Personal Compilation KHYBARI

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . · · . · · · . · · . . . . . · . . . . . . . . Prehistory Aryans & Achaemenids Alexander of Macedon Mauryans & Graeco-Bactrians Kushans Interim: Sasanian - Samanid Islamic Conquest Ghaznavid Ghorid Rule Mongol Rule Timorids Mughul Safavid Rivalry Mirwais Khan Hotak The Durrani Empire The Sadozai shahs Amir Dost Mohammad Khan First Anglo Afghan War Second Anglo Afghan War Amir Abdur Rahman Khan Habibullah Khan King Amanullah Khan Tajik Rule Nadir accede the throne Mohammad Nadir Shah Mohammad Zahir Shah . Zahir & His Uncles . The Pashtunistan Issue . Weekh Zalmian . Daud As Prime Minister . The Last Decade of Monarchy Daoud's Republic Noor Mohammad Tarakai Hafizullah Amin Babrak Karmal Najibullah Ahmadzai Sibghatullah Mojaddedi Burhanuddin Rabbani The Taliban Hamid Karzai

Early man in Afghanistan lived on river terraces and inhabited caves and rock shelters. Countless stone tools scattered about the countryside attest to this and each year archaeological excavations add substance to the picture of life in the Afghan area during the distant past. Lower Palaeolithic tools made more than 100,000 years ago were collected from terraces to the east of the perennial brackish lake called Dasht-i-Nawur west of Ghazni (L. Dupree, 1974). They consist mainly of quartzite tools of the following types: large flake cores, cleavers, side scrapers, choppers, adzes, hand axes and "proto-hand axes". These are the first Lower Palaeolithic tools to be identified in Afghanistan. Earlier, in 1966, a team of American archaeologists searching for evidence to support the theory that "Neanderthaloids possibly developed out of the East Asian strains of Java and Peking Man, and, during the lush Third Interglacial Period, spread along the foothills of the Eurasian mountains into Europe," excavated hundreds of stone tools of classic Middle Palaeolithic types from a rock shelter called Darra-i-Kur near the village of Baba Darwesh not far from Kishm, in Badakhshan. (L. Dupree, director) These represent the first tools of this early period to be scientifically excavated in Afghanistan. They date ca. 50,000 years ago. Continuing their search, the team moved west during the sum-mer of 1969 and found additional evidence in the foothills near Gurziwan, southeast of Maimana. The tools from Ghar-i-Gusfand Mordeh (Cave of the Dead Sheep) may be even older than those from Darrai-Kur. During the 1974 season Middle Palaeolithic tool types closely resembling those found at Darra-i-Kur were also recovered from terraces north of Dasht-i-Nawur. They in-clude Levallois flakes, side and round scrapers, points and possible burins. What manner of man made these tools? Ordinarily, skeletons of Neanderthal Man are found in association with the type of tools found at Darra-i-Kur. Indeed, less than 150 miles to the north, at Teshik Tash in Uzbakistan, Soviet archaeologists found the skeleton of a Neanderthal child with such tools. At Darra-i-Kur, however, a massive temporal bone has been pronounced by experts to be essentially modern with certain Neanderthaloid characteristics. Additional evidence is needed and continued excavations are planned, but it may be that Darra-i-Kur will necessitate a reappraisal of the development of contemporary man. "North Afghanistan may well be the zone where modern Homo sapiens, or at least a variety of modern man, developed physically and began to revolutionize Stone Age technology," says Dupree. As man ceased to be an animal chasing other animals, he began to manufacture a greater variety of more sophisticated stone tools. Upper Palaeolithic sites in Afghanistan dating from about 34,000 to 12,000 years ago illustrate this. Kara Kamar, a rock shelter 23 kin; 14 mi. north of Samangan, the first Stone Age site to be scientifically excavated in Afghanistan, produced tools dating ca. 30,000 B.c. (C. Coon, 1954). Evidence of Upper Palaeolithic man was subsequently expanded when other American archaeologists excavated over 20,000 stone tools from several rock shelters beside the Balkh River at Aq Kupruk in the hills some 120 kin; 75 mi. south of Balkh (Dupree, 1962, 1965). The tools in this assemblage are so beautifully worked that one eminent specialist in palaeolithic technology has dubbed the tool makers of Aq Kupruk "the Michelangelos of the Upper Palaeolithic." They represent a cultural phase which endured for about 5000 years at Aq Kupruk, from ca. 20,000 to 15,000 years ago, during which someone, a man or a woman, carved the face of a man, or is it a woman?, on a small limestone pebble. This work of art is one of the earliest representations of man by man. Other representations made from bone and pottery found in Czechoslovakia are of comparable age or even older; a carved stone piece found in France is possibly comparable in age. The face from Aq Kupruk smugly retains the secret of why it was carved. Does it perhaps represent an early ritual object? It was found in a hearth. (On display, National Museum, Kabul).

North of Balkh, Russian archaeologists found an extremely rich concentration of high quality Mesolithic implements on the sand dunes south of the Amu Darya (classical Oxus River) dating Ca. 10,000 B.C. (A. Vinegradov, 1969-present). Here the basic in-dustry is microlithic with geometrics. From dunes north of Khulm, a French archaeologist collected flints including microburins char-acteristic of the Epipalaeolithic, Ca. 7-6500 B.C. (Ph. Gouin, 1968). The great revolution which launched man onto the path of civilization-and eventually into the Atomic Age-took place dur-ing the Neolithic period when he learned to plant crops and domesticate animals and thus began to control his food supply.

Sculptured Head from Aq Kupruk, circa 20,000 B.C.

This revolution took place at Aq Kupruk about 9000 years ago which indicates that northern Afghanistan may indeed have been one of the early centers for the domestication of plants and animals. The evidence also supports another Dupree theory that the revolutionary ideas of agriculture and herding germinated within a zone bordered by the 34th and 40th parallels of north latitude, at an altitude of about 750 m; 2461 ft. extending from Central Afghani-stan through Anatolia to mainland Greece. Most Middle East Neolithic sites are found within this zone and Aq Kupruk is now added to the list. A much later Neolithic at Darra-i-Kur, dating about 4000 years ago, ties in with sites in South Siberia and Kashmir, rather than with the much earlier Middle East sites to which Aq Kupruk relates. The Dupree Line, following the 76th longitude through Afghanistan, divides the mixed farming-herding Neolithic of the Middle East from the highland semi-nomadic Neolithic of South Siberia and Northeast Afghanistan, and emphasizes again the pre-historic significance of northern Afghanistan. Another extremely interesting phenomenon was encountered in the Darra-i-Kur Neolithic. Three intentional burials of domesticated goats, one in association with fragments from two or three children's skulls, were uncovered. Here must be evidence of ritual; of a concern for the mysteries of death and what follows. It was not a unique find for Darra-i-Kur. The Neanderthal child of Teshik Tash in the Soviet Union only 150 miles to the north was encircled by seven pairs of goat horns. Nor is it a phenomenon related solely to the prehistoric. Countless shrines and graves in Afghanistan today are adorned with goat horns, symbols of strength, virility and grace.

As man gained proficiency in agriculture, he moved down from mountain caves onto the plains where planting was easier and water more plentiful. Villages emerged; cities followed. Early peasant farming villages came into existence in Afghanistan ca. 5000 B.c., or 7000 years ago. Deh Morasi Ghundai, the first prehistoric site to be excavated in Afghanistan, lies 27km; 17 mi. southwest of Kandahar (Dupree, 1951). Another Bronze Age vil-lage mound site with multiroomed mud-brick buildings dating from the same period sits nearby at Said Qala (I. Shaffer, 1970). Second millennium B.C. Bronze Age pottery, copper and bronze horse trappings and stone seals were found in the lowermost levels in the nearby cave called Shamshir Ghar (Dupree, 1950). In the Seistan, southwest of these Kandahar sites, two teams of American archaeologists discovered sites relating to the 2nd millennium B.C. (G. Dales, University Museum, University of Pennsylvania, 1969, 1971; W. Trousdale, Smithsonian Institution, 1971-76). Stylistically the finds from Deh Morasi and Said Qala tie in with those of pre-Indus Valley sites and with those of com-parable age on the Iranian Plateau and in Central Asia, indicating cultural contacts during this very early age. Striking correlations also indicate the parallel development of Deh Morasi with Mun-digak, 51 kin; 32 mi. to the north of Deh Morasi, which was excavated by French archaeologists under the direction of Jean-Marie Casal, from 19511958. Mundigak is a huge mound 9 m; 30 ft. high; an urban center compared to the seminomadic villages of Deh Morasi and Said Qala. As the great cities of the Indus Valley, such as Mohenjo-daro and Harrapa, grew, specialization necessitated the develop-ment of a complex economic base to supply them. The villages supplied the towns and the towns supplied the cities. The ex-cavations at Deh Morasi, Said Qala and Mundigak provide much needed information regarding early economic supply networks and the beginnings of an urban civilization in the Afghan area. Evidence that trade was not limited regionally, but extended as far afield as Ur (in modern Iraq), was recovered accidently in 1966 from the valley of Sai Hazara in northern Afghanistan. The Khosh Tapa (Happy Mound) Hoard consists of several gold and silver goblets, now broken into 19 fragments weighing a total of almost eight pounds, stunningly ornamented with raised geomet-rical designs and vigorous figures of bulls, boars and snakes. These animal motifs bear tantalizing similarities stylistically with domin-ant Mesopotamian, Iranian, Indus Valley and Central Asian styles. Khosh Tapa lies in Baghlan Province, north of the Khawak Pass, on a once popular route linking the Middle East with Central Asia and Central Asia with the southern provinces in India. One of the more popular luxury items carried along this route was lapis lazuli from the mines of Badakhshan which are still being worked today. The two main periods of intensive lapis trade date from ca. 2300 B.c. and 1350 B.c.; the probable date of the hoard is ca. 2300 B.c. (on display, National Museum, Kabul). Three small mounds near Daulatabad in Faryab Province ex-cavated by Soviet archaeologists produced fine, well-fired Bronze Age clay vases and footed vessels dating ca. 2000 B.c. (V. Sarianidi, 1969). A series of Bronze Age mounds given the general designa-tion of (D)ashli greatly expanded the picture of Bronze Age life ca. 1500 B.c. north-west of Balkh. Dl is a large plastered mud-brick fort-qala surrounded by farming settlements.

Mother goddess figurines, right, from Mundigak, left, from Deh Morasi Ghundai, 3rd Millennium B.C. (h. 5cm)

Here utilitaiian pottery, fine ceramics and imported wares from Iran were found together with jewelry and stone and bronze compartmented seals. Weaponry included sling balls as well as bronze and copper weapons. In an intrusive burial during the end of this period goat skeletons were found surrounded by many delicate ceramic vessels of high quality. D3 was a much larger complex in two sections. A circular temple building 150 m; 492 ft. in diameter had an inner wall and an outer wall with nine projecting towers. Across from this temple there was a monumental palace with stepped pilasters on its outer façade surrounded by massive walls and a moat 10 m; 33 ft. wide and 3 m; 10 ft. deep. Not far away several extensive Bronze Age graveyards are being systematically looted by illegal diggers. Bronze seals, pins, mirrors, weaponry, unguent jars and various styles of jewelry grace the sidewalks of Kabul; graceful paper-thin pottery of elegant shapes bespeaking great sophistication lie abandoned by the ravished pits. Another three-period farming settlement (ca. 1300-500 n.c.) was excavated at Till Tepe near Shibarghan (V. Sarianidi, 1969, 1971). Fortifications are conspicuous and numerous clay missiles and bronze projectile points were found. Deh Morasi and Mundigak also provide tantalizing evidence regarding early religious developments. Casal suggests a religious use for a large white-washed, pillared building, its doorway out-lined with red, dating from the 3rd Millennium B.C. at Mundigak. At Deh Morasi there is evidence of a possible altar. Built of fire-burned bricks, the shrine complex contained several objects sug-gesting religious ritual: goat horns, goat scapula, a goblet, a copper seal, hollow copper tubing, a small alabaster cup, and a pottery figurine of classic Zhob Valley style. These pottery figurines are generally considered to represent the mother-goddess, being at once voluptous in form, to symbolize her power over life and fertility, and, terrifyingly ugly, to symbolize equal power over death and the horrors of the dark, mysterious unknown. (On display, National Museum, Kabul) Deh Morasi was abandoned about 1500 B.C., perhaps because of the westward shift of the river. Mundigak continued to survive and to suffer two invasions before it was abandoned about 500 years later after an existence of 2000 years. The caves of Aq Kupruk and Darra-iKur, however, contain evidence of continuous occupation. Indeed, retaining walls and hearths belonging to modern nomadic groups occupy the attention of the excavators as each prehistoric cave site is opened. Some men never took to a sedentary life, and still don't. Nomads have always been a part of the Afghan scene

Aryans & Achaemenids (c. 1500 B.C. - 330 B.C.)
A pastoral, cityless, people led by heroic warriors riding two-horsed chariots came out of the north to shatter the great Cities of the Indus Valley. In the sacerdotal writings of the Vedic Aryans, the Rigveda, we read of the Kubha (Kabul) River and know of their passage through Afghanistan sometime around 1500 B.C. In the related Persian hymns of the Avesta, we read of Bakhdi (Balkh) "the beautiful, crowned with banners" and of Zarathustra Spitama (Zoroaster), the great politico-religious leader who lived in Balkh sometime between 1000 and 600 B.C. The Aryans found the northern plains ideal for their flocks of sheep and goats. Many settled here and prospered. As the years passed, however, the various Aryan tribes frequently fought among themselves, encouraging the subjugated indigenous tribes to rise in revolt. Predatory raids by bands of horse-riding nomads from across the Oxus added to the turmoil. Keeping the Aryan herdsmen from their grazing lands, the nomads demanded, and began to receive, tribute for grazing rights. Aryan independence seemed doomed. It was then that Zoroaster came forth to exhort the people to unite, in the name of the god Ahuramazda. Victorious, Zoroaster then advised his followers to develop agriculture in addition to herding if they wished to remain inde-pendent and grow strong. The fertile plains of Bactria blossomed and the land prospered. Successive waves of Aryan migrations from Trans-Oxiana, find-ing the Afghan area occupied by the Vedic Aryans, moved west, onto the Iranian Plateau, where they evolved from a seminomadic state into an extensive empire which eventually stretched from the borders of Greece to the Indus River. The Achaemenid Kings conquered in the name of Ahuramazda and Zoroastrianism was their religion. Achaemenid campaigns into the Afghan area were undertaken by Darius I (522-486 B.C.), builder of the famous palaces of Susa and Persepolis, and are recorded on his tombstone. To facilitate trade, an imperial highway passed through Afghanistan, along virtually the same route modern highway builders have but re-cently paved. The excavations at Shahr-i-Kona, the old city of Kandahar, undertaken by the British Institute of Afghan Studies in 1974 (D. Whitehouse) and 1975 (A. McNicoll) indicate that by 500 B.C. Kandahar had replaced Mundigak as the major city of the south. In the north, Soviet excavations at a series of mounds given the general designation of (A)ltyn, not far from the Dashli group above Balkh, revealed a large principal administrative town and a monumental private residence in the Achaemenid style with a central court dominated by a pool or fountain. Outside the residence there was a large columned courtyard divided into two equal sections by a line of rooms possibly used for public audiences by some grandee or noble. There is evidence of a great conflagra-tion which burned the wooden superstructure of the portico sur-rounding these courtyards. Curiously, it seems to have been set just about the time of Alexander of Macedon's sojourn in northern Afghanistan. (V. Sariandi, 1972).

Alexander of Macedon (c. 330 B.C. - 327 B.C.)
Alexander the Great crushed the Achaemenid Empire. By the time he stood on the threshold of Afghanistan the last Achaemenid King, Darius III, lay dead, murdered by his Bactrian allies. Alex-ander's armies momentarily exulted in the belief that their task was complete; they yearned to be homeward bound. But the young, still in his twenties, conqueror dreamed of equaling, if not sur-passing the conquests of Darius I. Furthermore, he smarted with anger on hearing that Bessus, murderer of Darius and chief of the Bactrians, had assumed the titles of the Achaemenid kings and was gathering an army. In 330 B.c. Alexander started east. His direct pursuit of Bessus was, however, checked by revolt in Aria (Herat). Turning south, covering 75 miles in two days, he quickly subdued the surprised rebels and moved on into Drangiana (along the Hilmand) and from there relentlessly pushed on into Arachosia (Kandahar and Ghazni), on to Paropamisadae (Kabul-Charikar), up the Panjsher Valley and over the Khawak Pass to Drapsaka (Kunduz). The two chief cities of Bactria, Aornos (Tashkurghan) and Bactra (Balkh), surrendered without resistance in the spring of 329 B.C. Establishing a base camp at Bactra, Alexander pursued the rebels across the Oxus. Bessus was captured, put into chains and executed. Some Bactrian chieftains offered their submission and were confirmed in their satrapies; many fought on with the aid of nomadic groups mounted on swift horses. Two years of cam-paigns brought less than total success. Furthermore, increasing opposition to Alexander's assumption of god-like airs, and his adoption of Persian dress and court ceremonial led to conspiracies, executions and distressing disquiet within the camp. It was time to move on and Alexander turned to the conquest of India. With characteristic haste he took only ten days to move his army back over the Hindu Kush to the Charikar area. An estimated 27-30,000 fighting men moved at his command. They followed the Panjsher River to its junction with the Kabul River and then moved on to Jalalabad where Alexander divided this huge force, sending the main army through the Khyber Pass area while he took a small mobile force to deal with the tribes in the mountains above the Kunar River, in the area known today as Nuristan. From here he passed into Swat. Campaigns in the Punjab and in Sind continued until 326 B.c. when his troops, at long last, forced a return to their homeland. Alexander established several Alexandrias in the Afghan area and many cities in Afghanistan claim the honour of being so found-ed, but no conclusive archaeological evidence exists. Even Balkh, traditionally thought to be the site of Bactra, has failed to oblige the archaeologists' spades. Kandahar lays claim to being Alexandria-ad-Arachosia and the discovery there of two inscrip-tions in the Greek language certainly points to a flourishing Greek community living in old Kandahar. When they came, however, is still debated. Evidence to support the theory that Ai Khanoum (discussed below) may in fact have been first established by Alexan-der as Alexandria-ad-Oxiana, increases with each year's excava-tions, however.

Mauryans & Graeco-Bactrians (c. 305 B.C. - 48 B.C.)
Three years after Alexander left India he died in Babylon (343) a.c.) and, while his Companions fought over the division of his conquests, independent local dynasties in the east rose and pros-pered. Seleucus, inheritor of Alexander's eastern conquests, came to establish his authority in Bactria (305 B.C.), but south of the Hindu Kush he lost the Kabul-Kandahar area to the Indian Mauryan Dynasty, which had united the plethora of petty kingdoms in India under their strong and able rule after Alexander left. Having received the southern provinces of Afghanistan from Seleucus in return for 500 elephants and a princess, the Mauryans confirmed local chieftains in their satrapies but continued to regard them with a keen sense of benevolent responsibility, especially during the rule of King Ashoka, the dynasty's renowned ruler who reigned from 268-233 B.c. An Ashokan bilingual rock inscription discovered on a boulder near the old city of Kandahar in 1967 is written in Greek and in Aramaic, the official language of the Achaemenids. A lengthier Greek inscription, also found in the old city of Kandahar, in 1963, provided further concrete evidence for an important Greek-speak-ing community in Kandahar in the middle of the 3rd century B.C. Many had undoubtedly come during the period of Achaemenid rule for the Achaemenids are known to have deported politically dissident Greeks to Bactria. Their number no doubt swelled dur-ing and following the advent of Alexander. The Ashokan Rock and Pillar Edicts which spell out his pre-cepts for a life devoted to charity and compassion toward both man and beast, are well known in India, but these Kandahar Edicts are the western-most Edicts to have been found and they are the only ones to use Greek. As such they are an exciting addi-tional illustration of Afghanistan's traditional role in bringing to-gether east and west. An Ashokan inscription in Aramaic found in 1969 in Laghman Province indicates that Ashoka also thought of lands far to the west of the Afghan area. Professor André Dupont-Sommer of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Paris, points out that the inscription contains the phrase "At a distance of 200 'bows' this way to (the place) called Tadmor." Tadmor may be identified as Palmyra, Syria, and the inscription stood beside the highway which led from India to the Middle East. Ashoka's missionaries travelled the length of this highway and Professor Dupont-Som-mer, who also worked on the Dead Sea Scrolls, theorizes that they may have provided the inspiration for such monastic orders as the Essenes, authors of the Dead Sea Scrolls, whose origins continue to mystify scholars. Though the ideals are similar, the texts on the inscriptions found in Afghanistan are not identical to any of the texts found in India. Ashoka adapted his edicts to meet the cultural patterns of the peo-ple to whom they were addressed. Ashoka's Doctrine of Piety is put forth in the Greek text from the bilingual inscription at Kandahar: "Ten years (of reign) having been completed, King Piodasses (Ashoka) made known (the doctrine of) Piety to men; and from this moment he has made men more pious, and everything thrives throughout the whole world. And the king abstains from (killing) living beings, and other men and those who (are) huntsmen and fisher-men of the king have desisted from hunting. And if some (were) intemperate, they have ceased from their intemperance as was in their power; and obedient to their father and mother and to the elders, in opposition to the past also in the future, by so acting on every oc-casion, they will live better and more happily." (Trans. by G.P. Carratelli) For the people living south of the Hindu Kush, subject to this humanitarian influence from the east, this was a period of tran-quility accompanied by prosperity.

In the north, Bactria also prospered but here the cultural ori-entation was toward the west and the times were turbulent instead of tranquil. A local Bactrian governor eventually declared complete independence from Seleucid rule in 250 B.C. and his successors ultimately expanded Bactrian authority below the Hindu Kush to Kabul and to the cities of the Punjab where Mauryan power had steadily declined since the death of Ashoka. The search in Afghanistan for a genuine Bactrian city, begun in the 1920s, finally ended in 1965 when French archaeologists began excavations, now under the direction of Paul Bernard, at the mile long mound of Ai Khanoum (Moon Lady, in Uzbaki), at the confluence of the Kokcha and Oxus Rivers, northeast of Kunduz. The 627 magnificent Bactrian coins contained in the Kunduz Treasure recovered (1946) from Khist Tapa at Qala-i-Zal, northwest of Kunduz (now in the National Museum, Kabul), are masterful monuments to the strength of those they portray; they speak of a highly sophisticated culture. Superbly rich Ai Khanoum yearly adds substance to our knowledge of life in Bactria during the rule of the Bactrians. The lower levels of the city mound site of Emchi Tepe near Shibarghan excavated by Soviet archaeologists produced many human figurines in Bactrian style, sherds inscribed with Greek characters, plates with central ornamental medallions in relief and other artifacts permitting a dating from the end of the 4th to the end of the 2nd centuries B.C. (I. Kruglikova, 1969-70). The Bactrian dynasties were beset in later years by internal weak-nesses brought on by overextension, personal rivalries, murder and fratricide. Charred beams and great quantities of charcoal through-out the upper levels of Ai Khanoum provide mute evidence of a succession of nomadic invasions at the end of the Second Century A.D.

A Coin from the Kunduz Hoard

It is hard to imagine the imperious kings of the Bactrian coins in this account of what the nomads saw as they gazed across the Oxus and considered the invasion: "They (the Bactrians) were sedentary, and had walled cities and houses. They had no great kings or chiefs, but some cities and towns had small chiefs. Their soldiers were weak and feared fighting. They were skillful in trade." (Chinese source, Shih Chi, Book 123). The invading nomads crossed the Oxus and submerged Bactria about 135 B.C.; in 48 B.C. the last Greek king, Hermaeus, confined to the valley of Kabul, signed an alliance with the nomad chief, now a king, and peaceful]y ended Greek rule in the Afghan area.

Kushans (c. 135 B.C. - 241 B.C.)
Restless nomadic tribes living in Central Asia had long been of concern to the rulers of Bactria and their relentless encroachments into the settled areas fill the pages of the area's early history. Real nomadic political power in Afghanistan was, however, first established by the Yueh-chih who, forced from their grazing lands on the Chinese border, enter this story as a loose confederation of five clans. United under the banner of one, the Kushan, they wrote one of history's most brilliant and exciting chapters in Afghanistan. Kushan King Kanishka (c. 130 A.D.) was this dynasty's most forceful and colorful personality. The heart of his empire centered around two capitals: the summer capital of Kapisa, north of Kabul near the modern towns of Begram and Charikar, and, Peshawar, the winter capital. Far beyond this, however, from the Ganges Valley to the Gobi Desert, satellite satrapies and independent states bowed to Kushan economic and political influence. The Second Century A.D. which saw the Kushan Empire reach its greatest heights was a fabulous era in world history: the time of the Caesars in Rome and the Han Emperors in China, both of whom avidly exchanged their most exotic products and greedily eyed the spices, gems and cosmetics of India and Ceylon, the gems and furs of Central Asia. Silk was the major item of this trade and it is reported that it sold for $800,000 a pound in the sybaritic markets of Rome. Situated exactly midway on the great caravan route known as the Silk Route, the Kushans exploited their position and gained vast wealth and with it, great power. In addition, during the first two centuries of the A.D. era sea trade between the northern and eastern coasts of Africa and India was brisk and prosperous. Sometime in the middle of the 1st century n.e. a Greek sailor named Hippalus discovered that he could take advantage of the monsoon winds and sail from southern Arabia to India in forty days. By 24 B.C. at least 120 ships set sail annually and by the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D. ships and fleets had become so large that they were "agitating the white foam," according to Strabo the geographer. The overland Silk Route takes its name from the most prestigious commodity traded along it. The sea route could therefore be called the Pepper Route, for though the great warehouses in the Indian ports were stocked with pearls and gems, fine fabrics and perfumes, it was the tangy spice from Mala-bar which was valued above all. In exchange, the merchants from Greece and Alexandria brought wine, metalwork, ceramics, glass-ware and slaves. At Kapisa, political and commercial center of the Empire, French archaeologists discovered (1939) a most magnificent Kushan treasure which represents the extent and the richness of this trade in capsule form. Here, in two small rooms, exquisitely carved ivories wrought in classic Indian style were stacked side by side with fine Chinese lacquers and an infinite variety of Roman bronzes, bas reliefs and glass from Alexandria. Obviously, Kapisa's citizenry had fine taste, and the wealth to indulge it. The rise to world prominence had wrought great changes on the nomadic Kushans. Having no traditions on which to build a settled way of life, they adapted what they found in ways best suited to their own personality. What emerged was a vibrant and indigenous culture born of the fusion of western-oriented Bactrian ideals with those from eastern-oriented India, interpreted by the forceful, free character born on the steppes of Central Asia. The result was vital and dynamic. The massive city site of Delbarjin built on the plains north-west of Balkh during the Achaemenid/Bactrian period flourished under Kushan occupation. Wall-paintings depicting the icono-graphy of Buddhism and Hinduism exhibit stylistic affiniti.es with Central Asia (I. Kruglikova, 1970-present). Delbarjin is a most dramatic monument to Kushan power and culture. The old city of Kandahar was also extensively occupied during this period. An unique

soapstone mold depicting a winged lion on an elephant standing on a lotus includes several Buddhist motifs; a stupa/monastery stands on a spur overlooking the city. The revival of the ancient religion of Buddhism by Kanishka and the attendant emergence of Gandhara art are enduring mani-festations of Kushan culture. A new school of Buddhist thought stressing the miraculous life and personality of the Buddha was officially sanctioned at a great council called by Kanishka. This humanization of the Buddha led directly to a desire for a represen-tative figure of the Buddha who had, until this time, been depicted by such symbols as a wheel, an empty throne, a riderless horse, or a foot print. East and West joined in the creation of the familiar Buddha figure and adapted it to fit Indian philosophical ideals. Scores of missionaries soon travelled the world to spread the word. They followed the caravans along the Silk Route and Buddhism spread from its homeland through Afghanistan to China and the lands of the Far East where it lives today as one of the Twentieth Century's most vibrant religions. Along the route they established countless shrines and monas-teries and Afghanistan's landscape is liberally sprinkled with Buddhist Kushan sites : Hadda and Darunta near Jalalabad; Kandahar; Maranjan, Shewaki and Guldara in and near Kabul; Tope Darra, Koh-i-Mari, Shotorak, and Paitava in the Koh Daman; Tapa Sardar in Ghazni; Wardak; Fondukistan in the Ghorband Valley; Bamiyan; Takht-i-Rustam in Samangan; Durman Tapa and Chaqalaq near Kunduz, and Tapa Rustam and Takht-i-Rustam at Balkh. The most recently identified complex, dated by carbon-14 Ca. 150 A.D., sits beside the lake of Abi-Istada, southwest of Moqor (Dupree, 1974).

Tapa-i-Shotor, Hadda

The central shrines at these religious complexes, called stupas, were lavishly decorated with sculptured scenes from the life of the Buddha. Fashioned from stone, stucco, or, simply from mud and straw, this indigenous art style, among history's most stimulat-ing and inspiring forms, bears the name of Gandhara Art. Kanishka's interest in religion was, however, eclectic. On his coinage the Buddha stands as only one of a wide pantheon of gods and goddesses representing deities of Greek, Persian, Central Asian and Hindu origin. Buddhist iconography is, for instance, totally lacking at Kanishka's own temple at Surkh Kotal, just north of the Hindu Kush. Excavations began at Surkh Kotal in 1952 under the direction of Daniel Schlumberger. They have disclosed the existence of a purely indigenous religion centered around the cult of fire which may have been dedicated to the worship of Kanishka himself. A layer of ash at Surkh Kotal speaks silently of the end of this brilliant era and the beginning of an age characterized by warring petty kingdoms. With the demise of the Great Kushans, the centers of power shift outside the area and almost 900 years pass before Afghanistan swings back into the spotlight.

Interim : Sasanian - Samanid
Decadence sapped the power of both China and Rome and gravely disrupted the trade upon which Kushan prosperity de-pended. At the same time, civil wars following Kanishka's death so weakened the Kushans that they fell under the sway of the recently established Sasanian Empire of Persia. Reduced to provincial status by the middle of the 3rd Century A.D. (241 A.D.) they were subsequently swamped by a new wave of nomadic in-vasions from Central Asia. The Hephthalites (White Huns) came into Afghanistan about 400 A.D. and ruled for almost 200 years but little outside their ruthless destruction of Buddhist shrines is known of their Afghan sojourn. Thousands of large and small tumuli lying outside Kunduz on the plateau of Shakh Tapa have been identified as Hephthalite tombs by exploratory excavations conducted by French archaeologists under the direction of Marc Le Berre in 1963, and they may some day reveal a fuller picture of the Hephthalites in Afghanistan. For the moment, however, we know only that local strongmen, some now Hinduized, some still adhering to Buddhism, ruled Afghanistan. Tribal independ-ence was the fiercely protected ideal. The advent of Hinduism is clouded with mystery but Chinese accounts such as Hsuan-tsang's in the 7th century report Hindu kingdoms in the Kabul, Gardez and Ghazni areas. Accidental finds of marble statuary representing the elephant god Ganesh were found in the Koh Daman and Gardez and some scholars have advanced the theory that the concept of Ganesh actually originated in the Afghan area. The two statues now reside as the principal votive figures in two of Kabul's largest Hindu temples. A head of Shiva and a large fragmentary piece depicting Shiva's consort, Durga, slaying the Buffalo Demon, were accidentally retrieved from Gardez; a head of Durga, a beautifully modelled male torso and a large lingam were discovered, also accidentally, in the Tagao Valley, between Gulbahar and Sarobi. All these pieces are now in the National Museum, Kabul. A sculptured piece representing the Sun God Surya was excavated by French archaeologists at Khair Khana on the outskirts of Kabul in 1934 (J. Carl, DAFA). Most recently, exciting new scientifically excavated evidence has come from the Italian excava-tions at Tapa Sardar in Ghazni (M. Taddei, IsMEO; section (7), Chapter 9) and the Japanese excavations at Tapa Skandar in the Koh Daman (T. Higuchi, Kyoto). The results of future excava-tions at these sites are eagerly awaited. Just 24 kin; 15 mi. southwest of Kandahar, not far from Deh Morasi Ghundai, a large cave called Shamshir Ghar, excavated by Dupree in 1950, provides a tantalizing footnote to this con-fused era. Occupied from the 1st century B.C. to the 13th century A.D., a particularly thick occupation level relates to the Kushano-Sasanian period from 300-700 A.D. It seems unreasonable that people would choose to live in a cave at a time when several large cities like Bost and Zaranj, numerous towns, and countless villages provided more comfortable conditions. Nor Could periodic stops by nomads have contributed such a thick level of material. It would seem rather that this was a place of refuge used by the inhabitants of the area while the Hephthalites and Sasanians battled for supremacy and during the early plundering raids by the Arabs which followed. Continuous political upheavals culminating in a Mongol invasion in the middle of the 13th century, the last significant occupation level at Shamshir Ghar, are am ply docu-mented by historical accounts. Arab armies carrying the banner of Islam came out of the west to defeat the Sasanians in 642 A.D. and then they marched with confidence to the east. On the western periphery of the Afghan area the princes of Herat and Seistan gave way to rule by Arab governors but in the east, in the mountains, cities submitted only to rise in revolt and the hastily converted returned to their old beliefs once the armies passed. The harshness and avariciousness of Arab rule produced such unrest, however, that once the waning power of the Caliphate became apparent, native rulers once again established themselves independent. Among these the Saffarids of Seistan shone briefly in the Afghan area. The fanatic founder of this dynasty, the cop-persmith's apprentice Yaqub ibn Layth Saffari, came forth from his capital at Zaranj in 870 A.D. and marched through Bost, Kanda-

har, Ghazni, Kabul, Bamiyan, Balkh and Herat, conquering in the name of Islam. He then marched on Baghdad (873) to chastise the Caliph for failing to adequately confirm his authority but in this he was defeated and he returned to northern Afghanistan where another local Islamic dynasty, the Samanids ruling from Bokhara (872-999), contested his authority. Yaqub succeeded in keeping his rivals north of the Oxus River but immediately after his death in 879 the Samanids moved to take Balkh from his brother. Suc-ceeding in 900 A.D., they moved south of the Hindu Kush and ex-tended their enlightened rule throughout the Afghan area. Unlike the dashing, opportunistic soldier-of-fortune Yaqub, the Samanids stood for law and order, orthodoxy in Islam, and a return to cul-tural traditions. Balkh was a prominent Samanid town, the home of numerous poets including the beautiful but tragic poetess Rabia Balkhi whose tomb was discovered in 1964. The richly decorated remains of the mosque called No Gumbad, Nine Domes, also at Balkh, is an unique and very beautiful example of the highly sophisticated, exuberant Samanid culture. South of the Hindu Kush, however, allegiance to Samanid authority was vague and constantly contested by revolt, especially in Seistan where a rapid succession of Yaqub's descendants ceaselessly jockeyed for position and power which they miraculous-ly maintained, albeit tenuously, as provincial officials until 1163. Elsewhere the country was apportioned approximately thus: Bost, Ar-Rukhaj (i.e., Arachosia or Kandahar) and Ghazni were ruled by Turkic princes; Kabul by the Hindu Shahi dynasty; Tukharis-tan (from Balkh to Badakhshan) had numerous fortified towns with their own princes; and Khurasan, roughly encompassing Meshed, Merv and Balkh with Herat at its center, was governed for the Samanids by a Turkic slave general.

Islamic Conquest
In 637 A.D., only five years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the Arab Muslims shattered the might of the Iranian Sassanians at the battle of Qadisiya, and the invaders began to reach into the lands east of Iran. The Muslim conquest was a prolonged struggle in the area that is now Afghanistan. Following the first Arab raid into Qandahar in about 700, local rulers, probably either Kushans or Western Turks, began to come under the control of Ummayid caliphs, who sent Arab military governors and tax collectors into the region. By the middle of the eighth century the rising Abbasid Dynasty was able to subdue the area. There was a period of peace under the rule of the caliph, Harun al Rashid (7&S-809), and his son, in which learning fluorished in such Central Asian cities as Samarkand, located in what is now the Soviet Union. Over the period of the seventh through the ninth centuries, most inhabitants of what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan, the southern parts of the Soviet Union, and some of northern India were converted to Sunni Islam, which replaced the Zorastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and indigenous religions of previous empires. During the eighth and ninth centuries, partly to obtain better grazing land, ancestors of many of the Turkic-speakinggroups now identifiable in Afghanistan settled in the Hindu Kush area. Some of these tribes settled in what are now Ghor,Ghazni, and Kabul provinces and began to assimilate much of the culture and language of the already present Pashtun tribes. By the middle of the ninth century, Abbasid rule had faltered, and semi-independent states began to emerge throughout the empire. In the Hindu Kush area three shortlived, local dynasties emerged. The best known of the three, the Sammanid, ruling out of Bukhara (in what is now the Soviet Union), extended its rule briefly as far east as India and west into Iran. Bukhara and neighboring Samarkand were centers of science, the arts, and Islamic studies. Although Arab Muslim intellectual life still centered on Baghdad, Iranian Muslim scholarship, i.e., Shia Islam, at this time predominated in the Sammanid areas. By the mid-tenth century the Sammanid Dynasty crumbled in the face of attack from the Turkish tribes to the north and from a rising dynasty to the south, the Ghaznavids.

