites for Success

38. General. Any revolutionary movement, however small and localized, must satisfy certain basic requirements if it is to be successful and achieve its aim. The following pre-requisites apply particularly to insurgency in the context of a revolutionary war but also in some degree to any local revolt or rebellion.

39. Popular Support. The revolutionary movement must aim at gaining the support of the population. This, with the aid of strong propaganda, will probably come easily if based on real grievances and weak government. The most general causes were given in paragraph 20; such causes will be used to fuse the population into a revolutionary movement. The civilian population must provide food, shelter, clothing, medical care, informants and recruits. If this support should not be forthcoming voluntarily it wilI be compelled by terror .

40. Strong Leadership. A revolution must be organized and controlled by a leader who is not only highly trained but a fanatic for his cause. He must be brave, tough, politically astute, cold-blooded and utterly ruthless in imposing discipline and obedience on his followers.

41. Intelligence. Good intelligence is fundamental to the survival and successful growth of a revolutionary movement. A widespread and efficient intelligence organization must be established by the revolutionaries amongst the civilian population, government agencies, police and armed forces, providing them with the essential details for their strategic and tactical planning and for their propaganda and security.




42. T errain. Favourable terrain in remote areas of under-developed countries, such as jungle, bush, swamps and mountains, which hampers the deployment of regular troops, is important. It alsO' provides adequate cover from air and ground observation. In these areas, firm bases for guerilla warfare are formed, and if near to' friendly communist countries small airfields are constructed for supply and liaison, These bases then become refuge, administrative and production areas. Where the frontier actually marches with that of a communist Dr sympathetic neighbour every attempt will be made by the insurgents to' control this frontier area SO' that the neighbour may be used for resupply, reinforcement and refuge should the insurgents be hard pressed. In better developed countries, especially those with large urban and industrial areas, the towns alsO' provide favourable cover for terrorists and insurgents because here they can merge easily with the population.

43. Outside Support. All revolutionary movements today receive some out- •

side support. The chief forms of aid are training facilities, cadres to' stiffen

the hard core of the movement, funds, communications, equipment and mili-

tary supplies, continuous propaganda originating from outside to support the movement inside the country, and covert assistance from embassies and lega-

tions. In the insurgency phase of a revolutionary war additional troops from

other countries friendly to' the insurgents may be committed. Without such

outside assistance, and a safe haven in which insurgents can train, organize and

equip, insurgency would rarely succeed.

44. Time. Time in which to' develop a revolutionary organization is essential. Many years may be needed to reach the stage where a guerilla force can be formed into a regular force capable of destroying the administration and assuming control of the country.

45 .. 49. Reserved.



50. The leaders of any revolutionary movement tend to CDPY the com .. munist pattern. It is most important therefore for readers to' remember that in many places where the word communist appears in this Section it could equally well be nationalist Dr revolutionary and the communist technique has merely been used as an example.

51. This Section describes in general terms hDW communist revolutionary warfare is organized and the pattern it fDllDWS, but communist leaders are flexible and opportunist in the methods they employ, They may use a variety of methods concurrently to' achieve their aims.

Communist Aim

52. The acknowledged communist aim is to' establish governments sym .. pathetic to' the communist cause in all countries of the world, They see this being achieved mainly through a three-stage process of political evolution: national liberation ; socialism ; communism. All means are employed to'




achieve this aim. Subversion, the staging of coups d'etat and the exploitation of "United Fronts"are the primary means employed to overthrow weak or inexperienced governments. The support. of local wars of various kinds does not conflict. with the communist theory of "peaceful co-existence". which in communist terminology is defined as "intense political, ideological and economic struggle". The need and justification for various. types of armed struggle is accepted, provided that general war is avoided. Thus the communists frequently support indigenous independence movements with arms. instructors, and if necessary, fighting troops. The instigation of a state of insurgency and the staging of a revolution are undertaken only when the circumstances seem to warrant them and other methods have failed or seem unlikely to succeed.

Protracted Warfare

53. The communists recognize that at the beginning of a revolutionary war the balance of forces is likely to be in favour of the government they intend to overthrow. The process of changing this balance may. be long and difficult, They expect no great success until the support of the people has been effectively won. They stress this fact by preparing their cadres . for a protracted war, thus forestalling any disillusionment that may occur later among their forces.

Co-ordination of Political and Military Action

54. Revolutionary warfare is waged by .the use of carefully co-ordinated political, economic, psychological and military measures. Military action is expected to succeed only when it is supported by the people. Mao Tse- Tung has illustrated the relationship that should exist between the troops and the people by saying that insurgents must be able to move among the people as naturally as fish in water. To achieve this state of affairs the communists put forward local political objectives to appeal to the aspirations and exploit the grievances of the people. Thus they gain their sympathy, co-operation and active support. Military action is preceded and accompanied by effective political measures which include the use of propaganda and economic pressures designed to mobilize popular support and direct it against the government. Thus revolutionary war is planned as an armed struggle of the people under the closely co-ordinated direction of the local communist party.

Phases of Revolutionary War

55. An analysis of the patterns of communist revolutionary wars shows that they normally have four .phases, despite the much publicized three phases used by Mao Tse-Tung. It can be seen, however, that these dovetail with the communist concept and, provided they are known by the description of the phase and not by numerical sequence, confusion is avoided. There is no doubt that there are in fact four degrees of intensity in the full development, although the phases merge as parts of a continuous struggle. A diagrammatic pattern is at Annex A.

Preparatory Phase

56. During the preparatory phase the local communist party is organized and prepared for the struggle. Communists, who have been trained for their




tasks . either locally or in communist countries, set about establishing themselves in particular sections of the community. They mayor may not belong to the country that is to be attacked. Some of them endeavour to infiltrate into schools, youth organizations, trade unions, the press andgovemment bodies, including the police and the armed forces, where they may later bring their influence to bear. Others establish themselves in the villages and aim to become accepted as normal worthy people. All attempt to build up good reputations and make themselves well informed about local affairs, politics, personalities and grievances. They report the information they acquire to their communist superiors. Camps may be set up in the remotest areas if this is safer or easier than preparing and establishing the organization from the urban areas. All training however will be clandestine.

57. When they are established these communists are given the task of

forming cells of dissidents who are prepared to work for the revolutionary •

cause. Members of these cells are indoctrinated and trained for the coming

struggle. They will collect taxes, liquidate informers and generally provide the

strong arm to back up the methods of coercion and persuasion. As the organization expands, particular efforts are made to recruit from the professional

classes. Doctors, barristers, politicians and other prominent citizens can by

their influence encourage other dissidents to join the movement. They can

also embarrass the government when eventually it is faced with the political problems of their arrest and detention. Prominent people are used as " front

men" or "cheer leaders ", while the party organizers remain anonymous.

Other suitable dissidents are recruited as potential guerillas and saboteurs.

All these dissidents are recruited as potential guerillas and saboteurs. AD

these dissidents are not necessarily communists; some are dupes who are just

hostile to the government and may thus be useful. The revolutionary move-

ment at this stage may not be openly communist; it may, for instance, be operating under the guise of a "United Front" of parties or factions that are dissatisfied with the government.

58. Political and military intelligence sections are now established within the party or expanded, and the effective working of the whole organization is overhauled. Special attention is given to intelligence work and a widespread network of informers is established. All supporters of the movement are expected to report on a wide variety of subjects irrespective of their particular tasks.

59. At this stage propaganda and psychological warfare have mainly peace- •

ful aims and are directed towards winning the co-operation of the local peo-

ple. Local grievances are aired and exploited and, if the revolutionary move-

ment is now openly identified with communism, an effort is made to show

how much better affairs are managed in neighbouring communist countries ..

To this end leaflets as well as medicines, radio sets and other attractive good's

that have been produced in these countries may be distributed. These are especially welcome in remote and backward areas.

60. Summary. The intentions during this phase are to set up an efficient party organization, infiltrate communists into key positions, recruit and train active workers, and gain support for the revolutionary movement to that it acquires momentum. Most of the action taken is covert. It is impossible to




Jay down a time scale but this preparation may take years. At this stage force will only be used for the protection of camps and to intimidate and coerce the population, thus building up a cadre of those actively supporting the struggle or at least tacitly accepting it. It is when violence expands from these limited aims and is directed at the government and national institutions that the revolutionary war moves into the active resistance phase.

Active Resistance Phase

61. When the party organization has been sufficiently prepared and the time seems to be propitious active resistance to the government is encouraged and steps are taken to increase popular support for the revolutionary movement. This may still not be openly identified with communism. Cells in the party organization are expanded and further supporters are recruited, sometimes by coercion. Coercion and terrorism are increasingly used against two main groups of people and for two main reasons. The first group is the local population from amongst whom ordinary people are murdered, either because they fail to provide material support in the form of food or money, or because they fail to respond with enthusiasm to the rebel cause. Such murders are frequently done as a warning "pour encourager les autres ", The second group includes everyone in a position of authority in the local government. These may range from village headmen to government officials, administrators, police and servicemen. The object of murdering people in this category is to disrupt the power of authority to resist the revolutionary movement, and to remove effective opposition leadership. Other prime targets are Special Branch officers and agents. The use of propaganda and psychological warfare is intensified and made more militant with the aim of discrediting the government. A climate of dissidence, civil disobedience and possibly industrial unrest is engendered. Acts of sabotage begin to take place and guerilla bands may start to operate in those areas where sufficient popular support has been gained. Factories and workshops for the manufacture and repair of weapons are set up in safe areas if they exist, otherwise clandestinely.

62. This phase is characterized by acts of terrorism. As the phase progresses so the insurgents take on more ambitious targets. Small military parties are ambushed, isolated police posts attacked and military stores raided to capture arms and explosives. In following Mao's dictum" Fight only when victory is certain; run away when it is not" the terrorists will only attack an illprepared or weak force. In the early stages terrorists will operate largely by night, hiding by day and melting away in the face of superior forces. Only as their successes increase and their confidence grows will such attacks take place in daylight or near to centres of military strength. The main intentions are to increase the amount of popular support for the movement, to eliminate or neutralize all opposition, to embarrass and discredit the government, and to test, prepare further and train the party organization for the next phase.

Insurgency Phase

63. As the revolutionary movement gains strength its military activity increases. Guerilla warfare becomes more widespread. As the insurgents gain funds and capture arms and explosives so their hold and influence grow over the local population. It is when such a hold ensures the safe tenure of their




bases and freedom to move in daylight over a wide surrounding area that a state of insurgency exists. Bases are fully established in inaccessible and relatively safe areas where recruits can be trained; regular revolutionary fighting units are formed and trained for their role during the open offensive phase. It is now that the insurgents most need foreign support in the procurement of weapons, equipment and advisers. If they are fortunate enough . to have a sanctuary in a neighbouring country this will be invaluable to them for raising, equipping and training new units.

64. At this stage steps are taken to enlarge the areas dominated by the guerillas. Efforts are made to win support in areas adjacent to those they already control and these are gradually incorporated in whole districts that are

then controlled by the insurgents. The process of expansion may be protracted •

and is carefully controlled. Usually, in a mainly agricultural country, no

attempt is made to bring the larger cities and towns under control until the

villages round them have been won. The towns fall more easily when their supporting rural areas have been dominated. As each area under effective

control by the guerillas expands, a revolutionary administration is set up. If

by now the revolution is openly supported or identified with communism.

the districts that are controlled may be declared "liberated areas" for pro-

paganda purposes. The revolutionary government may also be recognized by

other communist countries.

65. Military action in this phase is concentrated on attacking government security forces, especially small detachments such as police posts and minor military units in outlying areas. The supply lines of the government forces are harassed, and acts of sabotage are aimed at damaging communications and generally impairing the economy of the country. Attempts may also be made to sabotage military installations in base areas. The military aim is now to extend, harass and weaken the government forces and to deny them access to the areas controlled by the guerillas.

66. Political action is continued in the form of intense propaganda, coercion, blackmail and terrorism which are used to win further popular support, to neutralize opposition among the people and to undermine the morale of the government's forces and supporters.

67. The aims of the insurgents throughout this phase are to gain further

popular support, to enlarge the areas under their control, to discredit the •

government, dishearten its supporters, weaken its forces and to demonstrate that the revolutionary movement is capable of providing an alernative and

better government. The essence of insurgency is that the insurgents, not the

local government, effectively control specific areas.

Open OtIensive Phase

68. The final phase starts when it is apparent that the balance has definitely swung in favour of the revolutionary forces. When this stage is reached the revolutionary movement assumes the form of a people's war against the government. Large areas of the country are by now dominated and administered by the insurgents. Guerilla war begins to be supplemented by mobile war in which large regular fighting units and even formations of divisional




size operate against the government forces from communist controlled areas of the country. Some of these units may well have substantial artillery support. The. struggle becomes a form of limited war which retains many of the characteristics of guerilla operations.

69. Regular mobile warfare is normally only undertaken when adequate supplies of heavy equipment are obtainable and a sanctuary exists for the training of regular forces. The need of the insurgents for greatly increased supplies and for secure supply lines is crucial at this stage. They will require increased numbers of advisers to improve the quality of their forces and volunteers from other communist countries will be most welcome.

70. The communists only embark on this final stage of revolutionary war after very careful deliberation. The need for it will not arise if subversion and the results of previous activities have led to the overthrow of the government. When it is launched, however, the aim is to depose the government after the defeat of its military forces. If the results of this phase are not conclusive, the communists will aim to consolidate their gains by political manoeuvres and prepare for further expansion at a later date.


71. The pattern of communist revolutionary war has been described in phases but the whole process is continuous, is managed with great flexibility and may be very protracted. The phases merge, can be altered to suit the circumstances, and may even be reversed. At all stages the primary aim is to win popular support and show that the revolutionary war is a people's war of liberation against an unpopular and ineffective government.

72-79. Reserved.



80. If the revolutionary war is fought on the communist pattern there are likely to be various types and grades of insurgent soldier. An insurgent soldier will normally be :

a. Used to the privations associated with a low standard of living .

b. Able to carry heavy loads over long distances on foot.

c. Able to exist for many weeks away from his base on meagre rations.

d. Trained in stealth and cunning. Aided by his native resourcefulness and local knowledge he is a skilful and adaptable opponent.

e. Adept at the use of ground.

Village and Urban Cells

81. Village cells normally consist of three to six people. In larger towns there will be many such cells. These cells then recruit further members and multiply. Village cells. organize the local population in a support role. From these cells suitable recruits are obtained for guerilla service.




Village Guerillas

82. Suitable recruits are formed into village guerillas which operate from, or close to, their home village, often in conjunction with regional and regular soldiers. By day the guerilla works at his job but at night or in emergencies he is available for assignment by his superiors. The insurgents like to have five to ten guerillas of this type in each village. In villages under insurgent control there may be a full squad of 10 to 16 or even a platoon of three or four such squads. A village section is likely to have a few anti-vehicle mines and some. grenades. It will probably own rifles stolen from local police stations and small military posts and patrols. Its main armament will therefore be a variety of firearms in addition to knives, machetes, spears and other hand weapons.

83. As the result of intensive indoctrination by the hard core cadre some •

of the villagers will undoubtedly be volunteers for this role but records show

that many young men are dragooned into service as guerillas. Some are kidnapped, others are threatened, and others join to prevent their families

being harmed. In a village where there are few secrets, the identity of the

guerillas is probably known to most of the inhabitants, but fear of brutal re-

prisals ensures security. The guerilla is therefore not readily identifiable by government forces. He conceals his activities until such time as there are sufficient converts to allow him to proclaim publicly his allegiance to the


84 .. The guerilla does not receive much formal military training and takes part in military action only in emergencies or when specifically required to playa supporting role to regional or regular troop activities. Such' military training as he has is devoted to the use of camouflage or concealment, weapon handling, elementary tactics and a study of the government forces and their tactics. He is taught how to set simple ambushes, dig defence works, site hides and dig man-traps. Seventy per cent of his training time, however, is taken up with political indoctrination, which is thorough. He is taught to obey unquestioningly even when the tasks given are repugnant to him. The chief value to the insurgents of village guerillas is that they provide an effective intelligence organization for passing on all available information concerning the movements of government forces; they are, in fact, the eyes and ears of the revolutionary movement within the village communities. They also provide a labour force for the carriage and storage of food and equipment, thus playing a part in the very flexible logistic system.

85. For a variety of reasons many individuals may not advance up the scale of revolutionary soldiery, but will continue to serve in the ranks of the guerillas indefinitely. Others who are young and unmarried and whose absence from the area can be explained, or who demonstrate a degree of political understanding and efficiency, will be sent to selected areas to become regional soldiers.

Regional Soldiers

86. These are organized into companies or even battalions and are better armed and equipped than village guerillas, usually with good quality small arms and light mortars captured or stolen from the security forces. They are





not normally used before the insurgency phase has been reached. A typical organization for an insurgent regional battalion is shown at Annex C.

87. A regional soldier devotes about half his time to his military activities and the other half to his normal civilian occupation. He may be away for several days at a. time on specific training or operational activities. He will already have received some military training before joining and will have been successfully subjected to intensive indoctrination. Nevertheless, half his training time is still devoted to political study. A regional unit serves in the province of its origin with, ideally, squads coming from the same village and companies from one or more districts. Concentration is effected from squad to platoon to company. Dispersal is on similar lines unless unforeseen pressure forces individuals to scatter .

