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ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. COMMISSIONER RALPH C.

LANTION and
ROLANDO F. SALVADOR
Facts:
In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order,five (5) of the then incumbent seven (7)
members of the COMELEC participated: Commissioners Benjamin Abalos, Sr., LuzvimindaTangcangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ressureccion
Z. Borra and Ralph C. Lantion.
Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion voted for the issuance of said order, while Commissioner Borra
dissented.
Issue:
How many votes are needed for the Commission on Election En Banc to reach a decision. Whether or not
3 is the majority vote of all its members.
Ruling :
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid down in Cuaand holds that the
COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of "all its members," and NOT
majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.
WHEREFORE, private respondents motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
Article IX-A, Section 7
Cua v. Commission on Elections (& Priv.Respondent Puzon) (1987)
Facts:1. The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the petitioner but neverthelesssuspended his proclamation as
winner in the lonecongressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the proceduralrules in Comelec
Resolution No. 1669.2. Section 5 of the said resolution states that, A case being heard by it shall be decided with theunanimous
concurrence of all three Comissionersand its decision shall be considered a decision of the Comission. If this required number is
notobtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion,the case may be appealed to the Commission EnBanc, in which case the vote of
the majoritythereof shall be the decision of the Commission.3. Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of thefirst division was a
valid decision despite theresolution stated above because of Art. IX-A,Section 7 of the Constitution.
He argues thatthis applies to the votings of the Comelecboth in division and En Banc.
4. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that nodecision was reached by the first divisionbecause the required unanimous vote was
notobtained.
It was also argued that no validdecision was reached by the Comelec EnBanc because only three votes were cast infavor of the
petitioner and these did notconstitute the majority of the body.
Issue:W/N the 2-1 decision of the first division wasvalid.Held:The 2-1 decision by the first division was a validdecision under Art. IX-A,
Section 7 of theConstitution.Ratio:The three members who voted to affirm the firstdivision constituted a majority of the fivemembers
who voted and deliberated thereon
(Note: This is the part of the decision which Fr. Bcriticized in the Reviewer. See second column.)En Banc and their decision is also valid
under theaforecited constitutional provision. Hence, theproclamation of Cua on the basis of the twoaforecited decisions was a valid
act that entitleshim to assume his seat in the House of Representatives
Cagas vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012)
Post under case digests, Political Law at Monday, March 19, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national
and local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for
Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527
votes. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an
electoral protest on May 24, 2010. The Comelec issues orders stating that the protestant paid the cash deposit for filing of the case,
and his petition set out specific acts complained of. Petitioner moved to reconsider, which was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari directly with the SC.
Issue: Whether the Comelec erred in no dismissing the petition for insufficiency of form.
Held: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election
protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of
the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. The court may have the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Where the Commission in division
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible
under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
\Aratuc vs Comelec
FactsPetitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec.A supervening panel headed by
Comelec had conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the election records. In order for
the Commission to decide properly. It will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records and registration records and it
will have to interview and get statements from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual voting took place. The
Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass
Issue Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Ruling No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the commission on elections shall have direct control and
supervision over the board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or office having supervision or control over another
may do directly what the latteris supposed to do or ought to have done.The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs Haydee Yorac
in December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by
Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an
associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she
was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the President for such is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as
a constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional
commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions.
The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative expediency
to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the
members of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do
that by choosing the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate
Yorac as their acting chairman the point here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the
principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.
Case Digest: Republic vs. Imperial
FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173
of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several
titles, which are now the subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a

case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void
on the ground that the subject land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigation
conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's
land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with
cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to
dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since
the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a
direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to dismiss.
After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the
cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the
parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief within the extended period
granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable
land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is
between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the
high and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the
director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively
weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of the
director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR Secretary.
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents
contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be
"definitely outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V,
Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the features of a
foreshore land." The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land,
which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land
involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands
constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file
appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due
course.
Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds. Petitioner also alleged that it has raised
meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury
to, public interest, as the Government would lose its opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands of the public
domain.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what constitutes good and sufficient cause that will
merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. It has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from
their operation when compelling reasons so warrants or when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to
determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and
sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief.
Petitioner Republics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in the Courts discretion must
be given due course.
Nacionalista Party v. De Vera
Facts:The petitioners, members of theNacionalista Party, sought to disqualifyComelec chairman Vicente de Vera from taking part in
the Comelec deliberations concerning theNov. 1949 elections on two grounds:
1. De Veras son, Teodoro de Vera,
was a Liberal Party senatorial candidateduring said elections. Following Rules of Court, the older de Vera should be disqualified.2. De
Veras
appointment as Chairman is void ab initio, because he had already served as member of Comelec prior to his term as Chairman.
Under theConstitution, he was not entitled to anyreappointment.Issues / Held / Ratio:(1)WON the Rules of Court applies to the
ComelecNo. The Rules of Court, promulgated by the Supreme Court, applies only to judicial bodies under itsgeneral power of
supervision.The Comelec is an independent, administrative body over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction onlyto the extent that
it may review the
Comelecs
decisions, ordinances or rulings on certiorari.Assuming the Comelec adopted the ROC suppletorily, it does not have the power to
adopt rules onthe disqualification of its members because the Constitution providesthat its members may only be removed through
impeachment.The older De Vera should be able to inhibit himself solely on the basis of ethics.(2)WON a person who has not served
for the full term of nine years in the Comelec may be reappointedYes. The phrase
may not be reappointed is a continuation of the phrase who shall serve officefor a term of nineyears.
This does not warrant theinterpretation that members may not bereappointedwhen they have not served the full term. In such cases,
they may be reappointed provided that(1) the appointment does not preclude the appointment of a new member and(2) a term does
not exceed nine years in all.** Petition dismissedNote: De Vera inhibited himself from the deliberations
Promotional appointmentsCase: Funa v COA
following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourthyear of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COAfrom February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar wasnominated
and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointmentpapers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or onFebruary 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend
color oftitle to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairmanaccorded him a fresh term of seven (7)
years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, infine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
yearsreckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San
Buenaventura) was appointed asCOA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up toFebruary 2,
2011.Issues:Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that bodyand after having served for four (4) years
of his seven (7) year term as COAcommissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and thecircumscribing
concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the ConstitutionDecision:WHEREFOREthe petition isPARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of
thenCommissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission onAudit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose

term of once as such chairman has expired, is hereby declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)of the
Constitution.Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, reads:(2) The
Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall beappointedby thePresident with the consent of the Commission on Appointmentsfor a
term ofseven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairmanshall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and
the othe
commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor
. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Emphasis added.)The Court restates its
ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years;
an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.i. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of
seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotationalsystem prescribed by the
Constitution.2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the term of thepredecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or
CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barredfrom reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition againstreappointment.4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less thanseven years is eligible
for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
not covered by theban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service a scommissioner and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceedseven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position
of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Courtclarifies that reappointment found in
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
Onthe other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute
a new appointment and, hence, not, inthe strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution5. Any member of the
Commission cannot be appointed or designated in atemporary or acting capacity

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