Ghaznavids (962 - 1186)
The right of these local rulers to rule rested solely upon their personal strength and charisma; seats of power were fair game for anyone strong enough to take them. Taking advantage of this situation, Alptigin, a Turkish slave deposed as Commander-in-Chief of Samanid forces in Khurasan, marched south and estab-lished himself as master of the fort of Ghazni in 962 A.D. Alptigin died soon after taking Ghazni, but his successors, particularly his slave, Sebuktigin (977-997), and Sebuktigin's son, Sultan Mahmud (998-1030), moved out to annex Kabul (977), Bost (977-8), Balkh (994), Herat (1000) and parts of western Persia. Thus established, they then carried the banner of Islam on to India during numerous iconoclastic campaigns from which they returned laden with rich booty. Ghazni, until then an in-significant fort-town, became one of the most brilliant capitals of the Islamic world. Great mosques and sumptuous palaces, surrounded by carefully rended gardens, rose to be adorned with the gold and gems of India. Here the era's most illustrious poets, artists, architects, philosophers, musicians, historians, arti~ans and craftsmen gathered under the keen patronage of the court. Two thousand five hundred elephants, symbols of the Sultan's immense power and prestige, the backbone of his army, lived in fine stables and "his court was guarded by four thousand Turkish beardless slave-youths, who, on days of public audience, were stationed on the right and left of the throne, two thousand of them with caps ornamented with four feathers, bearing golden maces, on the right hand, and the others, with caps adorned with two feathers, bearing silver maces, on the left." (Juzjani).

The founder of Ghaznavid empire, Mahmud Ghaznavi

Ghorids (1148 - 1202)
The Ghorids who delivered the death blow to the Ghaznavids are a classic example of the sometimes independent, sometimes semi-independent local chieftains to which this discussion has referred so often. Living in the high mountains east of Herat where the rugged terrain discouraged outsiders from all but periodic raids for plunder, slaves or tribute, these chieftains dwelt in heavily fortified villages happily engaging in their personal contests. Fortune was a highly mecurial commodity, however, and the rise or fall of an individual was often determined by the vagaries of mere chance. It is related, for instance, that during the time of the great Caliph Harun al-Rashid (785-809), of Arabian Nights fame, two chieftains of Ghor decided to settle their dispute over paramountcy by placing their case before the Caliph. Though they both joined the same caravan only one caught the shrewd eye of a Jewish merchant who offered, in return for exclusive trading rights in Ghor, to instruct his awkward travelling companion in the intricacies of the sophisticated court life of Baghdad. His pupil listened well during the long, slow journey and on the day of the audience the chief of the House of Shansab of Ghor moved imperiously through the complicated ceremonies, dressed inagnificently in robes of highest fashion. His rival, on the other hand, appeared in the "short garments which he was accustomed to wear at home," impressing no one. And so, it is written, the "Shansabani received all of the territory of Ghor from Caliph Harun-ar-Rashid." (Juzjani, 1260 A.D.) The historical accuracy of such tales must, of course, be ques-tioned for when Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi invaded Ghor in 1009 he found the people to be pagan, but the fickleness of fortune is accurately illustrated and Sultan Mahmud did negotiate with a local Shansabani chief ruling at Ahangaran where prized Ghorid arms were manufactured. By the beginning of the 12th century the Shansabani had extended their authority over the other Ghorid chiefs and their power was such that they stood almost as equals with the Ghaznavids on their southern border and the Seljuks on their northern border. Honoring this strength, Malik alJibal "King of the Mountain" laid out the foundations of a great capital city called Firozkoh which some believe to have been at Jam where a magnificent minaret now stands. Malik Qutubuddin was unable, however, to finish his city for he had a falling out with his brothers (he had seven) and was forced to leave for Ghazni where he was well received and well respected until Sultan Bahram Shah (1118-1152), jealous of his increasing popularity, served him with a glass of poisoned sherbet (1146). Fratricidal bickerings at home in Ghor were immediately set aside once this heinous insult became known and a relentless enmity betw&en Ghor and Ghazni began, to end in the obliteration of the Ghaznavids. One by one the brothers left their mountain capital with their armies to engage in a complicated series of maneuvers for revenge and counter-revenge: the first brother captured Ghazni and dis-dainfully sent his army back to Ghor whereupon the Sultan re-turned to torture the Ghorid to death; the second brother died on his way to revenge the new death (1149); the third, Alauddin, defeated the Sultan Bahram Shah in the vicinity of modern Kan-dahar (1151). The Sultan fell back in retreat upon Ghazni which "Alauddin took by storm, and during seven nights and days fired the place, and burnt it with obstinacy and wantonness. . . During these seven days, the air, from the blackness of the smoke, continued as black as night; and those nights, from the flames raging in the burning city, were lighted up as light as day. During these seven days likewise, rapine, plunder and massacre were carried out with the utmost pertinacity and vindictiveness." (Juzjani) Thus Alauddin earned the title of Jahansuz "World Burner". These scenes at Ghazni were repeated several times as the army returned to Ghor; the pleasure villas of Lashkar Gah were gutted, the countryside completely ravaged, and at Firozkoh victory tow-ers were built of Ghazni's soil carried there on the backs of cap-tives whose blood served as mortar.

The founder of Ghorid Dynasty, Ghias-ud-Din Ghori

Turbulent warfare marks the early years of this dynasty and continued until Alauddin's nephew, Ghiyasuddin (1157-1202), was raised to the throne by the Ghorid army. Under his enlightened direction the House of Ghor and the Afghan area at last knew peace and prosperity, at least for a few years. Ghiyasuddin's famous brother, Muizuddin, ruled for him at Ghazni and took Ghorid rule into India, while at Bamiyan his uncle built a great city from which Ghorid authority was spread throughout the northern re-gions of Afghanistan and across the Oxus River as far as Kashghar. At its height the Ghorid Dynasty claimed suzerainty from India to Iraq, from Kashghar to the Persian Gulf. Ghiyasuddin was an avid builder. The intricately decorated minaret of Jam bears his name as does the arch at the great mosque of Herat, a city he added to his domain in 1175. In this mosque the body of Ghiyasuddin Ghori lies under an unadorned tomb in a special chapel to which the faithful still come to pray. Rivals to the north, the Khwarizm from south of the Aral Sea, enviously coveted the power and the riches of their Ghorid neigh-bors. As soon as death removed the strong personality of Sultan Ghiyasuddin (1202) they moved. Muizuddin tried valiantly to stem their advance but Balkh (1205) and then Herat (1206) fell before the Khwarizm Shah. Deserted by his followers, Muizuddin fled first to Ghazni, where his officers denied him entrance, and then into India where he was assassinated on the banks of the Indus. Only at Bamiyan, in the heart of the mountains, did the dynasty survive for a short while and then it too succumbed and the last of the Shansabani rulers was taken north to the Khwarizm capital and there put to death in 1215.

Mongols (1220 - 1332)
On the eastern borders of the Khwarizm Empire a Mongol chieftain by the name of Temujin, later entitled Genghis Khan, was busily consolidating his power. From him the Khwarizm Shah received the following note: "I am the sovereign of the sun-rise, and thou the sovereign of the sun-set. Let there be between us a firm treaty of friendship, amity, and peace and let traders and caravans on both sides come and go, and let the precious products and ordinary commodities which may be in my territory be con-veyed by them into thine, and those in thine into mine." With the notebearer he sent five hundred camels laden with gold, including a nugget of pure gold as big as a camel's neck, silver, silks, furs, sable and other "elegant and ingenious" rarities (Juzjani). Such riches were just too tempting for the Shah's avaricious bor-der commander. He seized the treasure and, in an attempt to pre-vent news of his perfidious act from reaching the ears of the Khan, killed all those accompanying the caravan. Or so he thought. He had in fact missed one young camel boy who, taking a steam bath, succeeded in escaping through the chimney to return with the fateful news to his master. Furious, Genghis Khan demanded that the Shah turn over the border commander for punishment but the Shah, sublimely confident of his supreme power, answered by returning the Khan's messengers with singed beards. Insult having thus been added to theft and murder, the flood gates opened for one of the most catastrophic episodes recorded in the annals of mankind. Two hundred thousand Mongols marched west to chastise the Khwarizm Shah in the year 1219. By 1221 Balkh, Herat, the Seistan, Ghazni, Bamiyan and all points in between had fallen before the onslaught and " . . . with one stroke a world which billowed with fertility was laid desolate, and the regions thereof became a desert and the greater part of the living dead and their skins and bones crumbling dust; and the mighty were humbled and immersed in the calamities of perdition." So says Juvaini, an eloquent eye-witness chronicler writing only thirty years later. The ruined citadel of the Shansabani capital in Bamiyan is a poignant, visual monument to the presence of Genghis Khan in Afghanistan. Its name, Shahr-i-Gholghola, "City of Noise," refers to the tumult of that final massacre during which the conqueror fulfilled a vow to kill every man, woman and child, every animal and plant in the valley of Bamiyan. Recovery was slow. The great irrigation works which had en-abled this land to produce an abundance lay broken and useless, purposely destroyed by Genghis Khan; anarchy so frightened traders that they turned to the sea, and the great cities of the desert and the plain, robbed of their livelihood, became mounds of sand. Only in the rich province of Khurasan was there a return to law and order under an extremely skillful local family, known as the Karts. Appointed Governors by the Mongol Il-Khans of Persia in 1245, they expanded from their capital at Herat to include Kandahar (1281), prominent since the destruction of Bost by Alauddin Ghori, within their realm. When, therefore, they de-clared their independence in 1332 they seemed well on their way toward a long and prosperous reign. The huge bronze cauldron in the courtyard of the great mosque in Herat is a stunning ex-ample of their sophisticated tastes. A new storm was, however, already brewing in Central Asia.

Timurids (1369 - 1506)
Part of the early career of the man who cut short Kart rule was spent, most inauspiciously, in Kart territory. Having lost out in the game of playing one chieftain against the other in his homeland just south of Samarkand, Timur, the young adventurer, turned fugitive and fled into the protective mountains of Afghanistan. Passing stealthily past Kabul he journeyed on to Zaranj, capital of Seistan, where he took service with the city's chief, as head of a rather unsavory lot of 100 similarly outlawed companions. Fighting with legendary daring, Timur distinguished himself in battles with various rebel bands. It was during one such encounter that an arrow pierced his right leg, a wound which caused him to limp for the rest of his life for which his detractors nicknamed him Timur-i-Lang, "Timur the Lame," or Tamerlane. Timur soon tired of the petty rebellions in Seistan and returned to the grander contests of the north where fortune favored him. Word of his prowess spread and one by one the tribes rallied to his cause; in 1369, at Balkh, he proclaimed himself supreme sovereign from Kabul to the Aral Sea and turned to conquer an empire. The Karts resisted without success and their capital city of Herat was destroyed in 1381. Following this, Timur moved on to subdue his former master in Zaranj (1383). Here fighting was fierce and the august conqueror's temper flared when his horse was shot from under him. From then on he showed no mercy and Zaranj was razed to the ground. Today Kandaharis speak with pride of Seistan's ancient prosperity: "Once there were so many fine buildings and palaces that one could easily walk from Bost to Zaranj on the rooftops without once touching the ground." Medieval geographies speak of its remarkable prosperity, calling it the "garden of Asia" and the "granary of the East". And yet today its various parts are known by such names as Dasht-i-Margo (Desert of Death), Dasht-i-Jehanum (Desert of Hell), and Sar-o-Tar (Desolation and Empti-ness, in Baluchi). The Sar-o-Tar is covered with constantly moving sand dunes rising to a height of 20 m; 66 ft. Experts have con-cluded that these may be the fastest moving sand dunes anywhere in the world: an average dune of 6 m; 20 ft. moves at an annually adjusted rate of 15 cm; 6 in. a day.

Shahr-i-Gholghola, Sar-o-Tar, Seistan

Two extensive studies have sought to determine how this came to be. A team from Bonn University carried out a multi-faceted study of medieval settlement patterns and ecological conditions from 1968-1973 (K. Fischer, director). The Smithsonian Institu-tion's (USA) programme extended from 1971-76 (W. Trousdale, director). They have confirmed the ancient reports and dispelled the notion that Tamerlane's visitation resulted in the present desolation. On the contrary, the southern Hamun basin contains the greatest assemblage of 15th century A.D. architecture anywhere in the Middle East. More than this, the remains speak of a sophis-ticated culture, of affluence permitting a rich variety of architec-tural forms and ornamentation, of stately manor houses contain-ing sometimes more than sixty rooms fashioned from sun-dried and kiln-baked bricks. The largest complex of ruins, known today as Shahr-i-Ghol-ghola, sits in the Sar-o-Tar region. It consists of a citadel within a circular wall 15 m; 49 ft. high protected by massive outer fortifications and three moats. Water for its inhabitants, the moats, and an agricultural zone 16-19 kin; 10-12 mi. wide, flowed through huge canals running from behind a barrage on the Hilmand River 80 kin; 50 mi. away. Copper coins minted by the last two Saffarid kings before the Mongol invasion were also recovered. Going back beyond the 9th century, however, there seems to be a great void, with no indication of habitation until the end of the 3rd century A.D. Again, from the 3rd century A.D. to the 1st century B.C. signs of occupation such as Sasanian coins and potteries stamped with the seals of Sasanian princes are present. Beyond that, another long period of abandoment is evident until the 2nd millennium B.C. when a grandiose system for the distribution of water covering thousands of square miles with canals speaks of technological sophistication and prosperity. Fine painted potteries from this period confirm this. In a temple abandoned at the end of the 2nd century A.D. plastered walls were found in a remarkably well-preserved state because the building was completely filled with sand; perhaps it had actually been overwhelmed by sand. At any rate, the Seistan surveys have led archaeologists to conclude that "While it would be oversimplifying the case to ignore political and economic factors in accounting for the periodic prosperity of this region, followed by periods of desolation and emptiness lasting from 600 to perhaps 1,000 or more years, the cyclical nature of uncontrollable sanding appears to have played a major, if not the decisive, role." (Trous-dale, 1975) Genghis Khan abhorred cities and cultivated fields for he said they robbed him of grazing lands for his mounted army which he likened to a "roaring ocean". Timur, on the other hand, often rebuilt what he had once, or twice, destroyed. Herat is an example; Balkh another. From these cities the glory of the Timurids was to shine.

The familiar series of rival family claims erupted on Timur's death in 1405. One of the major contestants was his grandson, Pir Mohammad, who held Kandahar, seat of government in the south after the destruction of Zaranj. Setting out with a large army, Pir Mohammad marched toward Samarkand, Timur's capital, sending ahead a letter outlining his reasons for believing the throne was rightfully his. The reply, written by the court's leading statesman, is perhaps one of the more candid dispatches ever penned by a diplomat: "Certainly you are the lawful heir and successor of Amir Timur, but fortune does not favour you, for if it did, you would be near the capital." Exactly. By the time Pir Mohammad arrived in Samarkand his rival was well established and "the sea of destruction flowed over his head." Several years, many exiles and numerous murders later, Shah Rukh (Timur's youngest son) and his remarkable wife, Gawhar Shad, emerged as undisputed masters of an empire stretching from the Tigris River to the borders of China. From their capital at Herat they led a cultural renaissance by their lavish patronage of the arts, attracting to their court artists, architects and philoso-phers and poets acknowledged today among the world's most illustrious: Bihzad the miniaturist and Jami the poet are only two. Many exquisite examples of Timurid architecture remain in Herat today. Though ravaged by man and nature, they remain as glori-ous monuments to the artistic genius of their creators and an inspiration to all who view them. Fratricidal quarrels resumed on Shah Rukh's death in 1447 and intensified after Gawhar Shad was murdered in 1457. She was well past the age of 80! Herat itself experienced its Golden Age under Sultan Husain Baiqara (1468-1506) but the nobles of his court, too intent upon their precious pursuit of luxury, could not be bothered with the drab responsibilities of government. Ambi-tious local leaders, some from within the Timurid family, some from without, seized the opportunity thus offered them and the age-old games for power began anew. As the Turkoman proverb so aptly states: "The sand of the desert is lightly blown away by a breath; still more lightly is the fortune of man destroyed."

Moghuls & Safavids (1504 - 1709)
An energetic contender in these games for power was an Uzbak youth whose early life mirrors to some extent the early life of Timur. Shaibani Khan (1451-1510), an orphan who had spent his youth as a soldier-of-fortune helping his grandfather keep rebellious chiefs in line, had, for services rendered, been given the governorship of a few outlying provinces far to the north of the Oxus. Thus established, the erstwhile adventurer began to dream dreams of empire, and these dreams assumed reality after he captured Samarkand in 1500. Sultan Husain Baiqara and his nobles in Herat turned deaf ears to pleas made by their kinsmen in the Samarkand area, and one by one these tiny kingdoms fell to the Uzbak and his riders. One such was Zahiruddin Mohammad, known to history as Babur, through whose veins coursed the blood of both Genghis Khan and Timur. Only 17, but already ruler of the Kingdom of Ferghana, east of Samarkand, and sometime holder of Samarkand itself, he fought furiously and valiantly for his kingdom, but, with no assistance forthcoming, he was forced to flee, as others had before him, to the safety of the southern mountains in Afghanistan. In October 1504, he encamped outside Kabul, a city suffering under the rule of an usurper, whose citizenry offered him the city, if he could take it. The invitation was all Babur needed. Victorious, he immediately began to secure what was still an extremely precarious position by deposing of rivals from within his own family and wooing the surrounding tribes. While he was so engaged Shaibani Khan continued to eat away at the Timurid empire by subduing Balkh and Kunduz. Then he struck out toward the heart, Herat. Babur responded to a hurried call for help from Sultan Husain but by the time he reached Herat he found Sultan Husain dead, the Timurid troops returned from a decisive defeat west of Maimana, and the nobles, according to Babur's own account, unconcernedly vying with one another in lavish wining and dining. The House of Timur crumpled before the Uzbak, and Herat, easily taken in 1507, was deprived of a huge treasure but not de-stroyed. Babur was not in Herat when it fell. His visit had shown him clearly that it must fall, which left Kandahar the last defense between himself and his old enemy to whom he had already lost one kingdom. He hurried to Kabul to make preparations for its defense and, incidentally, to put down a rebellious step-grand-mother. Then he captured Kandahar. Kandahar was held at this time by that same usurper from whom Babur had taken Kabul and naturally enough he did not take kindly to Babur's occupation of Kandahar. The usurper called Shaibani Khan to his aid and a siege began (1507) which was lifted when Shaibani Khan received news that his harem in Herat was being threatened by the advance of the King of Persia who, after numerous battles, finally trapped and killed Shaibani Khan (1510) in the vicinity of Merv, downstream from Bala Murghab. On hearing the news of Shaibani's death, Babur put all interest in Kandahar behind him and immediately marched north hoping to regain his homeland. The Uzbaks, however, though they had lost their great leader, were still strong, and Babur had reluctantly to shift his dreams from a kingdom in the north to conquest in the south. This decision earned him an empire. Babur left Kabul for India in 1525 and from that time on Delhi and Agra formed the center of his activities. He never lost his love for Kabul, however, and asked that he be brought back to that city for burial. His favorite garden where he was buried is today known simply as Babur's Gardens. For over 150 years after the death of Babur (1530) the Afghan area swung on the periphery of two magnificent empires: the Mo-ghuls of India and the Safavids of Persia. On the borders, the division was quite clear: Herat was held by the Persians; Kabul zealously maintained by the Moghuls. To the north, however, Turkic Khans pushed their authority south of the Oxus River at the expense of both empires. There were, of course, sporadic successes and a

beautiful marble mosque near the tomb of Babur is dedicated to one: the capture of Balkh by the Moghul Shah Jahan in 1646. The Moghuls never succeeded in establishing any permanent influence over the north, however, and Father Benedict Goes, travelling from Lahore in 1603, clearly pinpoints Charikar as the limit of Moghul domain. For this period the most outstand-ing monuments in Afghanistan are Uzbak, such as the Shrine of Khwaja Abu Nasr and the monumental arch from the madrassa built by Sayyid Subhan Quli, dating from the end of the 15th and 17th centuries respectively. They speak clearly of a continuance of Timurid Culture in the north without showing any Moghul influence. One other remarkable Moghul monument does exist in Afghanis-tan. This is the Chihlzina, "Forty Steps," a stone chamber sitting at the top of some 40 steps hewn from the rock of a craggy cliff outside Kandahar. Inside it an exquisitely carved Persian inscrip-tion records the conquests of Babur. It remains unfinished, in-terrupted by the interminable game of see-saw which the Per-sians and the Moghuls played with Kandahar; taking it from one another through conquest or by intrigue they contested its owner-ship down through the 17th century. It is perhaps fitting to pause a moment to reflect on the fact that the unfinished Moghul record of conquests sits directly above the Ashokan edict, inscribed some two thousand years before, beseeching man to live in peace. But man is not beloved of peace as the years of turmoil which follow attest.

Mirwais Khan Hotak (1709 - 1715)
A picture of life in the old city of Kandahar under the Timurids, the Safavids and the Moghuls has begun to emerge since the British Institute began its excavations in 1974. Bronze ewers, imported glazed ceramics and ornate glass from Persia and im-ported porcelains from China speak of widespread trade. Locally made glazed wares in the Persian style speak of a cultural orienta-tion toward the west. On the whole the indigenous Pushtun tribes living in the Kandahar area were more attached to the Persians and, indeed, on those occasions when the Moghuls received the city by means other than conquest, it was disaffected Persian governors who instigated the transfer, not the tribes. The tribes were not above pitting foreigner against foreigner in order to further their attempts to better one another. However, siding sometimes with the Persians, sometimes with the Moghuls, but never with each other, they perpetuated tribal disunity and prolonged foreign domination. The principal contenders in these tribal disputes came from the two most important Pushtun groups in the Kandahar area, the Ghilzai and the Abdali (later Durrani), between whom there was long-standing enmity. As a matter of fact, because of these quarrels, many of the turbulent Abdali had been forcibly transferred to Herat by the irritated Persians by the end of the 16th century. This left the Ghilzai paramount in Kandahar, but the dispute more hotly contested, the hatred more deeply entrenched, and revenge more fervently sought. The Persians were adept at manipulating such machinations and their rule at Kandahar was tolerant until the court at Isfahan began to sink in decadence. Mirroring this, the Persian governors of Kandahar became more and more rapacious and, in response, the tribes became more and more restless. Mounting tribal disturbances finally caught the concern of the court and they sent Gurgin, a Georgian known for his uncompromising severity toward revolt, to Kandahar in 1704. Kandahar's mayor at this time was Mir Wais Hotak, the astute and influential leader of the Ghilzai. Gurgin, advocate of law by force, burnt, plundered, murdered and imprisoned, but the tribes would not be subdued; revolts were crushed only to break out anew and Mir Wais, credited with master-minding the rebellions, was sent to Isfahan tagged as a highly dangerous prisoner. Imagine Gurgin's surprise and dismay when Mir Wais returned to Kandahar shortly thereafter clothed in lustrous robes of honour, symbols of respect and trust. The Shah of Persia thus declared the influence of Mir Wais, not Gurgin, at the Persian court. Mirwais had extricated himself from a very nasty situation but, more importantly, he had observed the depths of decay at Isfahan, much as Babur had observed it at Herat, and correctly determined that the Safavid Empire was on the brink of collapse.

Mir Wais Khan Hotak

Mir Wais formulated plans for disposing of the hated Gurgin; only the difficult task of waiting for the right moment remained. The moment came in April, 1709. Because details of the assassination are varied, this discussion recounts the version popular among Kandaharis today who say that MirWais invited Gurgin to a picnic at his country estate at Kohkran on the outskirts of Kandahar city. Here the guests were fed all manner of rich dishes and plied with strong wines until "everyone was plunged in de-bauch." This was the moment. Mir Wais struck, killing Gurgin, and his followers killed the Georgian's escort. The rebels then marched to take possession of the citadel. Isfahan was astounded and sent emissaries to complain. The emissaries were imprisoned. Isfahan sent armies to take the city. The armies were defeated. The Persian court then sat in stunned idleness while Mir Wais extended his authority throughout the Kandahar region. If they were to remain free the tribes must be united and to this formidable task the venerable statesman devoted the rest of his life. But not many years were left for Mir Wais. He died in 1715. An imposing bluedomed mausoleum at Bagh-i-Kohkran, next to the orchard where Gurgin was assassinated, is a fitting monument to Afghanistan's first great nationalist. The qualities which enabled MirWais to lead the tribes toward a meaningful unity were not, unfortunately, inherited by his ambitious 18 year old son, Mahmud, whose visions only encompassed conquest and power. Killing his uncle, elected successor to MirWais, Mahmud gathered his followers and marched across Persia and seized the Safavid throne (1722). Mahmud met an early death in 1725 and was succeeded by his cousin, Ashraf, who ruled until 1730 when a new soldier-of-fortune, the Turkoman Nadir Quli Beg, ended Ghilzai rule.

Ahmad Shah and the Durrani Empire (1747 - 1772)
From the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 until the communist coup of April 1978, Afghanistan was governed-at least nominally- by Pashtun rulers of the Abdali tribe. Indeed, it was under the leadership of the first Pashtun ruler, Ahmad Shah, that the nation of Afghanistan began to take shape after centuries of fragmentation and rule by invaders. Even before the death of Nadir Shah, the tribes of the Hindu Kush area had been growing stronger and were beginning to take advantage of the waning power of their distant rulers. The Ghilzai Pashtuns had risen in rebellion against Iranian rule early in the eighteenth century, but they had been subduedand relocated by Nadir Shah. Although tribal independence would remain a threat to rulers of Afghanistan, the Abdali Pashtun established political dominance, starting in the middle of the eighteenth century with the rise of AhmadShah. Two lineage groups within the Abdali ruled Afghanistan from 1747 until the downfall of the monarchy in the 1970s-theSadozai of the Popalzai tribe and the Muhammadzai of the Barakzai tribe. Although the names of Timur, Genghis Khan, and Mahmud of Ghazni are well-known for the destruction they wrought in South and Central Asia, the name of the founder of the Afghan nation-state is relatively unknown to Westerners, though Ahmad Shah created an Afghan empire that, at its largest in the 176Os, extended from Central Asia to Delhi and from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea. There have been greater conquerers in the region before and since Ahmad Shah, but never before his reign and rarely since has there been a ruler of this fragmented area capable not only of subduing the truculent Afghan tribes but also of pulling them together into a nation. Ahmad was the second son of the chief of the Sadozai, which although small was the most honored of the Abdali lineages. Along with his brother, he had risen in rebellion against Nadir Shah and had been jailed by the Ghilzai in Kandahar. Finally released by Nadir Shah in 1738 when he took the city from the Ghilzai, Ahmad rose in the personal service of theIranian monarch to the post of commander of an elite body of Afghan cavalry. When Nadir Shah, who had become viciousand capricious in his later years, was killed by a group of dissident officers, Ahmad and some 4,000 of his cavalrymen escaped with the treasury Nadir Shah always carried with him for payments and bribes en route. Ahmad and his Abdali horsemen rode past Herat and southeastward, joining the chiefs of the Abdali tribes and clans at a shrine near Kandahar to choose a paramount chief. Although his rivals for the post included Haji Jamal Khan-chief of the Muhammadzai, chief branch, of the Barakzai, which would be the other royal branch of the Abdali-and although only 23, Ahmad was finally chosen after more than a week of discussion and debate. Despite being younger than other claimants, Ahmad had several factors in his favor. He was a direct descendant of Sado,eponym of the Sadozai; he was unquestionably a charismatic leader and seasoned warrior, who had at his disposal a trained, mobile force of several thousand cavalrymen; and he had part of Nadir Shah’s treasury in his possession. In addition, the other chiefs may have preferred someone from a small tribe who would always need the support of the larger groups to rule effectively.

One of Ahmad’s first acts as chief was to adopt the title“Durr-i-Durran” (meaning “pearl of pearls” or “pearl of the age”), whether because of a dream or because of the pearl earrings worn by the royal guard of Nadir Shah. The Abdali Pashtuns were known thereafter as the Durrani. Ahmad’s rise was owing not only to his personality and talents but also to extraordinary luck. His reign coincided with the deterioration of the empires on both sides of Afghanistan- the Mughals to the southeast and the Safavis to the west. Even his first days as paramount chief were blessed with good fortune. Just before arriving in Kandahar, where some resistance was expected, Ahmad encountered a caravan bound for the Iranian court laden with treasure. The new ruler seized it, used it to pay his cavalry and to bribe hostile chiefs, and invited its Qizilbash (Turkmen Shia who served as palace guards for many Afghan and Iranian rulers) escort to join his service. Ahmad Shah began by taking Ghazni from the Ghilzai Pashtuns and then wrested Kabul from a local ruler. In 1749 the Mughal ruler, to save his capital from Afghan attack, ceded to Ahmad Shah sovereignty over Sind province and over the areas of northern India west of the Indus. He returned to his headquarters in Kandahar to put down one of an endless series of tribal uprisings and then set out westward to take Herat, which was ruled by Nadir Shah’s grandson, Shah Rukh. Herat fell to Ahmad after almost a year of bloody siege and conflict, as did also Meshed (in present-day Iran). Ahmad left Shah Rukh, a 16-year-old who had previously been blinded by a rival, to rule the eastern Iranian province of Khorasan for him. At Nishapur, Ahmad was temporarily halted, but the following spring he struck again, this time employing a cannon that fired a 500-pound projectile. Although the cannon exploded on its first shot, Ahmad Shah’s determination and the effect of the huge missile convinced the local rulers that they should surrender. Before returning to Herat, Ahmad’s troops plundered the city and massacred much of the population. Stopping by Meshed to remind the rebellious Shah Bukh of his subservient position, Ahmad next sent an army to subdue the areas north of the Hindu Kush. In short order the army brought under control the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara tribes of northern Afghanistan. Ahmad invaded India a third, and then a fourth time, taking control of the Punjab, Kashmir, and the city of Lahore. Early in 1757 he sacked Delhi, but he permitted the attenuated Mughal Dynasty to remain in nominal control as long as the ruler acknowledged Ahmad’s suzerainty over the Punjab, Sind, and Kashmir. Leaving his second son Timur (whom Ahmad married to a Mughal princess) in charge, Ahmad left India to return to Afghanistan, Like

Babur, he preferred his homeland to any of his other domains. Dupree quotes an Afghan writer’s translation of one of Ahmad Shah’s poems: Whatever contries i conquer in the world. I would never forget your beautiful gardens. When i remember the summits of your beautiful mountains i forget the greatness of the Delhi throne. The collapse of Mughal control in India, however, also facilitated the rise of rulers other than Ahmad Shah. In the Punjab the Sikhs were becoming a potent force, and from their capital at Poona the Marathas, who were Hindus, controlled much of western and central India and were beginning to look northward to the decaying Mughal empire, which Ahmad Shah now claimed by conquest. After Ahmad returned to Kandahar in 1757, he was faced not only with uprisings in Baluch areas and in Herat hut also with attacks by the Marathas on his domains in India, which succeeded in ousting Timur and his court. Herat was quickly brought under control, and the Baluch revolt was quelled by a combination of siege and compromise, but the campaign against the Marathas was a more substantial operation. Ahmad called for Islamic holy war against the Marathas, and warriors from the various Pashtun tribes, as well as other tribes such as the Baluch, answered his call. Early skirmishes ended in victory for the Afghans, and by 1759 Ahmad and his army had reached Lahore. By 1760 the Maratha groups had coalesced into a great army. Once again Panipat was the scene of a historical confrontation between two contenders for control of northern India. This time the battle was between Muslim and Hindu armies, numbering as many as 100,000 troops each, who fought along a 12.kilometer front. Although he decisively defeated the Marathas, Ahmad Shah was not left in peaceful control of his domains because of other challenges to the ailing monarch in his last years. Moreover, the ultimate effect of the 1761 Battle of Panipat may have had detrimental effects on the rule of Ahmad Shah’s descendants; by thwarting the consolidation of Maratha power in northern and central India, the battle may have set the stage for the rise of both Sikh and British power in the region. The victory at Panipat was the high point of Ahmad Shah’ and Afghan-power. Afterward, even before his death, the empire began to unravel. Ahmad Shah was less fit to cope with insurrection because he suffered from severe ulceration of the face, an ailment that was probably cancer. Even before the end of 1761 the Sikhs had risen and taken control of much of the Punjab. In 1762 Ahmad Shah crossed the passes from Afghanistan for the sixth time to subdue the Sikhs. He assaulted Lahore, and when he had taken the Sikh holy city of Amritsar, he massacred thousands of its Sikh inhabitants, destroyed their temples, and desecrated their holy places with cow blood. The Sikhs rebelled again within two years, but Ahmad Shah’s efforts to put down the uprising of 1764 were not as successful. Again in 1767 he crossed the mountain passes. Although much harassed by Sikh guerrilla warfare, Ahmad Shah took Lahore and again laid waste to Amritsar, killing many of its inhabitants. After this attempt Ahmad Shah tried two more times to subjugate the Sikhs permanently, but he failed. By the time of his death, he had lost all but nominal control of the Punjab to the Sikhs, who remained in control until defeated by the British in 1849. It was not only the fierce Sikhs who rebelled against the rule of Ahmad Shah. His empire was being seriously eroded in other areas as well. Ahmad Shah’s Indian domains refused to pay homage, and other regions simply declared their independence. The amir (ruler) of Bukhara claimed some of the northern provinces, and Ahmad Shah reached an agreement with him to accept the Amu Darya as the border between them. Three years before his death, Ahmad Shah had to put down a revolt in Khorasan. In 1772 Ahmad Shah retired to his home, the mountains east of Kandahar, where he died. He was buried in Kandahar, where his epitaph, recalling his early connection with the Iranian monarchy, calls him a ruler equal to Emperor Cyrus. Despite his relentless military attacks and his massacres of Sikhs and others in imperial warfare, he is known in Afghan history as Ahmad Shah Baba, or “father.” Although confusion reigned after his death, Ahmad Shah was clearly the creator of the nation of Afghanistan, As scholar Leon B.

Poullada notes, the loyalty of the Afghan tribes was not transferred from their own leaders and kin to the concept of nation, but Ahmad Shah succeeded to a remarkable degree in balancing tribal alliances and hostilities and in directing tribal energies away from rebellion into his frequent foreign excursions. He certainly enjoyed extraordinarily good luck, but he was clever in exploiting his good fortune, and he showed exemplary intelligence in dealing with his own people. Having started his rule as merely the paramount chief of the Durrani, Ahmad Shah never sought to rule the Pashtuns by force. He reigned in consultation with a council of eight or nine sirdars (or sardars), the most powerful Durrani Pashtuns, each of whom was responsible for his own group. He sought the advice of his council on all major issues. Although he favored the Durrani, and especially his own lineage, the Sadozai, he was conciliatory to the other Pashtun chiefs as well. Ahmad Shah’s successors were not so wise, and the nation he had built almost collapsed because of their misrule and the intratribal rivalry that they could not manage. By the time of Ahmad Shah, the Pashtuns included many groups whose greatest single common characteristic was their Pashto language. Their origins were obscure: most were believed to have descended from ancient Aryan tribes, but some, such as the Ghilzai, may have been Turks. To the east, the Waziris and their close relatives, the Mahsuds, have been located in the hills of the central Suleiman Range since the fourteenth century. By the end of the sixteenth century and the final Turkish-Mongol invasions, tribes such as the Shinwaris, Yusufzais, and the Mohmands had moved from the upper Kabul River Valley into the valleys and plains west, north, and northeast of Peshawar, and the Afridis had long been established in the hills and mountain ranges south of Khyber Pass. By the end of the eighteenth century the Durranis had blanketed the area west and north of Kandahar.

