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THE LIBRARY

192 P94

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SIX

BOOKS OF PROCLUS,

...

ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO,


TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

TO WHICH

A SEVENTH BOOK
IN

IS

ADDED,

ORDER TO SUPPLY THE DEFICIENCY OP ANOTHER BOOK ON THIS SUBJECT,


WHICH

R!TTEV BY

ULT MSCE KMT.

VKOCIA'S,

ALSO, A TRANSLATION FROM

THE CREEK OF

PROCLUS' ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.


A TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE OF PROCLUS,
>n protMDcncc ano jTate;

A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM

HIS TREATISE, ENTITLED,

TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE;


AND

A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE


ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL;
As preserved

in the Bibliotheca

Gr. of Fabricius.

BY T HOMA S TAYLOR.
A>

rrv,

m, run tij

tyyiKa

Tlierc are, there are, though laugh the


offer roar,
Jove and the God*, who mortal ills survey.

axnif nvt Jmi to Wit, xau xujmi rsXXix.

At

there be

Gods

many, and

Lord*

Corinlh.

1.

Cap,

8. v. i.

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL

I.

LONDON
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,
By

A. J.

I'afpy,

Tooket Court, Chancery Lane.

Co.; LONGMAN AND Co.; BALDWIN AND


AND ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS.

AND SOLD BY MESSRS. LAW AND

Co.;

1816.

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Q'7

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TO
I

WILLIAM MEREDITH, ESQUIRE,


WHO WITH

A FIRMNESS AND MUNIFICENCE,

UNPARALLELED

IN

MODERN

TIMES,

HAS PATRONIZED

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,


AND
AS

ITS

ENGLISH PROMULGATOR

AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NO COMMON ESTEEM FOR HIS CHARACTER,

AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR

THIS

WORK

IS

HIS PATRONAGE,

DEDICATED

BY THE TRANSLATOR,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

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INTRODUCTION.

I rejoice

iu the opportunity

which

afforded

me of presenting

the present work, with a treasure of Grecian theology

of

the truly philosophic reader, in

a theology,

which was

mystically

first

and symbolically promulgated by Orpheus, afterwards disseminated enigmatically through images


by Pythagoras, and

in the last

peculiarity indeed, of this theology

that

is,

it is

metrical scries of reasoning originating from the

no

sublime

less scientific than

moat

self-evident trutlw,

it

and

(bat

developes

all

progressions from the ineffable principle of things, and accurately exhibit* to our view

of that golden chain of which deity

That also which

>.

The

place scientifically unfolded by Plato and his genuine disciples.

the one extreme, and

is

most admirable and laudable

by a geothe deified

all

the links

body the other.

in this theology

is,

that

it

produces

in the

mind

properly prepared for iu reception the most pure, holy, venerable, and exalted conceptions of the
great cause of
itself;

as

it

fit

to

things,

connumerate

it

attempting to give an appropriate

the appellation of the

Hence

most simple of
it

denominates

it

name

its

which

Indeed,

it

even apologises

in reality in enable,

is

beyond

the

latter its subsistence as the object

same time however, it

ail

Vol.

I.

it,

and
gives

knowledge and

names

of desire to

all

all

indica-

beings.

asserts that these appellations are in reality

nothing more than the parturitions of the soul which standing as

Prod.

is

nature, which striving intently to behold

conceptions to that which

For

At

nevertheless ineffably the source, and does

the one, and the good,- by the former of these

and by the

things desire good.

it is

to this principle,

human

ting its transcendent simplicity,


all

of which

principle as something superior even to being

with any triad, or order of beings.

ascribes the attempt to the imbecility of

conception.

immense

celebrates this

exempt from the whole of

not therefore think


for

For

all.

it

were in the vestibules of the


6

INTRODUCTION.
adytum of

announce nothing pertaining to the

deity,

tendencies towards

it,

ineffable, but only indicate her

spontaneous

and belong rather to the immediate offspring of the first God, than to the

first

iuelf.

Hence,

most venerable conception of the supreme, when

as the result of this

only to denominate the ineffable, but also to assert something of


sider* this as pre-eminently its peculiarity, that

its

the principle of principles

it is

that the characteristic property of principle, after the

same manner

Conformably to

magnificence of dictiou

leas

this,

:"

ventures not

con-

it

being necessary

it

as other things, should not begin

from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which
all principles.

it

relation to other things,

the principle of

is

Proclus, in the second book of this work' says, with match-

Let us as

it

were celebrate the

first

God, not

as establishing the

earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generation of

all

produced these indeed, but among the

us celebrate him as

last

of things

but prior to these,

let

animals

unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of Gods, together with

supermundane and mundane


and beyond the

first

adyta,

as

the

as

divinities

more

God

The

from which

scientific reasoning

the one,

vacuum should

it is

all

Gods, the unity of

this

dogma

is

intelligible

deduced

is

with

the followiug

nature, a natural

and

before

it

generates

its

through similitude.

it

if

toul,

one that

that

its

else, a

is

As

the principle of

(i.

