You are on page 1of 31

Shell International Exploration & Production B.V.

HAZID

EP 95-0312

HSE
MANUAL

Revision 0: 29 September 1995

Contents

EP HSE Manual Amendment Record Sheet
Section Number:

EP 95-0312

Section Title:

HAZID

Rev

Chapter
Nos.

Description to amendment

All

Original hard copy and CD-ROM issue

Amended by

dd/mm/yy

No.
0

Date

29/9/95

EPO/61

* In this publication, some of the figures have been colour enhanced. This was done after the issue of the
CD ROM. The next issue of the CD ROM will include these enhancements. There is no difference in content.

EP 95-0350 Revision 06 June 1998
jh 9/698

ii

Shell International Exploration & Production B.V.

Contents
1

OVERVIEW

1

APPENDIX I HAZID CHECKLIST

15

1.1

What Is HAZID

1

APPENDIX II HAZID Worksheet

21

1.2

Why Use HAZID

1

2

Use of HAZID

3

APPENDIX III EXAMPLE HAZID
MINUTE

23

2.1

Optimum Timing Within a
Development

3

Glossary

27

2.2

Study Duration

3

2.3

Application of HAZID

3

3

HAZID Team Composition

5

3.1

Team Members

5

3.2

Experience Required

5

3.3

Team Changes

5

3.4

Team Leader

6

4

HAZID Methodology

7

4.1

Styles of HAZID

7

4.2

Preparation

7

4.2.1

Conceptual HAZID

7

4.2.2

Detailed HAZID

8

4.2.3

Definitions of HSE terms

8

4.3

Study Procedure

8

4.3.1

Global view

8

4.3.2

Project implementation issues 9

4.3.3

Plant areas and nodes

9

4.4

Brainstorming and Analysis

10

4.5

Prioritisation

11

4.6

Operating Modes and Life Cycle
Issues

12

4.7

Recording and Reporting

12

4.8

Links with the HSE Case

13

Revision 0: 29 September 1995

V. This page intentionally left blank Revision 0: 29 September 1995 .Shell International Exploration & Production B.

g. in a short timeframe. the issues surrounding a new venture or development. The benefits of using HAZID include:  full recognition of the importance and interdependence of all HSE aspects at the outset of the development  an opportunity to consider the HSE implications of alternative developments and process designs as part of the selection process between (competing) options  the potential to affect major changes to philosophy/design at a very early stage before significant financial commitments are made  identification of specific hazards and threats within a project life-cycle phase or process option  an inventorisation process for HSE hazards and threats that provides a springboard for the development of the HSE Case Hazards and Effects Register  identification of all the intended continuous emissions from the facility.2 Why Use HAZID HAZID has been developed specifically to reflect the importance of HSE issues on the fundamental (and often non-HSE-related) decisions that are made at the inception of all development projects (e. design concept and location). HAZID is the first opportunity to collect experienced line and HSE staff together to address. This will focus design effort on the minimisation of such emissions as well as compliance with company and third party requirements. to assess the applicability of potential hazards  a rapid identification and description process only. Conceptual and Detailed and should be applied at the very outset of a new venture or during the early stages of a development. This will lead to safer and more cost-effective design options being adopted with a minimum cost of change penalty. based on a checklist of potential HSE issues. The technique has two styles. The major benefit of HAZID is that early identification and assessment of the critical HSE hazards provides essential input to project development decisions.1 Overview 1 OVERVIEW 1. EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 .1 What Is HAZID HAZID (HAZard IDentification) is a technique for early identification of potential hazards and threats. 1. It is therefore likely to be the first formal HSE-related study for any new project. The HAZID technique is:  a means of identifying and describing occupational HSE hazards and threats at the earliest practicable stage of a development or venture  a meeting employing a highly experienced multi-discipline team using a structured brainstorming technique. not a forum for trying to solve potential problems.

HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID This page intentionally left blank 2 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .

locations of the development. The study should be held as soon as enough general information is available. Hence the duration of a study would normally be short.1 gives an indication of the appropriate stages in the project development at which to hold a HAZID study. the optimum timing of the study and the selection between a conceptual or detailed study. In terms of the proposed development. (a typical study duration for a major development would be two to three days). This represents a very efficient use of time and is a significant advantage over alternative identification techniques. 2. technical and facility schemes.2 Study Duration The objective of a HAZID study is to recognise and identify the issues rather than to discuss the consequences and propose solutions. The constraints on the timing of any study arise from establishing a balance between having enough information available to the team and still having the ability to change or affect the basic development decisions. EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 . For a Detailed HAZID design work would normally have progressed to the point where a Process Flow Scheme (PFS) has been developed and some thought has been given to plot layout. the quality of the infrastructure and details about the population and previous land use. For a Conceptual HAZID this would include information on the proposed. hazardous inventories.1 Optimum Timing Within a Development The major benefits from HAZID arise from the technique being used at the earliest possible stage in a development. A combined study (running a conceptual and detailed study together) may be appropriate for a relatively small project with a short schedule or when it has not been possible to hold a conceptual study at the optimum time.2 Use of HAZID 2 USE OF HAZID 2. All chapters of this document apply to both Conceptual and Detailed HAZID studies. 2. The different types of project will however lead to a variation in the amount of information that is required. except where expressly identified. In all other aspects there is no difference between the two styles of study. utility requirements. Figure 2. etc.3 Application of HAZID The HAZID technique is equally effective for traditional greenfield developments and for brownfield projects or modifications as well as onshore or offshore plants. several options may have been under consideration and some information on costing and project economics should be available.

HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID Figure 2.1 Application of HAZID styles Greenfield development • New venture • New venture with inherited facilities • Stand alone development in existing operation Brownfield development • Modification or extension to own existing facility HAZID Conceptual Detailed Pre-exploration/exploration viability studies • First assessment of HSE impacts (HAZID precedes or complements EIA and HRA) • Exploration activities Seismic Drilling Development • Conceptual studies Deployment options Development options Initial studies • Life cycle activities/strategies • (Process) engineering Development • Conceptual studies Development options Combined study Initial studies • Life cycle activities/strategies • (Process) engineering Interface with existing operations • Parallel operation • Operation during construction/ tie-in 4 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .

Where HAZID is applied to new ventures and other activity-related projects (e.1 Team Members A HAZID team should be kept comparatively small but the team should contain sufficient knowledge to recognise and identify all the HSE issues. 3.g. seismic survey. For a production development. drilling campaign. EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 .3 HAZID Team Composition 3 HAZID TEAM COMPOSITION 3. A typical team would have four to six members.3 Team Changes HAZID looks at the whole development but also focuses on particular aspects such as plant areas (see chapter 4). As very senior personnel constitute the ideal team. It is essential that the depth is achieved by full knowledge of the particular circumstances. 3. Inevitably the levels of experience and knowledge required will mean that the team consists of senior personnel from within the project and elsewhere in the organisation. It may be appropriate for the most senior members of the team to attend for the global hazards and project implementation issues only and delegate the more detailed study elements to others. It is also important that several members of the team can contribute broad experience from other similar developments in terms of the technology applied and the location. exploration activities.2 Experience Required The key to a successful HAZID is the correct combination of breadth and depth in the experience of the team. for example the key members of the team should include the most experienced personnel available from the following disciplines:  project engineering  process engineering  production engineering  operations  specialists such as Reservoir Engineers and HSE Advisers. it is likely that severe time constraints will apply. the background to decisions made and options considered for the current project. abandonment) the team composition should be adjusted accordingly.

time management and communication skills and also to be familiar with the technique and objectives of HAZID. The role of secretary should be taken by someone not otherwise involved in the study so that the Team Leader can give his full concentration to record accurately the discussions. The Team Leader requires a high level of technical and managerial skills. To manage the team and the study he needs man management. He is required to:  lead the team through the HAZID technique  prompt the brainstorming effort  manage the discussion without compromising the creativity of the process  identify the key issues as they are raised by the team  record the findings and ensure that the minutes fully reflect the points identified. To recognise the HSE issues as they are raised. he needs to have wide-ranging technical expertise applicable to the type of development under review. He needs to remain independent of the discussion and it is recommended that he is not associated with the development. the role of the Team Leader is critical to the success of the meeting.4 Team Leader In common with other structured brainstorming and review studies. 6 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID 3. It is not recommended and is often not possible for an experienced Team Leader to act as the meeting secretary even for a small study.