The Rise of Dost Mohammad and the Beginning of the Great Game (1826 -1839; 1843 - 1863)
It was not until 1826 that the energetic Dost Mohammad was able to exert sufficient control over his own brothers to take over the throne in Kabul, where he proclaimed himself amir, not shah. Although the British had begun to show interest in Afghanistan as early as 1809 with their agreement with Shuja, it was not until the reign of Dost Mohammad, the first of the Muhammadzai rulers, that the opening gambits were played in what came to be known as the Great Game. The Great Game involved not only the confrontation of two great empires whose spheres of influence moved steadily closer to one another until they met in Afghanistan, but also the repeated attempts by a foreign power to impose a puppet government in Kabul. The remainder of the nineteenth century was a time of European involvement in Afghanistan and the adjacent areas and of conflicting ambitions among the various local rulers. Dost Mohammad achieved predominance among his ambitious brothers through clever use of the support of his mother’s Qizilbash tribesmen and his own youthful apprenticeship under his brother, Fateh Khan. He was, by all accounts, a shrewd and charming leader. Many problems demanded his attention: consolidating his power in the areas under his command, controlling his half-brothers who ruled the southern areas of Afghanistan, defeating Mahmud in Herat, and repulsing the encroachment of the Sikhs on the Pashtun areas east of the Khyber Pass. After working assiduously to establish control and stability in his domains around Kabul, the amir next chose to confront the Sikhs. In 1834 Dost Mohammad defeated an invasion by ex-shah Shuja, but his absence from Kabul gave the Sikhs the opportunity to expand westward. The forces of Ranjit Singh occupied Peshawar and moved from there into territory ruled directly by Kabul. In 1836 Dost Mohammad’s forces, under the command of his son, defeated the Sikhs at Jamrud, a post some 15 kilometers west of Peshawar. The Afghan leader, however, did not follow up this triumph by retaking Peshawar. Instead, Dost Mohammad decided to contact the British directly for help in dealing with the Sikhs. In the spring of 1836 he wrote the new governor general of India, Lord Auckland, a letter of congratulations and asked his advice on dealing with the Sikhs. Just as Dost Mohammad’s letter formally set the stage for British intervention in Afghanistan, so also did Lord Auckland’s reply foreshadow the duplicitous policy of the British in dealing with the Afghans. Auckland responded that he would send a commercial mission to Kabul and stated that “it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states.” In fact, at the heart of the Great Game lay the willingness of Britain and Russia to subdue, subvert, or subjugate the small independent states that lay between them. The British-through the East India Company-had first become involved in the subcontinent of India in 1612 during the heyday of the Mughal Empire. British influence spread until, by the end of the eighteenth century, their interests in northern India impinged on Central Asia. Although by that time the empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani was already disintegrating, the British were well aware of his exploits in northern India only four decades before, and they feared what they thought was a formidable Afghan force. By the end of the eighteenth century the British had approached the Iranians, asking that they keep the Afghans in check. By the last years of the eighteenth century, a new worry motivated the British in the region-fear of French involvement. Napoleon was, in the British view, capable of overrunning areas of Central Asia and northern India, just as he had defeated much of Europe. In 1801 the British signed an agreement with Iran not only to halt any possible Afghan moves into India by attacking their western flank but also to prevent the French from doing the same thing. In 1807 Napoleon signed with the tsar of Russia the Treaty of Tilsit, which envisaged a joint invasion of India though Iran. The British hastened to cement their relationship with the Iranians and signed an agreement with Shuja in 1809, only a few weeks before he was deposed.

The debacle of the Afghan civil war left a vacuum in the Hindu Kush area that concerned the British, who were well aware of the many times this area had been the invasion route to India. In the first decades of the nineteenth century it became clear to the British that the major threat to their interests in India would not come from the fragmented Afghan empire, the vitiated Persians, or from the French, but from the Russians, who had begun a steady advance southward from the Caucasus. As in earlier times, two great empires confronted each other, with Central Asia lying between them. The Russians feared permanent British encroachment into Central Asia as the British moved northward, taking control of the Punjab, Sind, and Kashmir. Equally suspicious, the British viewed Russian absorption of the Caucasus and Georgia, Kirghiz and Turkmen lands, and Khiva and Bukhara as a threat to British interest in the Indian subcontinent.

The First Anglo-Afghan War
To justify his plan, Auckland ordered a manifesto issued on October 1, 1838, at Simla that set forth the reasons for British intervention in Afghanistan. The Simla Manifesto stated that the welfare of India required that the British have on their western frontier a trustworthy ally. The British pretense that their troops were merely supporting the tiny force of Shuja in retaking what was once his throne fooled no one. Although the Simla Manifesto asserted that British troops would be withdrawn as soon as Shuja was installed in Kabul, Shuja's rule depended entirely on British arms to suppress rebellion and on British funds to pay tribal chiefs for their support. Like other interventions in modern times, the British denied that they were invading Afghanistan but claimed they were merely supporting its legitimate government (Shuja) "against foreign interference and factious opposition." From the point of the view of the British, the First AngloAfghan War (often called "Auckland's Folly") was an unmitigated disaster, although it proved surprisingly easy to depose Dost Mohammad and enthrone Shuja. An army of British and Indian troops set out from the Punjab in December 1838 and by late March 1839 had reached Quetta. By the end of April the British had taken Qandahar without a battle. In July, after a two-month delay in Qandahar, the British attacked the fortress of Ghazni, overlooking a plain that leads to India, and achieved a decisive victory over the troops of Dost Mohammad, which were led by one of his sons. The Afghans were amazed at the taking of fortified Ghazni, and Dost Mohammad found his support melting away. The Afghan ruler took his few loyal followers and fled across the passes to Bamian, and ultimately to Bukhara, and in August 1839 Shuja was enthroned again in Kabul after a hiatus of almost 30 years. Some British troops returned to India, but it soon became clear that Shuja's rule could only be maintained by the presence of British forces. Garrisons were established in Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kalat-iGhilzai (Qalat), Qandahar, and at the passes to Bamian. After a winter in temporary quarters, the British thought to move their Kabul garrison to the great fort, Bala Hissar, overlooking the city, but Shuja, either on his own or under pressure, refused to sanction the move. Omens of disaster for the British abounded. Opposition to the British-imposed rule of Shuja began as soon as he assumed the throne, and the power of his government did not extend beyond the areas controlled by the force of British arms. The British cantonment in Kabul was eventually constructed on a virtually indefensible open plain northeast of the city, with the commissariat and munitions outside the low walls of the garrison. Early in 1841 a new commander, who was elderly, ill, and indecisive, joined the British troops in Afghanistan. After several attacks on the British and their Afghan protege Dust Mohammad decided to surrender to the British and in late 1840 was allowed to go into exile in India. Sir William Macnaghten, one of the principal architects of the British invasion, wrote to Auckland two months later, urging good treatment for the deposed Afghan leader. With that fairness and clearsightedness that, in retrospect, was characteristic of British colonial officials, Macnaghten said: His case has been compared to that of Shah Shoojah . . . but surely the cases are not parallel. The Shah [Shujal] had no claim on us. We had no hand in depriving turn of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim. Dual control (by Shuja and the British) was unworkable. Shuja did not succeed in garnering the support of the Afghan chiefs on his own, and the British could not-or would notsustain their subsidies. When the cash payments to tribal chiefs were curtailed in 1841, there was a major revolt by the Ghilzai. By October 1841 disaffected Afghan tribes were flocking to the support of Dost Mohammad's son, Muhammad Akbar, in Bamian. Barnes was murdered in November 1841, and a few days later the commissariat fell into the hands of the Afghans. Macnaghten, having tried first to bribe and then to negotiate with the tribal leaders, was killed at a meeting with the tribal chiefs

in December. On January 1, 1842, the British in Kabul and a number of Afghan chiefs reached an agreement that provided for the safe exodus of the entire British garrison and its dependents from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the British would not wait for an Afghan escort to be assembled, and the Ghilzai and allied tribes had not been among the 18 chiefs who had signed the agreement. On January 6 the precipitate retreat began and, as they struggled through the snowbound passes, the British were attacked by Ghilzai warriors. Although a Dr. W. Brydon is usually cited as the only survivor of the march to Jalalabad (out of more than 15,000 who undertook the retreat), in fact a few more survived as prisoners and hostages. Shuja remained in power only a few months and was assassinated in April 1842. The destruction of the British garrison prompted brutal retaliation by the British against the Afghans and touched off yet another power struggle among potential rulers of Afghanistan. In the fall of 1842 British forces from Qandahar and Peshawar entered Kabul long enough to rescue the British prisoners and burn the great bazaar. All that remained of the British occupation of Afghanistan was a ruined market and thousands of dead. Although the foreign invasion did give the Afghan tribes a temporary sense of unity they had lacked before, the accompanying loss of life and property was followed by a bitterness and resentment of foreign influence that lasted well into the twentieth century and may have accounted for much of the backlash against the modernization attempts of later Afghan monarchs. The Russians advanced steadily southward toward Afghanistan in the three decades after the First AngloAfghan War, and historians of the period generally agree that the Russians were motivated, at least in part, by British intervention in Afghanistan. In 1842 the Russian border was on the other side of the Aral Sea from Afghanistan, but five years later the tsar's outposts moved to the lower reaches of the Syr Darya. By 1865 Tashkent had been formally annexed, as was Samarkand three years later. A treaty with the ruler of Bukhara virtually stripped him of his independence, and by 1869 Russian control ran as far as the northern bank of the Amu Darya. As the Russians overran much of Central Asia north of the river, the British advanced toward Afghanistan as well, absorbing territories that had once been part of Ahmad Shah Durrani's empire: Sind in 1843, Kashmir in 1846, the Punjab in 1849, Baluchistan in 1859, and the North-West Frontier in 1895.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War
After months of chaos in Kabul, Mohammad Akbar secured local control, and in April 1843 his father, Dost Mohammad, returned to the throne of Afghanistan. In the following decade, Dost Mohammad concentrated his efforts on reconquering Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, Badakhshan, and Qandahar. During the Second Anglo-Sikh War, in 1848-49, Dost Mohammad's last effort to take Peshawar failed. In 1854 the British were interested in resuming relations with Dost Mohammad, whom they had more or less ignored since 1842. In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Crimean War, British officials in India, though they had no immediate concerns. for Russian involvement, thought to make Afghanistan a barrier to Russian penetration across the Amu Darya. Dost Mohammad agreed, apparently perceiving the utility of British backing against the Russians and even the Iranians, to whom the independent rulers of Herat always turned for support against re-absorption into the Afghan kingdom. In 1855 the Treaty of Peshawar reopened diplomatic relations, proclaimed respect for each sides' territorial integrity, and committed each to be the friends of each other's friends and the enemies of each other's enemies. In October 1856 the Iranians siezed Herat, and the British, whose policy it was to maintain the independence of this city, declared war against Iran. After three months the Iranians withdrew from Herat and committed themselves never again to interfere there or elsewhere in Afghanistan. This brief war convinced the British that they should bolster the strength of Dost Mohammad in an attempt to enable him to meet future challenges by the Iranians. In 1857 an addendum was signed to the 1855 treaty that permitted a British military mission to go to Qandahar (but not to Kabul) and to provide a subsidy during conflict with the Iranians. FraserTytler notes that as Dost Mohammad signed the document he proclaimed, "I have now made an alliance with the British Government and come what may I will keep it till death." Even during the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion in India, when British forces in the Punjab were thinned dramatically, Dost Mohammad refused to take advantage of British vulnerability to retake the Pashtun areas under British control. The British governor general of India at the time of the 1857 agreement with Afghanistan stated in a memorandum that the British would never again intervene in Afghan internal affairs or send an army across its borders unless Herat was besieged, and then only with Afghan consent. He went so far as to argue in favor of the Afghan absorption of Herat. In 1863 Dost Mohammad retook Herat with British acquiescence. A few months later Dost Mohammad died and, although his third son, Sher Ali, was his proclaimed successor, he did not succeed in taking Kabul from his brother, Muhammad Afzal (whose troops were led by his son, Abdur Rahman) until 1868. Abdur Rahman retreated across the Amu Darya and bided his time. The disaster of the First Anglo-Afghan War continued to haunt the British for decades, and the 70 years following the defeat of 1842 were a period of extraordinary vacillation in British policy toward Afghanistan. Not only were political perspectives different in Delhi and London, but there were also changes in government between what writer John C. Griffiths calls "halfhearted Imperialists and ill-informed Liberals." The former favored what was called the Forward Policy, which held that the defense of India required pushing its frontiers to the natural barrier of the Hindu Kush so that Afghanistan (or at least parts of it, such as Herat) would be brought entirely under British control. The Liberal policy rested on the assumption that the Forward Policy was immoral and impractical. Many of its adherents believed that the Indus River formed the natural border of India and that Afghanistan should be maintained as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. In the years immediately following the First Anglo-Afghan War, and especially after the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion in India, Liberal governments in London tended toward the buffer-state approach. By the time Sher Ali had established control in Kabul in 1868, he found the British ready to provide arms and funds in support of his regime, but nothing more. Fraser-Tytler reports that Sher Ali declared, "As long as I am alive, or as long as my governments exists, the foundation of friendship and goodwill

between this and the powerful British Government will not be weakened." From this high point, relations between the Afghan ruler and the British steadily deteriorated over the next 10 years. Despite the good feeling between Sher Ali and the British in 1869, the sensitivities engendered by the First Anglo-Afghan War made it impossible for Sher Ali to accept a British envoy in Kabul, and there is no doubt that misperceptions colored the unfortunate sequence of events that led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In 1873 relations between Sher Ali and the British viceroy began to become strained. The Afghan ruler was worried about the southern movement of Russia, which in 1873 had taken over the lands of the khan (ruler) of Khiva. Sher Ali sent an envoy to ask the British for advice and support. In 1872, however, the British had signed an agreement with the Russians in which the latter agreed to respect the northern boundaries of Afghanistan and to view the territories of the Afghan amir as outside their sphere of influence. With this agreement in mind, and still following a noninterventionist policy as far as Afghanistan was concerned, the British refused to give any assurances to the disappointed Sher Ali. In 1874 Benjamin Disraeli became prime minister of Britain, and in 1876 a new viceroy was dispatched to Delhi with orders to reinstate the Forward Policy. Sher Ali rejected a second British demand for a British mission in Kabul, arguing that if he agreed the Russians might demand the same right. The Afghan ruler had received intimidating letters from the Russians, but the British offered little in return for the concessions they demanded. Sher Ali, still sensitive to the probable reaction in Afghanistan to the posting of British officers in Kabul or Herat, continued to refuse to permit such a mission. After tension between Russia and Britain in Europe ended with the June 1878 Congress of Berlin, Russia turned its attention to Central Asia. In the summer of 1878 Russia sent an uninvited diplomatic mission to Kabul, setting in motion the train of events that led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Sher Ali tried to keep the Russian mission out but failed. The Russian envoys arrived in Kabul on July 22, 1878, and on August 14 the British demanded that Sher Ali accept a British mission. Sher Ali had not responded by August 17 when his son and heir died, throwing the court into mourning. When no reply was received, the British dispatched a small military force, which was refused permission to cross the Khyber Pass by Afghan authorities. The British presumably considered this an insult, but more likely it was viewed at the highest levels as a fine pretext for implementing the Forward Policy and taking over most of Afghanistan. The British delivered an ultimatum to Sher Ali, demanding an explanation of his actions. The Afghan response was viewed by the British as unsatisfactory, and on November 21, 1878, British troops entered Afghanistan at three points. Sher Ali, having turned in desperation to the Russians, received no assistance from them. Appointing his son, Yaqub, regent, Sher Ali left to seek the assistance of the tsar. Advised by the Russians to abandon this effort and to return to his country, Sher Ali returned to Mazare Sharif, where he died in February 1879. With British forces occupying much of the country, Yaqub signed the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879 to prevent British invasion of the rest of Afghanistan. According to this agreement and in return for an annual subsidy and loose assurance of assistance in case of foreign aggression, Yaqub agreed to British control of Afghan foreign affairs, British representatives in Kabul and other locations, extension of British control to the Khyber and Michni passes, and the cession of various frontier areas to the British. An Afghan uprising against the British was, unlike that of the First Anglo-Afghan War, foiled in October 1879. Yaqub abdicated because, as Fraser-Tytler suggests, he did not wish to share the fate of Shuja following the first war. Despite the success of the military venture, by March 1880 even the proponents of the Forward Policy were aware that defeating the Afghan tribes did not mean controlling them. Although British policymakers had briefly thought simply to dismember Afghanistan a few months earlier, they now feared they were heading for the same disasters that befell their predecessors at the time of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Fraser-Tytler summarizes the position of the viceroy:

He could hardly have based his policy on the assumption that after overrunning the country and thereby once more inflaming the hatred of every patriotic Afghan against us, we should by some magic discover among the Afghan chiefs a leader who would he acceptable both to ourselves and to the Afghan people . . . And yet this is what he did . . . The amazing thing is that while his assumption was wholly unwarranted his gamble was successful. While the British and Indian Governments were arguing over the dismembered corpse of the Afghan Kingdom, the one man who could fulfill the requirements o[ a desperately difficult situation was moving southwards into Afghanistan. Just as the British interventionists were reaching this conclusion, the Liberal Party won an electoral victory in March 1880. This assured the end of the Forward Policy, which had been a major campaign issue.

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880 - 1901)
Amir Dost Mohammad carefully selected his third son, Sher Ali, to succeed him, and earnestly enjoined his other sons to serve him faithfully, but, as in the past, only a few acquiesced, with reluctance, and the others openly challenged him. All the familiar disruptive patterns now reappear with- the same devastating con-sequences: brother fought against brother; uncle against nephew, tribe against tribe. Herat held out against Kabul while the Khan-ates in the north happily resumed their play, one against the other. Beyond the borders outsiders kept the rivalries boiling. In short, between 1863 and 1880, Amir Sher Ali won and lost the throne twice (1863-1866; 1868-1879) and Russian-British hostility again brought a British army on to Afghan soil. Despite the internal dissensions and connivance of his neighbors, Amir Sher Ali was still able to pursue an energetic series of re-forms. He created a national army, laid the ground-work for col-lecting land taxes, began the Afghan postal system, and published Afghanistan's first newspaper. Forces gathered against him.As the year 1878 drew to a close the sudden, uninvited arrival of a Russian Mission in Kabul precipitated the final calamitous events. Irritated when they were refused permission to send a similar mission, the British marched their troops to Jalalabad, into Khost, to Kandahar and up to Kalat-i-Ghilzai; and the Second Anglo-Afghan War began. Ringed by enemy forces, Amir Sher Ali went north seeking promised Russian aid which failed to materialize and he died, disheartened, in Mazar-i-Sharif in February, 1879. His son, Amir Yaqub Khan, then travelled to meet with the British at Gandamak, west of Jalalabad, in May, and there signed a treaty which secured for the British their long sought after permission to station a British Representative in Kabul. The treaty further stated that the Amirs of Afghanistan agreed to "henceforth conduct all relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government."Thus the British endeavored to control without actually annex-ing their prickly neighbor but less than three months later the Afghans protested this renewed British interference in their affairs by killing the newly arrived Representative and all but a few of his escort in their residence inside the Bala Hissar of Kabul. The massacre took place on September 3rd, 1879. This gave the British the pretext to bring their armies immediately to occupy Kabul (October) and, after the abdication of Amir Yaqub Khan, to as-sume direct control of the government of Kabul. General Roberts was in charge.

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan with an impressive personality and a curious Afghan humour, ruled Afghanistan (1880-1901)

The country was restless and numerous engagements were launched all over the country to show their disapproval of the British presence. The British on their part desperately searched for a leader acceptable to all. It was then that Abdur Rahman rode into Afghanistan from eleven years of exile in Samarkand as a guest of the Russian Government. His talents as a strong energetic tribal leader were well known for he had fought successfully to place his father, Amir Mohammad Afzal, an elder half-brother of Amir Sher Ali, on the throne in 1866. Even when his father died a year later, Abdur Rahman continued to serve the new Amir, his uncle, Mohammad Azam, until defeat at the hands of Amir Sher Ali forced him into exile in Russia in 1868. Sensing a propitious moment to bid for the throne, Abdur Rah-man crossed over the border into Badakhshan, gathering forces as he moved south from Kishm to Charikar where, on July 20th, 1880, a tribal council proclaimed him Amir of Kabul. On August 11th, the British formally handed over to him the Kingdom of Kabul and withdrew to India. British composure at Kabul was severely shattered, however, by distressing news from Kandahar. On July 27th an entire British brigade had been outfought on the plains of Maiwand in one of the most crushing defeats ever suffered by a British army. The mortifying blow had been inflicted by Sardar Ayub Khan, son of Amir Sher Ali and full brother of Amir

Yaqub Khan, who had declared himself Amir at Herat after hearing of his brother's abdication. Following up his victory at Maiwand, Ayub Khan invested Kandahar. Swiftly mobilizing 10,000 picked men and 9000 animals, General Roberts marched from Kabul to the relief of Kandahar. Moving entirely on foot, with no wheeled transport to slow their progress, procuring supplies as they went, except for such essentials as tea, sugar, salt, rum and two hundred gallons of lime juice, they covered the 324 miles through hostile burning deserts with incredible speed and arrived in Kandahar, only 23 days later, on the 31st of August, 1880. Military strategists write with admiration of this difficult feat but the diaries of the men involved reveal some interesting attitudes. Just before arriving at Ghazni, for instance, Major Ashe writes: " . . . our march up to the present time has been a veri-table picnic, not unaccompanied by a rubber of whist in the after-noon, and not divested of that little duck and quail slaughter which in measure consoles our youngsters for their banishment from Hurlingham. Arriving in Kandahar tired but in good spirits, the Kabul troops were shocked at the demoralized state of the Kandahar garrison. Undaunted, they went out the very next day to defeat Ayub Khan behind the Baba Wali Pass, to the north of the city. In seeking arrangements which would secure for Britain if not a pro-British at least not an antiBritish buffer against Russia, British policy makers contemplated giving Herat to Persia and establishing Kandahar as an independent state under another Sadozai puppet. Fortunately, these proposals were vetoed and the last British troops on Afghan soil marched from Kandahar in April, 1881. Amir Abdur Rahman in Kabul was left to become master of his own state. He faced monumental problems of divisiveness as he candidly admits in his autobiography." . . . when I first succeeded to the throne of Kabul my life was not a bed of roses. Here began my first severe fight against my own relations, my own subjects, my own people." Rebellions began immediately and continued to erupt to the east in the Kunar, in the north around Maimana, and in the central mountains of the Hazarajat. The Ghilzai uprising alone took two years to subdue. The Amir defeated his tribal opponents on the battlefield and then, in order to insure their fealty, resettled many of the leaders in areas far from their homelands thereby cleverly exploiting age-old traditional tribal rivalries. As he rightly surmised, the Pushtun tribesmen would fight for him, a fellow Pushtun, before they would join with the Uzbaks. In this way he created a loyal force of his enemies. In addition to the tribal wars the sorely beset Amir had more-over to fight one cousin, Sardar Ayub Khan, for Kandahar and Herat (1881) and another cousin, Mohammad Is'hak for the North (1888). Finally, in 1895 when all was relatively quiescent, he moved to conquer and convert the Kafirs, "Infidels," a warlike people living in the eastern mountains to the north of Jalalabad. The Kafirs had at one time impressed Alexander the Great who in-vited their young men to accompany him on his campaign to India. Later they had withstood the iconoclastic advances of Arab and Ghaznavid armies. They had even bested the august Tamer-lane, but now at last they submitted and the Amir decreed that henceforth their land was to be known as Nuristan, Land of Light. While the Amir proceeded thus to establish his rule supreme within his own domains, foreigners hemmed him in with bound-aries: a joint Russian-British Boundary Commission settled the northern boundary in 1887; the unpopular western boundary demarcated during the reign of Amir Sher Ali, was renegotiated in 1888; the British drew the equally unpopular Durand Line in 1893 to separate Afghanistan from their Indian Empire. Mutual mistrust, especially after March, 1885 when Russian troops took the Afghan fort of Panjdeh north of Herat, led to the acceptance of Afghanistan as a buffer state. For strength and protection against further Russian advances the Amir also accepted subsidies from the British in return for which they continued to control his foreign affairs. The Amir insisted, however, on preserving the independence of Afghanistan by maintaining absolute control over internal affairs. Though the British resented the Amir's policy of isolation and bombarded him with proposals regarding advisçrs, telegraphs and railroads, commercial treaties and diplomatic missions, the Amir proved adamant, preferring to develop his country on his own. He built small forts along all major caravan routes to make ona hazardous travel safe, and trade flourished. He introduced fac-tories, schools and hospitals for which he did

hire, on his own several British technicians and a doctor, but only a select few. A' the capital he built a new citadel to replace the palaces in the Bal~ Hissar, a heap of rubble since the days of the British occupation their vengeful "lesson" to Kabul. Zarnegar Park in the heart o Kabul once formed part of the Amir's palace grounds, a come: where he and his favorite young wife, Bibi Halima, had adjoinin~ bungalows. Hers, richly decorated with stucco omnamention depict ing birds entwined within flowering vines, is Central Asian ii design and recalls the years he spent there. The Amir's bungalow became his mausoleum and was sub sequently topped with a dome and minarets to make it an impres sive structure in keeping with this dynamic personality who domi nated the period from which modern Afghanistan emerges.

Amir Habibullah Khan
Habibullah Khan (1872 - 1919) was the Emir of Afghanistan from 1901 until 1919. He was born in Tashkent, the eldest son of the Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, whom he succeeded by right of primogeniture in October 1901.

He was Abdul Rahman's eldest son but child of a diffrent mother, kept a close watch on the palace intrigues revolving around his father's more distinguished wife (a granddaughter of Dost Mohammad), who sought the throne for her own son. Although made secure in his position as ruler by virtue of support from the army which was created by his father, Habibullah was not as domineering as Abdur Rahman. Consequently, the influence of religious leaders as well as that of Mahmoud Beg Tarzi, a cousin of the king, increased during his reign. Tarzi, a highly educated, well-traveled poet and journalist, founded an Afghan nationalist newspaper with Abdur Rahman's agreement, and until 1919 he used the newspaper as a platform for rebutting clerical criticism of Western-influenced changes in government and society, for espousing full Afghan independence, and for other reforms. Tarzi's passionate Afghan nationalism influenced a future generation of Asian reformers. Habibullah was a relatively secular, reform-minded ruler who attempted to modernize his country. During his reign he worked to bring Western medicine and other technology to Afghanistan. In 1904, Habibullah founded the Habibia school as well as a military academy. He also published a weekly paper in Persian called Siraj-ul-Akhbar, which agitated for reform. He instituted various legal reforms and repealed many of the harshest criminal penalties. Other reforms included the dismantling of the repressive internal intelligence organization that had been put in place by his father.

He strictly maintained the country's neutrality in World War I, despite strenuous efforts by the Sultan of Turkey, spiritual ruler of Islam, to enlist Afghanistan on its side. He also greatly reduced tensions with India, signing a treaty of friendship in 1905 and paying an official state visit in 1907. During World War I, Afghanistan remained neutral despite pressure to support Turkey when its sultan proclaimed his nation's participation in what it considered a holy war. Habibullah did, however, entertain a Turco-German mission in Kabul in 1915. After much procrastination, he won an agreement from the Central Powers for a huge payment and arms provision in exchange for attacking British India. But the crafty Afghan ruler clearly viewed the war as an opportunity to play one side off against the other, for he also offered the British to resist a Central Powers from an attack on India in exchange for an end to British control of Afghan foreign policy. On February 20, 1919, Habibullah, the ruler of Afghanistan, was assassinated on a hunting trip. He had not declared a succession, but left his third son, Amanullah, in charge in Kabul. Because Amanullah controlled both the national treasury and the army, he was well situated to seize power. Army support allowed Amanullah to suppress other claims and imprison those relatives who would not swear loyalty to him. Within a few months, the new amir had gained the allegiance of most tribal leaders and established control over the cities.

Amir Amanullah Khan
Born. June 1, 1892, Paghman Died April 25, 1960, Zürich, Switzerland

On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated on a hunting trip. He had not declared a succession, but left his third son, Amanullah, in charge in Kabul. Because Amanullah controlled both the national treasury and the army, he was well situated to seize power. Army support allowed Amanullah to suppress other claims and imprison those relatives who would not swear loyalty to him. Within a few months, the new amir had gained the allegiance of most tribal leaders and established control over the cities. Amanullah's ten years of reign initiated a period of dramatic change in Afghanistan in both foreign and domestic politics. Starting in May 1919 when he won complete independence in the month-long Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, Amanullah altered foreign policy in his new relations with external powers and transformed domestic politics with his social, political, and economic reforms. Although his reign ended abruptly, he achieved some notable successes, and his efforts failed as much due to the centripetal forces of tribal Afghanistan and the machinations of Russia and Britain as to any political folly on his part. Amanullah came to power just as the entente between Russia and Britain broke down following the Russian Revolution of 1917. Once again Afghanistan provided a stage on which the great powers played out their schemes against one another. Amanullah attacked the British in May 1919 in two thrusts, taking them by surprise. Afghan forces achieved success in the early days of the war as Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the border joined forces with them. He was crowned in Kabul over the prior claims of his uncle Nasrullah, whom he denounced as a usurper and an accomplice in the murder of his father. King Amanullah (he assumed the title of king in 1926) was an ardent reformer and contemporary of like-minded rulers, Muhammad Reza in Iran and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. He demanded a revision of the AngloAfgha agreements concluded by Amir Abdur Rahman which left Britain in charge of Afghanistan's foreign relations in exchange for protection from unprovoked Russian aggression and a subsidy in money and military materiel.

The military skirmishes soon ended in a stalemate as the British recovered from their initial surprise. Britain virtually dictated the terms of the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement, a temporary armistice that provided, somewhat ambiguously, for Afghan self-determination in foreign affairs. Before final negotiations were concluded in 1921, however, Afghanistan had already begun to establish its own foreign policy, including diplomatic relations with the new government in the Soviet Union in 1919. During the 1920s, Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with most major countries. British reluctance to accept a change in the status quo led to Afghan armed attacks, culminating in the start of the third Anglo-Afghan war on May 3, 1919. Britain was war-weary and in no condition to wage war on the Indian frontier and, after lengthy negotiations in Rawalpindi, Mussoorie, and Kabul, peace was restored, leaving Afghanistan free and independent from British control . King Amanullah became a national hero and turned his attention to reforming and modernizing his country. He established diplomatic and commercial relations with major European and Asian states, founded schools in which French, German, and English were the major languages of education, and promulgated a constitution which guaranteed the personal freedom and equal rights of all Afghans. He built a new capital, named Darulaman (Dar alAmen - Abode of Peace), which include a monumental parliament and other government buildings as well as villas of prominent Afghans. Social reforms included a new dress code which permitted women in Kabul to go unveiled and encouraged officials to wear Western dress. Modernization proved costly for Afghanistan and was resented by the traditional elements of Afghan society. In the 1920s, King Amanullah introduced new criminal and civil codes, including a 1921 family code that banned child marriage, required judicial permission before a man took more than one wife, and removed some family law questions from the jurisdiction of mullahs. His wife, Queen Soraya, opened the first girls’ school in Kabul. His policy was to convert Afghanistan into a stable and prosperous kingdom on modern railway lines, and highway system, adapting the best of western practice, but cautiously, to Afghan conditions. The second round of Anglo–Afghan negotiations for final peace were inconclusive. Both sides were prepared to agree on Afghan independence in foreign affairs, as provided for in the previous agreement. The two nations disagreed, however, on the issue that had plagued Anglo-Afghan relations for decades and would continue to cause friction for many more — authority over Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. The British refused to concede Afghan control over the tribes on the British side of the line while the Afghans insisted on it. The Afghans regarded the 1921 agreement as only an informal one. The rivalry of the great powers in the region might have remained subdued had it not been for the dramatic change in government in Moscow brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In their efforts to placate Muslims within their borders, the new Soviet leaders were eager to establish cordial relations with neighboring Muslim states. In the case of Afghanistan, the Soviets could achieve a dual purpose: by strengthening relations with the leadership in Kabul, they could also threaten Britain, which was one of the Western states supporting counterrevolution in the Soviet Union. In his attempts to unclench British control of Afghan foreign policy, Amanullah sent an emissary to Moscow in 1919; Lenin received the envoy warmly and responded by sending a Soviet representative to Kabul to offer aid to Amanullah's government. Throughout Amanullah's reign, Soviet-Afghan relations fluctuated according Afghanistan's value to the Soviet leadership at a given time; Afghanistan was either viewed as a tool for dealing with Soviet Muslim minorities or for threatening the British. Whereas the Soviets sought Amanullah's assistance in suppressing anti-Bolshevik elements in Central Asia in return for help against the British, the Afghans were more interested in regaining lands across the Amu Darya lost to Russia in the nineteenth century. Afghan attempts to regain the oases of Merv and Panjdeh were easily subdued by the Soviet Red Army.

In May 1921, the Afghans and the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship, Afghanistan's first international agreement since gaining full independence in 1919. The Soviets provided Amanullah with aid in the form of cash, technology, and military equipment. Despite this, Amanullah grew increasingly disillusioned with the Soviets, especially as he witnessed the widening oppression of his fellow Muslims across the border. Anglo-Afghan relations soured over British fear of an Afghan-Soviet friendship, especially with the introduction of a few Soviet planes into Afghanistan. British unease increased when Amanullah maintained contacts with Indian nationalists and gave them asylum in Kabul, and also when he sought to stir up unrest among the Pashtun tribes across the border. The British responded by refusing to address Amanullah as "Your Majesty," and imposing restrictions on the transit of goods through India. Amanullah's domestic reforms were no less dramatic than his foreign policy initiatives, but those reforms could not match his achievement of complete, lasting independence. Mahmoud Beg Tarzi, Amanullah's father-in-law, encouraged the monarch's interest in social and political reform but urged that it be gradually built upon the basis of a strong army and central government, as had occurred in Turkey under Kemal Atatürk. Amanullah, however, was unwilling to put off implementing his changes. Amanullah's reforms touched on many areas of Afghan life. In 1921 he established an air force, albeit with only a few Soviet planes and pilots; Afghan personnel later received training in France, Italy, and Turkey. Although he came to power with army support, Amanullah alienated many army personnel by reducing both their pay and size of the forces and by altering recruiting patterns to prevent tribal leaders from controlling who joined the service. Amanullah's Turkish advisers suggested the king retire the older officers, men who were set in their ways and might resist the formation of a more professional army. Amanullah's minister of war, General Muhammad Nadir Khan, a member of the Musahiban branch of the royal family, opposed these changes, preferring instead to recognize tribal sensitivities. The king rejected Nadir Khan's advice and an anti-Turkish faction took root in the army; in 1924 Nadir Khan left the government to become ambassador to France. If fully enacted, Amanullah's reforms would have totally transformed Afghanistan. Most of his proposals, however, died with his abdication. His transforming social and educational reforms included: adopting the solar calendar, requiring Western dress in parts of Kabul and elsewhere, discouraging the veiling and seclusion of women, abolishing slavery and forced labor, introducing secular education (for girls as well as boys); adult education classes and educating nomads. His economic reforms included restructuring, reorganizing, and rationalizing the entire tax structure, antismuggling and anticorruption campaigns, a livestock census for taxation purposes, the first budget (in 1922), implementing the metric system (which did not take hold), establishing the Bank-i-Melli (National Bank) in 1928, and introducing the afghani as the new unit of currency in 1923. The political and judicial reforms Amanuallah proposed were equally radical for the time and included the creation of Afghanistan's first constitution (in 1923), the guarantee of civil rights (first by decree and later constitutionally), national registration and identity cards for the citizenry, the establishment of a legislative assembly, a court system to enforce new secular penal, civil, and commercial codes, prohibition of blood money, and abolition of subsidies and privileges for tribal chiefs and the royal family. Although sharia (Islamic law) was to be the residual source of law, it regained prominence after the Khost rebellion of 1923-24. Religious leaders, who had gained influence under Habibullah Khan, were unhappy with Amanullah's extensive religious reforms. Conventional wisdom holds that the tribal revolt that overthrew Amanullah grew out of opposition to his reform program, although those people most affected by his reforms were urban dwellers not universally opposed to his policies, rather than the tribes. Nevertheless, the king had managed to alienate religious leaders and army members.

The unraveling began, however, when Shinwari Pashtun tribesmen revolted in Jalalabad in November 1928. When tribal forces advanced on the capital, many of the king's troops deserted. Amanullah faced another threat as well: in addition to the Pashtun tribes, forces led by a Tajik tribesman were moving toward Kabul from the north. In January 1929, Amanullah abdicated the throne to his oldest brother, Inayatullah, who ruled for only three days before escaping into exile in India. Amanullah's efforts to recover power by leading a small, illequipped force toward Kabul failed. The deposed king crossed the border into India and went into exile in Italy. He remained in exile in Switzerland until his death. He died in 1960, and was buried in Jalalabad, near his father's tomb.

Habibullah Kalakani January-October 1929

The man who seized Kabul from the faltering hands of Amanullah was a Tajik tribesman from Kala Khan (a village about 30 kilometers north of Kabul), whom historians usually describe as a Tajik bandit. The new Afghan ruler called himself Habibullah Khan, but he was called by others Bacha-i Saqqao (Son of the Water Carrier). A deserter from the Afghan army, he had worked in Peshawar as a tea seller and then served 11 months in prison for housebreaking. He had participated in the Khost rebellion of 1924 and then had become a highwayman. Although Bacha-i Saqqao robbed Afghan officials and the wealthy, he was generous to the poor. His attack on Kabul was shrewdly timed, following the Shinwari Rebellion and the defection of much of the army. Habibullah was probably the first Tajik to rule in the area since before the coming of the Greeks, with the possible exception of the brief Ghorid Dynasty of the twelfth century. Little is written of his nine-month reign, but most historians agree that he could not have held power for very long under any condition. None of the powerful Pashtun tribeseven the Ghilzai, who in the beginning had supported him against Amanullah-would long tolerate rule by a nonPashtun. When Amanullah's last feeble effort to regain his throne failed, the clearest contenders for the throne were the Musahiban brothers, who were also Muhammadzai Barakzai and whose great-grandfather was an older brother of the great nineteenth-century ruler, Dost Mohammad. There were five prominent Musabihan brothers. Nadir Khan, the eldest, had been Amanullah's minister of war until he left office in dissent over Amanullah's military and domestic reforms. Although it has generally been believed that the British had a hand in the overthrow of Amanullah and in the accession to power of Nadir, such scholars as Louis Dupree, FraserTytler, and Poullada concur that the British did not bring down Amanullah and that while the British hoped that the Musahiban brothers would establish control, they tried to maintain some degree of neutrality in the contest. FraserTytler derides the rules established by the British for dealing with this situation as "a mixture of the rules of cricket and football." The brothers were permitted to cross through the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to go into Afghanistan to take up arms. Once on the other side, however, they were not to be permitted to go back and forth across the border to use British territory as sanctuary, nor were they allowed to gather a tribal army on the British side of the Durand Line. The restrictions were successfully ignored by the Musahiban brothers and the tribes.