In consequence of

this,

number of the same order


c.

belonging to soul); and

characteristic peculiarity to

which gives subsistence to progressions

It is therefore necessary

far distant

to itself according to essence,

number

the

itself,

its

and

and con-

from these premise,, since there

produce from

multitude of natures characterized by unity, and a

cause

psychical

own form and

unity the principle of the universe, that this unity should

its

whatever possesses a power of generating, generates simi-

must constitute things proximate

separate from

nature,

For

cause must deliver

joined with

it

number;

number.

lars prior to dissimilar*, every

progeny

all

It is also necessary that every

likewise necessary that every producing principle should generate a


itself, vut.

the

necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no

intervene either in incorporeal or corporeal natures.

uittUtti, an intellectual

all

unities,

Gods."

thing which has a natural progression should proceed through similitude.


it is

all

and more unknown than

inefieble than all silence,

essence, as holy among the holies, and concealed in the

all things is

of

be

for

is

one

prior to every thing

most of

all

things allied to

and these natures are no other than the Gods.

According to

this

'

theology tlierefore, from the immense principle of principles, in which

P. 190.

*
.

e.

The

highest order of intelUgibks.

all

INTRODUCTION.

li

thing? causally subsist, absorbed in supcreaseotial light, and involved in unfathomable depths,

beauteous progeny of principles proceed, aU largely partaking of the ineffable,


occult characters of deity,

possessing an overflowing fulness of good.

all

all

From

monads suspended from

monads

too, is the leader of

all

their

hending one.
lects
first

Thus

all

and

are

leader.

And

these principles

all

great all-compre-

first

being; aU intel-

all

comprehended

souls from one


vital

in the first

Hence

cries are unfolded into light.

No objections of any

its

these

first

first intellect

monads, the principle of

and returns to

Each of

deities.

of thing*, and which while

centered and rooted by their summits in the

finally

bodies proceed from the

all

monads

in,

itself to the last

ami body

beings proceed from, and are comprehended in the

progeny are

emanate from one

nature

these great

principles, the

soul

all

natures blossom from one

And

one

is

lastly, all

all their

depending

truly the unity of unities, the

monad of

one, from which both they and

this first

God

first

and luminous body of the world.

of Gods, one and

all things,

and yet one prior to

all.

weight, no arguments but such as are sophistical, can be urged against this

most sublime theory which


it

which extends from

proceeds from, at the same time abides

it

aVid

proceeding from

uniliet, deified natures

series

sum*

these dazzling

mils, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, being, life, intellect, soul, uature,

depend

stamped with the

is

so congenial to the unperverted conceptions of the

can only be treated with ridicule and contempt

in degraded, barren,

human mind,

and barbarous ages.

that

Igno-

rance and priestcraft, however, have hitherto conspired to defame those inestimable works,' in

which

this

and many other grand and important dogmas can alone be found

Greeks has been attacked with

the

of mistaken wit, by

men whose

all

the insane fury of ecclesiastical ?eal,

and

conceptions on the subject, tike those of a

and the theology of

all

the

jmbecd

man between

flashes

sleeping

and waking, have been turbid and wild, phantattic and confuted, prtpotterotu aud tain.

Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible cause of

all,

a divine multitude subsists, co-operating

with this cause in the production and government of the universe, has always been, and

by

all

nations, and

all

religions,

however much they may

of the subordinate deities, and die veneration which

barbarous the conceptions of some nations ou


others.
in

all

Hence, says the elegant

the earth, that there

ruling together with him.

'

Via. the present

is

Maxim us

this

Tyrius,

is

is still

admitted

differ in thoir opinions respecting the nature

to be paid to

subject

" You

them by man

may be when compared

will see

and however
with those of

one according taw and assertion

one God, the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of God,

This the Greek

says,

and the Barbarian

says, the inhabitant of the Continent,

and other works of Protlus, together with those of Plolious, Porphyry, Jambluihus,

Syruaus, Ammonius, Damascrus,01ympu>dorus, and Simplicms.

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who

and he

TnODUCTIO N.

