Section 702 Case Neg

Strat Sheet
Their 1AC and a sample 1NC are included below. The plan text
doesnt specify which agency does the plan but their solvency
evidence specifies congress so you can read XO if you want.
Other than XO, there is T-Domestic, a PIC for tangible w/ the
net benefit of terror, specific Terror DA links and a Security K.
The PIC argues that tangible threat is too specific and
doesnt take in account fake threats. We should analyze all
threats regardless of being fake or real.
1NC Security K, PIC w/ Terror DA, T-Domestic, Case
2NC- Security K or PIC, Case
1NR Terror DA
2NR Security K or PIC w/ Terror DA, Case
-Allen Xu
Questions? Email xuallen99@gmail.com

Their 1AC

1AC Inherency
The recent USA Freedom Act, did not reform the NSAs the
mass collection of domestic communication under Section 702
of the FISA Amendments Act.

Goitein 15,
Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and National
Security Program, 6-5-2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reform
The USA Freedom Act will end the bulk collection of phone metadata and prohibit similar
programs for any type of business records under foreign intelligence collection
authorities. For phone records, the government may obtain metadata on an ongoing basis only for suspected
terrorists and those in contact with them. For other types of records, the government must tie its request for
records to a specific selection term, such as a person, address, or account. Given the surge in surveillance since
9/11, the USA Freedom Acts imposition of constraints on collection is historic. Indeed, the USA Freedom Act is the
most significant limitation on foreign intelligence surveillance since the 1970s. If faithfully implemented a critical

Even under
USA Freedom, however, the government is still able to pull in a great deal of
information about innocent Americans. Needless to say, not everyone in contact with a suspected
caveat, to be sure the law will meaningfully curtail the overbroad collection of business records.

terrorist is guilty of a crime; even terrorists call for pizza delivery. Intelligence officials also may need to obtain
records like flight manifests that include information about multiple people, most of whom have nothing to do
with terrorism. Some of this overcollection may be inevitable, but its effects could be mitigated. For instance,
agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after which they
would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More fundamentally,
bulk collection of business records is only one of the many intelligence activities that abandoned the individualized

Until a few years ago, if the NSA, acting within the United
States, wished to obtain communications between Americans and foreigners, it had
to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign power or its
agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may target
any foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans
without obtaining any individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333, which governs the
NSAs activities when it conducts surveillance overseas, the standards are even more lax. The result is mass
surveillance programs that make the phone metadata program seem dainty in
comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners, they
incidentally sweep in massive amounts of Americans data, including the content
of calls, e-mails, text messages, and video chats. Limits on keeping and using such information
are weak and riddled with exceptions. Moreover, foreign targets are not limited to suspected
terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama administration recently
acknowledged, foreigners have privacy rights too , and the ability to eavesdrop on any foreigner
suspicion approach after 9/11.

overseas is an indefensible violation of those rights. Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom
because they hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their likely long-term goal is to avoid
changes to Section 702, Executive Order 12333, and the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection

Privacy advocates who supported USA

Freedom did so because they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle to rein in
surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return to the principle of
individualized suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their
without any individualized showing of wrongdoing.

calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the
full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy advocates who supported it.

The answer

to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the law, but in
the unwritten story of what happens next.

And, the NSA has massively expanded its surveillance since

2008, American internet communication have been intercepted
by NSA surveillance operations far more often than the
intended surveillance targets.
Gellman, 2014
Barton Gellman, Washington Post national staff. Contributed to three Pulitzer Prizes
for The Washington Post, 7-5-2014, "In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far
outnumber the foreigners who are," Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-datathose-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/

Ordinary Internet users, American and non-American alike, far outnumber legally
targeted foreigners in the communications intercepted by the National Security
Agency from U.S. digital networks, according to a four-month investigation by The Washington Post. Nine of
10 account holders found in a large cache of intercepted conversations , which former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden provided in full to The Post, were not the intended surveillance targets but
were caught in a net the agency had cast for somebody else. Many of them were Americans.
Nearly half of the surveillance files, a strikingly high proportion, contained names, email addresses or other details that the NSA marked as belonging to U.S. citizens or
residents. NSA analysts masked, or minimized, more than 65,000 such references to protect Americans privacy, but The
Post found nearly 900 additional e-mail addresses, unmasked in the files, that could be strongly linked to U.S. citizens or

The surveillance files highlight a policy dilemma that has been aired only
abstractly in public. There are discoveries of considerable intelligence value in the
intercepted messages and collateral harm to privacy on a scale that the Obama
administration has not been willing to address. Among the most valuable contents which The Post will
U.S.residents.

not describe in detail, to avoid interfering with ongoing operations are fresh revelations about a secret overseas nuclear project,
double-dealing by an ostensible ally, a military calamity that befell an unfriendly power, and the identities of aggressive intruders
into U.S. computer networks. Months of tracking communications across more than 50 alias accounts, the files show, led directly to
the 2011 capture in Abbottabad of Muhammad Tahir Shahzad, a Pakistan-based bomb builder, and Umar Patek, a suspect in a 2002
terrorist bombing on the Indonesian island of Bali. At the request of CIA officials, The Post is withholding other examples that officials

Many other files, described as useless by the analysts

but nonetheless retained, have a startlingly intimate, even voyeuristic quality . They tell
said would compromise ongoing operations.

stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons, mental-health crises, political and religious conversions, financial anxieties and
disappointed hopes. The daily lives of more than 10,000 account holders who were not targeted are catalogued and recorded
nevertheless. In order to allow time for analysis and outside reporting, neither Snowden nor The Post has disclosed until now that he

The cache Snowden provided came from

domestic NSA operations under the broad authority granted by Congress in 2008
with amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA content is generally stored in
obtained and shared the content of intercepted communications.

closely controlled data repositories, and for more than a year, senior government officials have depicted it as beyond Snowdens
reach.The Post reviewed roughly 160,000 intercepted e-mail and instant-message conversations, some of them hundreds of pages
long, and 7,900 documents taken from more than 11,000 online accounts. The material spans President Obamas first term, from

the files offer an

unprecedented vantage point on the changes wrought by Section 702 of the FISA
amendments, which enabled the NSA to make freer use of methods that for 30
years had required probable cause and a warrant from a judge . One program, codenamed PRISM, extracts content stored in user accounts at Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and
five other leading Internet companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream, intercepts
2009 to 2012, a period of exponential growth for the NSAs domestic collection. Taken together,

data on the move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice and data networks .
No government oversight body, including the Justice Department, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
intelligence committees in Congress or the presidents Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has delved into a
comparably large sample of what the NSA actually collects not only from its
targets but also from people who may cross a targets path.

1AC Privacy Rights

Advantage One is Privacy
First, surveillance under Section 702 is a substantial invasive
of privacy because of the broad targetting guidelines in the
FISA Amendments Act.
Laperruque, 2014,
Jake, Center for Democracy and Tehcnology Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and
Security. Previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the
Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for
Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant
Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014,
https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section702-reform/

Section 702 Surveillance Is Fundamentally More Invasive

While incidental collection of the communications of a person who communicates with a target is an inevitable
feature of communications surveillance, it is tolerated when the reason for the surveillance is compelling and

In other instances of communications surveillance

conducted in the US, surveillance requires court approval of a target, and that
target must be a suspected wrongdoer or spy, a terrorist, or another agent of a
foreign power. Section 702 requires neither of these elements.
adequate procedural checks are in place.

Under Section 702, targeting can occur for the purpose of collecting foreign
intelligence information even though there is no court review of any particular
target. Instead, the super secret FISA court merely determines whether the guidelines under which the
surveillance is conducted are reasonably designed to result in the targeting of non-Americans abroad and that
This means incidental surveillance may occur purely
because someone communicated with an individual engaged in activities that may
have broadly defined foreign intelligence value . For example, the communications of
someone who communicates with a person abroad whose activities might relate to
the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs can be collected, absent any independent
assessment of necessity or accuracy.
minimization guidelines are reasonable.

As another example, under traditional FISA for intelligence surveillance in the U.S. of people in the U.S. your
communications could be incidentally collected only if you were in direct contact with a suspected agent of a
foreign power, and additionally if the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had affirmed this suspicion based on

Under Section 702, your personal information could be scooped up by

the NSA simply because your attorney, doctor, lover, or accountant was a person
abroad who engaged in peaceful political activity such as protesting a G8 summit.
probable cause.

And, these invasions are magnified because the data is the full
content of the communication.

Goitein 15,
Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and National

Security Program., 6-5-2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reform

Some of this overcollection may be inevitable, but its effects could be mitigated .
For instance, agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after
which they would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More
fundamentally, bulk collection of business records is only one of the many intelligence activities that abandoned the

Until a few years ago, if the NSA, acting within the

United States, wished to obtain communications between Americans and foreigners,
it had to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign power or
its agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may
target any foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans
without obtaining any individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333, which governs the
NSAs activities when it conducts surveillance overseas, the standards are even more lax. The result is mass
surveillance programs that make the phone metadata program seem dainty in
comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners, they
incidentally sweep in massive amounts of Americans data, including the content
of calls, e-mails, text messages, and video chats . Limits on keeping and using such
information are weak and riddled with exceptions . Moreover, foreign targets are not limited to
individualized suspicion approach after 9/11.

suspected terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama administration recently acknowledged,
foreigners have privacy rights too, and the ability to eavesdrop on any foreigner overseas is an indefensible

Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom

because they hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their
likely long-term goal is to avoid changes to Section 702, Executive Order 12333, and
the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection without any
individualized showing of wrongdoing . Privacy advocates who supported USA Freedom did so because
violation of those rights.

they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle to rein in surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return
to the principle of individualized suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their
calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the

The answer
to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the law, but in
the unwritten story of what happens next.
full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy advocates who supported it.

And, indiscriminate wide-scale NSA Surveillance erodes privacy

rights and violates the constitution

Sinha, 2014
G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014
With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism,
Law, and American Democracy Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/node/127364

The United States government today is implementing a wide variety of surveillance

programs that, thanks to developments in its technological capacity, allow it to scoop up personal
information and the content of personal communications on an unprecedented
scale. Media reports based on revelations by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
Edward Snowden have recently shed light on many of these program s. They have
revealed, for example, that the US collects vast quantities of informationknown as metadataabout phone calls
made to, from, and within the US.

It also routinely collects the content of international chats,

emails, and voice calls.

It has engaged in the large-scale collection of massive amounts of cell phone

location data. Reports have also revealed a since-discontinued effort to track internet usage and email patterns in
the US; the comprehensive interception of all of phone calls made within, into, and out of Afghanistan and the
Bahamas; the daily collection of millions of images so the NSA can run facial recognition programs; the acquisition
of hundreds of millions of email and chat contact lists around the world; and the NSAs deliberate weakening of

In response to public concern over the programs intrusion on

the privacy of millions of people in the US and around the world, the US government has at
times acknowledged the need for reform. However, it has taken few meaningful
steps in that direction. On the contrary, the USparticularly the intelligence communityhas forcefully
global encryption standards.

defended the surveillance programs as essential to protecting US national security. In a world of constantly shifting
global threats, officials argue that the US simply cannot know in advance which global communications may be
relevant to its intelligence activities, and that as a result, it needs the authority to collect and monitor a broad
swath of communications. In our interviews with them, US officials argued that the programs are effective, plugging
operational gaps that used to exist, and providing the US with valuable intelligence. They also insisted the programs
are lawful and subject to rigorous and multi-layered oversight, as well as rules about how the information obtained
through them is used. The government has emphasized that it does not use the information gleaned from these

The questions raised by

surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national
security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights
to that end. At the same time, international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the
states authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to
undermine so many other rights. The current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US
approach to surveillance carries enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and
sets a terrible example for other countries like India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others
programs for illegitimate purposes, such as persecuting political opponents.

that are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in advocating
internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an important foreign policy objective since at least

US surveillance programs are also doing damage to some of

the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include freedoms of
expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all
protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.
2010.As this report documents,

And, these privacy violations are more dangerous than any risk
of terrorism, which is magnified by the fact that surveillance
fails to prevent attacks.

Schneier, 2014
Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard
Law School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory
Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient
Systems, Inc.,1-6-2014, "Essays: How the NSA Threatens National Security,"

Schneier On Security,
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/how_the_nsa_threaten.html

We have no evidence that any of this surveillance makes us safer . NSA Director General
Keith Alexander responded to these stories in June by claiming that he disrupted 54 terrorist plots. In October, he

At this point, the only "plot"

prevented was that of a San Diego man sending $8,500 to support a Somali militant
group. We have been repeatedly told that these surveillance programs would have been able to stop 9/11, yet
the NSA didn't detect the Boston bombingseven though one of the two terrorists was on the
watch list and the other had a sloppy social media trail. Bulk collection of data and metadata is an
ineffective counterterrorism tool. Not only is ubiquitous surveillance ineffective, it is
extraordinarily costly. I don't mean just the budgets, which will continue to skyrocket. Or the diplomatic
revised that number downward to 13, and then to "one or two."

costs, as country after country learns of our surveillance programs against their citizens. I'm also talking about the

It breaks so much of what our society has built. It breaks our political
systems, as Congress is unable to provide any meaningful oversight and citizens are kept in the dark about what
government does. It breaks our legal systems, as laws are ignored or reinterpreted, and people are unable
to challenge government actions in court . It breaks our commercial systems, as U.S. computer
cost to our society.

products and services are no longer trusted worldwide. It breaks our technical systems, as the very protocols of the

And it breaks our social systems; the loss of privacy, freedom,

and liberty is much more damaging to our society than the occasional act of random
violence. And finally, these systems are susceptible to abuse. This is not just a hypothetical
Internet become untrusted.

problem. Recent history illustrates many episodes where this information was, or would have been, abused: Hoover
and his FBI spying, McCarthy, Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement, anti-war Vietnam protesters, and
more recentlythe Occupy movement. Outside the U.S., there are even more extreme examples .

Building
the surveillance state makes it too easy for people and organizations to slip over the
line into abuse.

The First impact is the loss of personal autonomy and agency.

Privacy is a gateway right, it enables all of our other freedoms.

PoKempne 2014,
Dinah, General Counsel at Human Rights Watch, The Right Whose Time Has Come
(Again): Privacy in the Age of Surveillance 1/21/14 http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2014/essays/privacy-in-age-of-surveillance

Technology has invaded the sacred precincts of private life, and unwarranted
exposure has imperiled our security, dignity, and most basic values. The law must
rise to the occasion and protect our rights. Does this sound familiar? So argued Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article announcing
The Right to Privacy. We are again at such a juncture . The technological developments they
saw as menacingphotography and the rise of the mass circulation pressappear rather quaint to us now. But the
harms to emotional, psychological, and even physical security from unwanted exposure seem just as vivid in our
digital age.Our

renewed sense of vulnerability comes as almost all aspects of daily

social life migrate online. At the same time, corporations and governments have acquired frightening

abilities to amass and search these endless digital records, giving them the power to know us in extraordinary
detail.

In a world where we share our lives on social media and trade immense amounts of personal
information for the ease and convenience of online living, some have questioned whether privacy is
a relevant concept. It is not just relevant, but crucial.
Indeed, privacy is a gateway right that affects our ability to exercise almost every
other right, not least our freedom to speak and associate with those we choose,
make political choices, practice our religious beliefs, seek medical help, access
education, figure out whom we love, and create our family life. It is nothing less
than the shelter in which we work out what we think and who we are; a fulcrum of
our autonomy as individuals.
The importance of privacy, a right we often take for granted, was thrown into sharp relief in
2013 by the steady stream of revelations from United States government files released by former National
Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden, and published in the Guardian and other major newspapers
around the world. These revelations, supported by highly classified documents, showed the US, the UK,
and other governments engaged in global indiscriminate data interception, largely
unchecked by any meaningful legal constraint or oversight, without regard for the
rights of millions of people who were not suspected of wrongdoing.

The Second impact is Totalitarianism, the loss of autonomy due

to surveillance enables turnkey totalitarianism, destroying
democracy.

Haggerty, 2015
Kevin D. Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta, Whats
Wrong with Privacy Protections? in A World Without Privacy: What Law Can and
Should Do? Edited by Austin Sarat p. 230

emphasis on the threat of authoritarian forms of rule

inherent in populations open to detailed institutional scrutiny will be portrayed as overblown
and over dramatic, suggesting I veer towards the lunatic fringe of unhinged conspiracy theorists.66 But one
does not have to believe secret forces are operating behind the scenes to recognize that
our declining private realm presents alarming dangers . Someone as conservative and deeply
embedded in the security establishment as William Binney a former NSA senior executive
says the security surveillance infrastructure he helped build now puts us on the
verge of turnkey totalitarianism.67 The contemporary expansion of surveillance ,
where monitoring becomes an ever-more routine part of our lives, represents a tremendous shift in
the balance of power between citizens and organizations. Perhaps the greatest danger
of this situation is how our existing surveillance practices can be turned to oppressive uses.
Still others will say I am being alarmist. My

our expanding surveillance infrastructure stands as a resource to

be inherited by future generations of politicians, corporate actors, or even messianic leaders.
Given sufficient political will this surveillance infrastructure can be re-purposed to monitor
in unparalleled detail people who some might see as undesirable due to their political opinions,
religion, skin color, gender, birthplace, physical abilities, medical history, or any
number of an almost limitless list of factors used to pit people against one another . The
twentieth century provides notorious examples of such repressive uses of
surveillance. Crucially, those tyrannical states exercised fine-grained political control by
relying on surveillance infrastructures that today seem laughably rudimentary,
comprised as they were of paper files, index cards, and elementary telephone tapping.68 It is no more
alarmist to acknowledge such risks are germane to our own societies than it is to
recognize the future will see wars, terrorist attacks, or environmental disasters
events that could themselves prompt surveillance structures to be re-calibrated towards
more coercive ends. Those who think this massive surveillance infrastructure will
not, in the fullness of time, be turned to repressive purposes are either innocent as to the realities of
power, or whistling past a graveyard. But one does not have to dwell on the most extreme possibilities to
From this point forward

be unnerved by how enhanced surveillance capabilities invest tremendous powers in organizations.

Surveillance capacity gives organizations unprecedented abilities to manipulate

human behaviors, desires, and subjectivities towards organizational ends ends that
are too often focused on profit, personal aggrandizement, and institutional self-interest rather
than human betterment.

Freedom and dignity are ethically prior to security.

Cohen, 2014
Elliot D. Ph.D., ethicist and political analyst. He is the editor in chief of the
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Technology of Oppression: Preserving
Freedom and Dignity in an Age of Mass, Warrantless Surveillance.. DOI:
10.1057/9781137408211.0011.
The threat posed by mass, warrantless surveillance technologies
Presently, such a threat to human freedom and dignity lies in the technological
erosion of human privacy through the ever-evolving development and deployment
of a global, government system of mass, warrantless surveillance . Taken to its logical
conclusion, this is a systematic means of spying on, and ultimately manipulating and
controlling, virtually every aspect of everybody's private life a thoroughgoing, global
dissolution of personal space, which is supposed to be legally protected. In such a governmental state
of "total (or virtually total) information awareness," the potential for government control and
manipulation of the people's deepest and most personal beliefs, feelings, and values can
transform into an Orwellian realityand nightmare. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the
technology that has the potential to remove such scenarios from the realm of science fiction to that of true science
is currently being developed. This is not to deny the legitimate government interest in "national security"; however,

the exceptional disruption of privacy for legitimate state reasons cannot and should
not be mistaken for a usual and customary rule of mass invasion of people's private
lives without their informed consent. Benjamin Franklin wisely and succinctly
expressed the point: "Those who surrender freedom for security will not have, nor
do they deserve, either one." In relinquishing our privacy to government, we also

lose the freedom to control, and act on, our personal information, which is what
defines us individually, and collectively, as free agents and a free nation. In a world
devoid of freedom to control who we are, proclaiming that we are "secure" is an
empty platitude.

1AC Economy Advantage

Advantage Two is the Economy.
NSA surveillance has put the US ecomony and competive
advantage at risk because of losses in the technology sector.
The USA freedom act wont solve the problem.
Mindock 2015
Clark Mindock - Reporting Fellow at International Business Times Internally quoting
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. ITIF is a non-partisan
research and educational institute a think tank NSA Surveillance Could Cost
Billions For US Internet Companies After Edward Snowden Revelations International Business Times - June 10 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/nsasurveillance-could-cost-billions-us-internet-companies-after-edward-snowden1959737
Failure to reform National Security Administration spying programs revealed by Edward
Snowden could be more economically taxing than previously thought , says a new study
published by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation Tuesday. The study suggests the
programs could be affecting the technology sector as a whole, not just the cloudcomputing sector, and that the costs could soar much higher than previously
expected. Even modest declines in cloud computing revenues from the revealed
surveillance programs, according to a previous report, would cost between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by
2016. New estimates show that the toll will likely far exceed ITIFs initial $35 billion estimate. The U.S.
governments failure to reform many of the NSAs surveillance programs has damaged
the competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector and cost it a portion of the global
market share, a summary of the report said. Revelations by defense contractor Snowden in June 2013
exposed massive U.S. government surveillance capabilities and showed the NSA collected American phone records

bulk phone-record revelations, and many others in the same vein,

Internet companies in providing the data,
raised questions about the transparency of American surveillance programs and
prompted outrage from privacy advocates. The study, published this week, argues that unless the
American government can vigorously reform how NSA surveillance is regulated and
overseen, U.S. companies will lose contracts and, ultimately, their competitive edge in
a global market as consumers around the world choose cloud computing and
technology options that do not have potential ties to American surveillance
programs. The report comes amid a debate in Congress on what to do with the Patriot
Act, the law that provides much of the authority for the surveillance programs. As of June 1, authority
to collect American phone data en masse expired, though questions remain as to whether
letting that authority expire is enough to protect privacy. Supporters of the programs argue that they
provide the country with necessary capabilities to fight terrorism abroad. A further reform made the
phone records collection process illegal for the government, and instead gave that
responsibility to the telecom companies.
in bulk, and without a warrant. The

including the required complacency of American telecom and

Reform is necessary to regain US leadership in the global

marketplace.
Castro and Mcquinn 2015
Daniel Castro is the Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation and Director of the Center for Data Innovation; Alan McQuinn is a
Research Assistant with The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.
Prior to joining ITIF, he was a telecommunications fellow for Congresswoman Anna
Eshoo, an Honorary Co-Chair of ITIF, 6/9/15, Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How
U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation http://www.itif.org/publications/2015/06/09/beyond-usafreedom-act-how-us-surveillance-still-subverts-us-competitiveness

When historians write about this period in U.S. history it could very well be that one of the
themes will be how the United States lost its global technology leadership to other
nations. And clearly one of the factors they would point to is the long-standing
privileging of U.S. national security interests over U.S. industrial and commercial
interests when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. This has occurred over the last few years as the U.S.
government has done relatively little to address the rising commercial challenge to
U.S. technology companies, all the while putting intelligence gathering first and foremost.
Indeed, policy decisions by the U.S. intelligence community have reverberated
throughout the global economy. If the U.S. tech industry is to remain the leader in
the global marketplace, then the U.S. government will need to set a new course that
balances economic interests with national security interests. The cost of inaction is
not only short-term economic losses for U.S. companies, but a wave of protectionist
policies that will systematically weaken U.S. technology competiveness in years to come,
with impacts on economic growth, jobs, trade balance, and national security
through a weakened industrial base. Only by taking decisive steps to reform its
digital surveillance activities will the U.S. government enable its tech industry to
effectively compete in the global market.

The US is the driving force behind global economic recovery

Economist 2015
American shopper, 2-14, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643188world-once-again-relying-too-much-american-consumers-power-growth-americanshopper

A Global economy running on a single engine is better than one that needs jump
leads. The American economy is motoring again, to the relief of exporters from
Hamburg to Hangzhou. Firms added more than 1m net new jobs in the past three months, the best showing
since 1997 (see article). Buoyed up by cheap petrol, Americans are spending; in January consumer sentiment
jumped to its highest in more than a decade.

The IMF reckons that American growth will hit 3.6%

in 2015, faster than the world economy as a whole . All this is good. But growing dependence on
the American economyand on consumers in particularhas unwelcome echoes. A decade ago American
consumers borrowed heavily and recklessly. They filled their ever-larger houses with goods from China; they fuelled
gas-guzzling cars with imported oil. Big exporters recycled their earnings back to America, pushing down interest
rates which in turn helped to feed further borrowing. Europe was not that different. There, frugal Germans financed
debt binges around the euro areas periphery.After the financial crisis, the hope was of an end to these imbalances.
Debt-addicted Americans and Spaniards would chip away at their obligations; thrifty German and Chinese
consumers would start to enjoy life for once. At first, this seemed to be happening. Americas trade deficit, which

But now the world is slipping back into

some nasty habits. Hair grows faster than the euro zone, and what growth there is
depends heavily on exports. The countries of the single currency are running a
current-account surplus of about 2.6% of GDP, thanks largely to exports to America.
At 7.4% of GDP, Germanys trade surplus is as large as it has ever been. Chinas
growth, meanwhile, is slowingand once again relying heavily on spending
elsewhere. It notched up its own record trade surplus in January. Chinas exports have actually begun to drop,
was about 6% of GDP in 2006, had more than halved by 2009.

but imports are down by more. And over the past year the renminbi, which rose by more than 10% against the
dollar in 2010-13, has begun slipping again, to the annoyance of American politicians. A mericas

economy is
warping as a result. Consumptions contribution to growth in the fourth quarter of
2014 was the largest since 2006. The trade deficit is widening. Strip out oil, and Americas trade deficit
grew to more than 3% of GDP in 2014, and is approaching its pre-recession peak of about 4%. The worlds
reliance on America is likely to deepen. Germans are more interested in shipping savings abroad
than investing at home (see article). Households and firms in Europes periphery are overburdened with debt,
workers wages squeezed and banks in no mood to lend. Like Germany, Europe as a whole is relying on exports.
China is rebalancing, but not fast enough: services have yet to account for more than half of annual Chinese output.

Additionally, NSA surveillance has created a global move

towards data nationalisation which threatens to fragment
the internet.
Omtzigt 15,
Pieter Herman Omtzigt is a Dutch politician. As a member of the Christian
Democratic Appeal he was an MP from June 3, 2003 to June 17, 2010 and is
currently an MP since October 26, 2010. He focuses on matters of taxes, pensions
and additions. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Pieter Omtzigt, rapporteur
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mass surveillance Report, 1/26/2015,
http://website-pace.net/documents/19838/1085720/20150126-MassSurveillanceEN.pdf

In response to growing discontent with US surveillance, one political response has been
to push for more technological sovereignty and data nationalisation. The
Snowden disclosures have therefore had serious implications on the development of
the Internet and hastened trends to balkanize the Internet to the detriment of the
development of a wide, vast and easily accessible online network. The Internet as we
knew it, or believed we knew it, is a global platform for exchange of information, open and
free debate, and commerce. But Brazil and the European Union , for example,
announced plans to lay a $185 million undersea fibre-optic cable between them to
108.

thwart US surveillance. German politicians also called for the development of a German internet for
German customers data to circumvent foreign servers and the information to stay on networks that would fully be

Russia passed a law obliging internet companies to store the

data of Russian users on servers in Russia .160 After a six-month inquiry following the Snowden
under Germanys control. 159

disclosures, the European Parliament adopted a report on the NSA surveillance programme in February 2014 161,
which argues that the EU should suspend bank data and Safe Harbour agreements on data privacy (voluntary data
protection standards for non-EU companies transferring EU citizens personal data to the US) with the United States.
MEPs added that the European Parliament should only give its consent to the EU-US free trade deal (TTIP) that is

The European Parliament

seeks tough new data protection rules that would place US companies in the
difficult situation of having to check with EU authorities before complying with
mandatory requests made by US authorities . The European Parliaments LIBE Committee also
being negotiated, if the US fully respects EU citizens fundamental rights.

advocated the creation of a European data cloud that would require all data from European consumers to be

Some
nations, such as Australia, France, South Korea, and India, have already
implemented a patchwork of data-localisation requirements according to two legal
scholars.162
stored or processed within Europe, or even within the individual country of the consumer concerned.