After being thrown back several times, Nadir and his brothers finally raised a sufficiently large force (mostly from the British side of the Durand Line) and took Kabul on October 10, 1929. Six days later the eldest of the Musahiban brothers was proclaimed King Nadir Shah. The Tajik Habibullah fled Kabul, was captured in Kohistan, and was executed on November 3, 1929, despite promises of reprieve.

How did Nadir accede the throne? Translated by Maliha Fazel Zafar written by Sayed Qasim Reshtia The accession of Nadir to the throne and the fall of all the others in the struggle against Habibullah Kalakani, were not accidental. The British imperialist government planned it all. The British had taken a certain number of weak-willed people under special patronage. Among those Nadir was the desirable candidate to the throne of Afghanistan. The plan was conceived at an early date. We can find its origin a century earlier in the days of the Peshawar Sardars such as Sultan Mohammad Khan Telai, the great grand father of Nadir. He had links with the British, and then his sons, Yahya Khan and Zikria Khan, followed the path. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War they struggled on the British side. After the above-mentioned Sardars the underhand activities continued by their sons: Sardar Mohammad Asif Khan and Sardar Mohammad Yousof Khan, private advisors to Amir Habibullah Khan, son of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Finally Nadir and his brothers and cousins took up the task. They received training at Dehradun in India from the British and were kept there until circumstances became favourable in Kabul for their appearance. This was at the end of the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan. By that time the British became sure of the fall of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the IRON AMIR, and the mentioned family was sent back to Afghanistan. So it was the British who enabled the family influence the successor of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Thus, according to the British plan, the work ran on smoothly. The beautiful daughter of Sardar Mohammad Yousof Khan was engaged to the new king. The engagement smoothened the path for the activities of all the members of that family in influencing sate affairs. Each one received a suitable position at the royal court, according to their field of training, and according to their ages.

The older Sardars, like Mohammad Asif Khan and Mohammad Yousof Khan, were appointed as special companions of the king. Sardar Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, who was a soldier in the mounted unit of the British army, received the position of military attaché; Sardar Fatih Mohammad Khan Zikria became the magistrate and Sardar Mohammad Aziz Khan was appointed as cultural attaché. Sardar Mohammad Nadir Khan who was in the British artillery was awarded the position of Brigadier at the royal guard. Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan and Sardar Shah Wali Khan respectively got the military positions of (Sir Soru and Sir Mir Espor). Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan Asifi received the military position of Sir Mir Espor, and Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan was appointed military chief of Parwanaha Thus, those were the important ranks held by that trained family in the military and civil service. Until the end of the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan, they regularly received promotions. In that order Mohammad Sulaiman Khan became the governor of Herat and

Sardar Shir Ahmad Khan Zikria, who also was in the British army, was appointed military attaché. But, the one who was the focus of the British attention was Nadir. Nadir very soon secured the position of General and as then promoted to the position of General Commander. In the beginning of the First World War, The British actually prepared the plan of the Mangal rebellion in 1913. The British wanted to compel the Amir to resist the enlightened, who wanted Afghanistan to assume an anti-British posture. A revolt was engineered at Mangal and Nadir suppressed it. The revolt was staged merely for Nadir to enhance his reputation. In the beginning of the World War, ostensibly, Afghanistan declared a policy of neutrality. The royal aides made sure the king would not act against the British policy and interests. When the war entered into its second year, a joint delegation of Turks and Germans came to Kabul. To appease public opinion, and due to presence of the representative of the Ottoman Sultan in the delegation, the Amir saw it fit and welcomed them. According to a declassified document of the British Government, the Sardars assured the agents of the British Government, Hafiz Saifullah, that they should not be concerned about the arrival of the delegation. It was only for the sake and satisfaction of the group, which favoured the country’s entrance into the war. Consequently the delegation of Turks and Germans headed by Raja Mahendra Partab, who led the Indian liberals, and its members, Von Niedermeiyer and Von Hentag who were German soldiers, and Kazem Beg the representative of the Sultan of Turk, left Kabul after six months with empty hands. Thus the foreign policy of Afghanistan until the end of the war remained as the British desired. They deceived the Afghans with vague promise of recognizing their independence, and kept them hoping so until one year after the war. The people of Afghanistan were plagued during the war with various problems, like recession and lacking necessary imported commodities, laying of heavier taxes for strengthening the defensive capability of the country. The enlightened of Afghanistan were afraid to miss the opportunity created by the defeated a number of the great imperialist powers, the disunity and weakness of the remaining powers, including the victorious states, as well as the workers’ revolution and liberal movements in countries around Afghanistan. They started to act immediately. As a result, in a matter of a few dramatic days, the struggles of the conservative and reactionary groups were failed. The enlightened liberal group under Amanullah Khan came into power. It was the first time that the British initiative failed here in Afghanistan. The new leader not only refused to accept all the agreements earlier signed with the British, but wanted her to recognize the independence of Afghanistan. In the face of the hesitation of the British who pinned their hopes on the activities of their protégés the Afghans were compelled to resort to arms. Thus the third Anglo-Afghan War, known in Afghan history as the war of Independence, was started. The war begun by the will power and action of the people of Afghanistan, with coordination of all class to banish the shameful influence of foreigners. People came from all sides of the country and voluntarily took part in the war of Independence. They hoisted the flag of war and moved toward the enemies’ frontier. Along with using arms, the vast and influential publicity was continued through the India frontier as well as in India. The mentioned aspects and means compelled the British government to stop her rigid policy toward Afghanistan. Before the rise of the people in the free frontier and the Indian people who were interested in Afghanistan, the British became ready to negotiate and compromise. The British army had all the facilities which the Afghans lacked, but in spite of that, the Afghans inflicted heavy losses to the enemy on all the battlegrounds of Afghanistan. Sustaining heavy losses and sacrifices, the Afghans got their independence. The British, after spending forty years at this land, under the Rawalpindi agreement of Assad 28, 1298 (August 17, 1919), officially recognized and declared Afghanistan independent. In spite of those victories, the British imperialists were still attempting to ruin our victorious national plans. The British protégés here were activated to serve this end. One of their objectives was the return of the “Musahiban (Companion) family” to the summit of power. Although the mentioned family, during the struggle of Amanullah Khan with his opposition, sided with the opposition to Amanullah Khan, but after Amanullah Khan’s victory incredibly took the enlightened nationalists’ side. Not only were they acquitted, but their titles and privileges were also restored. However, those privileges did not suffice them, so Nadir

volunteered to lead the army in one of the most sensitive battlegrounds, the Southern front. Since Amanullah was in a sensitive position at the time, therefore, he welcomed Nadir’s gesture. Nadir as well as his two brothers, Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud, were appointed by Amanullah Khan as head of the army divisions and departed for Paktia. It is worth mentioning that the main strategy of the Afghan army previously sent to the Eastern and Western (Kandahar) battle grounds, and the southern field considered by the British a secondary and defensive field because of no transportation roads and the regional problems and did not send there the new strategy. Vice-versa, in connection of disturbances at the provinces and its favour from Afghanistan, they compelled to disarm the militia of the provinces. Thus the forward military divisions at the Afghanistan boundary like Wana, Tandi, Saratochi, and Speen Wam became vacant. Instead, the Indian army, under the British officers, occupied a number of important divisions like Miran, Razmak and Fort Sundiman. Accordingly Nadir and his brothers by provincial cooperation which formed the front power, passed through the Durand Line. Without facing any difficulty and resistance of the enemy, captured the unoccupied forts, which the British let them capture and occupy. After Nadir fulfilled the mentioned activities, the first British reinforcements under General Dyer arrived at the field. Before starting to fight, both sides in the war received orders to cease-fire. And each side, according to the instruction of their countries, drew back their forces about ten miles. About Nadir and his brothers’ victory, the foreign authors have one opinion that concerning their title, warrior and the conqueror of Kabul, it could not be considered completely accidental. Because, without taking part in a real battle, they received the mentioned titles. Since Amanullah Khan was looking for a symbol for the remembrance of the independence war therefore, he made the mistake and instructed to build a monument in which the name of the mentioned personalities, instead of the names of the martyrs who bravely lost their lives for their land, was inscribed. On the other hand Nadir with his family always were relying on that historical error and counted all the honour and glories connected to the war to their credits. Even the “Taq-e-Zafar (Arch of Victory)” At Paghman, and the monument of Unknown Soldier, nearly for a half century was completely forgotten. And in place of those historical monuments, the foreign quests and the ambassadors had to lay wreaths on their family cemetery as the commemorative place. So far Amanullah Khan was not completely aware of the inauspicious purposes and selfish plans of Nadir, therefore in his return from Paktia he was appointed as the minister of war. Moreover the opportunity was given to Nadir to travel and visit all over Afghanistan as the first minister and contacted with the people. It was part of the plan of Nadir and his Masters. At the Eastern province in 1920, he gathered the people for a provincial meeting, there to the “Maliks” and “Mullahs” he presented robes of honour and arranged for them the colonial salary. A year later, he started to visit the northern province. Then from Qatarghan, he visited the boundary of Russia and built relationships with contradictories of that country. His treatment nearly spoiled the relation between the two countries. Because of Nadir’s adventurous and stubborn activities, Amanullah Khan was compelled to go there to advise them. Therefore, he himself left Kabul on horseback and went to Panjshir and passed the Khawak Pass. There he punished Nadir and told him to come back to Kabul. During the peace negotiations with the British government in Kabul, in which Nadir participated and indulged self-serving interventions under arising Afghan national interests and dignity, just to get along with the British. The British government wanted Nadir to influence the Afghans not to certify and approve the friendly agreement of cooperation with Russia; in that case the British would supply financial aid to Afghanistan. This is mentioned in the declassified documents of the British, as well as in the book Fire in Afghanistan by American writer Rhea Talley Stewart. Since Nadir resisted on the matter very seriously, therefore, Abdul Hadi Dawi called him at the meeting by the name of perfidious and treacherous, and Mahmud Tarzi interfered and settled down the dispute. The peace agreement was signed with the British as the British required and planned it before. It was at that time that Amanullah Khan became suspicious about Nadir’s incantations. When Nadir held the position of War Minister and the General Commander of all forces of Afghanistan, the Mangal rebellion was started and he excused himself from going to Mangal.

Because Nadir was aware of what was going on in the back of the scene and what was his purposes. Again in another meeting of the cabinet between Nadir and the other members an argument was started about how to face the revolt. Nadir was opposed to use of force and wanted to accept the demands of the rebels. He meant that the fundamental reforms for the state should be put aside. There Nadir remained in the minority and became compelled to resign. It was at that time that Amanullah Khan understood his schemes and considered his staying unnecessary in Kabul. So, Nadir was appointed as the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Paris and brother Hashim was sent to Moscow as the cultural attaché. Both of the brothers considered the mentioned appointments as exile. Thus, after those appointments they rendered their relations with the British closer. Eventually, Nadir before leaving Kabul met in person with the British Ambassador, Humphreys, at his office. During the mentioned meeting, which is written in the declassified document of the British, Nadir promised to follow whatever role would be given to him by the British. In Paris, he was always in contact with he British Ambassador. According to the declassified documents of the British, Hashim Khan was also in contact with the British ambassador in Moscow and openly with him slandered Amanullah Khan. He was always saying to the Ambassador that Nadir was the suitable and best candidate for the state of Afghanistan. Moreover, he became ready to hand all the secret materials related to Afghanistan and Russia’s relations to the British government. And for preparing the copies Faqir Ahmad Panjshiri, the first secretary of the embassy, who was the real patriot, quarrelled with Hashim. Since Hashim Khan persisted to get the copies of the related correspondence, therefore, Faqir Ahmad Panjshiri became compelled to fire at him. The rumour of their quarrel reached Kabul, and as a result Hashim Khan was dismissed from his position. Nadir, who was in charge of the running of the plan against Amanullah Khan, because of the dismissing of his brother got angry and pretended that he was sick, and resigned. Thus, the two brothers bought a villa in the south of France in a remote corner named Garas. Far from the sight of the foreigners and according to the instruction of their masters became busy to work on the plan. Soon, Shah Wali Khan who was promoted to the rank of Vice-General Commander of the Army pretended to visit his elder brother, but defected and joined them in France. But Shah Mahmud Khan remained in Afghanistan as the centre for their contact. Shah Mahmud Khan was in an important position, Governor of Mashriqi (Eastern Provinces), and was able to prepare easily the contact with the interior provinces as well as with the free frontier people. With British advice and with the assistance of a number of authoritative people including the Sardars and the religious figures and high ranking personnel, Nadir proposed a plan connected to the fall of the progressive regime of Amanullah Khan with the help of the imperialist organization and the local backward-looking. The mentioned proposal has been cited in the declassified document of the British government by the name of “Patyala Plot,” Patyala is a place at Dayra Ismail Khan, and the plan was authored there. The plot called for a coup d'état in Afghanistan when Amanullah Khan was leaving for his European visit. Accordingly Mohammad Wali Khan and the Party of Jadid Khiyalan (Modern Visionaries) should be captured and the power should be transferred to the followers of Nadir. Then by request Nadir should return to Afghanistan to assume authority as the king of Afghanistan. Moreover, the help of the provincial people and the cooperation of military were quiet significant in carrying out the coup d'état. Some of the provincial governors were in the group of coup d'état. Some of the provincial governors were in the coup d'état as well. The date and agenda of the Patyala meeting which was helped in presence of the prominent banished religious and other provincial personalities, especially the leaders of the nomad tribes, the names of people who colluded with them in Kabul, Jalalabad, Khost, and Kandahar with their messengers all were written in the official reports of the British agents. Moreover, in the 23rd issue of the Tarjuman-i-Sarhad (The Frontier Interpreter) dated February 1928, all their names were also documented. But it is certain that the centre of real activity was Jalalabad. The person who played a pivotal role in the plot was Shah Mahmud Khan, the High Governor of Mashriqi (Eastern Province), who was in the meantime the contact man of the plotters, Nadir and his brothers who were in southern France.

The importance of the Patyala plot was so great that in spite of the information which was received continuously by different means through the British Charge D’Affairs in Kabul, the British asked the Indian government by a telegram on February 28, that they should be informed about all the affairs of the plot, and the related correspondence should be sent to London. It was a few days before the appointed date, March 8, 1928, for the coup d'état. Very soon before the formal visit of Amanullah Khan to London, and in spite of all efforts of the forces opposed to Amanullah Khan to conceal the matter, the Afghanistan government discovered the plot. The one who actually unfolded the secret was Abdul Aziz Khan Barakzai, Minister of War and Second Deputy for Amanullah Khan. The plot makers trusted him because of his conservative inclinations, and his loyalty to the mentioned banished clergy and let him in the secrets of the plot. They revealed more and more secret messages o him and his brother Abdul Hakim Khan, High Governor of Southern Province. As a result of Abdul Aziz Khan Barakzai, who was faithful to Amanullah Khan, and then spent of his life in the prison of Nadir. He was the one who informed Amanullah Khan about what was going on his behalf in Kabul. In reply, Amanullah Khan instructed him that before missing the time he should consult with Mohammad Wali Khan and other cabinet members to take the necessary actions to foil the plot. During this time, Shah Mahmud Khan was busy arranging the final organization for his provincial visit and also did propaganda against Amanullah Khan and in favour of his brother, Nadir. He was dismissed by Mir Hashim Khan, Minister of Finance, was sent back to Kabul. The other personalities related to the plot, were dismissed from their positions or were detained. Moreover, Mohammad Wali Khan handed a notice to the British Charge D’Affairs to get out the mentioned clergy from the Frontier immediately. Thus, the Patyala plot failed to materialize, and Nadir’s bid to the throne failed this time. Still, work on the basis of the plan was continued. Only its date and its process were put under review and study of the British imperialists in light of their experience and the recent developments. At the end of this article, there are detailed studies drawing on official documents and creditable sources. Before going into details, it is wise to explain the Master plan of the intelligence service. I would like to reveal here a very novel and skilful action of Nadir to reach his goal: He met with Amanullah Khan in France, during his European visit. After complaining he expressed that a number of undesirable personalities have circled the king. If the king would remove them and grant the authority to him, he would be ready to go back to Afghanistan with his brothers. By that proposal he had in mind that he would be able to run the plan of the coup d'état. From within the country much more easily and without the fear of failure. Then he would be able to assume power in Afghanistan. Since Amanullah Khan was informed from the events running on in Afghanistan, he did not accept the bets on Nadir’s conditions. He replied to Nadir that he and his brother like any other Afghans have the citizenship of Afghanistan. So, whenever they wanted they could go to their homeland. This was the result of their meeting. After that unsuccessful coup d'état, the British directly handled the activities themselves and embarked upon a complicated plan with several stages, step by step. According to documents and other credible sources, the plan to depose King Amanullah Khan and to fail all the plans of Amanullah Khan were prepared ahead of time, two years earlier, by the imperialist power and the internal backward-looking. When Amanullah Khan announced the details of his European visit, and added the name of the two countries, Turkey and Russia, on his itinerary the idea became mature in the Indian British political circles. In spite of that, the experts of Afghanistan affairs in Delhi and London were waiting hopefully to cancel his visit when he was passing from Indian transit to other than altering his intention to visit those two countries with whose policies differed with those of the British and the revolutionary regime in London. That is why Amanullah Khan was accorded a greater welcome than any other king who previously had visited Britain.

Economic and transportation assistance including building of the railway line between Peshawar and Kabul, and even to construct an arms factory were proposed to Amanullah Khan by the British government. As it is the method of the imperialist states to help with one hand and to dispose with the other, they managed the fall of Amanullah Khan’s government. British agents were instructed that in case Amanullah Khan insisted upon his plan, they should start their activities for the fall of his regime. Thus, according to the official document of Indian government, Sheikh Mahbub Ali, the eastern desk secretary at the British Embassy in Kabul, was responsible to gather the information and received for that purpose a monthly salary of six thousand Indian rupees, considerable amount in those days, to maintain contact with the backward-looking and the opposition to Amanullah Khan. He was responsible to ensure their cooperation for the coming activities. The British Consulate in Jalalabad and Kandahar worked under Sheikh Mahbub Ali for the mentioned purpose. Nonetheless, the duty f Jahangir Khan, Consul at Jalalabad, was much more important and sensitive. Chapman and Baker’s book Wings over Kabul mentions in detail Jahangir Khan played a very important role during the revolt. According to the test of the official reports of the British government, especially document Number F.51, 1928; a number of authoritative Afghans were contemplating to pave the ground for the future activity. One of them was Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, the High Governor of the Eastern Province, and the other one was Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan, former Governor of Kandahar, and the third one was Sardar Faiz Mohammad Khan Zikria, Minister of Education, who were in contact with the prominent religious figures banished to Dehradun, India. Since Amanullah Khan refused to accept the proposal of the British government not to visit Russia, the British forged the news about disturbances in Afghanistan and let Amanullah Khan become aware of the news through the press. Humphreys, who accompanied the king as his host, tried to influence the other members of the delegation like Sardar Shir Ahmad Zikria, President of the Parliament, to make the king drop Russia from his itinerary. In spite of all the efforts and struggles, Amanullah Khan did not change his mind and followed his trip according to the arranged program. In particularly, after the visit of Amanullah Khan to Moscow and the warm and sincere welcome he received, and the agreement on air transportation between Tashkent and Kabul caused the British authorities to engineer the fall of Amanullah Khan, planned originally for a year later in time. The related personnel of the India government were authorized to follow and launch the British plan. Although it seemed as if peacetime prevailed in Afghanistan and Mohammad Wali Khan looked after the state affairs on the behalf of Amanullah Khan, news from the Easters and Southern Frontiers revealed secret activities. One of these involved a number of known thieves and robbers at the Frontiers area who used to move between Peshawar and Parachenar. Moreover, poisonous propaganda against the king frequently was perpetuated by different sources in the country. Furthermore, photos of the king and queen dressed in European styles in receptions and functions at various countries of Europe were distributed among the people y unknown sources. Seeing photos of Queen Soraya without the “burka” was unacceptable and strange for conservatives and for the hypocritical religious people. British agnets such as Mullah Lang of Paktia and the brothers Sadiq and Mian Hazrat Mojadidi of Shor Bazaar. The pictures were copied from the cover of the Illustrated London News magazine’s special issue and dispatched to Afghanistan by aide of the mentioned clergy. It is worth mentioning that during Amanullah Khan’s visit, the news which were disseminated about the riots in Afghanistan to some extend were true. In spite of that Mohammad Wali Khan and his compatriots were thought to be in full control. Therefore, Amanullah Khan was assured by cable, of complete peace in the country, and they themselves adopted precautionary measures. As noted in the declassified documents of the India government, Mohammad Wali Khan, deputy for the kingdom, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, summoned the Charge D’Affairs, B.J.

Gold, of the British Embassy in Kabul on January 21, 1928 and told him, “since relations’ between the two countries are getting better now than any other time in the past and also His Majesty the King will soon visit England, so it would be necessary that you should try not to allow any erroneous action to be taken from here. You know that in India some people including the clergy who oppose the policy of the government of Afghanistan indulge in activities and propaganda, inconsistent with the friendly relations of the two countries. These are notorious people and criminals who have escaped to India. It would be wise, if you could hand them over to us, or you could keep them there under surveillance.” In addition, Mohammad Wali Khan showed B.J. Gold, the clipping of the Indian papers, which exposed the activities of the mentioned clergy, and the facilities offered them by the personnel of the Indian government. Mohammad Wali Khan handed him a list of the names, which contained the names of Habibullah Kalakani (whom Nadir personally named as Bacha-iSaqao), Sayed Hussain Charikari, Azam Maidani, and a number of others. The British Charge D’Affairs without losing any time passed the information to Indian government. Accordingly the political agent of Baluchistan, Major Scott, on June 28, 1928 reported that the mentioned clergy were transferred to Lahore. Then because of the second reference of the government of Afghanistan he was sent to southern India. According to the declassified documents of the Indian government in so far the thieves and robbers were concerned, the provincial government of the Frontier was let by the central government of India to shed light on the problem. Thus, informed them about the visit of the two thieves, Habibullah Kalakani and Azam Maidani, to Peshawar. It was mentioned in the text of the telegram Number 78 dated February 17, 1928 of the provincial government of Frontier, which is preserved as document number F.68, of the Foreign Affairs at the National Archive of India, that Habibullah and Azam were imprisoned in Peshawar in January. The sentence of their imprisonment was issued out according to article 40th of the criminal regulations for committing robbery and theft at the bazaar of Parachenar. But the court for deferment of their imprisonment asked that each one of them should pay three thousand rupees in bail. Both paid the mentioned amount through a citizen in Kurm. Nonetheless, the court did not accept that for the sentence was issued at Peshawar and the person who guaranteed should be from the same state. Thus, their cash guarantee was restored by the court and both of them sentenced each to two years of imprisonment according to article 41 of the mentioned regulations. The British Charge D’Affairs, B.J. Gold, in Kabul let Mohammad Wali Khan know of the matter. Gold assured Wali Khan that Sayed Hussain and his comrades had left the area of the Frontier and had already returned to Afghanistan before the action of the British government. Thus, Habibullah Kalakani and his friend Azam Maidani were in the Peshawar prison in April 1928 (Saur 1307). And the duration of their imprisonment was for three years. However, strangely, three months after the mentioned date in Asad 1307, Habibullah Kalakani was seen in Paghman busy with acts of robbery and murder. Before explaining this, the point is worth mentioning that Habibullah Kalakani who was sentenced to three years imprisonment and the matter was communicated to the Afghanistan government. Still, after giving the information to the Afghanistan government, immediately all the files of Kalakani were closed by the provincial government and nothing was added to this file after that. But about his cell friend let us make a note of following by the Higher Commissioner of Peshawar: “Francis Humphrey, the British Envoy in Kabul, returned to Peshawar on March 2, 1929 and told me, ‘Habibullah the Amir of Kabul asked me at a farewell meeting that if his cell friend, Azam Maidani with Mohammad Aslam and two others be free from the prison of Peshawar.’ Since their imprisonment took place because of the request of the government of Amanullah Khan, therefore, it is unreasonable to keep them in prison. Thus, because of the request of the new Amir of Kabul and the agreement of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the government of India, Dahis Beri, the mentioned robbers were freed on April 5, 1929 and were sent from the Frontier area to Afghanistan.”

It was mentioned by Habibullah, the real hero of the story, himself at various meetings in Kabul in the months of Saratan and Asad. He killed a man by the name of Abdul Qadir in Paghman for five thousand afghanis and a rifle. Moreover, he expressed with pride that he was walking in Paghman’s public garden one day where Amanullah Khan was playing ball with a few others. He wanted to shot him with the mentioned rifle but he took pity on his youth. Otherwise, he said, there and then he could accede to the throne and would become king in place of Amanullah Khan. You could see that Habibullah Kalakani in spite of being at the prison was free and walking around the capital here and there in Summer 1928 (1307) corresponding to the time of returning of Amanullah Khan from Europe, and committing robbery and killing people. Then he spent all his time in Kohdaman and Kohistan to lead a group of robbers and thieves until his attack upon Kabul. His name and his fabulous and curious deeds once in a while were published in the home papers as well as in the foreign papers. One of his deeds was the murder of Ghulam Ghaus Khan, the Governor of Charikar, in broad daylight inside the bazaar of Charikar. Its news was published in the paper of Aman-i-Afghan with the two names Habibullah Kalakani and Sayed Hussain. By that time Habibullah had gained enough popularity and skill to carry out the greater roles of the play, the fall of the government of Amanullah Khan and ending his reforms programmes including by the British imperialist Master plan with cooperation of the local backward-looking and followed skilfully and step by step. As said earlier the play was ready to be enacted and all the actors had occupied their roles but an expert and experienced director need to lead the cast. For the performing of that difficult and sensitive role the famous Colonel Lawrence of Arabia who passed another examination ten years ago in Saudi Arabia and gained enough experience and international fame was seen to be the suitable candidate. At that time Lawrence was at home because he resigned when his opinions in relation to the secession of Syria and Lebanon for the assigned prince Amir Faisal, the second son of Sharif Hussain were rejected because of the insistence of the French government. Both came under the mandate of France and out of the British guardianship. Again he was employed by his government to start his activities in another part of the globe. But his role here in Afghanistan in comparison with Arabia was just opposite to each other; there in Arabia he should stimulate the sense of nationalism between Arabs and them to arise against the 400-year rule of the Ottoman Turks. Here in Afghanistan, he should stimulate the sense of the people of Afghanistan against the regime of the king, Amanullah Khan, and enlightened monarch. Still, so far in his field of activities in both places was of the same type. His actual and main problem in Afghanistan was to know the people and their characteristics and to learn their language which required him a certain period of time. Therefore, according to the approval of Stanley Baldwin, the conservative Prime Minister of Britain in 1926, Lawrence employed by the British Royal Air Force without receiving technical education in the field. After receiving primary training in 1927, he was transferred to India. He spent some time working as an airplane technician. As his real job was a thorough and general study of the Afghans and Afghanistan as well as to learn Pashtu and Urdu, on the other hand he was a language specialist. Therefore, during one year he became able to receive all the necessary information. As it was mentioned in Wings over Afghanistan by the Air Marshall of Britain Chapman that when Amanullah Khan was passing through India for his European visit in December 1928, Irman Shah arrived at the Frontier area and began his activities. At that time he was also the airplane technician at Miran Shah Airport in the Waziristan Province. Both the Indian and the British governments tried to keep secret the identification and his residence and succeeded in that for about two years. During that time Irman Shah by using his rare free time used to go to the Frontier area even inside Afghanistan territory to study the land and meet certain individuals. Irman Shah continued his activities until Amanullah Khan returned after his six-month visit to the three continents. So, it was time for the British to announce the beginning of their activities.

At that time the Master plan of the British was completed, approved, and considered through the complicated channels of Indian government in Delhi and by the high authorities of the British government. Moreover, each of the actors for the play was placed in his right position and was ready to start it. In the activities, Sir Francis Humphreys, the British Ambassador in Kabul was the main and actual contact of Colonel Lawrence. Both of them during the First World War were working at the battleground in Egypt and knew each other very well. The duo here started their activities to run the Master plan with the difference that Lawrence ran all his activities in clandestine but Humphreys worked partly in covert and sometimes overtly. So far as their authorities are concerned they were allowed as much money as required and to act without following administration procedures with any high-ranking Indian government and even at any part of the British Empire. As I, Sayed Qasim Reshtia, myself witnessed the incidents during rebellion days, actually the declassified documents of the British government in London or Delhi which are accessible to the researchers and to the interested people shed light on each part episode by episode, the light some time shows the incidents very clearly and sometimes one could get a picture of them from the meaning of the context. In most parts the role of Lawrence and the intelligence service is quite clear and helps one to know the cause and actions of the reactionary revolution of 1307, and its main characteristics. It is true that Habibullah Kalakani and Sayed Hussain Charikari took the oath and by the guarantee of a great local clergy became free and handed enough money and arms by the government to leave for the Mashriqi Province, but then they changed that skilfully and started toward Kabul. Suddenly on the 23rd of Qaus, 1307 they attacked Kabul. But the military students who were busy practicing around Kolola Pushta and Sharara held back their advances and did not let them march toward the Palace. Since their attack was unexpected and the capital had no preparation for it, therefore, it took several days to get them out from the city. But after a month’s struggle, they got the upper hand because a stronger leader, Sir Francis Humphreys, the British Ambassador, backed them. As mentioned in the notes of Humphreys’ Special Secretary named Bust and Mrs. Humphreys, Habibullah Kalakani after the attack when entered Kabul directly went to the British Embassy in Kabul and introduced himself to Humphreys from behind the gate entrance and explained that his purpose was the fall of Amanullah Khan. Then they started talking in the Dari language and it was their first meeting, which followed then by detailed meetings in the future. After than Humphreys’ policy changed completely toward the government of Afghanistan. He, without the permission of the government of Afghanistan, asked for a plane from his government to come to Kabul and fly over the British Embassy and over the city as well. That plane used to distribute the menacing flyers against the dignity and prestige of Afghans. In those flyers, Afghans were called in a sarcastic way: “O, brave and religious people of Afghanistan” then warning them “if in case a British national might receive a hurt here, the government of Britain would take revenge.” That direct address to the people of the people of Afghanistan was against international law and opposite to the independence and national domination of Afghanistan. Moreover, the British Embassy brought by plane a telegraph machine but without the permission of the government of Afghanistan, which was installed at the embassy to contact India directly, and it was against the treaty of 1921. Still that did not suffice them, so in reply to a courteous notice of the Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan which expressed regret for some unintentional damages brought to the British Embassy during the war expressed wit harshness and far from grace that the British reaction in the matter would be reciprocal. The text of that reply which was against diplomatic relations is contained in the book Wings over Kabul. It is quite natural that those irritating acts were intolerable for Afghans, even though because of the sensibility of the circumstances and according to the recommendations of Amanullah Khan’s advisors he refrained from direction reaction. Until two connected incidents occurred

in Kabul and remained no possibility to keep silent. Therefore, the opposition between the countries became manifest. One of these incidents was the discovery of Mahmud Sami’s correspondences with the British agents and who handed them very detailed reports about the military, number of soldiers, quality and quantity of arms, the kind of arsenal and other arms equipments. Although the relations of Mahmud Sami with the British was known earlier to the others but the king himself resisted that he was his classmate at the military school and considered him as a loyal friend. Here it is worth mentioning that the published declassified documents of the British clearly pointed out to the nightly meetings of Mahmud Sami and Sir Henry Dubs, Head of the British Delegation in Kabul. It was mentioned in the reports that of Mr. Dubs to his government that it was Mahmud Sami who persuaded Amanullah Khan to act against the opinion of Mahmud Tarzi, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. As a result, Amanullah Khan intervened in the matter of Central Asia against the interests of the USSR. That dangerous and unessential intervention took place and ended with the slaying of Anwar Pasha in Bokhara. Again the relation between Afghanistan and USSR became friendly. The discovery of documents and the knowing of communicator, Rahmatullah Khan, an attendant at the British Embassy who later during the reign of Habibullah Kalakani became guard of the embassy. Between both sources, Mahmud Sami and Humphreys became evident. So, Amanullah Khan disposed Mahmud Sami and kept him under house arrest. The matter was sent to the military court and because of the occurring incidents the order about Sami was not executed. Also, at the military court other documents were presented and showed that during the days of Habibullah Kalakani’s attack Mahmud Sami pretended to have an illness and stayed home. He purposely postponed all the immediate works and the urgent orders for days. Finally, as a result of the complaint of the military heads at the battlegrounds, it became evident that by his order, the arsenal were sent to the battlegrounds one kind of arm instead of the one which was needed and caused the failure of the army and brought them heavy losses. When Habibullah Kalakani acceded the throne, Mahmud Sami became his advisor and remained in his position until the last day of his rule that could be counted for his collaboration with the British imperialists. During the days of Kabul’s crisis, a network of British spies were discovered inside the palace whose main operators were Madam See, the tutor of the royal family, and Tasaduq Ali, the king’s driver. They informed nearly every day the British Embassy of what happened in the palace. According to declassified documents, Madam See herself wrote most of the mentioned reports. She was a Romanian emigrant and a citizen of France. It is strange that she suddenly disappeared while holding secret inquires and on the next day she appeared between children and women of the British diplomats who were leaving Kabul for England. One the same day, Tasaduq Ali was found killed inside his car. It is very surprising that after passing three days from his murder the British Embassy handed a petition by the family of Tasaduq Ali to the Afghanistan government. Then though an official note asked from the government of Afghanistan to shed light on his death. IT should be mentioned that Tasaduq Ali was an Indian by birth but he lived in Afghanistan since the time of Amir Habibullah Khan in Kabul’s Deh Afghanan District. He was employed by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Court and he had the citizenship of Afghanistan. A tumultuous incident was the capture of another British spy, arrested at the door of the Ministry of Defence. This took place during the attack of Habibullah Kalakani at Kabul. When searching him, letters of recommendation, identity cards, and special service passports in Pashtu and Urdu as well as considerable amounts of Indian Rupees, Kaldars, a gun and bullets were found on him and his residence. This spy used to disguise himself as a frontiersman except that he had the green eyes and yellow hair of an Englishman. Thus, at first, it was thought that he might be Lawrence himself. Everyday he was seen opposite the entrance of the Ministry of Defence conversing with the people who had just been called up for military service. Because of his suspicious behaviour the responsible authorities captured him.