And if you

dwells near the sea, the wise and the unwise.

proceed as far as to the utmost

shores of the ocean, there also there arc Gods, rising very near to some, and setting very near to
others."
it is

This dogma, too,

'

is

admitted by both, though

God

the worship of one

following testimonies will,

In

Cod,"

among

" the

it

Jacob, and

of the nations

made according

teas

number of

is

which

the genuine reading,


it is

said,

is

" Awl

lest

stars,

even

sun and the moon, and the

and serve them, which the Lord


it is

For

alone.

all

up

lift

in

the Septuagint

the Latins,

thine eyes unto heaven,

same book and the I9tb

and wbeu thou sent the

hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven."


the natioas, which

all

number of

it is

text

Jerom aud Gregory.

the stars

is

equivalent to saying that the

the Jewish legislator at the

nation as an exception, and as being under the government of the

iu the following verse

Hebrew

fathers of the Christian church, such as,

among

the host of heaven, sbouldsl be driven to worship them,

said that the stars are divided to

own

v. 8.

(In, assertion.

number of the angels of

evident from the 4th chapter of the

thou

% God

nations were divided according to the

considering his

of the truth of

to the

The

of his inheritance.

the children of Israel, as the present

Greeks, Origen, Basil, and Chrysostom, and

too,

litis

Israel the line

liberal reader

This reading was adopted by the most celebrated


tlie

verse, in

Here

is

appears from the 3fid chapter of Deuteronomy,

divition

and not according to the

asserts.

That

place

tle first

version, that

whose portion

doubt not, convince the

Testament, that

forbids the religious veneration of the inferior deities, and enjoins

it

alone,

New

Old or

so far from being opposed by either the

added, " But the Lord

liath

taken you

(i.

same time,

God

e. the

of Israel

Jews), and

brought you forth out of the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheritance, as
signified

ye
;

are to this day."

and these

in the

By

the angels of

same book (chapter

God

therefore (in Deuteron. 32.

v. 8.)

ihe stars arc

Gods; " And hath

17- v. 3.) arc cxprr-stly called

gone and served other Gods, and worshipped them, either the tun or moon, or any of the host of
heaven, which
in tlie

I have not commanded.'"

question which

terrestrial

Gods

is

" For what

God

is

works, and according to thy might

worship of the

God

God,

u the 3d chapter also, and

God

of the

Jews

this

is

llic

24lh verse,

superior to

there in heaven, or in earth, that cau


r"

As

the attention of the

of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they but

conceived to be subordinate to
their

there asked, that the

God, and considering

all

they gave them the general appellation of angel*

little

Jews was

f*

*<rx"*s *vx 9V

t****!

it

is

implied

the celestial

do according

and

to thy

solely confined to the

regarded the powers

whom

they

of them as merely the messengers of

though as we shall shortly prove from

t m t nii t

all

Dissert.

1.

Edit. rriae.

IHTRODUCTIOH.
angth properly so

the testimony of the Apostle Paul, they were not consistent in confounding

died

with Gods.

But

wood

" Behold even

man

less

Gods by

that tiie stars are not called

fashioned of

that

the

or stone,

moon and

it

" Wheu

I consider thy heavens, the

ordained

(Psalm

what

man

To

little

Farther

man

and

man which

work of

thy fingers, the

But

in the

For

rce

this is saying

the other slurs, and produces in us

God dwells

who

And

divine.

6.)

that thou visitest

Hence, says

bodies are divine,

we have shown, were

God

considered by

nhm

rf/rs to o-xtevtapet

" In them

more of

nothing

awrou) which

has

ia

made

Moses

as

is

God

said to have

is

doubtless the genuine

e. the heavens) hath he set a tabermV

the suu than what

were, in dazzling splendor.

l.

(i.

artificer

may be

said

of the universe.

in

Psalm

Thus with

xi. v.

4.

it

To
is

which we may add

said,

in

of any of

But

the Ix>rd, the heaven

For nothing can come


Siroplicius,'
is

" That

it

is

into

is

my

Is in

heaten."

throne, and the earth

immediate contact with

divinity without

eommeBUry on

is

my

must
being

connascent with the human soul to think the celes-

especially evident from (hose, (the Jews)

For tbey also say

who

look to these bodies through

that the heavens are the habitation of

than which assertions what can be more

In his

to say

confirmation of^

" The Lord's throne

and the throne of God, and are alone sufficient to reveal the glory and excellence of
;

him."

which

a magnificent idea both of that glorious luminary, and the deity

preconception* about divine natures.

tho are worthy

And,

heavens and the stars

excellent than that

If therefore the heavens are the throne, and the sun the tabernacle of deity, they

evidently be deified.

tial

it

of the Septuagint, that

again in Isaiah Ixvi. v.

footstool."