This regional fragmentation of the internet would collapse the

global economy and create the necessary conditions for global
instability.
Jardine, 2014
Eric CIGI Research Fellow, Global Security & Politics, 9-19-2014, "Should the Average
Internet User in a Liberal Democracy Care About Internet Fragmentation? ," Cigi,
https://www.cigionline.org/blogs/reimagining-internet/should-average-internet-userliberal-democracy-care-about-internet-fragme
Even though your average liberal democratic Internet user wouldnt see it, at least
at the content level, the fragmentation of the Internet would matter a great deal. If
the Internet was to break apart into regional or even national blocks, there would be
large economic costs in terms of lost future potential for global GDP growth. As a
recent McKinsey & Company report illustrates, upwards of 15 to 25 percent of
Global GDP is currently determined by the movement of goods, money, people and
data. These global flows (which admittedly include more than just data flows)
contribute yearly between 250 to 400 billion dollars to global GDP growth. The
contribution of global flows to global GDP growth is only likely to grow in the future,
provided that the Internet remains a functionally universal system that works
extraordinarily well as a platform for e-commerce. Missing out on lost GDP growth
harms people economically in liberal democratic countries and elsewhere. Average
users in the liberal democracies should care, therefore, about the fragmentation of
the broader Internet because it will cost them dollars and cents, even if the
fragmentation of the Internet would not really affect the content that they
themselves access.Additionally, the same Mckinsey & Company report notes that
countries that are well connected to the global system have GDP growth that is up
to 40 percent higher than those countries that have fewer connections to the wider
world. Like interest rates, annual GDP growth compounds itself, meaning that early
gains grow exponentially. If the non-Western portions of the Internet wall

themselves off from the rest (or even if parts of what we could call the liberal
democratic Internet do the same), the result over the long term will be slower
growth and a smaller GDP per capita in less well-connected nations. Some people
might look at this situation and be convinced that excluding people in non-liberal
democracies from the economic potential of the Internet is not right. In normative
terms, these people might deserve to be connected, at the very least so that they
can benefit from the same economic boon as those in more well connected
advanced liberal democracies. In other words, average Internet users in liberal
democracies should care about Internet fragmentation because it is essentially an
issue of equality of opportunity.Other people might only be convinced by the idea
that poverty, inequality, and relative deprivation, while by no means sufficient
causes of terrorism, insurgency, aggression and unrest, are likely to contribute to
the potential for an increasingly conflictual world. Most average Internet users in
Liberal democracies would likely agree that preventing flashes of unrest (like the
current ISIL conflict in Iraq and Syria) is better than having to expend blood and
treasure to try and fix them after they have broken out. Preventive measures can
include ensuring solid GDP growth through global interconnection in every country,
even if this is not, as I mentioned before, going to be enough to fix every problem
every time. Overall, the dangers of a fragmented Internet are real and the average
user in liberal democracies should care. With truly global forces at play, it is
daunting to think of what the average user might do to combat fragmentation.
Really only one step is realistic. Users need to recognize that the system works best
and contributes most to the content and material well-being of all Internet users
when it approaches its ideal technical design of universal interoperability. Societies
will rightly determine that some things need to be walled off, blocked or filtered
because this digital content has physical world implications that are not acceptable
(child pornography, vitriolic hate speech, death threats, underage bullying on social
media, etc.). However, in general, citizens should resist Internet fragmentation
efforts in any form by putting pressure on their national politicians, Internet Service
Providers, and content intermediaries, like Google, to respect the fundamental (and
fundamentally beneficial) universally interoperable structure of the Internet. To do
otherwise is to accept the loss of potential future global prosperity and to encourage
a world that is unequal and prone to conflict and hardship.

The impact of economic decline is great power war.

James, 2014
Harold, Princeton history professor,Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world
war?, 7-2, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/

Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging. Then an
economically declining power, Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against
its larger and faster growing competit ors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in
turn obsessed by being overtaken by China according to some calculations, set to become the

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial

institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction , but also as potential
worlds largest economy in 2014.

instruments for the application of national power. In managing the 2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on
U.S. dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal
Reserve. The United States provided that support to some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly
political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the Dollar Trap.

Geo-politics is intruding

into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to acquire assets
in Central and Eastern Europe. European and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance.
Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to
build up the renminbi as a major international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit

The next
stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national
advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful)
rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias of the existing (American-based) agencies.

part of the pressure applied to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more
powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. The test is in the Western
imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Vladimir Putins calculation in response is
that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious about the financial war. It would turn into
a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of Europe and

The threat of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty, one

that mirrors the decisive feature of the crisis of the summer of 1914. At that time,
no one could really know whether clashes would escalate or not. T hat feature contrasts
America.

remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the 1960s, when the strategic doctrine of

The idea of
network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage by surprise, and to win
at no or low cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others
might, but also might not be able to, mount the same sort of operation. Just as in
1914, there is an enhanced temptation to roll the dice, even though the game may
be fatal.
Mutually Assured Destruction left no doubt that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate.

1AC Internet Freedom

NSA spying has undermined American foreign policy. It
undercut any credibility to push for democratic freedom in
repressive regimes, repressive surveillance is growing
worldwide as a result.
Schneier 15
Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard
Law School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory
Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient
Systems, Inc 3/2/15, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and
Control Your World. P. 106

In 2010, then secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave a speech declaring Internet freedom a
major US foreign policy goal. To this end, the US State Department funds and supports a variety of
programs worldwide, working to counter censorship, promote encryption, and enable anonymity, all designed " to
ensure that any child, born anywhere in the world, has access to the global Internet
as an open platform on which to innovate, learn, organize, and express herself free
from undue interference or censorship." This agenda has been torpedoed by the
awkward realization that the US and other democratic governments conducted the same
types of surveillance they have criticized in more repressive countries. Those
repressive countries are seizing on the opportunity, pointing to US surveillance as a
justification for their own more draconian Internet policies: more surveillance, more
censorship, and a more isolationist Internet that gives individual countries more
control over what their citizens see and say . For example, one of the defenses the
government of Egypt offered for its plans to monitor social media was that "the US
listens in to phone calls, and supervises anyone who could threaten its national
security." Indians are worried that their government will cite the US's actions to justify surveillance in that
country. Both China and Russia publicly called out US hypocrisy. This affects Internet freedom
worldwide. Historically, Internet governancewhat little there waswas largely left to the
United States, because everyone more or less believed that we were working for the security of the Internet
instead of against it. But now that the US has lost much of its credibility, Internet
governance is in turmoil. Many of the regulatory bodies that influence the Internet are trying to figure out
what sort of leadership model to adopt. Older international standards organizations like the International
Telecommunications Union are trying to increase their influence in Internet governance and develop a more

This is the cyber sovereignty movement, and it threatens to

fundamentally fragment the Internet. It's not new, but it has been given an
enormous boost from the revelations of NSA spying. Countries like Russia, China,
and Saudi Arabia are pushing for much more autonomous control over the portions
of the Internet within their borders. That, in short, would be a disaster. The Internet
is fundamentally a global platform. While countries continue to censor and control,
today people in repressive regimes can still read information from and exchange
ideas with the rest of the world. Internet freedom is a human rights issue, and one
that the US should support.
nationalist set of rules.

Further, this hypocrisy has created the conditions that will

accelerate the global rise of authoritarianism.
Chenoweth & Stephan 2015
Erica Chenoweth, political scientist at the University of Denver.& Maria J. Stephan,
Senior Policy Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic
Council.7-7-2015, "How Can States and Non-State Actors Respond to Authoritarian
Resurgence?," Political Violence @ a Glance,
http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/07/how-can-states-and-non-stateactors-respond-to-authoritarian-resurgence/

Chenoweth: Why is authoritarianism making a comeback? Stephan: Theres obviously no

single answer to this. But part of the answer is that democracy is losing its allure in parts of the
world. When people dont see the economic and governance benefits of democratic transitions, they lose hope.
Then theres the compelling stability first argument. Regimes around the world, including China
and Russia, have readily cited the chaos of the Arab Spring to justify heavyhanded policies and consolidating their grip on power . The color revolutions that toppled
autocratic regimes in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine inspired similar dictatorial retrenchment. There is nothing
new about authoritarian regimes adapting to changing circumstances. Their
resilience is reinforced by a combination of violent and non-coercive measures. But
authoritarian paranoia seems to have grown more piqued over the past decade .
Regimes have figured out that people power endangers their grip on power and they are cracking down .
Theres no better evidence of the effectiveness of civil resistance than the measures
that governments take to suppress itsomething you detail in your chapter from my new book.
Finally, and importantly, democracy in this country and elsewhere has taken a hit lately.
Authoritarian regimes mockingly cite images of torture, mass surveillance, and the catering to
the radical fringes happening in the US political system to refute pressures to democratize
themselves. The financial crisis here and in Europe did not inspire much confidence in democracy and we are
seeing political extremism on the rise in places like Greece and Hungary. Here in the US we need to get
our own house in order if we hope to inspire confidence in democracy abroad.

American surveillance is the primary driver behind this

authoritarian accelleration. The plan is necessary to restore US
credibility.
Jackson, 2015
Dean Jackson is an assistant program officer at the International Forum for
Democratic Studies. He holds an M.A. from the University of Chicagos Committee
on International Relations, 7-14-2015, "The Authoritarian Surge into Cyberspace,"
International Forum For Democratic Studies,
http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/the-authoritarian-surge-into-cyberspace/

This still leaves open the question of what is driving authoritarian innovation in cyberspace .

Deibert identifies
increased government emphasis on cybersecurity as one driver : cybercrime and terrorism
are serious concerns, and governments have a legitimate interest in combatting them. Unfortunately, when
democratic governments use mass surveillance and other tools to police

cyberspace, it can have the effect of providing cover for authoritarian regimes to
use similar techniques for repressive purposesespecially, as Deibert notes, since former NSA
contractor Edward Snowdens disclosure of US mass surveillance programs. Second, Deibert
observes that authoritarian demand for cybersecurity technology is often met by
private firms based in the democratic worlda group that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls the
Corporate Enemies of the Internet. Hacking Team, an Italian firm mentioned in the RSF report, is just one
example: The Guardian reports that leaked internal documents suggest Hacking Teams clients include the
governments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

in a world where Big Brother and Big Data share so many of the
same needs, the political economy of cybersecurity must be singled out as a major
driver of resurgent authoritarianism in cyberspace. Given these powerful forces, it will be
Deibert writes that

difficult to reverse the authoritarian surge in cyberspace. Deibert offers some possible solutions: for starters, he
writes that the political economy of cybersecurity can be altered through stronger export controls, smart
sanctions, and a monitoring system to detect abuses. Further, he recommends that cybersecurity trade fairs open
their doors to civil society watchdogs who can help hold governments and the private sector accountable. Similarly,
Deibert suggests that opening regional cybersecurity initiatives to civil society participation could mitigate
violations of user rights. This might seem unlikely to occur within some authoritarian-led intergovernmental
organizations, but setting a normative expectation of civil society participation might help discredit the efforts of

Deibert concludes with a final recommendation that society develop

models of cyberspace security that can show us how to prevent disruptions or
threats to life and property without sacrificing liberties and rights. This might
restore democratic states to the moral high ground and remove oppressive regimes
rhetorical cover, but developing such models will require confronting powerful vested interests
and seriously examining the tradeoff between cybersecurity and Internet freedom.
Doing so would be worth it: the Internet is far too important to cede to authoritarian
control.
bad actors.

The impact the failure of global democratic consolidation

causes extinction.
Diamond, 1995
Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the
1990s, December, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the
former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal
drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with

Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on
Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered . Most of these new and
unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or
absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that
govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.
They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders.
Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and
they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.

terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use
on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely

and the rule of law,

democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international
security and prosperity can be built.
because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights,

1AC Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should limit the
scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose
sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose
targets pose a tangible threat to national security.

1AC Solvency
The plan solves, limiting the purposes of 702 collection to a
tangible threat to national security is critical to solve
overcollection.
Sinha, 2014
G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014
With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism,
Law, and American Democracy Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/node/127364
Narrow the purposes for which all foreign intelligence surveillance may be
conducted and limit such surveillance to individuals, groups, or entities who pose a
tangible threat to national security or a comparable state interest. o Among other steps, Congress
should pass legislation amending Section 702 of FISA and related surveillance authorities to
narrow the scope of what can be acquired as foreign intelligence information,
which is now defined broadly to encompass, among other things, information related to
the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. It should be restricted to what is
necessary and proportionate to protect legitimate aims identified in the ICCPR, such as national security. In
practice,

this should mean that the government may acquire information only from
individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security
narrowly defined, or a comparable compelling state interest.

And, this limit solves without damaging counterterrorism.

Laperruque 2014,
Jake, CDTs Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously served as a law
clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the
Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet
Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy
& Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-usersshould-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

There are sensible reforms that can significant limit the

collateral damage to privacy caused by Section 702 without impeding national
security. Limiting the purposes for which Section 702 can be conducted will narrow
the degree to which communications are monitored between individuals not
suspected of wrongdoing or connected to national security threats . Closing retention
loopholes present in the Minimization Guidelines governing that surveillance will ensure that when
Americans communications are incidentally collected, they are not kept absent
national security needs. And closing the backdoor search loophole would ensure
that when Americans communications are retained because they communicated
with a target of Section 702 surveillance, they couldnt be searched unless the
standards for domestic surveillance of the American are met.
Where Do We Go From Here?

And, the plan eliminates the collection of communication

about targets -that solves upstream collection.
Nojeim, 2014
Greg, Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology Comments To The Privacy
And Civil Liberties Oversight Board Regarding Reforms To Surveillance Conducted
Pursuant To Section 702 Of Fisa April 11, 2014
https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2014/04/CDT_PCLOB-702Comments_4.11.13.pdf

Collection of communications about targets that are neither to nor from targets
should be prohibited. The Government takes the position that Section 702 permits it to collect not only
C.

communications that are to or from a foreign intelligence target, but also communications that are about the
target because they mention an identifier associated with the target.17 The practice directs the focus of
surveillance away from suspected wrongdoers and permits the NSA to target communications between individuals

Because this is inconsistent with the legislative

history of the statute, and raises profound constitutional and operational problems,
PCLOB should recommend that about collection be ended, and that Section 702
surveillance be limited to communications to and from targets . Section 702 authorizes the
with no link to national security investigations.

government to target the communications of persons reasonably believed to be abroad, but it never defines the
term target. However, throughout Section 702, the term is used to refer to the targeting of an individual rather
content of a communication.18 Further, the entire congressional debate on Section 702 includes no reference to
collecting communications about a foreign target, and significant debate about collecting communications to or

To collect about communications, the NSA engages in upstream

surveillance on the Internet backbone,20 meaning on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows
past,21 temporarily copying the content of the entire data stream so it can be
searched for the same selectors used for the downstream or PRISM surveillance .
from a target.19

As a result, the NSA has the capability to search any Internet communication going into or out of the U.S.22 without

Direct access creates direct opportunity for abuse,

and should not be permitted to a military intelligence agency . This dragnet scanning also
particularized intervention by a provider.

results in the collection of multi-communication transactions, (MCTs) which include tens of thousands wholly
domestic communications each year.23 The FISC required creation of new minimization rules for MCTs in 2011, but
did not limit their collection.24 The mass searching of communications content inside the United States, knowing
that it the communications searched include tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications each year,

Abandoning collection of communications about

targets would remove any justification for upstream collection, eliminate the serious
problems posed by direct government access to the Internet infrastructure,
eliminate the collection of tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications in
contravention of the statute, an make surveillance under Section 702 consistent
with the congressional intent.
raises profound constitutional questions.

And, these limits restore US leadership.

Edgar, 2015
Timothy H. Edgar is a visiting scholar at the Brown Universitys Watson Institute for

International Studies. He was the first-ever director of privacy and civil liberties for
the White House National Security Staff. Under George W. Bush, he was the first
deputy for civil liberties for the director of national intelligence, from 2006 to 2009.
He was the national security counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union from
2001 to 2006. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Dartmouth College, 4-132015, "The Good News About Spying," Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-aboutspying

The United States should also pivot from its defensive position and take the lead on
global privacy. The United States has an impressive array of privacy safeguards, and it has even imposed new
ones that protect citizens of every country. Despite their weaknesses, these safeguards are still
the strongest in the world. The U.S. government should not be shy about trumpeting
them, and should urge other countries to follow its lead. It could begin by engaging
with close allies, like the United Kingdom, Germany, and other European countries,
urging them to increase transparency and judicial supervision of their own
communications surveillance activities.

Finally, the plan is a critical step to fight the politics of fear

and regain privacy rights.
Snowden, 2015,
Edward J. Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer and National
Security Agency contractor, is a director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. 64-2015, "Edward Snowden: The World Says No to Surveillance," New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/opinion/edward-snowden-the-world-says-no-tosurveillance.html
Though we have come a long way, the right to privacy the foundation of the freedoms
enshrined in the United States Bill of Rights remains under threat. Some of the worlds most
popular online services have been enlisted as partners in the N.S.A.s mass
surveillance programs, and technology companies are being pressured by governments around the world to
work against their customers rather than for them. Billions of cellphone location records are still
being intercepted without regard for the guilt or innocence of those affected. We have
learned that our government intentionally weakens the fundamental security of the Internet with back doors that

Metadata revealing the personal associations and

interests of ordinary Internet users is still being intercepted and monitored on a
scale unprecedented in history: As you read this online, the United States
government makes a note. Spymasters in Australia, Canada and France have exploited recent tragedies
transform private lives into open books.

to seek intrusive new powers despite evidence such programs would not have prevented attacks. Prime Minister
David Cameron of Britain recently mused, Do we want to allow a means of communication between people which
we cannot read? He soon found his answer, proclaiming that for too long, we have been a passively tolerant

At the turning of the

millennium, few imagined that citizens of developed democracies would soon be
required to defend the concept of an open society against their own leaders. Yet the
balance of power is beginning to shift. We are witnessing the emergence of a postterror generation, one that rejects a worldview defined by a singular tragedy . For the
first time since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, we see the outline of a politics that turns away
society, saying to our citizens: As long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone.

from reaction and fear in favor of resilience and reason. With each court victory, with every
change in the law, we demonstrate facts are more convincing than fear. As a
society, we rediscover that the value of a right is not in what it hides, but in what it
protects.

Sample 1NC

T-Domestic
Interpretation Domestic surveillance deals with
communication inside the US
HRC 14 (Human Rights Council 2014, IMUNC2014,
https://imunc.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/hrc-study-guide.pdf)
Domestic surveillance: Involves the monitoring, interception, collection,
analysis, use, preservation, retention of, interference with, or access to
information that includes, reflects, or arises from or a persons
communications in the past, present or future with or without their
consent or choice, existing or occurring inside a particular country.

Violation the affirmative limits the scope of foreign

intelligence collection under section 702 of FISA, which is
distinct from domestic surveillance
McCarthy 6 (Andrew, former assistant U.S. attorney, now contributing editor
of National Review and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, National
Review Its Not Domestic Spying; Its Foreign Intelligence Collection, May 15,
2006,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-itsforeign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy)
Eggen also continues the mainstream medias propagandistic use of the term domestic surveillance [or 'spying']
program. In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing i.e., eavesdropping on content of

A call is not considered domestic just because

one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is
not domestic just because some of the subjects of interest happen to
reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him
had we done it would not have been domestic spying. The calls NSA eavesdrops on are
international, not domestic. If that were not plain enough on its face,
the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held
that judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations , the Court
excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and
their agents operating both within and without the U.S. That is, the Court understood
conversations is not domestic.

what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to

if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers

inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN
counter-intelligence. That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating
acknowledge:

within the U.S. the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-

The United States has never

needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the
wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not domestic surveillance.
stamp is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

Voters:
1. Limits- The affs interpretation allows them to have a
surveillance policy that affects any country, which
overstretches the negs research burden by a factor 196,
because all surveillance becomes topical, no matter what the
target country is.

Security K
Framing the economy in terms of security discourse leads
states to implement unreliable policies, destroying the
economic strength they attempt to preserve
Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie Lipschutz, PhD in Politics and Director at UC Santa
Cruz, 1998, On Security p. 11-12,
http://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/index.html/A.Lipschutz%20VITA.11.pdf)
The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly
than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a
national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue

Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma
Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic
interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the
socially constructed? Beverly

increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of
the product cycle--undermines

the ability of states to control those technologies

that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military
might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also
seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening.
(Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come
at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.)

What,

then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it?
According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First,
they can try to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although, in
doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced
competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to
potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies , although this
begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of
those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally,
they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances
among firms. The former approach may slow down technological
development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are
driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially
unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be
a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying
to gain.

Limiting surveillance to resolve the fear of apocalypse creates

an endless cycle of violence and governmentality
Coviello 2K (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of
Africana Studies Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Queer_frontiers.html?
id=GR4bAAAAYAAJ)
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we
inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I
want to hazard my second assertion:

if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse

signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques

destruction,"6 then in the

postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are
definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the
affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose
very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion,
threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general
population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that,
"Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but
'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of
apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present
because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful.
That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the
constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power
ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular
population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his
Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic

first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than
productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive
influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls
and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however,
Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation

as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and

the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of
the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat
to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of
force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If
genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not
because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because
power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that
would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive
power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat
of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative
that can scarcely be done without.
of violent or even lethal means. For

Reject the affirmatives fear-drive politics-critical analysis of

the politics of security and resultant militarism gives us a new
political view to articulate a truly democratic politics--activating your role as an ethical educator is the only way to
avoid war
Giroux 13 (Henry, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University,
Violence, USA, 2013, monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa)
In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the most crucial decisions
regarding national policy are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites. 53

Such
massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces
point to the need for critical analysis in which the separation of power and
politics can be understood. This means developing terms that clarify how
power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the

national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions
at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering
taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising
other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global

Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics

restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises
of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the
political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center
stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that
refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor.
War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the
production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced
from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy
possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a
network of violence it has produced.

culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United
States as both a warfare and a punishing state,

I am not appealing to a form of left

moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant
registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance. What is needed are modes of
analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of
institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a militaryindustrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex
of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of
violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global
interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000
military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and
academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday life.

Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational

component. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the
violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses
that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only guide experience, they also
expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called our own.55 This narrowing of experience shorn
of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience

Social responsibility
gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility.
Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies
that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the
corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its
apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social
movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One
central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is,
therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public
spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators
of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens.
Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education,
which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than
market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role,
educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would
enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively
participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for
itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized.

creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational,

military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will
be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of
domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current
authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means
pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of
knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such
notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls a new
grammar of political disobedience.56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature
and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central
to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices
that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative
action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought
about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give
war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to
be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and
foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to ones own
self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional
democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have
no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public

structuring forces of
violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and
a weakened culture of civic engagementone in which there is little room
for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange .
Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society in which the
production and circulation of death functions as political and economic
recovery.57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new
urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of
negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while
imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the
ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the
abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a
full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of
democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least,
the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the
future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of
violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than deaththe future of the
good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the

current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture.

It is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to
connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social
movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social
relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative
cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that:
the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination , the absence of a
viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its
intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths
in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protesterit would be
premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment
to what may be termed a long march through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist

metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are

this is notindeed, cannot beonly a short-term project for

reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained
growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces , the progressive use of
digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes
of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic
expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and
mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of
making clear that

young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic.

Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty
and violence must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and
sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and enacted,
particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of
sociality, and alternative conceptualizations of the self and its
relationship to others.59 Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim
to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral
monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to
be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of
struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

Counterplan
Plan: The United States federal government should limit the
scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose
sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose
targets pose a threat to national security.
Tangible threat requires facts of danger
Supreme Court of Georgia 6 (Decatur County v. Bainbridge Post
Searchlight, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, Fulton County D. Rep. 2191, July 6,
2006, Lexis)
In our litigious society, a governmental agency always faces some threat of suit. To construe the term potential
litigation to include an unrealized or idle threat of litigation would seriously undermine the purpose of the Act. Such
a construction is overly broad. HN4Go to this Headnote in the case. Construing OCGA 50-14-2 (1) narrowly, we
hold that a meeting may not be closed to discuss potential litigation under the attorney-client exception unless the

tangible threat of legal action against it or its officer[s] or

a threat that goes beyond a mere fear or suspicion of being sued. A
realistic and tangible threat of litigation is one that can be characterized with reference
to objective factors which may include, but which are not limited to, (1) a formal demand letter or some
governmental entity can show a realistic and
employee[s],

comparable writing that presents the party's claim and manifests a solemn intent to sue, [cit.]; (2) previous or preexisting litigation between the parties or proof of ongoing litigation concerning similar claims, [cit.]; or (3) proof that
a party has both retained counsel with respect to the claim at issue and has expressed an intent to sue, [cit.] This
list is not intended to be exhaustive but merely illustrative of circumstances that a trial court may consider, in the
exercise of its discretion, that take the threat of litigation out of the realm of remote and speculative and into the
realm of realistic and tangible.

NSA surveillance on real and fake treats have thwarted

terrorism
Sterman et al 14 (David, a program associate at New America and holds a
master's degree from Georgetowns Center for Security Studies, gis work focuses on
homegrown extremism and the maintenance of New America's datasets on
terrorism inside the United States and the relative roles of NSA surveillance and
traditional investigative tools in preventing such terrorism, Emily Schneider, senior
program associate for the International Security Program at New America, Peter
Bergen, Vice President, Director of Studies, Director, International Security, Future of
War, and Fellows Programs, DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP
TERRORISTS?, January 13th 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)
On June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the
extent and nature of the NSAs surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to
privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S. national security and
counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published,

President Obama defended the NSA surveillance programs during a visit

to Berlin, saying: We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted
because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have
been saved. Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress that: the

information
gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical

leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20

countries around the world. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor in July that 54 times [the NSA programs]
stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe saving real lives.

Increasing transparency alerts terrorists of NSA tactics

increases the risk of cyberterrorism
De 14 (Rajesh,General Counsel, National Security Agency, The NSA and
Accountability in an Era of Big Data, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW &
POLICY, May 8th 2014,p.4, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-NSAand-Accountability-in-an-Era-of-Big-Data.pdf)

Perhaps the most alarming trend is that the digital communications

infrastructure is increasingly also becoming the domain for foreign threat
activity. In other words, it is no longer just a question of collecting or
even connecting the dots in order to assess foreign threats amidst more
and more digital noise, it is also a question of determining which of the socalled dots may constitute the threat itself. As President Obama has recognized, the
cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face. Many of
us read in the papers every day about cyber-attacks on commercial entities. Hackers come in all shapes and sizes,
from foreign government actors, to criminal syndicates, to lone individuals. But as former Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta warned a few months ago, the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes

A cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as

destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. And as the President warned in his recent State
of the Union address, we know that our enemies are seeking the ability to
sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air-traffic control
systems. We also have seen a disturbing trend in the evolution of the
cyber threat around the world. As General Keith Alexander, the Director of NSA, describes it, the trend
is one from exploitation to disruption to destruction. In fundamental terms,
beyond harassment.

the cyber threat has evolved far beyond simply stealing the stealing of personal or proprietary information, for
example-to include more disruptive activity, such as distributed denial of service attacks that may temporarily
degrade websites; and more alarmingly, we now see an evolution toward truly destructive activity. Secretary
Panetta, for example, recently discussed what he described as probably the most destructive attack the private
sector has seen to date a computer virus used to infect computers in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company
Aramco in mid-2012, which virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. *** Within this context, big data presents
opportunities and challenges for the government and the private sector. Improving our ability to gain insights from
large and complex collections of data holds the promise of accelerating progress across a range of fields from
health care to earth science to biomedical research. But perhaps nowhere are the challenges and opportunities of
big data as stark as in the national security field, where the stakes are so high both in terms of the threats we
seek to defeat, and of the liberties we simultaneously seek to preserve. This reality is readily apparent in the
evolving and dynamic cyber environment, and perhaps no more so than for an agency at the crossroads of the

NSA must necessarily operate in

a manner that protects its sources and methods from public view. If a person
intelligence and the defense communities, like NSA. Of course,

being investigated by the FBI learns that his home phone is subject to a wiretap, common sense tells us that he will
not use that telephone any longer. The same is true for NSA .

If our adversaries know what NSA

is doing and how it is doing it or even what NSA is not doing and why it
is not doing it they could well find ways to evade surveillance, to obscure
themselves and their activities, or to manipulate anticipated action or
inaction by the U.S. government. In sum, they could more readily use the
ocean of big data to their advantage.