During the investigation, it was proved that he was a spy and the military Supreme Court sentenced him to death. Through his confessions the government of Afghanistan learned that Colonel Lawrence had been staying in the Shinwar region. The malicious interference of the British government clear from this evidence and it was therefore decided to publicize this news all over the world. A strong article with all details was published in the “Aman-i-Afghan” paper, the only publication of the state of Afghanistan. Copies of the article were sent abroad to all diplomatic missions of Afghanistan, and they were instructed to try to distribute it to the foreign press. It was first published in January 5, 1929 in the Sunday Express of London under title “Colonel T.A. Lawrence, the responsible person in sedition of Afghanistan tribes against Shah Amanullah.” On the following day, most widely read newspapers of England, France, German, and Italy had published it. After ten years’ of obscurity the name of Lawrence, who was once famous as Lawrence of Arabia, was brought back to public attention. The news caused a commotion and offered a means for the British opposition government to attack the conservative party headed by Stanley Baldwin. The press of the Soviet Union, Turkey, the Arab countries and India soon took up the matter. According to available documents, the Russian press shed light on the role of this famous, enigmatic spy of the British Empire during his stay in Arabia and later in Afghanistan. The storm of the related publicity not only created disorder on the London and Delhi political scenes but its repercussions in Afghanistan finally made Sir Francis Humphreys ask his government to recall Lawrence from the Frontier. By the time Colonel Lawrence had done his job, his Master plan for the fall of the regime of Amanullah Khan having reached its desired end. He was no longer needed in the Frontier area nor in India. As a result on January 22, 1929, Sir Austin Chamberlain, Britain’s Secretary of State, replied to questions concerning this agent of the Liberal Party. He announced that although Lawrence was an ordinary mechanic at the Miran Shah airport and had no connection wit the incidents in Afghanistan since his existence there caused anxiety for the British agent in Kabul, he had consequently been removed from there. This speech was delivered at a time when Amanullah Khan had been deposed and had left for Kandahar. Furthermore, his successor Enayatullah Khan had left the country for Peshawar on a British airplane. It was Habibullah Kalakani who now took the throne of Afghanistan following the plane of Lawrence and Humphreys. Thus, the second act ended successfully and the third one, the reign of Habibullah Kalakani began. Habibullah, as he had done during his first attack, went directly to the British Embassy to meet Sir Francis Humphreys. His supporters had taken the city and Habibullah, riding a white horse and followed by a number of horsemen stopped at the entrance of the British Embassy and asked to meet the ambassador. According to Wings Over Kabul, a British pilot, Donaldson who was in Kabul in those days stated that the ambassador came out alone and went directly toward Habibullah Kalakani. Another person introduced, as Habibllah’s cousin knew some English and helped in interpretation. They spoke in secret for a while and then Habibullah left for Bagh-i-Balah where Enayatullah, the successor of Amanullah Khan, to persuade Kalakani to accept him as king, arranged a meeting. The important meeting was that Habibullah who never had the idea to become king of Afghanistan and whose intention was only to depose Amanullah Khan and bring a suitable person to the throne according to the will of the people of Afghanistan. The result was he taking control abruptly on a new role. He not only refused to accept Enayatullah as the king of Afghanistan whose cousins, Abdul Ghafur Khan and Ghulam Mohammad Khan Tagaowi had cooperated with Habibullah. Furthermore, he also rejected the possible candidates Hazrat Mohammad Sadiq Mojadidi and Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan. Kalakani in this same

meeting declared himself as king of Afghanistan. This sudden decision astonished even his near comrades. The British plan was not only against Amanullah Khan but used Amanullah Khan as a pawn to reach their final goal with Amanullah and his progressive ideas as an effective means. If this had not happened, Afghanistan would not have become the scene of war and struggle for a period of nine months during which it suffered heavy losses, the economy ruined, and the country put back half a century. But, as mentioned earlier, the British master plan once mobilized continued rapidly toward its goal with no possibility to stop it. According to the plan Habibullah Kalakani was the buffer between the accused leader, Amanullah Khan and the new desired candidate, Nadir. It was necessary to surround the new and inexperienced player with a number of seasoned and qualified men to keep an eye on his actions. The most important and trustworthy of these people was Shirjan, Minister of Court, who had the illiterate new king completely under his control. During the reign of Amir Habibullah, Shirjan who was the companion of king, Enayatullah Khan who was originally deputy for the king, Ataulhaq Khan and Mohammad Sidiq Khan reached the highest position in short time periods. When Habibullah Kalakani came to power Shirjan was the Governor of Kohdaman, Ataulhaq was Commander of Forces, and Mohammad Sidiq Khan was the commander of the military in the southern provinces. Consequently, though Shirjan was Minister of Court, in reality he was the Prime Minister and Ataulhaq was the Foreign Minister. Mohammad Sidiq held the position of Commander-inChief of the Central Forces. Their youngest brother, Mohammad Karim was appointed Head of the Secret Police. Thus, this family actually ran the government until the fall of Habibullah. They were not in league with Habibullah’s criminal deeds, on the contrary, they tried to teach them how to behave like cultured men. The above-mentioned family was not alone. A number of other people such as Mahmud Sami (whose secret activities with the British Embassy are discussed earlier), the former commander of the Central Forces, accompanied them. Mahmud Sami besides being a Marshall was also the military advisor of Habibullah. Other men such as Sardar Shir Ahmad Zikria, Head of Inspection, and Sardar Faiz Mohammad Khan Zikria, Minister of Education during the Amani period, surrounded the throne and without having any distinctive position, their opinions and authority were felt in every aspect of government activity. IT was even more stranger that Amanullah Khan three months before his fall appointed Sardar Zikria Khan as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Since the entire cabinet member were aware of his secret relations with the British and knew him to be an experienced friend of the British, they refused to stay in his cabinet. Thus, he did not succeed in forming a cabinet. Sardar Faiz Mohammad Khan Zikria, six months before the succession of Habibullah delivered a speech in Paghman’s public garden. He called Amanullah Khan the Great Amanullah. Then to please Habibullah, he presented a play called “Fall of Indulus” which was a satire on Amanullah Khan’s supposed weak personality. It was given at the Stor Palace by the students of Lycee Estiqlal. Another comrade of Faiz Mohammad Zikria was the principal of Lycee Habibia who was then appointed Director of Education. He outwardly acted against the British but in reality was faithful to the British. For year he posed as an intellectual and liberal. During Habibullah’s reign he was the Editor of Habib-al-Islam, the only publicity organ of Habibullah. These personalities who were the authoritative figures in the administrative, military and political organization of the government of Habibullah. Lawrence’s plan through clandestine movements was to take over all candidates to the throne.

After Habibullah acceded to the throne, the first candidate for the throne was Ali Ahmad Khan who Amanullah Khan appointed President of Administration of the Eastern Provinces during the last days of his reign. Ali Ahmad Khan who for years had hopes of becoming king after arriving in Jalalabad, instead of turning the people toward Amanullah Khan declared himself to be a future candidate for the throne. When heard that Amanullah Khan had been deposed before waiting for the situation to clear, he declared himself king and with the military forces and the provincial army behind him he immediately started for Kabul. He halted at Jagdalik and from there he sent the messengers, Malik Mohammad Shah and Malik Qais, to Habibullah to declare that he was intending to take the throne. But Habibullah by giving the messengers bribes and attractive promises brought them over to his side and they returned to Jagdalik to sow discord at the camp of Ali Ahmad Khan. At this time, a British plane with a pilot (who later published his memoirs in Wings Over Kabul) and a mechanic apparently because of mechanical problems landed on the riverbed by Jagdalik. Both were brought to the military camp of Ali Ahmad Khan where they were interrogated. They were then escorted by the military up to the British Consulate in Jalalabad’s Charbagh District. With the cooperation of the British consulate contact between the British authorities in Kabul and Peshawar was made and extra equipment for the plane was brought from Peshawar by another plane. The damaged planed with its two men then left for India. But, as later incidents showed, these men had landed not because of the problems of the plane but for the purpose of contacting Ali Ahmad Khan and warning him not to attack Kabul. Since Ali Ahmad Khan loved power and authority it was too late for him to change his mind. His messengers returning from Kabul started to fight and Malik Mohammad Shah who had remained on the side of Ali Ahmad Khan was killed. The provincial armies attacked his camp and Ali Ahmad Khan was compelled to leave the country and cross by foot the open frontier to Peshawar. At Peshawar he tried to prove to the British that he was loyal to them but did not succeed. Nadir and his brothers were warmly welcomed by the British while Ali Ahmad Khan was told to leave India within three days or to return to Afghanistan at his own risk. Ali Ahmad Khan accepted to return to Afghanistan where he went to Kandahar to see Amanullah Khan, who was betrayed by his demand for the kingdom. He sought pardon for his actions against Amanullah Khan, who forgave him and before his departure appointed him Commander-inChief of all the Army which was scattered. Amanullah Khan knew that with this appointment Ali Ahmad Khan could not escape his destiny. When Ali Ahmad Khan received the new that Amanullah Khan had left the border he left the battlefield and returned to Kandahar. As was expected he declared himself king for the second time. However, Habibullah’s forces under Purdil Khan, the commander of the army, did not allow him to fulfil his desire even for a few short days.

The city of Kandahar was surrounded within twenty-four hours and the people opened the doors of the city from inside. Ali Ahmad Khan who was a refugee and concealed in a private residence in the region of Tohp Dara was captured and handed over to Habibullah’s men. They brought him back to Kabul. Habibullah knew him from the past and accused him of being a treacherous and unfaithful man. He ordered his men to parade Ali Ahmad Khan through the city of Kabul, so the people could see a traitor before he was put to death. Perhaps these were some of the unsavoury incidents, which occurred during the reign of Habibullah. No doubt these activities were aided by the old imperialists who were helped by local backward-looking against the people of Afghanistan with the aim of stopping the development of the country. The plan now enters its third and decisive stage. Amanullah with a limited number of ministers and advisors on the 24th of Jadi reached the Kandahar’s Ahmad Shahi District. He did not contact the people but waited to see what his brother had done. Enayatullah Khan had already left Kabul for India. The two brothers stood in front of the people on the veranda of Kandahar’s palace and Amanullah Khan addressed the people, “Now, it was up to the people to select him or his brother as the future king of Afghanistan.” Amanullah Khan realized that the people wanted him to be king and the people of Kandahar in spite of being dissatisfied with Amanullah Khan welcomed his proposal. Thus, Amanullah Khan announced his intention to take the throne. He set about with a number of advisors to plan for the future of his country. The plan, military, rather than political to depose Habibullah and to occupy the city of Kabul was a reasonable one: Herat accepted to be the executive centre of the forces while Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif would be the centre of action. Both forces would attack Kabul under the leadership of the king himself who was stationed in Herat. In the meantime, it was decided that Kandahar because of its location should be considered as the second strategic centre. It was also decided that for the time being, Shujal-Dawla who was Afghan Ambassador in London, the Minister of Safety, and the former administrator of Herat, should come to Herat. They were authorized to replace Mohammad Ibrahim Khan. As for the other eastern and southern provinces, the military commanders and governors were ordered to stay where they were and were not allowed to take any direct action or make any decision related to the coming preparations until Ali Ahmad Khan’s position became clear. It was also decided that the younger of Amanullah Khan, Aminjan, with a delegation should visit the Hazarajat and seek their help when Amanullah Khan was ready to attack Kabul. The Hazarajat favoured Amanullah Khan because of his righteous treatment of them, especially the abolishment of slavery. At the same time Ghulam Sidiq Khan Charkhi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sent abroad to approach friendly countries and ask for their cooperation especially for arms and military equipment. He worked through the Afghan embassies as the Ambassador-at-Large of Afghanistan. Ghulam Sidiq Khan Charkhi therefore left Herat for Moscow. According to the time and circumstances, it can be said that the plan was a comprehensive and practicable one and if it profited from previous experience, chances of its success were relatively high. But unfortunately, the British master plan neutralized any of these efforts in advance. The first reaction of the British government towards Amanullah Khan’s announcement of his return to the throne was to publish a proclamation, which stated that Amanullah Khan’s power did not extend over the entire country. Therefore, the British government refused to recognize his rule. In Wings over Kabul, the text of the proclamation written with the help of Ambassador Humphreys states: “On January 30, 1929, Sir Austin Chamberlain, the Foreign Minister, at the House of Commons relied on the mentioned proclamation to reply to Mr. Thomas’ question on the nonpartiality policy of the government toward Afghanistan. ‘The British government was officially

informed by Amanullah Khan of his dethronement. Now in spite of his dethronement, if the people of Afghanistan wanted him to be their king that is another question and up to the people of Afghanistan, but we could not recognize him as the legal figure of Afghanistan.’” A result of this proclamation was that the India government not only refused to all the arms and other military equipment bought by Amanullah Khan to cross the Indian borders, but it also stopped the export of petroleum to Afghanistan under the pretext that it could be considered a military arm. Offenders were severely punished. Not content with this and against all international postal regulations, they intercepted the diplomatic post from London addressed to Ghulam Sidiq Khan Charkhi. Instead they despatched it to Ataulhaq Khan, Habibullah’s Foreign Minister, so that he would be aware of Amanullah Khan’s activities in Kandahar and would be better able to plan his strategies against him. It is surprising that all these restrictions against Amanullah Khan were imposed only at the frontier of Kandahar. But there were no restrictions at the Torkham frontier. Thus, until the end of the reign of Amir Habibullah sufficient petroleum arrived from India to cover strategic needs on land and in the air. As a result of the one-sided British boycott during Amanullah Khan’s attack on Ghazni the military plane sent to attack him unexpectedly changed its course and joined Amanullah Khan’s forces. The pilot and its mechanic, Mohammad Omar and Mir Saifullah had both been sent abroad for training and they had nationalist feelings toward Amanullah Khan. Mir Hashim Khan, Finance Minister, persuaded them to go directly to Kandahar. They did not have enough fuel to reach Kandahar and were shot down by Habibullah’s forces. Mohammad Omar, the pilot, reached Amanullah Khan and then in his company left the country for Italy. He later returned to Afghanistan and was imprisoned by Nadir’s men. In Fire in Afghanistan, there is mention of Ghulam Sidiq Khan, the Foreign Minister, handing a note through the British Consulate in Kandahar to the British government objecting to their one-sided position. First of all, Ghulam Sidiq Khan challenged the words of Sir Austin Chamberlain concerning the recognition of Amanullah Khan. He said that the British according to the agreement of 1921 had already recognized the government of Amanullah Khan and then they did not take it back. Therefore, a few days of internal disturbances cannot bring the cause of the non-recognition by the British government. Then Ghulam Sidiq Khan expressed his amazement on the transit ban of commodities through India. He considered it again the agreement of 1921. He added why Indian authorities at the Indian borders held the arms and other equipment bought by or donated to Amanullah Khan during his European visit? Ghulam Sidiq Khan pointed to the long time relations, which existed between Afghanistan and British and said that it was the first time that the British relied on her onesided policy. For in the past under such conditions and circumstances the British did not follow such onesided policy toward other rulers of Afghanistan. Moreover, she recognized each ruler in their certain area and held relations and communications with them. For instance, between 18661868 when Amir Shir Ali Khan was defeated in Kabul and fled to Herat the British government recognized him as the Head of government even though in Herat and considered Amir Mohammad Afzal Khan as the Governor of Kabul. Now, they refused to recognize the government of Amanullah Khan as the legal government of Afghanistan because he had transferred the capital from Kabul to Kandahar and communicated with the usurper of the throne in Kabul. Ghulam Sidiq Khan finally stated this British policy was against the people of Afghanistan. The British government should revise her policy toward the Afghans; otherwise, it will make deeper the hostility of the Afghans. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Britain did not accept the note and returned it in kind through her consulate in Kandahar. The failure of Amanullah Khan was not only due to the negative position of the British government but also due to the implementation of the plan. He transferred the capital from Kandahar to Herat. This decision was a sad one for the people of Kandahar. They compelled

the king to change his mind, which he finally did. This was probably a great mistake an caused his future activities to fail. When Amanullah Khan saw how happy the people of Kandahar were at this change of mind, he became hopeful. In spite of the lack of financial resources and arms he started to raise a new army. In three months he prepared a force of 8,000 men from Kandahar, Farah, and Girishk. The volunteer groups from Kandahar city as well as from its surrounding areas were put under the leadership of Amanullah Khan and in the company of his brother, Enayatullah Khan, they started toward Kabul in the month of April. Abdul Ahad Khan, Minister of Interior, with a reconnoitring division was sent ahead to ask help of the people who were on the way to Kabul. Without any great difficulty, the forces of Amanullah Khan reach Ghazni in late April. There they met a small opposing force that was easily taken by Amanullah Khan. An argument arose between the young educated soldiers and the old experienced soldiers about whether the army should stop at Ghazni or go to Kabul. The young soldiers wanted to continue to Kabul and the other ones wanted to stay and capture Ghazni. The old soldiers won and thus began the siege of Ghazni. Habibullah used this opportunity to send a fresh army through Logar to Ghazni. Moreover, when a number of the Sulaimankhels who were in India at the time, received the news that Amanullah Khan had left Kabul returned to Afghanistan by way of Uruzgan. They were ordered to attack Amanullah Khan from the rear flank. The people who themselves were present at that war believed that beside the abovementioned reasons; a trick was used to neutralize the decisions, especially these concerning the capture of Ghazni. However, during the siege of Ghazni two unknown men were caught inside the army camp. One of them was a foreigner and the other was an Afghan. After investigations it was proved that the former had entered the country with a forged passport and some Indian rupees, the later who carried a big dagger confessed that he wanted to kill Amanullah Khan. Both spies were sentenced to death. Thus, Amanullah Khan was shadowed everywhere by British espionage operatives and his plans were neutralized. As said earlier, Herat was of particular significances in comparison to other provinces especially during wartime. Its location was conducive to the rescuing of those who were defeated and used it as a retreat where they could muster their forces. From this point of view, the first attack to be made on the part of Amanullah Khan from Herat followed a classic pattern. However, the British began to play the Shiite-Sunni divide. As a result, a battle ensued inside the town with a large number killed from both sides. Finally, few elders from both sects tried to end the fighting. However, the situation was so fluid that it led to a mutiny augmenting the grave dangers. Apparently, the mutiny was caused by the despatch of troops to Kandahar. Unusually, there were two military commanders simultaneously in Herat. One of them was Mohammad Ghaus Khan, professional officer, and the other was Abdur Rahman Khan, son-in-law of local Governor Mohammad Ibrahim. The later tried to dispose Mohammad Ibrahim Ghaus Khan in favour of his son-in-law. So, he availed himself of the opportunity and sent Mohammad Ghaus Khan as the head of troops in Kandahar. His conduct led to the mutiny as this gross nepotism had disenchanted all the soldiers and officers. As a result, the undercover operatives did what they wanted. On the other hand, Abdur Rahman Khan the new commander acted rashly against he mutinous troops. So, a soldier shot him on the spot. When Mohammad Ibrahim Khan received the news accompanied by his other son-in-law Mohammad Sidiq Amir, local Foreign Affairs Director, rushed to the barracks. Consequently, both of them were cut into pieces and Habibullah appointed General Abdur Rahim Khan of Kohistan garrison commander. He was sent to Herat via Mazar-i-Sharif.

On reaching Maimana, he had received the news of the mutiny in Herat. Therefore, utilizing the golden opportunity he started to head towards Herat. During the same time, Shujal Dawla had returned from London and had hardly the time to strengthen his position. Moreover, Mohammad Ghaus was not able to muster and reorganize the mutinous soldiers. So, Abdur Rahman Kohistani reached the town periphery sending him an ultimatum to leave Herat within 24 hours. When Amanullah Khan was fighting in two battles in Ghazni, Herat fell into the hands of the enemy. So, he last his final retreat where the former kings could halt to reorganize their forces and launch counter-attacks against their opponents. And it was so easily taken over by the other side. However, on the northern front, Amanullah Khan’s loyal supporters scored a measure of success. Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi, a former general, and a number of young officers who had received training in Turkey, Russia, and other European countries. They led a small but well organized contingent and entered Afghanistan via Khamyak early in April. With a swift attack, he conquered Mazar-i-Sharif. Mohammad Qasim, Habibullah’s local governor with his assistant, Khalilullah and their defeated force retreated to Maimana. Ghulam Nabi Khan entered Mazar-i-Sharif and sent a group of his men to Kabul. Since most of his troops consisted of mounted soldiers, they conquered Tashqurghan within a few days defeating Habibullah’s forces led by Sayed Hussain that marched to face the contingent via Abdane Mir Alam. Passing through Aibak via Dandan Shikan Pass, it advanced toward Bamyan Valley. This advance coincided with the arrival in Ghazni of Amanullah Khan. Habibullah was greatly upset by the news about the setback suffered by his forces. They thought if the two forces faced each other at the mouth of Maidan Valley, Ghulam Nabi’s contingent would as mobile professional troops make a short work of Habibullah’s foolhardy warriors. Afterwards then it would be child’s play for the old pro to capture Kabul. He was briefed in details by some of his loyal officers who had rushed back to Kabul from Tashqurghan after the whole army was routed these at the hands of Ghulam Nabi Khan and his young officers. A mentioned in British declassified documents Habibullah’s Foreign Minister alarmed by the changed of fortunes asked Sir Francis Humphreys, The British Ambassador in Kabul now in Simla, India for help. The British who anticipated this eventuality in their plan were ready to tackle it. A number of people were considered to play this role, one of them being Sayed Alim Khan, a friend and Ibrahim Beg Laqai, a colleague of former king Anwar Pasha of Bokhara, now living in exile in Kabul. Ibrahim Beg and his followers with help of the Khalifa of Qizil Ayaq lived along Balkh’s frontiers. When Habibullah came to power, Ibrahim Beg and Sayed Alim established close relations with Habibullah cooperating with the latter to capture the then Qaterghan and Mazari-Sharif. Without missing the chance, Ibrahim Beg’s men became active along a vast battlefield stretching from Mazar-i-Sharif to the mouth of the Ghorband Valley. Their guerrilla attacks began to threaten Ghulam Nabi’s communication route. Since the latter had to keep this open at any cost, the division stationed at Mazar-i-Sharif was immediately despatched to meet those guerrillas. Thus, Mazar-i-Sharif was left without a military force to speak of. According to his master’s plan, Habibullah’s defeated troops who were dispersed around Dehdadi waiting for an opportunity launched a surprise attack on Mazar-i-Sharif and captured it from Ghulam Nabi Khan. Early in the morning, a messenger hurried to convey to him the news about the impending invasion of Habibullah’s forces. He also was informed about the arrival of a large group of mullahs marching toward the town holding up a copy of the Holy Koran bearing a pledge written on its margin that they would hand over the town to Amanullah Khan. Ghulam Nabi Khan thought something was suspicious about all this and therefore he ordered a detachment to be ready for any event. He himself went out to welcome the mullahs. It was a big gathering in which all men had put on white clothes covered their shoulders with shawls

and raised white flags. They marched via Azizabad toward the government house. When they reached the entrance they put aside their shawls and took their rifles out to shoot but Ghulam Nabi’s detachment was ready to chase the deceitful raiders. Ghulam Nabi not upset by this unexpected turn of the events grabbed the rifle from his guard and fired a shot into the air. By hearing this signal, the detachment fired at the gathering and dispersed and chased down the attackers. Although this incident was not so significant, it attracted Ghulam Nabi’s attention to the swift attack on Kabul, which was planned earlier by him. He realized that this attack was not an easy one because of the covert hands obstructing his decisions. However, he waited to hear the hopeful news from the front where his forces were divided into two groups: one proceeding via the Ghorband Valley towards Charikar and the other via Bamyan along the Hajigak Pass to join the Hazara forces led by Shahnur’s son along with Ghulam Nabi Khan who was looking after Mazar-i-Sharif. Meanwhile, he received a telegram from his brother, Ghulam Sidiq Khan, about Amanullah Khan’s departure from Afghanistan advising him to muster his forces and leave as soon as possible. Ghulam Nabi Khan who was on the verge of victory and did not await such news consulted his advisors. Most of who advised him to leave but Ghulam Nabi Khan hesitated to listen to them. He wanted to stay and execute his plan. Then he was called by Ghulam Haider, the military division commander at Tashqurghan, who informed him about the advance of large reinforcements headed by Sayed Hussain toward Tashqurghan. For Ghulam Nabi Khan, this parcel of new was the last straw. In spite of this, Ghulam Nabi Khan kept this news secret for three days so he could muster his forces. Although he was fired on from all sides, he was successful in evacuating his forces unscathed. Ghulam Nabi Khan, a very brave general, was the last man who crossed the Oxus River. When Amanullah Khan’s forces were pressured from both sides, he could hardly return to Moqur. However, once there Ghulam Jilanli Khan Charkhi with the young officers trained in Turkey and two units of reinforcements arrived from Kandahar. They brought the good news of the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif by Ghulam Nabi Khan and the arrival of Shujal Dawla in Herat, which pepped Amanullah Khan’s morale. The dispirited monarch held a military conference in which Ghulam Jilani Khan was appointed commander of the defence forces. At that meeting, it was also decided that Amanullah Khan should go back to Kandahar to muster reinforcements to strengthen his position on the battlefield. These decisions were made when the king himself resided at the Moqur Hotel. Now, he was convinced that the only way to solve the problem was to follow the original instructions of his father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, to go directly to Herat. One there, he should prepare a new plan away from distractions caused by his enemy. He was quite confident that Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi was at Mazar-i-Sharif expecting him to capture Kabul before coming to Herat. His optimistic attitude had hardly manifested itself when the telephone rang with Abdul Aziz Khan informing him about the fall of Herat. After a moment’s silence, Amanullah Khan asked his War Minister where the division had left Herat was. Abdul Aziz Khan replied that after receiving the news of the fall of Herat near Farah, the troops had taken prisoner Mohammad Amin Tata and other officers who were planning to return to Herat. However, General Mohammad Anwar Khan Nurzayi, the Governor and Military Commander of Farah disarmed them diplomatically. Amanullah Khan put the receiver down and asked his servant, Lala Sayed Mir, to call Hasanjan his secretary and let him know about his immediately departure for Kandahar. He also instructed him not to let anyone except Ghulam Jilani Khan and his company is informed about this news. At the time, he made the decision that he did not realize fully well that it was not only important to himself but also to the future of Afghanistan as a whole.

Two men insistently asked him to change his mind about his decision. One was Abdul Hadi Dawi who had just arrived from Kabul to join Amanullah Khan and the other was Abdul Aziz Khan who was the War Minister. Dawi proposed that he appeal to the Durrani tribe forces and ask for their help and cooperation. He assured him that those tribal forces would undoubtedly support him and in worst-case scenario they would safely escort him to the border. However, Amanullah Khan did not accept this for was quite taken aback. Amanullah Khan reached Qalat early in the morning and by telephone asked Ali Ahmad Khan, the Governor, to join him. Amanullah Khan met the latter at Robat Maiwand and appointed him as his deputy as well as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He ordered him to start immediately toward Qalat and command the division there. However, without entering Kandahar, he directly went toward the border. As his family and few of his ministers had joined him along the way, they crossed the border on May 25, 1929. There he introduced himself to the British frontier officer who took them to Dock Bangla. Meanwhile, the local officer at Chaman was informed about the news. The latter despatched an urgent telegram to the Indian Viceroy at Simla. Lord Irvin who was at that time called Lord Halifax was appointed as the Foreign Minister of British during World War Two. Before the start of the crisis in Afghanistan, he received the mentioned telegram after 30 minutes. According to the declassified documents of the British government, the India regent upon getting the news for which he was waiting impatiently should that, “finally … we get rid of him.” Then he dictated a letter to his secretary: “Now you do not withhold any favour for as a refugee. And under no circumstances he could stay here and should leave India as soon as possible.” The India government consulted with the authoritative sources in London concerning the announcement of the news of Amanullah Khan’s departure from his county. After 24 hours, in the morning of May 27, 1929 (Jauza 6, 1303), this news was reported by the news agencies and newspapers of the world. Now, we see the government’s celebration of the 6th of Jauza which corresponded with the departure day of Amanullah Khan was not an accidental matter or without an historical reason. As later incidents showed the ecstasy and delight of the India regent was a little bit ahead time. Although Amanullah Khan left the country, Afghans remained with their arms ready to face the enemy of their homeland. The Afghans continued with their struggles on both sides of the border. As Rose Kepal, a British officer, predicted that they would not be able to extinguish the fire, which was lit by Amanullah Khan for a long time. Thus, for 20 years until they left India the British did not live in peace because of the Afghans even for a very short time. With Amanullah Khan leaving Kandahar and through the cooperation of the internal backward-looking, the third part of the British imperialist’s master plan was successfully launched. Then it was the turn of the British imperial hero, Nadir, to appear on the scene. While Nadir and his brother who were in the south of France gave careful thought to the internal crisis built up in Afghanistan. Apparently they were away from the scene but actually they held communication with the designer of the master plan regarding the fall of the progressive regime of Afghanistan. The plan, which was prepared by Nadir’s cooperation, was adhered to in all its details both inside and outside of Afghanistan. So, they had to report the occurrence of and predict the incidents and foresee the events. After the failure of the “Patyala Plot” when Shah Mahmud, High Commissioner in the Mashriqi Province, was dismissed and Abdul Washed Shinwari, known as Mr. Weed, an Australian citizen was appointed to serve as liaison between the exiled brothers in the south of France and the British sources. Mr. Weed was a frontier Afghan by birth who travelled with a camel caravan to Australia at the end of the 19th century. He worked there on the vast plain using his camels as a means of transportation and earned enough money. Later he came back to the frontier.

According to the declassified documents of the British government, Mr. Weed came to Afghanistan in 1923-1924 concurrently with the event of Mullah Lang. He acted like a sensitive Afghan interested in using his money and experience for the benefit of his homeland. He proposed to have the concession for working the gold mines in Kandahar and trade of wood in Kunar. For this purpose, he proposed to give the amount of 10,000 English pounds of gold for obtaining this concession. Though his proposal was very lucrative, it soon became clear that behind all this there were the real British masters involved. Their main goal was to penetrate into the sensitive part of Afghanistan. According to the declassified documents of the British government and also the book Fire in Afghanistan when his proposal was rejected by the government of Afghanistan in 1925 he wrote to the Military Attaché of Britain in Kabul that he still hoped and desired to serve for the benefit of the British government. Thus, Nadir met him a year later in Paris to help coordinate with him their plans. Another comrade of Mr. Weed was M.A. Hakim, the agent with the German Commercial agency Anbar in Kabul. Mr. Hakim used to travel between Kabul and Peshawar. Mr. Hakim who was called Hakimjan became a trustworthy communicator of Nadir in covert matters with high ranking authorities of the British government in India. When Nadir acceded to the throne he transferred the centre of his activity to Kabul and all the government purchasing was brought within his monopoly. It was seen that the opposing elements to the regime of Amanullah Khan were in contact with the British imperialists and were very well organized. But seemingly, they looked scattered and unorganised. Mr. Weed resumed his activity on Aqrab 1307 and went to the High Commissioner of Peshawar and proposed to him that because of his close relationship with the chief of the rebellious tribes of Mashriqi and with the help of the people of Kabul, he could guarantee the security of British transportation and safety of the British Embassy in Kabul. Though his proposal was reliable, the Indian government got in touch with Humphreys. He did not advise him to go back to Kabul because the government of Afghanistan prohibited him from entering the country. In Fire in Afghanistan, it refers to the declassified documents of the British government stating that the High Commissioner of Peshawar authorized to substitute for money all the necessary services required from him. Thus, Mr. Weed got the permission to carry on his activity at the frontier area and Mashriqi Province. The main ally was Lawrence, top officer in the British Intelligence Service. He cooperated to run the plan against the Government of Afghanistan. Once of his important works was to outline a proclamation in 18 articles against Amanullah Khan. His proclamation was published at Iqbal Press in Peshawar and distributed among the tribal areas. His other work was obtaining freedom for the British pilot and the return of the airplane, which landed in Jagdalak. The exiled brothers in the southern of France became impatient with the news of the Shinwar Revolt. Without the permission of their master to wait for the conditions to improve they decided to leave for Afghanistan. According to the declassified documents of the British government, Hashim went to the British Consulate in Nice on December 10th. He asked for transit visas through India for his two brothers, Nadir and Shah Wali, and himself. The request was made before Habibullah Kalakani attacked Kabul. According to the administrative regulations, the British Consulate asked for an entry visa to Afghanistan first. So, Hashim returned to Paris where he repeated his demand. He received the same reply there. Hashim insisted they were well known people and close friends of the British government. Therefore, it was not necessary for them to have an Afghan visa. He was advised to go to London to make his case. The negative attitude of the British Embassy made him irresolute. On the other hand, Hashim was not sure what would be the result of his trip to London and did not want to let the Afghan Embassy know about their decision. Finally, he was compelled to go to the Afghan Embassy for permission to return. So, Hashim returned very nervously to Nice.

The newspapers reported Habibullah Kalakani’s attack of Kabul and it was another factor that aggravated their nervousness. Again, Hashim went to the British Consulate in Nice. He, on behalf of Nadir, asked to communicate his personal message to London via telegram. In Fire in Afghanistan, his message contained their request from the British government to send a high ranking officer who would be able to communicate in Persian and help them in their covert conversations. The related British sources informed the British Embassy in Kabul about the matter. Humphreys became anxious of Nadir and his brothers' hasty decision. It was against his required plan and he was especially worried about the divulgence of the original plan. In reply, he instructed that visas should be issued yet. Thus, the British Counsellor in Nice informed Hashim after two days the visas could not be issued nor could the British Embassy send them a Persian speaking Englishman. Nadir could not imagine such a cold and negative treatment of the British government, he though there must be some misunderstanding. So, Hashim wanted to go in person to London to make clear the situation. For that purpose, he had to go first to the Afghan Embassy. He was informed that instructions had been received from Kabul to issue them visas for Afghanistan. Hashim became so happy that he immediately left Paris and returned to Nice to bring his brother’s passports. In spite of that they did not dare to make any decisions by themselves without the agreement and permission of their British contacts. Amanullah Khan was not aware of the underground activities of Nadir and his brothers. That is why, the government of Afghanistan issued the visas in good faith. He considered the brothers request to come home as an indication of cooperation and goodwill to the government of Afghanistan. Amanullah Khan’s weak position made him reply to everyone. Thus, he appointed Ali Ahmad Khan, his arch enemy as Commander of the Armed Forces in Mashriqi and sent him to Jalalabad. Then he considered he would finish off the guerrilla forces of Habibullah with the support of Nadir and his brothers. In spite of the fact, he appreciated the return of Nadir he did not forget the importance of security and instructed the Afghan Embassy in Paris that they should return only via Moscow and Tashkent and by Russian airplane. TO show his trust in Nadir, Amanullah Khan told his son who was studying in Paris to accompany the brothers. Also, the younger brother of Nadir, Shah Mahmud, who did not hold any position, was appointed as Commander of Armed Forces in Dehsabz and Khwaja Rawash. Both Dehsabz and Khwaja Rawash were defensive positions during the attacks of Habibullah Kalakani. However, the location of the Shirpur airport as well as Kabul prison situated at the historical fort of Shirpur gave them special importance. By the second attack of Habibullah Kalakani and the defeat of the government forces, Amanullah Khan was deposed and left for Kandahar. Humphreys, the British Ambassador in Kabul, watched the events very carefully. He contacted his government to issue transit visas for Nadir and his brothers, so they could be able to start immediately for India. Humphreys explained in his telegram that even if it made Habibullah unhappy, the being of Nadir and his brothers in Afghanistan is now very important and necessary. So, the British Embassy in Paris called Nadir on January 21, 1929 to invited to come to Paris for their visas. There the British Ambassador in person met them and offered his excuses for what had happened in connection with the issuance of their visas. They got a diplomatic visa an started for India with a special recommendation letter. They left the port of Marseilles on the Indian ship, Kaiser. The three years of seclusion and expectation of Nadir and his brothers in the south of France reached its end. Nadir was so happy he neglected the instructions of his government concerning his return via Moscow. Moreover, he forgot the guardianship of the young prince on the way. Nadir was so happy that while singing a song to himself with Indian rhythm, he departed from the port of Marseilles the next morning.

Nadir was considered by Habibullah Kalakani as his probable competitor. He was aware of their existing opposition between Nadir and Amanullah Khan. Therefore, he wanted to bring him inside the circle of his activity or to keep him under his authority. With that thought in mind, he acceded to the throne on the first week and appointed Shah Mahmud his private advisor. He also appointed Ahmad Shah, Nadir’s cousin, and Abdul Aziz, Hashim’s cousin, to go to Europe to escort Nadir to Kabul. There were instructed to get their travel expenses from the Commercial Agency in Peshawar. Since Abdul Hakim, Commercial agent, was on Amanullah Khan’s side, he refused to accept the instructions of Habibullah. He did not play their travel expenses from Kabul to Peshawar, so they flew by a British plane. Therefore, the expenses were paid by the British government and they left by boat from an Indian port. According to the declassified documents of the British government, the British were aware of Habibullah’s decision to invite Nadir. Since the British plan was formulated earlier and then it ran parallel with Habibullah’s decision and they did not want to disclose the latter stages of the plan, they took it easy in a time that Amanullah was still on the scene. In spite of that fact, the British knew this and refused to send Habibullah’s agent. They also prepared the required facilities for them. The British political agencies and consulates in Europe hesitated and were surprised about the matter but the political departments in London and Delhi did not show even a small hesitation in connection with what had happened. Their arrival on the scene of activity in India was impatiently awaited. Due to various cases and reasons, they were worried the plan might be made public and neutralized ahead of time. The anxiety of the Indian government from t disclosure of the plan could be judged from the covert message of the Indian Viceroy to Vice Count Phil in London, which the Indian Minister dated February 3, 1929. It corresponded with the departure of the Indian Kaiser from Marseilles heading for Bombay. In Fire in Afghanistan, reference is made to the declassified documents: “Fortunately, in spite f the seditious publicity the conditions are developing in our favour. I hope to succeed in bringing Nadir here quietly and without causing disturbance. Under the existing circumstances, there is no doubt that he would play the part of a winner bead on the confused board of politics in Afghanistan. It would be a God given chance.” On February 23, three days before the arrival of the ship into the port of Bombay, following earlier messages another message was sent to the Governor of Bombay. Again, in In Fire in Afghanistan, contained the following instructions: In a very friendly was apologise to Nadir. IT should be expressed that for the existence of certain political considerations the Indian government could not arrange an elaborate welcome for such a distinguished guest such as Nadir and we hope you will understand. Accordingly, he should be kept away from all political activities and should be sent to Afghanistan. Their baggage should not go through the custom regulation. Moreover, necessary steps should be taken for their safety. Nadir and his brothers arrived at the port of Bombay on February 3, 1929. The representative of the Indian Viceroy, C.J. Freek, met Nadir on the deck of the ship. He communicated the crucial matters with him before Nadir saw the Afghan officials who were there to bid him welcome. According to declassified documents of the British government, the special representative of the Indian Viceroy was assured by Nadir he would not meet Amanullah Khan and would not support him. On the contrary, he would do what the British government desired. After this conversation was over, Nadir landed and was received by the Afghan Consul and the Afghan citizens in Bombay. Nadir resided at the Taj Mahal Hotel. At the hotel the letter of Amanullah Khan was presented to him by the Afghan Consul.