g.1 Styles of HAZID The balance between holding a study early enough to affect major decisions but late enough to have allowed the accumulation of sufficient information (see 2. Operations Philosophy).4 HAZID Methodology 4 HAZID METHODOLOGY 4. etc.2 Preparation 4. certain documents will be useful and if available may be referred to.2. Without compromising the timing of a study.1 Conceptual HAZID The optimum (early) timing of a Conceptual HAZID study inevitably means that the formal documentation available to the team will be minimal and most information will be in the minds of the team.1) has led to the definition of two styles of HAZID study.  Detailed HAZID Designed for use once the single or competing process options have been developed to the point where PFSs exist. 4. The study is based on a review of the appropriate sections of the HAZID Checklist which is a structured list of HSE-related hazards drawn up from experience of such studies (see Appendix I). These documents include:  Project Initiation Notes  Policy Statements  Feasibility Studies  Key (development) Discussion Papers  Field (Reservoir) Development Plans  Relevant Shell Group Standards  Baseline Surveys  Description of Operational Environment  Key Legislative Documents  Key Philosophy Documents (e. As well as the inherent external and internal hazards for the development.  Conceptual HAZID Intended to be used during the first few weeks of a development project to identify all the systematic hazards associated with the development. This study is based on a review of the whole or remaining sections of the HAZID Checklist dependent on whether or not a conceptual study precedes the detailed one. etc. at this stage the team can focus more effectively on components of the selected or competing processes. They are therefore able to review the initial engineering decisions on: – process technology – capacity – sparing philosophy – operations concept.  Environmental Regulations EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 .

3. the environment. 4. 4.2 Detailed HAZID The detailed study will take place later in the engineering design process once design options have been identified but before any final decisions have been made. life cycle issues and planned plant flexibility  safety philosophy  preliminary operating philosophy and product take-off constraints.2. A basic understanding of the following key terms is required:  hazards These are defined as having the potential to cause harm. the experience of the team and the development in question it may be appropriate for the Team Leader to introduce basic hazard analysis principles to the team prior to the study (refer to EP 95-0100 and EP 95-0300). production losses or increased liabilities.with possibly Process Engineering Flow Schemes (PEFS) at block diagram level  mass balance information (for each competing design option)  plot layout  process description including all planned operating cases  project description including all options.  incidents These are defined as an unplanned event or chain of events. environmental assessments. products or the environment.HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID 4. or third parties. etc. for each design option. A significant number of additional documents and drawings will be available.2. 8 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 . The typical procedure is therefore firstly to apply the technique to the whole development as a single entity. which have caused or could have caused injury. Additional information may be available from site visit reports. damage to property. An example of where it may be of benefit is for those occasions where some of the team members will be involved in preparing an HSE Case for the development. including ill health and injury. The additional documents would include. preliminary issues of:  Process Flow Schemes (PFS) . illness and or damage (loss).3 Study Procedure 4. to assets.3 Definitions of HSE terms Depending on the objectives of the HAZID.  threats These are possible causes that could potentially release the hazard and produce an incident.1 Global view Many of the hazards and HSE issues are generic for a whole development and are not specific to any part of the plant or location.