Cyberterrorists could break into computers and launch an

attack on a nuclear statetriggers global nuclear war
Fritz 09
(Jason, May 2009, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, Jason is a defense
researcher, served as a cavalry officer in the US Army for 6 years, masters in IR @
Bond University, icnnd.org/documents/jason_fritz_hacking_nc2.doc, 7/15/15)
In order to see how cyber terrorists could detonate a nuclear weapon it is important to identify the
structures which they would be attempting to penetrate. Nuclear command and control (NC2), sometimes referred to as nuclear
command and control and communications (NC3) includes the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, organisation,
procedures, and chain of command involved with maintaining a nuclear weapon capability. A Command and Control Centre is
typically a secure room, bunker, or building in a government or military facility that operates as the agency's dispatch centre,
surveillance monitoring centre, coordination office and alarm monitoring centre all in one. A state may have multiple command and
control centres within the government and military branches which can act independently or, more commonly, be used in the event
a higher node is incapable of performing its function. A minimum of eight states possess a nuclear arsenal, providing eight varying
nuclear command and control structures for cyber terrorist to target. The eight states which possess nuclear weapons are, in order
of acquisition, the US, Russia (former Soviet Union), the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa formerly
possessed nuclear weapons, but has since dismantled its arsenal. Israel is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons, but has

There are approximately 20,000 active nuclear

weapons in the world. The vast majority of these belong to the US and Russia,
stemming from the Cold War. Nuclear command and control has inherent
weaknesses in relation to cyber warfare. The concept of mutually assured
destruction means a state must have the capability to launch nuclear weapons in the event of a decapitating strike. This
requires having nuclear weapons spread out in multiple locations (mobility and redundancy), so an
enemy could not destroy all of their capabilities . Examples of this include land based mobile launch
not officially confirmed their status as a nuclear state.

platforms and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). This provides terrorists with multiple locations for attaining access to
these weapons. Further, under NATO nuclear weapons sharing, the US has supplied nuclear weapons to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the

This further increases the number of

access points for terrorists, allowing them to assess not only installations
and procedures, but also which borders and state specific laws may be
easier to circumvent. The weapons themselves may all be under the complete control of the US, but the operational
Netherlands, and Turkey for storage and possible deployment.

plans of terrorists may include items such as reconnaissance, social engineering, and crossing borders which remain unique
between states. The potential collapse of a state also presents a challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were in possession of nuclear weapons. These have since been transferred to Russia, but there was, and
still is, considerable concern over the security and integrity of those weapons, especially in the face of a destabilized government

Mutually assured destruction also promotes a hair trigger launch

posture and the need for launch orders to be decided on quickly. The advent of SLBMs
and civilian hardship.

increased this high pressure tension, as the ability of a submarine to sneak up close to a states border before launch significantly

These short decision times make it easier for terrorists to provoke a

launch as little time, and little discussion, is given to assess a situation in full . The desire
reduced response time.

to reduce the time it takes to disseminate plans to nuclear forces may expand the use of computers in nuclear command and
control, or lead to the introduction of fail-deadly and autonomous systems. This chapter is by no means comprehensive, However it
sheds some light on the operations of nuclear command and control and the difficulties in defending those systems from cyber
terrorism. Many of the details of nuclear command and control are classified, so the information provided below may be outdated.
However it points towards a pattern, and there is no certainty these systems and procedures have been updated since entering
open source knowledge. Further, terrorists do not have to restrict themselves to unclassified data, and therefore may be able to
obtain up to date information. The United States The US employs a nuclear deterrence triad consisted of nuclear-capable long
range bombers, SLBMs, and land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as an arsenal of nonstrategic (tactical)
nuclear weapons. US nuclear command and control covers a geographically dispersed force with the US President, as Commander in
Chief, being the highest authority in the decision to make a nuclear launch. There is a hierarchy of succession in the event the
President cannot perform this duty, such as if the President were killed in an attack. Additionally, once the order to launch is given, it
travels down a chain of command; the President does not press the button, so to speak, nor is the President physically present at
the launch location. These locations would be targets in a nuclear war, so it is imperative that the leader not be there. Additionally,
multiple independent launch locations make this impossible (except for cases in which multiple missiles are tied together in a Single
Integrated Operational Plan). So it is theoretically possible to subvert this control by falsifying the order at any number of locations
down that chain of command. The infrastructure that supports the President in his decision to launch nuclear weapons is the Nuclear
Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning and attack assessment of

missile launches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of Presidential force-direction orders, and management of
geographically dispersed forces (Critchlow 2006). Key US nuclear command centres include fixed locations, such as the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Raven Rock Mountain Complex (Site R), and mobile platforms, such as the E-4B National
Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) and the Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC). The US seeks to integrate its nuclear
forces into its vision of command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
hinting towards a greater reliance on computer technology in maintaining and upgrading its nuclear force, not only to combat
against Cold War style nuclear war, but also against perceived emerging threats from China, Iran and North Korea. In particular the
US recognises these states potential to use nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude to create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
The threat of EMP was known during the Cold War, and a considerable amount of attention has been paid to hardening nuclear
systems (Critchlow 2006). The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) links to the ICBMs, bombers, and
submarine forces. Information widely available on the internet shows the US is seeking to upgrade the MEECNs satellite
communications capability through Advanced Extremely High Frequency and the Transformational Communications Satellite
programs. Cyber terrorists may use this knowledge to research these new forms, or to expose weaknesses in the old system before
upgrades are completed. Early warning systems and communications are essential to assessing whether a nuclear launch has been
made and communicating the orders to launch a retaliatory strike. Falsifying the data provided by either of these systems would be
of prime interest to terrorists. Commands emanating from the NAOC for example, include Extremely High Frequency and Very Low
Frequency/Low Frequency links, and its activation during a traditional terrorist attack, as happened on 9/11, could provide additional
clues as to its vulnerabilities. Blogging communities have also revealed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks revealed insights into the US
continuity of operations plan as high level officials were noted heading to specific installations (Critchlow 2006). One tool designed
by the US for initiating a nuclear launch is the nuclear football. It is a specially outfitted briefcase which can be used by the
President to authorize a nuclear strike when away from fixed command centres. The President is accompanied by an aide carrying
the nuclear football at all times. This aide, who is armed and possibly physically attached to the football, is part of a rotating crew of
Presidential aides (one from each of the five service branches). The football contains a secure satellite communication link and any
other material the President may need to refer to in the event of its use, sometimes referred to as the playbook. The attack options
provided in the football include single ICBM launches and large scale pre-determined scenarios as part of the Single Integrated
Operational Plan. Before initiating a launch the President must be positively identified using a special code on a plastic card,
sometimes referred to as the gold codes or the biscuit. The order must also be approved by a second member of the government
as per the two-man rule (Pike 2006). In terms of detecting and analysing a potential attack, that is, distinguishing a missile attack
from the launch of a satellite or a computer glitch, the US employs dual phenomenology. This means two different systems must be
used to confirm an attack, such as radar and satellite. Terrorists trying to engage a launch by falsifying this data would need to
determine which two systems were being used in coordination at the target location and spoof both systems. Attempting to falsify
commands from the President would also be difficult. Even if the chain of command is identified, there are multiple checks and
balances. For example, doctrine recommends that the President confer with senior commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is the primary military advisor to the President. However, the President may choose to consult other advisors as well. Trying to
identify who would be consulted in this system is difficult, and falsification may be exposed at any number of steps. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes that new systems of command and control must be survivable in the event of cyber
warfare attacks. On the one hand, this shows that the US is aware of the potential danger posed by computer network operations
and are taking action to prevent it. On the other hand, this shows that they themselves see computer network operations as a
weakness in their system. And the US continues to research new ways to integrate computer systems into their nuclear command
and control, such as IP-based communications, which they admit, has not yet been proven to provide the high degree of assurance

The US nuclear arsenal

remains designed for the Cold War. This means its paramount feature is to survive a
decapitating strike. In order to do so it must maintain hair-trigger posture on early
warning and decision-making for approximately one-third of its 10,000 nuclear
weapons. According to Bruce G. Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information, and a former Minuteman launch officer:
Warning crews in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., are allowed only three minutes to judge whether
initial attack indications from satellite and ground sensors are valid or false . Judgments of
of rapid message transmission needed for nuclear command and control (Critchlow 2006).

this sort are rendered daily, as a result of events as diverse as missiles being tested, or fired for example, Russias firing of Scud
missiles into Chechnya peaceful satellites being lofted into space, or wildfires and solar reflections off oceans and clouds. If an
incoming missile strike is anticipated, the president and his top nuclear advisors would quickly convene an emergency telephone
conference to hear urgent briefings. For example, the war room commander in Omaha would brief the president on his retaliatory
options and their consequences, a briefing that is limited to 30 seconds. All of the large-scale responses comprising that briefing are
designed for destroying Russian targets by the thousands, and the president would have only a few minutes to pick one if he wished
to ensure its effective implementation. The order would then be sent immediately to the underground and undersea launch crews,

These rapid response times dont

leave room for error. Cyber terrorists would not need deception that could stand up
over time; they would only need to be believable for the first 15 minutes or so. The
amount of firepower that could be unleashed in these 15 minutes, combined with
the equally swift Russian response, would be equivalent to approximately
100,000 Hiroshima bombs (Blair 2008).
whose own mindless firing drill would last only a few minutes (Blair 2003).

Case

Privacy Rights
Surveillance outweighs and privacy violations are
overstretched post-Snowden solves security threats
Gallington 13 -- (Daniel J. Gallington, senior policy and program adviser at the
George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington VA, served in senior national policy
positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of ?Justice, and
as bipartisan general counsel for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
The Case for Internet Surveillance, US News,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/18/internetsurveillance-is-a-necessary-part-of-national-security, Accessed 07-02-15)
the recent public debate
brought on by Edward Snowden's disclosures is far more mundane, and far less
sensational than the media would perhaps like it to be . Also In that case, the real issue set
If the answer to these questions continues to be yes and it most likely is then

boils down to the following set of key questions, best answered by our Congress specifically the Intelligence
committees working with some other key committees after a searching inquiry and a series of hearings, as many
of them open as possible. Were the established and relevant laws, regulations and procedures complied with? Are
the established laws, regulations and procedures up to date for current Internet and other technologies? Is there
reason to add new laws, regulations and procedures? Is there a continued requirement based on public safety to
be able to do intrusive surveillance, including Internet surveillance, against spies, terrorists or criminals? In sum,

the idea that we have somehow "betrayed" or "subverted" the Internet (or the
telephone for that matter) is as my mom also used to say "just plain silly." Such kinds of
inaccurate statements are emotional and intended mostly for an audience with
preconceived opinions or that hasn't thought very hard about the dangerous
consequences of an Internet totally immune from surveillance . In fact, it
seems time for far less sensationalism primarily by the media and far more
objectivity. In the final analysis, my mom probably had it right: "Those kind of people, sure".

The public doesnt feel strongly about surveillance.

Rieff 13
(David, Author with focus on immigration, international conflict, and
humanitarianism, Why Nobody Cares About the Surveillance State, August 22,
2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/why-nobody-cares-about-thesurveillance-state/, kc)
And yet, apart from some voices from the antiwar left and the libertarian right, the
reaction from this deceived public has been strangely muted. Polls taken this
summer have shown the public almost evenly split on whether the seemingly
unlimited scope of these surveillance programs was doing more harm than good.
Unlike on issues such as immigration and abortion, much of the public outrage
presupposed by news coverage of the scandal does not, in reality, seem to exist. It
is true that the revelations have caused at least some on the mainstream right, both
in Congress and in conservative publications like National Review, to describe the
NSAs activities as a fundamental attack on the rights of citizens. For their part,
mainstream Democrats find themselves in the uncomfortable position of either
defending what many of them view as indefensible or causing trouble for a
beleaguered president who seems increasingly out of his depth on most questions

of national security and foreign policy. The press can certainly be depended on to
pursue the story, not least because of a certain guild anger over the detention
recently of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwalds partner, David Miranda, by British
police at Londons Heathrow Airport, and the British governments decision to force
the Guardian to destroy the disks it had containing Snowdens data in the papers
London office with two officials from CGHQ, the British equivalent of the NSA,
looking on. But while the surveillance scandal has both engaged and enraged the
elites, when all is said and done, the general public does not seem nearly as
concerned. Why? In an age dominated by various kinds of techno-utopianism the
conviction that networking technologies are politically and socially emancipatory
and that massive data collection will unleash both efficiency in business and
innovation in science the idea that Big Data might be your enemy is antithetical
to everything we have been encouraged to believe. A soon-to-be-attained critical
mass of algorithms and data has been portrayed as allowing individuals to
customize the choices they make throughout their lives. Now, the data sets and
algorithms that were supposed to set us free seem instead to have been turned
against us.

No impact to Totalitarianism privacy is just as likely to be

used to cursh dissent
Siegel 11 (Lee Siegel, a columnist and editor at large for The New York Observer,
is the author of Against the Machine: How the Web Is Reshaping Culture and
Commerce and Why It Matters. The Net Delusion and the Egypt Crisis,
February 4, 2011, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/the-net-delusionand-the-egypt-crisis)

Morozov takes the ideas of what he calls cyber-utopians and shows how reality
perverts them in one political situation after another. In Iran, the regime used the
internet to crush the internet-driven protests in June 2009. In Russia, neofascists use
the internet to organize pogroms. And on and on. Morozov has written hundreds of
pages to make the point that technology is amoral and cuts many different ways.
Just as radio can bolster democracy or as in Rwanda incite genocide, so the
internet can help foment a revolution but can also help crush it. This seems obvious,
yet it has often been entirely lost as grand claims are made for the internets
positive, liberating qualities. And suddenly here are Tunisia and, even more
dramatically, Egypt, simultaneously proving and refuting Morozovs argument. In
both cases, social networking allowed truths that had been whispered to be widely
broadcast and commented upon. In Tunisia and Egypt and now across the Arab
world Facebook and Twitter have made people feel less alone in their rage at the
governments that stifle their lives. There is nothing more politically emboldening
than to feel, all at once, that what you have experienced as personal bitterness is
actually an objective condition, a universal affliction in your society that therefore
can be universally opposed. Yet at the same time, the Egyptian government shut
off the internet, which is an effective way of using the internet. And according to
one Egyptian blogger, misinformation is being spread through Facebook as it was
in Iran just as real information was shared by anti-government protesters. This is

the dark side of internet freedom that Morozov is warning against. It is the
freedom to wantonly crush the forces of freedom. All this should not surprise
anyone. It seems that, just as with every other type of technology of
communication, the internet is not a solution to human conflict but an amplifier for
all aspects of a conflict. As you read about pro-government agitators charging into
crowds of protesters on horseback and camel, you realize that nothing has changed
in our new internet age. The human situation is the same as it always was, except
that it is the same in a newer and more intense way. Decades from now, we will no
doubt be celebrating a spanking new technology that promises to liberate us from
the internet. And the argument joined by Morozov will occur once again.

Econ
Growth rates are unsustainable we are exceeding the earths
biophysical limits
Klitgaar and Krall 11 (Kent A. Klitgaard, , Lisi Krall, ,Ecological economics,
degrowth, and institutional change, 12/12/2011, Ecological Economics journal issue
no. 84 pages 247-248, www.elsevier.com/ locate/ecolecon)
The age of economic growth is coming to an end. The mature economies of the
industrial North have already entered the initial stages of the era of degrowth. This
is evidenced by data that show overall economic activity has increased at a
decreasing rate since the Golden Age of 1960s postwar capitalism turned into the
era of stagflation in the 1970s. Despite the supposed revival of growth in the
neoliberal age, percentage growth rates have continued their secular decline. In the
United States real GDP growth was lower in the1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s
and lower still in the first years of the 21st century (Tables 1). While percentage
growth rates may have declined over the last five decades the absolute size of the
economy, as measured by real gross domestic product (for all its flaws) has
increased, more than tripling from 1970 until 2011. This creates a dilemma within
our present institutional context. Absolute growth, which uses more resources,
especially fossil fuel resources, destroys more habitat, and emits more carbon and
other pollutants into the planet's sinks, has grown exponentially. At the same time,
relative, or percentage growth, upon which employment depends, has fluctuated
over the same decades and shows a downward trend. We are growing too fast to
remain within the limits of the biophysical system. At the same time the world
economy is growing too slowly to provide sufficient employment and there appears
to be a secular decline at work. Despite rapid and sustained rates of economic
growth in many newly emerging market economies (e.g. Brazil, India and China)
patterns of declining growth rates also exist for the world economy (Table 2). The
reduction in the long-term growth rates, especially for mature market economies, is
not something we must contend with in the distant future. They have been
occurring for decades. Neither are they simply the result of misguided policy, as
growth rates have fallen in times of both liberal and conservative policy regimes.
Rather, we believe the growth rate decline is embedded deeply within the
institutional structure of the economy, as well as within biophysical limits. Clearly a
better understanding of the complex dynamics of the interactions of the economic
and biophysical systems is needed to provide important insights for the degrowth
and steady-state agendas. While ecological economics has addressed ecological
limits, it has not explored as fully the limits to growth inherent in a market system.
The analysis of biophysical limits has been the strength of ecological economics.
Beginning with the work of Herman Daly, who placed the economy within the
context of a finite and non-growing biophysical system, through the first 1997 text
by Robert Costanza and colleagues, ecological economists have carefully delineated
limits such as the climate change, the human appropriation of the products of
photosynthesis, and biodiversity loss (Costanza et al., 1997). Subsequent analyses
by Rees and Wackernagel showed that the human ecological footprint now exceeds
the earth's biocapacity, and the Limits to Growth studies by Meadows et al.

concluded that human activity has overshot the carrying capacity and the scale of
human activity is unlikely to be maintained into the next century. The work of many
energy analysts (Campbell, 2005; Campbell and Laherrere, 1998; Deffeyes, 2001;
Hall and Klitgaard, 2011; Hallock et al., 2004; Heinberg, 2005; Simmons, 2006)
concludes that we are at or near the global peak of fossil hydrocarbons and future
economic activity will be impacted strongly by more expensive and less available
petroleum. The second set of limits is internal and is to be found in the dynamics of
the accumulation process, involving the complex structural interaction of
production, consumption, and distribution. The internal limits that gear the economy
toward both cyclical variation and secular stagnation have not been considered
systematically by ecological economists. When the economy reached these limits
historically the result has been a series of periodic recessions and depressions.
Renewed growth has been the answer, just as it is now. If the system reaches its
own internal limits at the same time the world reaches its external biophysical limits
we will have a profound challenge because we need a way to facilitate decent
standards of living when economic growth can no longer be the vehicle to maintain
incomes and assure social stability. In the last instance, a system in overshoot can
neither growits way out of its inherent tendency toward stagnation, nor can it grow
its way into sustainability. We believe it is unlikely that the present system of
capitalism, dominated by multinational corporations, globalization, speculative
finance, and dependence upon fossil fuels, can adjust to the era of degrowth and
remain intact as is. In order to devise an economy that meets human needs as it
approaches both sets of limits, ecological economics needs to understand more fully
the structural and institutional dimensions of the internal and external limits, as well
as the interaction between the two. This is our challenge, and it is a difficult one.
Ecological economics can better understand the necessary institutional
configuration of the non-growing economy only by an improved understanding of
the dynamics of growth and capital accumulation, because it is here that the
inherent tendencies to stagnate and the resolution to stagnation are found.

Only econ collapse solves in the necessary timeframe

Abramsky 10 (Koyla, visiting fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in
Science, Technology and Society; fmr. coordinator of the Danish-based World Wind
Energy Institute, Racing to "Save" the Economy and the Planet: Capitalist or Post
capitalist Transition to a Post-petrol World?, in Sparking A Worldwide Energy
Revolution, ed. Koyla Abramsky, pg. 7)

the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global
CO2 emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful
periods of forced economic degrowth-namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current
The stark reality is that

financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first
time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has town that a lot of time

and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly-ineffective

regulatory framework to tackle climate change . Years of COPs and MOPs-the international basis for
regulatory efforts have simply proven to be hot am And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global
warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations
sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to-climate change continue to focus on promoting

regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments,
multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called 'civil society:' especially the major national and
international trade unions and their federations, and NOOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this
approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued . Furthermore, they may well
contribute to shoring up legitimacy , at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern
countries where the effects Of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on pepplds lives less
directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level.

The impact is linear the greater growth, the quicker

extinction happens. It magnifies all impacts and social
problems
Pradanos 15 (Luis Pradanos, writer and Assistant Professor of Spanish at Miami
University, An economy focused solely on growth is environmentally and socially
unsustainable, 4/7/2015, The Conversation, http://theconversation.com/aneconomy-focused-solely-on-growth-is-environmentally-and-socially-unsustainable39761)
Most world leaders seem to believe that economic growth is a panacea for many of
societys problems. Yet there are many links between our societys addiction to
economic growth, the disturbing ecological crisis, the rapid rise of social inequality
and the decline in the quality of democracy. These issues tend to be explored as
disconnected topics and often misinterpreted or manipulated to match given
ideological preconceptions and prejudices. The fact is that they are deeply
interconnected processes. A large body of data and research has emerged in the
last decade to illuminate such connections. Studies in social sciences consistently
show that, in rich countries, greater economic growth on its own does very little or
nothing at all to enhance social well-being. On the contrary, reducing income
inequality is an effective way to resolve social problems such as violence,
criminality, imprisonment rates, obesity and mental illness, as well as to improve
childrens educational performance, population life expectancy, and social levels of
trust and mobility. Comparative studies have found that societies that are more
equal do much better in all the aforementioned areas than more unequal ones,
independent of their gross domestic product (GDP). Economist Thomas Piketty, in
his recent book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has assembled extensive data
that shows how unchecked capitalism historically tends to increase inequality and
undermine democratic practices. The focus of a successful social policy, therefore,
should be to reduce inequality, not to grow the GDP for its own sake. Placing
economic growth above all else contributes to environmental degradation and social
inequality. Concurrently, recent developments in earth system science are telling us
that our frenetic economic activity has already transgressed several ecological
planetary boundaries. One could argue that the degradation of our environmental
systems will jeopardize socioeconomic stability and worldwide well-being. Some
scientists suggest that we are in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, in
which human activity is transforming the earth system in ways that may
compromise human civilization as we know it. Many reports insist that, if current
trends continue, humanity will soon face dire and dramatic consequences. If we
consider all these findings as a whole, a consistent picture emerges, and the faster

the global economy grows, the faster the living systems of the planet collapse. In
addition, this growth increases inequality and undermines democracy, multiplying
the number of social problems that erode human communities. In a nutshell, we
have created a dysfunctional economic system that, when it works according to its
self-imposed mandate of growing the pace of production and consumption, destroys
the ecological systems upon which it depends. And when it does not grow, it
becomes socially unsustainable. In a game with these rules, there is no way to win!

Decoupling means US isnt key to the global economy

Bloomberg 10 [Wall Street Sees World Economy Decoupling From U.S.,
October 4th, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-03/world-economydecoupling-from-u-s-in-slowdown-returns-as-wall-street-view.html, Chetan]

The main reason for the divergence: Direct transmission from a U.S. slowdown to
other economies through exports is just not large enough to spread a U.S. demand
problem globally, Goldman Sachs economists Dominic Wilson and Stacy Carlson
wrote in a Sept. 22 report entitled If the U.S. sneezes... Limited Exposure Take the
so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. While exports account for
almost 20 percent of their gross domestic product, sales to the U.S. compose less
than 5 percent of GDP, according to their estimates. That means even if U.S. growth
slowed 2 percent, the drag on these four countries would be about 0.1 percentage
point, the economists reckon. Developed economies including the U.K., Germany
and Japan also have limited exposure, they said. Economies outside the U.S. have
room to grow that the U.S. doesnt, partly because of its outsized slump in house
prices, Wilson and Carlson said. The drop of almost 35 percent is more than twice as
large as the worst declines in the rest of the Group of 10 industrial nations, they
found. The risk to the decoupling wager is a repeat of 2008, when the U.S. property
bubble burst and then morphed into a global credit and banking shock that
ricocheted around the world. For now, Goldman Sachss index of U.S. financial
conditions signals that bond and stock markets arent stressed by the U.S. outlook.
Weaker Dollar The break with the U.S. will be reflected in a weaker dollar, with the
Chinese yuan appreciating to 6.49 per dollar in a year from 6.685 on Oct. 1,
according to Goldman Sachs forecasts. The bank is also betting that yields on U.S.
10-year debt will be lower by June than equivalent yields for Germany, the U.K.,
Canada, Australia and Norway. U.S. notes will rise to 2.8 percent from 2.52 percent,
Germanys will increase to 3 percent from 2.3 percent and Canadas will grow to 3.8
percent from 2.76 percent on Oct. 1, Goldman Sachs projects. Goldman Sachs isnt
alone in making the case for decoupling. Harris at BofA Merrill Lynch said he didnt
buy the argument prior to the financial crisis. Now he believes global growth is
strong enough to offer a handkerchief to the U.S. as it suffers a growth recession
of weak expansion and rising unemployment, he said. Giving him confidence is his
calculation that the U.S. share of global GDP has shrunk to about 24 percent from
31 percent in 2000. He also notes that, unlike the U.S., many countries avoided
asset bubbles, kept their banking systems sound and improved their trade and
budget positions. Economic Locomotives A book published last week by the World
Bank backs him up. The Day After Tomorrow concludes that developing nations

arent only decoupling, they also are undergoing a switchover that will make them
such locomotives for the world economy, they can help rescue advanced nations.
Among the reasons for the revolution are greater trade between emerging markets,
the rise of the middle class and higher commodity prices, the book said. Investors
are signaling they agree. The U.S. has fallen behind Brazil, China and India as the
preferred place to invest, according to a quarterly survey conducted last month of
1,408 investors, analysts and traders who subscribe to Bloomberg. Emerging
markets also attracted more money from share offerings than industrialized nations
last quarter for the first time in at least a decade, Bloomberg data show. Room to
Ease Indonesia, India, China and Poland are the developing economies least
vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, according to a Sept. 14 study based on trade ties by
HSBC Holdings Plc economists. China, Russia and Brazil also are among nations with
more room than industrial countries to ease policies if a U.S. slowdown does weigh
on their growth, according to a policy- flexibility index designed by the economists,
who include New York-based Pablo Goldberg. Emerging economies kept their
powder relatively dry, and are, for the most part, in a position where they could act
countercyclically if needed, the HSBC group said. Links to developing countries are
helping insulate some companies against U.S. weakness. Swiss watch manufacturer
Swatch Group AG and tire maker Nokian Renkaat of Finland are among the
European businesses that should benefit from trade with nations such as Russia and
China where consumer demand is growing, according to BlackRock Inc. portfolio
manager Alister Hibbert. Theres a lot of life in the global economy, Hibbert, said
at a Sept. 8 presentation to reporters in London.

No impactstatistics prove
Drezner 12 Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts. (The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked, October
2012, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-ColloquiumMT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great
Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the
crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to
increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater
internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power
conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead
to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South
China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of
surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise,
however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a Global Peace
Index annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that
The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in
2007.38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the
financial crisis as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other
studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in
violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the
Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, the crisis has not
to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that

might have been expected.40 None of these data suggest that the global economy
is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly
slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis
levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe.
Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other
postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the
developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other
postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped
recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008
global economy as in a state of contained depression.41 The key word is
contained, however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial
crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the
outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
concluded in This Time is Different: that its macroeconomic outcome has been only
the most severe global recession since World War II and not even worse must be
regarded as fortunate.42

Internet Freedom
And US allies destroy i-freedom signal
Hanson 10/25/12, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson-internetfreedom

Another challenge is dealing with close partners and allies who undermine internet
freedom. In August 2011, in the midst of the Arab uprisings, the UK experienced a
different connection technology infused movement, the London Riots. On August 11,
in the heat of the crisis, Prime Minister Cameron told the House of Commons: Free
flow of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. So we are
working with the police, the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it
would be right to stop people communicating via these websites and services when
we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality. This policy had farreaching implications. As recently as January 2011, then President of Egypt, Hosni
Mubarak, ordered the shut-down of Egypts largest ISPs and the cell phone network,
a move the United States had heavily criticized. Now the UK was contemplating the
same move and threatening to create a rationale for authoritarian governments
everywhere to shut down communications networks when they threatened
violence, disorder and criminality. Other allies like Australia are also pursuing
restrictive internet policies. As OpenNet reported it: Australia maintains some of
the most restrictive Internet policies of any Western country When these allies
pursue policies so clearly at odds with the U.S. internet freedom agenda, several
difficulties arise. It undermines the U.S. position that an open and free internet is
something free societies naturally want. It also gives repressive authoritarian
governments an excuse for their own monitoring and filtering activities. To an
extent, U.S. internet freedom policy responds even-handedly to this challenge
because the vast bulk of its grants are for open source circumvention tools that can
be just as readily used by someone in London as Beijing, but so far, the United
States has been much more discreet about criticising the restrictive policies of allies
than authoritarian states.

Even absent data localization private companies will

voluntarily self-censor nominal internet freedom is irrelevant
Morozov 11 (Evgeny Morozov, visting scholar at Stanford University, Schwartz
Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2011, The Net Delusion, ch. 8)

What is clear is that, contrary to the expectations of many Western policymakers,

Facebook is hardly ideal for promoting democracy; its own logic, driven by
profits or ignorance of the increasingly global context in which it operates,
is, at times, extremely antidemocratic. Were Kafka to pen his novel The Trial
in which the protagonist is arrested and tried for reasons that are never explained to
himtoday, El Ghazzali's case could certainly serve as inspiration. That much of

digital activism is mediated by commercial intermediaries who operate on similar

Kafkaesque principles is cause for concern, if only because it introduces too much
unnecessary uncertainty into the activist chain, imagine that El Ghazzali's group
was planning a public protest on the very day that its page got deleted: The protest
could have easily been derailed. Until there is complete certainty that a Facebook
group won't be removed at the most unfortunate moment, many dissident groups
will shy away from making it their primary channel of communication. In reality,
there is no reason why Facebook should even bother with defending freedom of
expression in Morocco, which is not an appealing market to its advertisers, and even
if it were, it would surely be much easier to make money there without crossing
swords with the country's rulers. We do not know how heavily Facebook polices
sensitive political activity on its site, but we do know of many cases similar to El
Ghazzali s. In February 2010, for example, Facebook was heavily criticized by its
critics in Asia for removing the pages of a group with 84,298 members that had
been formed to oppose the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of
Hong Kong, the pro-establishment and pro-Beijing party. According to the group's
administrator, the ban was triggered by opponents flagging the group as "abusive"
on Facebook. This was not the first time that Facebook constrained the work of such
groups. In the run-up to the Olympic torch relay passing through Hong Kong in
2008, it shut down several groups, while many pro-Tibetan activists had their
accounts deactivated for "persistent misuse of the site." It's not just politics:
Facebook is notoriously zealous in policing other types of content as well. In July
2010 it sent multiple warnings to an Australian jeweler for posting photos of her
exquisite porcelain doll, which revealed the doll's nipples. Facebook's founders may
be young, but they are apparently puritans. Many other intermediaries are not
exactly unbending defenders of political expression either. Twitter has been accused
of silencing online tribute to the 2008 Gaza War. Apple has been bashed for blocking
Dalai Lama-related iPhone apps from its App Store for China (an application related
to Rebiya Kadeer, the exiled leader of the Uighur minority, was banned as well).
Google, which owns Orkut, a social network that is surprisingly popular in India, has
been accused of being too zealous in removing potentially controversial content
that may be interpreted as calling for religious and ethnic violence against both
Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, a 2009 study found that Microsoft has been
censoring what users in the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Algeria, and Jordan could
find through its Bing search engine much more heavily than the governments of
those countries.