It request that Nadir should come directly to Kandahar and meet Amanullah Khan. Nadir answered his letter on the same day and sent it back via the Afghan Consul. Amanullah Khan had accused Nadir for being unreliable. Then Nadir assured Amanullah Khan and took oath he would remain loyal to Amanullah Khan. He said that since their goal is the same, therefore, let me begin the struggle in another part of the country instead of coming to Kandahar. After sending the letter, Nadir pretended to be sick and severed relations with the Afghan officials and citizens. He continued his contact with the British officials. It was continued until he received the preliminary plan for his activity. Afterwards, Nadir and his brothers secretly left for Peshawar by train on a dark night. In spite of all the secrecy, the news of their arrival in India was reported in newspapers. The newspaper representatives and men of political parties were looking for them everywhere. His incantations were questioned by them. In reply, Nadir claimed he struggled in support of Amanullah Khan and had no claim for himself. When he acceded to the throne, his past promises became a sharp weapon in the hands of the patriotic elements in India who were against the British and favoured Amanullah Khan. They encouraged public opinion in India and the frontier against his illegitimate regime. Humphreys waited for the arrival of Nadir and his brothers. He convinced his government that the British Embassy should close their office and leave Kabul. So, with this action, the other embassies in Kabul would also feel unsafe and might follow suit. When the conditions became favourable then could come back and open the embassy again. However, the acquired government would not give permission to the other diplomatic representative to open their offices again. The matter can be clearly seen in the famous declaration of Shinwars outlined by Humphreys’ agents. Contrary to his prediction, with the exception of a few western embassies in Kabul the other remained open. According to the declassified documents of the British government, the USSR Embassy adopted a free policy and the embassies of Turkey and Iran followed suit and remained active with all their delegation members until the reign of Habibullah. The British apparently closed the embassy after a month of rule of Habibullah Kalakani and the British officials left the country one after another. A frontier servant, Rahmat Khan, who was an Indian citizen, took the responsibility of looking after the embassy building and the British property in Kabul. Yet, Rahmat Khan was an expert and experienced comrade of Humphreys. At the time of Habibullah Kalakani, all the government correspondence with the Indian government was carried out by him. Actually the British Embassy was transferred to Peshawar and all its members including Sheikh Mahbub Ali, the secretary for the eastern desk were busy there. Humphreys went on talking about closing the embassy with a view to attract the attention of other embassies especially that of the USSR embassy. He pretended the diplomatic members were leaving by English plan he postponed his departure until he was convinced of the failure of his plan. He then took the British flag and left Kabul for Peshawar on an English airplane on February 7, 1929 just after 34v days of the rule of Habibullah. Before leaving he met with Shah Mahmud, the younger brother of Nadir, for six hours. In Wings over Kabul, Baker and Chapman give the summary of their negotiations. The purpose of their negotiations was to guide Shah Mahmud who was appointed by Habibullah to talk with the Eastern and Southern Provinces as to how he can deceive Habibullah. Humphreys desired to meet in person with Nadir and discuss the matter. Through a few telegrams sent to the Indian and British governments he pointed out the necessity of such a meeting. In a telegram, he said, “Fortunately Nadir, his brothers, and I were once very close friends. If I would be able to see them, it would surely create a misunderstanding. Since the Indian and Russian presses continue with their propaganda, therefore, from my point of view the disaffection of such an influential family of Afghanistan might not be proper.” So, they met in Peshawar when the brothers arrived on April 27, 1929. They met at the residence of Humphreys covertly. As far as it could be deduced from Humphreys’ reports,

Nadir showered him the latest letter of Amanullah Khan, which was written in a leading tone and instructed hi to come immediately to Kandahar. Nadir assured him he will neglect Amanullah Khan’s instructions as he did before about his return via Russia. Meanwhile, Nadir said he and his brothers would start the struggle for power in the eastern and southern provinces. However, he will also arrange the details of their work after his meeting with Shah Mahmud who was in Khost. As Humphreys advised Nadir, he held a number of meetings with Mr. Wilton, Chief Commissioner of Peshawar. He discussed the work of Nadir and his comrades. Meanwhile, a few persons were introduced as messengers and communicators. On the British side, Mohammad Sadiq Mujadidi and M.A. Hakim and on Nadir’s side were Haji Mohammad Akbar Khan and Alanawaz Khan. The purpose of the meeting was to let Nadir understand not to introduce himself as the representative of Amanullah Khan as he did since he left France. Meanwhile, Nadir delivered a speech at the Friday prayer in Peshawar without knowing that Ali Ahmad Khan was also present there and vice-versa. Nadir shed light on their struggle to assume power and deliver the country from thieves and robbers. He asked for help and cooperation of the frontier men. From that moment, he avoided newspaper journalists and members of the political structure. Nadir made sure he keep away from the Hisb-i-Khilafat headed by Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan who was active along the frontier area and stood shoulder to shoulder with Amanullah Khan. When Abdul Ghafar Khan heard about Nadir’s speech, he advised his followers to hold the oath of support because he was sure Nadir was acting in hypocrisy, dissimulation, and betrayal to Amanullah Khan. He said Nadir was working for himself with the cooperation of foreigners against Amanullah Khan and the Afghan people. Still, Habibullah was disturbed but the activity among the eastern and southern tribes. He became suspicious of the British intentions and tried to bring Nadir under control as soon as possible. So, he despatched a telegram to Peshawar for Humphreys. He noted in the telegram that the road of Mashriqi is not safe yet, so the Indian government could cooperate and let an airplane to transfer Nadir and his brothers to Kabul immediately. It was clear that both, Humphreys and the Indian government would not be ready to grant his request. On the other hand, as it was usual with them he assured Habibullah that whenever Nadir and his brothers were ready to go to Kabul, the plane will carry them. Meanwhile, Nadir, Shah Wali, and Hashim started for Kabul via Tal and Khost. Then, they journeyed through the Momand district of Jalalabad. An American writer, Louis Dupree, writes in his book Afghanistan that it was the British who devised the rules for the game in which Nadir and his brothers only had the responsibility for playing it step by step according to the plan of the master. Thus, Hashim entered Afghanistan through the eastern province and Nadir and Shah Wali through the Southern Province on March 8, 1929. According to declassified documents of the British government, the first condition laid down by the people of Momand at the Lalpur Meeting was that Hashim and his brothers should only fight to regain the throne for Amanullah Khan; otherwise, they would not cooperate with and help them. The condition was accepted by the tribes of Byazi and Khawji. Naturally, it weakened the chance of accession for Hashim. When Hashim met the Shinwar people; contrary to his expectations, the people laid down the same conditions at the Achin Meeting. The report prepared by the Chief Commissioner of Frontier addressed to the Central Government of India and reflecting clearly the change of opinion of the related tribes is part of the documents in the National Archives in India. Apparently, the immediate change of mind among the tribal people was something strange and unnatural. However, in reality it was because of being naive and easily impressed by dishonest Maliks, Khans, and Sardars who conspired with foreign imperialist led by Lawrence

(also know as Pir Karam), Abdul Wahid Shinwari (known as Mr. Weed), Sardar Mohammad Omar who was son of Sardar Mohammad Ayub Khan, and others. When the impression of the dark missionaries was neutralized, the tribesmen knew the result of their action by the coming of Habibullah Kalakani and his band into power. Then their reaction to get to the side of Amanullah Khan was a natural act. When they saw Nadir and his brothers emerge on the scene without any approvals from Amanullah Khan, the tribesmen became suspicious. Malik Mohammad Alam Khan and Malik Mohammad Afzal Khan, leaders of the Shinwar Rebellion four months earlier, drove Hashim out from their region despaired and disappointed. Hashim’s chances of success among the Khogyanis were comparable with the Shinwar people. Since Khogyani was near Kabul, the gathering and organization of forces in the area was easier for Hashim. This gave Hashim the idea he was not far away from his goals. Meanwhile, the forces of Habibullah marched from Kabul and the Khogyani Maliks left Hashim and joined the approaching forces. Thus, Hashim’s forces like those of Ali Ahmad Khan’s forces became scattered. He left Afghanistan and after a month returned to India. Although he wanted to go to the southern province to join his brothers, the British sent him to Quetta for their future plans. When Nadir attacked Kabul, the Achikzais rose against Habibullah Kalakani’s forces. After a few days, they captured Kandahar from Abdul Qadir Kohistani, the governor appointed by Habibullah. The flag of Amanullah Khan was hoisted over the town hall. Immediately, the British brought Hashim back to the frontier. With the collaboration of a number of elders and merchants from Kandahar, Hashim as the agent of Nadir was able to reach Kandahar. By spreading the news of the conquest of Kabul and bating Mehrdil Khan whom he had promised a ministry position. At least he could take part in achieving the freedom of the country from the thieves and actually handing it over to the treasonous elements of the homeland. However, before entering Afghanistan Nadir met wit his old friend Richard Mechaniki, former British Ambassador in Kabul, who had the crucial duty of being the political agent in Kurm. After the kingship of Nadir, Mechaniki replaced Humphreys as the British Ambassador in Kabul. Mechaniki briefed him about the latest occurrences and the condition of the tribesmen. Moreover, he outlined to Hashim the procedure of the work he should follow. Mechaniki confirmed the view of Humphreys and said Nadir should hold a tribal meeting and explain his policy before any other activity. He elicited the cooperation of the tribal people. Shah Mahmud with the invitation message of Habibullah Kalakani and four hundred gold pounds as gift was sent earlier toward the southern provinces. He joined Nadir and informed him about the outcome of his contact with the tribal people. He assured Nadir with the exception of a small number of Ahmadzais, some other Logaris, and the Shiites; the remaining tribes of the southern provinces were on their side. After receiving the information and guidance from and consulting with his brothers, Nadir prepared the plan of his action. His first activity was sending Shah Mahmud to gather the representatives of the tribes for the tribal meeting in Gardiz. Nadir and Shah Wali stayed at Alikhel of Jaji and started to communicate with the chiefs, elders, and maliks of the tribes. Another person who met with Nadir was Mirza Abdul Hakim who earlier was introduced as liaison between him and the British authorities. According to the declassified documents of the British government, Hakim received a considerable amount of money transferred to Peshawar during Amanullah Khan’s time. It was to buy government supplies through Anbdar, a German businessman, residing in Kabul. According to the guidance of Welton who was Chief Commissioner of Peshawar, Nadir was assured of the existence of such a considerable sum. First, Nadir ordered the purchase of British guns and ammunitions, which were available at Lowarguy and other part of the Khyber

Pass. They are available at cheap prices and in considerable quantity and transferred them immediately. Nadir also requested Mirza Abdul Hakim, Commercial agent of Afghanistan in Peshawar, to buy weapons with the Afghan government funds and to send the consignments to him. However, Mirza Abdul Hakim who was aware of his intentions refused to do so. Disappointed Nadir sent Humphreys a letter who was in Peshawar where he had asked for him to send money. The letter was sent through Mohammad Sadiq Mojadidi who was a man introduced to Nadir as a messenger and confidante. This letter is now part of the declassified documents of the British government. It contains a detailed request for the amount of two hundred thousand Indian Rupees for the time being. He added in the letter that if made no difference whether they gave the amount in his name or in the name of the government of Afghanistan. It meant that Nadir considered himself at that time the leader of Afghanistan and on that basis had asked for the money from the British government. Ironically, a few months earlier when Amanullah Khan was in Kandahar he objected to the one-sided interference of the British to which the British replied they felt he was not accepted throughout the country. Now, that Nadir is in similar stance and was never a government minister let alone a leader his requested is being considered. After a few days, the preliminary steps toward the tribal meeting were taken, Nadir and Shah Wali started towards Gardiz to participate in the meeting. There they were welcomed by Ghausuddin, son of Jandad Ahmadzai, who was also a seasoned British conspirator and adventurer. According to a source who was at the meeting, two days after the meeting started which was contrary to Nadir’s expectation. The Khost tribes who earlier had promised to stand behind Nadir as well as some of the Ghilzais proclaimed they would cooperate with Amanullah Khan, which is documented in the report of March 14 of the Tribal Commissioner of the Frontier addressed to the Indian government. The same people proposed to the meeting since Amanullah Khan is now in Ghazni, a delegation consisting of the representatives of the different tribes should be sent to him. The unexpected proposal of the Khost people upset Nadir. As a result, he announcement his opposition to Amanullah Khan in that same meeting. Nadir reminded the meeting of the Mullah Lang Rebellion, the slaughter of the Mangal chiefs, and other southern tribes by Amanullah Khan. However, this announcement instead of changing the view of the meeting in his favour had a negative effect and a large number of the participants as a sign of protest left the meeting without taking any decision. Thus, the meeting ended in confusion. Consequently, the opposing elements together with Ghausuddin attacked the Balahissar of Gardiz, the residence of Nadir and his followers. They all ran out in confusion with the help of Abdul Ghani Gardizi through a side exit and reach Alikhel again. The main reason why Ghausuddin changed sides was he received the decrees of Amanullah Khan through Mirza Faqir Ahmad Khan, Director of Forestry, who addressed to him and the other tribal head in the Southern Province. However, the actual cause of the incident was General Mohammad Sidiq Khan who was Military Commander of the Southern Province (and the brother of Shirjan, Minister of Court for Habibullah Kalakani). He for the time being remained loyal to Amanullah Khan. Since he assured that Nadir is trying to benefit for himself under the name of Amanullah Khan and advised to stand against this treachery. Shirjan’s brother soon left for Kabul and joined his brothers against Nadir until he lost a leg one of the battles. Shah Mahmud and Janbaz of Charkh were sent to Logar to prevent the advances of Habibullah Kalakani’s forces. They were also defeated. Nadir saw the support of the tribesmen gave him much less than he had hoped for. He understood without the effective help of the British government, he alone would not be able to stand up to dangerous opponents such as Habibullah.

Accordingly, he sent Shah Wali to Fazel Omar Mojadidi who had recently arrived from India and resided in Orgoon. There he was busy gathering forces, Nadir’s agents asked for his help and cooperation. He was asked to prevent the Ghilzais from joining Amanullah Khan’s forces. This matter is described in detail in Shah Wali’s book My Memoirs. Meanwhile, Haji Mohammad Akbar Yousofi, Former Consul in Bombay, was sent to Simla with a letter to Deans Barry, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the India government, along with a personal letter to Humphreys would help to deliver the letter and fulfil his requests. Thus, Nadir expressed in this secret letter dated September 18, 1929, which is filed document number F.40 in the National Archives of India: “If the Indian Government does not allow the tribesmen on the other side of the frontier to help him, he would not succeed at all. Therefore, Afghanistan would face an anarchy. The current situation would be explained to you in detail by Haji Mohammad Akbar himself. The coming of a powering Government in Afghanistan is entirely in the interest of the British government. Moreover, the following privileges would be given to the British government: 1. Establishment of closer relations between Afghanistan and Britain. 2. Reduction of Russian influence. 3. Refraining from inimical and inflammatory publicity against India. 4. Construction of Chaman, Kandahar, and Herat railways. 5. Establishing relations among the frontier tribes so as to suit the British Government. 6. In spite of being independent, Afghanistan would accept financial aid from the British Government as before.” Nadir obtained the agreement of the British government to use the tribesmen beyond the frontier. By their cooperation, Nadir succeeded to conquer Kabul. Nadir clearly confessed in his letter to the Indian government that without the effective and direct cooperation of the British government in the use of the competent forces of Wazir and Mashud Provinces. Otherwise, he was quite sure it would be impossible for him to succeed against Habibullah Kalakani. As it is understood from the text of his letter and proposals, Nadir received those privileges at the cost of the independence of Afghanistan. From this point, he like those before him could not free themselves from the British influence and authority. The prior 20 year term was freed by Amanullah Khan. After the aforementioned agreement, the British government officially continued with her so called policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. To deceive local and foreign people, the British agents apparently forbade the tribesmen from entering Afghan soil. However, in practice the Wazir and Mahsud forces numbering over ten thousand people were sent inside Afghanistan under the supervision of British personnel and Nadir’s agent, Mawlawi Alanawaz Multani, with large sums of money and weapons to gather and mobilize forces. It is worth considering that during the revolt of Shinwar when the people of Momand wanted to enter Afghanistan in favour of Amanullah Khan, it was the British government that forbad their entering and resorted to air bombardment. However, then contented with overall protestations and the official personnel that “because of the sensitiveness of the time tribal forces should be strictly prevented from any practical actions.” This was the meaning of the non-interference policy of the British government six months earlier announced by the British Foreign Secretary in the parliament of that country. At Alikhel, Nadir watched for the arrival of the tribesmen. At the same time, he prepared the plan of attack on Kabul. During this time, he prepared the plan of attack on Kabul. On the other side, Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud at the entrance of the Logar Pass took their defensive positions. They were also warding off the attacks of the forces of Habibullah Kalakani.

It was at this moment that Aminjan, brother of Amanullah Khan, accompanied by Hazaras and using a detour arrived at Alikhel and ran into Nadir. Nadir tricked him by advising him to save his life and that it would be better for him to leave Afghanistan without delay. Nadir could ask the Indian government to assign him a suitable residence and salary until conditions to better in Afghanistan. Instead, Nadir sent different messages to the British personnel. For example, he asked that Abdul Hakim Khan, Commercial Agent in Peshawar, who openly criticized Nadir’s intentions to be exiled in Rangun. Meanwhile, as the plan for preparation and organization of attack on Kabul was completed the tribesmen with zeal and excitement of bringing back Amanullah Khan finally appeared on the battle scene. With a few days they defeated the forced of Habibullah on several fronts. At that time, first of all Shah Wali leading one of those forces through Charasyb reached Kabul and declared himself the “Conqueror of Kabul. One the other side, Shah Mahmud, leading another force chased the surrendered forces of Habibullah arriving the next day through Rishkhor and Daralaman in Kabul. When Nadir was assured that Kabul was occupied and Habibullah took refuge toward Kohistan, he then came to Chilsitoon. One the next day, Nadir victoriously entered Kabul and Bagh Alimardan, the quarter of his grandfather Sardar Sultan Mohammad Khan Telai. There he consulted with the near relations some of whom were the near dependents of the imperialist organization. Such as Shir Ahmad Zikria and Faiz Mohammad Zikria. There, at that meeting preparations for the election of the future king were made and the plot revealed that they all betrayed their oath to bring back Amanullah Khan and used the tribesmen. Finally, the crowing ceremony took place at the Public Hall of Salamkhana on October 16, 1929 in the presence of a small number of his comrades. That desired and chosen candidate of the British government who earlier received the tile of “Winner Bead” by the Indian government finally reached his imperial destiny. His clear promises contained in his speeches and published declarations distributed among the people were quite contrary to what he practiced. For instance, in a meeting collusively and without the knowledge and agreement of the people he proclaimed himself king of Afghanistan. According to a previous and agreement, the British, soon offered to Nadir the amount of one Kror Rupees as a contribution for what he had committed himself. According to the declassified documents of the British government, Nadir requested them that this amount be changed to Sterling Pounds and transferred to the Bank of England to his personal account. Humphreys, his old friend and colleague, who got for his activities the position of High Commissioner of England in Iraq, tried to raise the mentioned amount from one Kror to six Kror for the sake of friendship. But, according to documents of the time which existed in the National Archives of India, the total expenses of England for the fall of the progressive government of Amanullah until the succession of the reactionary and anti-nationalist regime of Nadir was estimated to be over 600,000 Kror. Although during that reactionary movement the Afghans bore great losses and thousands of youth were sacrificed, millions of money and wealth were spent uselessly. But the main disadvantage was the loss of precious time and opportunity that could have been used for the progress of the country. In spite of the fact that the people of Afghanistan were put out of patience due to the cruelty, oppression, and tyranny of Habibullah the kingship of Nadir which started wit deceit, and dishonesty was not welcomed by them. From the very early days the people did not trust Nadir. Thus, when he announced his cabinet and declared his policy their doubt changed into opposition and antagonism. Especially the voice of criticism and adducting rose from the intellectual circles all over the country. Especially his weak foreign policy that took the British side strongly shocked the Afghans and made them to rise and begin their struggle. Soon, the national uprising took shape and an allsided struggle was started in the country. Nadir and his protectors knew that the Afghans

would never give up their freedom and independence for any price as they had shown in the time of Shah Shuja and Yaqub Khan. Under such circumstances and conditions they not only rise against the foreign influence, they also fight against the internal reactionary until their last dying breath. Thus, during the four years of Nadir’s kingship, the courageous people of Afghanistan continued their struggles against him. It was a strange struggle between life and death, therefore, Nadir resorted to all kinds of savagely and fierce acts against the compatriots. The people of Afghanistan fro mall classes and circles individually and in groups, and with empty hands but high morals rose and struggled against Nadir. The imposing and uncompassionate Nadir using every handy facility tried to annihilate them but in spite of all this, the people’s struggle did not stop. When the people received a single stroke in reply they dealt several heavy blows to him. If he killed a compatriot, for avenging his death another compatriot killed his brother. outside the country. Whenever he hanged a group of intellectual people, another youth killed a number of the British personnel who protected Nadir. Briefly, in that bloody war in which equipment and forces of the two sides were not comparable hundreds of Afghan intellectuals lost their lives. But, finally the success was with the Afghan nation. Although that irreconcilable work took four years at the end Nadir was shot and killed by a bulled of an ardent youth. Thus, the shameful stain was washed out from the skirt of the homeland. After that incident this nation spent forty-five years under the descendents of that bloody and tyrant dynasty. It was the Afghan Nation's Saur Uprising that ended the fifty years of illegal sovereignty of a despotic dynasty. Main Sources: Indian national Archives. Declassified Pages of years 1919-1931. India Office Record (manuscript of India Ministry). 1919-1929 Rhea Talley Stewart. Fire in Afghanistan. N. Baker and Air Marshall Heyola Chapman. Wings over Kabul. Louise Dupree. Afghanistan. Ronald Wild. Amanullah Khan: The Ex-king of Afghanistan. Madame Violees. Rebellion in Afghanistan. Colonel Premakov. Afghanistan in Fire. Translated by M.S. Tarzi. Iqbal Ali Shah. My life from highway robbery to kingship: Habibullah Kalakani. Ghulam Mohaiuddin Anis. Crisis and Deliverance. Monshi Ali Ahmad Shalizi. The Fall of Amanullah Khan. A collection of Aman-i-Afghan dated 1307. A collection of Habib-al-Islam dated 1307 Interviews with the people who were seen or took part in those happenings .

Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-33)

Born in 1883 Died 1933. Mohammad Nadir chose military as his carrier. He commanded the government forces against the Mangals in 1912. He was awarded the title General for his services. He was appointed Commander-in-chief in 1914. He commanded the Afghan troops in Paktia in third Anglo-Afghan War 1n 1919. He was appointed Minister of War in 1919. Due to policy differences with King Amanullah, Nadir Khan was appointed Afghan minister to Paris in 1924. After King Amanullah was overthrown by Bacha-e Saqao, Nadir Khan returned to Afghanistan via India with his brothers Shah Wali Khan and Shah Mahmud Khan. He amassed tribal troops and attacked Kabul. After initial setbacks, his brother Shah Wali Khan finally managed to capture Kabul in October of 1929. Two days later, Nadir Khan was proclaimed Afghanistan's King. He fought those who favored the return of King Amanullah. He executed Ghulam Nabi, a supporter of King Amanullah. The new ruler quickly abolished most of Amanullah's reforms, but despite his efforts to rebuild an army that had just been engaged in suppressing a rebellion, the forces remained weak while the religious and tribal leaders grew strong. In 1930, there were uprisings by the Shinwari Pushtuns as well as by another Tajik leader. The same year, a Soviet force crossed the border in pursuit of an Uzbek leader whose forces had been harassing the Soviets from his sanctuary in Afghanistan. He was driven back to the Soviet side by the Afghan army in April 1930, and by the end of 1931 most uprisings had been subdued. Nadir Shah named a ten-member cabinet, consisting mostly of members of his family, and in September 1930 he called into session a loya jirga of 286 which confirmed his accession to the throne. In 1931 the king promulgated a new constitution. Despite its appearance as a constitutional monarchy, the document officially instituted a royal oligarchy, and popular participation was merely an illusion. Although Nadir Shah placated religious factions with a constitutional emphasis on orthodox denominational principles, he also took steps to modernize Afghanistan in material ways, although far less obtrusively than his cousin Amanullah. He improved road construction, especially the Great North Road through the Hindu Kush, and methods of communication. He forged commercial links with the same foreign powers that Amanullah had established diplomatic relations with in the 1920s, and, under the leadership of several prominent entrepreneurs, he initiated a banking system and long-range economic planning. Although his efforts to improve the army did not bear fruit immediately, by the time of his death in 1933 Nadir Shah had created a 40,000-strong force from almost no national army at all. It is notable that Afghanistan's regeneration was carried out with no external assistance whatsoever.

During his reign, Nadir Khan reopened many schools. He established faculty of Medicine, which later became Kabul University with the addition of a few more faculties. Nadir Shah's brief four year reign ended violently, but he nevertheless accomplished a feat of which his great-great-uncle, Dost Mohammad, would have been proud: he reunited a fragmented Afghanistan. Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933 by a young man whose family had been feuding with the king since his accession to power.

Mohammad Zahir Shah

Muhammad Zahir, last in the 226-year dynasty of Pashtun monarchs to rule Afghanistan, emerged in the fall of 2001 as a symbol of unity for his country. In December 2001 Zahir Shah gave his blessing to Hamid Karzai, a fellow Pashtun selected as an interim leader for the troubled country. The son of King Nadir Shah of Afghanistan, Muhammad Zahir Shah was born on October 15, 1914, in the capital city of Kabul. Educated in both his native country and France, he was thrust suddenly into power at the age of 19, only hours after his father was assassinated. On November 8, 1933, he replaced his father on the throne of the Durani dynasty, first established in 1747 by Ahmad Shah. The young monarch adopted the title Mutawakkil Ala'llah, Pairaw-I Din-I Matin-I slam ("Confident in God, Follower of the Firm Religion of Islam"). He instituted programs of political and economic modernization, ushering in a democratic legislature, education for women and other such changes. These reforms put him at odds with the religious militants who opposed him. Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, the same year the United States officially recognized Afghanistan. The conclusion of the Treaty of Saadabad with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in 1937 reinforced Afghanistan's regional ties to neighboring Islamic States. After the outbreak of World War II, the king proclaimed Afghan neutrality on August 17, 1940, but the Allies were unhappy with the presence of a large group of German non-diplomatic personnel. In October British and Soviet governments demanded that Afghanistan expel all non-diplomatic personnel from the Axis nations. Although the Afghan government considered this demand insulting and illegitimate, it appeared to heed the example of Iran; Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran in August 1941 after the government ignored a similar demand. Afghanistan ordered non-diplomatic personnel from all belligerents to leave, and a loya jirga called by the king supported his policy of absolute neutrality. As the war progressed, it provided larger markets for Afghan agricultural produce especially in India. He also oversaw the opening of relations with the newly created state of Pakistan, which inherited the Pashtuns from the formerly British-ruled side of the Durand Line. The Pashtuns sought an independent or semi-independent statehood, that would include the Pashto speakers within Pakistan, but Zahir Shah did nothing to support or reject this notion. By mid-1953, the younger members of the royal family, which may have included the king himself, challenged domination by the king's uncles. The rift became public in September 1953 when the king's cousin and brother-in-law, Mohammad Daoud, became prime minister.

The single greatest achievement of the 1963-73 decade was the promulgation of the 1964 constitution. Zahir Shah was gaining a reputation of being lazy and letting everything pass him by. The Ambitious Daud Khan resigned in protest soon after. On January 1, 1965, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded. The PDPA, a communist party in fact if not in name, was established for the primary purpose of gaining parliamentary seats. The PDPA was comprised of a small group of men, followers of Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal, both avowed Marxist-Leninists with a proMoscow orientation. There were daily demonstrations on the streets of Kabul by the students, dogs were dressed as Zahir shah and dragged towards the Kings Palace, and Zahir Shah ignored them. The 1969 parliamentary elections, when voter turnout was not much greater than in 1965 produced a legislative assembly essentially consistent with the real population and distribution of power in the hinterland, in that conservative landowners and businessmen predominated and many more non-Pashtuns were elected than in the previous legislature. Most of the urban liberals and all of the female delegates lost their seats. Few leftists remained in the new parliament, although Karmal and Hafizullah Amin had been elected from districts in and near Kabul. Former prime minister Maiwandwal, a democratic socialist, lost his seat when the government selectively influenced the elections. Between 1969 and 1973, instability ruled Afghan politics. The parliament was lethargic and deadlocked. Public dissatisfaction over the unstable government prompted growing political polarization as both the left and the right began to attract more members. Still personally popular, the king nevertheless came under increasing criticism for not supporting his own prime ministers. It was in this atmosphere of internal discontent and polarization and external shakiness that Daoud implemented the coup d'état he had been planning for a year in response to the "anarchy and the anti-national attitude of the regime." While the king was out of the country for medical treatment, Daoud and a small military group seized power in an almost bloodless coup. There were dancing in the streets of Kabul and singers sang songs of the young repulic as Daud Khan proclaim Afghanistan a republic and himself as president. After the 1973 coup, Zahir shah relinquished his claim to the thrown and spent life with his family in villa in Italy. On April 18, 2002 former Afghan king Zahir Shah returned to Kabul after 29 years in exile. Overjoyed at his return, delegations from all over Afghanistan flooded to the airport to greet him. Although the 87-year old former monarch returned as an ordinary citizen, his arrival was seen as a force for unification, as he is seen as symbol of better times in prewar Afghanistan. The former king still commands considerable respect.

Zahir Shah and his Uncles 1933-53
Three of the Musahiban brothers were still alive after Nadir Shah's death, and they exercised decisive influence over decisionmaking during the first 20 years of Zahir Shah's reign. The eldest, Muhammad Hashim, who had been prime minister under the late king, retained that post until 1946, when he was replaced by the youngest of the Musahiban brothers, Shah Mahmud. Hashim is described by Fraser-Tytler as a statesman of great administrative ability and high personal integrity who devoted all of his energy to his country. In the months immediately following Nadir Shah's assassination, while the tribes remained quiet and the followers of exking Amanullah remained disorganized and impotent, Hashim began to put into practice the policies already planned by the Musahiban brothers. Internal objectives of the new Afghan government, up to the outbreak of World War II, were focused on improving the army and developing the economy (including transport and communications). Both goals, however, required external assistance. Seeking to avoid involvement with the Soviet Union and Britain, Hashim turned to a far-off nation that had both the interest and the technical expertise required-Germany. By 1935 the Afghan government had invited German experts and businessmen to help set up factories and build hydroelectric projects. Lesser amounts of aid were also accepted from Italy and Japan, but these two countries did not achieve Germany's level of prominence in Afghanistan's foreign relations. By the beginning of the 1940s Germany was Afghanistan's most important foreign friend. Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, the same year that the United States accorded Afghanistan official recognition. Regional ties to nearby Islamic states were reinforced by the conclusion in 1937 of friendship and nonaggression pacts with Turkey and Iran. Although never implemented because World War II intervened, Dupree notes that the pacts laid the groundwork for coordination among the three states in later periods. The relationship with Turkey was especially close. A few relatively minor uprisings along the Afghan border, including one on behalf of ex-king Amanullah, occurred late in the 1930s, but these were overshadowed by the outbreak of World War II. The king issued a proclamation of Afghan neutrality on August 17, 1940, but the Allies were unhappy with the presence of a large group of German nondiplomatic personnel. In October the British and Soviet governments demanded that Afghanistan expel all nondiplomatic personnel from the Axis nations. The Afghan government considered this an insulting and illegitimate demand, but it undoubtedly found instructive the example of Iran, which Britain and the Soviet Union had invaded and occupied in August 1941 after the Iranian government ignored a similar demand. Zahir Shah and his advisers found a face-saving response, ordering all nondiplomatic personnel from the belligerent countries out of Afghanistan. A Loya Jirgah called by the king at this time supported his policy of absolute neutrality. Although World War II disrupted Afghanistan's incipient foreign relationships and to some extent the government's domestic goals, it also provided larger markets for Afghan agricultural produce (especially in India). By the war's end the government had exchanged official missions with both China and the United States, and the latter had replaced Britain as the major market for Afghanistan's principal export, karakul skins. Shortly after the end of the war, Shah Mahmud replaced his older brother as prime minister, ushering in a period of great change in both the internal and external politics of Afghanistan. Among other things, the new prime minister presided over the inauguration of the giant Helmand Valley Project (which brought Afghanistan into a closer relationship with the United States) and the beginning of relations with the newly created nation of Pakistan, which inherited the Pashtuns on the side of the Durand Line formerly ruled by Britain. The issue of Pashtunistan (or Pakhtunistan)-agitation for an independent or semi-independent state to include the Pashto and Pakhtu speakers within Pakistan, whether officially joined with Afghanistan or not-would have a resounding impact on Afghanistan politics, as would the political liberalization inaugurated by Shah Mahmud.

The Helmand Valley Project, inaugurated in 1945 with an agreement between the Afghan government and an American company, was designed to harness the irrigation and hydroelectric potential of the Helmand. There were myriad problems with the project, and although parts of it were completed before 1953, it was not until Daoud became prime minister in 1953 that the project began to move toward completion.

The Pashtunistan Issue
In their colonial period, European nations created frontiers throughout Asia and Africa that left legacies of bitterness, and often of war, for the independent nations that emerged from colonial rule. Although it was never colonized, Afghanistan was no exception. The Durand Line had been bitterly resented by Amir Abdur Rahman, and none of his successors gave up the notion of Pashtun unity, even though they cooperated with the British government in other matters. The line dividing the Pashtun people became extremely irksome to the Afghans and the Pakistani government, which inherited the frontier upon the partition of British India in 1947. The fragility of the new nation of Pakistan may have incited the Afghans to reassert the concept of Pashtunistan in 1947. Although the issue became most vexing at the time of the partition, British policy in the area before 1947 also contributed to the development of the Pashtunistan problem. In 1901 they had created a new administrative area, the NWFP, which they detached from the Punjab, and had divided the new province into Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies, the latter ruled not by the provincial government but by a British political agent who reported directly to Delhi. This separation was reinforced by the fact that the experiments in provincial democracy inaugurated in 1919 were not extended to the NWFP. In the 1930s Britain extended provincial self-government to the NWFP. By this time the Indian National Congress (Congress), which was largely controlled by Hindus, had extended its activities to the province. The links between the political leaders of the NWFP with the Hindu leaders of Congress was such that a majority in the NWFP cabinet originally voted to go with India in the partition, a decision that might have been rejected by a majority of voters in the province. In July 1947 the British held a referendum in the Settled Districts of the province that offered the population the choice of joining an independent India or a now-inevitable Pakistan. Although local leaders now leaned toward independence, a position officially supported by the Afghan government, this was not an option offered in the vote. Although these leaders advocated a boycott of the referendum, an estimated 56 percent of the eligible voters participated, and of these over 90 percent voted to join Pakistan. In the Tribal Agencies a Loya Jirgah was held. Offered the choice between joining India or Pakistan, the tribes declared their wish for the latter. Both the Afghan and Indian leaders objected to both procedures, declaring that, because the tribes had the same kind of direct links to the British as the princely states of India, the Pashtun tribes should be treated the same way, i.e., they should be offered a third option of initial independence until they could decide which state to join. The birth, along with India, of the independent nation of Pakistan, accompanied by massive dislocation and bloodshed, was thus further complicated by the agitation for independence or provincial autonomy by a significant minority, and perhaps a majority, of the residents of the NWFP. This issue poisoned relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan for many years. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Pashtunistan issue was manifested not only in bitter denunciations but also by such actions as Afghanistan's casting of the sole negative vote on Pakistan's admission to the United Nations (UN) and Pakistan's meddling with the transit of commodities to its landlocked neighbor. Although both Afghanistan and Pakistan made conciliatory gestures-including Afghanistan's withdrawal of its negative UN vote and the exchange of ambassadors in February 1948the matter remained unresolved. In June 1949 a Pakistani air force plane bombed a village just across the frontier in one of the government's attempts to suppress tribal uprisings. In response, the Afghan government called into session a Loya Jirgah, which promptly proclaimed that it recognized "neither the imaginary Durand nor any similar Line" and declared void all agreements-From the 1893 Durand agreement onwardrelated to the issue. There was an attempt to set up an independent Pashtun parliament inside the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, which was undoubtedly supported covertly by the Afghan government. Irregular forces led by a local Pashtun leader crossed the border in 1950 and 1951 to back Afghan claims. The Pakistani government did not accept the Afghan government's claim that they had no control over these men, and both nations' ambassadors were withdrawn. Ambassadors were exchanged once again a few months later. In March 1952 the assassination of the

Pakistani prime minister by an Afghan citizen living in Pakistan was another irritant in bilateral relations, although the Pakistani government accepted Afghan denials of any involvement on its part. The Pakistani government, despite its preoccupation with many other problems, adopted from the beginning a very conciliatory attitude toward its Pashtun citizens. The residents of the Tribal Agencies were permitted to retain virtual autonomy, expenditures on health and other services in the NWFP were disproportionately higher than in other areas of the country, and only a few units of a locally recruited Frontier Corps were left in the Tribal Agencies (in contrast with the 48 regular army battalions that had been kept there under British rule). The government also continued to pay subsidies to hundreds of maliks (chiefs or leaders) in the tribal areas. The issue of the international boundary through Pashtun areas was of the greatest possible importance to the policymakers in Kabul, just as it had been in the days of Amir Abdur Rahman. The beginning in recent times of Afghanistan's ties to the Soviet Union grew at least partially from the Pashtunistan and related issues. By the 1950s the United States-which had replaced Britian as the major Western power in the regionhad begun to develop a strong relationship with Pakistan. When in 1950 Pakistan stopped vital transshipments of petroleum to Afghanistan for about three months, presumably to retaliate for the attacks across the border by Afghan tribes, the Afghan government became more interested in offers of aid from the Soviet Union and, in July 1950, signed a major agreement with the Soviet Union.