88. In most instances the regional soldier is clad in his normal working clothes and carries his ammunition in a rough canvas bag or bandolier over the shoulder. About one half of a regional unit is armed with modern fire arms. Those who are unarmed ·attain armed status by rescuing arms from killed or wounded comrades or by capture. The security forces provide the main source of weapons. It therefore follows that the standard of equipment of . a regional unit is in direct proportion to its success in battle. Arms so obtained are often passed to other regional or regular units if required. When

in his village the regional soldier hides his weapon and lives the life of a peaceful villager.

89. Regional soldiers must concentrate and disperse quickly in order to carry out their tasks. They often cover long distances by night across the " grain" of the country. In this phase of his training the regional soldier is introduced to the hardness and severity of guerilla warfare which he will also find in increasing measure if he graduates through skill and leadership qualities, to become a regular soldier.

Regular Soldiers

90. After a district has been thoroughly indoctrinated and brought under insurgent influence, regional soldiers will be concentrated to form regular units. These are likely to be armed, trained, organized and equipped along conventional communist bloc lines. They are the main forces of the insurgent movement and are reserved for the destruction of inferior government forces anywhere in the country; and particularly for the main task of mounting the open offensive phase. These forces will normally be created only when they can be supplied and maintained by a friendly population. When possible, the manpower and logistic requirements will be augmented from an adjacent and sympathetic country. The manpower assistance from outside will include trained leaders, technicians and, in some cases, complete units and formations. Such forces can then be expected to have heavy support weapons and artillery support with even air support not totally discounted.

91. When a regional soldier becomes a regular soldier he leaves his own village and moves to an area, perhaps a village base, where all the men are soldiers. Alternatively his sub-unit may be based in a jungle, bush, mountain or swamp area with other sub-units.




92. In a village base he will live in a reasonably safe environment where he receives ample and timely warning from outlying regional units and guerillas of government forces penetrating in his direction. He will eat and live in comparative comfort and the hardships of war will only be faced when "his unit moves out against enemy targets. Then he will be compelled to live on what he carries and will move as quickly as possible, carrying substantial

weights for long distances. "

93. Regular soldiers in the other type of base have a more rigorous existence. They must always be on their guard against penetration by government security forces. Their bases must be carefully concealed from ground and air observation and this may necessitate frequent moves. " Because these bases are normally sited some distance from habitation, rations ate often

meagre. The bases are carefully sited for ease of defence and to facilitate •

a quick getaway. Security within the base is considered most important.

Sentries cover all obvious approaches and bamboo spikes, camouflaged pits

and other booby trap devices are used in the plan of defence.

94. Life for the regular soldier is a very full one. He has long hours of military instruction but over a quarter of his training time is still devoted to political indoctrination. The regular soldier is armed with a good weapon of communist bloc or western origin and over and above" the normal small arms, a regular unit may have:

a. Light and heavy machine guns.

b. Light mortars.

c. Medium mortars.

d. Recoilless rifles.

e. Anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines.

f. Rocket launchers.

95. The regular soldier will have a proper uniform and "may wear a western or communist bloc type web belt with water bottle and carry a haversack and ammunition pouches. His rations and ammunition are usually carried in two stout canvas bags slung from each shoulder. He will wear some form of military headgear and rough leather shoes or rubber sandals and will carry a blanket, a sharp machete and a length of plastic material for protec-

tion against the rain to complete his personal equipment. On arrival in a •

regular unit the regional soldier is exposed to formal and intensive discipline

under trained cadre staffs.

96. In the regular insurgent forces infantry is considered the decisive combat arm and all soldiers receive intensive basic infantry training.·Weapon training is conducted carefully and methodically to ensure that all soldiers are capable of handling with skill the various types of weapons available. Great emphasis is placed on camouflage and concealment. Considerable time is taken in studying terrain and cross country navigation and long marches are undertaken to test navigation and stamina. After basic infantry training .some riflemen specialize on heavier weapons-machine guns, recoilless rifles and mortars. Insurgent forces develop great skill in the use of these weapons,




particularly mortars. Political studies continue and the favourite communist device, self-criticism, is widely used. Many of the soldiers are illiterate but from their ranks will come the non-commissioned officers and platoon or company level commanders, who require varying levels of literacy; some time is therefore, also devoted to giving the soldiers a general education.

97. The period of graduation for an insurgent soldier from the guerilla fighter to the ranks of the regular units is filled with action and experience. During this period he has gained much military knowledge, has experienced combat and learned to adapt himself to military life. The process. of advancing through this system may take several years. The final effect of his training is to produce an experienced, well trained, dedicated and enthusiastic soldier .


98. The opportunity and scope for training company and platoon commanders is obviously restricted. Insurgent commanders are devoted to the cause and will lead by example. The state of their tactical training will probably not be as good relatively as the individual skill of the. insurgent They command ruthlessly and have few scruples about using brutal methods to achieve their aim.

99. Reserved.


100. A military insurgency organization will divide the country into military regions; these will often follow the governmental military region boundaries. Regions will be divided into districts and again into regiment, battalion, company etc. areas with HQ. Regional HQ often double the function of regional and district HQ. Regular and regional forces are commanded only through military command channels, but village. guerillas. usually come -under the control of the local political HQ. They may however come under regional or regular units for specific operations. At every level there is co-ordination between military and political staffs .

Intelligence and Propaganda

101. Insurgent intelligence agencies permeate all walks of life. They not only collect and -disseminate intelligence but also direct small operations against individuals, installations, etc. These agencies are normally grouped under the

following headings: .

a. Party and political intelligence.

b. Secret intelligence.

c. Security service.

d. Military intelligence.

eo Military propaganda service.




102. Of the above, military intelligence and the military propaganda service affects us most directly.

103. Military Intelligence. Sub-units are found in all insurgent units at all levels. Village guerillas and cells are the main sources of information.

104. Military Propaganda Service. Its aims are to encourage desertion and organize treachery within the government and security forces and it works in very close co-operation with party and political intelligence. One of its main functions is to provoke its contacts into acts of treason against the government. The insurgent propaganda organization includes the dissemination of information, the establishment of information centres in houses, shops or cafes along routes used by government forces, telephone calls to government posts and passing letters from deserters to their former comrades.

Administration and the Formation of an Insurgent Firm Base

105. The logistic support of guerilla and regional insurgents is dependent on bases. When regular units are formed they normally function with an administrative tail, drawing upon guerilla bases if required.

106. The population is regarded as the vital element in supporting the insurgent force during the organization and functioning of bases. All adults under 45 are organized to help in some way.

107. Generally, there are two main areas which lend themselves to the establishment of firm bases. Firstly, there are the mountainous, bush, wooded, jungle or swamp areas in remote districts where, by virtue of the terrain, it is difficult for government forces to penetrate. It is in this type of area that the first bases may be established during the preparatory and active resistance phases. Secondly, there are the populated rural areas where the people have all accepted indoctrination and the insurgents are in full political and administrative control. In a reasonably populated area the establishment of a firm base follows a set pattern :

a. A propaganda campaign is mounted among the civil population and individuals are selected as nuclei for the necessary organization. This propaganda is accompanied when necessary by terrorism.

b. Depots of all natures are established to provide logistic support. They consist of a multitude of small caches which are spread. over a large area and are therefore difficult to locate.

c. When the area is politically ripe, with depots established and rations assured, the guerilla forces take over. Only then does major insurgency start.

108. At this stage revolutionary reforms may be introduced by the insurgents in any area they control in order to obtain the full support of the population. A common method is the redistribution of land holdings combined with the elimination of hostile elements, eg the previous land owners.

109. The appropriate insurgent district committee draws up plans for the defence of the firm base ensuring co-ordination of efforts between guerilla and




regional forces. Villages are listed and the tasks for their guerillas laid down. Some are ordered to form fortified centres, some to undertake liaison between government controlled and liberated areas, others to watch the security forces and report on their movements.

110. When the firm bases are ready, regional units are formed and have to use the bases to extend the scope of operations. With the establishment of firm bases troops can move about swiftly, without the encumbrance of supply trains and secure in the knowledge that the popular organizations within their area of operations will have stockpiled supplies ahead of them. The bases will also be stocked, as far as possible, to serve the regular forces in the open offensi ve phase .

111-119. Reserved.



120. On the military side insurgent operations in revolutionary war are waged initially by sabotage and terrorism, which in the preparatory phase are on a small scale but increase in scope and intensity in successive phases. They may develop into guerilla operations and even ultimately into limited war.


121. Active. Sabotage activities are usually carefully co-ordinated with tactical operations at regional RQ. Agents or urban terrorist gangs carry out special missions in the cities and factories, while in the rural areas sabotage cadres supervise trained village guerillas. The primary mission of the saboteurs is to disrupt government communications, increase general confusion and to tie down as many government troops as possible in the static defence of communications and installations. The main targets are therefore bridges, roads, railways, telephone lines, military supply dumps, sewers, power lines, water supplies and transport, but targets whose destruction might causemass unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are carefully avoided.

122. Passive. Passive sabotage in key government industries and communication centres will be organized through political front organizations, with the object of promoting economic disorder and interrupting or blocking the movement of government supplies and troops. Such operations include strikes and "working to rule ", deliberate errors in despatching supplies, contrived accidents, absenteeism and sabotage of machinery by neglect.







123. Terrorism is one of the principal weapons of revolutionaries, who believe that to be fully effective it must be absolute. It is used to demoralize those who are loyal to the government, to extort support from those who are politically uncommitted, and as a means of maintaining discipline and enforcing obedience among individual revolutionary soldiers. For example, it is made clear that even though a man has been forcibly drafted into the revolutionary movement his defection on patrol is punishable by death. Should a defector reach an area free from insurgent control he knows that retribution will be exacted from his family.

124. Terrorist operations in government held territory are carried out by

guerilla bands or special assassination squads against individuals or whole •

groups of people. The targets of assassination squads are those people to whom the ordinary inhabitants of the country will look for leadership and example; they will therefore include the persons, families and property of influential citizens such as politicians, professional men and industrial, com-

mercial and union leaders. The terrorism may take the form of beatings, kidnappings, blackmail, mutilation, assassination, arson or bombing. Threats

of terrorism are used to force individuals to obey rebel instructions and terrorists will often use government, police or military vehicles and uniforms

during such operations to discredit the government and deceive the public.

125. In insurgent held areas mass terrorism may be directed against sections of the population who, because of race, class, origins, wealth or employment, are judged to be pro-government. Revolutionary leaders will involve the local inhabitants in their acts of terrorism and thus compel them to associate themselves with the uprising. For example, villagers will often be rerequired. to murder landlords under the guise of carrying out death sentences imposed by so-called "People's Courts."

Guerilla Tactics

126. Guerilla warfare is the most militant manifestation of the insurgency phase. Mao Tse- Tung has written a great deal about the subject and is

generally accepted as being a leading authority on guerilla warfare as well as •

being the architect of the broader concept of revolutionary war. Mao Tse-

Tung accepts as the basis for guerilla warfare that" War will be protracted,

that control of the countryside is essential and that a widespread intelligence network must be established". Against this background he has laid down

certain guide lines which should govern all guerilla tactics, Although these

were drawn up with Asia in mind, they and the communist guerilla tactics

which spring from them could apply equally or with only minor modifications,

to other areas. These guide lines, from which emanate the tactical trends described in later paragraphs, are :

a. "Act with speed and maintain mobility".

b. " Always seek to deceive and surprise ".




c. "Make· an uproar in the East and strike in the West".

d. "Be as cautious as a virgin and as quick as a rabbit ".

e. "If the enemy withdraws, pursue ".

f. "If. the enemy advances, withdraw".

g. "When . the enemy halts, trouble him, particularly by. night attacks, to

prevent him resting and to. unnerve him ".

h. "When the enemy seeks to. avoid battle, attack ".

i, "Divide and destroy the enemy: don't hold places and cities ". j ... In attack ten against one ".

k. "Fight only when victory is certain; run away when it is not " .

127. Mobility. Because insurgent forces are .. generally numerically inferior and lack sophisticated logistic backing they avoid positional warfare and fight what Mao. calls mobile warfare. This implies an ability to. move large forces quickly on foot carrying, iJf necessary, support-weapons with them. Rapid foot movement across difficult countryand the ability to. concentrate quickly on arrival in a new area is the insurgent's greatest asset. Distances of up to. 50 miles can be achieved in 24 hours. Such movement calls for careful preparation and reconnaissance, and co-ordination of support from •. local guerillas on route, Dispersion after an operation has to. be similarly o.rganized.

128. Deception. This is achieved by:

a. False Intelligence-deliberately planted on government forces by apparent sympathizers, returning prisoners vor deserters with pre-arranged stories, treacherous guides or decoys,

b. Fake Surrenders-a completeguerilla unit may apparently defect and join the government forces. Their aim is to. obtain equipment and training prior to. re-defection at a critical stage.

c. Exploitation of Treachery-penetrating government security forces with a view to. obtaining weapons and information and carrying out subversion and acts of treason .

129. Surprise. This can be achieved by:

a. Calculated deception;

b. Diversionary action.

c.Attacks in areas which have previously been quiet.

d. Attacks at long distances away from known guerilla bases..

e. Speed ot approach marches.

f.Skilful use of ground in attack and defence. g. Merging with the localpopulation,






130. Camouflage and Concealment. Insurgents attach great importance to camouflage 'and concealment. .Harsh discipline is imposed during training and in the course of operations to achieve a high standard of personal and equipment camouflage. Camouflage and concealment during movement is paramount, all soldiers changing or rearranging their personal camouflage frequently in order to blend with the local surroundings at all times. Great ingenuity is also shown in concealing arms caches, stores and hiding places in general. Material caches or hides are usually of small dimensions with only a small ventilation outlet; such hides are very difficult to locate. Hides for personnel are usually spacious, with ventilators and drainage sumps, and contain blankets, clothes, water and food. The pattern of construction is usually a narrow tunnel leading to one or two rooms, the tunnel following a zig-zag course and partitioned by bulkheads to' deflect any blast from explosives. Some favourite entrance positions are:

a. Through a night soil pit.

b. Under an animal stall.

c. In a clump of dense bush.

d. Through a syphon entrance in a river, canal or stream bank.

131. Ambushes. The ambush is the most widely used guerilla tactic because it makes the fullest use of surprise and allows a smaller force to engage a larger one effectively. Ambushes are often sited in broken ground where camouflage and concealment is easy but they 'may also be sited in open clear ground where there is good observation over long stretches of road. In the latter case the ambush positions are completely dug in and concealed and the ambushers" rise from the ground" to spring the ambush. Because of the apparent unlikelihood of an ambush in flat open country the ambushers often achieve complete surprise. Insurgents will frequently stage an incident deliberately in order to lure the security forces into an ambush. There are

two main types: .

a. Hit and Run Ambush. This is designed to impose delay, to inflict casualties and to cause the diversion of security forces to route protection. It is a common task for village guerillas and the strength of the ambushes may be as little as two or three men and the target a small

patrol of one or two vehicles. This type of ambush may take place in •

any phase of revolutionary war. It is frequently employed in covering a

guerilla withdrawal.

b. Annihilation Ambush. This is a much larger affair in which even a large force of up to a battalion may be isolated and destroyed. In this type of ambush the convoy is first effectively stopped by an element of up to company strength with the help of demolitions. The centre of the convoy is then assaulted by the main assault force. If cover is scarce the force will halt in positions up to 800-1,200 metres away and will move up once the ambush has been sprung under the cover of prepositioned supporting weapons. Once the convoy has been engaged the rear stop will close the ambush and intercept any reinforcements.




132. Infiltration. Guerilla tactics make extensive use of infiltration, because the ground and the nature of operations often permit even large forces to live undetected inside government dominated territory.

133. Sparrow Tactics. In the active resistance and subsequent phases village-guerillas and regional troops split into small groups along roads frequented by security forces in order to:

a. Snipe at all who venture outside fortified posts.

b. Cause delays and so restrict movement.

134. Attack. A deliberate attack against a prepared position is generally only undertaken after meticulous preparation and when sufficient superiority has been achieved. Provided the full sequence has been followed insurgent commanders will have been taught to make detailed arrangements under such headings as:

a. Preparation, including reconnaissance and dumping.

b. Breaching.

c. Fire support.

d. Assault plan.

e. Complementary guerilla attacks elsewhere.

f. Withdrawal plan.

g. Recovery of casualties and weapons.

135. Defence. Guerillas will be. on the defensive because they are not yet strong enough to go over to the offensive, to lure the enemy into an area where he can be destroyed, or to defend a vital base area. Whatever the reason their concept of defence will always be aggressive and, if possible, only temporary. 11: will often be based on a complex of defended or fortified villages to which the whole population is committed. These will be dealt with more fully in Part 3-Counter Insurgency, but the framework for defence can be summarized as follows:

a. Observation Villages. These are located in areas controlled by the government, along lines of communication or on the fringes of guerilla infested zones. They are organized into intelligence cells to which all other villages teport all movement of government forces. Observation villages avoid all action likely to bring reprisals.

h. Passive Villages. The majority of the villages around an insurgent base area have duties similar to those of an observation village, but features such as watchtowers, cleared fields of fire and isolated sniping serve to confuse the enemy as to' whether these villages are real centres of resistance. Searchers may encounter booby traps and mines within these villages.