Solvency
And the exec can circumvent via national security letters
Sanchez 15 (Julien, a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Dont (Just) Let the Sun
Go Down on Patriot Powers, May 29, 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/dontjust-let-the-sun-go-down-on-patriot-powers)

Also permanent are National Security Letters or NSLs, which allow the FBI to obtain
a more limited range of telecommunications and financial records without even
needing to seek judicial approval. Unsurprisingly, the government loves these
streamlined tools, and used them so promiscuously that the FBI didnt even bother
using 215 for more than a year after the passage of the Patriot Act. Inspector
General reports have also made clear that the FBI is happy to substitute NSLs
for 215 orders when even the highly accommodating FISC manages a rare display
of backbone. In at least one case, when the secret court refused an application for
journalists records on First Amendment grounds, the Bureau turned around and
obtained the same data using National Security Letters.

Plan is too small to overcome requirements that are necessary

to change the status quo
Kehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New Americas Open
Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn
Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OT,
New Americas Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance Costs: The
NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014)

Two months later, many of the same companies and organizations issued another
letter supporting surveillance transparency legislation proposed by Senator Al
Franken (D-MN) and Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) that would have
implemented many of the original letters recommendations.334 Elements of both
bills, consistent with the coalitions recommendations, were included in the original
version of the USA FREEDOM Act introduced in the House and the Senateas were
new strong transparency provisions requiring the FISA court to declassify key legal
opinions to better educate the public and policymakers about how it is interpreting
and implementing the law. Such strong new transparency requirements are
consistent with several recommendations of the Presidents Review Group335 and
would help address concerns about lack of transparency raised by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights.336

Offcase

T-Domestic
Interpretation Domestic surveillance deals with
communication inside the US
HRC 14 (Human Rights Council 2014, IMUNC2014,
https://imunc.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/hrc-study-guide.pdf)
Domestic surveillance: Involves the monitoring, interception, collection,
analysis, use, preservation, retention of, interference with, or access to
information that includes, reflects, or arises from or a persons
communications in the past, present or future with or without their
consent or choice, existing or occurring inside a particular country.

Violation the affirmative limits the scope of foreign

intelligence collection under section 702 of FISA, which is
distinct from domestic surveillance
McCarthy 6 (Andrew, former assistant U.S. attorney, now contributing editor
of National Review and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, National
Review Its Not Domestic Spying; Its Foreign Intelligence Collection, May 15,
2006,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-itsforeign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy)
Eggen also continues the mainstream medias propagandistic use of the term domestic surveillance [or 'spying']
program. In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing i.e., eavesdropping on content of

A call is not considered domestic just because

one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is
not domestic just because some of the subjects of interest happen to
reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him
had we done it would not have been domestic spying. The calls NSA eavesdrops on are
international, not domestic. If that were not plain enough on its face,
the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held
that judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations , the Court
excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and
their agents operating both within and without the U.S. That is, the Court understood
conversations is not domestic.

what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to

if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers

inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN
counter-intelligence. That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating
acknowledge:

within the U.S. the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-

The United States has never

needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the
wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not domestic surveillance.
stamp is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

Voters:
1. Limits- The affs interpretation allows them to have a
surveillance policy that affects any country, which
overstretches the negs research burden by a factor 196,
because all surveillance becomes topical, no matter what the
target country is.

PIC Tangible

1NC
Plan: The United States federal government should limit the
scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose
sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose
targets pose a threat to national security.
Tangible threat requires facts of danger
Supreme Court of Georgia 6 (Decatur County v. Bainbridge Post
Searchlight, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, Fulton County D. Rep. 2191, July 6,
2006, Lexis)
In our litigious society, a governmental agency always faces some threat of suit. To construe the term potential
litigation to include an unrealized or idle threat of litigation would seriously undermine the purpose of the Act. Such
a construction is overly broad. HN4Go to this Headnote in the case. Construing OCGA 50-14-2 (1) narrowly, we
hold that a meeting may not be closed to discuss potential litigation under the attorney-client exception unless the

tangible threat of legal action against it or its officer[s] or

a threat that goes beyond a mere fear or suspicion of being sued. A
realistic and tangible threat of litigation is one that can be characterized with reference
to objective factors which may include, but which are not limited to, (1) a formal demand letter or some
governmental entity can show a realistic and
employee[s],

comparable writing that presents the party's claim and manifests a solemn intent to sue, [cit.]; (2) previous or preexisting litigation between the parties or proof of ongoing litigation concerning similar claims, [cit.]; or (3) proof that
a party has both retained counsel with respect to the claim at issue and has expressed an intent to sue, [cit.] This
list is not intended to be exhaustive but merely illustrative of circumstances that a trial court may consider, in the
exercise of its discretion, that take the threat of litigation out of the realm of remote and speculative and into the
realm of realistic and tangible.

NSA surveillance on real and fake treats have thwarted

terrorism
Sterman et al 14 (David, a program associate at New America and holds a
master's degree from Georgetowns Center for Security Studies, gis work focuses on
homegrown extremism and the maintenance of New America's datasets on
terrorism inside the United States and the relative roles of NSA surveillance and
traditional investigative tools in preventing such terrorism, Emily Schneider, senior
program associate for the International Security Program at New America, Peter
Bergen, Vice President, Director of Studies, Director, International Security, Future of
War, and Fellows Programs, DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP
TERRORISTS?, January 13th 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)
On June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the
extent and nature of the NSAs surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to
privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S. national security and
counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published,

President Obama defended the NSA surveillance programs during a visit

to Berlin, saying: We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted
because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have
been saved. Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress that: the

information
gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical

leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20

countries around the world. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor in July that 54 times [the NSA programs]
stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe saving real lives.

***Insert Net Benefit of Terrorism DA***

2NC
Broad NSA access to US data is crucial to preventing terrorist
attacks in the US their authors vastly underestimate the
probability of attack. You need to evaluate link through a very
high probability of attempted attack
Lewis 14 (James, senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Underestimating Risk in the
Surveillance Debate, http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf)

Americans are reluctant to accept terrorism is part of their daily lives, but attacks have been planned or attempted
against American targets (usually airliners or urban areas) almost every year since 9/11. Europe faces even greater
risk, given the thousands of European Union citizens who will return hardened and radicalized from fighting in Syria
and Iraq. The threat of attack is easy to exaggerate, but that does not mean it is nonexistent. Australias thenattorney general said in August 2013 that communications surveillance had stopped four mass casualty events

The constant planning and preparation for attack by terrorist

groups is not apparent to the public. The dilemma in assessing risk is that
it is discontinuous. There can be long periods with no noticeable activity,
only to have the apparent calm explode. The debate over how to reform
communications surveillance has discounted this risk. Communications
surveillance is an essential law enforcement and intelligence tool. There is
no replacement for it. Some suggestions for alternative approaches to
surveillance, such as the idea that the National Security Agency (NSA)
only track known or suspected terrorists, reflect wishful thinking, as it is
the unknown terrorist who will inflict the greatest harm. The Evolution of Privacy
since 2008.

Some of the unhappiness created by the Edward Snowden leaks reflects the unspoken recognition that online
privacy has changed irrevocably. The precipitous decline in privacy since the Internet was commercialized is the
elephant in the room we ignore in the surveillance debate. Americas privacy laws are both limited in scope and out
of date. Although a majority of Americans believe privacy laws are inadequate, the surveillance debate has not led
to a useful discussion of privacy in the context of changed technologies and consumer preferences. Technology is
more intrusive as companies pursue revenue growth by harvesting user data. Tracking online behavior is a
preferred business model. On average, there are 16 hidden tracking programs on every website. The growing
market for big data to predict consumer behavior and target advertising will further change privacy. Judging by
their behavior, Internet users are willing to exchange private data for online services. A survey in a major European
country found a majority of Internet users disapproved of Google out of privacy concerns, but more than 80 percent
used Google as their search engine. The disconnect between consumer statements and behavior reduces the
chances of legislating better protections. We have global rules for finance and air travel, and it is time to create
rules for privacy, but governments alone cannot set these rules, nor can a single region impose them. Rules also
need to be reciprocal. NSA bears the brunt of criticism, but its actions are far from unique. All nations conduct some
kind of communications surveillance on their own populations, and many collect against foreign targets. Getting
this consensus will be difficult. There is no international consensus on privacy and data protection. EU efforts to
legislate for the entire world ignore broad cultural differences in attitudes toward privacy, and previous EU privacy
rules likely harmed European companies ability to innovate. Finding a balance between privacy, security, and
innovation will not be easy since unconstrained collection creates serious concerns while a toorestrictive approach
threatens real economic harm. Espionage and Counterterrorism NSA carried out two kinds of signals intelligence
programs: bulk surveillance to support counterterrorism and collection to support U.S. national security interests.
The debate over surveillance unhelpfully conflated the two programs. Domestic bulk collection for counterterrorism
is politically problematic, but assertions that a collection program is useless because it has not by itself prevented
an attack reflect unfamiliarity with intelligence. Intelligence does not work as it is portrayed in filmssolitary agents
do not make startling discoveries that lead to dramatic, last-minute success. Success is the product of the efforts of
teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques, working together to
assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent picture. In practice, analysts must simultaneously
explore many possible scenarios. A collection program contributes by not only what it reveals, but also what it lets

us reject as false. The Patriot Act Section 215 domestic bulk telephony metadata program provided information that
allowed analysts to rule out some scenarios and suspects. The consensus view from interviews with current and
former intelligence officials is that while metadata collection is useful, it is the least useful of the collection
programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one surveillance program they had to give up, it
would be 215, but this would not come without an increase in risk. Restricting metadata collection will make it

Spying on Allies NSAs mass

surveillance programs for counterterrorism were carried out in
cooperation with more than 30 countries. Unilateral U.S. collection programs focused on
harder to identify attacks and increase the time it takes to do this.

national security problems: nonproliferation, counterintelligence (including Russian covert influence operations in
Europe), and arms sales to China. The United States failed to exercise sufficient oversight over intelligence
collection, but the objectives set for NSA reflect real security problems for the United States and its allies. The
notion that friends dont spy on friends is naive. The United States has friends that routinely spy on it and yet are
strong security partners. Relations among powerful states are complex and not explained by simple bromides drawn
from personal life. The most startling thing about U.S. espionage against Germany was the absence of a strategic
calculation of risk and benefit. There are grounds for espionage (what other major power has a former leader on
Russias payroll?), but the benefits were outweighed by the risk to the relationship. The case for spying on Brazil is
even weaker. While Brazil is often antagonistic, it poses no risk to national security. If economic intelligence on
Brazil is needed, the private sector has powerful incentives and legitimate means to obtain information and usually

Broad surveillance of communications is the

least intrusive and most effective method for discovering terrorist and
espionage activity. Many countries have expanded surveillance programs
since the 9/11 attacks to detect and prevent terrorist activity, often in
has the best data. Risk Is Not Going Away

cooperation with other countries, including the United States. Precise metrics on risk and effectiveness do not exist
for surveillance, and we are left with conflicting opinions from intelligence officials and civil libertarians as to what

the new
context for the surveillance debate is that the likelihood of attack is
increasing. Any legislative change should be viewed through this lens.
makes counterterrorism successful. Given resurgent authoritarianism and continuing jihad,

NSA mass surveillance is critical were drawing down in every

other area of intelligence gathering which means its essential
to preventing terrorism
Wittes 14 (Benjamin, Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institute, "Is Al Qaeda
Winning: Grading the Administration's Counter terrorism Policy, April 8th 2014
Brookings Institute)
As I said at the outset of this statement, the question of intelligence collection under Section 702 of the FAA may

the connection between

intelligence collection authorities and the underlying regime authorizing
the conflict itself is a critical one. Good intelligence is key to any armed
conflict and good technical intelligence is a huge U.S. strength in the fight
against Al Qaeda. Yet ironically, the more one attempts to narrow the conflict, the more important
seem connected to the AUMFs future in only the most distant fashion. In fact,

technical intelligence becomes. The fewer boots on the ground we have in Afghanistan, for example, the greater our
reliance will become on technical collection. The more we rely on drone strikes, rather than large troop movements,
in areas where we lack large human networks, the more we rely on technical intelligence. Particularly if one
imagines staying on offense against a metastasizing Al Qaeda in the context of a withdrawal from Afghanistan and
a narrowingor a formal endof the AUMF conflict, the burden on technical intelligence collection to keep us in the
game will be huge even ignoring the many other foreign intelligence and national security interests Section 702
surveillance supports.

Section 702 is a complicated statute, and it is only one part of a far more
permits the NSA to acquire
without an individualized warrant the communications of non-US persons
reasonably believed to be overseas when those communications are
transiting the United States or stored in the United States. Under these
complicated, larger statutory arrangement. But broadly speaking, it

circumstances, the NSA can order production of such communications

from telecommunications carriers and internet companies under broad
programmatic orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC), which reviews both targeting and minimization procedures under
which the collection then takes place. Oversight is thick, both within the executive branch, and
in reporting requirements to the congressional intelligence committees. Make no mistake: Section 702 is a
very big deal in Americas counterterrorism arsenal. It is far more important than the
much debated bulk metadata program, which involves a few hundred queries a year. Section 702
collection, by contrast, is vast, a hugely significant component not only of
contemporary counterterrorism but of foreign intelligence collection more
generally. In 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote that [T]he authorities provided [under
section 702] have greatly increased the governments ability to collect information and act quickly against
important foreign intelligence targets. . . . [The]

failure to reauthorize [section 702] would

result in a loss of significant intelligence and impede the ability of the
Intelligence Community to respond quickly to new threats and intelligence
opportunities.[8] The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, after quoting this language, wrote that Our own review is not inconsistent
with this assessment. . . . [W]e are persuaded that section 702 does in
fact play an important role in the nations effort to prevent terrorist
attacks across the globe.[9] The Washington Post has reported that 702
was in 2012 the single most prolific contributor to the Presidents Daily
Brief.[10]

Terror DA

Links
Increasing transparency alerts terrorists of NSA tactics
increases the risk of cyberterrorism
De 14 (Rajesh,General Counsel, National Security Agency, The NSA and
Accountability in an Era of Big Data, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW &
POLICY, May 8th 2014,p.4, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-NSAand-Accountability-in-an-Era-of-Big-Data.pdf)

Perhaps the most alarming trend is that the digital communications

infrastructure is increasingly also becoming the domain for foreign threat
activity. In other words, it is no longer just a question of collecting or
even connecting the dots in order to assess foreign threats amidst more
and more digital noise, it is also a question of determining which of the socalled dots may constitute the threat itself. As President Obama has recognized, the
cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face. Many of
us read in the papers every day about cyber-attacks on commercial entities. Hackers come in all shapes and sizes,
from foreign government actors, to criminal syndicates, to lone individuals. But as former Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta warned a few months ago, the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes

A cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as

destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. And as the President warned in his recent State
of the Union address, we know that our enemies are seeking the ability to
sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air-traffic control
systems. We also have seen a disturbing trend in the evolution of the
cyber threat around the world. As General Keith Alexander, the Director of NSA, describes it, the trend
is one from exploitation to disruption to destruction. In fundamental terms,
beyond harassment.

the cyber threat has evolved far beyond simply stealing the stealing of personal or proprietary information, for
example-to include more disruptive activity, such as distributed denial of service attacks that may temporarily
degrade websites; and more alarmingly, we now see an evolution toward truly destructive activity. Secretary
Panetta, for example, recently discussed what he described as probably the most destructive attack the private
sector has seen to date a computer virus used to infect computers in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company
Aramco in mid-2012, which virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. *** Within this context, big data presents
opportunities and challenges for the government and the private sector. Improving our ability to gain insights from
large and complex collections of data holds the promise of accelerating progress across a range of fields from
health care to earth science to biomedical research. But perhaps nowhere are the challenges and opportunities of
big data as stark as in the national security field, where the stakes are so high both in terms of the threats we
seek to defeat, and of the liberties we simultaneously seek to preserve. This reality is readily apparent in the
evolving and dynamic cyber environment, and perhaps no more so than for an agency at the crossroads of the

NSA must necessarily operate in

a manner that protects its sources and methods from public view. If a person
intelligence and the defense communities, like NSA. Of course,

being investigated by the FBI learns that his home phone is subject to a wiretap, common sense tells us that he will
not use that telephone any longer. The same is true for NSA .

If our adversaries know what NSA

is doing and how it is doing it or even what NSA is not doing and why it
is not doing it they could well find ways to evade surveillance, to obscure
themselves and their activities, or to manipulate anticipated action or
inaction by the U.S. government. In sum, they could more readily use the
ocean of big data to their advantage.

Requiring individualized determinations for targets creates a

massive bureaucratic drain, disturbing investigations
Cordero 15 (Carrie, Director of National Security Studies, Georgetown University
Law Center, Adjunct Professor of Law, The Brennan Center Report on the FISA
Court and Proposals for FISA Reform 4/2, Lawfare,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/brennan-center-report-fisa-court-and-proposals-fisareform)

1. End Programmatic Surveillanceor If Programmatic Surveillance Continues, Reform It One of the major
criticisms of the governments use of FISA to emerge in the recent debate is that the Court has shifted from
approving individual surveillance or search requests directed at a particular agent of a foreign power or foreign
power, to a practice of approving programmatic requests for collection authority. The criticism is a repudiation of
not only the bulk telephone metadata program, but also of section 702 of FISA, which was added to the Act in 2008.
Section 702 authorizes the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to issue directives to
communications service providers under a set of procedures and certifications that have been approved by FISC.
Referring to the collection authorized by Section 702 as programmatic can lead to misunderstanding.

Acquisition under section 702 is programmatic in the sense that the Court
approves rules and procedures by which the acquisition takes place. The
Court does not, under section 702, make a substantive finding about a
particular target. It does not approve individual requests for collection.
Instead, the FISC approves the rules and procedures, and then intelligence
community personnel abide by a decision-making process in which there
are actual intended targets of acquisition. In his February 4, 2015 remarks at Brookings,
ODNI General Counsel Bob Litt described it this way: Contrary to some claims, this [section 702
collection] is not bulk collection; all of the collection is based on
identifiers, such as telephone numbers or email addresses, that we have reason to believe
are being used by non-U.S. persons abroad to communicate or receive foreign intelligence
information. Regardless of the characterization, however, it is correct to say that section 702 allows
the intelligence community, not the Court, to make the substantive
determination about what targets to collect against. Those decisions are
made consistent with intelligence community leadership and policymaker
strategic priorities, which Litt also discussed in his February 4th remarks. Targets are selected
based on their anticipated or demonstrated foreign intelligence value . And
targeting decisions are subject to continuous oversight by compliance, legal and civil liberties protection authorities
internal to NSA, and external at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. The
question, then, is why was the change needed in 2008? And, if the Brennan Centers recommendation were
accepted, what would be the alternatives? What follows is a shorthand answer to the first question (which I
previously addressed here): basically, the change was needed because the pre-2008 definitions in FISA technically
required that the government obtain a probable-cause based order from the Court in order to collect the
communications of Terrorist A in Afghanistan with Terrorist B in Iraq. This was a problem for at least two reasons:
one, as non-U.S. persons outside the United States, Terrorist A and Terrorist B are not entitled to Constitutional

the bureaucratic manpower it took to supply and check

facts, prepare applications and present these matters to the Court were
substantial. As a result, only a subset of targets who may have been worth
covering for foreign intelligence purposes were able to be covered. This is an
protections; and two,

extremely condensed version of the justification for 702 and does not cover additional reasons that 702 was sought.

it is the bottom line, and one that cannot be overlooked

when suggestions are made to scale back 702 authority.
But, from my perspective,

Section 702 has empirically been used to stop terrorist attacks

Young 14 (Mark, President and General Counsel of Ronin Analytics, LLC. and
former NSA senior leader, National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of
Classified Information, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society,
2014, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Young-Article.pdf)
The Deputy Attorney General has noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation benefited from NSAs Section 702

Using Section 702 collection and while monitoring the activities of Al

the National Security Agency (NSA) noted contact from an
individual in the U.S. that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) subsequently identified
as Colorado-based Najibulla Zazi. The U.S. Intelligence Community,
including the FBI and NSA, worked in concert to determine his relationship
with Al Qaeda, as well as identify any foreign or domestic terrorist links .44
collection in the fall of 2009.
Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan,

The FBI tracked Zazi as he traveled to New York to meet with co-conspirators, where they were planning to conduct

Zazi and his co-conspirators were subsequently arrested. Zazi,

pled guilty to conspiring to bomb the NYC subway system.
Compelled collection (authorized under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, FISA, Section 702) against foreign terrorists was critical to the
discovery and disruption of this threat against the U.S. 45 Regardless of the
a terrorist attack.
upon indictment,

accuracy of the information released by Snowden, the types of programs described by the material contribute to
national security and its release, regardless of its validity, will negatively impact US security.

Limiting section 702 means probable cause requirements

would be applied to foreign investigations
Cordero 15 (Carrie, Director of National Security Studies, Georgetown University
Law Center, Adjunct Professor of Law, The Brennan Center Report on the FISA
Court and Proposals for FISA Reform 4/2, Lawfare,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/brennan-center-report-fisa-court-and-proposals-fisareform)
Which brings us to the second question I posed abovewhat are the alternatives if Section 702 authority, were, as

One option is to revert to the pre-2008

practice: obtaining Court approval based on probable cause for non-U.S.
persons located outside the United States. The operational result would be
to forego collection on legitimate targets of foreign intelligence collection,
thereby potentially losing insight on important national security threats .
the Brennan Center recommends, repealed?

Given the challenging and complex national security picture the United States faces today, I would think that most
responsible leaders and policymakers would say, no thanks to that option. A second option would be to conduct
the acquisition, but without FISC supervision. This would be a perverse outcome of the surveillance debate. It is
also, probably, in the current environment, not possible as a practical matter, because an additional reason

702

was needed was to be able to serve lawful process, under a statutory

framework, on communications service providers, in order to effectuate
the collection. In light of these options: collect less information pertaining
to important foreign intelligence targets, or, collect it without statutory
grounding (including Congressional oversight requirements) and judicial supervision, the
collection framework established under 702 looks pretty good.

Security K

1NC
Framing the economy in terms of security discourse leads
states to implement unreliable policies, destroying the
economic strength they attempt to preserve
Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie Lipschutz, PhD in Politics and Director at UC Santa
Cruz, 1998, On Security p. 11-12,
http://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/index.html/A.Lipschutz%20VITA.11.pdf)
The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly
than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a
national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue

Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma
Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic
interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the
socially constructed? Beverly

increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of
the product cycle--undermines

the ability of states to control those technologies

that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military
might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also
seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening.
(Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come
at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.)

What,

then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it?
According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First,
they can try to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although, in
doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced
competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to
potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies , although this
begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of
those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally,
they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances
among firms. The former approach may slow down technological
development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are
driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially
unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be
a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying
to gain.

Limiting surveillance to resolve the fear of apocalypse creates

an endless cycle of violence and governmentality
Coviello 2K (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of
Africana Studies Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Queer_frontiers.html?
id=GR4bAAAAYAAJ)
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we
inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I
want to hazard my second assertion:

if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse

signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques

destruction,"6 then in the

postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are
definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the
affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose
very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion,
threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general
population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that,
"Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but
'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of
apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present
because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful.
That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the
constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power
ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular
population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his
Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic

first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than
productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive
influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls
and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however,
Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation

as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and

the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of
the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat
to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of
force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If
genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not
because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because
power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that
would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive
power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat
of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative
that can scarcely be done without.
of violent or even lethal means. For

Reject the affirmatives fear-drive politics-critical analysis of

the politics of security and resultant militarism gives us a new
political view to articulate a truly democratic politics--activating your role as an ethical educator is the only way to
avoid war
Giroux 13 (Henry, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University,
Violence, USA, 2013, monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa)
In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the most crucial decisions
regarding national policy are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites. 53

Such
massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces
point to the need for critical analysis in which the separation of power and
politics can be understood. This means developing terms that clarify how
power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the

national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions
at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering
taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising
other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global

Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics

restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises
of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the
political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center
stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that
refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor.
War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the
production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced
from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy
possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a
network of violence it has produced.

culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United
States as both a warfare and a punishing state,

I am not appealing to a form of left

moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant
registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance. What is needed are modes of
analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of
institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a militaryindustrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex
of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of
violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global
interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000
military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and
academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday life.

Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational

component. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the
violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses
that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only guide experience, they also
expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called our own.55 This narrowing of experience shorn
of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience

Social responsibility
gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility.
Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies
that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the
corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its
apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social
movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One
central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is,
therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public
spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators
of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens.
Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education,
which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than
market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role,
educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would
enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively
participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for
itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized.

creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational,

military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will
be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of
domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current
authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means
pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of
knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such
notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls a new
grammar of political disobedience.56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature
and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central
to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices
that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative
action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought
about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give
war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to
be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and
foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to ones own
self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional
democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have
no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public

structuring forces of
violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and
a weakened culture of civic engagementone in which there is little room
for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange .
Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society in which the
production and circulation of death functions as political and economic
recovery.57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new
urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of
negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while
imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the
ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the
abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a
full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of
democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least,
the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the
future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of
violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than deaththe future of the
good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the

current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture.

It is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to
connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social
movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social
relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative
cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that:
the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination , the absence of a
viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its
intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths
in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protesterit would be
premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment
to what may be termed a long march through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist

metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are

this is notindeed, cannot beonly a short-term project for

reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained
growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces , the progressive use of
digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes
of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic
expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and
mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of
making clear that

young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic.

Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty
and violence must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and
sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and enacted,
particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of
sociality, and alternative conceptualizations of the self and its
relationship to others.59 Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim
to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral
monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to
be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of
struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

2NC Framework
Interp: The aff must defend the political implications of the
plan as well as the epistemological and methodological
groundings of the 1AC. The securitized ideology of the 1ac
must be justified, before moving on to questions of policy.
Giroux says Debate is primarily an educational activity the
signal sent intellectually outweighs any specific policy
proposal- our method is comparatively better than any
roleplaying strategy- we must use pedagogical approaches to
deconstruct the securitized logic. Only through critical analysis
can we create a new political vocabulary that challenges the
militarism of the squo
1. Education
A) Real world as intellectuals we can move thought in the
direction of a new modernity that challenges securitization and
the assumptions behind the plan the same way that
intellectuals during the Enlightenment contributed to a
general shift in human thinking if our vision of the world
would result in less violence, you should vote for it.
B) Policy failure if their assumptions continually result in
data/error replication, there is no reason to use debate to train
us to be advocates in that system focusing on short-term
problem solving instead of broader theoretical issues
guarantees policy failure thats Cuomo- we have to deal with
the way war is woven into the fabric of life or else it will result
in crisis politics that results in constant securitization look at
what happened after 9/11 and WW2
Security politics assures the constant reproduction of the very
problems it seeks to eradicate

Dillon & Reid 00 (Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International

Relations at the University of Lancaster, & Julian, Lecturer in International
Relations in the Department of War Studies at King's College London,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 25:1, Jan-Mar, Global Governance,
Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and

where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge . Such
More specifically,

problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy

Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by

turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life
into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the
domains.

continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise
that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also
discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed
in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise

there is no limit to the ways in which the

management of population may be problematized . All aspects of human conduct, any
have them officially adopted. In principle,

encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.

Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy
science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf
of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and
ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable
ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely
contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the
suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such

"paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are
compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less

Yet serial policy

failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous
search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find
themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science
and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is
rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion
the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as
a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing
ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of
intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and
unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of
policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problemsolving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems
simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of
power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically
inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both
locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is
variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and
acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries
that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of
application that govern the introduction of their policies . These now threaten to
control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want.

exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of

there are no definitive

policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems . The "subjects" of
governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that

policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable
referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower"
ways.

2NC - Links
Democratic global peace is an act of securitization that
ensures total war
Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International
Relations at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence:
War against the Other pg 231232,https://books.google.com/books/about/Security_Strategy_and_Critical_Theory.ht
ml?id=RYgi4GOgy_0C)
the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade
and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, its
means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic
scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a
Yet

Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides
the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics
have decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and
ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of
threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of

relationship between democracies and

nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear',
writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist
methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the
ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama
naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with
billions of people defined only through their lack of 'development' and
'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of
American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour
of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more
forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising
from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early
premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72
In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process
of 'world-historical' violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of
the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and
dispossession through which the modem United States was created and
then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and
coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the
self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global
economic and strategic order after 1945. This role involved the hideous
destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador,
Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive
'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first
building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then
punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the
deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as
proof of America's benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the
service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the
mass destruction. Because 'the

'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom'
offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into
a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, bu t by
the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the
means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must understand both the
prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have
on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers
into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out,
and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to
Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's
actors."

Economic security discourse attempts to violently re-order the

world
Neocleous 08 (Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel
University 2008, Critique of Security, Pg. 101-102,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Critique_of_Security.html?id=OFaB6_OgP94C)
the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the
connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former
simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was
being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use
perhaps its most important power of all its economic strength in order to re-order the
world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of economic
security. Despite the fact that economic security would never be formally defined beyond economic order
In other words,

or economic well-being, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal orderbuilding also had a strategic ideological role .

By playing on notions of economic wellbeing, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus
human needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital , international
order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and
humanitarian. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process
and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using
notions such as personal freedom and social equality . Marx and Engels once
highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a
constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere It compels all nations, on pain of
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to become bourgeois in themselves. In
one word, it creates a world after its own image. In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to batter
down all Chinese walls would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the

The whole world became a garden to be cultivated to be

recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the
concept economic security had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people
to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion and back again. In fact,
it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used
for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a
comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global
order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security
doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois
conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of
guise of security.

national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors
that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and Americas core

Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the

regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital
not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also secured
everywhere.
interests in particular.