the team will want to sharpen the focus of the study and the development may be broken down into a number of clearly defined areas.2 discusses the possibility of changing the team after this point if severe time constraints or availability problems apply. There is a potential overlap between a Detailed HAZID carried out at the end of the development stage of a project.3. The Team Leader will then move the HAZID Checklist and within each checklist section adopt the following procedure:  the Team Leader will nominate a category from the checklist and then ask the team to consider each guide word EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 . They may consider each functional block of the process. These will then be examined in turn to identify issues which have a specific impact on each location within the development. The definition of a section will usually be either a geographical location. the intention of that node will be discussed and agreed by the team. potential escalation. or each major process group/functional area for a single site containing an integrated plant. and Coarse HAZOP. The topics would normally include hazards management. 4.3). 4.) The remaining section (Facility Hazards) will be repeatedly studied for each separate area (conceptual study) or node (detailed study) of the plant (see 4.3 Plant areas and nodes Once all the global issues have been discussed. maintenance hazards. the most senior members of the team may delegate the focused plant area discussion to others. etc.2 Project implementation issues For a conceptual study (or a combined study). contracting strategy. namely:  Section 1 External and Environmental Hazards  Section 3 Health Hazards  Section 4 Project Implementation Issues. The initiator of the study (or Team Leader) should consider the quality of information available and decide which methodology is appropriate (refer to EP 95-0313 HAZOP). contingency planning and applicable legislation (see Appendix I). These are studied by the team by first using the most experienced personnel available for the study. Three of the sections contain global hazards and project implementation issues which may be covered once for the whole development. The particular hazards for each node can then be addressed separately.4 HAZID Methodology Global study methodology The study method is a combination of identification. For a Detailed HAZID the team will be able to use smaller areas or ‘nodes’. For example one node could be 'product storage' where the guide words would be applied to consider the effects of inventory control or release. If time constraints apply. (3. Area and node study methodology Once the Team Leader has identified the ‘node’ being studied which may be the whole facility or a small section. project implementation issues may be considered after the team has considered the single ‘whole facility’ area.3. The results are entered on the HAZID Worksheet (See Appendix II). analysis and brainstorming based on the hazards identified on the checklist which is divided into four main sections containing a total of 16 categories. for a development consisting of many sites.

1 HAZID technique steps HAZID HAZID Procedure step Checklist Conceptual Detailed Combined Global issues Section 1 Section 3 Yes No1 Yes Project implementation issues Section 4 Yes No1 Yes Location (area) Section 2 (repeated for each area) Yes No No Process node Section 2 (repeated for each node) No Yes Yes Note 1: Type of study A Detailed HAZID study will only skip these steps if a conceptual study precedes it and the team accepts that there are no changes to the global or project implementation issues. The HAZID Checklist is comprehensive but not exhaustive. Table 4. They must also be prepared to use the brainstorming process to identify specific novel or unforeseen sources. The team may decide to exclude items suggested by the Team Leader but agreed not to be relevant to the development. Otherwise a Combined Study methodology should be used. Again the Team Leader may suggest mitigation measures where included in the checklist  finally the team will identify the development phase(s) for which the hazard is credible and assess the HSE priority (high. It is important however that these expanders are suggested as examples and not presented as a closed list which will restrict the team’s brainstorming activity  the team will analyse the appropriate controls that should be put in place to prevent or control each threat. 4.4 Brainstorming and Analysis HAZID gives emphasis to the use of the checklist as a prompt for the team to brainstorm. medium or low). or where specific combinations of factors will be identified as causes of concern. It is important that the list of hazards is used in a creative manner and not as a rigid checklist. During this process the Team Leader may suggest examples from the ‘expanders’ section of the checklist. 10 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 . It is only in this way that new or unusual hazards will be recognised. The team knowledge and creativity is used to identify credible causes and hence applicability of the hazards.HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID  in each case the team will analyse each guide word (helped by the examples given in the checklist) to identify any hazard and its potential effects which may then be entered on the worksheet  the brainstorming process will then be used to identify all the potential threats or causes of the release of the hazard.

The hazards and continuous emissions will be further evaluated as a normal part of the later development of the project. During the study the team may use a general qualitative system to give a simple priority rating to the risks (high.2.1 The HAZID process Select Plant AREA or NODE & Section. medium or low) associated with the hazards identified. This would combine an estimation of the HSE consequence of an incident or a continuous emission with its likely probability. Discuss and agree INTENT IDENTIFY HAZARD GUIDE WORD IS IT POSSIBLE IS IT LIKELY ? NO YES BRAINSTORM THREATS & CAUSES ASSESS CONTROLS WHAT BARRIERS OR CONTROLS ARE REQUIRED TO PREVENT OR CONTROL THE EFFECT? The HAZID Process 4. An example of such a system is given in Figure 4. It will also recognise continuous releases from the installation and their effects on the environment. EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 . Select CATEGORY. This will include all emissions not associated with an incident but as part of the design intent.4 HAZID Methodology Figure 4.5 Prioritisation The intention of any study is to identify and describe potential HSE hazards.