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c. Fortified Villages. The usual characteristics of fortified villages (Fig 1) are:

(1) Approaches are cleared, surrounding country maybe flooded and roads leading into the viHageare narrowed to less than the width required by motor transport.

(2) A thick belt of obstacles is constructed round the perimeter of the village, within which are inter-communicating fire positions.

(3) The interior of the village is divided up into active and passive areas.

The latter consist of obstacles and heavily mined and booby trapped areas designed to lead attacking troops into ambushes in the active area.

(4) Numerous tunnels are constructed to link active areas to each other, to the central strong point from which counter attacks will be launched, and to various hides, rest rooms and supply and arms stores. Tunnels will also lead to emergency exists and to other neighbouring hamlets to allow escape in the face of a hard pressed attack.

(5) The defence of the village will be based on three echelons:

(a) First line-using terrain outside the village.

(b) Second line-on the perimeter of the village.

(c) Third line-using dominant features and strong points within the village.

d. Additional Points on Defence.

(1) Before a security force attack on a fortified village is due the guerillas normally evacuate the population to a safe refuge or conceal them underground.

(2) The defence is designed to delay the security force assault until nightfall, when they must choose between continuing under extremely unfavourable conditions, haIting in an exposed position, or withdrawing until the next day-which may give the defenders a chance to slip away through their escape tunnels.

(3) Where the .. defenders are faced with a large scale clearing operation which they have little hope of resisting successfully, they win try to break out of the area of encirclement leaving small elements behind to continue resistance and harass the enemy. The guerillas who have escaped may then move round the flank and rear of the attacker and seek to regain the initiative by surprise attacks and ambushes.

'136. Mines and Booby Traps. Guerillas make considerable use of mines and booby traps. The types used are anti-tank mines, improvised mines from shells and aerial bombs, numerous booby traps using grenades and shells and man-traps with spikes in them. The skill and cunning with which mines, and particularly booby traps, can be set by insurgents is of a very high order. To attempt to give guidance in a few sentences would be worthless. All security forces must be well trained to deal with these hazards and must consider them in all types of operation.






137. Anti-tank Tactics. Some methods are to:

a. Destroy road surfaces.

b. Place remote-controlled mines in the roadway with the firer in a nearby ditch.

c. Mine tank tracks.

d. Throw smoke grenades, followed by grenades on cords designed to wrap around the guns.

e. Mine crossroads and other turning places.

f. Hold a strong force near an obstacle to destroy the tank when it slows down.

g. Use light and medium anti-tank weapons.

138. Air Defence. Insurgents that have been located or are operating overtly will use small arms aggressively against helicopters and low fiying aircraft. If unlocated they are trained not to fire.

139-149. Reserved.







150. The aim of counter revolutionary operations is totally to destroy the revolutionary movement. This is not purely a .matter of soldiers killing insurgents, but has far wider political and social aspects. Initially counter revolutionary operations must check the progression of revolt, rebellion and insurgency; then it must force the insurgents back to an earlier phase in their activities; next it must destroy the revolutionary movement; finally, and concurrently with other measures,' i,t must rectify any political and social wrongs. There are innumerable facets to this subject, and this Chapter deals both with the part which has to be played by a government and the local civil authorities and also with the organization required for co-ordinated civil and military action.


151. National Plan. Counter revolutionary operations can never be prosecuted successfully unless and until a national policy, which mobilizes the full national potential, can be established 'for its conduct. The outstanding lesson from past revolutionary wars is that no single programme-political, military, psychological, social or economic-is sufficient by itself to counter a determined revolutionary movement.

152. Good Government. Any 'permanent solution must be based on the provision of good government by an administration that is aware of, and in sympathy with, the aspirations of the mass of the people. The importance of this is highlighted by the fact that all measures taken to provide good government will be viciously and continuously attacked by the revolutionaries.

153. Popular Support. Since revolutionary operations aim to win or coerce the support of the people, a government can successfully counter them only by ensuring that it regains this support. This is likely to be a long and difficult struggle fought against the strong appeal which communists and national propaganda is likely to have, and against the. fear resulting from terrorism. Unless popular support is regained, however, purely military actions wHI fail to have any permanent effect. The whole national plan must therefore be directed to winning this support.

National Plan

154. A national plan will involve co-ordinatedgovernment action and should include:

a. The passing of emergency regulations to facilitate the conduct of a national campaign.

h. Various political, social and economic measures designed to gain popular support and counter or surpass anything offered by the insurgents.




c. The setting up of an effective organization for joint civil and military control at all levels: this is covered in the next Section.

d. The forming of an effective integrated and nation-wide intelligence organization, without which military operations will never be successful.

e. The strengthening of indigenous police and armed forces so that their loyalty is beyond question and their work effective. This is often easier said than done.

f. Control measures designed to isolate the insurgents from popular support: this is covered in Section 29.

Co-ordinated Government Action

155. The legal government must be firmly established and be seen to •

govern. This is not always the case, and weak central government is frequently a contributory factor to the uprising. Outside military forces may well

have to bolster up the central government, but it must always be made ap-

parent that it is the government who run the country and not the outside mili-

tary power. Measures taken must be issued in the name of the government

and all joint committees headed by a national official.

156. It is the government's duty to formulate its political aims and make them known to everyone. Without a clearly stated policy, effective co-ordinated action is unlikely.

157. It is difficult to determine, in abstract, what social and economic measures are necessary to achieve these aims, but a government will probably have to make some attempt at some or all of the following:

a. Removal of whatever social, political or economic grievances are tending to justify the rebel cause, particularly an inequitable system of land tenure.

b. Political reform to franchise the population, giving freedom of political expression.

c. The establishment of sound, .uncorrupt central. and regional government with every department acting in accordance with government policy and in consultation with other departments.

d. Respect and support for local religions and minorities.

e. An education system which is open to all.

f. Moulding of public opinion in support of the national programme.

g. An amnesty plan for the rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents.

h. Ensuring impartial, humane and honest administration of justice.

i. Food distribution and control, both to relieve starvation and to prevent food from reaching the insurgents.

j. Rehabilitation measures designed to help those who have lost homes or work" due to the insurgency.

k, Keeping the population informed.


RESTRICTED Public Opinion and Popular Support

158. The ... government must keep its finger on the pulse of public opinion in urban and rural areas. Only by doing so can the government know and assess the views and grievances of the population and the improvements needed to counteract them.

159. Public Relations. While it is. gathering information the government must also keep the people informed of its policies and the action it is taking in their interest. For this purpose it should maintain properly staffed information services to provide accurate information on which public opinion can be formed. Psychological operations should be mounted to improve the morale of the people in government controlled areas and undermine the confidence of those in areas under insurgent control. (Considered in detail in Chapter 9).

160. The Press. The government should permit a free press to exist, as far as ,this is possible. While it obviously cannot allow publication of subversive propaganda and must apply safeguards to meet the needs of security, it should be aware of the dangers of stifling criticism and suppressing honest opposition to its policies. Action to muzzle the press almost invariably rebounds on. the government, and any proposed restrictions on press activities must be carefully considered. The press, . properly handled, Is potentially one of . the government's strongest weapons. Within the country it is a vehicle for passing information between the government and the people. A favourable press can do 'much to maintain the morale of the security forces. A favourable attitude by representatives ·of the foreign press will result in sympathy and support from other countries.

161. Radio and Television. The value of radio broadcasts for publicity and propaganda is so great-that the free provision of a receiving set for each village community is a most desirable target. The frequency range must be carefully selected, however, to avoid the set being used to listen to counter propaganda broadcasts. The reception of television broadcasts is .at present confined to the most populated areas, and the equipment for reception is expensive; but when it can be provided, and particularly among a lar:gely illiterate population, it is a most effective . means of persuasion.

162. Justice. In any society a frequent cause of discontent is the maladministration of justice. To maintain support for the government, the courts must regularly and impartially dispense justice and be seen to do so.. Offenders 'must be caught and brought to .. trial quickly, evidence produced against them, witnesses protected from coercion and judgement given and enforced fairly, The various agencies responsihleforthese tasks must be .. strong enough to carry them out. The dispensation of justice in 'a fair and humane manner according to the laws of the country is an important way in which the government can show the people that it· takes a close interest in looking after their legitimate interests. Such evident concern in the people's welfare is a prime factor in winning popular support.

Security Intelligence

163. As well as an effective public relations organization the government must also have an efficient centralized intelligence organization that will pro-




vide it with timely intelligenc-e on all matters affecting the. security of the state. This should provide intelligence reports about people, their activities. their affiliations, and the aims and aotions of the leaders of discontented groups. Such a service is vital if timely and effective measures are to be taken to redress grievances and to restore public order and confidence, should disturbances and rioting take place or be likely. One of the main targets of this organization must be the penetration of the insurgent organization by the police Special Branch. To be effective Special Branch must be allocated adequate funds by the government. In times of peace and apparent stability governments may be reluctant to provide sufficient money, but-past experi .. ence has shown that Special Branch cannot be expanded or built up rapidly to meet an emergency.

Strong and Popular Security Forces •

164. Good security intelligence will. however, be ineffeotive unless the government has adequate and efficient forces for maintaining public order. An efficient, loyal police force with the sympathy and support of the people is

the first requirement. Where a state of insurgency has arisen the loyalty of

the police force may become doubtful. Its resources will certainly be stretched,

and its morale and the regard in which it is held by the people may have suffered. Where this has happened the leadership must be stiffened and morale improved. Until this is done, the police will be unable to discharge their

duties effectively, and the armed forces may have to be used on some police

tasks. This. is undesirable as the armed forces are not equipped for police

duties. It shows the need. however, for the training of the armed forces in

all types of counter insurgency roles. The police forces must take over their

own duties as soon as possible and the armed forces released for military tasks.

165. The police and local military forces should represent the people as a whole. Ideally, they should be reoruited from all sections of the people and not only from one race or class, They must be neither partisan nor oppressive in their behaviour, but should make a determined effort to maintain good relations with the public. While much can be done by parades and demonstrations, by assistance to local welfare activities and by helping in times of national disaster, it will be on their behaviour in the discharge of their duties and in their day-to-day contact with the people, and their ability to protect them. that success or failure will rest.


166. The only effective and permanent counter to a revolutionary movement •

is good government, which alone will gain and maintain the support of the

people. All branches of the government and the security forces must be

alive to the need for this support. The government must co-ordinate all the

various activities so that they are purposefully directed towards the aims

of a clearly stated and widely publicised policy which is in the best interests

of the people. The security forces and civil administration must be strong

enough for their tasks, which they must fulfil humanely and efficiently.

While military operations are an essential ingredient of the national plan, it

is vital to keep them in proper perspective in relation to the national plan as

a whole.

167-169. Reserved.





General Principles

170. It was made clear in the previous Section that the aibility to coordinate the action of all the civil and military forces of the government in the national plan is the principal ingredient of success in counter revolutionary operations. The organization required to achieve this will be in" fluenced by the constitution of the country, the personalities of the leaders, the size and effectiveness of the security forces, the degree of insurgency, the structure of local government and many other factors. Every country and situation is different and no standard organization can be suitable for all situations. The organization finally adopted must, however, ensure:

a. Joint direction of operations, based on the civil administration, police (including Special Branch) and the military forces (including RN and

RAF). .

b. Joint civil, military and police consultation and, as far as security allows, joint planning at all levels.

c. The collection of information and the production of intelligence on which sound operational decisions can be taken.

d. The security of bases (in depth), public utilities, and installations against

attack by terrorists and guerillas.

e. Effective action by mobile armed forces in depth.

f. The safety of loyal people within the ever expanding controlled areas.

g. The rapid introduction into controlled areas of measures to reduce grievances, and of good government in general, in order to speed the process of pacification.

Political Aspects

171. Although British Forces, called in to assist the local government, will have little opportunity for (and should avoid action in) the purely civil sphere, all soldiers must understand the problem, be aware of national policies and ensure that all military actions are co-ordinated with and complementary to these aims. A military commander must support the policies of the national government and demonstrate clearly to the civilian population, particularly at the lowest levels, rthat his actions and those of the units under his command stem from that policy.

Joint Tasks

172. The insurgents must be isolated physically and psychologically from their civilian support. To do this joint action needs to be taken in certain fields and may include:

a. Control of the population, by registration and by establishing zones in which movement and residence are restricted, and by curfews, food control and search operations designed to trap insurgents living among the civil population.




b. Resettlement operations to separate insurgents from the population.

c. Establishment of village self-defence or home guard units to free regular forces from guard duties.

d. Activities which provide military assistance to the national -ecenomic and social programmes, and thereby win the support and co-operation of the population for the work of the security forces.

e. Psychological operations, within the framework of the national political programme, to gain the support of the civil population and to depress the morale of the insurgents.

173. A defensive attitude in these matters is as useless politically as it is

militarily. Insurgents are not harmless because they appear inactive, and •

their pressure on the civil population is often greatest during an apparently quiet phase. The political attack as well as the military must be pressed

with vigour and should be aimed at the basic weaknesses of an insurgent movement, many of whose members may be selfish, ambitious, or misfits who

are maladjusted to normal society. Frequently their leaders will have rival ambitions. The movement may contain mutually suspicious ethnic groups

and it may be possible to persuade the weaker ones that their interests are

not being considered by their leaders. There may also be ideological differ-

ences between extremists and moderates. Finally jhere are the "weaknesses inherent in a situation in which as well as the constant danger of betrayal

there are difficulties brought about hy bad living conditions and relatively

poor military equipment and facilities. All these factors can be successfully exploited by military psychological operations in co-ordination with political

action. These aspects are covered in fuller detail in Chapters 8 and 9.

High Command

174. National Defence Council. A council is needed at the highest level to decide the policy for the conduct of the campaign to pacify the COUDtry and . remove the causes of revolt. The title of this council will vary; so will its composition. The latter will depend on the form of government and the characters of its leaders. To be effective, the council should have as its chairman the head of the government and its permanent membership should include his deputy and some of the more important ministers. The ohiefs of the armed forces and police, a director of operations and other persons may

be co-opted where necessary to discuss particular subjects. These tempor- •. ary members of the council should advise, but not participate in the taking

of decisions.

175. The Director of Operations. The appropriate ministers should take the. executive action necessary to implement the decisions of the national defencecounoil concerning civil departments. It is desirable to appoint one director . of . operations to ensure that the military aotion taken by all the security forces is co-ordinated and effective. He should be .respons~ble to

the head of the government for the. co-ordination and direction of all the e,

security forces, both military and civil, which have been allotted for counter insurgency operations. He exercises his authority by issuing instructions to

regional operations executive commitJtees. He is normally an officer. of the

armed forces but could be a senior police officer. He will have. a. smail




staff to assist him in planning operations and issuing suitable instructions. It must be recognized, however, that for political reasons the. head of govemmentmay not always be prepared to delegate such authority toone individual, and the authority of a council may have to suffice.

176. War Council or National Operations Committee. The director of operations, if. appointed, will be. the chairman of a council or committee which is the executive instrument. for implementing the military policy. Its members should include the heads of the military services and police, the chief of intelligence services, the director of psychological operations and such civil administrative officers as are needed. Where British forces are committed in a foreign or Commonwealth country the ambassador, high commissioner or special representative (possibly the theatre commander-in-chief), of the British Government should be a member of the national operations committee. The tasks of the committee will include:

a. The submission of intelligence and other miIitaryassessments to the national defence council. These will provide the basis for the formulation of the government's defence policy and decisions.

h. The issue of orders giving effect to the decisions of the national defence council in the military sphere.

c. The co-ordination, control and deployment of the security forces engaged in operations.

Control of Operation

177. Subordinate Committees. For day to day control, integrated coordination committees must be formed at the regionalj province/dlstrict level. These committees may be known by a variety of .names-c-local operations committee (regional, province, district as appropriate), war executive council, operations command and so on. . In . this pamphlet the title of. operations committee will be used. The chairman of a local committee should be the senior officer of the local civil government, for example at provinciai level, a provincial governor, thus demonstrating that military 'Operations are in support of the government. Its members must include the local military and police commanders, a representative of the intelligence organization and if necessary some selected civilian experts such as the head of PWD, forestry officers, and the local health officer. If British forces. are involved the commanding officers of our own formation/units would be included on these committees at the appropriate level.

178. Joint Secretariats.. In an emergency a.considerable extra secretarial toad will. fall upon the staffs of government, the military and (he 'Police at all levels. If the committees are to function smoothly arrangements must be made for the distribution of agendas and briefing papers, the taking and issue of minutes,and the issuing of orders or decisions that emanate from the committees. In addition there are usually daily reports to the made to higher authority and the . press must be dealt with by press releases or the calling of press conferences. There is also the vital need for security in the reproduction and distribution of papers which requires the maintenance of




registers for classified correspondence. Plans must be made to establish adequate joint secretariats at the appropriate levels, otherwise the implementation of decisions taken by the various committees will be slow and almost certainly insecure.