Their model of economic security commodifies risk by framing

the future as a product to be appropriated by private actors
Kessler 2011 (Oliver, Kyung Hee University, South Korea and University of
Groningen, The Netherlands, Beyond sectors, before the world: Finance, security
and risk, Security Dialogue 42:2, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/42/2/197.)

For example, in security studies the argument is made that the concept of security prevalent within the discipline of
international relations does not capture contemporary security practices.21 While the notion of security signifies an

the notion of risk

highlights how security practices have become part of our everyday lives
and take place in airports, railway stations and the private home
computer. The change from security to risk highlights how the exception becomes routinized, how
the exception becomes everyday experience. Within political economy, it has been pointed out that
economic risk models are constitutive for financial practices and have
created their own reality (see, in particular, MacKenzie, 2006). Economics is a part of economic
existential threat that triggers the employment of exceptional measures,

practices, yet it is unable to reflect the consequences of a practical application of economic models. Further,

economists general disregard for true uncertainty has blinded them to

questions related to the systemic risks that new practices like
securitization produce (see Kessler, 2009b). In both areas, the notion of risk captures the
way in which the future is commodified or made subject to the art of
government. In security studies, for example, it highlights the changing relationship
between the present and the future by introducing ideas of precaution.
Through an assemblage of material and discursive elements, risk enacts
actors and is therefore not just a characteristic of our society but is ordering our world
through managing social problems and surveying populations (Aradau and Van
Munster, 2007: 97). In particular, the employment of precautionary measures acting on
the limits of knowledge, or probably even beyond those limits, enables
the governance of the unknown. As a result, global risks are divided and
controlled through proactive security policies and the surveillance of
populations and movements (or circulations), where private actors make profits not
by reducing risks (even if they claim otherwise), but by managing and
controlling contingency. In finance, the trends are quite similar: banks do not make
money from the risks they avoid, but from the risks they make tradable.
The temporality of derivatives is detached from production chains and markets
and works on the level of anticipated cash flows, movements, futures. In the social
dimension, we witness in both areas a de-bordering of world politic s. Up to the
1970s, the risk discourse formed part of a broader discourse of war and peace. Major economic topics like exchange

the
transformation of global finance and the redefinition of national borders
that accompanied it have brought new masters of risk (Sinclair, 2005) who are
dispersed globally. Today, financial data are given meaning by an assemblage of
economic actors, models and practices and not by nation-states representatives. In addition,
rates or capital controls were subject to security considerations. Since the 1980s, however,

the war on terror has been redefining the social dimension of world
society in three ways. First, we witness the advent of new security actors and practices. Increasingly,
insurance companies and banks are seen as security actors that shape
practices (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). Insurances and banks may hedge terrorism-related risks, dividing
those risks up and selling them to those willing to take the risks (Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). Second,
private military companies are increasingly seen as stand-alone actors .
Third, as Mick Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero (2008) have pointed out, security is not something that takes
place at national borders, but affects our everyday lives (see also Lobo-Guerrero,
2008). New security practices change the ways in which human beings
are included and excluded. Ultimately, risk even impacts on how things,
events, facts are produced. Risk redefines the boundary between
knowledge and non-knowledge, defining the kind of knowledge that is
constitutive for producing something as a political, legal or financial entity. In this
context, it is noteworthy that some commentators speak of a commodification of the future, of life and of security
(Krahmann, 2006: 379404).

Democratic peace theory is used to justify military

interventions and mask war-makingit doesnt result in
democracy
Mueller 9 (John, pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on

terrorism threats in foreign policy, AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from

UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency,
Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15
June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.pdf)

Philosophers and divines not only encased democracy in a vaporously

idealistic or ideological mystique, they have done the same for the
democracy-peace correlation. After all, if correlation is taken to be cause,
it follows that peace will envelop the earth right after democracy does.
Accordingly for those who value peace, the promotion of democracy, by
force or otherwise, becomes a central mission. This notion has been
brewing for some time. Woodrow Wilson's famous desire to "make the
world safe for democracy" was in large part an antiwar motivation. He and
many others in Britain, France, and the United States had become convinced that, as Britain's Lloyd
George put it, "Freedom is the only warranty of Peace" (Rappard 1940, 42-44). With the growth in the
systematic examination of the supposed peace-democracy connection by the end of the century, such
certain pronouncements became commonplace. Notes Bruce Russett, sentiments like those have
"issued from the White House ever since the last year of the Reagan administration" (2005, 395).
Foolish consistency, fatal consequence: the role of little statesmen It was left to George W. Bush to put
mystique into practice. As he stressed to reporter Bob Woodward during the runup to his war with Iraq,
"I say that freedom is not America's gift to the world. Freedom is God's gift to everybody in the world. I
believe that. As a matter of fact, I was the person that wrote that line, or said it. I didn't write it, I just
said it in a speech. And it became part of the jargon. And I believe that. And I believe we have a duty
to free people. I would hope we wouldn't have to do it militarily, but we have a duty" (2004, 88-89).
And in an address shortly before the war, he confidently proclaimed, "The world has a clear interest in
the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of
murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life" (quoted, Frum and Perle 2003, 158). In
this, Bush was only trying to be consistent (foolishly so, perhaps, but nonetheless), a quality that

If democracy is so wonderful, and if in

addition it inevitably brings both peace and creates favorable policy
preferences, then forcefully jamming it down the throats of the decreasing
number of nondemocratic countries in the world must be all to the good . He
endears him to so many of his followers.

had already done something like that, with a fair amount of success, in Afghanistan; his father had
crisply slapped Panama into shape; Reagan had straightened out Grenada; and Bill Clinton had invaded
Haiti and bombed the hell out of Bosnia and Serbia with the same lofty goal at least partly in mind.
Further, the Australians had recently done it in East Timor and the British in Sierra Leone (Mueller
2004, ch. 7). Critics have argued that democracy can't be spread at the point of a gun, but these
cases, as well as the experience with the defeated enemies after World War II, suggests that it
sometimes can be, something that supporters of the administration were quick to point out (Kaplan
and Kristol 2003, 98-99. Frum and Perle 2003, 163). Even Russett, a prominent democratic-peace
analyst, eventually, if rather reluctantly, concedes the possibility (2005, 398-400; see also Peceny and
Pickering 2006). However, Bush and some of his supporters--particularly those

in the neo-Conservative camp--foolishly, if consistently, extrapolated to

develop an even more extravagant mystique. Not only would the invasion
crisply bring viable democracy to Iraq, but success there would have a
domino effect: democracy would eventually spread from its Baghdad
bastion to envelop the Middle East. This would not only bring (it needs
hardly to be said) blissful peace in its wake (because, as we know,
democracies never fight each other), but the new democracies would also
adopt all sorts of other policies as well including, in particular, love of, or at least much
diminished hostility toward, the United States and Israel (because, as we know, the democratic process
itself has a way of making people think nice thoughts). Vice President Dick Cheney attests, reports
Woodward, to Bush's "abiding faith that if people were given freedom and democracy, that would
begin a transformation process in Iraq that in years ahead would change the Middle East" (Woodward
2004, 428). Moreover, since force can establish democracy and since democracies rather
automatically embrace peaceful and generally nice thoughts, after Iraq was forced to enter the
democratic (and hence peaceful and nice-thinking) camp, military force would be deftly applied as
necessary to speed up the domino-toppling process wherever necessary in the area. Such extravagant,
even romantic, visions fill war-advocating neo-Conservative fulminations. In their book, The

War Over Iraq, Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol apply due reverence
to the sanctified correlation--"democracies rarely, if ever, wage war
against one another"--and then extrapolate fancifully to conclude that
"The more democratic the world becomes, the more likely it is to be
congenial to America" (2003, 104-5). And war architect Paul Wolfowitz also seems to have
believed that the war would become an essential stage on the march toward freedom and democracy
(Woodward 2004, 428). In a 2004 article proposing what he calls "democratic realism," Charles
Krauthammer urges taking "the risky but imperative course of trying to reorder the Arab world," with a
"targeted, focused" effort that would (however) be "limited" to "that Islamic crescent stretching from
North Africa to Afghanistan" (2004 23, 17). And in a speech in late 2006, he continued to champion
what he calls "the only plausible answer," an ambitious undertaking that involves "changing the
culture of that area, no matter how slow and how difficult the process. It starts in Iraq and Lebanon,
and must be allowed to proceed." Any other policy, he has divined, "would ultimately bring ruin not
only on the U.S. but on the very idea of freedom." And Kaplan and Kristol stress that "The mission
begins in Baghdad, but does not end there....War in Iraq represents but the first installment...Duly
armed, the United States can act to secure its safety and to advance the cause of liberty--in Baghdad
and beyond" (2003, 124-25). With that, laments Russett, democracy and democratic peace

theory became "Bushwhacked" (2005). Democratic processes of pressure and policy

promotion were deftly used by a dedicated group to wage costly war to establish both peace and
congenial policy in the otherwise intractable Middle East. It could be argued, then, that the little
statesmen of the Bush administration had the courage of the mystical convictions of the democracy
and democratic peace philosophers and divines. However, although Bush's simple faith in democracy

may perhaps have its endearing side, how deeply that passion is (or was) really shared by his neoConservative allies could be questioned. That is, did they really believe that the United States which,
as Francis Fukuyama notes, "cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, DC," could
"bring democracy to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American
to boot" (2004, 60)? Although they hype democracy, David Frum and Richard Perle carefully caution
that "in the Middle East, democratization does not mean calling immediate elections and then living
with whatever happens next," but rather "opening political spaces," "creating representative
institutions," "deregulating the economy," "shrinking and reforming the Middle Eastern pubic sector,"
and "perhaps above all" changing the educational system (2003, 162-63). Similarly, Krauthammer's
"democratic realism" approach doesn't seem, actually, to stress democracy all that much. (Its wildly
extravagant calls for massive warfare over a very substantial portion of the globe--only "limited" in
comparison to Bush's exuberant crusadery--suggests it is rather lacking in realism as well.) Most
interesting is a call issued by neo-Conservatism's champion guru, Norman Podhoretz, in the runup to
the war. He strongly advocated expanding Bush's "axis of evil" beyond Iraq, Iran, and North Korea "at a
minimum" to embrace "Syria and Lebanon and Libya, as well as 'friends' of America like the Saudi
royal family and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, along with the Palestinian Authority." However , Podhoretz

proved to be less mystical (or simply less devious) than other neocons
about democracy by pointedly adding "the alternative to these regimes
could easily turn out to be worse, even (or especially) if it comes into
power through democratic elections." Accordingly, he emphasized, "it will be necessary
for the United States to impose a new political culture on the defeated parties."14 (Although Podhoretz
may be more realistic that others about democracy, his extravagant notion that the US would
somehow have the capacity to impose a new political culture throughout the non-Israeli Middle East is,
like Krauthammer's comparable vision, so fantastic as to border on the deranged.) Indeed, after

one looks beneath the boilerplate about democracy and the democratic
peace, what seems to be principally motivating at least some of these
people is a strong desire for the United States to use military methods to
make the Middle East finally and once and for all safe for Israel (Drew 2003,
22; Fukuyama 2004; Roy 2003). All of them are devoted supporters of Israel, and they seem to display
far less interest in advocating the application of military force to deal with unsavory dictatorial regimes
in other parts of the world that do not seem to threaten Israel--such as Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan,
Haiti, or Cuba. As John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt point out in their discussion of what they call
"The Israel Lobby" (2006), such policy advocacy is entirely appropriate and fully democratic: "There is
nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway US policy"
(although they also note that Jewish Americans generally actually were less likely to support the war
than was the rest of the population). Democracy, as noted earlier, is centrally characterized by the
contestings of isolated, self-serving, and often tiny special interest groups and their political and
bureaucratic allies. What happened with Iraq policy was democracy in full

flower. It does not follow, of course, that policies so generated are necessarily wise, and
Mearsheimer and Walt consider that the results of much of the Lobby's efforts--certainly in this case-have been detrimental to American (and even Israeli) national interest, although their contentions that
the Lobby was "critical" or "a key factor" in the decision to go to war or that that decision would "have
been far less likely" without the Lobby's efforts would need more careful analysis. It is also their view
that the Lobby has too much influence over U.S foreign policy--a conclusion, as it happens, that is
shared by 68 percent of over 1000 international relations scholars who responded to a 2006 survey.15
However that may be, it could certainly be maintained that, as an Israeli scholar puts it, the United
States by its action eliminated what Israel considered at the time to be a most "threatening neighbor"
(Baram 2007). Following this line of thinking, then, the Israel Lobby and its allies

skillfully and legitimately used democracy to Bushwhack the democracy

and democratic peace mystiques as part of its effort to nudge, urge, or
impel the United States into a war that, as it happens, has proven to be its
greatest foreign debacle in its history after Vietnam. It should be noted, however,
that, although Bush and Cheney and at least some of the neocons may actually have believed their
pre-war fantasies about the blessings that imposed democracy would in turn impose on the Middle

East, the arguments they proffered for going to war stressed national security issues, not democracy
ones--the notion that Saddam's Iraq was a threat to the United States because of its development, or
potential development, of weapons of mass destruction and of its connections to terrorist groups out to
get the United States (Roy 2003). The democracy argument rose in significance, notes

after those security arguments for going to war proved to be

empty (2005, 396). As Fukuyama has crisply put it, a prewar request to spend "several hundred
Russett, only

billion dollars and several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to...Iraq" would "have
been laughed out of court" (2005). Moreover, when given a list of foreign policy goals, the American
public has rather consistently ranked the promotion of democracy lower--often much lower--than such
goals as combating international terrorism, protecting American jobs, preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons, strengthening the United Nations, and protecting American businesses abroad (see Figure 1).

2NC Alternative
A complete rejection of dominant security allows us to recraft
security to include a structuralist and pluralist paradigm-The
affsvision views of security fail in the context of Latin America

Pettiford 96 (Lloyd, Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third

World Third World Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 2, pg. 289-306, Published by Taylor
and Francis Group, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993094)
Security is potentially a more complex concept than is traditionally understood
and the increasing number of people working on the concept suggests that it will

be an important area for future

The traditional Realist definition of security in International

Relations is relatively simple. However, Pluralist and Structuralist
paradigms emphasise that other linkages exist between various actors
and issues, the inclusion of which might enrich current concepts of
security. Security as understood in the traditional sense is not free of
political meaning and interest. The traditional definition of security
developed to represent the view of the most important issue for Western
developed states. Security thus came to be a dominant organizing
concept in the study of International Relations but it was not the only
way of looking at the subject. Non-Realist interpretations 303 This content downloaded from
investigation.

129.105.215.146 on Tue, 23 Jul 2013 20:53:29 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsLLOYD PETTIFORD
of International Relations from the Pluralist and Structuralist paradigms suggest that traditional
concepts of security have kept important issues off the political agenda.

Of course, attempts to re-conceptualise security will not be free of political implications either. With the ending
of the Cold War and the recognition of, for example, environmental problems, even for Western developed states,

Thus
some attempts to expand the concept of security seem to fit the new
interests of the world's powerful in the extent to which they include environmen- tal matters
other concerns have

become a part of the mainstream political and International Relations agenda.

and the definition of sustainable development used. In redefining security to include the environment in ways
which do not suggest the need for significant restructuring of the global political economy, the concerns of the
world's most powerful states are kept at the forefront of International Relations. In this sense the definition of
security may be changing but it will still be a concept which, while it can be applied to the Third World, will be

for a full understanding of it. One can go beyond the traditional definition
of security or the limited expansion envisaged by those arguing for environmental security. Security
can be re-conceptualised as, or including, ecological sustainability and the need for fundamental

inadequate

structural changes in the political system. There seems to be an important danger in this; too many new concerns
may be squeezed into security, causing the concept to become so broad that the division between security and
International Relations in general become very blurred. It is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion that the debate

Traditional concepts of security developed

for reasons which were valid at the time for the people who used them.
However, they are clearly limited in attempting to understand Third
World regions such as Central America. But getting involved in complex debates over how to
over expanding

security is not entirely useful.

redefine security may not be the answer. To improve our understanding of InternThe traditional concept of security
does not show itself amenable to stretching. Stretching causes the concept to lose meaning without offering any
compensat- ing advantage. Thus, rather than redefine security, as traditionally understood, it might be enough
to recognise its limitations in terms of when and where it should be applied, and to investigate its linkages to
other areas of International Relations. Traditional security could then continue to exist alongside more serious
considerations of problems of more interest to Third World states, such as environmental problems and survival
within the world economy, using non-Realist tools of analysis. The current period of change and uncertainty
about the future suggests that International Relations would be well served by a period of coexistent ational
Relations it may be more important to recognise that the current historical juncture allows us to broaden the focus

 of study. Pluralist and Structuralist paradigms

make us aware of actors and issues other than the state and its security
from external attack, and consequently give new insights into
International Relations. In the case of Central America, a Structuralist
approach, based on sustainability, would seem a particularly valuable
path to take. The traditional concept of security does not show itself
amenable to stretching. Stretching causes the concept to lose meaning without offering any
compensat- ing advantage. Thus, rather than redefine security, as traditionally understood, it
might be enough to recognise its limitations in terms of when and where it should be
applied, and to investigate its linkages to other areas of International
Relations. The current period of change and uncertainty about the future suggests that International
Relations would be well served by a period of coexistent paradigms. However, if the position of
Realism is not weakened the conse- quences might be serious. The evidence
brought to light by research on Central America suggests that a traditional
Realist concept of security fails to recognise or adequately deal with
important environmental problems which may ultimately threaten life on
earth; neither does it address fundamental structural disadvan- tages in
the world economy which condemn ever larger numbers of people to live
in misery.

of what is seen as important and worthy

Your intellectual choices influence war more than specific

policy academic actvity is key

Jones 99 (Richard Wyn, Professor International Politics @ Aberystwyth University,

Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 155-163,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Security_Strategy_and_Critical_Theory.html?
id=RYgi4GOgy_0C)
The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of
a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of
discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony.
This task is accomplished through educational activity, because , as Gramsci
argues, every relationship of hegemony is necessarily a pedagogic
relationship (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the philosophy of praxis to political practice, Gramsci
claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the simple in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to
a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and simple it is not in order to restrict scientific
activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can
make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333).
According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative intellectual-moral bloc should take place under the auspices of the
Communist Party a body he described as the modern prince. Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the
country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on
its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramscis relative optimism about
the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in
the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with
revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic
prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat
necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that
erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that
the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very
important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of
domination for example, in the case of gender to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not
only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to
social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1
This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in

revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad
examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means
with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties
are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the infallible party has obviously been the source of strength
and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and
progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so
often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their

History furnishes examples of progressive

developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals
operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984).
Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable
realm of security. These examples may be considered as resources of
hope for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are
important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction
of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking
and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of
the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the alternative
defense school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together
they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant
discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long
run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of
both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common
security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term common security originated in the contribution of peace researchers
fetishization is potentially disastrous.

to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission

Initially, mainstream defense

intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic ; it certainly had no place in
their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security
were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities , including the
report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982).

liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left
political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet institutchiks members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such
as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer

able to take advantage of public pressure

exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for
common security. In Germany, for example, in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations
1995). These communities were subsequently

such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD (Risse-Kappen 1994:
207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration . As
Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed

It was the American peace movement and what became

known as the freeze campaign that revived the arms control process
from policy influence.

together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be
difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt

that it did at least have a

substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and
certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union . Through
the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear

various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct

a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn

toward common security and such attendant notions as nonoffensive defense (these links are detailed in
personal links,

Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the
Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei
Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup

then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachevs

subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet
leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West
relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (the interaction of
and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203),

the Soviets commitment to common

security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in
turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet
domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control
over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union . At the present time, in marked
ideas and material reality). But what is significant is that

contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points
out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to

This points to an interesting and

potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As
concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by
governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat
debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to
shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction .
justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997).

Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently)
critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common

critical intellectuals can be politically

engaged and play a role a significant one at that in making the world a better and
safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical
international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular.
Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. C RITICAL
security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that

SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of
Gramscis theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of
the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement
suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself
to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of

Said captures this

broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals are
always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing
experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless (Said 1994:
84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those
men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a
cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and
making suffering humanity rather than raison detat the prism through
which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If all
theory is for someone and for some purpose, then critical security
studies is for the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless, and its
purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have
already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization
of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of
issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this
expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how
these alternative types of theorizing even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of
issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward

critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures

can become a force for the direction of action. Again, Gramscis work is insightful. In the
Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular
political and economic orders, or, in Gramscis terminology, historic blocs (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavellis
view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling
hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and
even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they
can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e.,
commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marxs
well-worn phrase, All that is solid melts into the air. Gramscis intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it
moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a war of position (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci
argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at

progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular,

struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an
alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process
by helping to undermine the natural, commonsense, internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political
space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramscis
strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their

If the project of critical security

studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of
those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt
to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be
accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an
immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing
the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is
attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are
found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also
involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or
organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing
world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and
certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while
drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into
mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist faade . In this sense,
proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucaults notion of
specific intellectuals who use their expert knowledge to challenge the
prevailing regime of truth (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this
theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES

sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of speaking truth to power (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along
the eisteddfod lines of speaking truth against the world. Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a
similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that strategists must be prepared to speak truth to power (Gray 1982a: 193). But
the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers
in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional

critical theorists base their critique on the

presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that the need to lend
suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of
security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore,

critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, every
relationship of hegemony is necessarily a pedagogic relationship (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy

by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing

alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the
approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the
ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a
counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in
pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage
skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities.
They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the
media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader
stage. Nancy Fraser argues: As teachers, we try to foster an emergent
pedagogical counterculture . As critical public intellectuals we try to
inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres
we have access to (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even
be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization
there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by
focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their
unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the
in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus,

delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such unobtrusive yet insistent work does not in itself create the social change to which
Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice
into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational
activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide
support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social
change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating
alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in
supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and
instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North
American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts
are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealands

Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical

intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the
countrys political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear
movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals
antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C.

interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each others efforts. If such critical social movements do
not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not
abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of
the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace
movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive
defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas
developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a message in a bottle, but in this case, contra Adornos expectations,
they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be nave to understate
the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have
been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by

Academics are now so

constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that
they are extremely risk-averse. It pays in all senses to stick with the crowd
and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary
preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing
so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming
inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by
the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S.
nuclear planners for new targets for old weapons). And, of course, the pressures
for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when
governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent.
Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking
can connect with the practices of social movements and become a force
for the direction of action. The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical
what he describes as the growing professionalisation of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62).

thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial
role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

Individual analysis of security allows us to resituate our

relationship to others
Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International
Relations at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence:
War Against the Other,https://books.google.com/books?
id=4vd9AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=It+is+perhaps+easy+to+become+de
spondent,
+but+as+countless+struggles+for+freedom&source=bl&ots=Mg50LDvj3o&sig=vM
xj5FZMultitajyYke6z5Th0K4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAGoVChMIrYnS8Ir1xgIV
SaseCh3WSwXp#v=onepage&q=It%20is%20perhaps%20easy%20to%20become

%20despondent%2C%20but%20as%20countless%20struggles%20for
%20freedom&f=false)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for

freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of
seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are
already availableand where they are not, the ef fort to create a
productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political
opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effec tive when it is
absorbed as truth, consented to and desiredwhich creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues,
Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well
as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to
take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in
Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as

We can
critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy,
economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these
institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their
consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for
both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene.

agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland
Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a
decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures,"

We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be

able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting
boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden
appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." Pushing
beyond security requires tactics that can work at many-levelsthat
empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cul tural, and economic
implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline
they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to
collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and
power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic
"fragmentation," and "thinness."

possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that
security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and
repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of
the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might, allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a
"debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"an encounter that involves a transformation
than the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be
acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of
individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would
entail another kind of work on "ourselves"a political refusal of the One,
the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to
ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possi bilities
might be.
of the self rather

Voting neg opens up the space necessary for emancipation

from endless securitization
Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel
University 2008, Critique of Security, Pg. 185-186,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Critique_of_Security.html?id=OFaB6_OgP94C)
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to
eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically
loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the
authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is
clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never
even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that
the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and
reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But
it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to
consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse
exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises
all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions
that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security
as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in
any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which
differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise
from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to
believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be
transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it

suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates
about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told
- never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an
anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human
beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of
security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond
security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the
state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication

you take away

security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with
Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be
with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if

filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or
whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the

The real task is not to fill the supposed hole

with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which
takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us
into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more
terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security.

adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the

the negative may be as significant as the positive in

setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the
fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep
demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is
to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the
authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves
tradition of critical theory is that

against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved
through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps
consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the shortcircuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of
politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and
talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be
emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely,
must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires
recognising that security is not the same as solidarity;

it requires accepting that insecurity is part

of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead
learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that
come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not
mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the
state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

2NC Impact
This quest for security in an inherently chaotic and insecure
world guarantees extinction
Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International
Relations at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence:
War against the Other,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Security_Strategy_and_Critical_Theory.html?
id=RYgi4GOgy_0C)
Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and
epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He
opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later
wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human
power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished
countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance
Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the
advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man

We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's

thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the
heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would
the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate,
and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the
primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and
may be said to be a god unto man'.68 #

his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the
second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in
consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our
labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his

There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself,
and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats
like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked
bread...69 #

humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a
return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and

no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the

awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to
man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is
nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human
actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 # And what would be
mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation' ?

If the new method and

invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation,
communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian
genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the
hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some
of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry,
computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for
national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so
marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and
bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation,
slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the

new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty;

degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much
as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology # If Bacon could not reasonably be expected
to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did
occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts
and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of
every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over
nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason
and true religion.71 # By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears
could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert
Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for
supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude
sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and
this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 # Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to

his discovery of
the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the
stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed,
but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had
been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its
betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction . This would not
acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation --

prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in
invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. # Oppenheimer -- who

the
weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic
energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of
warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are
resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that

'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live
any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the
better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men
unprepared to deal with it.'75 # Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world
in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought
as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that
modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is
applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest ,

technology and its

relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless
series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force
for good. # Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view
there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its

Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions

that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a
vehicle.

potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the

technology brings with it the

truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns
epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over
'facts' into control over the earth. # Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially
minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers,

telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The
Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not
merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one
that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing
reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially
lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 # This
process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some

Man is
not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and
limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined
way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'.

the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within

its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous
fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.
Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the
posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the
name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but
incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In
strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations
are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing
reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate
matter.

Focus on security undermines human security and human

rights
Aravena 2 (Francisco Rojas, Aravena is Director of the Facultad Latinoamericana
de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)-Chile, Human Security: Emerging Concept of Security
in the Twenty-First Century, 2002,
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art1442.pdf)

Globalization has universalized such values as human rights, democracy

and the market.22 This universalization has a strongly western flavour. Associated technological and
economic processes have generated greater global interdependence with both positive and negative aspects, such
as increased trade, wider dissemination of scientific knowledge and more global information. There is also greater
danger to the environment, terrorism has acquired a global dimension, organized crime is worldwide, and financial
crises know no borders. Generating stability and global governance without proper institutions is hard. Significant
deficiencies can be observed in this area. In turn, there is increasing differentiation and multiplication of
international actors and that has a bearing on the degree of importance and means of power with which each one

this
framework within the international systems current period, various
different global concepts in specific areas such as security have not been
honed. Human security visualizes a new global order founded on global
humanism. The core issue is to solve the populations basic needs within
the framework of globalization and interdependence. This delicate balance demands,
deals with the processes and seeks to influence future courses of action. A vision of the future is essential. In

on the one hand, a tendency to unify behaviour, consumption and ideals centred on universal values and, on the
other, the requirement to recognize and respect diversity and particular identities and cultures. We have seen,

It also
has an adverse effect on cultural practices and national and local
identities. All of this is taking place in a context of economic and social
polarization in various areas of the world. The result is local
ungovernability, which transfers instability to the global system and
regional sub-systems. A zero-sum security concept asserts that there is
no absolute security and that the greater security of one actor must mean
a greater degree of insecurity for another. In the case of human security,
we can assert that the vulnerabilities of one are manifested as
vulnerabilities of all. For example, in Latin America this requires that we pay greater attention to and
however, that globalization also increases differences and does notin and of itselfmeet any needs.

seek more alternatives for the Colombian conflict.