shutdown. the study team should consider all the phases of the development from design and construction through to eventual abandonment. These comments should be regarded as expert advice from the HAZID team and not definitive recommendations for action. Recommendations for remedial action are not normally part of the HAZID scope although key items of follow-up should be noted in the Team Leader’s report. Whenever possible. (e. etc. 12 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .2 Simplified incident potential matrix CONSEQUENCE Severity 0 1 2 3 4 5 People No injury Slight injury Minor injury Major injury Single fatality INCREASING PROBABILITY Assets Environment Reputation No damage Slight damage Minor damage Localised damage Major damage No effect Slight effect Minor effect Localised effect Major effect No impact Slight impact Limited impact Considerable impact National impact Multiple Extensive fatalities damage Massive effect International impact A B C D E Never Has Incident Happens Happens heard of occurred has several several in EP in EP occurred times per times per industry industry in Opco year in year in Opco location Low Medium High 4.6 Operating Modes and Life Cycle Issues In a Conceptual HAZID there is unlikely to be sufficient information to consider operating modes and life cycle issues in much depth. 4.7 Recording and Reporting During the study. all hazards which are identified by the team are minuted and described on a HAZID Worksheet (see Appendix II). The minutes of the HAZID study are so structured as to provide a sound basis for the subsequent transfer of the appropriate information. At the end of the study the Team Leader will produce a report which discusses the findings of the study and details the critical issues.g. The team may however use the 'controls' section of the worksheet to propose alternative solutions or methods of reducing risk. ESD and blowdown. where options are being considered at the time of the study) to the HSE Case Hazards and Effects Register. Many hazards are only relevant to unique project phases or become apparent at different stages of the life cycle of the plant development and this should be recorded on the worksheet. e. but it may be possible to consider alternative operating modes.8 Links with the HSE Case Conceptual HAZID uses the Hazards Hierarchy as a working structure. Detailed HAZID uses a less structured checklist but for both study styles the worksheet contains the elements of Description (Hazards and Potential Effects). start-up.g. A Detailed HAZID Study will usually concentrate on the normal operating mode (design case) of the plant. 4. for the actual selected development. This allows for easy transfer of information on to a Hazards and Effects Register for the project.HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID Figure 4. Threats and Controls which are directly transferable to the Hazards and Effects Register.

EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 .4 HAZID Methodology Figure 4. it is most likely that the document will evolve progressively and be published around the time of plant start-up.nf.03 Description jsvfvjhb shfviausfv afh hv a hap hu fphf8 bgj ija sa. Hazards and Effects Register No: 2. describes and broadly categorises/prioritises the HSE hazards inherent in the development. The HSE Case will be updated throughout the project with input from normal design activities.vjnafv afv afnvpau aufj afvfvh uhav hoha v Threats jflsdfnblkbb dre fr nkl d a jklkjdfv. Development Phase Conceptual design P No : 2 1 Fejrnei u nk h kjby. The study identifies.3 Application of HAZID Worksheet to Hazards and Effects Register HAZID Worksheet Source sdrftvy Potential Effects & Hazard jsvfvjhb shfviausfv afhhv a haph ufphf8 b gj ija sa. HAZOPs. Although there are no specific guidelines on the process of documenting the HSE Case as a project design matures. and enables transcription of this information from the HAZID report into Hazards and Effects Register sheet format for further detailing as the project matures. etc.nf. 1 -klfnslcdvr der t cftg 2 -fnfvf cd frtg cmdt 3 -fdklvnf cdr ebtde vda Controls All offered c kjejenr vb eeur eazse. The HSE Case (Hazards and Effects Register) may then contain reference to the HAZID.1. as part of the process to demonstrate comprehensively the management of hazards. Trgr e cvg hmrn . and other safety study findings.vjnafv afv afn vpau aufj afvfvh uhav hohav Number Potential Effects & Hazards to Description Threats & Controls Selectively Transfer Threats jsvfvjhb shfvi ausfv sfg afafhad Control usfhvjbf vbhfbaf jlafsvlafsh fhdbvi Later Detailing A HAZID is useful as a means of initiating the process of compiling the Hazards and Effects Register for the HSE Case.

HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID This page intentionally left blank 14 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .

The main categories are: * Section 1 : External and environmental hazards  Natural and Environmental Hazards  Created (Man-made) Hazards  Effect of the Facility on the Surroundings  Infrastructure  Environmental Damage Section 2 : Facility hazards  Control Methods/Philosophy  Fire and Explosion Hazards  Process Hazards  Utility Systems  Maintenance Hazards  Construction/Existing Facilities * Section 3 : Health hazards  Health Hazards * Section 4 : Project implementation issues  Contracting Strategy  Hazards Recognition and Management  Contingency Planning  Competency EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 . It is not intended to be totally exhaustive and constant feedback from users is appreciated to maintain the most effective current working version. Some sections of the checklist are relevant to a conceptual or combined study only.Appendix I HAZID Checklist APPENDIX I HAZID CHECKLIST The list below recognises the major hazards found by experience of previous HAZID studies. These are shown by an * in the list below.

water links Continuous Plant Discharges to Air Continuous Plant Discharges to Water Continuous Plant Discharges to Soil Emergency/upset Discharges Contaminated Ground Flares. ice. coastal. sandstorms. roads. air links. periods of environmental significance EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 . local attitude. chemical storage Facility Impact Area minimisation. air routes. vulnerable fauna and flora. oil/water separation Drainage. pipeline routing. fugitive emissions.11 Erosion Subsidence Ground slide.01-. strikes. civil disturbance. accommodation camps Shipping lanes. waves. flooding.4 H-09. drainage facilities. military action. foundations.03 H-09.99 Lightning Earthquakes H-15. etc Previous land use.99 Consumables/spares holding Flares. wind. visual impact Local population. energy efficiency Target/legislative requirements. drainage Previous use or events Seasons. political unrest Effect of the Facility on the Surroundings Geographical Infrastructure Plant location. environmental impact assessment Waste Disposal Options Timing of Construction H-09. plant layout. vents. area minimisation Proximity to Population Adjacent Land Use Proximity to Transport Corridors Environmental Issues Social Issues Infrastructure Environmental Damage 16 Crop burning. vents. dust. social/cultural areas of significance Normal Communications Communications for Contingency planning Supply Support Road links. pipeline routing. riverine Ground structure.HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID Section 1: External and environmental hazards Category Guide word Expanders (Examples of guide word application not exclusive) Hazards Hierarchy Natural and Environmental Hazards Climate Extremes Temperature. airfields. blizzards H-09. reservoir depletion Created (Manmade) Hazards Security Hazards Terrorist Activity Internal and external security threats Riots.

access. heavy lifting. blowdown/relief system philosophy. connection of process to utility systems. ESD philosophy. containment and recovery measures) Offsite sources. escalation following release of explosive or flammable fluid (operator error. flares. erosion or corrosion (mitigation measures include: recognise and minimise process hazards during design. remove. process control failure. visited) 1 train. simplification Plant/train/equipment item. commonality of equipment. structural failure. corrosion). minimise and separate inventory) Electricity.Appendix I HAZID Checklist Section 2: Facility hazards Category Guide word Control Methods/ Philosophy Manning/operations Philosophy Operations Concept Maintenance Philosophy Control Philosophy Manning Levels Emergency Response Fire and Explosion Hazards Concurrent Operations Start-up Shutdown Stored Flammables Sources of Ignition Equipment Layout Fire Protection and Response Operator Protection Process Hazards Inventory Release of inventory Over Pressure EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 Expanders (Examples of guide word application . impact. sparks. unmanned. thermal expansion. blowdown. impact process control failure. maintenance requirements Modular or plant wide Improper storage. predominant wind direction (mitigation measures include: reduce degree of confinement.not exclusive) Effect on design. hot surfaces (mitigation measures include: identify. operator error (release). separate) Confinement. x-trains. alternate processes and utility systems) Excessive process stress. (DCS/local panels) Accommodation. module layout/proximity. override. process blockage. etc philosophies Isolation. firefighting facilities Means of escape. defect. emergency response. fire/gas detection. impact (penetration by foreign object). effect on locality (Manned. fire (mitigation measures include: substitute non flammable. plant evacuation Excess hazardous material (mitigation measures include: minimise hazardous inventory. bypass. PPE. orientation of equipment. transport Appropriate technology. defect. flaring requirements Production. communications. travel. inherently safe plant. chemical reaction Hazards Hierarchy H-01 H-10 H-14 H-15 H-01 H-05 H-08 H-01 H-05 . escalation barriers) Active/passive insulation. Consistency with operations and maintenance. support requirements. spacing based on consequence assessment.