179. Military Responsibilities. In the preparatory phase of a revolutionary war the military role is predominantly one of support. Whatever the degree of insurgency however, the limits of the military commander's authority must be carefully prescribed. Where the civil administration has collapsed, or where none has existed in the past, it may be necessary for the military to set up and operate the organization required for both the conduct of operations and the administration of the local population. In such a situation the military commander will need an appointed political adviser. It is certain

that under these circumstances the revolutionaries will endeavour to infiltrate .•

such an organization. It is therefore important that no one, even a civilian

of high standing, should be accepted at their face value. Nevertheless, civi-

lians should be brought into the local operations committee as early as prac-

ticable to advise on problems affecting the local population.

180. Operations. The local operations committee is a planning and coordinating agency-it has no command responsibility once an operation starts. When operations are in progress committees meet as frequently as necessary. They consider new information and the progress of operations and decide the directions which members will give to their subordinates. To facilitate this function an operations room is established where possible. Control by committee 'means that the military commander will be expected to consult his civilian and police counterparts before ordering a major change in plans; only to this extent is his command over his own forces limited. Members must 'be prepared to make some compromise when there is a difference of opinion. The committee structure ensures that:

a. There is always complete integration of effort.

b. The security forces are always acting in support of the civil authorities and the national plan.

c. Plans are agreed by joint decision. Orders are then passed through service channels.

181. Chain of Command. A possible chain of command showing the oontrol of security forces and the civil administration is set out in diagrammatic

form in Annex D. .

182. Location of Headquarters. The siting of a local operations com- • mittee is usually determined by the position of civil and police communications and the intelligence organization. The operations room should be at

a police or civil administrative HQ. It is, therefore, always best to locate

the military unit HQ as close as operational convenience will permit to the

local committee. If it is apart it must at ali times be linked by secure communications.

183. Communications. In counter insurgency operations the communicationproblems are increased because of the many agencies with whom the commander must deal and the special need for security. The problems are examined in detail in Chapter .4.




184. Intelligence, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. Because of the importance of these subjects on military operations) they are considered separately in Chapters 5, 8 and 9.

185. Summary. Control of military operations is ideally exercised in three ways:

a. As ordered by the director of operations to local operations committees at lower levels ;

b. As directed by these lower level operations committees; and

c. As ordered by local commanders, within their immediate areas of responsibility, in accordance with the joint policy issued by the local operations committees .

186. It is of paramount importance that a clear and known chain of command should be established, and that the actual command of the military forces involved remains in military channels. This is particularly important during the preparatory or active resistance phases, when unreasonable demands by civil authorities could result in the dissipation of military resources.

187. The degree of command or control that a British commander can expect over indigenous regular and para-military forces will vary. Nevertheless it must be precisely stated and must never be less than operational control over indigenous military and para-military forces located in the area for which he bears operational responsibility.

188-190. Reserved •








Police Forces

191. In British Colonies and Commonwealth countries the pattern of police organization follows the British Colonial police system. There are some variations but the details' given below will generally apply.

192. The police force is usually a federal or national organization commandedby an inspector general or commissioner of police, responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. The force will. be split up into contingents, each commanded by a chief police officer. In a federation these contingents will normally belong to each component state. When a country or state is administratively split into districts the police will also be divided into police districts, each with its own officer commanding police district (OCPD).

193. Tasks. The tasks of the police force are ~

a. Maintenance of law and order.

b. Prevention 'Of crime and apprehension 'Of offenders.

c. Protection of life and property.

d. Maintenance of an. efficient Special Branch, which is the intelligence department 'Of the police and as such is the police instrument for the collation and assessment of any information which may affect the security 'Of the country.

e. Controlof population.

f. Destruction of the insurgent cell structure in town and village communities.

g. Para-military duties necessitated by any state of insurgency.

194. Where the police undertake para-military duties during a state of insurgency these operations must be closely co-ordinated with the military forces. This is usually done at district level.

195. Organization. The police are divided into:

a. Regular police .

b. Temporary and volunteer police, the main groups of which are : (1) Special constabulary,

(2) Temporary staff (female searchers etc).

(3) Police volunteer reserve (fer use in an emergency).

Regular Police

196. The regular police are permanent career policemen, and are divided into:

a. Uniform Branch, This includes .the policeman 'On patrol, traffic police, a police field force or special riot police, and marine police.




b. Criminal Investigation Department (CID). This is organized and trained to carry out orthodox criminal investigation duties in urban and rural areas.

c. Special Branch. This is the intelligence department of the police force.

Its main duties are:

(1) To collect, process and assess information of subversive and potentially subversive political organizations and connected personalities from all available sources.

(2) To plan, conduct and advise upon counter subversive and counter espionage operations.

(3) To investigate the background and activities of all foreigners entering the country.

(4) To ensure that all security intelligence deriving from travel control •

measures is received, evaluated and acted upon.

(5) To advise the government where appropriate, through security and intelligence committees, on matters relating to protective security and the use of security intelligence.

(6) To assist the CID in the investigation of any criminal offence having a political or subversive complexion.

(7) To work in close touch with all government authorities and to. keep in touch with public opinion on matters which are likely to cause general discontent among racial, economic or political sections of the public, dissatisfaction with central or local government or individual officials,

197. A Police Field Force. This is a para-military formation equipped and trained to operate in any area of the country on a platoon and company basis, in the same way as army units. It also provides additional trained riot units. It does not usually have heavy support weapons but its vehicles are generally equipped with some form of armoured protection.

198. Marine Police. These deal with the problems of water guards, harbour protection and immigration. In some countries they carry out customs and excise duties.

Special Constabulary

199. Where found, they are usually raised and deployed in the. more de-

veloped areas of the country as area security units and special police squads. •

. Their role is offensive patrolling against insurgents, enforcement of food denial measures and the static defence of vital public utility installations against sabotage.

Other Forms of Police Organization

200. Some countries employ the system of a national gendarmerie. This implies a force which is more closely controlled at national level, and does not permit autonomous discretion and command at district Or state level. In such a force it is usual to have major police units, armed and equipped on full military lines and with heavy infantry support weapons. These carry out full counter insurgency roles.



Local Military Forces

, ; . 201. In British Colonies' and Commonwealth countries any local military forces will probably, like the police, be organized, trained and equipped on British lines. In other territories this will depend on the nationality of any military advisers and. on the orientation of the country's trade and foreign policy. In many cases. this will mean forces organized on United States lines. The part which local forces can play in counter revolutionary operations will depend on their efficiency and reliability, These in turn will depend amongst other things on the quality of any advisers or military missions and the length of time, that these have had to organize and supervise training. An early assessment must be made of the quality and morale of the local forces .



202. Principal. Tasks .. The versatility and mobility of infantry make it the predominant arm in this form of warfare. Its tasks vary from duties in aid of the civil authorities in quelling urban unrest, to limited war against organized and well equipped regular troops (see also Section 25). A battalion is prepared to fight with a good deal less than the normal support expected in conventional warfare. It is fully air transportable, able to operate for long periods in difficult types of country and in bad climatic conditions, carrying its immediate needs and relying on air resupply. It can be independent of motor transport and. capable of lengthy operations under the most adverse conditions. An infantry battalion oan and will be required to carry out any tole envisaged in counter revolutionary operations without alteration to its establishment. The only equipment which is not part of its scale is that required for anti-riot duties in the police role and this is available as a special issue should it be required.

203. Support Weapons Platoons. The roles of the mortar and anti-tank platoons vary, because of the need to use minimum force when on internal security operations and the restrictions sometimes imposed by distance and terrain on their employment in counter insurgency operations. Dependent on the threat they may be trained additionally as:

a. Rifle platoons .

,'b. Sustained fire machine gun platoon.

c. Reconnaissance platoon.

d. Combat tracker teams . . . e. Dog handlers.


204. Armour can assist greatly in counter insurgency situations. Its mere presence will have a favourable effect on the morale' of the local friendly population, and a correspondingly adverse effect on the insurgents. There may well be problems of transportation to the battle area and once there




the use of armour may be restricted by the going and nature of the country. However, the dividends which the skilful use of armour will pay are worth the effort.

205. It has been found in the past that the areas in which counter insurgency operations take place favour the employment of light armoured vehicles, both wheeled and tracked, rather than heavy AFVs. The armoured reconnaissance regiment will be mainly used, because it can be adapted more easily to the tasks for which armour is required. .This does not preclude the use of tanks; the problems of transportation, maintenance and supply should not be allowed to over-influence any decision against their employment.

206. Principal Tasks of Armour.

a. Armoured Reconnaissance Units. The firepower, protection, mobility and flexibility of these units make them ideal for tasks in support not only of military forces but also of the police and 'local civilian authorities. Each regiment has six helicopters on establishment. On some occasions reconnaissance units may be required to carry out tasks more usually performed by tanks in limited or general war. It must be remembered, however, that they have no tanks and cannot perform such tasks against an enemy equipped with sophisticated anti-tank weapons, Examples of the tasks which are suitable for reconnaissance units whenever the terrain allows are:

(1) Direct and indirect fire using main armament or machine guns.

(2) Offensive operations against insurgents, including the reduction of strong points by fire.

(3) Convoy protection for the movement of troops and supplies through

dangerous areas and escorts for VIPs.

(4) Evacuation of casualties under fire.. (5) Manning a stop line.

(6) Reconnaissance and confidence patrols. (7) Snap road blocks.

(8) Cordons-generally employed in the outer cordon.

(9) Route reconnaissance and the checking of critical points fOI sabotage (eg bridges).

(10) Supplementing radio communication networks.

b. Armoured Units. It is obviously more difficult to employ tanks in these circumstances but their value should not be underestimated. Even on a narrow front the shock action produced by their firepower, protection and mobility can be decisive. The tasks they can perform are:

(1) Providing fire support.

(2) Offensive operaoions against enemy units, including close support of infantry and' the reduction of enemy strongpoints.




(3) Relief of isolated outposts and, in some cases, close protection of convoys where the danger of an annihilation ambushexists.

(4) Acting .as a deterrent or protection force in capital cities or operational bases.


207. Lack of roads, inaccessible gun areas, lack of security and the threat of ambush all highlight the need for a light airportable gun and highly mobile fire units able to provide continuous fire support and observation in all areas, whenever such a degree of force is necessary and justified. In addition, the need for range and for counter mortar and possibly counter battery retaliation in the insurgency phase make medium guns, even if only a few, invaluable, and mortar locating equipment essential. In certain circumstances air defence equipment may also be needed. If air and naval weapons are employed there may be a requirement for a fire support coordination centre. The burden placed upon a commanding officer of an affiliated field regiment may be considerably increased and the normal fire control manning may have to be augmented to meet the additional work load.

208. Organization and Equipment. Artillery in counter insurgency operations must beflexible, The field regiment must be able to :

a. Deploy by independent batteries, or even down to single guns for special tasks.

b. Concentrate the fire of a regiment at every opportunity, to take full advantage of range and weight of fire.

e. Move by: (1) Road.

(2) Tac T (MR) and tac T (SR) aircraft, and support helicopters. (3) Inland water transport or assault craft.

(4) Track, pack transport or, for short distances, by being manhandled.

d. Be maintained by air.

e. Provide its own gun area defence, though any position of less than

regimental strength cannot withstand concentrated attack .

209. Principal Tasks for Artillery;

a. Defensive fire in support of operational bases or controlled areas.

b. Counter battery fire on insurgent artillery and mortars.

c. Support of mobile operations, patrols and ambushes. This will require

normal artillery OP parties.

d. Destruction of located enemy hides, bunkers and fortified villages.

e. Harassing of enemy patrol bases, supply and courier routes.

f. Air defence when applicable.

g. Provision of artillery operational intelligence.

h. Provision of advice at. all levels on all types of fire support.





210. General. Counter revolutionary operations increase the calls upon engineers since they normally take place in underdeveloped areas. Engineer units must be able to fight as infantry and provide their own protection. The engineer task falls into three categories:

a. Combat Engineering, Engineer assistance and support to other arms in the combat zone.

b. Logistic Engineering. Engineer work in the base area, L of C or forward operational bases.

c. Aid to the Civil Community. Engineer work for the benefit of the local population.

211. Combat Engineering. The following engineer work is likely to be required in the combat zone. The priority of the tasks will vary with the theatre and the type of operations:

a. Construction and maintenance of roads and tracks. This may require additional engineer units and plant.

b. Construction and maintenance of forward airstrips, STOLjVTOL strips and helicopter landing points.

c. Water supply, which may have a high priority in an underdeveloped country.

d. Clearing mines and booby traps. These are amongst the insurgents' main weapons in counter revolutionary war and the most difficult to counter.

e. Field defences, including bunkers, battle shelters, clearing fields of fire

and the fortification of buildings in urban areas. "

f. Demolitions, especially of insurgent positions and fortified villages.

g. Construction of obstacles including minefields.

h. River and obstacle crossings.

212. Logistic Engineering. This consists of developing essential facilities in the base area and. the forward operational bases, and will include some or

all of the following tasks ; •

a. The construction, improvement and maintenance of airfields, including associated buildings and other facilities.

b. Camp construction including water, sewage, drainage, electricity supply and possibly air conditioning.

c. Provision of facilities for handling and storing bulk petroleum and aviation fuels.

d. The construction, improvement and maintenance of roads and tracks and if necessary railways.

e. The construction, improvement and maintenance of port facilities where these are required.




213. Aid to the Civil Community. Engineer effort will sometimes have to be diverted from combat and logistic tasks in order to assist in gaining the goodwill of the local population. The sort .of tasks envisaged are: .

a. Construction or repair of roads and bridges to isolated communities.

b. The drilling of wells to improve local water supply.

c. Irrigation and flood control.

d. The construction of community buildings such as schools.

: 'e. Maintenance . of essential services (eg water, electricity, sewage etc), in the event of strikes, riots, sabotage or natural disasters.

214. Organization. In all such operations the basic engineer unit will remain the field squadron. But the engineer units organic to any formation are unlikely to be sufficient to enable muoh work to be undertaken outside the combat zone. Apart from minor tasks, if logistic engineering is required extra field squadrons, field .squadrons (airfield), engineer specialist teams and an engineer command organization,and RCT general transport and tipper units will have to be added to the order of battle. It will also be necessary to . employ local labour, possibly in large numbers.

II .;

" 215. Engineer Support Organization. Engineer work cannot be carried out Without plant and other special equipment. Their supply will depend partly oritbe methods of transport to the area, and partly on the availability of s.llcb equipment and materials from local resources. Where a force is entirely dependent on such items being brought from the United Kingdom or sorne other distant base a substantial proportion of the available air or sea freight space will have to be allocated to them.


, i

.216. The high degree of mobility and the need to control widely dispersed forces in counter revolutionary operations demand good communications. These often have to be provided under conditions of bad interference, extrpriles of climate and difficult country. The scale of communication equipment may be inadequate; ingenuity and improvisation will often therefore reap great benefits.

",217. In under-developed areas where vehicle movement is impossible formation and unit radio nets must be able to operate on a manportable basis. These sets are at present of low power and their performance will often only be .marginal. Mobile forces, especially patrols, must halt when necessary to allow time for antennas to be erected at the best possible sites.

;' ";

~18. Principal Tasks . . These are.:

a. Provision of communications down to unit level using VHF where pos. sible and HF as a back up. Line should also be provided in static situations and where distances permit, Radio. relay between forma: tions should be provided.




b. Provision of cipher and message carrying facilities (SDS).

c. Assistance in training regimental signallers if this is needed.

d. Press communications, when other facilities do not exist.

e. Controlling all aspects of communications .security, . including electronic warfare.

219. Main Requirements and Facilities.

a. HF. In order to achieve reliable communications over the distances involved and to reduce the problems of bad siting, radio interference and high noise levels on HF radio, it will often be necessary to use handspeed morse. Radio operators, down to sub-unit level, must be proficient in this skill.

b. VHF. Where VHF communication is practicable operational. control of the signal plan must be centralized at the highest tactical level to ensure satisfactory results. By carefully grouping and siting sets on high ground where they can be protected it should be possible to form a VHF network that will provide reliable communications.

c. Radio Relay. There is some organic radio relay capability down to and including brigade. Because of its large traffic capacity and reliability radio relay. is invaluable for. connecting geographically separated but operationally interdependent areas. The ranges required and the nature of the intervening terrain may, however, dictate the need for. relay stations. If such stations are required the problems of their protection and maintenance may render the system impracticable but the great benefits of a radio relay system must be fully taken into account before the possibility is discarded. In extreme cases it may be necessary to use light aircraft to operate rebroadcast on a schedule basis.

d. Line. Although radio is the primary means of communication, atelephone system should, ~f stores are available, always be installedwhere practicable. Unless the physical security of the line is assured it must be regarded as an unclassified means and appropriate security measures employed. Its use will normally be restricted to within the forward operational bases. The use of cable should be carefully controlled and must be concealed if used outside a completely secure area.: as the enemy can use it as a guide to HQ, observation posts, gun areas, etc. As it is ollly a secondary. means of communication it would usually be wrong to risk casualties to maintain it.

e. Civil Telephone System. The area of operations may include some civil telephone facilities; these may amount to a local service in main centres with a limited trunk facility between centres. Such a system may be used wholly or in part for military purposes provided it is at all times regarded as an unclassified means. The normal problem of security will be aggravated by the need to rely on local civilian operators-and-technicians for the operation of the system.

f. Liaison. Army radio nets should be linked with police radio nets where appropriate and joint working practised. It may be necessary to ex .. change equipment or liaison detachments if the types of radio are in-




compatible. . Radios should be supplemented by other means, such as an air despatch service. Close friendly relations between the Army and civil telecommunications staffs are essential. If the civil postal service is slow, uncertain or insecure the use of SDS for the carriage of important civil documents should be offered.

g. Message Carrying Agencies. There is a limit to the traffic handling capacity of electronic means. This is especially true of classified messages which must be enciphered and deciphered. Maximum use must be made of message carrying agencies to avoid overloading radio nets. A great weight of traffic can be moved but the seeurity achieved is, of course, only as good as the safety of the carrier. In a oounter insurgency situation liaison officers and despatch riders moving on the ground will be a security risk except in oompletely secure areas; full use must therefore be made of air despatch, whether by RAF or army aviation. Both scheduled and unscheduled flights should be used to clear routine traffic and an organization must exist at the airfield to facilitate this process. The use of British civil commercial aircraft for delivery of packages by hand of pilot can prove a bonus.

h. Communications Security Even an unsophisticated enemywill be capable of,. and will. attempt, exploiting our. radio and line by listening in and entering a system with a view to passing deceptive messages. Users and operators must be prepared to minimize the threathy the correct use of communication security procedures, authentication drills and codes.

i. Air Support Communications. The importance of prompt close air support and therefore the need for efficient air support communications is obvious. All aspects of air support communications are contained in the Manual of Joint Warfare, Volume V, Offensive Support Operations, aSp 5).