Experiment with Liberalized Politics
The third major policy focus of the immediate postwar period in Afghanistan was the experiment in political liberalization implemented by Shah Mahmud. Encouraged by young, Western-educated members of the political elite, the prime minister allowed national assembly elections that were distinctly less controlled than ever before, resulting in the "liberal parliament" of 1949. He also relaxed strict press censorship and allowed opposition political groups to come to life. The most important of these groups was Weekh--Zalmayan (Awakened Youth), a movement made up of diverse dissident groups founded in Kandahar in 1947. As the new liberal parliament began taking its duties seriously and questioning the king's ministers, students at Kabul University also began to debate political questions. A newly formed student union provided not only a forum for political debate but also produced plays critical of Islam and the monarchy. Newspapers criticized the government, and many groups and individuals began to demand a more open political system. The liberalization clearly went further than the prime minister had intended. His first reaction was to ride the tide by creating a government party, but when this failed, the government began to crack down on political activity. The Kabul University student union was dissolved in 1951, the newspapers that had criticized the government were closed down, and many of the leaders of the opposition were jailed. The parliament elected in 1952 was a large step backward from the one elected in 1949; the experiment in open politics was over. The liberal experiment had an important effect on the nation's political future. It provided the breeding ground for the revolutionary movement that would come to power in 1978. Nor Muhammad Taraki, who became president following the 1978 coup d'etat claimed in his official biography to have been the founder of the Wikh-i-Zalmayan and the dissident newspaper, Angar (Burning Embers). Writer Beverley Male notes, however, that the claim appears exaggerated. Babrak Karmal, who became president after the Soviet invasion of December 1979, was active in the Kabul University student union during the liberal period and was imprisoned in 1953 for his political activities. Hafizullah Amin later claimed to have also played a role in the student movement, although his activities were apparently not so noteworthy as to bring about his imprisonment by the government. The government crackdown in 1951 and 1952 suddenly ended liberalization and alienated many young, reformist Afghans who may have originally hoped only to reform the existing structure rather than radically transform it. As Male suggests, "the disillusionment which accompanied the abrupt termination of the experiment in liberalism was an important factor in the radicalisation of the men who later established the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan."

Daoud as Prime Minister 1953-63
In the wake of the failed political reforms of the 1949-52 period came a major shakeup within the royal family. FraserTytler notes that since the advent of Nadir Shah to the throne in 1929, Afghanistan had been ruled by the royal family as a united group. By mid-1953, however, the younger members of the royal family (including perhaps the king himself) had challenged the dominance of the king's uncles, and in September 1953 the rift became public when the king's first cousin and brother-in-law, Daoud (son of the third Musahiban brother, Muhammad Aziz, who had been assassinated in Berlin in 1933), became prime minister. The king's uncle, Shah Mahmud, left his post, but he continued to proffer his support and advice to the new leaders. The change occurred peacefully, entirely within-and apparently with the consent of-the royal family. Prime Minister Daoud was the first of the young, Westerneducated generation of the royal family to wield power in Kabul. If the proponents of the liberal experiment hoped that he would move toward a more open political system, they were disappointed. Daoud was, as FraserTytler puts it, "by temperament and training ...of an authoritarian habit of mind." By all accounts, however, he was a dynamic leader whose accession to power marked major changes in Afghanistan's policies, both domestic and foreign. Although Daoud was concerned to correct what he perceived as the pro-Western bias of previous governments, his keen interest in modernization manifested itself in continued support of the Helmand Valley project, which was designed to transform life in southwestern Afghanistan. Another area of domestic policy initiative by Daoud included his cautious steps toward emancipation of women. At the fortieth celebration of national independence in 1959, Daoud had the wives of his ministers appear in public unveiled. When religious leaders protested, he challenged them to cite a single verse of the Quran that specifically mandated veiling. When they continued to resist, he jailed them for a week. Daoud also increased control over the tribes, starting with the repression of a tribal war in the contentious Khost area adjacent to Pakistan in September 1959 and the forcible collection of land taxes in Qandahar in December 1959 in the face of antigovernment demonstrations promoted by local religious leaders. Daoud's social and economic policies within Afghanistan, reformist but cautious, were relatively successful; his foreign policy-which was carried out by his brother, Mohammad Naim-although fruitful in some respects, resulted in severe economic dislocation and, ultimately, his own political eclipse. Two principles guided Daoud's foreign policy: to balance what he regarded as the excessively pro-Western orientation of previous governments by improving relations with the Soviet Union but without sacrificing economic aid from the United States, and to pursue the Pashtunistan issue by every possible means. The two goals were to some extent mutually reinforcing because hostilities with Pakistan caused the Kabul government to fall back on the Soviet Union as its trade and transit link with the rest of the world. Daoud believed that the rivalry between the two superpowers for regional clients or allies created the conditions in which he could play one off against the other in his search for aid and development assistance. Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the 1953-63 period began on a high note with a Soviet development loan equivalent to US$3.5 million in January 1954. Daoud's desire for improved bilateral relations became a necessity when the Pakistani-Afghan border was closed for five months in 1955. When the Iranian and American governments declared that they were unable to create an alternate Afghan trade access route of nearly 5,800 kilometers to the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea, the Afghans had no choice but to request a renewal of the 1950 transit agreement. The renewal was ratified in June 1955 and followed by a new bilateral barter agreement: Soviet petroleum, building materials, and metals in exchange for Afghan raw materials. After a December 1955 visit to Kabul by Soviet leaders Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union announced a US$100 million

development loan for projects to be mutually agreed upon. Before the end of the year the Afghans also announced a 10-year extension of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, originally signed in 1931 by Nadir Shah. Afghan-Soviet ties grew throughout this period, as did Afghan links with the Soviet Union's East European allies, especially Czechoslovakia and Poland. Despite these strengthened ties to the Soviet Union, the Daoud regime sought to maintain good relations with the United States, which began to be more interested in Afghanistan as a result of the efforts by Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration to solidify an alliance in the "Northern Tier" (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Adhering to its nonaligned stance, the Afghan government refused to join the American-sponsored Baghdad Pact, although Eisenhower's personal representative was courteously welcomed when he came to discuss regional issues in 1957. These rebuffs did not deter the United States from continuing its relatively low-level aid program in Afghanistan. Its other projects in the 1953-63 period included the Qandahar International Airport (which became obsolete with the advent of jet aircraft), assistance to Ariana Afghan Airlines, and continuation of the Helmand Valley Project. The United States was reluctant to provide Afghanistan with military aid, and the Daoud government successfully sought it from the Soviet Union and its allies. These nations agreed to provide Afghanistan with the equivalent of US$25 million worth of military materiel in 1955 and also undertook the construction of military airfields in Mazar-a Sharif, Shindand, and Bagrami. Although the United States did provide military training for Afghan officers, it made no attempt to match Soviet arms transfers. Dupree points out that eventually the United States and Soviet aid programs were bound to overlap, and when they did there developed a quiet, de facto cooperation between the two powers. All other foreign policy issues faded in importance, given Daoud's virtual obsession with the Pashtunistan issue. His policy disrupted Kabul's important relationship with Pakistan andbecause Pakistan was landlocked Afghanistan's main trade route-the dispute virtually cut off development aid, except from the Soviet Union, and sharply diminished Afghanistan's external trade for several years. In 1953 and 1954 Daoud simply applied more of the same techniques used in the past to press the Pashtunistan issue, i.e., hostile propaganda and payments to tribesmen (on both sides of the border) to subvert the Pakistani government. In 1955, however, the situation became more critical from Daoud's point of view. Pakistan, for reasons of internal politics, abolished the four provincial governments of West Pakistan and formed one provincial unit (like East Pakistan). The Afghan government protested the abolition of the NWFP (excluding the Tribal Agencies), and in March 1955 a mob in Kabul attacked the Pakistani embassy and consulate and tore down their flags. Retaliatory mobs attacked the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, and soon both nations recalled their officials from the neighboring state. Despite the failure of mediation by a group of Islamic states, tempers eventually cooled, and flags were rehoisted above the diplomatic establishments in both countries. This incident left great bitterness in Afghanistan, however, where interest in the Pashtunistan issue remained high, and the closure of the border during the spring and fall of 1955 again underlined to the Kabul government the need for good relations with the Soviets to provide assured transit routes for Afghan trade. Although the Afghan side was not resigned to accepting the status quo on the Pashtunistan issue, the conflict remained dormant for several years, during which relations improved slightly between the two nations. Nor did the 1958 coup that brought General Mohammad Ayub Khan to power in Pakistan bring on any immediate change in the situation. In 1960, however, Daoud sent Afghan troops across the border into Bajaur in an unsuccessful and foolhardy attempt to manipulate events in that area and to press the Pashtunistan issue. The Afghan forces were routed by the Pakistan military, but military skirmishes along the border continued at a low level in 1961, often between Pakistani Pashtun (armed by the Afghans) and Pakistani regular and paramilitary forces. The propaganda war, carried out by radio, was more vicious than ever during this period.

Finally, in August 1961 Pakistan used another weapon on Afghanistan: It informed the Afghan government that its subversion made normal diplomatic relations impossible and that Pakistan was closing its consulates in Afghanistan, requesting that Afghanistan follow suit. The Afghan government, its pride severely stung, responded that the Pakistanis had one week to rescind this policy, or Afghanistan would cut diplomatic relations. When the Pakistanis failed to respond to this, Afghanistan severed relations on September 6, 1961. Traffic between the two countries came to a halt, just as two of Afghanistan's major export crops were ready to be shipped to India. The grape and pomegranate crops, grown in traditionally rebellious areas, were bought by the government to avoid trouble. The Soviet Union stepped in, offering to buy the crops and airlift them from Afghanistan. What the Soviets did not ship, Ariana Afghan Airlines airlifted to India, so that in both 1961 and 1962 the fruit crop was exported successfully. Dupree notes that although the loss of this crop would not have been as disastrous to the average Afghan as observers generally suggest, the situation did provide the opportunity for a fine public relations gesture by the Soviets. At the same time, although the United States attempted to mediate the dispute, it was clearly linked closely to Pakistan. More than the fruit crop was jeopardized by the closure of Afghanistan's main trade route. Much of the equipment and material provided by foreign aid programs and needed for development projects was held up in Pakistan. Another outgrowth of the dispute was Pakistan's decision to close the border to nomads (members of the Ghilzai, variously known as Powindahs or Suleiman Khel), who had been spending winters in Pakistan and India and summers in Afghanistan as long as anyone could remember. Although the Pakistani government denied that the decision was owing to the impasse with Afghanistan, this claim appeared disingenuous, and the issue added weight to the growing conflict between the two countries. Afghanistan's economic situation continued to deteriorate. The nation was heavily dependent upon customs revenues, which fell dramatically; trade suffered, and foreign exchange reserves were seriously depleted. It became clear by 1963 that the two stubborn leaders, Daoud of Afghanistan and Ayub Khan of Pakistan, would not yield and that one of them would have to be removed from power to resolve the issue. Despite growing criticism of Ayub among some Pakistanis, his position was strong internally, and it was Afghanistan's economy that was suffering most. In March 1963 King Zahir Shah, with the backing of the royal family, asked Daoud for his resignation on the basis that the country's economy was deteriorating because of Daoud's Pashtunistan policy. During the decade that Daoud was prime minister, the king, who was his peer in age, had become better known by the public and more influential in the royal family and the political elite. Because he controlled the armed forces, Daoud almost certainly had the power to resist the king's request for his resignation, but he did not do so. Daoud bowed out, as did his brother Naim, and Zahir Shah named as the new prime minister Muhammad Yousuf, a nonPashtun, Germaneducated technocrat who had been serving as the minister of mines and industries.

The King Rules: The Last Decade of Monarchy 1963-73
The decision to ask Daoud to step down had been reached not only within the royal family but also with the involvement of other members of the Afghan political elite. This set the tone for the 10 years to follow, in which Zahir Shah ruled as well as reigned but with a broad base of support within the political elite. The reaction to the dramatic change in Kabul was subdued. Although some Afghans attributed Daoud's fall to covert American intervention (because of Daoud's friendship with the Soviets), others were delighted that the unnatural strain in relations with Pakistan could be ended. A thriving black market trade had continued across the border, but the hostility had weighed heavily on the daily life of many Afghans especially city dwellers, who had experienced a doubling of prices for many essential commodities since the 1961 border closing. Dupree observes that devout Afghans expected an end to Daoud's secularization, intellectuals anticipated social and political reforms, and the population in general seemed to feel that while Daoud's economic reforms had benefitted the nation, his stubbornness on the Pashtunistan issue made his departure necessary. He notes that only three groups were unhappy over Daoud's resignation: the Pashtunistan fanatics, royal family members who worried about giving nonfamily members any power in decisionmaking, and proSoviet Afghans. Although it could not provide the immediate transformations the public expected, the new government clearly both represented and sought change. The prime minister and at least one other cabinet member were non-Pashtuns; only four of the new cabinet were Durrani, and none was a member of the royal family. Before the end of May the government had appointed a committee to draft changes in the constitution had ordered an investigation into the abysmal conditions of Afghan prisons, and had reached agreement with Pakistan on the reestablishment of diplomatic and trade relations. The single greatest achievement of the 1963-73 decade was the 1964 constitution. Only two weeks after the resignation of Daoud, the king appointed a committee to draft a new constitution. By February 1964 a draft document had been written, and within a few months another royal commission, including members of diverse political and ethnic backgrounds had reviewed and revised the draft. In the spring of 1964 the king ordered the convening of a Loya Jirgah-a national gathering that included the members of the National Assembly, the Senate, the Supreme Court, and both constitutional commissions. One hundred seventy-six members were elected by the provinces, and 34 members were appointed directly by the king. As Dupree notes, Afghan monarchs had abused the mechanism of a Loya Jirgah in the past by allowing only their own supporters to attend. Although the assemblage of 452 persons (including six women) that met in September 1964 was composed predominantly of officials who could be expected to support the royal line, the Loya Jirgah also included members elected from the entire nation. Dupree notes that the government did screen out many potential dissidents but concludes that "on the whole. . .delegates to the Loya Jirgah appeared to represent the full range of social, political, and religious opinion." The 10-day deliberation of the Loya Jirgah produced heated debates and significant changes in the draft constitution. On September 20 the constitution was signed by the 452 members, and on October 1 it was signed by the king and became the constitution of Afghanistan. The constitution-and the deliberations that produced it-demonstrated several interesting changes in political thinking. It barred the royal family, other than the king, from politics and government-a provision that was viewed as being aimed at keeping Daoud out of politics. Individual, as opposed to tribal, rights were strongly championed by provincial delegates, and most conservative religious members were persuaded to accept provisions that they had previously suggested were intolerably secular. The succession issue within the royal family was settled to common satisfaction. The most interesting aspect of this discussion was one delegate's query as to why the throne should not go to the king's eldest daughter if there was no qualified male heir. Although some delegates were horrified and the question was not seriously considered, Dupree notes that the mere fact of its being asked was a sign of

growing political sophistication among Afghans. Although there was lengthy debate over the use of the word Afghan to denote all citizens of Afghanistan (many people regarding it as a reference to Pashtuns alone), it was agreed by the Loya Jirgah that this term should refer to all citizens. The constitution provided that state religious rituals be conducted according to the Hanafi rite and identified Islam as "the sacred religion of Afghanistan," but it was still necessary to persuade many conservative religious members of the group that Islam had been enshrined in the constitution. Although Article 64 provided that there be no laws that were "repugnant to the basic principles" of Islam, Article 69 defined laws as resolutions passed by the houses of parliament and signed by the king, with sharia to be used when no such law existed. The constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary gave rise to heated debate among religious leaders, many of whom supported the existing system of religious laws and judges. The new constitution incorporated the religious judges into the judicial system, but it also established the supremacy of secularlaw. The new constitution provided for a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature, but predominant power remained in the hands of the king. Despite the difficulties imposed by widespread illiteracy, low voter turnout, attempts by some government officials (especially in the outlying areas) to influence the results, the lack of political parties, and the fact that Afghanistan was a tribal society with no tradition of national elections, most observers described the 1965 election as remarkably fair. The 216-member Wolesi Jirgah, the lower house of parliament, included representation by not only antiroyalists but also by both the left and right of the political spectrum. It included supporters of the king, Pashtun nationalists, entrepreneurs and industrialists, political liberals, a small leftist group, and conservative Muslim leaders who still opposed secularization. In heated early debates some members castigated the members of Yousuf's transitional cabinet. A student sit-in in the lower house of parliament was followed by demonstrations in which government troops killed three civilians, shocking many Afghans. The king nominated another prime minister, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, who quickly established a firm but friendly relationship with the students. There were, of course, rumors in Kabul about outside support for these and subsequent demonstrations. Dupree, who was in Kabul at the time, finds it unlikely that they were the work of outside agitators but rather resulted from "homegrown dissatisfaction with the ministerial clique which had played musical chairs during the Daoud regime and the succeeding interim regime." On January 1, 1965, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded. This was not an orthodox Marxist party but an entity created out of diverse leftist groups that united for the principal purpose of gaining parliamentary seats in the elections. The fact that four PDPA members won parliamentary seats suggests that government efforts to intervene in the balloting to prevent the success of its leftist opponents were halfhearted. The press was semicontrolled. Starting in 1966, as many as 30 newspapers were established and, although some were short-lived, they provided the focus for the many political groups in Kabul that now began to make their views known. Taraki, one of the four PDPA members elected to parliament in 1965, started the first major leftist newspaper, Khalq (Masses), which lasted little more than a month before being banned by the government. Student unrest continued and escalated into violence, which included police beatings of student and faculty demonstrators. For a month and a half in 1969 there was a citywide student strike in Kabul, but the government refused to give in to student demands, and the university was peacefully reopened in November. The Afghan political system remained suspended between democracy and monarchy, though much closer to the latter. Political parties remained banned because the king refused to sign legislation that had passed the parliament allowing parties. The lower house of parliament engaged in free and often insulting criticism of government policies and personnel. Although unorganized as a legislative body, the Wolesi Jirgah was able to exert some influence on the royal administration. By 1969 the PDPA had already undergone an important split, the faction of Babrak Karmal parting company ideologically with Taraki (see Evolution of the PDPA as a Political Force, ch.

4.) The new group's newspaper, Parcham (Banner), operated from March 1968 until July 1969 when it was closed. It was not long before other divisions within the PDPA began to occur. The 1969 parliamentary elections (in which voter turnout was not much greater than that of 1965) produced a parliament that was more or less consistent with the real distribution of power and population in the Afghan hinterland; conservative landowners and businessmen predominated, and many more non-Pashtuns were elected than in the previous legislature. Most of the urban liberals and all female delegates lost their seats. There were few leftists in the new parliament, although Karmal and Hafizullah Amin (a mathematics teacher educated in the United States) had been elected from districts in and near Kabul. Former prime minister Maiwandwal, a democratic socialist, lost his seat because of government interference. The years between 1969 and 1973 saw a critical downturn in Afghan politics. The parliamenton which hopes for democracy in Afghanistan had depended-was lethargic and deadlocked; Griffiths reports that it passed only one minor bill in the 1969-70 session. Public dissatisfaction over the lack of stable government reflected the fact that there were five prime ministers in the decade starting in 1963. There was a growing polarization of politics as the left and the right began to attract more and more members. The king, although still personally popular, came under increasing criticism for not supporting his own prime ministers and for withholding support from legislation passed by the parliament (such as the political parties bill). Some critics of the government blamed not the king but his cousin (and son-in-law) General Abdul Wali, a key military commander, or other members of the royal family. Abdul Wali, commander of the Kabul region and of the palace guard, was especially hated by leftists for having ordered troops to fire on demonstrators in October 1965. Other disruptive elements were two successive years of drought followed by a tragic famine in 1972 in which as many as 100,000 Afghans may have perished. Relief efforts and foreign donations were mishandled, and there were accusations of speculation and hoarding that eroded public confidence in government administration. Finally, the Indo-Pakistani War and the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 was closely watched in Afghanistan, where interest in Pakistani politics was great and where the Pashtunistan issue always lurked near the surface of politics. It was in this atmosphere of external instability and internal dissatisfaction and polarization that Daoud executed a coup d'etat that he had been planning for more than a year in response to the "anarchy and the anti-national attitude of the regime." While the king was out of the country for medical treatment, Daoud and a small military group took power with strong resistance only from the regent, Abdul Wali. The stability Zahir Shah had sought through limited democracy under a constitution had not been achieved, and there was a generally favorable popular response to the reemergence of Daoud, even though it meant the demise of the monarchy established by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747.

Mohammad Daud Khan
Born July 18, 1909 - died April 27, 1978 The welcome Daud Khan received on returning to power on July 17, 1973 reflected the citizenry's disappointment with the lackluster politics of the preceding decade. King Zahir's "New Democracy" had promised much but had delivered little. Daud Khan's comeback was a return to traditional strongman rule and he was a particularly appealing figure to military officers. As prime minister, Daud Khan had obtained large supplies of modern arms from the Soviet Union and he had been a former army officer himself. Also, his strong position on the Pashtunistan issue had not been forgotten by conservative Pashtun officers. Daud Khan discussed rebellion for more than a year with various opposition elements--both moderates and leftists, including military officers who were members of both the Khalqi and Parchami factions of the PDPA. Certainly the communists had worked vigorously to undermine Zahir Shah's experiment in constitutional democracy. Their inflammatory speeches in parliament and organized street riots were tactics which alarmed the king to the degree that he refused to sign the law legalizing political parties. Karmal's Parcham faction became integrally involved in planning the coup. There is general agreement that Daud Khan had been meeting with what he called various "friends" for more than a year. The coup itself was carried out by junior officers trained in the Soviet Union . Some Afghans suspected that Daud Khan and Karmal had been in touch for many years and that Daud Khan had used him as an informant on the leftist movement. No strong link can be cited to support this, however, other than the closeness between Karmal's father, an army general, and Daud Khan. At the time of the July 1973 coup, which took place when the king was in Italy receiving eye treatment at the medicinal mud baths at Ischia , Italy , it was sometimes difficult to assess the factional and party affiliation of the officers who took place. Despite a number of conversions of Parchamis to the Khalqi faction by the time of the communist coup of April 1978 which overthrew Daud Khan, both party and factional loyalties became obvious after the PDPA took power. Although leftists had played a central role in the coup, and despite the appointment of two leftists as ministers, evidence suggests that the coup was Daud Khan's alone. Officers personally loyal to him were placed in key positions while young Parchamis were sent to the provinces, probably to get them out of Kabul , until Daud Khan had purged the leftist officers by the end of 1975. The next year, Daud Khan established his own political party, the National Revolutionary Party, which became the focus of all political activity. In January 1977, a loyal jirgah approved Daud Khan's constitution establishing a presidential, one party system of government.

Any resistance to the new regime was suppressed. A coup attempt by Maiwandwal, which may have been planned before Daud Khan took power, was subdued shortly after his coup. In October 1973, Maiwandwal, a former prime minister and a highly respected former diplomat, died in prison at a time when Parchamis controlled the Ministry of Interior under circumstances corroborating the widespread belief that he had been tortured to death. While both of the PDPA's factions had attempted to collaborate with Daud Khan before the 1973 coup, Parcham used its advantage to recruit on an unprecedented scale immediately following the coup. Daud Khan, however, soon made it clear that he was no front man and that he had not adopted the claims of any ideological faction. He began in the first months of his regime to ease Parcharmis out of his cabinet. Perhaps not to alienate the Soviet Union , Daud Khan was careful to cite inefficiency and not ideological reasons for the dismissals. Khalq, seeing an opportunity to make some short-term gains at Parcham's expense, suggested to Daud Khan that "honest" Khalqis replace corrupt Parchamis. Daud Khan, wary of ideologues, ignored this offer. Daud Khan's ties with the Soviet Union , like his relations with Afghan communists, deteriorated during his five year presidency. This loosening of ties with the Soviet Union was gradual. Daud Khan's shift to the right and realignment made the Soviets anxious but western observers noted that Daud Khan remained solicitous of Soviet interests and Afghanistan 's representative in the United Nations voted regularly with the Soviet Bloc or with the group of nonaligned countries. The Soviets remained by far Afghanistan 's largest aid donor and were influential enough to insist that no Western activity, economic or otherwise, be permitted in northern Afghanistan . Daud Khan still favored a state-centered economy, and, three years after coming to power, he drew up an ambitious seven-year economic plan (1976-83) that included major projects and required a substantial influx of foreign aid. As early as 1974, Daud Khan began distancing himself from over-reliance on the Soviet Union for military and economic support. That same year, he formed a military training program with India , and opened talks with Iran on economic development aid. Daud Khan also turned to other oil-rich Muslim nations, such as Saudi Arabia , Iraq , and Kuwait , for financial assistance. Pashtunistan zealots confidently expected the new president to raise this issue with Pakistan , and in the first few months of the new regime, bilateral relations were poor. Efforts by Iran and the United States to cool a tense situation succeeded after a time, and by 1977 relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had notably improved. During Daud Khan's March 1978

visit to Islamabad , an agreement was reached whereby President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan released Pashtun and Baloch militants from prison in exchange for Daud Khan withdrawing support for these groups and expelling Pashtun and Baloch militants taking refuge in Afghanistan . Daud Khan's initial visit to the Soviet Union in 1974 was friendly, despite disagreement on the Pashtunistan issue. By the time of Daud Khan's second visit in April 1977, the Soviets knew of his purge of the left begun in 1975, his removal of Soviet advisers from some Afghan military units, and his changes in military training whereby other nations, especially India and Egypt , trained Afghans with Soviet weapons. Despite official goodwill, unofficial reports circulated of sharp Soviet criticism of anticommunists in Daud Khan's new cabinet, of his failure to cooperate with the PDPA, and of his criticism of Cuba 's role in the nonaligned movement. Furthermore, Daud Khan was friendly with Iran and Saudi Arabia , and he had scheduled a visit to Washington for the spring of 1978. President Daoud met Brezhnev on a state visit to Moscow from April 12 to 15, 1977. Pres. Daoud had asked for a private meeting with Brezhnev, to discuss with him the increased pattern of Soviet subversive actions in Afghanistan. In particular the intensified Soviet attempt to unite the two Afghan communist parties, Parcham and Khalq. Mr. Samad Ghaus, who at the time was the Afghan deputy foreign minister and was accompanying Pres. Daoud, recalls the story of the second meeting of the leaders of the two nations in his book "The Fall of Afghanistan". It is a telling tale of the nature of the relationship between the two nations. But more importantly it gives us a glimpse of the character and nature of the Afghan leader. President Daoud may have had many faults, but he was a true Afghan, and a true patriot, who give his life for his country. His disciplinary presence is missed dearly in today's chaotic Afghanistan. The next day it was the host country's turn to make its presentation. Brezhnev, as the head of the Soviet delegation, took the floor. Although seemingly less tired than the previous day, he still spoke with difficulty and perspired profusely. Brezhnev repeated a few words of welcome to President Daoud. He expressed his happiness that the Helsinki Accords on security and cooperation in Europe had been signed. He characterized that as a great step in the process of detente, which, in his view, was making progress in spite of difficulties. He cited the "militarist circles" in the US and Europe and the "hegemonists" in the People's Republic of China as the main obstacles to the relaxation of international tensions and the consolidation of peace. He said that the Soviet Union wished to improve its relations with China, but it was the latter's fault if this had not yet been realized. He expressed his country's desire to see Afghanistan prosper and, to that end, promised increased economic and technical help. Brezhnev described Afghanistan's non-alignment as important to the Soviet Union and essential to the promotion of peace in Asia and hoped that the nonaligned movement would not fall victim to imperialist machinations and intrigue. At this point, Brezhnev looked straight at Daoud and said something that seemingly made Gavrilov, the interpreter, quite uncomfortable. But, after a brief pause, he hesitantly translated Brezhnev's words, and what we heard was both crude and unexpected: Brezhnev complained that the number of experts from NATO countries working in Afghanistan in bilateral ventures, as well as in the UN and other multilateral aid projects, had considerably increased. In the past, he said, the Afghan government at least did not allow experts from NATO countries to be stationed in the northern parts of the country, but this practice was no longer strictly followed. The Soviet Union, he continued, took a grim view of these developments and wanted the Afghan government to get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies bent on promoting the cause of imperialism. A chill fell on the room. Some of the Russians seemed visibly embarrassed, and the Afghans appeared greatly displeased. I looked at Daoud, whose face had grown hard and dark. Brezhnev had stoppd talking, as if he were waiting for an answer from the Afghan president. In a cold, unemotional voice Daoud gave Brezhnev his reply, which apparantely was as unexpected to the Russians as Brezhnev's words had been to us. He told Brezhnev that what

was just said by the Russians leader could never be accepted by the Afghans, who viewed his statement as a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. He went on to say that Afghanistan greatly appreciated its ties with the Soviet Union, but this partnership must remain the partnership of equals. Daoud added, and I remember clearly his exact words, we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts and decisions. After saying this, Daoud abruptly stood up. All the Afghans did the same. Daoud nodded slightly to the Russians and staretd walking toward the exit of the huge conference room. At this point, Brezhnev, as if emrging from a state of shock, rose from his chair with some difficulty. Accompanied by his two colleagues, Podgorny and Kosygin, and followed by the Russian interpreter, he took hurried steps toward Daoud. it was clear that he intended to repair the damage done. Waheed Abdullah and I, who were walking close to the president, saw the Russians coming. Waheed Abdullah whispreed to Daoud that, for the sake of diplomatic niceties, it was advisable to take leave of the Russians properly, otherwise the visit to Moscow would be a total fiasco. He advanced towards the Russians and shook Brezhnev's extended hand. Sporting a big smile, Brezhnev said "I am told that Your Excellecy wishes to have a private meeting with me; I am at your disposal. We shall meet whenever it is convenient for you." Daoud replied in a clear, loud voice for all to hear, "I wish to inform Your Excellency that there is no longer any need for that meeting." Having said that, he shook Podgorny's and Kosygin's hands and quickly walked out of the room. That was the last time that Daoud met Brezhnev. The interruped meeting between the two delegations was never resumed, and the Russians' presentation remained unfinished. By 1978 Daud Khan had achieved little of what he had set out to accomplish. Despite good harvests in 1973 and subsequent years, no real economic progress had been made, and the Afghan standard of living had not improved. By the spring of 1978, he had alienated most key political groups by gathering power into his own hands and refusing to tolerate dissent. Although Muslim fundamentalists had been the object of repression as early as 1974, their numbers had nonetheless increased. Diehard Pashtunistan supporters were disillusioned with Daud Khan's rapprochement with Pakistan , especially by what they regarded as his commitment in the 1977 agreement not to aid Pashtun militants in Pakistan . Most ominous for Daud Khan were developments among Afghan communists. In March 1977, despite reaching a fragile agreement on reunification, Parcham and Khalq remained mutually suspicious. The military arms of each faction were not coordinated because, by this time, Khalqi military officers vastly outnumbered Parchami officers and feared the latter might inform Daud Khan of this, raising his suspicion that a coup was imminent. Although plans for a coup had long been discussed, according to a statement by Hafizullah Amin, the April 1978 coup was implemented about two years ahead of time. The April 19, 1978, funeral for Mir Akbar Khyber, a prominent Parchami ideologue who had been murdered, served as a rallying point for Afghan communists. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 persons gathered to hear stirring speeches by Taraki and Karmal. Shocked by this demonstration of communist unity, Daud Khan ordered the arrest of PDPA leaders, but he reacted too slowly. It took him a week to arrest Taraki, and Amin was merely placed under house arrest. According to later PDPA writings, Amin sent complete orders for the coup from his home while it was under armed guard using his family as messengers. The army had been put on alert on April 26 because of a presumed "anti-Islamic" coup. Given Daud Khan's repressive and suspicious mood, officers known to have differed with Daud Khan, even those without PDPA ties or with only tenuous connections to the communists, moved hastily to prevent their own downfall. On April 27, 1978, a coup d'état beginning with troop movements at the military base at Kabul International Airport, gained ground slowly over the next twenty-four hours as rebels battled units loyal to Daud Khan in and around the capital. Daud Khan and most of his family were

shot in the presidential palace the following day. Two hundred and thirty-one years of royal rule by Ahmad Shah and his descendants had ended, but it was less clear what kind of regime had succeeded them.

Noor Mohammad Tarakai (1978-1979)

Nur Mohammad Tarakai was a Shabikhel Tarakai Ghilzay Pashtun from the Sur Kelay village in the Nawa Valley in the Muqur District of Ghazni Province. In 1965, Tarakai was elected general secretary of the PDPA in its founding congress. Thirteen years later, in 1978, he became the president and prime minister of Afghanistan after a coup that toppled the centuries-old Durrani rule. It is therefore necessary to describe his biography in detail, particularly because of incorrect but widely reported information about him. Tarakai had no formal education except for a few classes he attended in a school in Quetta in British India, where he learned English. It was customary for members of his family to go there for work. When he returned home, his knowledge of English brought him a job as clerk with the Pashtun Trading Company of Musa Jan (Tokhay), first in Kandahar and later in its Bombay branch. On arrival in Kabul in 1937 Tarakai was appointed a member of the editorial board of a periodical of the Ministry of Finance, a post that helped him learn the art of writing. An influential patron, Mohammad Zaman Tarakai, helped him get the job (A.M. Karzay, personal communication, March 1993). During World War II Abdul Majid Zabuli (Tarakai), an influential businessman and president of the National Bank, appointed him director general in the State Monopoly Department. Zabuli also commissioned Tarakai to supervise the construction of his house. But Tarakai misappropriated construction material as well as money to build a house for himself; for this he was tried and dismissed (Zabuli, personal communication, Boston, 1975). Afterward Abdur Raof Benawa, director general of the Pashto Academy, helped Tarakai find a job in the Press Department, where in 1952 he became assistant director of the Bakhtar News Agency. This was during the democratic interlude, when a free press and political parties had emerged and the government had become impatient with them. Among the parties was the Awakened Youth (Weesh Zalmyan), founded in 1945 in Kabul by known nationalist contitutionalists—Qazi Bahram, Abdul Hadi Tokhay, Mohammad Rasul Pashtun, Fayz Mohammad Angar, Gul Pacha Ulfat, Qiamuddin Khadem, Ghulam Hassan Safay, Ghulam Mohayuddin Zurmulwal, Abur Raof Benawa, Nur Mohammad Tarakai, and others. This was the major political party of the time (Zurmulwal, “Weesh Zalmyan,” 17). Fearful of being arrested, Tarakai and Benawa resigned from the party and followed the government line; for this service, in 1953 Premier Shah Mahmud appointed them press attachés to Washington and Delhi, respectively. Tarakai remained at his new Washington post only a short time, however. Mohammad Na’eem, foreign minister in the new government of Premier Mohammad Daoud, recalled Tarakai because of his poor knowledge of English (G. M. Zurmulwal, personal communication, 1993). Tarakai declined to obey the order, and instead tried to claim political asylum in the United States. When this was denied him, he held a press conference in which he declared his opposition to Daoud. . . . Five weeks later, in

Karachi, he disavowed his press conference and said he was returning to Afghanistan (A. Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, 17). His return was made possible by the intercession of Benawa and Mohammad Akbar Parwani with Premier Daoud. The former was then a press attaché in the Afghan embassy in New Delhi (Karzay, personal communication, March 1993). In Kabul, Tarakai was unemployed, and toward the end of the premiership of Mohammad Daoud, he made a trip to the Soviet Union, where the KGB is believed to have recruited him. In the early 1960s he applied to the American embassy in Kabul to work as a translator but failed to get the job. When asked why he was not there, Tarakai replied, “I was not employed because I have eyes as green as those of Khruschev” (Haroun, “Daoud Khan,” 183). He then opened the Noor Translation House, apparently to make a living but, in fact, to organize like-minded Afghans into a political organization. His command of English did not enable him to do the difficult translation work. His clients were few, but the house served as an avenue of contact, especially with the Soviet agents (Karzay, personal communication, March 1993). Later Tarakai gave up the translation work to devote his full time to organizational activities. On 1 January 1965 he was able to assemble twenty-eight young, educated Afghans in a secret meeting in his residence in Karta-e-Char in the city of Kabul. There they founded the PDPA. On returning from the United States, Tarakai read Marxist literature in both English and Persian, the latter the work of the writers of the Tudeh communist party of Iran. Before his departure to the United States, Tarakai showed no sign of being a Marxist (Karzay, personal communication, March 1993). In 1957, though, he published his first novel, The Journey of Bang, an imitation in Pashto of the works of the Soviet novelist Maxim Gorky (Zurmulwal, personal communication, May 1993). Though a mediocre piece of literary work, The Journey of Bang is the first novel of its kind in Pashto that paints issues in rural society in terms of the Marxist notion of the exploitation of agrarian laborers by landlords, spiritual leaders, and government officials. This means that some time before 1957 Tarakai had turned communist. A year or two earlier, when Tarakai and I held a discusssion, he did not give me the impression of being a communist. Rather, he sounded like a discontented leftist. When in power, Tarakai published two more novels similar to The Journey of Bang, but the book published under his new surname, Nazarzad, is a standard Marxist sociological and philosophical treatise that his comrades in the Soviet Union wrote for him. Although Tarakai took part with others in compiling the first English-Pashto Dictionary, which the Pashto Academy published in 1975, he was neither a historian nor a sociologist but an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. He was also unsophisticated, and friends used to make fun of him. The more he believed in communism, the more dogmatic he became. In 1968 I returned home from higher studies in England and told Tarakai of my research thesis; he replied, “Any work based on the sources of imperialism we reject.” Yet this Tarakai organized hundreds of educated men around socialism, and after the April coup he allayed the fears of his countrymen with the simple words of the country folk, lecturing group after group of their elders that those who had overthrown the rule of the Mohammadzay tyrants were their sons, determined to do them good by providing them “home, clothes, and food,” the epitome of Bang’s dreams. But the ephemeral allaying of fear was the only service of note he rendered his “revolution.” When he was rejected by the peasants for whose emancipation he claimed he was toiling, Tarakai did not hesitate to ask the then unwilling Soviet Union to suppress them by the army. When in the game of power politics his own “loyal disciple,” Hafizullah Amin, asserted himself, Tarakai did not hesitate to suppress him either. On 9 October 1979 Amin managed to suffocate Tarakai after removing him from power on 14 September. His other opponents then blew up his grave with dynamite. All this prompted the Kremlin decision makers to order their army to invade Afghanistan. So ended the life of “the genius of the East” and “the soul and body of the party” who was without issue and often drunk, but affable with a good sence of humor. During his short rule Tarakai, in imitation of the Mughal emperors of India, watched dancing girls and enjoyed a good life (Haroun, “Daoud Khan,” 186).