2NC Perm
The permutation fails you cant re-appropriate your security
discoursethe 1AC leaves it unquestioned
Burke 2 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International
Relations at University of New South Wales Aporias of Security, January-March
2002, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645035?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)
humanist critiques of security uncover an aporia within the concept of
security. An aporia is an event that prevents a metaphysical discourse
from fulfilling its promised unity--not a contradiction that can be brought
into the dialectic, smoothed over, and resolved into the unity of the
concept, but an untotalizable problem at the heart of the concept,
disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure .
Thus

Derrida writes of aporia being an "impasse," a path that cannot be traveled; an "interminable experience" that,
however, "must remain if one wants to think, to make come or to let come any event of decision or responsibility."
(13) As an event, Derrida sees the aporia as something like a stranger crossing the threshold of a foreign land: yet

the aporetic stranger "does not simply cross a given threshold" but
"affects the very experience of the threshold . . . to the point of
annihilating or rendering indeterminate all the distinctive signs of a prior
identity, beginning with the very border that delineated a legitimate home
and assured lineage, names and language." (14) Thus it is important to open up and focus
on aporias: they bring possibility, the hope of breaking down the hegemony
and assumptions of powerful political concepts, to think and create new
social, ethical, and economic relationships outside their oppressive
structures of political and epistemological order--in short, they help us to think new
paths. Aporias mark not merely the failure of concepts but a new potential to experience and imagine the
impossible. This is where the critical and life-affirming potential of genealogy can come into play. My particular

humanist discourses of security is that, whatever their critical value, they

leave in place (and possibly strengthen) a key structural feature of the
elite strategy they oppose: its claim to embody truth and fix the contours
of the real. In particular, the ontology of security/threat or
security/insecurity--which forms the basic condition of the real for
mainstream discourses of international policy--remains powerfully in
place, and security's broader function as a defining condition of human
experience and modern political life remains invisible and unexamined.
This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is able to question the
very categories in which our thinking, our experience, and actions remain
confined.
concern with

Permutation only masks the security logic of the 1AC

guaranteeing violence
Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International
Relations at University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence

and Reason, December 7th 2007,https://muse.jhu.edu/login?

auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html)
Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by
no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it

but it is hard to accept his

caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse
(which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of
originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational
way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's
argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through
the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the everpresent possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I
explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war
join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.
neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism')

The permutations is a cover for a flawed ontologydooms

their action to replicate violence.
Burke 7 ((Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics and International
Relations at University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence
and Reason, December 7th 2007, https://muse.jhu.edu/login?
auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html)
I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the

available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist

and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various
Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse
to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have
sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced
and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic
thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the
nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek
mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs
and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more
radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of
political community or strategic theory.82 # In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain,
just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses
Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in
which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83
She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nationstate, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between
friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the
only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political
and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being.
She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human

beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are
so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem
here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a

Yet we know from

the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an
ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature
of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others,
provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing
with conflict and difference.85 # My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral
demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is
not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is
rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action
and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and
Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms.

formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican

The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate

the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and
have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress,
modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the
states will save us.

enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger
man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the
rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original
revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 # What I take from Heidegger's argument --

one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of

modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the
challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government,
technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and
understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence.
Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention,
geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not
merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular
interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and
political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being . Confined
within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions
become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of
reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous,
becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints
-- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the
mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary
policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

Case

Economy Advantage

DeDev 1NC
Growth rates are unsustainable we are exceeding the earths
biophysical limits
Klitgaar and Krall 11 (Kent A. Klitgaard, , Lisi Krall, ,Ecological economics,
degrowth, and institutional change, 12/12/2011, Ecological Economics journal issue
no. 84 pages 247-248, www.elsevier.com/ locate/ecolecon)
The age of economic growth is coming to an end. The mature economies of the
industrial North have already entered the initial stages of the era of degrowth. This
is evidenced by data that show overall economic activity has increased at a
decreasing rate since the Golden Age of 1960s postwar capitalism turned into the
era of stagflation in the 1970s. Despite the supposed revival of growth in the
neoliberal age, percentage growth rates have continued their secular decline. In the
United States real GDP growth was lower in the1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s
and lower still in the first years of the 21st century (Tables 1). While percentage
growth rates may have declined over the last five decades the absolute size of the
economy, as measured by real gross domestic product (for all its flaws) has
increased, more than tripling from 1970 until 2011. This creates a dilemma within
our present institutional context. Absolute growth, which uses more resources,
especially fossil fuel resources, destroys more habitat, and emits more carbon and
other pollutants into the planet's sinks, has grown exponentially. At the same time,
relative, or percentage growth, upon which employment depends, has fluctuated
over the same decades and shows a downward trend. We are growing too fast to
remain within the limits of the biophysical system. At the same time the world
economy is growing too slowly to provide sufficient employment and there appears
to be a secular decline at work. Despite rapid and sustained rates of economic
growth in many newly emerging market economies (e.g. Brazil, India and China)
patterns of declining growth rates also exist for the world economy (Table 2). The
reduction in the long-term growth rates, especially for mature market economies, is
not something we must contend with in the distant future. They have been
occurring for decades. Neither are they simply the result of misguided policy, as
growth rates have fallen in times of both liberal and conservative policy regimes.
Rather, we believe the growth rate decline is embedded deeply within the
institutional structure of the economy, as well as within biophysical limits. Clearly a
better understanding of the complex dynamics of the interactions of the economic
and biophysical systems is needed to provide important insights for the degrowth
and steady-state agendas. While ecological economics has addressed ecological
limits, it has not explored as fully the limits to growth inherent in a market system.
The analysis of biophysical limits has been the strength of ecological economics.
Beginning with the work of Herman Daly, who placed the economy within the
context of a finite and non-growing biophysical system, through the first 1997 text
by Robert Costanza and colleagues, ecological economists have carefully delineated
limits such as the climate change, the human appropriation of the products of
photosynthesis, and biodiversity loss (Costanza et al., 1997). Subsequent analyses
by Rees and Wackernagel showed that the human ecological footprint now exceeds
the earth's biocapacity, and the Limits to Growth studies by Meadows et al.

concluded that human activity has overshot the carrying capacity and the scale of
human activity is unlikely to be maintained into the next century. The work of many
energy analysts (Campbell, 2005; Campbell and Laherrere, 1998; Deffeyes, 2001;
Hall and Klitgaard, 2011; Hallock et al., 2004; Heinberg, 2005; Simmons, 2006)
concludes that we are at or near the global peak of fossil hydrocarbons and future
economic activity will be impacted strongly by more expensive and less available
petroleum. The second set of limits is internal and is to be found in the dynamics of
the accumulation process, involving the complex structural interaction of
production, consumption, and distribution. The internal limits that gear the economy
toward both cyclical variation and secular stagnation have not been considered
systematically by ecological economists. When the economy reached these limits
historically the result has been a series of periodic recessions and depressions.
Renewed growth has been the answer, just as it is now. If the system reaches its
own internal limits at the same time the world reaches its external biophysical limits
we will have a profound challenge because we need a way to facilitate decent
standards of living when economic growth can no longer be the vehicle to maintain
incomes and assure social stability. In the last instance, a system in overshoot can
neither growits way out of its inherent tendency toward stagnation, nor can it grow
its way into sustainability. We believe it is unlikely that the present system of
capitalism, dominated by multinational corporations, globalization, speculative
finance, and dependence upon fossil fuels, can adjust to the era of degrowth and
remain intact as is. In order to devise an economy that meets human needs as it
approaches both sets of limits, ecological economics needs to understand more fully
the structural and institutional dimensions of the internal and external limits, as well
as the interaction between the two. This is our challenge, and it is a difficult one.
Ecological economics can better understand the necessary institutional
configuration of the non-growing economy only by an improved understanding of
the dynamics of growth and capital accumulation, because it is here that the
inherent tendencies to stagnate and the resolution to stagnation are found.

Only econ collapse solves in the necessary timeframe

Abramsky (visiting fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society; fmr.
coordinator of the Danish-based World Wind Energy Institute) 10
(Koyla, Racing to "Save" the Economy and the Planet: Capitalist or Post capitalist Transition to a Post-petrol
World?, in Sparking A Worldwide Energy Revolution, ed. Koyla Abramsky, pg. 7)

the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global
CO2 emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful
periods of forced economic degrowth-namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current
The stark reality is that

financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first
time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has town that a lot of time

and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly-ineffective

regulatory framework to tackle climate change . Years of COPs and MOPs-the international basis for
regulatory efforts have simply proven to be hot am And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global
warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations
sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to-climate change continue to focus on promoting
regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments,
multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called 'civil society:' especially the major national and

despite the patent inadequacy of this

approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued . Furthermore, they may well
contribute to shoring up legitimacy , at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern
international trade unions and their federations, and NOOs. And

countries where the effects Of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on pepplds lives less
directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level.

The impact is linear the greater growth, the quicker

extinction happens. It magnifies all impacts and social
problems
Pradanos 15 (Luis Pradanos, writer and Assistant Professor of Spanish at Miami
University, An economy focused solely on growth is environmentally and socially
unsustainable, 4/7/2015, The Conversation, http://theconversation.com/aneconomy-focused-solely-on-growth-is-environmentally-and-socially-unsustainable39761)
Most world leaders seem to believe that economic growth is a panacea for many of
societys problems. Yet there are many links between our societys addiction to
economic growth, the disturbing ecological crisis, the rapid rise of social inequality
and the decline in the quality of democracy. These issues tend to be explored as
disconnected topics and often misinterpreted or manipulated to match given
ideological preconceptions and prejudices. The fact is that they are deeply
interconnected processes. A large body of data and research has emerged in the
last decade to illuminate such connections. Studies in social sciences consistently
show that, in rich countries, greater economic growth on its own does very little or
nothing at all to enhance social well-being. On the contrary, reducing income
inequality is an effective way to resolve social problems such as violence,
criminality, imprisonment rates, obesity and mental illness, as well as to improve
childrens educational performance, population life expectancy, and social levels of
trust and mobility. Comparative studies have found that societies that are more
equal do much better in all the aforementioned areas than more unequal ones,
independent of their gross domestic product (GDP). Economist Thomas Piketty, in
his recent book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has assembled extensive data
that shows how unchecked capitalism historically tends to increase inequality and
undermine democratic practices. The focus of a successful social policy, therefore,
should be to reduce inequality, not to grow the GDP for its own sake. Placing
economic growth above all else contributes to environmental degradation and social
inequality. Concurrently, recent developments in earth system science are telling us
that our frenetic economic activity has already transgressed several ecological
planetary boundaries. One could argue that the degradation of our environmental
systems will jeopardize socioeconomic stability and worldwide well-being. Some
scientists suggest that we are in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, in
which human activity is transforming the earth system in ways that may
compromise human civilization as we know it. Many reports insist that, if current
trends continue, humanity will soon face dire and dramatic consequences. If we
consider all these findings as a whole, a consistent picture emerges, and the faster
the global economy grows, the faster the living systems of the planet collapse. In

addition, this growth increases inequality and undermines democracy, multiplying

the number of social problems that erode human communities. In a nutshell, we
have created a dysfunctional economic system that, when it works according to its
self-imposed mandate of growing the pace of production and consumption, destroys
the ecological systems upon which it depends. And when it does not grow, it
becomes socially unsustainable. In a game with these rules, there is no way to win!

DeDev 2NC
Growth is not sustainablemodels prove
Fagnart 14 (Jean-Francois Fagnart, Marc Germain, Energy, complexity and
sustainable long-term growth, Elsevier, September 2nd, 2014)
This note has reconsidered what type of long-term growth is possible in a model with expanding product variety a la
Gross- man and Helpman (1991) where all human activities require en- ergy . In this framework, we
have linked the complexity of final production to the number of different components (or inputs) en- tering into its
assembly process. We have considered two cases, whether complexity is costly or not, i.e. whether product
complex- ity increases the energy requirements of production operations or not .

A balanced growth path

combining quantitative and non- quantitative growth has appeared possible only if the
potential of energy efficiency gains is unbounded in all (production and re- search) activities. This
requires in particular a decrease (towards zero) of the energy intensiveness of final production in spite of its

Less optimistic assumptions unavoidably lead to less favourable

long-term growth scenarios. If the energy intensiveness of intermediate and/or final productions is
bounded from below by a strictly positive constant, quantitative growth is not sustainable in the
long-run but a purely non-quantitative growth path remains possibl e (i) if the impact of
increased complexity.

complexity on energy consumption is nil or not too strong and (ii) if the energy intensiveness of the innovation
process (the research activities in the present model) tends towards zero .

If either one of these two

conditions is not met, zero-growth is the most favourable long-run scenario. It is not
obvious to assess the realism of the conditions under which long-term growth (even
limited to its non quantitative dimension) is possible. First, even though common
perception suggests an increasing complexity of human productions and processes, and of the economy as a whole, we do not have at our dis- posal an
objective index of the complexity of our economies. A fortiori, we do not have a
quantification of the link between complexity and energy intensiveness at the
aggregate level. How- ever, the present note tends to reinforce the pessimistic view
of ecological economics with respect to the feasibility of long-term growth: in a finite
world, even the intermediary case of a purely non-quantitative long-term growth is
only feasible under rather restrictive conditions, as discussed above.

Economic growth kills the environment scientific study

proves
Ahmet Atl Asici, Istanbul Technical University, 6-18-2012, Economic growth and
its impact on environment: A panel data analysis Ecological Indicators.
With a panel of 213 low, middle and highincome countries, between 1970 and 2008, we employ a panel regression
analysis to investigate the relationship between log real per capita income and
log real pressure on nature. Our dependent variable, per capita pressure on nature, in constant 2005 US
3. Methodology 3.1. Data and descriptive analysis:

$, is defined as; Pressure on nature p.c. = carbon dioxide damage p.c. +mineral depletion p.c. +energy depletion
p.c. +net forest depletion p.c. Unless otherwise indicated,

all variables are extracted from

World

Development Indicator (WDI) database3 of the World Bank (World Bank, 2012), and are summarized in Table 2.
See Table A1 for a detailed explanation and sources of all variables. Table 1 shows that the pressure on nature takes
different forms in different income groups. Comparatively, net deforestation and mineral depletion in low-income
countries, energy depletion and CO2 damage in middle-income countries and energy depletion in high-income
countries constitute the major sources of the pressure on nature. When we look at the shares of each component in

high and middle

income countries CO2 damage and energy depletion constitute the majority of the
the total pressure on nature, we come up with a similar picture. In Fig. 1 we see that, in

total pressure on nature, whereas in low income countries, it is dominated by forest

depletion, followed by CO2 damage and mineral depletion. This uneven distribution of
components across different income groups requires more attention and we will turn back to this issue in the

analysis, by using the plot diagram in Fig. 2, reveals

that there is a positive relationship between income and pressure on nature. In other
words, as countries grow richer, so do their pressure on nature. However, the
regression analysis part. Preliminary cross-country

relationship is not linear across different income groups. Due to the possible existence of endogeneity and omitted
variable biases cross-country relationship does not necessarily prove causation. Consider for example Turkey and
Finland. Finland is richer and exerts less pressure on her nature, so a simple crosscountry comparison would
suggest that higher per capita income causes less pressure on nature. But the right question to ask should be
whether a country is more likely to exert less pressure on nature as it becomes richer or not. In Fig. 3, we plot the
changes in log per capita income against changes in pressure on nature between 1970 and 2008. This helps to
eliminate the time-invariant country- fixed effects. But even after eliminating them, the positive relation between
income and pressure on nature remains. While differencing variables helps to remove the time-invariant
characteristics of countries, it does not necessarily heal the simultaneity bias. That is, the positive relationship
emerged in the plot-diagram may be arisen due to some other factor affecting both economic growth and pressure
on nature. The preliminary analysis of the data by plot diagrams presented in Figs. 2 and 3 helps us to find the right
econometric method to study the economic growth-environmental pressure relationship. We will come back to this
issue in the next subsection. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the observations included in the
regression analysis.

Economic growth kills the environment data shows income,

trade, and open structure increase pressure on nature
Ahmet Atl Asici, Istanbul Technical University, 6-18-2012, Economic growth and
its impact on environment: A panel data analysis Ecological Indicators.
In other components, like mineral depletion and CO2 damage, regression results indicate a negative scale effect of increasing
income. As for energy depletion, we do not find a statistically significant effect. Lastly, we investigate the influences of some
structural and institutional covariates. Table 7 presents the fixed-effects IV model results. The results are fairly supportive of the
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis which asserts that countries tend to lower down their environmental standards in order to attract

We found
that 10% increase in openness ratio increases the per capita pressure on nature by
9.5%. This is in line with the conclusion reached by Borghesi and Vercelli (2003). The regression results support our
hypothesis that the governance structure is positively related with environmental
sustainability which also confirms the findings of the earlier studies mentioned above. More specifically, we found that a unit
increase in the rule of law indicator decreases the per capita pressure on nature by 0.5%. Together with the effects of
increasing openness to trade, the positive relationship between rule of law (or
quality of institutions) and environmental protection calls for a closer look at the
current globalization patterns. The environmental consequences of deregulation efforts by international
more investment. Increasing integration to the global system through trade increases the pressure on environment.

institutions like IMF, WB and WTO during the sample period is worth to mention. As Tisdell (2001) and Esty (2001) argue, existing
environmental and social constraints were gradually eroded by the indiscriminate deregulation of world trade. In the same spirit,
Daly (1993) argues that free trade promotes competition that results in lowering of environmental standards as well as wages, which
in turn, increases environmental degradation in developing and unemployment in high-income countries. The experience of Mexico,
as a middleincome country receiving a good deal of foreign direct investment especially after the NAFTA agreement is telling.
Steininger (1994) reports that lower environmental standards in Mexico played a crucial role in the concentration of maquiladoras
along the USbordering area, and this resulted in increasing unemployment in US and environmental damage and health problems in
Mexico. Coming to the education, we find a statistically significant result between the secondary school enrollment rate and
pressure on nature, yet the positive sign of the estimate is not as expected, possibly due to the very limited availability of data
especially for low and middle-income countries. Overall, we see that even after controlling for various structural and institutional

Our
results suggest that there is a positive relationship between income per
capita and per capita pressure on nature. The effect is much stronger in
middle-income countries than in low and high-income countries. After controlling for
various covariates, institutional and structural, the positive effect still continues to hold. Our conclusions are
fairly robust to the inclusion of these covariates, and to the inclusion and exclusion of countries from the sample. The
regression results shed doubts on the environmental sustainability of the growth
indicators, the positive relationship between income and pressure on nature continues to hold. 5. Concluding remarks

process especially in middle-income countries. Increasing prosperity leads more

consumption and thereby more pressure on nature especially in the form of CO2
damage and mineral depletion. However, we found an opposite effect on forestry resources. The
institutional quality, as measured by the extent of enforceability of rule of law, has a
significant negative effect on the pressure on nature along with our expectations. Our results suggest
that increasing trade has a negative impact on environment and this finding clearly
can be taken as a support for race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. Although the formulation of MDGs
clearly demonstrates that economic growth and environmental protection are mutually reinforcing, there are serious doubts on our
ability in decoupling of economic growth from pressure on nature in absolute terms (Moldan et al., 2011). Our results support those

economic growth paradigm is unsustainable especially in

middle-income countries. Given the increasing importance of these countries as recipients of FDI flows and as
studies indicating that the current

producers in the global supply chain, achieving environmental sustainability without jeopardizing the other determinants of human
welfare continues to be a big challenge that has to be confronted.

Global Econ Resiliant 1NC

Its resilientglobal economic governance worked
Drezner 12 Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts. (The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked, October
2012, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-ColloquiumMT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in
policy coordination. As John Ikenberry has observed, the complex interdependence that is
unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of
exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other
sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the
system.103 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching
these interests even more across the globe . Despite uncertain times, the open economic
system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime
soon.

Global Econ Resiliant 2NC

Now, the global economy is resilient 2008 proves economic
decline could trigger renewed growth measurements that are
likely to maintain the post 2008 economic order. Assumes their
warrants for diversionary theory and decoupling Thats
Drezner
Aff is one sided scenario planning economic decline could
solve all conflict - Your evidence
Merlini 11 (Senior Fellow Brookings)
(Cesare. A Post-Secular World? Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117
130)
The opposite scenario contemplates not an unprecedented era of peace

and prosperity, but rather continuity in the international

system, with further consolidation rather than rupture. Current
conflicts and those most likely to emerge from existing tensions are
contained, thanks to diplomatic or coercive instruments, and
major wars are avoided. Economic and financial give-and-take is kept under
control and gives way to a more stable global game , including increased
safeguarding of public goods such as the health of the planet.
This scenario does not entail the United Nations becoming a global government,

nor the European Union turning into a fully fledged federation,

nor the various Gs becoming boards of a global corporation.
But these international organisations, reformed to improve representativeness and
effectiveness, would remain to strengthen the rule of law globally.

Global Economy is resilient

Zakaria, 9 Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University and Editor of
Newsweek International (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, Newsweek, 12/21/2009,
lexis)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial
system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the
world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of -globalization--about the
virtues of free markets, trade, and technology--were being called into question.
Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled.
Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide
trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose
bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust,
with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited

essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief
economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom
among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great
Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the
Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to
political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation
hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis
Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely
to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next
year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign
Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of
one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the
financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has
the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks
(three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was
some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran.
Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new
problems caused by responses to the crisis--soaring debt and fears of inflation. But
overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic
and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and
fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt
markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned
168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does
reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that
even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of
my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had
this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not
happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather,
governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined
not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state
support for the economy--through central banks and national treasuries--they
buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process
remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established
across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still
tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments
played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state
interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash
and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have
fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also
demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic
force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic
growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the
real motor of the economy started cranking again--the animal spirits of investors,
consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe
there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last
year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the
recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the

tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently

more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces
for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

US Not Key 1NC

Decoupling means US isnt key to the global economy
Bloomberg 10 [Wall Street Sees World Economy Decoupling From U.S.,
October 4th, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-03/world-economydecoupling-from-u-s-in-slowdown-returns-as-wall-street-view.html, Chetan]

The main reason for the divergence: Direct transmission from a U.S. slowdown to
other economies through exports is just not large enough to spread a U.S. demand
problem globally, Goldman Sachs economists Dominic Wilson and Stacy Carlson
wrote in a Sept. 22 report entitled If the U.S. sneezes... Limited Exposure Take the
so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. While exports account for
almost 20 percent of their gross domestic product, sales to the U.S. compose less
than 5 percent of GDP, according to their estimates. That means even if U.S. growth
slowed 2 percent, the drag on these four countries would be about 0.1 percentage
point, the economists reckon. Developed economies including the U.K., Germany
and Japan also have limited exposure, they said. Economies outside the U.S. have
room to grow that the U.S. doesnt, partly because of its outsized slump in house
prices, Wilson and Carlson said. The drop of almost 35 percent is more than twice as
large as the worst declines in the rest of the Group of 10 industrial nations, they
found. The risk to the decoupling wager is a repeat of 2008, when the U.S. property
bubble burst and then morphed into a global credit and banking shock that
ricocheted around the world. For now, Goldman Sachss index of U.S. financial
conditions signals that bond and stock markets arent stressed by the U.S. outlook.
Weaker Dollar The break with the U.S. will be reflected in a weaker dollar, with the
Chinese yuan appreciating to 6.49 per dollar in a year from 6.685 on Oct. 1,
according to Goldman Sachs forecasts. The bank is also betting that yields on U.S.
10-year debt will be lower by June than equivalent yields for Germany, the U.K.,
Canada, Australia and Norway. U.S. notes will rise to 2.8 percent from 2.52 percent,
Germanys will increase to 3 percent from 2.3 percent and Canadas will grow to 3.8
percent from 2.76 percent on Oct. 1, Goldman Sachs projects. Goldman Sachs isnt
alone in making the case for decoupling. Harris at BofA Merrill Lynch said he didnt
buy the argument prior to the financial crisis. Now he believes global growth is
strong enough to offer a handkerchief to the U.S. as it suffers a growth recession
of weak expansion and rising unemployment, he said. Giving him confidence is his
calculation that the U.S. share of global GDP has shrunk to about 24 percent from
31 percent in 2000. He also notes that, unlike the U.S., many countries avoided
asset bubbles, kept their banking systems sound and improved their trade and
budget positions. Economic Locomotives A book published last week by the World
Bank backs him up. The Day After Tomorrow concludes that developing nations
arent only decoupling, they also are undergoing a switchover that will make them
such locomotives for the world economy, they can help rescue advanced nations.
Among the reasons for the revolution are greater trade between emerging markets,
the rise of the middle class and higher commodity prices, the book said. Investors

are signaling they agree. The U.S. has fallen behind Brazil, China and India as the
preferred place to invest, according to a quarterly survey conducted last month of
1,408 investors, analysts and traders who subscribe to Bloomberg. Emerging
markets also attracted more money from share offerings than industrialized nations
last quarter for the first time in at least a decade, Bloomberg data show. Room to
Ease Indonesia, India, China and Poland are the developing economies least
vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, according to a Sept. 14 study based on trade ties by
HSBC Holdings Plc economists. China, Russia and Brazil also are among nations with
more room than industrial countries to ease policies if a U.S. slowdown does weigh
on their growth, according to a policy- flexibility index designed by the economists,
who include New York-based Pablo Goldberg. Emerging economies kept their
powder relatively dry, and are, for the most part, in a position where they could act
countercyclically if needed, the HSBC group said. Links to developing countries are
helping insulate some companies against U.S. weakness. Swiss watch manufacturer
Swatch Group AG and tire maker Nokian Renkaat of Finland are among the
European businesses that should benefit from trade with nations such as Russia and
China where consumer demand is growing, according to BlackRock Inc. portfolio
manager Alister Hibbert. Theres a lot of life in the global economy, Hibbert, said
at a Sept. 8 presentation to reporters in London.

US Not Key 2NC

Now, the US isnt key to the global economy - internal
resolution states with countries disincentives massive violence
by limiting the effects of a single nations economic decline,
proved recently by the economic devastation in Greeces
minimal impact on the economy. Thats Bloomberg
U.S. not key to the global economy.
Caryl 10 [Christian, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy. His
column, "Reality Check," appears weekly on ForeignPolicy.com, Crisis? What Crisis?
APRIL 5, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?
page=full]

Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance
sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus
programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same
countries that have embraced globalization and markets are starting to build social
safety nets. And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly
distributed throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters
than the United States. Some economists are talking about "emerging market
decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss
bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have
actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that
emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a
cold. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid
organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies.
"The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were
expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the
policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned
the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in
immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been
surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending
money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says,
reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from
the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education,
and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself."