Army Aviation

220. Three main factors will lead to a much wider employment of .. army aviation in counter revolutionary operations. These are:

a. The virtual absence of any enemy air threat and the· greatly reduced threat from heavy calibre ground weapons.

b. The nature of the terrain and lack of surface communications .

c. Difficulties of ground mobility due to harassment of communication systems.

221. The tasks of army aviation are considered further in Section 13.

Specialized Units

222. Special units have an important part in .counter rev6lutionary warfare. These may include RMcommando$, parachute troops, SAS and locally raised forces, which may be used in support of the force Or complementary to it.




223. Parachute Troops. Parachute infantry supported bypamchute artillery and engineers may be particularly valuable for the following, roles:

a. Offensive airborne action against enemy positions in depth. Such operationsmay well be made in co-operation with other units approaching the objective area on foot, by water or helicopter. Consideration .must always be given to extrication 'Of the force once the task .has been completed.

b. Seizing and holding forward operational bases, Parachute troops, including parachute engineers, may be necessary to seize suitable areas and start construction of an airstrip at the earliest possible moment. I

224. Parachuting into Trees. Many under-developed countries have, areas 'Of tall jungle. The technique of parachuting into tall trees needs special

training. This applies to any paraohuting unit and to tracking or anyspecia- •

lized emergency teams, eg medical etc.

225. SAS. SAS squadrons are particularly suited, trained and equipped for counter revolutionary operations. Small parties may be infiltrated or dropped by parachute, including free fall, to avoid a long approach' through enemy dominated areas, in order to carry out any 'Of the following tasks:

a. The collection of information 'On the location and movement of insurgent forces.

b. The ambush and harassment of insurgents.

c. Infiltration of sabotage, assassination and demolition parties into insqr-

gent held areas.

d. Border' surveillance.

e. Limited community relations.

f. Liaison with, and organization, training and control of, friendly guerilla forces operating against the common enemy.

226. Hovercraft. Hovercraft operate successfully in coastal waters, rivers, estuaries and swamp type terrain. They are suitable for:

a.Patrolling rivers and coasts.

b. Quick tactical deployment and reinforcement 'Of small parties of troops, particularly at night.

c. Routine surface logistic support.

227. War Dogs. When properly trained and bandIed dogs can save lives •

on operations and reduce numbers employed on static guards. The main

types of dog are:

a. Infantry Patrol. Trained to give silent warning of the presence 'Of insurgents either' on reconnaissance patrols, fighting patrols 'Or ambushes.

b. Tracker. Trained to follow human ground scent.

c. Guard. Trained to detect intruders and to attack and held them when

ordered to de so. . .

d. Mine. Trained to locate buried mines, trip wires and booby traps. They can detect non-metallic mines overlooked by electronic devices.

228-229. Reserved.




230. General. In any area of operations which is accessible from the sea support can be provided by naval forces. . This may consist of air support from strike carriers, gun fire support from cruisers, destroyers or frigates, and operational and logistic support from amphibious shipping. The latter is divided into three main types of ship: landing platform helicopter (LPH) (commando ship), landing platform dock (LPD) (assault ship) and landing ship logistic (LSL) (logistic ship). The main characteristics of these ships are:

a. LPH. These are converted fixed wing aircraft carriers which carry a squadron of (Wessex V) helicopters {IS aircraft plus four in reserve) . The embarked force is normally a Royal Marine Commando group, in .. eluding a light battery, giving a total strength of 800 men. Under austere conditions this can be increased to 1,650 men for periods of normally up to 14 days, depending on climate, weather and space available after equipment and aircraft have been stowed. The helicopters can lift a company group in one wave to a radius of75 miles. Once ashore the group can be supported · direct from the ship up to a radius of 75 miles by a combination of helicopters and vehicles. The radius of action can be increased by establishing ashore refuelling points for the helicopters. In addition to helicopters the LPH carries four landing craft vehicle and personnel (LCVP) which can be used for ship to shore movement of men, 105 mm pack howitzers, vehicles (t ton only) and stores. The ship can support a unit group ashore with all commodities for a period of up to 42 days, depending on the intensity of operations,

b. LPD. The LPD has two main roles:

(1) To provide the joint HQ for an amphibious group commander and a brigade commander in an amphibious operation.

(2) To carry a military lift of personnel, heavy vehicles and stores for an amphibious operation. The ship can carry 325 embarked troops for a long period or 650 for up to 7 days; within these figures considerable flexibility can be achieved. The ship can also carry either 20 Centurion or 16 Chieftain tanks and 43 X 3-ten equivalents or 83 X 3-ton equivalents with no tanks. 50 tons of stores may be carried in addition. This can be increased to 2,000 tons of stores if no vehicles are carried. The ship has no helicopters of its own but can operate two from her flight deck simultaneously. Four landing craft mechanized (LCM) and four LCVP are carried for the ship-to-shore movement ·of tanks, vehicles and stores. Unlike the LPH the LPD is not designed to provide logistic support on a day-to-day basis to the embarked troops once ashore.

c. LSL. This is designed to' carry personnel, . helicopters, vehicles and tanks in the follow up role. The ship is capable of beaching to unload her cargo or may use ferries or pontoons as a causeway. The ship is fitted with bow and stern ramps and a helicopter platform. It can carry 16 tanks and 34 X 3-ton equivalents plus 4 X t·ton vehicles, or up to





60 X 3-ton equivalents without tanks. The ship can carry 534 embarked troops for a short period or 340 for long periods. The ship's capacity for bulk stores is 490 tons including 300 tons of water which can be increased at the expense of the vehicle lift.

231. Reserved.


232. The roles of RN, Army and RAF air support are invariably com-

plementary although in conventional operations there is some degree of geo- •

graphical separation of activity; ie offensive air support and reconnaissance beyond the forward edge of the battlefield area (FEBA), and transport sup-

port and helicopter operations behind the FEBA. In counter revolutionary operations there is no FEBA and this geographical separation tends to dis-

appear. The nature of the campaign enhances the operational value of air

transport support and reconnaissance, particularly by helicopter and light

aircraft, while offensive air support operations may have limited scope. The

division of tasks between the services is likely to be based upon the variations

of.scope, distances involved, response times and aircraft availability.

233. The air support roles considered in this section apply equally to air .. craft of the three services but employment of army aviation aircrafthas the following advantages/limitations :

a. They are an integral part of the ground forces, normally based with and commanded by the formation HQ. They have the ability to provide detachments to units as required and therefore are more readily available.

b. They have radio communications on Army networks.

c. Their pilots are soldiers, conversant with the needs and problems of the ground troops.

d. The aircraft have a smaller lift capacity.

234. The very nature of the operations, the terrain and difficulties of com-

munications will all call for the maximum use of air support. Although •

there may be a threat of intervention by a neighbouring country, the insur-

gents themselves are unlikely to have aircraft, so that the government forces

should have absolute air superiority. This will greatly extend the use which

can be made of air effort.


235. The helicopter in particular has an essential and prime contribution to make in all phases of counter revolutionary operations. Its advent has completely changed the method of operation of the security forces and has greatly increased their chances of quick success. Indeed in certain. parts of the world it will play an indispensable role in operations. It enables. rela-



timelysmall numbers of troops to dominate a very wide area and immeasurably increases their flexibility. Counter revolutionary operations are some of the few operations in which helicopters may, fairly consistently, be overflying territory, which may hold an enemy random .threat, It may be advisable to consider fitting armour to helicopters to reduce vulnerability. The possible protection achieved has to be balanced against the reduction in payload.


236. Insurgents quickly learn to conceal themselves from aircraft and to retaliate with small arms fire. They may. also seek protection by, mingling with the civil population. As a result reconnaissance is made difficult, and frequently deliberate attacks would result in grave repercussions. Aircraft flying low and slow may become vulnerable almost anywhere in the area.

237. Terrain may make air operations more hazardous and the climate may restrict visibility. Temperature and altitude affect the performance of all aircraft, particularly helicopters.

238. The probable difficulties of finding suitable air strips will place a premium on VTOL aircraft. Manoeuvrability, the ability to carry heavy loads, - the rugged construction and simplicity of maintenance are the particularly desirable characteristics of aircraft in this type of operation.

Command and Control

239. The Manual of Joint Warfare, Volume III, Air Transport Operations, (JSP 3),. Chapter 3 and Volume V Offensive Support Operations (JSP 5), Chapter 2 give the, established organization for command and control of RN and RAF aircraft in joint operations. In the context of counter revolutionary operations the director of operations can be equated with the joint force commander.

240. Command and control of army aviation will be as for any other operation, ,except that there may be a greater centralization of control of effort. The intermingling of aircraft from all three services operating in much the same areas ,and on broadly similar tasks will emphasize the importance of close liaison. When operational control of RN. and RAF aircraft is delegated to brigade or unit level it may be more satisfactory to establish a central tasking centre for all aircraft in support, whetherRN, Army or RAP.

Air Transport and Logistic Support

241. Strategic Transport (ST) and Tac T (MR) aircraft enable a force and its equipment to be moved rapidly into or near the .• ' area where it is to be deployed. Subsequently Tac T (SR), fixed wing aircraft and support helicopters as well as aircraft of RNand Army, maybe used for the maintenance and further forward movement of units and supplies.



Offensive Air Operations

243. Because of the nature of counter insurgency operations the opportunity for offensive air action with heavy weapons against insurgents is likely

to be very limited, except in prohibited areas. The aim must always be to •

regain the support of the people and the use of very destructive lethal weapons must therefore be closely controlled.

244. Aircraft need to be armed mainly with anti-personnel weapons for use against groups of enemy whose positions are known but invisible. Machine guns and small fragmentation bombs are likely to be used more frequently than heavy high explosive bombs. Rocket projectiles and guided missiles may also be used against targets that demand greater accuracy and hitting power. Heavy bombs will be required against bunkers, tunnels and well dug positions. The use of napalm should be considered for strikes against massed vehicles, bunkers or fortified positions, but political clearance for the use of this weapon must be obtained.



242. The use of air support within a theatre provides troops with increased tactical mobility and thus allows a commander greater flexibility in the use of his forces. Operations may include:

a. Airborne Operations. These enable a combat force and its logistic support to move by air direct into an area of operations, by fixed wing aircraft, helicopters or parachute.

b. Tactical Troop Lift. This will be primarily a task for helicopters.

Direct redeployment and the movement of reserves will usually be carried out with support helicopters. The smaller lifts such as the quick insertions of cut off parties, road blocks, check points, rooftop standing patrols, snatch parties etc may be undertaken by support helicopters or

those of army aviation; depending on scope, availability and the tactical •


c. Air Logistic Support. This is the logistic support by air of forces deployed in an area of operations. It includes air supply, the movement of personnel, evacuation of casualties and prisoners, and the backloading of equipment. It enables ground forces to operate in remote or inaccessible areas and reduces the need for a vulnerable land line of supply which has to be guarded. Troops are able to move with lighter scales of equipment and can be used with greater flexibility since their 'movements are not so restricted by logistic limitations. The rapid evacuation of casualties, especially from remote or inaccessible places, greatly improves their chances of survival, reduces manpower wastage and raises the morale of the forces on the ground. Apart from its purely military advantage, air logistic support is of great value to. the civil administration and it can be used to meet the urgent needs of the civil population in isolated districts, Aircraft should also be made available .whenever possible for the evacuation of civilian casualties. Army aircraft have a very limited lift but there may be tactical situations in which their use is preferable.

RESTRICTED 245. The principal types of operations will be:

a. Interdiction Attacks. These may be against insurgent supply routes and reinforcement areas. They disrupt insurgent communications and harass guerilla bands, forcing them to move into areas where the insurgents can be effectively engaged by ground troops. This form of attack is not an efficient or economical way of killing insurgents although it may adversely affect their morale. Haphazard attacks should never be authorized and great care must always be taken to avoid inflicting casualties on civilians even though they may have given support to the insurgents.

b. Close Air Support. Air strikes on parties of insurgents which are on the move are seldom fully successful because of the difficulties of directing aircraft quickly onto fleeting targets. Aircraft on alert with an airborne FAC shorten the response time. When insurgents are in camps or fortified villages that have been accurately located, however, air strikes can be most effective. In pre-planned operations there is a need for accurate target indication but the importance. of achieving surprise may rule this out. Air proscription missions may be used to attack insurgents in prohibited areas. Armed helicopters may on occasion be the only intimate air support available, particularly immediately before and after an airborne assault.

c. Support with Non-lethal weapons. Tear gas. and irritant smoke may be used to disperse hostile assemblies. This. is likely to be a task for army aviation since. it will invariably be required in the closest co-operation with ground forces. See also Part 20hapter 3.

Air Reconnaissance and Observation

246. Air reconnaissance and observation will provide an invaluable source of information. Reconnaissance may be photographic or visual.

247. Photographic Reconnaissance. This is normally undertaken by aircraft provided especially for this role. In the early stages of a campaign a large proportion of the available effort may have to be employed on aerial survey missions to provide topographical intelligence. Night photography may disclose activity which security forces' operations have forced the insurgents to perform after dark. Local and 'more limited photographic reconnaissance may frequently he undertaken with light. aircraft and helicopters. The use of a telescopic lens may enable individuals in mobs or assemblies to be identified.

248. Visual Observation and Reconnaissance. This will primarily be undertaken by army aircraft, since army pilots are specially trained for this role. In jungle type country the abundance of cover may mean that only sustained observation over a fairly extensive area is likely to detect any ground activity; in this case a light fixed wing aircraft, comparatively slow and with long endurance, may prove more suitable thana helicopter. Likely observation and reconnaissance tasks in counter revolutionary operations are:

a. Familiarizing commanders (military, police or the civil authorities) with their areas.






b. Reconnaissance and planning for specific operations.

c. Area reconnaissance to give advanced warning of crowd assembly.

d. Shadowing crowds.

e. Part of a convoy Of VIP escort.

f. Searches.

g. Verification of reports from other sources.

h. Airborne F AC and direction of artillery and mortar fire onto targets invisible from the ground.

i. Location and re-establishment of contact either visual or by radio with friendly ground forces that have lost communication with the main force.

j. Aircraft operating in the above roles, if armed, may also be able to engage opportunity targets which might otherwise escape.

249. Radar Scan. Radar reconnaissance is achieved by photographing the returning echoes from transmitted radar pulses. The resolution of radar pictures is inferior to photographs. Radar reconnaissance techniques are still developing and improvements can be expected.

250. Infra-red Photography. Infra-red is the latest development in sensor equipment; it records heat emission in the form of a photograph and is effective both by day and night. However it is affected by weather; thick cloud or rain reduces the heat emissions.

Assistance by Aircraft in Command and Control

251. The degree of dispersion involved and the difficulties of communication make aircraft an invaluable asset. Some of the ways in which aircraft are likely to be employed are:

a. As temporary airborne command posts or rovers.

b. Assisting with radio communications; either as re-broadcast stations or for relaying messages-particularly between isolated ground troops such as rooftop standing patrols and hilltop OPs. Such employment is, however, extremely expensive in aircraft effort and should be avoided

if possible. •

c. As a rapid and secure form of movement for VIPs, military/police commanders, government officials and liaison officers. This allows them to dispense with escorts, avoid ambushes and keep in close touch with developments. The use of service aircraft by government officials to visit distant areas. may be of the utmost importance. They may by their presence and influence rally support for the government. Such visits undoubtedly lead to improvements in the civil administration, and can thus have a decisive influence on the progress of the pacification campaign. They demonstrate the interest of the government in the people's welfare.

d. In traffic and crowd control.