Hafizullah Amin (1979)

Hafizullah Amin received a B.Sc. from the Kabul University and an M.A. in education from Columbia University in New York. In the early 1960s he returned to Columbia to work for a Ph.D degree. After having passed the general examination, he was about to begin work on a dissertation when he was called home. He also failed in his efforts to enroll in England, where I tried to help him in his efforts. While in the United States, Amin had tried to politicize the Afghan student association after he was elected its president. Back home he joined the PDPA, concentrated on politics, and recruited his Pashtun students in the government-run boarding high schools of Teachers Training and Ibn-e-Sena, which he served as a teacher and principal respectively for several years. A rural Pashtun himself, Amin succeeded in influencing the rural Pashtun students of the schools, many of whom became military officers after completing the military academy in Kabul. Amin was the only Khalqi member of the PDPA to be elected to parliament (1969). After the fall of the monarchy, when the PDPA had already split into the Parcham and Khalqi factions, the latter decided to recruit army officers, and Amin was commissioned to do the job. After the two factions reunited in 1977 Amin still went on with his job. His opponents, especially Babrak Karmal, unsuccessfully asked Taraki to relieve him of this work. On the eve of the communist coup Amin was a member of the central committee. The police did not single him out for immediate imprisonment, as it did politburo members of the PDPA on 25 April 1978. He was the last person to be arrested, and even then the police officer, who was a secret member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, postponed his imprisonment for five and a half hours (3:00-8:30 a.m., 26 April 1978) during which time Amin, without having the authority and while the politburo members were in prison, instructed the Khalqi army officers to overthrow the government. President Daoud was still in the besieged palace when Amin took command of the coup after he and his comrades were released from the prison. During the first night of the coup he alone remained in the radio station directing the coup. The other leaders of the PDPA, uncertain about their success, spent the night at the Kabul airfield ready to fly to safety if the situation warranted it. In the first week or so of the coup, Amin worked twenty-three hours a day to make the coup a success. Mainly because of the army support and the support of his associates in the party, Amin overcame both his Parchami and Khalqi opponents and reached the highest position in the party and the state, after the government had suppressed major civilian and military rebellions. During the 104 days of his own rule, except for one failed military rebellion, no major uprising took place. The Soviets killed him during their invasion of Afghanistan after Amin had effected the suffocation of pro-Soviet Taraki and had tried to govern as an independent ruler.

Babrak Karmal (1979-1986)

Although born into a wealthy Tajikid family of Kashmir origin in the village of Kamari east of Kabul, Babrak Karmal lived in hardship following the death of his mother. After graduation from the Nejat High School, Karmal enrolled at the College of Law and Political Sciences in 1951. The next year he was arrested for holding rallies in support of Abdul Rahman Mahmudi, the well-known revolutionary figure of the 1950s. In prison Karmal was befriended by a fellow inmate, Mier Akbar Khybar. A third inmate, Mier Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, initiated both to pro-Moscow leftist views. Karmal then broke off relations with the imprisoned Mahmudi because the latter had turned pro-Beijing. Following his release in 1955, Karmal resumed his studies at the university. After graduation he entered the Ministry of Planning, keeping in close touch with those who had special knowledge on communism, among them Mier Mohammad Siddiq Farhang and Ali Mohammad Zahma, a professor at Kabul University; in the 1960s Karmal addressed Farhang as ustad (master). Farhang then introduced him to the royal court. Both played a leading role in influencing the youth in adhering to communism (Sharq, Memoirs, 234). After he was raised to power, Karmal appointed Farhang as his adviser, promising him that the Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan within months and that “as economic adviser Farhang would have real power” (Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 194). On 1 January 1965 the PDPA was founded in Kabul, with Karmal serving as one of its twentyeight founding members in its founding congress. Karmal was appointed its secretary. In 1967, when the PDPA split into the rival Parcham and Khalq factions, Karmal headed the smaller, and more cosmopolitan, Parcham faction. When Daoud overthrew the monarchy and instituted a republic, Karmal’s faction shared power with him, although Karmal himself did not hold an official position. But the honeymoon did not last long. After he felt secure in his position, President Daoud dismissed Parchamis from the presidential cabinet and tried to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Under pressure from Moscow the Parcham and Khalq factions reunited in 1977, but the alliance was superficial. After the PDPA usurped power, Karmal held the posts of vice president of the Revolutionary Council and deputy premier, but he had no real power. Soon he was demoted to the post of ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Afterward the Khalqi government implicated him in a conspiracy, expelling him and his associates (who were at the time abroad as ambassadors from the PDPA) and depriving them of Afghan citizenship. The outcasts took refuge in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The Soviets resurrected them after the invasion of Afghanistan and promoted Karmal to the posts of president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister, supreme commander of the armed forces of Afghanistan, and general secretary of the PDPA. The Soviets let him assume the lofty titles but denied him the power that went with them. They let him serve only as a figurehead.

Babrak Karmal was popular with his followers, particularly the urbanized Parchamis, some of whom were emotionally attached to him. To them he was the symbol of defiance to social injustice and absolutism as well as a comrade of the downtrodden and the impoverished. His followers looked on him as the leader of the new-style pioneers who felt they had liberated themselves from the shackles of religion, tribe, region, and social customs, which restricted individuals in every corner of life. Karmal’s career of political struggle, his years of imprisonment, his perseverance in the hard profession of politics, his polished manners and convincing reasoning—all these endeared him still further to his followers. It was the force of their attachment that twice won for him seats in parliament in the constitutional decade. But all this is an incomplete picture of his personality and his social standing. Karmal’s loyalty to the Soviet Union was well known. He would say even in the presence of non-Parchamis that he wished to make Afghanistan the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union He was in the pay of the Soviet Union. He had been accused of this by Soraya Baha, a Parchami woman activist who had become disillusioned and who was therefore under investigation by some members of the central committee, including Karmal. She told him to his face that he was paid 35,000 rubles a month in the name of the party. Karmal was widely believed to be a man without scruples. Following the death of his mother, he left home and lived with his widowed maternal aunt. He was said to be living in disregard of the society’s moral values. Karmal’s father, a general in the Afghan army, had disowned him, apparently for his leftist viewsIn his mature life, too, there was talk about Karmal’s debauchery. To his critics Karmal would say, "Among us these issues have been resolved." Karmal resembled Mulla Zakki, whose licentious views permeated the court of Shah Mahmud Sadozay in the early years of the nineteenth century. Zakki’s actions led to a commotion that resulted in the overthrow of the monarch. Afghan society was no longer as rigid as it had been during the previous century, but it was not so liberal as to accept as its ruler a commoner with such a record. Karmal’s behavior created a problem for his faction, despite the fact that some urban Parchamis were "loose." Karmal’s behavior intensified a rift between himself and Mier Akbar Khybar, the number two man in the faction. Khybar once slapped Karmal in his face because Karmal had tried to seduce the unwilling wife of their host comrade. Khybar said to him, "You aspire for Afghan rulership, but do such base thingsThe incident had wider—and, for Khybar, fatal—implications. All this lowered the status of the Parchamis in the public eye. The incident had wider consequences for Karmal as well. All peoples want to know the identity of their rulers, and that desire is particularly strong among the genealogy-conscious Afghans. When Karmal was raised to power, his background became a subject of inquiry. Karmal was born in 1929 in the village of Kamari to the east of the city of Kabul. He had graduated from the College of Law and Political Sciences of Kabul University. Karmal’s family was believed to be Tajik, the second main ethnic group after the Pashtuns, because linguistically and culturally the family was Tajik and was integrated into the urban community of Kabul. But Karmal’s father did not say so and "would skillfully conceal his Tajik identityIn 1986 Karmal announced that he and his full brother, Mahmud Baryalay, were Pashtuns. He said so because they were the sons of a linguistically Persianized Pashtun mother of the Mullakhel section of the Ghilzays. But in the patriarchal society of Afghanistan, descent is traced only through the patriarchal line. Karmal should have stated that he was a Tajik if he was a Tajik. Karmal’s announcement was political in that he wanted to attach himself to the Pashtuns, but it confounded the issue of his identity. Karmal’s forefathers had immigrated from Kashmir to Kabul, as many Kashmiris had settled there over a long period of time. Kashmir was a part of the Afghan Durrani empire until its dissolution in 1818. This descent is reinforced by the fact that Karmal and his brother’s original names resemble the names of Indian Muslims. Karmal’s first full name was Sultan Hussayn, and his brother’s name was Sultan Mahmud; their father was named Mohammad Hussayn. The brothers changed their names to sound more like Afghan names. The fact that Karmal’s ancestors had immigrated to Kabul, Karmal’s statement that he was a Pashtun, the fact that his father was not a Pashtun, and his father’s reluctance to admit that

he was a Tajik—all these make it doubtful that the family was Tajik originally, although they were integrated into that group. It is a custom in Afghanistan for a person of no ethnic significance to relate himself to the ethnic group into which he has been integrated. Not all Pashto-speaking Afghans are Pashtuns, and not all Persian-speaking Afghans are Tajiks. Karmal went against the custom. This means that, ethnically speaking, the family was insignificant. Among the educated Afghans this was not so damaging to the social standing of Karmal and Baryalay. More damaging was the view that they were the descendants of Hindu ancestors. Some claimed that Karmal was descended from Hindu ancestors, but no evidence has substantiated the claim. However, it was said that Karmal and his two younger brothers looked like Hindus. Another supportive point can be traced in Karmal’s relationship with the government of India. Before the coup the Indian embassy in Kabul used to invite Karmal to its receptions, whereas it did not invite Taraki, although he, unlike Karmal, had spent some time in India. When Karmal was raised to power, India was, of all the nonaligned countries, the only one to establish full diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime. This is not to suggest that India did so for personal reasons. In maintaining a relationship with Kabul, India intended to promote its own regional interests. But in these relationships Karmal’s personal role was striking. For the first time in Kabul, the small Hindu and Sikh communities were officially encouraged to hold religious ceremonies openly. Senior officials participated in televised ceremonies. It might have been in line with their communist creed to encourage religious minorities. The Soviet advisers might also have instructed them to please India, their ally in the region. But the fanfare that they made on these occasions irritated the Afghans. In addition to being known as a self-indulgent communist, Karmal was said to be a promoter of Hinduism. Even if nothing else counted against Karmal, these labels were enough for the Afghans to distrust him. Karmal’s immediate problems were within the party. He was the chosen man of the Kremlin, and no one within the party could openly oppose him. However, scheming men devise ways to oppose even under the strictest of circumstances. Within the closed frame of government, the opposition, in order to seize power, may resort to whatever means available to it. After the fall of Amin and the suppression of his faction, Karmal had new rivals in the persons of Sarwari and Gulabzoy, the heads of the Taraki faction that called itself the "principled Khalqis." Sarwari and Gulabzoy had endeared themselves to the Soviets by helping them in the invasion. They had done so not for the sake of Karmal but for their own agenda, which was to get rid of Karmal and his faction.[ The scheme was to dispose of the Parchami leaders in their offices by a synchronized action. Since the Parchamis were few in number, since they were not as bold as the Khalqis were, and since the Khalqis had battered them twice before, they did not think much of them. This was what Sarwari thought. He was, however, so naive as to disregard the Soviet factor. In June 1980, before Sarwari was able to put his scheme into operation, he was sent as ambassador to Mongolia. This still did not mean that Karmal became the general secretary of a unified party, as he claimed. The Soviet Union, by overthrowing the Khalq government and raising the Parcham faction to its place, had split the PDPA into irreconcilable factions. The KGB’s view that the removal of Amin would ensure unity in the PDPA remained dominant in Moscow. But as minister of interior and a leader of the Taraki faction, Gulabzoy acted as if he were the head of a state within a state. He acted on the view that both he and Karmal had gotten their posts from Moscow, thus claiming himself Karmal’s equal. Because of all these problems, Karmal was raised to the position of head of state without ceremony to legitimize his rule. But in Afghanistan the head of state must gain legitimacy either directly from the constituencies or through their representatives, in accord with social conventions. This approach becomes a necessity when a dynasty is replaced. In the case of Karmal, though, such legitimation was impossible. No attempt was made to convene an

assembly of the notables to bestow on him the position of the head of state. Instead, the government in its mass media reported that people from various walks of life had expressed their allegiance to their leader, Karmal. Except for some messages from party cadres and some government employees, these messages were fabrications. No attempt was made to televise the process by which, even within the official party and the Revolutionary Council, Karmal was elected head of the party and of the state. Only official communiqués were issued to the effect that the central committee of the party and the Revolutionary Council "almost unanimously" agreed to elect Karmal as head of the party and the state After the Afghans demonstrated in opposition to Karmal, and when other governments, except for those of the Soviet bloc countries, declined to recognize the regime, Karmal invented stories that he hoped would legitimize his rule. According to one of these stories, he entered Afghanistan "through revolutionary pathways" and along with the true members of the party organized opposition with whose help he overthrew the government of Amin. By the phrase "through revolutionary pathways," Karmal meant his two secret flights aboard Soviet military aircraft to the Bagram military airport. The Soviets first flew him in on 13 December 1979, when they expected opponents would topple Amin by a coup. "But when the operation to kill Amin failed, Babrak [Karmal] was hurriedly brought back…to the Soviet Union."[The Soviets again flew him in after the invasion. So to Karmal the Soviet interference in Afghan affairs, its invasion of Afghanistan, and his becoming a tool of its policy were a "revolution"— but this view could not help him legitimize his rule. Karmal’s poor performance in interviews with foreign journalists also failed to help his public image. In the first and last televised interview of his life, held before a large number of foreign and Afghan journalists after he was raised to power, Karmal divided the journalists on the basis of the cold war line distinguishing between "the imperialist bloc of the West" and the "socialist bloc countries." In this interview his answer to a question put by a BBC correspondent showed that he lived in the past. Instead of answering the question he was asked, he adopted a confrontational attitude, lecturing the BBC reporter, "We know each other in history because our forefathers had defeated your forefathers in numerous battlefields in Afghanistan." People expected that since Karmal had served twice in parliament and since he had been abroad for over a year, he would now act as a statesman. Instead, he proved himself to be an exhibitionist. It was one thing for him to recite composed statements as an actor; it was quite another for him to answer questions that touched the lives of millions of men and women. He almost never spoke extemporaneously. After this interview the impression became widespread that Karmal, in addition to being a stooge, had no qualities of a statesman. From the moment Karmal was raised to power, he faced tremendous problems. Whatever weight he had he lost after the invasion. An Afghan author has summed up Afghan feelings about Karmal by stating, "His presence alongside the Red Army is so small that it attracts no attention. People don’t think of him, but evaluate the long-range consequences of this political move [the invasionKarmal’s Soviet supporters reduced him as a person and a ruler. Thus, "by the close of 1979 the PDPA no longer ruled Afghanistan; the CPSU [the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] didFrom the moment Karmal was flown in to Kabul, he was no longer his own master, still less the Afghan ruler. His Soviet cooks, waiters, and waitresses, the Soviet driver of his black limousine, and his Soviet advisers took care of him around the clock. Behind the curtain in his office were a Soviet adviser and an interpreter; his conversations were taped.[] Contingents of Soviet guards patrolled the palace in the city where Karmal lived. Afghan guards surrounded him, but their weapons were without ammunition. The Karmal of the old days, when he roamed freely, suddenly became a pearl. The Soviets were so kind to him that he had no need to meet with members of his family, or at least to meet them without their presence. Karmal’s wife, Mahbuba—a courteous woman who was once one of my students—spent most of her time in the Soviet Union. Karmal no longer needed his mistress, Anahita Ratebzad, since young Russian women gave him, as well as a select number of the politburo members, intimate company. Everything that the Soviets could provide for Karmal’s personal comfort was made available to him. Under Soviet supervision Karmal found himself in surroundings he had never been in before. But then he had to live the life of an unfree ruler, and this is clear from his own words to a friend and the words of one of his friends about him. To an old leftist friend, Asif Ahang, who met him under strictly supervised conditions, the

embarrassed Karmal said, "The Soviet comrades love me boundlessly, and for the sake of my personal safety, they don’t obey even my own ordersAnother friend, Zia Majid, said of Karmal after meeting with him, "The hands, feet and tongue of the poor Sultan had been tied, and he had no right to speak [without permission] with his personal friends Like Karmal, others in the politburo, the central committee, and the Revolutionary Council did not have to trouble to formulate policies or make decisions. These matters were handled for them. Whatever the guidelines of the Kremlin rulers, they were handed over to the regime’s appropriate agencies. This was done through an invisible body or council, composed of the Soviet ambassador, the local head of the KGB, and the commander of the Soviet army, and headed by the Soviet supreme commander, Marshall Sergei Sokolov. The council met regularly. As the actual ruler behind the scene, Sokolov issued directives to agents of the party and the government. He received Karmal in his presence in his own headquarters. Through his own agents Sokolov likewise supervised how the directives were implemented. In particular, policies on security matters emanated from this body, and they were handed over through its advisers to the regime’s intelligence department (KhAD) for implementation. The number of Soviet advisers was on the increase. In the first month after the invasion their numbers more than doubled, surpassing total PDPA members at the timeBy early 1984 they were believed to total over ten thousand They worked not only as advisers but also as executives in all the military and civilian departments to which they were assigned. Bureaucrats of the regime found that even routine orders had to be approved and countersigned by the Soviets. In fact, "no minister [could] make a single decision, even a minor one, without consulting his omnipresent shadowAs noted, even Karmal was not permitted to make decisions. "Slowly his power was confined to approving dismissals or appointments which, under instructions from Soviet advisers, the Intelligence Department or his comrades in the politburo would propose. He would neither postpone nor reject such proposals But as a Persian saying has it, "Alive, the hero is happy." To comrades who complained of the domineering attitude of Soviet advisers, Karmal said, "The Soviets have enough experience in implementing socialism and social justice in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. They will never make mistakes in their accomplishments. Be patient. They have come here to develop our country as a model in the region."[ During his stay in Czechoslovakia, Karmal’s belief in the Soviet Union had become total. The Czechoslovak leaders had impressed on him that the world’s progress was due to the invincible Red Army. That was why "he did not think he had made a mistake to have come [to Afghanistan] along with the Soviet army Promotions became a source of profit for corrupt advisers. An adviser in Herat, in return for a golden necklace for his wife, released a member of the Afghan Millat Party who had been sentenced to death. A few Parchami officers were said to have obtained promotion by offering women to their Soviet comrades. Similarly, a Soviet adviser who wished to remain longer in his post sent his own wife to the arms of a senior Afghan official to obtain his recommendation. Not all advisers were qualified. When a non-PDPA official informed Karmal that the advisers attached to his ministry were unqualified, Karmal ignored him and, holding to the party line, told him that "the Soviet advisers were most qualified in their fields, and… Afghanistan should take advantage of their expertise Soviet advisers composed statements in the Russian and Tajiki languages for party members and government officials to read on official occasions. Party and government experts paraphrased the Tajiki texts into Afghan Persian (Dari). Under Soviet supervision government officials also composed statements. Soviet advisers did not allow government and party officials—even Karmal or his brother Baryalay—to make statements of their own, particularly on issues relating to foreign affairs. Karmal and Baryalay were admonished after making unauthorized statements. However, within the framework of the guidelines, party members and government officials had a wide range in which to demonstrate their talents and to win over the public.

Empty Promises In his first radio broadcasts Karmal gave hopeful promises. He said that henceforth there would be no executions and that a new constitution would be drawn up providing for the democratic election of national and local assemblies. He also promised that political parties would function freely and that both personal property and individual freedom would be safeguarded. In particular, he stressed that soon a government representing a united national front would be set up and that it would not pursue socialism. He also promised a general amnesty for prisoners. In normal circumstances these promises would have aroused expectations, but now they sounded dreadful. As noted before, Karmal announced at the same time that his government had asked the Soviet Union to give economic, political, and military assistance, a request that, he said, had been accepted and rendered. Since he had become an agent for inflicting the calamity of Soviet troops on the Afghans, Karmal had no choice but to give the promises of a democratic government. But in this he went so far as to give promises that he could not fulfill even if he wished to. These promises were nothing but the Leninist tactical move of two steps backward and one step forward. For a Brezhnevian protégé such as Karmal, it was impossible to go ahead with a platform that his masters saw as bourgeois. Also, the Afghans had seen that the same Karmal following the communist coup had, with others, promised that private as well as personal property would remain safe, a promise that they violated. The fact was that he could not become a ruler without the military might of the Soviet Union. Karmal, with a view to taking revenge on Amin and making himself the ruler of Afghanistan, had let himself become an instrument in the hands of foreign masters with no regard for the rights of his compatriots to sovereignty, their dignity as free men and, above all, their lives. To reach his goal, this most slavish of puppet rulers let himself be entangled in a dilemma that was beyond his powers to solve and that brought untold suffering to millions of men, women, and children. Among the measures promised by Karmal, the most important were the release of prisoners; the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; the change of the red, Soviet-style banner of the Khalq period to the more orthodox one of black, red, and green; the granting of concessions to religious leaders; and the conditional restoration of confiscated property. Some concessions were also granted to landowners whose lands had been confiscated in the land reform program implemented by Karmal’s predecessors. Except for the release of prisoners, all these measures were taken gradually. What lessened the bitterness of the people was the release of prisoners on 6 January 1980. The Parchami prisoners, numbering about 600, had been released in the early hours of the invasion; the bulk of the prisoners, released on 6 January, numbered 2,000; and about 100 prisoners were not released. Thus, the total number of prisoners before the invasion was around 2,700. Much fanfare was made of the occasion of the release of prisoners. People from the outside were brought in to mingle with the prisoners to make their number appear higher. But the day turned into a day of wailing for thousands of families who were now convinced that they would never again see their imprisoned relatives. After Amin came to power, he had made public a list of those already executed; according to this list, 12,000 prisoners had been executed, but people still hoped that since the actual number of prisoners was higher, their imprisoned relatives might be alive. They were disappointed. (Amin had released 850 prisoners after he became the ruler and intended to release the rest by 1 January to coincide with the sixteenth anniversary of the party.) After the Khalqis came to power, they ran the country by issuing a series of eight edicts. They suspended all laws except those on civil matters. Another exception was the criminal law of the Daoud period, which the Parchamis, like the Khalqis, retained as a repressive instrument. In April 1980 the Karmal regime adopted a temporary constitution, the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which had been drafted while Amin was in power. The new constitution guaranteed certain democratic rights of individuals, including the right to "security and life," the right of "free expression," and the right "to form peaceful associations and demonstrations." It also declared that "no one would be accused of crime but in accord with the provisions of law," that the "accused is innocent unless the court

declares him guilty," and that "crime was a personal affair, and no one else would be punished for it." It likewise declared that "torture, persecution, and punishment, contrary to human dignity, are not permissible." Envisaged for the country was "a new-style state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," guided by the PDPA. It was the only legal party, and the Revolutionary Council, as the supreme state power, was to convene twice a year to approve measures already taken by the Presidium, which was composed mostly of the politburo members of the PDPA. The state was to safeguard three forms of property: state property, cooperative property, and private property. The constitution declared that the state had the right to exploit all underground property and other resources considered state property. The constitution also declared that the state had the power to develop the economy toward the creation of a society free of the exploitation of man by man. The state was likewise empowered to take families, both parents and children, under its supervision The constitution was inherently contradictory. On paper it was a perfectly democratic constitution, at least as far as the rights of the individuals were concerned; in reality it was a document granting a monopoly of power, since the state that it envisaged was to be steered only by the official party. More important, the way it was implemented was arbitrary. It relied on clauses in favor of the state while ignoring those in favor of individuals. The guaranteed rights of individuals were meaningless words. It was, in brief, a legal instrument of suppression in the hands of the regime. But its impact was limited. By the time it was promulgated, the mujahideen had confined the regime to cities. Among the palliative measures that Karmal was to take, the most important was the one intended to have an immediate effect on the current situation. This was the question of forming a government representing a united national front, which Karmal had promised. By definition, such a government would be composed of those groups or individuals having the power to influence national politics. Karmal had neither the desire nor the power to form such a government. The government he did form was composed of the Parchamis, Khalqis (Taraki group), and three persons of no national significance. A number of well-known noncommunist Afghans were also appointed to various ministries But these collaborators, who set the precedent of cooperation with the regime, found that they had been given posts without authority. Besides, by then it had become a fact of Afghan politics that any one who collaborated with the regime was no longer socially significant. The next step toward the formation of the government of national front was the appointment of a large number of junior bureaucrats in various ministries. The regime made a big fanfare of this, but these officials were ordinary civil employees, not politicians. This was what Karmal and his Soviet advisers meant when they spoke of a government representing a united national front. As has been pointed out, "no totalitarian regime can afford to share real power with any group outside its own immediate control Karmal had failed to unite the party, although calling it a unified democratic party. He had also failed to form a truly national government. Yet he and his associates called their regime "a new evolutionary phase of the glorious April Revolution." All this time armed opposition was mounting. Within weeks of the invasion the mujahideen had wrested the rural areas from the control of the regime. The regime ruled the city of Kabul, the provincial capitals, and those strategic areas where the Soviets and the regime had stationed military contingents and militia units. Even cities were unsafe for PDPA members. Worse still, the mujahideen killed Soviet soldiers in large numbers. All this was a spectacular feat for the mujahideen. (The situation remained the same until the Soviets withdrew their army in 1989.) Opponents of the regime spread rumors to the effect that the Kremlin rulers had decided to replace Karmal. But luckily for him, no one else within the party had even his meager standing. Years later, when Karmal’s inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said, "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping

to continue sitting in Kabul with our help Colonel Nikolai Ivanov, a Soviet military writer, even wrote that "he [Karmal] was a nobody Both statements reflect the failure of Soviet foreign policy. It was because of this policy that Karmal was unable to achieve "national consolidation," that he had become "a nobody." Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Karmal not only was not "a nobody" but was an important somebody. Twice the people had elected him to parliament. When his Kremlin comrades used Karmal as a tool of their policy, they turned him into a nobody. Then this "nobody" was unable to achieve "national consolidation." He even had to plead with his Soviet comrades: "You brought me here [to Afghanistan], you protect me."[ The Soviet invasion had generated forces of resistance beyond the control of even the strongest ruler with the best mind—let alone a puppet such as Karmal. In addition, Karmal was inexperienced in running the country, a particularly severe weakness at a time when the nation had turned against him. The truth of this statement Gorbachev accepted when in a politburo meeting he told his peers, "If we don’t change approaches [to evacuate Afghanistan], we will be fighting there for another 20 or 30 years be To make Karmal a scapegoat for the Soviet failure is wrong, but doing so was standard practice for the Soviet leaders. At any rate, the Soviet leaders stuck with him for six years. Hoping to prop him up, they received him and his delegation with pomp in October 1980 in the Kremlin, where they lectured him on how to run the country What was needed was a lecture to the Kremlin leaders themselves on why they had blundered in invading Afghanistan and raising to power a person whom their own historian called "a nobody."

Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai (1986-1992)
Dr. Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai was the fourth President of Afghanistan during the period of the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Najibullah (meaning "Honored of God") was born in August 1947 to a moderately prosperous family belonging to the Pushtun Ahmadzai sub-tribe of the Ghilzai. Though his ancestral village was located between the towns of Said Karam and Gardez, capital of Pakhtia Province, Najibullah was born in Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul. Najibullah's father, Akhtar Mohammad Khan, who died in 1983, served during the 1960s as the Afghani trade commissioner and consul in Peshawar, Pakistan He was educated at Habibia High School and Kabul University, where he graduated with a degree in Medicine in 1975. He joined the Parcham faction of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. and was jailed twice for his political activities and his stance on abolition of feudal power in the countryside relaxed form of religion. He was for equal rights for women and various ethnic minorities and the release of more than 13,000 political prisoners Despite being regarded as an intelligent man, he was referred to as Najib-e Gaw (the Bull) by his opponents due to his physique. The PDPA staged a successful coup in 1978, but the Khalq faction of the PDPA gained supremacy, and after a brief stint as ambassador in Tehran, Najibullah was dismissed from government and went into exile in Europe. He returned to Kabul after the Soviet invasion in 1979. In 1980, he was appointed the head of KHAD, the secret police. KhAD is an abbreviation for Khedamat-e Etelea'at-e Dawlati, the Afghanistan Marxist regime's secret police, also known as the State Information Agency. Set up in 1980, and controlled by the KGB, this was a brutal agency specifically created for the suppression of Afghanistan Marxist regime's internal opponents. Under Najibullah's control, it is claimed that KHAD arrested, tortured and executed tens of thousands of Afghans. He was known morst famously as "Najib e Gow" literaly meaning "Najib the Bull" Najibullah replaced Babrak Karmal as Afghanistan's President in 1986. In 1986 Najibullah became general secretary of the PDPA and had a mild success against the mujahidin revolt. Afghanistan was undermined by the intrigues of the soviet government led by Gorbachov and his clique. Finally Gorbachov withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. Najibullah's government survived for another three years. Eventually divisions within his own ranks, including the defection of General Abdul Rashid Dostam fatally weakened the government's resolve. Najibullah hadbeen working on a compromise settlement to end the civil war with Ahmad Shah Masood, brokered bythe United Nations. But talks broke down and the government fell. Mojahidin forces entered Kabul in 1992. Najibullah tried to flee Kabul, but his departure was blocked by Abdul Rashid Dostum. Najibullah sought sanctuary in the UN compound in Kabul. President Rabbani, refused to let him leave the country, but made no attempt to arrest him. Najibullah spent the rest of his days in virtual detention. On September 27 1996 Taliban militiamen burst into the compound and dragged Najibullah to the presidential palace, where he was beaten and shot. His mutilated body, together with that of his brother, was then hung on street lamp posts outside the palace.

Sibghatullah Mojaddedi

Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was born in 1925 in Herat province in western Afghanistan, Pashtun spiritual leader of the Naqshbandi Sufi order; designated after Bahauddin Naqshband, who died in1389. Mujaddedi was the leading survivor of this extraordinarily influential family which had emigrated from India at the beginning of the century. It had played a major role in the revolt against King Amanullah in 1929 and later became affiliated with the more conservative dynasty of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah. Mujaddidi studied theology and Arabic at the Al Uminium-Azhar in Cairo in 1940 and return in 50's to study Islamic Law.upon return to Kabul, he beings his tenure at Habibia High School. He appointed professor at Institute for higher Islamic studies Kabul, where he made his anti government and anti soviet feelings heard. More than 100 of Sibghatullah Mujaddidi's relatives were massacred at Amin's command early in 1979. followers. Few years later he is arrested because of his criticism of the pro-Soviet course of the government and spends 3 years in Kabul the prison. Upon release he moves out of Kabul and in 1979 creates "Jabha e the Najat e Mili Afghanistan" National Liberation Front of Afghanistan and starts his resistance fight against the invading Soviet Army. Without any assistance from nation, he builds a huge group of followers who join him by mere recognition of his name and the respected sufi order that he belongs to. Mojaddedi is often referred to as Pir, meaning saint or elder, as he is the oldest member of the Naqshbandi sufi order. His family holds the rank of pir (saint) in the Sufi order which is the basis for its large religious following throughout Afghanistan. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi is a conservative Maulawi. His party, the essentially consists of Naqshbandi. In 1992 after the fall of the communist government in Kabul, all 7 mujahidin factions met in Peshawar and there It was decided that a 51 persons body, headed by Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from the present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during the two months period. The head of this body will also represent the Presidentship of the State during these two months. After this period, this body will remain as an interim Islamic Council, along with the Transitional State and its Chairmanship will be held by Mr. Mojaddedi. Mojaddedi completed his term in office and returned to private life until 2004 where he was summoned by the UN and Afghan governing body to head the Loya Jirga of 2004.

Burhanuddin Rabbani
Burhanuddin Rabbani, son of Muhammed Yousuf, was born in 1940 in Badakhshan, a province of Afghanistan. After finishing school in his native province, he went to Darul-uloome-Sharia (Abu-Hanifa), a religious school in Kabul. When he graduated from Abu-Hanifa, he went to Kabul University to study Islamic Law and Theology. During his four years at Kabul University he became well known for his works on Islam. Soon after his graduation in 1963, he was hired as a Professor at Kabul University. Rabbani went to Egypt in 1966, and he entered the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo. In two years, he received his masters degree in Islamic Philosophy. In 1968, Rabbani returned to Afghanistan, where the High Council of Jamiat-i-Islami of Afghanistan gave him the duty of organizing the University students. Due to his knowledge, reputation, and active support for the cause of Islam, in 1972, a 15-member council selected him as head of Jamiat-i-Islami of Afghanistan; the founder of Jamiat-i-Islami of Afghanistan. In the spring of 1974, police cars came to Kabul University to arrest Rabbani for his proIslamic stance, but with the help of his students the police were unable to capture him, and he managed to escape to the country side. In 1992 he became President of the Islamic Council of Afghanistan. a selection of a new president was to take place, Rabbani along with a few of his supported held a meeting and declared himself president for another term. Other Factions controlling Afghanistan at that point were not invited. In January 1994, Hekmatyar joined forces with Dostum to oust Rabbani and his defense minister, Masood, launching full-scale civil war in Kabul. In 1994 alone, an estimated 25,000 were killed in Kabul; most of them civilians killed in rocket and artillery attacks. One-third of the city was reduced to rubble, and much of the remainder sustained serious damage. In September 1994, fighting between the two major Shi'a parties, the Hizb-i Wahdat and the Harakat-i Islami, left hundreds dead, most of them civilians. Thousands of new refugees fled to Pakistan that year. by the end of 1994 the rest of the country was carved up among the various factions, with many mujahidin commanders establishing themselves as virtual warlords. The city of Kabul was divided in to neighborhoods controlled by a different faction. Residence could not cross the street to their local market because the opposite side belonged to a different faction and thus you needed documents to cross the street. Women were reduced to slaves and sex toys of the warlords and renegade soldiers. Afghan girls were kidnapped and sold to Arabs and Pakistanis. The economy was shattered; the people were reduced to collect bones in order to trade them for food. Women were not safe in their own homes, thieves ran the streets, the Kabul museum was ransacked and sold to western archeologists and museums, the man with the gun ruled while unarmed civilians were their slaves. The situation around the southern city of Kandahar was particularly precarious: the city was divided among different forces, and civilians had little security from murder, rape, looting, or extortion. Humanitarian agencies frequently found their offices stripped of all equipment, their vehicles hijacked, and their staff threatened. Hekmatyar was awarded the post of prime minister, but still the Burhanuddin Rabbani government lost all authority in Afghanistan. and with popular support of the people, his government was ousted by then very popular Taliban movement Kabul was captured by the Taliban in 1996. Rabbani set up headquarters in the northern Afghan town of Faizabad and led, with support from Iran and Russia, one of the five antiTaliban factions. Stripped of power, he was still recognized as ruler of Afghanistan by the United Nations and most other countries until he formally handed over power to an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai on December 22, 2001.

The Taliban movement was formed in Kandahar in 1994 by Islamic students who take a radical approach to interpreting Islam. The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 from Mujaheedin regime. The government of Burhan-ul Din Rabani ousted. The Taliban government in Kabul has been recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Republic. The Taliban regime strongly have been supported by Pakistani military regime. Anti-Taliban factions still hold about 15 percent of the country in the northern parts of Afghanistan. The United Nations and other international communities condemn the Taliban regime because of its violation of human rights, particularly restrictions of women from outside work and freedom. On October 10, 1999, the United States government declared political and economical sanction against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan because of holding and supporting Saudi billionaire Ben Laden. October 25, 1999, Taliban offer talks between Afghanistan and the US Government including the future of Osma bin Laden. October 28, 1999. Saudi Millionaire declared his desire to leave Afghanistan November, 5, 1999: Bin Laden likely stay in Afghanistan

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