etc). hydrates. chemical reaction Overfill storage tanks. blowdown. build-up of wrong phase (sand. hot surfaces. toxic substances Hazards Hierarchy H-10 H-13 H-01 H-01 H-05 H-05 H-05 H-01 H-15 H-11 H-01 H-05 H-01 H-01 H-25 H-25 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 . blowby to downstream vessels Offsite contamination.HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID Section 2: Facility hazards (continued) Category Guide word Over/under Temperature Excess/zero Level Wrong Composition/Phase Utility Systems Maintenance Hazards Construction/ Existing Facilities 18 Firewater Systems Fuel Gas Heating Medium Diesel Fuel Power Supply Steam Drains Inert Gas Waste Storage and Treatment Chemical/fuel Storage Potable Water Sewerage Access Requirements Override Necessity Bypasses Required Commonality of Equipment Heavy Lifting Requirements Transport Tie-ins (shutdown requirements) Concurrent Operations Reuse of Material Common Equipment Capacity Interface Shutdown/blowdown/ ESD Skid Dimensions (weight handling/equipment (congestion) Soil Contamination (existing facilities) Mobilisation/ demobilisation Expanders (Examples of guide word application . failure of separation process.not exclusive) Atmospheric conditions. loss of function in separation vessels. fire.

infection. extreme weather.Appendix I HAZID Checklist Section 3: Health hazards Category Guide word Expanders (Examples of guide word application . e. e. VD. etc stagnant water. working in confined spaces.g. sunlight). hygiene . working in water. hazardous surfaces. ergonomics H-16 H-17 H-18 H-26 Mental Shift patterns H-26 Working Hazards Diving. radiation (ionising. e. failure to use appropriate PPE.g. UV. poor living conditions H-23 Asphyxiation hazards Asphyxiating atmospheres. hazardous equipment.not exclusive) Hazards Hierarchy Health Hazards Disease Hazards Endemic diseases. exhaust H-19 Carcinogenic Chemicals in use H-23 Toxic Hazardous atmosphere. flares. asphyxiating atmosphere. malarial mosquitoes. vessel entry. smoke. quality of roads (mitigation measures include: effective journey management) H-08 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 H-25 . electricity H-06 Transport Excessive journeys. working at heights. contaminated water or foodstuff.g. radioactive scale or non-ionising. social.personal and/or catering. chemicals in use H-19 H-23 Physical Noise. AIDS.

security/military support. etc Hazards Recognition and Management HSE Case Hazards Hierarchy Hazards and Effects Register Project Controls Quality assurance (change control. evacuation Competency Level of Indigenous Training Quality of local workforce and contractors Training Requirements Level of Technology 20 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID Section 4: Project implementation issues Category Guide word Expanders (Examples of guide word application not exclusive) Contracting Strategy Prevailing influence Stability and contractual conditions. firefighting support. plant layout Recovery Measures Medical support. HRA. FIREPRAN. SAFOP. spill leak/clean-up support. contractor selection constraints Legislation Governmental contracting requirements External Standards Additional engineering and construction standards External Environmental Constraints Governmental environmental requirements Hazard Studies HAZOP. EA. QRA. PHR. interdepartmental involvement and interfaces) Contingency Planning Geographical Infrastructure Plant location.