Special Tasks

252. There will always be innumerable special tasks for which aircraft are required. Some of these are described below.

253. Voice Aircraft. Suitable aircraft and helicopters can be fitted with public address equipment. Arrangements must be made to equip aircraft as soon as the need for the role is appreciated. They can:

a. Broadcast over a wide area, either as part of psychological operations, or for public announcements, eg imposition of a curfew or instructions to idle bystanders. Such broadcasts may follow the dropping of leaflets.

b. Dominate a crowd by flying overhead and broadcasting instruction to the crowd to disperse, thereby drowning cheer leaders .

c. Broadcast government propaganda or music over a specific area to drown anti-government propaganda being put out from amplifiers in the streets.

254. Additional Roles. The following are further possible tasks:

a. Defoliation of jungle to improve ground visibility and to expose Insurgent camps or routes.

b. Crop destruotion in prohibited areas by chemical spraying.

c. Leaflet dropping.

255-260. Reserved .








261. Intelligence is the key to success in counterrevolutionary operations; it saves time and also saves lives because accurate, reliable information and good intelligence make it possible for effective action to be taken by the minimum number of troops in the shortest possible time. But intelligence takes time, and much depends on building up mutual confidence between the security forces and the local population. Timely information from local sources may lead to a successful operation which will increase public confidence and so bring more information and further successes. It is probable that. in the early stages of an insurgency the only source of local information available to the security forces will be the Special Branch, or its equivalent if one exists, and the task of the security forces will always be made easier in those countries inwhich an efficient Special Branch is maintained as part of the normal police force.

262. In conventional war the intelligence required by a commander in order . to plan operations is acquired by the normal methods of surveillance. Information may not. be easy to obtain but at least the commander knows who his enemy is. From the mtelligence point of. view one of the essential differences between conventional war and counter revolutionary operations is that the enemy is merged with and is part of the population in the area. of operations. In planning internal security and counter insurgency operations, therefore, one of the primary tasks of the security forces is identification of the insurgent and the causes of unrest.

263. Whilst it is an axiom that the provision of accurate, UP. to date and timely intelligence is the pre-requisite of successful operations, the prerequisite of successful intelligence activities in counter revolutionary operations is understanding. This understanding must cover every aspect of the operations. Itmust apply to the language, the topographical.political; ethnologioal and economic background: it must itself be the basis for the evaluation of all information, and the foundation upon which intelligence officers build the intelligence organization. It cannot be acquired overnight.

264. A major factor which must influence all intelligence activities is the use. made of terror by the .insurgents. Intimidation of the local population is an essential part of the insurgents' security measures which, supplemented by elaborate systems of cells and cut-outs, aim to conceal identities, intentions and methods. Local inhabitants, the most important source of information, will not co-operate. with the security forces until. they are convinced that the insurgents are being defeated and that they themselves can be protected if they provide information. To win and retain the co-operation, goodwill and confidence of local inhabitants. must be a major operational objective. In conventional war it is possible to fight for information; in counter re .. volutionary operations the security forces must create an environment in which the local inhabitants feel that it is in their best interests to provide and volunteer information. This is a long process.





265. If intelligence is to be of value to a commander it must reach him in time for him to make use of it: this truism applies particularly to the need for background knowledge of a potential area of operations before the political situation has deteriorated into an emergency. When he is in the area of operations the commander will require intelligence on which to base his operations, and at the same time he will wish to deny information to the enemy. Thus in the planning and conduct of counter revolutionary operations the intelligence organization has three separate but closely re-' lated and continuous tasks :

a. Basic Intelligence. To provide background intelligence on potential areas of operations.

b. Current Intelligence. To provide the intelligence on which operations •

can be based. .

c. Counter Intelligence. To counter enemy activities to obtain information and their attempts to carry out subversion and sabotage.

266. First Requirement. The collection of information is a long process which cannot be accelerated: all available intelligence relating to potential areas of operations must therefore be collected long before an emergency has arisen. Furthermore, this intelligence must be constantly revised and kept up to date so that when it is required it is both accurate and opportune. This continuous pre-emergency process can be described as the first requirement of the intelligence function.

267. Second Requirement. The second requirement of the intelligence function is the setting up in the area of operations of an intelligence organization whose responsibilities are:

a. To provide the intelligence required by the commander, including a comprehensive order of battle of insurgents and their supporters, thus making complete eradication and rehabiiitatlon possible.

b. To expand, revise and keep up to date all basic intelligence.

c. Counter intelligence activities.


268. Although the basic aim of a rebellion or revolutionary war-e-the

overthrow of the government by armed force-is always the same, no two •

situations are ever alike. Past experience of an apparently similar situation

may in fact be a disadvantage. The setting up of an intelligence organiza-

tion will always be greatly influenced by local conditions which will, to a

large extent, dictate the structure of the organization and the methods by

which it will operate. Successful functioning of the organization depends on

the application of certain principles. It may be difficult, perhaps impossible.

to apply all these principles but they should nevertheless constitute the aims

of the intelligence organization. These principles are:

a. The need for a single centralized, integrated intelligence organization.

b. Careful pre-emergency collection of intelligence, planning and trainingparticularly language training.





. c. Continuous research into all aspects of the threat so that patterns and trends can be clearly understood and foreseen.

d. Effective liaison between the military operations staff and the civil administration to ensure that proper account is taken of the interests and requirements of the intelligence organization and effective use made of all intelligence obtained.

e. Good communications.

f. Security.

269. It must be appreciated that future counter revolutionary operations in foreign countries may present British forces with an entirely new situation in which a force may have entered at the request of an independent country in order to assist in quelling what, by then,may have become a state of insurgency. The force commander will nat necessarily be in charge of operations and the ability of the intelligence staff to apply the above principles will depend on many different factors. In particular, the establishment of a single, integrated intelligence organization will depend on:

a. The effectiveness of the indigenous intelligence organizations, in particular the police force and its Special Branch, or equivalent.

b. Their willingness to co-operate with British forces.

c. The need to protect the interests and maintain the security of British forces in the area of operations.



.. 270. The affairs of any government should be conducted to encourage the maintenance of law and order, for which the government is ultimately responsible. It follows that a government is responsible for maintaining some organization for obtaining security and intelligence information affecting the well-being of the country. The government must make arrangements fOl:

a. Ensuring that an efficient organization exists for the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of all categories of intelligence from all sources within the country and for maintaining liaison with outside sources .

b. Defining generally from time to time the current intelligence requirement and determining priorities connected with it for the guidance of the Special Branch in setting the targets.

c. Providing the local defence or security committee with intelligence on which to base defence planning and to formulate measures for any expansion of the intelligence organization which may be necessary in an emergency .

d.Keeping under review the threats to security within the country and in the light of these also keeping under' review protective security measures (physical security of key points from sabotage; security of secret information and protection of personnel from subversion).




271. In times of emergency more detailed Information .of a totally new type will be required, and it should all be. directed into a single channel, with collation at all levels, leading to an intelligence HQ which is responsible for producing the composite intelligence picture to cover the whole country. The intelligence organization should therefore incorporate the intelligenceelements of the civil government and the security forces, both British and in-

digenous, which are operating in the country.

272. There are, however, considerable differences between dependent territories in which a British force may be called upon to operate against insurgents, and a foreign country to which a British force has been invited

under treaty.

Composition of the Military Intelligence Organization

273. If the force deployed to the aid of a dependent Dr foreign country is of about brigade strength it may have to function independently or with supporting naval and air forces; furthermore, it may have a joint two-star force HQ superimposed on it. In these circumstances the normal intelligence establishment for a brigade is quite inadequate, for it is based on the assumption that a brigade is part of a force provided with sufficient intelligence facilities and support to supplement the intelligence element in formations as and when the need arises. Where no such SUpPDrt exists special provision of intelligence staff and personnel must be made.

274. It is impossible to lay down any finn establishment for such an organization, There are, however, certain basic requirements, and if a commander is to get the intelligence he needs, particularly at the beginning of an operation, it is essential that an intelligence organization which meets these basic requirements be established as early as possible in the area of operations. There will inevitably be adjustments in the light of experience as the campaign proceeds. Intelligence specialists are held in intelligence and securityigroups in commands and overseas theatres, whence they can be allotted to formations to augment the existing intelligence element.

275. The senior intelligence officer in the command where the force is being mounted is responsible for advising on the requirement in terms of specialist personnel. When making his assessment the following intelligence functions should be taken into account :

a. Operational intelligence.

; b. Counter intelligence.

c. Command and administration.

d. Interrogation,

e. Photo interpretation.

f. Field intelligence officers (FlO).

276. The accepted increment of personnel required by an intelligence and security group when an additional brigade joins the command can be used as a very rough guide to the minimum scale which an independent brigade may need, but any force deployed is also likely t.o require additional intelli-





gence sub-units. Thus the assessment of intelligence support falls under two headings:

a. Intelligence staff for the brigade or force HQ.

b. Intelligence sub-units and personnel for attachment to the brigade or joint force HQ.

277. Intelligence Staff. Any list is only a guide and could be far below an obvious requirement in a given set of circumstances but two vehicles and the following minimum scale of personnel are required :

a. One captain or subaltern and one staff sergeant as interrogators.

b. Two sergeants, one cor-poral and two lance corporals as operators 10-

telligence andsecurity .

c. One photo interpreter.

d. One photographer (RAOC).

e. One clerk (RAOC) who is a tactical sketcher.

278. Intelligence Sub-units and Personnel. Some or all. of the following may be required:

a. Operational Intelligence. The joint intelligence centre at joint force HQ cannot be manned without a staff of at least four.

b. Counter Intelligence. A minimum of three NOOs with, one vehicle, possibly locally requisitioned, will be required.

c. Command and Administration. A command and administrative elementshould consist of a minimum of two officers and three soldiers: responsibilities will include advising staff on counter intelligence matters.

d. Interrogation Centre. A minimum of seven specialists are needed for the centre, and they will require administrative support in the form of cooks, guards, etc, which may have to be f.ound by other units in the force.

e. Photo Interpretation Detachment. A minimum of one officer and two soldiers, with one vehicle are needed to form the army element in a joint air reconnaissance intelligence centre.

f. Field Intelligence Officers. The number ofFIOs will depend on the local situation .

279. The choice of intelligence sub-units and decisions on the number of additional intelligence personnel must depend on the nature and size of the intelligence problem in the area of operations. In making any assessment the following should be borne in mind:

a. An intelligence organization will normally have to operate continuously, 24 hours a day, and therefore proper manpower provision must be made.

b. The gathering of information, particularly in a foreign country, is a long process and success is dependent on creating a climate. of .confidence among the local inhabitants Efficiency helps to build confidence and an efficient intelligence organization, planned and complete from the start, is far more likely to achieve results than ione-supplemented at intervals

by ad hoc improvisation to meet situations after they have arisen.



RESTRICTED Integration with Other Intelligence Organizations

280. In the same way that every internal security task is different, so is every situation involving co-operation between allied intelligence organizations in the area of operations and local civilian intelligence organizations, if they exist Co-operation will always be affected by:

a. Local personalities.

b. Loyalties of indigenous security forces which may be influenced by the;

local situation.

c. National pride, and individual jealousy or fear.

d. The need to protect sources of information.

e. The general efficiency and effectiveness of the local intelligence or-

ganization. •

f. The security of our own intelligence organization.

g. The " need to know" principle.

281. Complete co-operation will seldom be achieved, but failure to reach a reasonably high level of mutual trust in the passing and. exchange ... of in~ formation will add to the problems confronting intelligence officers.

282. It is impossible to formulate rules relating to anything so unpredictable as human behaviour but if there is to be any understanding between the British intelligence organization, those of allies in the area and the local civilian organization, the following principles should where possible be observed:

a. All intelligence organizations should be grouped under one director of intelligence and subordinated to him.

b. All intelligence organizations should be represented on each intelligence committee at national, regional, provincial, district etc, level.

c. Naval, army and air intelligence officers should serve in the joint intelligence centre of joint force HQ or the joint HQ of the security forces.

d. Bearing in mind the "need to know" principle, particularly in the dissemination of security intelligence, the exchange of information should be as unrestricted as possible.

e. Every attempt should be made to establish friendly relations between intelligence officers of the security forces at all levels in the intelligence organization.

283. Successful integration must be based on representation at all committee levels and loyalty to one mutually approved director of intelligence. The success of the intelligence organization is liable to be proportionate to the degree of integration attained.

Dependent Territories

284. In dependent territories,with their structure of police force, and Special Branch, there need be little difficulty in establishing an integrated intelligence organization under a director of intelligence. In these territories





a national intelligence committee should be set up at central government level and should consist of a senior officer of the administration as chairman with members from the administration, police, Special Branch and the armed forces, both indigenous and British. This pattern of membership should be repeated in the intelligence committees at the lower levels.

Foreign Countries

285. In foreign countries it is possible that very close integration of this kind will not be achieved. Although a national intelligence committee may be set up it may not be possible or desirable for the British force to be represented on it. Good liaison and the setting up of joint intelligence committees at all levels are essential, however, to make the best use of all intelligence services; and all British control:led sources at least must be grouped under one man to ensure proper guidance and co-ordination .

Intelligence Committees

286. Membership and the choice of chairman for these joint committees will depend on local circumstances and the relative strengths of British, allied and indigenous forces in the area, but they must include representatives of:

a. The civil administration.

b. The uniformed police.

,c. The police Special Branch or its equivalent.

d. Senior intelligence officers from indigenous, allied and British forces.

287. The functions of an intelligence committee are:

a. To advise the government, or its next higher HQ, on all aspects of intelligence in the area for which it is responsible.

b. To provide the intelligence on which operational planning can be

based and protective measures adopted.

c. To allocate tasks, targets and priorities to the intelligence organization.

d. To liaise with parallel and subordinate committees where they exist.

e. To establish common procedures, particularly in relation to the disposal of surrendered or captured enemy personnel, captured documents and equipment, etc.

288. Intelligence committees should not have any executive command over the intelligence organization in the detailed direction of its activities; this should act only on the orders of the director of intelligence or the senior intelligence officer at the lower levels.

Special Branch or Equivalent

289. Ideally, an intelligence organization should be based on whatever civilian intelligence organization may exist in the area of operation, for example, the police Special Branch or its equivalent. If, however, there is no Special Branch or equivalent, or it has ceased to be effective, the military intelligence services must absorb what is left of the civilian elements and gradually build up an integrated, joint intelligence organization under a director of intelligence.




Joint Intelligence Centres

290. To achieve effective co-ordination of the various intelligence staffs a joint intelligence centre, adjacent to the joint . operations centre, must be established. This joint intelligence centre must contain the following sections:

a. Research. To cover all aspects of insurgent activity under such headings as:

(1) Historical intelligence.

(2) Organization and order of battle.

(3) Leaders and prominent personalities. (4) Weapons.

(5) Techniques, methods of operating etc.

b. Operational Intelligence. To be responsible for the collection of information through the control of all sources and agencies, its processing and dissemination as intelligence in time to be of use.

c. Counter Intelligence. This is oovered in detail in Section 21.

Military Intelligence Officers and Military Intelligence LiaisonOfficeh

291. As soon as there are signs that an emergency may develop in an area, immediate action should be taken to reinforce the police intelligence services in the threatened country. Every counter insurgency situation demands the closest liaison between civil and military intelligence services and this cannot be achieved unless proper preparations are made for it. These include:

a. Reinforcement of the Special Branch or its equivalent.

b. Close liaison between civil and military intelligence services. This can be achieved by providing specially trained military intelligence officers (MIOs), military intelligence liaison officers (MILOs) and field intelligence officers (FIOs).

292. The main role of an MIO is to work in the HQ of the Special Branch or its equivalent.: under the direction of its head. Although they may be given normal Special Branch duties, their tasks are to :

a. Plan and make provision for the military intelligence assistance which •

will be needed in an emergency.

b. Assist in the development of a joint civil/military intelligence organization.

c. Collate the intelligence required for the planning of military operations.

293. MILOs are attached to formations for employment on intelligence liaison duties in theatres and commands. They form the reserve from which MIOs may be appointed and from which the MIOs in the intelligence organization in an area of operations may be reinforced. FIOs duties are explained in paragraph 308.




294. The planning required for counter insurgency operations falls under two main headings:

a. Action in the United Kingdom.

b. Pre-emergency action in the potential area of operations.

Action in the United Kingdom

295. Action in the United Kingdom is limited to maintaining a pool of trained MIOs, MILOs and FIOs available for deployment and the collection of all available intelligence on the area of operations so that formations and units likely to form the British force will know the following before they leave:

a. All topographical and climatic details.

b. Basic intelligence of the origin, history and background of the situation.

c. Up to date intelligence on the current situation.

d. Details of the administration of the territory, with particular reference to the organization and deployment of intelligence and security forces.

Pre-emergency Action in the Area of Operations

296. It is most desirable, though not always possible, that a MIO be attached to the Special Branch or its equivalent before the situation has developed into an emergency in any country where the threat suggests the possibility of an appeal for assistance to the United Kingdom. This will enable the country concerned to prepare for the expansion of its intelligence resources and to begin establishing a joint intelligence organization. Much valuable time can be saved if a MID is in a position to give the British force commander an up-to-date briefing as soon as he arrives.