Doesnt Lead to War 1NC

No impactstatistics prove
Drezner 12 Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts. (The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked, October
2012, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-ColloquiumMT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great
Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the
crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to
increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater
internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power
conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead
to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South
China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of
surge in global public disorder.
The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics
and Peace has constructed a Global Peace Index annually since 2007. A key
conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that The average level of
peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.38 Interstate
violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the
Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular
decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been
reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, the crisis has not to date generated the
surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been
expected.40
None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly.
Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012.
Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily
due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility
remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar
recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world
have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions
in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was
unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as
in a state of contained depression.41 The key word is contained, however. Given
the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is
with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look
impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is
Different: that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global
recession since World War II and not even worse must be regarded as
fortunate.42

Doesnt Lead to War 2NC

Now, there Economic decline doesnt cause war would be disincentivized to escalate to war if the internal state within a
particular country Prefer decoupling model their Clarfeld
evidence says countries like Europe are key to the global
economy meaning the Greece debt transaction should have
escalated.
Europe should have escalated your evidence
Clarfeld 12
[Rob, Forbes Contributor, Decouple This!, 1/25/12,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robclarfeld/2012/01/25/decouple-this/, accessed
7/20/15)

During the first few weeks of 2012, the markets are following
the prevailing narrative that the U.S. economy has
decoupled from the widely known troubles of Europe, and
the somewhat less discussed prevailing risks from China. In a
decoupling scenario, a country or region is deemed to be
able to withstand the troubles going on outside of its own
borders because of its own internal economic strength. I see
two major problems with this thesis. First, the U.S. economy is
not growing at the recently predicted robust rate of 4-5%;
rather it is struggling to achieve a rate of 2-2.5%. This leaves
little cushion to withstand the contagion from a major
economic fallout from either Europe or China, or for that
matter, economic shocks that have yet to surface. A significant
European debt default, banking failure, natural disasters or geopolitical
events, would surely impact the U.S. economy and markets beyond the
current level of fragile growth we simply dont have the levels of
productivity requisite to absorb a major blow. Second, it was only a

few years ago when the decoupling thesis was widely

espoused following the U.S. banking crisis and ensuing
recession. At the time the thinking was that the robust growth
experienced in the emerging markets would be able to
withstand the U.S. slowdown and pick up some of the slack in
the global economy. We now know how that worked out it
didnt! When the U.S. went into a major recession it dragged
down the rest of the world with it. We need to deal with it
the global economy remains highly interdependent. If a
number of dominoes begin to fall, it is highly unlikely that any
individual country or region will be able to escape the carnage.
Again, any financial crisis would be occurring from levels of
growth that have not yet fully recovered from their
recessionary lows. In relative terms, some countries and
regions will do better than others, but the decoupling thesis
is highly flawed.
No link between economic decline or government instability
and conflict initiation
Sirin 11 (Cigdem V. Sirin, , University of Texas at El Paso, Department of Political
Science, Is it cohesion or diversion? Domestic instability and the use of force in
international crises, International Political Science Review 2011 32: 303, 5/12/11)
DOI: 10.1177/0192512110380554

Specifically, when a country suffers from increased mass violence, a leader may
choose to use external force with the anticipation that such foreign policy action will
increase national solidarity and consequently (although indirectly) solve the
problem of mass violence.4 By comparison, an economic downturn or government
instability will not necessarily generate incentives for the cohesionary use of force,
since increasing national solidarity does not typically constitute a possible solution
for dealing with such domestic problems. In sum, exploring the cohesionary
incentives of political leaders and examining mass violence as a causal factor
presents a more plausible route to untangling the relationship between domestic
instability and the use of force in international crises (see DeRouen and Goldfinch,
2005). These considerations lead to my baseline hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: A
countrys likelihood of using external force in an international crisis increases in the
presence of an increased level of mass violence within its borders. There exists a
consensus among scholars that external conflict increases internal cohesion and
political centralization. That said, most scholars note that the level of cohesion in a
group achieved by an external conflict also depends on certain conditions pertaining
to the nature of the group and Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard
Libraries on October 5, 2014 308 International Political Science Review 32(3) the
nature of the external conflict (see Coser, 1956; Stein, 1976). Among these
necessary preconditions (which act as intervening variables), the most important
factors that scholars propose are (1) the presence of a degree of group consensus
(solidarity) pre-dating the external conflict, and (2) a given groups perception of the
external conflict as a severe threat. Regarding the nature of the external conflict,
Coser (1956) who sought to systematize and qualify Simmels (1955) original ingroup/out-group argument differentiates between violent and non-violent conflict
by arguing that only violent conflict generates a sense of a serious threat to a given
group and thereby increases cohesion. Taking into account this qualification, I focus
on international crises that involve violent military acts. To capture the role of preexisting group solidarity, I take into consideration whether a given country is made
up of a heterogeneous society with ethno-religious divisions. Many scholars suggest
that civil violence seems to break out more frequently in countries with multiple
ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups (e.g. Ellingsen, 2000; Vanhanen, 1999). I
expect that ones attachment to the nation as a whole (rather than to his or her subnational ethnic group) is likely to be weaker in a country that is composed of
ethnically diverse groups compared with a country that is ethnically more
homogenous. This is because sub-national group affiliations in an ethnically plural
society may inhibit the potential for developing strong overall group identity
affiliations at the national level. Consequently, given an identity divided between
national and ethnoreligious attachments, external conflict is less likely to elicit as
much cohesionary power in a plural society as it is in a more homogenous one. In
such cases, the political leader of an ethnically divided country may have less
incentives to resort to cohesionary external conflict and may thus choose to deal
with ongoing mass violence through other policy means such as the suppression of
violent groups or the co-opting of opposition groups (see Bueno de Mesquita, 1980:
36198; Richards et al., 1993). On the other hand, I expect that a political leader of

a homogenous society has more incentives to engage in external conflict in the

presence of increased social unrest. This occurs because the presence of minimum
divisions beyond an existing group identity at the national level makes external
conflict a viable venture for increasing cohesion and, therefore, stopping ongoing
mass violence. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis on the effect
of mass violence, which is conditional upon the level of ethno-religious
heterogeneity in a country: Hypothesis 2: Countries with lower levels of ethnoreligious heterogeneity are more likely to use external force in an international crisis
in the presence of an increased level of mass violence within their borders.
Nevertheless, even in the presence of ethnic and religious divisions in a country, a
sense of national identity may persist, especially if the defining characteristics and
membership rules of such national identity go beyond ethno-religious attributes (as
in the case of the United States). This brings us to the difference between civic and
ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism concerns ones membership and loyalty to a
state in terms of citizenship, common laws, and political participation regardless of
ethnicity and lineage (Brown, 2000; Ipperciel, 2007). Ethnic nationalism, in contrast,
defines an individuals membership in and loyalty to a nation-state in terms of
ethnicity and lineage; hence, individuals belonging to different ethnicities, even if
they reside in and are citizens of a state, cannot become part of the dominant
national group (Alter, 1994; Ignatieff, 1993; Smith, 1991). In the case of ethnic
nationalism, there already exists a strong sense of cohesion among the dominant
group and little interest in extending the cohesion to domestic out-groups (see
Shulman, 2002). In such instances, options for dealing with rising mass violence are
likely to exclude cohesionary policy acts, since pre-existing ethnic nationalist group
solidarity often produces a ceiling Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard
Libraries on October 5, 2014 Sirin 309 effect, which limits the cohesionary influence
that the external use of force may have for curbing mass violence. On the other
hand, civic nationalism often fails to be the sole (or at least primary) basis for group
identification and falls short of evoking strong emotional attachment to the nation.
As Shulman (2002: 580) puts it: most civic components of nationhood are external
to the individual, whereas ethnic and cultural components are internal. Territory,
political institutions and rights, and citizenship exist outside the individual, whereas
ancestry, race, religion, language, and traditions are a part of a persons physical
and psychological makeup. As a result, the intensity of attachment to communities
founded predominantly on the latter will likely exceed those founded predominantly
on the former. When one considers regime type differences from the theoretical
framework of cohesionary incentives, democracies are more likely than autocracies
to promote a civic (rather than ethnic) nationalist identity (Habermas, 1996;
Ipperciel, 2007; Kymlicka, 2001). Under conditions of increased mass violence,
therefore, the incentives for democratic leaders to attempt to increase national
cohesion through external conflict should be stronger. Accordingly, in terms of
regime differences on the cohesionary use of force, I hypothesize that: Hypothesis
3a: Democracies are likely to use external force in an international crisis in the
presence of an increased level of mass violence within their borders. Hypothesis 3b:
In contrast to democracies, autocracies are unlikely to use external force in an
international crisis in the presence of an increased level of mass violence within
their borders. As a separate note, a dominant perception in the diversionary

literature is that different factors of domestic instability are interchangeable with

one another such that selecting one of them is a matter of conceptual taste and
analytical convenience (but see, e.g., Pickering and Kisangani, 2005; Russett, 1990,
12340). However, if different sources of domestic disturbance generate different
policy incentives, the measures of domestic problems may not always act as proxies
or alternatives to each other. In that sense, it would be better to incorporate these
different measures simultaneously in an analytical model to control for and compare
their distinctive impact on the propensity for leaders to use external force. Data and
research design For empirical testing of my hypotheses, I employ data from the
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project that covers 139 countries from 1918 to
2005. The ICB dataset is unique in the sense that it provides data on international
crises and different forms of domestic problems (i.e. social, economic, and political)
for a broad range of countries within a long time span. The ICB project allows one to
examine the data on two different levels: actor level and system level. The variables
that I use in my analyses are from the actor-level ICB dataset, with the exception of
the variable contiguity, which I adopt from the system-level dataset. I exclude all
the intra-war crises within this period to avoid confounding the results, given that
such crises have already escalated to violence and war (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld,
2000; DeRouen and Sprecher, 2004). I employ a monadic analysis because the
theoretical focus of this project centers on whether and how specific sources of
instability in a country determine the incentives and utility of that country for using
force in international crises. Specifically, I am testing whether particular sources of
Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 310
International Political Science Review 32(3) domestic strife have an independent
effect on a states international crisis behavior rather than whether certain
characteristics of the target state will influence the behavior of that state. Thus, the
research question at hand requires a monadic test. Accordingly, the analytical
models used here are not designed to elucidate strategic interactions between crisis
actors, such as whether democracies or autocracies tend to use force against states
with similar or different political systems in international crises or whether likely
targets may strategically avoid violent conflict with states experiencing domestic
instability. I do, however, introduce several control variables into my models to
account for certain international environmental characteristics (such as power
discrepancy) and crisis-specific factors (such as crisis trigger) that have been shown
to affect a states likelihood of using force in an international crisis.5 Dependent
variable External use of force. The ICB major response variable identifies the
specific action a state takes after it perceives a threat from an event or act that
triggers a crisis. This variable ranges across nine categories, from no action to
violent military action. Since the focus of my analysis is the use of force, I determine
the cut-off criterion for the dependent variable as violent versus non-violent acts. I
collapse the variable into a dichotomous measure by coding the events that involve
violent military action where the crisis actor resorts to the use of force (ICB
categories 89; e.g. invasion of air space, border clash, etc.) as 1 and 0 otherwise
(ICB categories 17; e.g. no response, verbal acts such as protest, economic acts
such as embargo, etc.). Major independent variables Mass violence. This variable
assesses the level of violence within the society of the crisis actor as evidenced by
insurrections, civil war, and revolution. The ICB dataset uses a code of 1 if there is

a significant increase in the level of domestic violence during the relevant period
preceding the crisis, a code of 2 if the level is normal, and a code of 3 if there is a
significant decrease. I collapse the ICB variable into a dichotomous variable and
code it as 1 if there is a significant increase in the level of mass violence and 0
otherwise. In this way, I obtain a more direct measure to test my hypotheses. Last,
the ICB dataset uses a code of 4 if the crisis actor is a newly independent state. I
exclude the observations of this category from the analysis for this variable (as well
as for the measures of economic downturn and government instability), since such
cases do not provide information on the level of the domestic problem under
investigation. Economic downturn. This variable assesses the overall state of the
economy for the crisis actor during the period preceding a crisis. I base this
measure on the ICB variable labeled economic status of actor, which provides a
summary indicator of the cost of living, unemployment, food prices, labor
disruption, and consumer goods shortages. Since there is a considerable amount of
missing data for a number of individual economic indicators, this composite index
takes advantage of the available partial information, and thus enables a more
parsimonious model. The data are examined from the year of the crisis to the fourth
preceding year. The ICB dataset has the values coded as 1 if there is an increase in
economic problems, 2 if the economic situation is normal, and 3 if there is a
decrease in economic problems. For a more direct measure of worsening economic
conditions, I generate a dichotomous variable and code the cases where there is a
significant increase in economic problems as 1 and 0 otherwise. Downloaded
from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 Sirin 311
Government instability. The ICB actor-level dataset provides information on whether
the crisis actor experiences government instability, which may include executive,
constitutional, legal, and/ or administrative structure changes within the relevant
period preceding an international crisis. For this measure, the ICB dataset codes the
observations as 1 if there is a significant increase in government instability, 2 if
the government is stable, and 3 if there is a significant decrease in government
instability. For a more direct measure of escalating governmental instability, I create
a dichotomous variable coding the cases where there is a significant increase in the
level of government instability as 1 and 0 otherwise. Ethno-religious
heterogeneity. For the operationalization of this concept, I use two different
measures that I adopt from the dataset of Fearon and Laitins (2003) study. The first
measure is the number of distinct languages spoken by groups exceeding 1 percent
of the countrys population (see Grimes and Grimes, 1996). The second alternative
measure captures the level of religious fractionalization, which Fearon and Laitin
constructed using data from the CIA Factbook and other sources. In order to test my
interactive hypothesis (H2), I generate two alternative multiplicative variables by
interacting mass violence separately with each of the two measures of ethnoreligious heterogeneity. Regime type. The ICB dataset provides five different
categories of this indicator including democratic regime, civil authoritarian regime,
military-direct rule, military-indirect rule, and military dual authority. I generate a
dummy variable where 1 denotes democratic regimes and 0 denotes
authoritarian regimes, mainly because the original variable does not differentiate
between levels of democracy while providing dissimilar types of authoritarianism.6
Control variables Power discrepancy. Several studies of state dyads have

demonstrated that disparity in a dyads capabilities reduces the likelihood of

violence initiation (see, e.g., Bremer, 1992). On the other hand, some scholars
argue that states that possess a power advantage over an adversary are much
more likely to take military action in crisis situations (see, e.g., Prins, 2005). My
model controls for this external determinant of interstate conflict by including the
ICB variable power discrepancy. The ICB dataset assigns a power score for each
crisis actor and its principal adversary based on six separate scores measuring
population size, GNP, territorial size, alliance capability, military expenditure, and
nuclear capability at the onset of a crisis. The power that a crisis actor possesses
and has at its disposal from alliance partners (i.e. those countries that are
connected to the crisis actor through some type of collective security agreement)
immediately prior to an international crisis is then compared with that of the actors
principal adversary (or adversaries) to create a final power discrepancy score, which
ranges from 179 to +179. Negative values indicate a power discrepancy that is to
the disadvantage of a crisis actor whereas positive values demonstrate that a crisis
actor is stronger than an adversary. To generate a measure that indicates less
power disparity as the score gets closer to zero (and vice versa), I take the square of
the original ICB power discrepancy variable. This allows one to also capture the
potential non-linear nature of this variable. Contiguity. On contiguity, Geller (2000:
413) presents two major perspectives. The first is that geographic opportunity
provides physical opportunity for wars and increases a nations Downloaded from
ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October 5, 2014 312 International Political
Science Review 32(3) involvement in a foreign conflict. The second thesis suggests
that proximity structures the context of interaction, which increases the probability
of conflictual relations and enhances the motivations for war. At the dyad level,
proximity is the strongest predictor of war probability (see Henderson, 1997;
Vasquez, 1993). Hence, I control for this factor with the expectation that when crisis
actors share a border, there will be a greater likelihood of the external use of force.
The ICB system level data refers to this variable as the geographical proximity of
principal adversaries. The coding values are 1 distant, 2 near neighbors, and 3
contiguous. Gravity. This ICB variable identifies the gravest threat a crisis actor
faces during a crisis, which ranges from 0 to 7. Most studies suggest that increases
in this measure lead to increases in the likelihood of violence in an international
crisis (see Hewitt and Wilkenfeld, 1999; Trumbore and Boyer, 2000). That said,
DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) find that gravity as a measure of domestic political
loss has a negative impact on the use of force due to a tendency to reject violence
as an initial policy option when the regime is threatened. Following DeRouen and
Sprecher, I recode the original ICB variable as 1 if there is a political threat and 0
otherwise to capture any serious political risk a crisis actor faces during a crisis.
Trigger level. The trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the
specific act, event, or situational change that leads to (1) a crisis actors perception
of the crisis as a threat to ones basic values, (2) constrained time pressure for
responding to the threat, and (3) heightened probability of involvement in military
hostilities (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000). It is reasonable to expect that states will
react to a crisis with the level of action (be it economic, diplomatic, or military) that
matches the level of the trigger (see Trumbore and Boyer, 2000). More specifically, I
expect that the likelihood of the use of force will increase in response to more

violent triggers. For this variable, I employ the original ICB indicator trigger to
foreign policy crisis, which ranges from 1 (verbal act) to 9 (violent act) in line with
the triggers level of intensity. Empirical results Some states are more likely than
others to get involved in international crises, such as major powers and enduring
rivals. An attempt to identify possible factors that are specific to each crisis actor
would be a strenuous and redundant task. Instead, I employ a panel-estimated
approach random effects probit to control for country-specific effects likely to be
present in the error term. In accordance with my theoretical framework, I adopt the
crisis actor as my unit of analysis. The baseline analytical model is as follows: Pr(Y ij
= 1 | X ij , v i ) = f(b 0 + b 1 (mass violence) ij + b 2 (economic downturn) ij + b 3
(government instability) ij + b 4 (power discrepancy) ij + b 5 (contiguity) ij + b 6
(gravity) ij + b 7 (trigger level) ij + b 8 (regime type) ij + v i ) where Pr(Y ij = 1 | X
ij , v i ) denotes the probability of external use of force; vi represents unit-specific
effects. For the analysis of the interactive effects of mass violence and ethnoreligious heterogeneity, I add a multiplicative interaction variable to the baseline
model, along with the constitutive terms of that interaction. For the testing of my
hypotheses regarding regime type differences, I run the baseline model (excluding
the regime type variable) for the subsets of democracies and autocracies. As the
Wald 2 results of the analyses demonstrate (see Tables 2, 3 and 4), the fit of each
model is good. Downloaded from ips.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on October
5, 2014 Sirin 313 Table 1. Frequency of the Use of Force according to a Crisis Actors
Experience of Domestic Problems Prior to an International Crisis, 19182005 Mass
violence Economic downturn Government instability 0 1 0 1 0 1 No use of force Use
of force 443 226 76 52 317 178 151 67 403 212 117 64 Use of force % 33% 40%
36% 30% 34% 35% Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the cross-tabulations
of the use of force in international crises with three different forms of domestic
problems (mass violence, economic downturn, and government instability). Among
crisis actors who experience increased mass violence prior to the crisis, 40 percent
use force. By comparison, if the country does not experience an increase in mass
violence, only 33 percent resort to the use of force. In cases of economic decline, 30
percent of crisis actors use force, whereas cases of no economic downturn
demonstrate the use of force 36 percent of the time. Finally, a change in the level of
government instability indicates almost no variation across the use of force and
non-use of force options (34 percent for no government instability and 35 percent
for increased government instability). These preliminary results fall in line with my
theoretical expectations that increased mass violence is more likely to lead to the
use of force rather than other forms of domestic problems.

Internet Freedom Advantage

Doesnt Solve I-Freedom 1NC

And US allies destroy i-freedom signal
Hanson 10/25/12, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson-internetfreedom

Another challenge is dealing with close partners and allies who undermine internet
freedom. In August 2011, in the midst of the Arab uprisings, the UK experienced a
different connection technology infused movement, the London Riots. On August 11,
in the heat of the crisis, Prime Minister Cameron told the House of Commons: Free
flow of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. So we are
working with the police, the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it
would be right to stop people communicating via these websites and services when
we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality. This policy had farreaching implications. As recently as January 2011, then President of Egypt, Hosni
Mubarak, ordered the shut-down of Egypts largest ISPs and the cell phone network,
a move the United States had heavily criticized. Now the UK was contemplating the
same move and threatening to create a rationale for authoritarian governments
everywhere to shut down communications networks when they threatened
violence, disorder and criminality. Other allies like Australia are also pursuing
restrictive internet policies. As OpenNet reported it: Australia maintains some of
the most restrictive Internet policies of any Western country When these allies
pursue policies so clearly at odds with the U.S. internet freedom agenda, several
difficulties arise. It undermines the U.S. position that an open and free internet is
something free societies naturally want. It also gives repressive authoritarian
governments an excuse for their own monitoring and filtering activities. To an
extent, U.S. internet freedom policy responds even-handedly to this challenge
because the vast bulk of its grants are for open source circumvention tools that can
be just as readily used by someone in London as Beijing, but so far, the United
States has been much more discreet about criticising the restrictive policies of allies
than authoritarian states.

Doesnt Solve I-Freedom 2NC

Now, the Aff doesnt solve internet freedom The United
States believes that countries inherently want free internet
access and have criticized actions of authoritarian states, such
as China and Iran Thats Hanson
Gambling ban spills over to internet freedom generally
Hammond 3/12/14, writer for RedState
http://www.redstate.com/diary/mikehammond/2014/03/12/crony-online-gamblingban-threatens-gun-owners-rights/
And, frankly, the fact is that neither the sponsors nor the beneficiaries of the
Internet gambling regulation are people who have given a lot of thought to
constitutional principle or the precedential impact of extending regulation into
this area. Sen. Dean Heller (R-NV) is sponsoring the ban on behalf of the owner of a
Las Vegas casino, and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) is reportedly jumping on board.
Heller represents Nevada and will hawk the interests of the casino owners who
handed Harry Reid his current six-year term. Thanks for that! Graham has a
different reason for his involvement. Billionaire casino owner Sheldon Adelson has
pledged to spend whatever it takes to have it the federal ban enacted. And
Graham, after years of stabbing conservatives in the back, has his back against the
wall. With a contentious primary and polls suggesting Graham could be forced into a
runoff, he would like nothing more than a billionaire casino owner to rain campaign
ads from the heavens to help him survive. True, billionaire Las Vegas casino owners
are on both sides of this issue. And I certainly dont begrudge billionaires their
billions. But Im staking my claim with the billionaires who dont believe that Big
Government should stick its heavy hand into the market in order to protect their
billions. The bottom line? This camels nose in the tent of Internet
regulation creates a dangerous precedent for those concerned about
Internet freedom. It should scare those who want to stop Chuck Schumer and his
gun-grabber choir form moving the central element of Barack Obamas gun control
agenda. To coin a phrase, Ideas have consequences. And regulation of Internet
gaming opens the door to regulation of other things congressmen or billionaire
political spenders find objectionable. Obviously, that includes firearms.

China undermines global i-freedom

Chang 14 (Research Associate, Technology & National Security Program, the
Center for a New American Security)
(Amy Chang, How the 'Internet with Chinese Characteristics' Is Rupturing the Web,
12/15/2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-chang-/china-internetsovereignty_b_6325192.html)

China is openly undermining the United States' vision of a free and open Internet.
Motivated by maintaining the fragile balance between information control, social
and political stability, and continued modernization and economic growth for an
online population of over 600 million, the Chinese government is attempting to alter
how nations understand their role in Internet governance through a concept called
"Internet sovereignty."
Internet sovereignty refers to the idea that a country has the right to control
Internet activity within its own borders, and it is what China refers to as a natural
extension of a nation-state's authority to handle its own domestic and foreign
affairs. For the United States and other Western nations, however, Internet
governance is delegated to an inclusive and distributed set of stakeholders
including government, civil society, the private sector, academia, and national and
international organizations (also known as the multi-stakeholder model of Internet
governance).

Gambling ban undoes internet freedom promotion

Aronson 14 Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper Series
Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University Can Trade
Policy Set Information Free? IIEP-WP-2014-9 Susan Ariel Aaronson George
Washington University
http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/2014WP/AaronsonIIEPWP20149.pdf
T here is a contradiction at the heart of the Internet. Al though the Internet
has become a platform for trade, trade policies have both enhanced and
undermined Internet freedom and the open Internet. Two recent events illuminate
this paradox. First, The New York Times ( Americas paper of record ) reported it had
b een repeatedly hacked after it published several articles delineating the financial
holdings of the families of Chinas highest leaders. The hackers inserted malware
and stolen its employees e - mail account passwords, allegedly to find out
information abou t the Times sources. Soon thereafter, The Wall Street Journal,
Washington Post, Bloomberg, Voice of America and other media outlets publicly
claimed their computers were hacked, allegedly also by Chinese hackers. And in late
February the government of A ntigua announced that it would retaliate against
Americas ban of Antiguan online gambling sites. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) gave the small island nation approval to sell items protected under US
copyright law as a means of compensation for trade p ractices that devastated its
economy. Antigua plans to set up a website to sell US - copyrighted material without
paying the copyright holders. In short , while China was using trade to steal
information and in so doing reduce Internet openness , Antigua will use trade to
undermine property rights while advancing information flows. Although t he global
Internet is creating a virtuous circle of expanding growth, opportunity, and
information flows , policymakers and market actors are taking steps tha t undermine
access to information, reduce freedom of expression and splinter the Internet.
Almost every country has adopted policies to protect privacy, enforce intellectual
property rights, protect national security, or thwart cyber - theft, hacking, and sp

am. While these actions may be necessary to achieve important policy goals, these
policies may distort cross - border information flows and trade. Meanwhile, US,
Canadian and European firms provide much of the infrastructure as well as censor
ware or blockin g services to their home governments and repressive states such as
Iran, Russia, and China

US Online gambling ban kills internet freedom signal

Kibbe 4/28/14 (Matt, FreedomWorks, "Coalition Letter: No Federal Ban on
Internet Gambling")

We, the undersigned individuals and organizations, are writing to express our deep
concerns about the Restoration of Americas Wire Act (H.R. 4301), which would
institute a de facto ban on internet gaming in all 50 states. The legislation is a broad
overreach by the federal government over matters traditionally reserved for the
states. H.R. 4301 will reverse current law in many states and drastically increase the
federal governments regulatory power. As we have seen in the past, a ban will not
stop online gambling. Prohibiting states from legalizing and regulating the practice
only ensures that it will be pushed back into the shadows where crime can flourish
with little oversight. In this black market, where virtually all sites are operated from
abroad, consumers have little to no protection from predatory behavior. Perhaps
even more concerning is the fact that this bill allows the federal government to take
a heavy hand in regulating the Internet, opening the door for increased Internet
regulation in the future. By banning a select form of Internet commerce, the
federal government is setting a troubling precedent and providing fodder to
those who would like to see increased Internet regulation in the future. We
fear that H.R. 4301 will begin a dangerous process of internet censorship that
will simultaneously be circumvented by calculated international infringers while
constraining the actions of private individuals and companies in the United States.

Online gambling is the BIGGEST internal link

Braithwaite and Blitz 5/6/9 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d47231c-3a82-11de8a2d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3E1KKpH4h staff, Financial Times

Barney Frank, chairman of the House financial services committee, presented

legislation on Wednesday that would legalise internet gambling in the US and
pave the way for overseas companies to return to the market. Calling existing law
the single biggest example of an intrusion into internet freedom, Mr
Frank said he was confident of some cross-party support for the bill, which would
regulate and tax online gambling.

Doesnt Solve Censorship 1NC

Even absent data localization private companies will
voluntarily self-censor nominal internet freedom is irrelevant
Morozov 11 (Evgeny Morozov, visting scholar at Stanford University, Schwartz
Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2011, The Net Delusion, ch. 8)

What is clear is that, contrary to the expectations of many Western policymakers,

Facebook is hardly ideal for promoting democracy; its own logic, driven by
profits or ignorance of the increasingly global context in which it operates,
is, at times, extremely antidemocratic. Were Kafka to pen his novel The Trial
in which the protagonist is arrested and tried for reasons that are never explained to
himtoday, El Ghazzali's case could certainly serve as inspiration. That much of
digital activism is mediated by commercial intermediaries who operate on similar
Kafkaesque principles is cause for concern, if only because it introduces too much
unnecessary uncertainty into the activist chain, imagine that El Ghazzali's group
was planning a public protest on the very day that its page got deleted: The protest
could have easily been derailed. Until there is complete certainty that a Facebook
group won't be removed at the most unfortunate moment, many dissident groups
will shy away from making it their primary channel of communication. In reality,
there is no reason why Facebook should even bother with defending freedom of
expression in Morocco, which is not an appealing market to its advertisers, and even
if it were, it would surely be much easier to make money there without crossing
swords with the country's rulers. We do not know how heavily Facebook polices
sensitive political activity on its site, but we do know of many cases similar to El
Ghazzali s. In February 2010, for example, Facebook was heavily criticized by its
critics in Asia for removing the pages of a group with 84,298 members that had
been formed to oppose the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of
Hong Kong, the pro-establishment and pro-Beijing party. According to the group's
administrator, the ban was triggered by opponents flagging the group as "abusive"
on Facebook. This was not the first time that Facebook constrained the work of such
groups. In the run-up to the Olympic torch relay passing through Hong Kong in
2008, it shut down several groups, while many pro-Tibetan activists had their
accounts deactivated for "persistent misuse of the site." It's not just politics:
Facebook is notoriously zealous in policing other types of content as well. In July
2010 it sent multiple warnings to an Australian jeweler for posting photos of her
exquisite porcelain doll, which revealed the doll's nipples. Facebook's founders may
be young, but they are apparently puritans. Many other intermediaries are not
exactly unbending defenders of political expression either. Twitter has been accused
of silencing online tribute to the 2008 Gaza War. Apple has been bashed for blocking
Dalai Lama-related iPhone apps from its App Store for China (an application related
to Rebiya Kadeer, the exiled leader of the Uighur minority, was banned as well).
Google, which owns Orkut, a social network that is surprisingly popular in India, has
been accused of being too zealous in removing potentially controversial content

that may be interpreted as calling for religious and ethnic violence against both
Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, a 2009 study found that Microsoft has been
censoring what users in the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Algeria, and Jordan could
find through its Bing search engine much more heavily than the governments of
those countries.