O t h e r 2 = M e d iu m s e v e r ity P O T E N T IA L H A Z A R D S & EFFECTS 1 = H ig h s e v e r it y G U ID E W O R D CATEGORY H A Z ID W o r k s h e e t ( D e t a ile d S t u d y ) M e e tin g D a te : N ode: DEVELO PM EN T PHASE P a g e -1 P* S IP M P ro je c t N o : No: Appendix II HAZID Worksheet APPENDIX II HAZID WORKSHEET .EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 [R e v . P ] P * .H S E P r io r it y CONTROLS 2 M a y .1 9 9 5 3 = L o w s e v e rity THREATS H SE M anual L e a d e r: A .N .

HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID This page intentionally left blank 22 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .

the team will need to identify.heat EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 . GUIDE WORD Lightning Potential hazardous event & effects The team are then invited to brainstorm to identify the hazardous events or effects which could potentially arise from this guide word. Position in the study The team are considering the global issues affecting the plant.flooding Guide Word: Climatic Extremes . This is a conceptual HAZID called to consider the planned scope of the development and the possible reuse of existing equipment. The intention is to reuse as much of the existing plant as possible including for example the refurbishment of the main storage tanks. the hazards or threats which are appropriate. The most significant one is recognised as a rim fire on the floating head storage tanks: POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS EVENT & EFFECTS: Rim fire on oil storage tanks with possible escalation to loss of inventory and major fire. They would then modify the guide word and generate a number of minutes which would look like: Guide Word: Climatic Extremes . e. Note: in this case the guide word is in itself a single threat and does not need modification or explanation. by brainstorming. looking at the HAZID checklist section 1 (Natural & Environmental Hazards) CATEGORY Natural & Environmental Hazards The leader has asked the team to discuss the guide word 'lightning' The team agree that this is a relevant guide word for this project and the identification/ discussion phase may continue. There are a number of potential events which are brainstormed by the team. In other examples.g. Climatic Extremes.Appendix III Example HAZID Minute APPENDIX III EXAMPLE HAZID MINUTE Background The HAZID team are considering a brownfield development to completely modernise an oil export terminal in West Africa.

HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID Threats The team agreed that the plant is situated in a high risk lightning area and several parts of the plant are tall and isolated. THREATS Lightning is a threat to all elevated or isolated parts of the plant. It is known that there are improved equipment and techniques available but the team members were not aware of the details. CONTROLS Existing conventional lightning conductors have been prone to failure. Development phase This hazard and its controls should be considered in the Initial development phase of the project. If lightning strikes cannot be prevented determine optimum tank design to prevent rim fires and firefighting techniques. 24 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 . The scope of the project includes the refurbishment of the floating head storage tanks rather than replacement. DEVELOPMENT PHASE Initial project development phase. It was also recognised that if lightning strikes could not be prevented. It was agreed to investigate alternate methods of lightning protection to determine any benefits. Controls The operating history of the existing plant has shown that the existing lightning conductors have failed on repeated occasions. The incidence of lightning is high in this location. the incidence and effects of rim fires should be reduced by tank design and firefighting techniques. Determine what novel equipment or techniques are available and their benefits. hence becoming natural targets. The risk and effects of lightning strikes were agreed not to be serious enough to recommend that the tanks themselves be replaced by another type. The leader agreed however to minute this point in his overall report in case there were additional hazards found elsewhere in the study which would lead to consideration of replacing the tanks.

*P N 2 5 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 26 September 1995 . Hence it was decided to classify the priority as '2' (medium severity). In chronological order this was the fifth minute of the team.Appendix III Example HAZID Minute Priority & number Rim fires were a known hazard on the plant and had been encountered in the past. There was however a risk of escalation to a major event.

HSE Manual EP 95-0312 HAZID This page intentionally left blank 26 EP 95-0312 Revision 0 29 September 1995 .

GLOSSARY The general glossary for the EP HSE Manual is now in a separate Section EP95-0010 Glossary.V. Revision 0: 29 September 1995 .Shell International Exploration & Production B.

Related Interests