Provision of Interpreters

297. One of the greater problems facing a British force in an area of operations is the early provision of linguists; there will always be a need for linguists trained in interrogation. Local interpreters constitute a major security risk, so they should be used with caution and closely supervised. In addition to the specialists required for the intelligence functions listed in para 275, specialists with the ability to speak the local language may be required for:

a. Interrogation .

b. Document translation.

c. Counter intelligence.

d. Censorship.

e. Travel control.


298. Research. Insurgents attract converts to their cause by exploiting local grievances to the detriment of the central government or local authority. These grievances may differ from village to village and they constitute the levers with which the insurgents hope to unseat the government. The need to dis-





299. Liaison. In addition to the complete integration of all intelligence

services good liaison is of extreme importance; but in the initial . stages •

of an emergency it may be difficult to achieve. Conscious 'Of failure,

the local intelligence services may well resent the assistance for which

the government has asked. It will be 'One 'Of the main tasks of MIOs

and MILOs to overcome any antipathy or resentment that may be felt by

local security forces. The successful conduct of counter revolutionary opera-

tions depends entirely on the liaison between G{InteHigence), G(Operations),

other services which constitute the British force, and the local government

and security forces.


cover what these levers are is obvious. Insurgency cannot be quelled solely by military action, which is directed at containing the operations of the insurgents until government reforms can remove grievances and thus gain popular support for the government. There is therefore a need for continuous research into the causes of unrest and all the aspects of the threat so that the patterns and trends can be understood and foreseen. The need for research also extends to the study of insurgents' tactics and methods because changes in any apparent pattern may indicate changes of plan whioh will affect the course of future operations : all basic intelligence must be constantly reviewed and brought up to date.

300. Communications. In counterrevolutionary operations, where apparently trivial events '. and negative information may be of great significance, the volume of signal traffic is likely to be large. Much 'Of the information must be-rapidly disseminated 'and reaction to it must be swift. Communications must therefore be efficient, secure and portable, and the standards of signal security must be high.

301. Security. The normal problems 'Of security are made more acute by the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and insurgent. All security measures must be rigidly enforced, particularly within the intelligence organization which will be the primary target 'Of hostile intelligence services. It must be assumed that by the time British forces arrive in the area of operations there will have been extensive penetration of government services, including the police Special Branch or its equivalent. It must also be assumed that the revolutionary organization is able to listen to insecure voice radio nets. Our forces must therefore be trained to :

a.Plan, provide and use alternative channels of communication.

b. Maintain the highest standards 'Of communications security.

c. Demand authentication from any suspicious sounding station.


302. Tasks. Operational intelligence entails the provision of intelligence on the terrain and on the insurgent movement in its military and civil aspects. Success in counter revolutionary operations does not depend en military action alone and therefore in addition to topography, climate, insurgent



order of battIe, insurgent leaders, intentions, tactics and methods, there must be information on:

a. Economics.

b. Historical background.

c. Political, sociological and psychological matters.

303. Insurgents devote much time and effort to concealing the structure of their organization and its leaders. This is largely because terrorism and insurgency. are set in motion by. a small but highly trained group,and the few leaders must be safeguarded if the revolution is to succeed. The capture of any leader can mean serious disruption of the insurgent organization and a consequent adverse effect on their capabilities and morale. The intelligence organization of the security forces should therefore concentrate on identifying and locating the insurgent leaders.

Sources of Information

304. Provided that the government concerned has not delayed its appeal for assistance until the local security services have ceased to be effective, the following sources and agencies, although possibly penetrated and therefore a security risk, should be available to the intelligence organization.

305. Local: Inhabitants. In areas more .or less controlled by . insurgents, and where their weapons of fear, intimidation and blackmail are in use, it is unlikely that much information will be obtained. But every soldier must understand the importance, and the operational necessity of winning andretaining "ithe hearts and minds" of the local people. Much of the intelligence from this source is usually obtained through the local policesrupplemented by the work of FIOs.

306. Local Police and Armed Forces. These have the advantage of coming from amongst the people, but the need to protect their sources of. information from terrorism. may result in their reluctance to co-operate with the intelligence organization,

307. Border Scouts. These are locally raised troops who are usually recruited as auxiliary policemen but armed and trained by the security forces. They are tribesmen and after training are sent back to their local tribal area to report on any irregular activity or movement of personnel.

308 .. Field Intelligence Officers. FIOs can either be serving officers, Intelligence Corps NOOs or locally recruited officers with an intimate knowledge of the area of operations and the local language. Their role is· to live with the people and collect information from any source available to them.

309. SAS. This is an important intelligence collection agency whose role was outlined in Chapter 4, paragraph 225.

310. Agents and Informers. Good agents and infomners,controlled by trained handlers, can be among the best sources of information, but failure to control and co-ordinate them, and the growth of private networks, will lead to compromise, false information and double agents.






311. Surrendered and Captured Insurgents. It is important that at the outset of counter revolutionary operations a policy on the treatment of captured and surrendered insurgents is agreed with the civil government. They must be questioned by trained interrogators at the earliest opportunity; but immediate tactical questioning in the field, before the initial shock of capture has worn off, may yield good results. A soldier able to speak a few words of the local language may obtain tactical information which leads to the discovery of insurgent camps, supply dumps, etc. It is possible that some governments may wish to make political capital from them even to' the extent of trial and execution on charges of treason. This can be disastrous for two reasons:

a. Insurgents will be defeated by loss of popular support for their cause

and not by military action alone. Retribution enacted on those who •

surrender or are captured will only stiffen resistance to the government

and create more dissidents.

b. They are an extremely valuable source of information and it is possible that with the right type of treatment and re-education they can be turned back and used against the insurgents.

312. Captured Documents. Though they may be unintelligible to troops who capture them, documents are valuable sources of information to intelligence staffs: documents found on a suspect can be extremely useful to an interrogator. Insurgent prisoners and dead, their camps and captured positions must be searched and any documents found must be preserved, labelled with the circumstances of capture, identified with individuals where possible and handed over as quickly as possible to the intelligence organization. The insurgents' communications may depend on the use of dead letter boxes. If discovered they may contain important documents and may provide an opportunity to capture a leading figure when be comes to collect or despatch his orders,

313. Air Reconnaissance. In the initial stages of deployment the air may be the only reliable source of information to British forces. In addition to obtaining specific information it can be a valuable means of confirming information received from other sources, not only by visual or photographic reconnaissance, but by the use of airborne surveillance devices.

314. Patrols. The proper briefing and de-briefing of patrols is essential • and troops must be trained in careful observation and recording of important information about insurgent camps, food dumps, tracks, mines, explosives

and insurgent tactics.

315. Observation Posts. Well sited observation posts, by day and night can provide useful inf.ormation on movement or the absence of it.

316. Surveillance and Listening Aids. These can be used to assist air and ground reconnaissance ; particularly heat sensitive devices which detect camp fires through foliage, image intensifiers and infra-red devices for night surveillance, short range radar and remote listening devices.




317. Captured Equipment. This can be of great value to technical intelligence staffs, and should be marked and identified in the same way as insurgent documents.



318. The greatest problem confronting the security organization is that of identifying the insurgent. The staff will be concerned with the measures that must be taken to prevent espionage, sabotage and subversion, and with the methods of obtaining intelligence on organizations which pose these threats. It must be assumed that civilian labour employed in or around military installations will include insurgent agents on long and short term reconnaissance tasks .


319. There are five main principles which must be observed:

8. Current military security instructions must be applied sensibly.

b. The activities of all counter intelligence agencies must be directed and controlled by a central authority.

c. Commanders at all levels must appreciate the importance of counter intelligence activities.

d. The distribution of information must be carefully controlled on a "needto-know" basis.

e. Communications security must be enforced.

Protective Security

320. Protective security is concerned with:

8. Orders, instructions and plans to ensure the safety and security of documents, equipment, installations and personnel.

b. Advice to commanders on physical security measures such as guards,

fences and systems for controlling access.

c. Investigation of subversive acts or incidents affecting our forces.

321. Protective security falls under three main headings:

8. Security of information-defence against espionage, including the security of operations.

b. Security of material-defence against espionage and sabotage.

c. Security of personnel-defence and protection against compromise and subversion.

322. Security of Information. All commanders are responsible for implementing security controls in their own units and making sure that all ranks are aware of the consequences of careless talk. It should never be assumed that a local inhabitant cannot understand English. Insurgents value documents more than mere verbal reports on them and current military security instructions must therefore be understood and obeyed. Local contractors






and employees in the area of operations are vulnerable to insurgent pressure; and to the insurgents they can be valuable sources of such information as unit ration strengths, operational roles, future moves, etc. Security risks of this sort can be reduced by careful vetting, adopting cover plans for moves and other activities, and by the training and indoctrination of all ranks in enforcing security measures.

323. Security of Material. Protection of equipment against espionage must be regarded as complementary to the protection of documents, for it is usually easier to gain access to equipment than to the documents concerning it. The targets of a saboteur are key installations, equipment and buildings, and his weapons are explosives and fire. Protection against sabotage is achieved by a combination of physical security, good orders and control of

access-normally by a pass system which denies entry to all except screened •

personnel. Insurgents are always in need of medical supplies, explosives,

weapons and ammunition, and these must be safeguarded. The weapons and ammunition of casualties, both men and equipment such as AFVs and air-

craft, must be recovered immediately: even empty cases may be valuable to

the enemy.

324. Security of Personnel. Protective measures can never be relaxed in an operational area. Propaganda is the main medium of subversion and. its object is to destroy the will to resist the insurgents. Deliberate atrocities against our troops will have the aim of encouraging the troops to react violently against the local population, thereby destroying the goodwill and confidence which are essential. Insurgent propaganda is insidious, and suitable counter measures are:

a. Education: explaining the true facts behind the insurgency and why the country has asked for assistance.

b. Explanation of the methods and techniques the insurgent will use to achieve subversion.

c. The prevention of . rumours by keeping troops as fully informed as possible.

d. Good discipline and leadership.

e. Good welfare amenities.

Civil Security

325. Civil security is concerned with controls imposed on the civilian population with the object of identifying hostile elements within. the population, highlighting the hostile intelligence attack and those working for insurgent intelligence. The measures are aimed at preventing the movement of insurgent agents and their information, the traffic of weapons, and at nullifying the activities of the insurgent intelligence services.

326. The supervision of these controls is a civil responsibility, but the assistance of the counter intelligence staff may be required for:

a. Background investigations and the vetting of persons whose loyalty is questionable.




b. Indoctrination of personnel in all aspects of security.

c. Control of civilian movement.

d. Unannounced searches and raids on clandestine meeting places.

e. Censorship.


327. Intelligence is the key to successful operations: with good intelligence the battle will be won, without it the security forces are fighting always in the dark and much of their effort will be fruitless or wasted. Furthermore, where there is a lack of information more troops than are in fact necessary have to be employed. Accurate and timely information usually results in operational successes which create confidence among the local population and lead to further information and successes provided always that sources of information are properly protected. The collection of information and its conversion into intelligence require an efficient intelligence organization which exploits all available sources to the full with a detailed, systematic and economical collection plan. The successful functioning of this organization depends largely upon :

a. Knowledge of the area of operations and the local language.

b. The collection of all available intelligence before the emergency begins.

c. The forming of close ties with the country concerned to make full use of all its sources of intelligence.

d. The setting up of a single, integrated and centralized intelligence organization, probably based on the local Special Branch or any similar civilian intelligence organization, if one exists, which operates through committees at all levels parallel with the civil administration.

e. The acquisition of intelligence by all arms and services, using all available means and technical aids.

f. Efficient, secure and portable communications.

328-330. Reserved .












331. British forces are most likely to undertake internal security operations either in a British dependency where civil disturbances need not necessarily savour of rebellion, or in a foreign country which is in the throes of a revolutionary war and has appealed for military assistance. In the latter instance civil disturbances may represent only one of the many types of unrest. Before long-term political, economic and social measures can be taken to solve the problems, military action may be necessary to control or contain the situation.

332. The patterns of internal security operations greatly depend on the political situation and the nature and cause of the disturbances.


333. The disturbances may have their origm in industrial or racial disputes, or be a phase of revolutionary war in a calculated campaign to overthrow the government.

334. The nature of the disturbances may take one, or a combination of the following forms and can escalate in intensity:

a. Unlawful assemblies, strikes and picketing, civil disobedience, riots, arson and looting.

b. Terrorism in urban areas, with murder groups selecting individual high priority targets such as government officers and officials or spreading terror by attacking selected civilians.

c. Sabotage of essential services, transport systems, police stations, and government installations.

d. The placing of mines, booby traps and bombs to terrorize the public and to create additional chaos.

e. Urban terrorist operations where the insurgents are prepared to contest the security forces in urban areas with rifles, light automatic Weapons and grenades.

Operating Principles

335. Civil Authority. The military will always be in support of the civil authority except in extreme cases of urban anti-terrorist operations.

336. Minimum Force. The principle of the use of minimum force must be applied. This must not be confused with the number of troops deployed on the ground. A large concentration of troops deployed at a critical time may actually enable a commander either to use less force than he otherwise would have done or avoid having to use it altogether.




337. Co-operation. The military must co-operate at every level, in every sphere and at every step with the civil authorities. The police and military must work together as a single team.

Types of Operation

338. In between internal security and counter insurgency operations there can be anti-urban terrorist operations. These can result from an escalation of aggression by the insurgents in urban areas or may represent an advanced stage of revolutionary war in urban or rural areas. When formed bodies of terrorists are carrying out ambushes and attacks on police and military posts it must be looked on in the insurgency context of a revolutionary war. Such attacks are more likely to take place in rural areas. Anti-terrorist operations

in urban areas are considered under internal security in Part 2 in order to • avoid overlap; those in rural areas, which impinge on controlled area operations, are considered under counter insurgency in Part 3.


339. Whatever the precise circumstances of the insurgency it is assumed that the government is still in control of at least part of the country. If this were not the case, the conflict would largely have the characteristics of a limited war until such time as a measure of control could be achieved. The control of the rest of the country would then be systematically regained in stages on the lines of the following paragraphs.

Establishment of a Base

340. The first requirement is for the armed forces to establish a secure base or bases from which aggressive operations against the insurgents can be mounted. Until this has been done the purely military tasks involved in seeking out and destroying the insurgents cannot be successfully achieved. These bases fall into two categories :

a. Base Areas. There may be a requirement for more than 'One of these bases. They should he developed around a port and lor terminal strategic transport CST) airfield, and have all the facilities and installations needed to support a prolonged campaign. At the same time each of them must be concentrated into a comparatively small area which can be protected from interference by saboteurs and ground forces. They are unlikely to he attacked from the air, but may be targets for subversion and shelling or mortaring.

b. Forward Operational Bases. These should be developed around Tae T(MR) and Tac T(SR) airfields/air strips, and at least one may have to be established in each province. If neither type of airfield is available the base may have to start as an air head. Development is then necessary and the criteria is that projected pacification operations and operations in depth must be within convenient helicopter turn round of a forward operational base. These bases will clearly be more vulnerable thana main base, hut they must be made impregnable, with properly dug in posts with





overhead cover. They should be capable of being held by one third of the garrison thus leaving two thirds of the garrison available for offensive operations.

Securing and Enlargement of Controlled Areas

341. Once a secure base has been established operations can be undertaken to secure controlled areas within which the authority of the national government can be maintained. Initially these may be carried out from the base itself but as it becomes necessary and possible to. deploy greater strength and SQ operate further afield, forward operational bases must be seized and areas cleared systematically outwards from these.

342. The operations to secure and enlarge a government controlled area, launched from a forward operational base, are known as pacification operations. An area adjacent to the base or existing controlled 'area should be selected, and this 'should be progressively dominated by regular forces carrying out clearing operations, cordons and searches, . patrols and ambushes. The security forces must be prepared to destroy at once any guerilla forces or bases identified by the operations. As each group of villages is cleared of insurgents, the covert insurgent organization destroyed and a framework of protection provided against further interference by insurgents; the police, local home guards and civil authorities should move in to re-establish orderly government. Once this has been done satisfactorily, the security forces should move on to the next selected area. When police are not available, Or are unreliable, local forces may have to be used in a police role. All this is a very slow process. The system does however have the great merit of ensuring that a progressively 'greater 'part of the nation is freed from insurgent influence and, once freed,remains so.

Operations in Depth

343. Because of the slowness of the operations to establish controlled areas, the insurgents are liable to have considerable freedom of action elsewhere. If sufficient troops are therefore available, a series of offensive actions. designed to locate and destroy insurgents in adjoining provinces and regions should be mounted simultaneously. This is done to isolate the insurgents from outside assistance, and thus prevent interference with the pacification operations, and also to ensure that the process of recapturing control over the whole country is not unduly protracted. This is also the quickest way of reducing the hard core insurgents; although the areas covered in these operations will, of course, invariably need clearing subsequently.

344. Such operations will not aim to clear areas but rather, by deep penetration raids, to capture or kill guerilla leaders, harass their movements and communications, destroy their food supplies and depress their morale. The stronger the hold of the insurgents the more emphasis will have to be placed on these offensive operations in depth in order to give the pacification opera .. tions a chance of success.

Border Protection

345. As part of the campaign to win. control over an increasing area of the country and deny outside help to the insurgents it may be necessary to




establish some form of control over a land frontier with a foreign power. It may be satisfactory to carry this out with locally recruited frontier guards, particularly if the area is very inaccessible. On the other hand the threat' may be too great fer this and it may be better to use these frontier guards as guides and fer providing information and early warning, and to move in regular formations prepared to undertake full scale operations with many of the characteristics of limited war.