Doesnt Solve Censorship 2NC

Non-state actors and social media monitoring make censorship
impossible to counter
Morozov 11 (Evgeny Morozov, visting scholar at Stanford University, Schwartz
Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2011, The Net Delusion, ch. 4)

But governments do not need to wait until breakthroughs in artificial intelligence to

make more accurate decisions about what it is they need to censor. One remarkable
difference between the Internet and other media is that online information is
hyperlinked. To a large extent, all those links act as nano-endorsements. If someone
links to a particular page, that page is granted some importance. Google has
managed to aggregate all these nano-endorsementsmaking the number of incoming links the key predictor of relevance for search resultsand build a mighty
business around it. Hyperlinks also make it possible to infer the context in which
particular bits of information appear online without having to know the meaning of
those bits. If a dozen antigovernment blogs link to a PDF published on a blog that
was previously unknown to the Internet police, the latter may assume that the
document is worth blocking without ever reading it. The linksthe "nanoendorsements" from antigovernment bloggersspeak for themselves. The PDF is
simply guilty by association. Thanks to Twitter, Facebook, and other social media,
such associations are getting much easier for the secret police to trace. If
authoritarian governments master the art of aggregating the most popular links that
their opponents share on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media sites, they can
create a very elegant, sophisticated, and, most disturbingly, accurate solution to
their censorship needs. Even though the absolute amount of informationor the
number of links, for that mattermay be growing, it does not follow that there will
be less "censorship" in the world. It would simply become more fine-tuned. If
anything, there might be less one-size-fits-all "wasteful" censorship, but this is
hardly a cause for celebration. The belief that the Internet is too big to censor is
dangerously naive. As the Web becomes even more social, nothing prevents
governments or any other interested playersfrom building censorship engines
powered by recommendation technology similar to that of Amazon and Netflix. The
only difference, however, would be that instead of being prompted to check out the
"recommended" pages, we'd be denied access to them. The "social graph"a
collection of all our connections across different sites (think of a graph that shows
everyone you are connected to on different sites across the Web, from Facebook to
Twitter to YouTube)a concept so much beloved by the "digerati," could encircle all
of us. The main reason why censorship methods have not yet become more social is
because much of our Internet browsing is still done anonymously. When we visit
different sites, the people who administer them cannot easily tell who we are. There
is absolutely no guarantee that this will still be the case five years from now; two
powerful forces may destroy online anonymity. From the commercial end, we
see stronger integration between social networks and different websites you can

now spot Facebook's "Like" button on many sitesso there are growing incentives
to tell sites who you are. Many of us would eagerly trade our privacy for a discount
coupon to be used at the Apple store. From the government end, growing concerns
over child pornography, copyright violations, cybercrime, and cyberwarfare also
make it more likely that there will be more ways in which we will need to prove our
identity online. The future of Internet control is thus a function of numerous (and
rather complex) business and social forces; sadly, many of them originating in free
and democratic societies. Western governments and foundations can't solve the
censorship problem by just building more tools; they need to identify, publicly
debate, and, if necessary, legislate against each of those numerous forces. The
West excels at building and supporting effective tools to pierce through the firewalls
of authoritarian governments, but it is also skilled at letting many of its corporations
disregard the privacy of their users, often with disastrous implications for those who
live in oppressive societies. Very litde about the currently fashionable imperative to
promote Internet freedom suggests that Western policymakers are committed to
resolving the problems that they themselves have helped to create. We Don't
Censor; We Outsource! Another reason why so much of today's Internet censorship
is invisible is because it's not the governments who practice it. While in most cases
it's enough to block access to a particular critical blog post, it's even better to
remove that blog post from the Internet in its entirety. While governments do not
have such mighty power, companies that enable users to publish such blog posts on
their sites can do it in a blink. Being able to force companies to police the Web
according to a set of some broad guidelines is a dream come true for any
government. It's the companies who incur all the costs, it's the companies who do
the dirty work, and it's the companies who eventually get blamed by the users.
Companies also are more likely to catch unruly content, as they know their online
communities better than government censors. Finally, no individual can tell
companies how to run those communities, so most appeals to freedom of
expression are pointless. Not surprisingly, this is the direction in which Chinese
censorship is evolving. According to research done by Rebecca MacKinnon, who
studies the Chinese Internet at New America Foundation and is a former CNN
bureau chief in Beijing, censorship of Chinese user-generated content is "highly
decentralized," while its "implementation is left to the Web companies themselves".
To prove this, in mid-2008 she set up anonymous accounts on a dozen Chinese blog
platforms and published more than a hundred posts on controversial subjects, from
corruption to AIDS to Tibet, to each of them. MacKinnon's objective was to test if
and how soon they would be deleted. Responses differed widely across companies:
The most vigilant ones deleted roughly half of all posts, while the least vigilant
company censored only one. There was little coherence to the companies' behavior,
but then this is what happens when governments say "censor" but don't spell out
what it is that needs to be censored, leaving it for the scared executives to figure
out. The more leeway companies have in interpreting the rules, the more
uncertainty there is as to whether a certain blog post will be removed or allowed to
stay. This Kafkaesque uncertainty can eventually cause more harm than censorship
itself, for it's hard to plan an activist campaign if you cannot be sure that your
content will remain available. This also suggests that, as bad as Google and
Facebook may look to us, they still probably undercensor compared to most

companies operating in authoritarian countries. Global companies are usually

unhappy to take on a censorship role, for it might cost them dearly. Nor are they
happy to face a barrage of accusations of censorship in their own home countries.
(:Local companies, on the other hand, couldn't care less Social networking sites in
Azerbaijan probably have no business in the United States or Western Europe, nor
are their names likely to be mispronounced at congressional hearings.) But this is
one battle that the West is already losing. Users usually prefer local rather than
global services; those are usually faster, more relevant, easier to use, and in line
with local cultural norms. Look at the Internet market in most authoritarian states,
and you'll probably find at least five local alternatives to each prominent Web 2.0
start-up from Silicon Valley. For a total online population of more than 300 million,
Facebook's 14,000 Chinese users, by one 2009 count, are just a drop in the sea (or,
to be exact, 0.00046 percent). Companies, however, are not the only intermediaries
that could be pressured into deleting unwanted content. RuNet (the colloquial name
for the Russian-speaking Internet), for example, heavily relies on "com-munities,"
which are somewhat akin to Facebook groups, and those are run by dedicated
moderators. Most of the socially relevant online activism in Russia happens on just
one platform, Livejournal. When in 2008 the online community of automobile lovers
on Livejournal became the place to share photos and reports from a wave of
unexpected protests organized by unhappy drivers in the far eastern Russian city of
Vladivostok, its administrators immediately received requests from FSB, KGB's
successor, urging them to delete the reports. They complied, although they
complained about the matter in a subsequent report that they posted to the
community's webpage (within just a few hours that post disappeared as well).
Formally, though, nothing has been blocked; this is the kind of invisible
censorship that is most difficult to fight. The more intermediarieswhether
human or corporateare involved in publishing and disseminating a particular piece
of information, the more points of control exist for quietly removing or altering that
information. The early believers in "dictator's dilemma" have grossly
underestimated the need for online intermediaries. Someone still has to provide
access to the Internet, host a blog or a website, moderate an online community, or
even make that community visible in search engines. As long as all those entities
have to be tied to a nation state, there will be ways to pressure them into accepting
and facilitating highly customized censorship that will have no impact on economic
growth.

Privacy Advantage

Surveillance Good 1NC

Surveillance outweighs and privacy violations are
overstretched post-Snowden solves security threats
Gallington 13 -- (Daniel J. Gallington, senior policy and program adviser at the
George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington VA, served in senior national policy
positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of ?Justice, and
as bipartisan general counsel for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
The Case for Internet Surveillance, US News,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/18/internetsurveillance-is-a-necessary-part-of-national-security, Accessed 07-02-15)
the recent public debate
brought on by Edward Snowden's disclosures is far more mundane, and far less
sensational than the media would perhaps like it to be . Also In that case, the real issue set
If the answer to these questions continues to be yes and it most likely is then

boils down to the following set of key questions, best answered by our Congress specifically the Intelligence
committees working with some other key committees after a searching inquiry and a series of hearings, as many
of them open as possible. Were the established and relevant laws, regulations and procedures complied with? Are
the established laws, regulations and procedures up to date for current Internet and other technologies? Is there
reason to add new laws, regulations and procedures? Is there a continued requirement based on public safety to
be able to do intrusive surveillance, including Internet surveillance, against spies, terrorists or criminals? In sum,

the idea that we have somehow "betrayed" or "subverted" the Internet (or the
telephone for that matter) is as my mom also used to say "just plain silly." Such kinds of
inaccurate statements are emotional and intended mostly for an audience with
preconceived opinions or that hasn't thought very hard about the dangerous
consequences of an Internet totally immune from surveillance . In fact, it
seems time for far less sensationalism primarily by the media and far more
objectivity. In the final analysis, my mom probably had it right: "Those kind of people, sure".

Public Perception 1NC

The public is only mildly concerned
Dukeman 14
(Ryan, European Union Program Undergraduate Fellow at Princeton University,
Surprisingly mild reaction to NSA surveillance, February 11, 2014,
http://dailyprincetonian.com/opinion/2014/02/surprisingly-mild-reaction-to-nsasurveillance/, kc)

One of the legacies 2013 will leave behind, as Andrea Peterson wrote recently in The Washington Post, is that it was

weve learned that the

National Security Agency is collecting massive amounts of phone call metadata, emails,
location information of cell phones and is even listening to Xbox Live. Shocking as
this obviously was to me, as a citizen of the country of We the People, one
founded on civil liberties, what was perhaps more shocking was how mild the
reaction of many Americans was. While polls showed that a small majority of U.S.
citizens opposed the NSAs collection of phone and Internet usage data, after months of
reassurances by the President that the programs would be reformed and used
responsibly, the numbers seem to have changed (or at least, the story seems to be dying down).
The problem here is that a story like this shouldnt ever go away, not until the
sought reforms are accomplished or at least until we as a society reach an informed
consensus about the core issues at stake . Every day that we wait, every day that such programs are
the year that proved your paranoid friend right. Since January of last year,

allowed to continue without public scrutiny or reform, is a day in which rights are unduly sacrificed without the
informed consent of the public.

Privacy is already dead- companies surveil more than the

government and will not change
Gillmor 14
(Dan, Professor of Digital Media Literacy and Entrepreneurship at Arizona State
University, As we sweat government surveillance, companies like Google collect
our data, April 18, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/18/corporations-googleshould-not-sell-customer-data, kc)

As security expert Bruce Schneier (a friend) has archly observed, "Surveillance

is the business model

of the internet." I don't expect this to change unless and until external realities force
a change and I'm not holding my breath. Instead, the depressing news just seems to be
getting worse. Google confirmed this week what many people had assumed: even if
you're not a Gmail user, your email to someone who does use their services will be
scanned by the all-seeing search and the advertising company's increasingly smart machines. The company
updated their terms of service to read: Our automated systems analyze your content (including e-mails) to provide
you personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, tailored advertising, and spam and
malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it is stored. My system doesn't
do this to your email when you send me a message. I pay a web-hosting company that keeps my email on a server

that isn't optimized for data collection and analysis. I would use Gmail for my email, if Google would let me pay for
service that didn't "analyze (my) content" apart from filtering out spam and malware. Google doesn't offer that
option, as far as I can tell, and that's a shame if not, given its clout, a small scandal. Also this week,

Advertising Age, a top trade journal for the ad industry, reported that tech
companies led by Google, Microsoft, Apple and Facebook are moving swiftly to fix
what they plainly see as a bug in the system: It's more difficult to spy on us as
effectively when we use our mobile devices than when we're typing and clicking
away on our laptops. Here's a particularly creepy quote in the story, courtesy of a mobile advertising
executive: The universal ID today in the world is your Facebook log-in. This industry-wide challenge of mobile
tracking has sort of quietly been solved, without a lot of fanfare. Facebook may be getting the message that
people don't trust it, which shouldn't be surprising given the company's long record of bending its rules to give
users less privacy. CEO Mark Zuckerberg told the New York Times' Farhad Manjoo that many upcoming products and
services wouldn't even use the name "Facebook," as the company pushes further and further into its users' lives.
The report concluded: If the new plan succeeds, then, one day large swaths of Facebook may not look like
Facebook and may not even bear the name Facebook. It will be everywhere, but you may not know it. Maybe.
But Facebook will know you. And like Google, Facebook won't let me pay for its otherwise excellent service,
something I'd gladly do if it would agree not to spy on me. Barring that, what I do to employ countermeasures
wherever possible, and to make choices in the services I use such as relying more and more on the DuckDuckGo
search engine. DuckDuckGo isn't as likely to give me the results I want as easily as Google, but it has proved to be
good enough for most purposes. But in a week when news organizations (like this one) won Pulitzer prizes for

one might hope that corporations would

show even the slightest sign of retreating from their longstanding practices that, if
revealing vast abuses of surveillance by the government,

conducted by the government, would give most citizens pause.

The public doesnt feel strongly about surveillance.

Rieff 13
(David, Author with focus on immigration, international conflict, and
humanitarianism, Why Nobody Cares About the Surveillance State, August 22,
2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/why-nobody-cares-about-thesurveillance-state/, kc)
And yet, apart from some voices from the antiwar left and the libertarian right, the
reaction from this deceived public has been strangely muted. Polls taken this
summer have shown the public almost evenly split on whether the seemingly
unlimited scope of these surveillance programs was doing more harm than good.
Unlike on issues such as immigration and abortion, much of the public outrage
presupposed by news coverage of the scandal does not, in reality, seem to exist. It
is true that the revelations have caused at least some on the mainstream right, both
in Congress and in conservative publications like National Review, to describe the
NSAs activities as a fundamental attack on the rights of citizens. For their part,
mainstream Democrats find themselves in the uncomfortable position of either
defending what many of them view as indefensible or causing trouble for a
beleaguered president who seems increasingly out of his depth on most questions
of national security and foreign policy. The press can certainly be depended on to
pursue the story, not least because of a certain guild anger over the detention
recently of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwalds partner, David Miranda, by British
police at Londons Heathrow Airport, and the British governments decision to force
the Guardian to destroy the disks it had containing Snowdens data in the papers
London office with two officials from CGHQ, the British equivalent of the NSA,
looking on. But while the surveillance scandal has both engaged and enraged the

elites, when all is said and done, the general public does not seem nearly as
concerned. Why? In an age dominated by various kinds of techno-utopianism the
conviction that networking technologies are politically and socially emancipatory
and that massive data collection will unleash both efficiency in business and
innovation in science the idea that Big Data might be your enemy is antithetical
to everything we have been encouraged to believe. A soon-to-be-attained critical
mass of algorithms and data has been portrayed as allowing individuals to
customize the choices they make throughout their lives. Now, the data sets and
algorithms that were supposed to set us free seem instead to have been turned
against us.

Public Perception 2NC

Facebook proves- consumers have privacy fatigue- dont
care about privacy anymore
Huffington Post 11
(Huffington Post, Facebook Users Experience Privacy Fatigue, 03/11/2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/11/03/facebook-users-privacyfatigue_n_1073131.html, kc)

Facebook Users Experience Privacy Fatigue -- Facebook users are struggling to keep
up with the "dizzying" number of changes to privacy settings made by the social
network, a survey has found. Almost half (48%) of those questioned by consumer magazine Which? Computing
confessed they had failed to keep track of all the security changes that had been introduced, while almost a fifth
(19%) said they had never altered their privacy settings. Despite concerns about the amount of personal
information being published by users of the website, many could be suffering "privacy fatigue", the magazine

Although Facebook has introduced a slew of changes over the past two
years, respondents had on average changed their privacy settings just twice . Rob
suggested.

Reid, scientific policy adviser for Which?, said: "Many Facebook users have never changed their privacy settings and
those who have do it far less often than Facebook makes changes. "This

may reflect a disregard or

lack of awareness for privacy or, more worryingly, privacy fatigue stimulated by the
dizzying number of changes." Which? Computing interviewed 953 people in September about their
Facebook use.

Public apathy about privacy violations.

Kelly 13
(Heather, Technology Reporter for CNNMoney, Writer/Producer at CNN Digital,
Degree in Journalism from NYU, Some shrug at NSA snooping: Privacy's already
dead, June 10, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/tech/web/nsa-internetprivacy, kc)
A series of revelations about the National Security Agency's surveillance programs sparked outrage among many

there seems to be a gap

between the roiling anger online and the attitudes of other people, especially
younger ones, who think it's just not that big a deal . It's the rare issue that crosses party lines
this week, including the expected privacy activists and civil libertarians. But

in terms of outrage, apathy and even ignorance. When interviewing people about the topic in downtown San

a number of people of all ages who had not heard the news, and
more than one who asked what the NSA was. The rest had various reasons for not
being terribly concerned. Privacy is already dead When the news broke on Wednesday, a
Francisco, we found

number of people responded online by saying an extensive government surveillance program wasn't surprising and
just confirmed what they already knew. The lack of shock wasn't limited to savvy technologists who have been
following reports from organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, or EFF, that cover possible monitoring

Many people already assumed that information online was easily

accessible by corporations and the government. A survey conducted by the Allstate/National
Journal Heartland Monitor just days before the NSA news broke found that 85% of
Americans already believed their phone calls, e-mails and online activity were being
monitored. Allen Trember from San Luis Obispo, California, said he knew when he started using the Internet
going back to 2007.

that his information wasn't going to be private, but still lamented that privacy no longer exists. "I don't like it, but
what can I do about it?" he said. "I'm

just glad that we have as much freedom as we do."

Efficiency gains from surveillance outweigh

Swire 99 Peter P. Swire, Chief Counselor for PrivacyUnited States
Office of Management and Budget, Professor at the Ohio State
University College of Law, 1999 (F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities
Law Symposium: The Modernization of Financial Services Legislation: Article:
Financial Privacy and The Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance,
LexisNexis Academic, Accessed 06-29-2015)
In discussing the advantages of allowing flows of financial data to government, the
focus has been on preventing or prosecuting illegal behavior. Greater information
flows can restrict money laundering, help track deadbeat parents who fail to pay
child support, and otherwise reduce the harms to society that inefficient
surveillance permits. An even more general rationale, however, often exists for
providing information to the government - efficiency. Free flows of information, in
both the public and private sector, can lead to a variety of efficiency gain s. Think, for example, of the
burden of filling out government paperwork. Suppose that in an electronic future an individual would never have to
provide information more than once to any government. In this technocratic utopia, the record would be entered

With this efficiency in assembling

and matching data, there would be far less burden on individuals who wish to apply for
once and then be available automatically for all authorized uses.

government benefits, enter into a contract with any government unit, file a report in connection with environmental

Better coordination
might also be possible between governments at the local, state, national, and even
international levels. In the private sector, free flows of financial data also create efficiency gains. From a
or other regulatory programs, or otherwise transfer information to the government.

seller's point of view, detailed information about the buyer allows more efficient provision of goods and services.
Detailed information permits "one-to-one" marketing, so buyers get precisely what they most value, and so sellers
can avoid unwanted inventory and can produce exactly what buyers want. n87 Ever-expanding computing power and
the growth of the Internet mean that the costs of assembling, processing, and communicating personal data
continue to fall rapidly. As the private sector develops new means for processing personal information, the
information also becomes potentially available to the government. [*493] In the area of information processing, the

Any data in private hands are

only a subpoena away from the government. The efficiency gains in the private
sector mean efficiency gains for law enforcement and the government more
generally.
public and private sectors are linked more closely than is often realized.

Doesnt Solve Totalitarianism 1NC

No impact to Totalitarianism privacy is just as likely to be
used to cursh dissent
Siegel 11 (Lee Siegel, a columnist and editor at large for The New York Observer,
is the author of Against the Machine: How the Web Is Reshaping Culture and
Commerce and Why It Matters. The Net Delusion and the Egypt Crisis,
February 4, 2011, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/the-net-delusionand-the-egypt-crisis)

Morozov takes the ideas of what he calls cyber-utopians and shows how reality
perverts them in one political situation after another. In Iran, the regime used the
internet to crush the internet-driven protests in June 2009. In Russia, neofascists use
the internet to organize pogroms. And on and on. Morozov has written hundreds of
pages to make the point that technology is amoral and cuts many different ways.
Just as radio can bolster democracy or as in Rwanda incite genocide, so the
internet can help foment a revolution but can also help crush it. This seems obvious,
yet it has often been entirely lost as grand claims are made for the internets
positive, liberating qualities. And suddenly here are Tunisia and, even more
dramatically, Egypt, simultaneously proving and refuting Morozovs argument. In
both cases, social networking allowed truths that had been whispered to be widely
broadcast and commented upon. In Tunisia and Egypt and now across the Arab
world Facebook and Twitter have made people feel less alone in their rage at the
governments that stifle their lives. There is nothing more politically emboldening
than to feel, all at once, that what you have experienced as personal bitterness is
actually an objective condition, a universal affliction in your society that therefore
can be universally opposed. Yet at the same time, the Egyptian government shut
off the internet, which is an effective way of using the internet. And according to
one Egyptian blogger, misinformation is being spread through Facebook as it was
in Iran just as real information was shared by anti-government protesters. This is
the dark side of internet freedom that Morozov is warning against. It is the
freedom to wantonly crush the forces of freedom. All this should not surprise
anyone. It seems that, just as with every other type of technology of
communication, the internet is not a solution to human conflict but an amplifier for
all aspects of a conflict. As you read about pro-government agitators charging into
crowds of protesters on horseback and camel, you realize that nothing has changed
in our new internet age. The human situation is the same as it always was, except
that it is the same in a newer and more intense way. Decades from now, we will no
doubt be celebrating a spanking new technology that promises to liberate us from
the internet. And the argument joined by Morozov will occur once again.

Doesnt Solve Totalitarianism 2NC

Now, the Aff doesnt promote dissent against Totalitarianism
states - New cyber utopian societies are extremely influenced
by technology Increased Freedom could result in increased
technology For example Iran government officals utilized
massive freedom to quell rebel - Thats Siegel
No evidence that the internet actually spurs democratization
Aday et al. 10 (Sean Aday is an associate professor of media and public affairs
and international affairs at The George Washington University, and director of the
Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication. Henry Farrell is an
associate professor of political science at The George Washington University. Marc
Lynch is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at The
George Washington University and director of the Institute for Middle East Studies.
John Sides is an assistant professor of political science at The George Washington
University. John Kelly is the founder and lead scientist at Morningside Analytics and
an affiliate of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University.
Ethan Zuckerman is senior researcher at the Berkman Center for Internet and
Society at Harvard University and also part of the team building Global Voices, a
group of international bloggers bridging cultural and linguistic differences through
weblogs. August 2010, BLOGS AND BULLETS: new media in contentious politics,
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pw65.pdf)

New media, such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, have played a major role
in episodes of contentious political action. They are often described as important
tools for activists seeking to replace authoritarian regimes and to promote freedom
and democracy, and they have been lauded for their democratizing potential.
Despite the prominence of Twitter revolutions, color revolutions, and the like in
public debate, policymakers and scholars know very little about whether and how
new media affect contentious politics. Journalistic accounts are inevitably
based on anecdotes rather than rigorously designed research. Although
data on new media have been sketchy, new tools are emerging that measure
linkage patterns and content as well as track memes across media outlets and thus
might offer fresh insights into new media. The impact of new media can be better
understood through a framework that considers five levels of analysis: individual
transformation, intergroup relations, collective action, regime policies, and external
attention. New media have the potential to change how citizens think or act,
mitigate or exacerbate group conflict, facilitate collective action, spur a backlash
among regimes, and garner international attention toward a given country.
Evidence from the protests after the Iranian presidential election in June 2009
suggests the utility of examining the role of new media at each of these five levels.
Although there is reason to believe the Iranian case exposes the potential benefits
of new media, other evidencesuch as the Iranian regimes use of the same social

network tools to harass, identify, and imprison protesterssuggests that, like any
media, the Internet is not a magic bullet. At best, it may be a rusty
bullet. Indeed, it is plausible that traditional media sources were equally if not
more important. Scholars and policymakers should adopt a more nuanced view of
new medias role in democratization and social change, one that recognizes that
new media can have both positive and negative effects. Introduction In January
2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton articulated a powerful vision of the
Internet as promoting freedom and global political transformation and rewriting the
rules of political engagement and action. Her vision resembles that of others who
argue that new media technologies facilitate participatory politics and mass
mobilization, help promote democracy and free markets, and create new kinds of
global citizens. Some observers have even suggested that Twitters creators should
receive the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in the 2009 Iranian protests.1 But not
everyone has such sanguine views. Clinton herself was careful to note when sharing
her vision that new media were not an unmitigated blessing. Pessimists argue
that these technologies may actually exacerbate conflict, as exemplified in
Kenya, the Czech Republic, and Uganda, and help authoritarian regimes monitor
and police their citizens. 2 They argue that new media encourage self-segregation
and polarization as people seek out only information that reinforces their prior
beliefs, offering ever more opportunities for the spread of hate, misinformation, and
prejudice.3 Some skeptics question whether new media have significant effects at
all. Perhaps they are simply a tool used by those who would protest in any event or
a trendy hook for those seeking to tell political stories. Do new media have real
consequences for contentious politicsand in which direction?4 The sobering
answer is that, fundamentally, no one knows. To this point, little research has
sought to estimate the causal effects of new media in a methodologically rigorous
fashion, or to gather the rich data needed to establish causal influence. Without
rigorous research designs or rich data, partisans of all viewpoints turn to
anecdotal evidence and intuition

Mobilization and Internet access are not correlated other

factors are more important
Kuebler 11 (Johanne Kuebler, contributor to the CyberOrient journal, Vol. 5, Iss.
1, 2011, Overcoming the Digital Divide: The Internet and Political Mobilization in
Egypt and Tunisia, http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=6212)

The assumption that the uncensored accessibility of the Internet encourages the
struggle for democracy has to be differentiated. At first sight, the case studies seem
to confirm the statement, since Egypt, featuring a usually uncensored access to the
Internet, has witnessed mass mobilisations organised over the Internet while Tunisia
had not. However, the mere availability of freely accessible Internet is not a
sufficient condition insofar as mobilisations in Egypt took place when a relative
small portion of the population had Internet access and, on the other hand,

mobilisation witnessed a decline between 2005 and 2008 although the number of
Internet users rose during the same period. As there is no direct correlation
between increased Internet use and political action organised through this
medium, we have to assume a more complex relationship. A successful social
movement seems to need more than a virtual space of debate to be successful,
although such a space can be an important complementary factor in opening
windows and expanding the realm of what can be said in public. A political
movement revolves around a core of key actors, and "netizens" qualify for this task.
The Internet also features a variety of tools that facilitate the organisation of events.
However, to be successful, social movements need more than a well-organised
campaign. In Egypt, we witnessed an important interaction between print and
online media, between the representatives of a relative elitist medium and the
traditional, more accessible print media. A social movement needs to provide
frames resonating with grievances of the public coupled with periods of increased
public attention to politics in order to create opportunity structures. To further
transport their message and to attract supporters, a reflection of the struggle of the
movement with the government in the "classical" media such as newspapers and
television channels is necessary to give the movement momentum outside the
Internet context.

Solvency

No Solvency Circumvention
FISA will circumvent
Bendix and Quirk 15 (assistant professor of political science at Keene State
College; Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the University of British
Columbia)
(William Bendix and Paul J. Quirk, Secrecy and negligence: How Congress lost
control of domestic surveillance, Issues in Governance Studies, March 2015,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecynegligence-congres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf)

Even if Congress at some point enacted new restrictions on surveillance, the

executive might ignore the law and continue to make policy unilaterally. The job of
reviewing executive conduct would again fall to the FISA Court.56 In view of this
courts history of broad deference to the executive, Congress would have a
challenge to ensure that legislative policies were faithfully implemented.

And the exec can circumvent via national security letters

Sanchez 15 (a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute)
(Julian Dont (Just) Let the Sun Go Down on Patriot Powers, May 29, 2015,
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/dont-just-let-the-sun-go-down-on-patriot-powers)

Also permanent are National Security Letters or NSLs, which allow the FBI to obtain
a more limited range of telecommunications and financial records without even
needing to seek judicial approval. Unsurprisingly, the government loves these
streamlined tools, and used them so promiscuously that the FBI didnt even bother
using 215 for more than a year after the passage of the Patriot Act. Inspector
General reports have also made clear that the FBI is happy to substitute NSLs
for 215 orders when even the highly accommodating FISC manages a rare display
of backbone. In at least one case, when the secret court refused an application for
journalists records on First Amendment grounds, the Bureau turned around and
obtained the same data using National Security Letters.

No Solvency Foreign Surveillance

Foreign, not domestic, surveillance is what is driving data pull
out restrictions on domestic surveillance will onlu further this
push
Chander and Le 15 (Director, California International Law Center, Professor of
Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis;
Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale
College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law)
Anupam Chander and Uyn P. L, DATA NATIONALISM, EMORY LAW JOURNAL, Vol.
64:677, http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/3/articles/chander-le.pdf)

First, the United States, like many countries, concentrates much of its surveillance
efforts abroad. Indeed, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is focused on
gathering information overseas, limiting data gathering largely only when it
implicates U.S. persons.174 The recent NSA surveillance disclosures have revealed
extensive foreign operations.175 Indeed, constraints on domestic operations may
well have spurred the NSA to expand operations abroad. As the Washington
Post reports, Intercepting communications overseas has clear advantages
for the NSA, with looser restrictions and less oversight.176 Deterred by a
2011 ruling by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court barring certain broad
domestic surveillance of Internet and telephone traffic,177 the NSA may have
increasingly turned its attention overseas. Second, the use of malware eliminates
even the need to have operations on the ground in the countries in which
surveillance occurs. The Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad reports that the NSA
has infiltrated every corner of the world through a network of malicious
malware.178 A German computer expert noted that data was intercepted here [by
the NSA] on a large scale.179 The NRC Handelsblad suggests that the NSA has
even scaled the Great Firewall of China,180 demonstrating that efforts to keep
information inside a heavily secured and monitored ironclad firewall do not
necessarily mean that it cannot be accessed by those on the other side of the earth.
This is a commonplace phenomenon on the Internet, of course. The recent
enormous security breach of millions of Target customers in the United States likely
sent credit card data of Americans to servers in Russia, perhaps through the
installation of malware on point-of-sale devices in stores.

No Solvency No Reverse Perception

The Aff cant undo the overwhelming perception of US
surveillance
Fontaine 14 (President of the Center for a New American Security)
(Richard, Bringing Liberty Online: Reenergizing the Internet Freedom Agenda in a
Post-Snowden Era, SEPTEMBER 2014, Center for New American Security)

Such moves are destined to have only a modest effect on foreign reactions. U.S.
surveillance will inevitably continue under any reasonably likely scenario
(indeed, despite the expressions of outrage, not a single country has said that it
would cease its surveillance activities). Many of the demands such as for greater
transparency will not be met, simply due to the clandestine nature of electronic
espionage. Any limits on surveillance that a govern- ment might announce will
not be publicly verifiable and thus perhaps not fully credible. Nor will there be an
international no-spying convention to reassure foreign citizens that their
communications are unmonitored. As it has for centuries, state- sponsored
espionage activities are likely to remain accepted international practice,
unconstrained by international law. The one major possible shift in policy following
the Snowden affair a stop to the bulk collection of telecommunications metadata
in the United States will not constrain the activ- ity most disturbing to foreigners;
that is, Americas surveillance of them. At the same time, U.S. offi- cials are
highly unlikely to articulate a global right to privacy (as have the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights and some foreign officials), akin to that derived
from the U.S. Constitutions fourth amendment, that would permit foreigners to sue
in U.S. courts to enforce such a right.39 The Obama administrations January 2014
presidential directive on signals intelligence refers, notably, to the legiti- mate
privacy interests of all persons, regardless of nationality, and not to a privacy
right.40

Plan is too small to overcome requirements that are necessary

to change the status quo
Kehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New Americas Open Technology Institute (OTI).
Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert
Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI)
(New Americas Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs Impact on the
Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014)

Two months later, many of the same companies and organizations issued another
letter supporting surveillance transparency legislation proposed by Senator Al
Franken (D-MN) and Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) that would have
implemented many of the original letters recommendations.334 Elements of both
bills, consistent with the coalitions recommendations, were included in the original
version of the USA FREEDOM Act introduced in the House and the Senateas were

new strong transparency provisions requiring the FISA court to declassify key legal
opinions to better educate the public and policymakers about how it is interpreting
and implementing the law. Such strong new transparency requirements are
consistent with several recommendations of the Presidents Review Group335 and
would help address concerns about lack of transparency raised by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights.336