346. To carry out the roles and tasks given in Section 11, all ranks require

their normal skills brought to the highest pitch. They also require a •

thorough training in matters which are common to all arms. The require-

ments set out in the following sections although applying in every respect to

infantry are not confined to that arm; they apply to every officer and every

soldier regardless of arm for there are no rear or safe areas. Counter revolu-

tionary warfare in all its phases and forms demands a higher standard of leadership than any other form of warfare. It is essential to train junior

leaders of all arms to make sound decisions and to act on their own.

347. The two training aspects of the greatest importance in counter revolutionary warfare are the need for supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot to kill at fleeting targets at short range.

Common Aspects

348. Briefing. A considerable amount of training time must be devoted to giving all ranks initial briefings and, subsequently, to keeping them up to date on the following subjects :

a. The background to the emergency.

b. The political situation.

c. The legal status of British forces in the theatre of operations, including limitations on the use of force.

d. The pattern of operations that can be expected including the organization .of local police and military forces,

e. Topography.

f. Insurgent habits and tactics. A sound knowledge of the insurgent in- •

eluding his minor tactics, subterfuges, hiding places, use of mines etc, is essential.

g. The tribal, religious background and customs. of the people 'Of the country.

h. An understanding of the necessity for treating defectors and surrendered insurgents leniently to enhance the good faith of the government in the eyes of both the local population and the insurgents.

349. Fitness and Endurance. A very high standard 'Of physical fitness is required to overcome any adverse climatic conditions and, when allied with mental toughness,' to enable fatigued, wounded or injured soldiers to carry on. All soldiers must be capable of sustained physical' effort over long




periods in circumstances which present both psychological and physical obstacles.

350. Skill at Arms. This invariably decides the outcome of any engagement in counter revolutionary operations, and the following points must be emphasized:

a. The ability to hit, instinctively and immediately, fleeting targets at short range and in poor visibility is vital. This skill calls for a special type of marksmanship and constant practice.

b. Shooting practice should be carried out at every available opportunity on whatever form of range is available. Firing on battle ranges from cramped positions and at night is particularly important .

c. Safety precautions against accidental discharge. The recommended drills are given in Part 2 Annex F.

351. Fieldcraft, A soldier must be capable of living in and making use of the local conditions however arduous and primitive they may be. This presupposes a thorough knowledge .of 'patrolling, navigation,ambush, search and tracking techniques, which can only be obtained by the sound training of junior leaders and the stressing of fieldcraft skills at both section and platoon or equivalent level. These skills must be supplemented by contact drills which will cultivate instinctive offensive reactions to counter ambushes and other tactical emergencies.

352. Night Operations. Insurgents make constant use of night operations and the cover of darkness. All training programmes must lay great stress on night training.

353. Medical. Unless health training is sound, casualties from disease are likely to be far greater than those due to enemy action. The majority of diseases are preventable or avoidable and sound training in the following will greatly reduce wastage:

a. Health and Hygiene Discipline. Orders dealing with health and hygiene measures must be comprehensive, realistic and enforced.

b. First Aid. All ranks must understand basic first aid. In many tactical situations, particularly when small groups are operating away from their units, medical orderlies will not be immediately available. A knowledge of first aid may make the difference between life and death. The manual carriage of sick and wounded should be understood and practised by all ranks.

354. Communications. Internal security and counter insurgency operations place heavy demands on signallers at all levels and reserves must be trained. The normal training syllabus for voice and telegraph operators win be adequate but special emphasis must be placed upon:

a. Antenna siting, especially for VHF communications.

b. Antenna design for both HF and VHF radios.




c. Siting, maintenance and resupply of rebroadcast stations.

d. Telegraph operating on HF radios at night under conditions of heavy interference and fading.

355. Specialist Training. The following aspects require particular attention:

a. Intelligence Training.

(1) Training of unit intelligence officers and sub-unit intelligence NCOs in intelligence techniques and methods applicable to the theatre of operations, including the role of the local Special Branch.

(2) Training of the individual soldier in accurate observation and reporting.

(3) Training of officers and NCOs in immediate tactical questioning •

following the capture of an insurgent.

(4) Training of patrols in intelligence gathering tasks, with particular reference to protracted day and night operations over difficult country.

(5) Training of all ranks in the art of deception and general security measures.

b. Language courses for selected officers and soldiers, particularly those covered by sub paragraph a.(I) above.

c. Training some officers and soldiers from all sub-units in the detection and disposal of mines, booby traps and explosive devices.

d. Signals exercises, including communication with aircraft and helicopters.

e. Organization and functioning of combined operations rooms at unit and sub-unit level.

f. Training of diarists and photographers down to platoon or equivalent


g. Use of riot control agent, as described in Annex Q of Part 2.

h. Tracker dog 'handler training.

i, Use of soldiers as porters for the carriage of heavy equipment such as guns, mortars and some heavy radio stations.

356. Air Mobility. Because of the emphasis placed on air support in the tactical concept, training in the following must take place:

a. Emplaning procedures. Every unit must have officers who have atten- •

ded unit emplaning officers courses as well as a cadre of other ranks who have qualified on aircraft loading and lashing courses.

b. Emplaning and deplaning drills for utility and support helicopters and STOL aircraft for tactical movement by air generally. This task will fall to unit emplaning officers who, with other qualified personnel, must pass on to all ranks their skills in air documentation and the loading and lashing of equipment. The RAP will, whenever possible, permit loading and unloading drills to be practised on aircraft. This should be arranged at unit level with the appropriate RAP unit. Besides making every effort to exploit this facility, full use must be made of mock-ups

within the unit. .




c. Air supply procedures including the clearing and marking of dropping

and landing zones.

d. All aspects of offensive air support, including air support at night.

e. Battle procedure and techniques for airmobile operations at night.

f. Night troop lifting.

357. Forward Air Controllers (FA C). Air strikes will normally be controlled by a primary FAC who is an Army or RAF officer established for the purpose. Some artillery FOOs and helicopter pilots are also trained as FACs. Other officers and NCOs may be trained as air contact officers (AOO).

358. Pioneer Tasks. Engineer troops win often be committed on priority tasks such as the development of forward operational bases and the opening up of main routes. Other arms should therefore be trained to carry out simple engineering tasks for themselves. These tasks will include field defences, improvised rafting, watermanshi p, makeshift tracks and roads, elementary water supply, mine warfare, the use 'Of explosives in felling trees for construction of helicopter landing points, dropping zones and field defences, and in the destruction of enemy defences, tunnel systems etc.

359. Watermanship. Special emphasis should be given to improvised river crossing including rafting and personal flotation. All ranks must be able to swim.

360. Security. Until all ranks are imbued with the highest. standard of security the simplest operation can be hazardous. Security of weapons is also of paramount importance.

361. Behaviour. The need for irreproachable behaviour must be stressed during training. This is essential, as every deviation from the strictest standards of behaviour will be used for hostile propaganda. Soldiers must be trained to show firmness combined with humanity, decency and impartiality. The importance of a high standard of bearing, turn out and discipline must also be emphasized.

Internal Security

362. The following tactics and techniques must be practised and rehearsed thoroughly. They should be regarded as a means to an end, to be applied intelligently and wieh tactical sense to a given situation. They are all considered in Part 2 of this Volume:

a. Precautions against ambush.

b. Guarding VIPs and small convoys.

c. Guarding VPs.

d. Crowd dispersal formations and techniques.

e. Road blocks.

f. Control points and rooftop/hilltop patrols.

g. Urban patrols. (Patrols and ambushes in rural areas are covered in Part 3 and also in Infantry Training Volume 4, The Infantry Platoon in Battle.) (Army Code No 9923).

h. Cordon, search and snatch operations.




Training in a Pollce Role

363. The training of a unit or part of a unit to act in a police role, using batons, shields and riot control agent, but without arms, would require some warning and the issue of the necessary equipment. This subject is also covered in Part 2.

Counter Insurgency

364. The many important training requirements for counter insurgency operations should be apparent from a study of the appropriate chapters and parts of this volume. However the two most important individual requirements are supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot to kill under any conditions.

365. The following tactics and techniques require special training and are •

considered in Part 3 of the Volume :

a. Patrolling and Ambushing.

b. Cordon and Search.

c. Search and Clear.

d. Immediate Action Drills.

e. Fix and Destroy Operations

(1) Attacking Insurgent Camps or Positions (2) Attacking a Fortified Village

366-370. Reserved.





371. The problems and accepted methods of administering British forces in under-developed countries with various types of terrain are set. out in "Administration in the Field ", 1966, Chapter III. (Army Code No 70182). The purpose of this Chapter is to emphasize those administrative problems that assume particular importance in counter revolutionary operations (both in internal security and counter insurgency). They arise because of the special conditions under which this type of operation is normally conducted, whatever may be the terrain or climate of the operational area.

372. The main factors affecting administration in these operations are:

a. The insurgents are the indigenous people; certain areas of the country may actually be insurgent-held territory and the whole country may be vulnerable to attack by guerillas, terrorists and saboteurs. This vulnerability of the land line of supply makes it important that the maximum use should be made of air transport.

b. The nature of military operations-eg that they take place over a wide area, and as a result of information which suddenly comes to hand-demands that the administration of the security forces is highly flexible. There will be a constant need to improvise new systems of supply and maintenance.

c. There is a need for the closest co-operation with the local people and the government agencies in all administrative matters of common concern. There will in fact be frequent requests for assistance by the civil government, eg for the accommodation and feeding of refugees. These must be sympathetically considered and help given whenever possible.

d. There is a need to make the maximum use of local resources, host nation or allied facilities, eg labour, accommodation, transport and fresh food; not only to eoonomize in the amount of logistic support that must be imported but also to help to identify loyal supporters of the government with the campaign against the insurgents.

e. There is a need for economy in all forms of administration, so that the size of the administrative tail does not limit the number of troops which are available for operations in the field .

f. If the force that is helping the government to quell the revolt or rebellion is a multi-national one, there will be the additional problems of coordinating the different administrative systems. The responsibility for this co-ordination should be vested in one nation.


373. Forward Planning. The need for early and thorough logistic planning cannot be over emphasized. Logistic planning for a military force entering a country for counter revolutionary operations, particularly counter insurgency, is bound to be complex. Negotiations for co-operation with the local government agencies and possibly with other national forces will have to be




conducted. It is therefore important that logistic staffs should be among the first to arrive in the theatre of operations.

374. Security. In a country where the insurgent cannot easily be identified and where agents may be everywhere, the need for strict. security measures in all logistic installations cannot be over emphasized. Installations must be suitably sited and effectively guarded using their own resources for local protection ; their staffs must be discreet; and the movement of equipment and supplies must not be allowed to. indicate the nature and area of active operations. When operations are undertaken by a purely British force, no indigenous persons should, as a rule, be trusted with knowledge of the aim, scope and logistic needs of the operations.

375. Training of Logistic Personnel. All soldiers of logistic units are

vulnerable to attack because there are no safe rear areas in this type of war- •

fare. They must therefore be suitably armed and trained in the use of their

personal weapons and capable of their unit's defence, and be responsible for

their own security.

376. Air Maintenance. As the maintenance system should be based mainly on the use of air transport, there must be the closest co-operation between the logistic and air force staffs. The use of air transport gives great flexibility and speed to the system of supply. The advantages this confers must be fully exploited. The size of reserve. holdings. can then be reduced, even though they II1ay have to be more widely distributed. The number. of installations on the ground can also be reduced, thereby effecting economies in staff, guards and transport. Troops on the ground can be supplied by air and therefore can be more lightly laden and armed, and can undertake longer operations. A flexible system of air maintenance by efficient and' alert logistic staffs will do much to. give increased mobility and effectiveness to. the troops on the ground.

377. Air Strips/Landing Points. Air dropping is most effective where air strips/landing points are not available or unusable. It is however uneconomical compared with air landing, owing to the air dropping equipment and crews required. There will therefore be an early requirement for forward airstrips and helicopter landing sites. If the operation is dependent on air supply, it is important that forward operational bases should be sited to include existing airfields or sites where airfields can be developed.

378. Communications. The provision of good communications is essential •

to the working of an efficient logistic organization. Reliable communica-

tions enable plans to. be more flexible and contribute to reducing the need

for large reserve stocks. These communications require as high a degree of

security as the operational network,

379. Medical. The rigorous conditions in which operations are conducted against insurgents enhance the need for good medical arrangements. Troops entering the theatre of operations should be given time to becomeacclima .. tized and adjusted to. the local conditions. Strict medical discipline must be enfo.rced.Pro.phylactic medicines must he regularly taken and hygiene must be of a high standard. Casualty evacuation although often by air may be





difficult to task at once and therefore a good knowledge of first aid by all ranks is particularly important. Army medical teams may find themselves overwhelmed by the medical needs of the local population, but their ability to compete with all the demands that are made on their resources will contribute important psychological advantages to our forces.

380. Morale. With the uncertain conditions in a country that is in the throes of a rebellion there may be a tendency for a loss of morale. The progress 'Of operations may appear to he slow, success may sometimes be in doubt and the effects of the insurgents' activities may be exaggerated. Rumours are easily spread but take time to disprove, and troops will be operating in small parties for long periods under trying conditions. It is therefore important to counter any tendency towards lowered morale by providing reliable information services, a full day's work for all troops, well 'Organized leave centres or at least rest and relaxation facilities in safe areas, and a frequent mail service from home.

381. Local Resources. To save valuable air and sea lift capacity and at the same time to help the economy of the country the maximum possible use should be made of reliable locally enlisted labour and indigenous resources of all kinds. An organization to control these resources should be set up as early as possible and careful screening of any local labour used is necessary.

382. Military Assistance to the Civil Power. As a counter revolutionary campaign is a combined civil and military affair, there must be close cooperation between the military administrative services and civilian government.agencies. Military staffs must always be willing to assist with civilian schemes and with measures to improve conditions in the country. Help should be given mainly in the form of advice, the loan of equipment and the provision of expert supervision. This subject is considered further in Section 30.

383. Financial Aspects. The commander of a force dispatched to assist the civil power of either a British dependency or of a friendly nation must ensure that the financing 'Of the operation is properly accounted for. Notes on certain financial aspects are at Annex E.

384-390. Reserved .










391. Civil affairs is concerned with the relationship between our armed forces, the civil authorities and the people, with particular reference to areas where the armed forces are conducting operations. This relationship will depend upon government policy and will vary from liaison with, and advice and assistance to the local civil government to the exercise of complete legislative, executive and judicial power by the armed forces, ie, military government. The civil affairs policy for each area of operations should be established at government level.

392. In conventional military operations, civil affairs is in a supporting role.

In counter insurgency, however, because of the importance of isolating the insurgents from the people, civil affairs, like psychological operations. assume greatly increased significance.

393. The conduct of civil affairs will vary depending on the extent to which integrated local operations committees have control and direction of the counter insurgency effort, and the effectiveness of the civil administration . generally. Where civil government and its agencies are efficient the armed force should seek to a void interference in governmental matters. On the other hand, if the civil administration has collapsed or is near collapse, the appropriate military commander may have to assume complete responsibility for administration of the area with the ultimate aim of creating the conditions whereby effective civil administration can be re-established.


394. The desirable objective for civil affairs/military government authorities operating in a given situation should be :

a. Support for Military Operations. Vigorous action may be required to maintain public order and to prevent unrest which could prejudice military operations. Local resources eg transport, aircraft, plant, timber, etc can often be employed to support military operations and should be properly purchased through civil agencies .

h. Meeting International Obligations. Regardless of the circumstances under which British forces are employed overseas, international law imposes 'On the military commander certain obligations concerning the welfare of the civil population. The British Government, by its membership of the United Nations, is committed to an exemplary discharge of its responsibilities, and this obligation extends to all its representatives, including its' armed forces.'

c. Support and Implementation of National Policies. The nature, extent and objectives of British civil affairs/operations in any country will depend on British national policy. A military commander must carry out this policy with the advice and assistance from a representative of his government. If he is not given enough guidance he must ask for it.




d. Transfer of Responsibility from Military to a Civil Agency. When military control is re-established in any area civilaffairsj military government functions should be restored to civil authorities as quickly as the situation will permit. The transfer will require foresight and careful advance planning.


395. For 'the pur-pose of organization and training, civil affairs / military government functions may be grouped under the following categories :

a. Government Functions. (1) Legal.

(2) Public safety.

(3) Public welfare. (4) Public health.

(5) Public finance. (6) Public education. (7) Labour.

b. Economic Functions. (1) Economic policy.

(2) Commerce and industry. (3) Food and agriculture.

(4) Price control and rationing. (5) Property control.

(6) Civilian supply.

c. Public Facilities Functions. (1) Public utilities.

(2) Public communications. (3) Public transportation.

d. Special Functions. (1) Civil information.

(2) Resettlement of population.

(3) Arts, monuments and arohives.


396. In the absence of specific political guidance, the following general principles should be used for planning civil affairs/military government operations:

a. Humanity. The principle of humanity prohibits the use of a greater degree of force than is actually necessary for the purpose of the wu .. War is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian prill¢iples..