How much

and

the stars which thou hast

and the son of man

no exalted conception of the

in the sun, gives us

dwells enshrined, as

this version

moon and

v. 5.

following verse David says, that

the stars, as

readiug, and not that of the vulgar translation,

that

(Job. xxv.

Septuagint version of verse the 4th of the 19th Psalm,

placed hit tabernacle in the tun, (

cle for the sun."

?"

and consequently, they are animated beings, and superior to man.

in the

still,

worm

It is evident therefore front these passages, that the

lower than the angels.


;

book of Job, and the Psalms

man; but nothing inanimate can be more

which may be added, that

Gods

is

that thou art mindful of him,

4.)

excellent than

animated.

angels and

is

3.

viii. v.

more

are

said in the

is

shineth not, yea the stars are not pure in his sight.

a worm, and the son of

is

the Jewish legislator as things inanimate like statues

evident from what

is

God

God,

to those

venerable ?"

the second book of AriUiuV. treaiKc

On

the

Hovn

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IHTBODOCMOM.
Indeed, that lb* heavens are not the inanimate throne and residence of deity,
the assertion in the 19th Psalm, "

is

that of those blessed intelligences,

no other than

letters as

Cod

has ordained

And

to expect.

say, the writing

The Gods

declaring unto us

hence, this same writing

is

who govern

iv.

were

therefore, which

distributed to

celestial bodies, yet

Hence

the

and 28. "

Hebrew

And

writing,

all

the nations but the Jews,

Gods

nor smell."

And

eat,

the

But when

do the worship of

it is

This

is

not attributed to

God

that

them

it is

unless this

is

admitted,

moon, and the other

they assign as the cause

as other nations are, in consequence of

not sufficient to say, "

God

be shown by any other

said,

and

it

what I mean.

masses downward

is it

God,

for instance,

how

was done," but

commanded

not therefore requisite,

in

it

this difference is
is

in

presides over

But

I will explain

that fire should tend upward,

souls,

produced.

sub-

For

requisite that the natures of

order that the mandate of

See Gaflarcl-s Unheard-*! CuriosiUes, p. 391.

God

and a peculiar genus of

things which are produced should accord with the mandates of divinity.
clearly

Deuteronomy,

under the whole heaven but the Jews.

there is an angel, a daemon,

let it

in

stone,

" They have a mouth but

Indeed, as the emperor Julian* justly observes, " unless a certain ethnarchic

God

Thus

brought them out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house

said that the stars are divided unto ail nations

statues.

evident from the before cited passage in the 4th chapter of

every nation, and under this

arises,

to

kind arc said by the prophet, of the

like

they blame the worship of the heavenly bodies,

being the inheritance of the

which

are

is

were the sun and

work of men's hands, wood and

the Psalmist,

These, and wany other things of the

(hat the people of Israel are

of bondage.

into such

prophets never leprobate and prohibit the worship of the stars

against the worship of images and statues, but never of the sun and

stars.

them

what events we

not so far as they are bodies, but so far as they are ani-

there ye shall serve

which neither see nor hear, nor


apeak not, &c.

Jews

never attributed to

is

called by all the ancients cktlab kamtlachim, that

as things which neither see, nor hear, nor understand, as they

Deuteron.

For R. Moses,

the stars, and dispose

men by means of this

from

also evident

of the angeli."

moon, and the other


mated beings.

is

That the heavens declare the glory of God."

a very learned Jew, says/ " that the word utphar, to declare or set forth,

God may

A pud Cyril.

more

and earthly

be aceom-

IITTiOBUCtroH.
plished, that die

formed should be

and the

light,

But the

other things, tllus too, m' divine concerns.

XT

Thus

heavy t

latter

reasori

also in a similar

manner in

human race

of (his is, because the

is frail

and corruptible. Hence also, the works oP man are corruptible and mutable, and subject to all-various
revolutions,

But God being

eternal,

also

it is

fit

nature contend with the mandate of divinity


fore, as

How

can

it fall

off from this concord

being

For how can


?

If, there-

he ordered that there should be a confusion of tongues, and that they should not accord
other, so likewise he ordered that the political concerns of nations should

he has not only effected

l;

dissonance.

For

to effect this,

it

this

by

his mandate,

would he

seen in bodies,

among

an> one directs his attention to the

li

nations are to be different.

Germans and

Julian adds,

God

alone.

For he

alone with him, but many, though he does not say

but those

who descended

who were

lh R C ft U 8 ^

with

God

llllA

is

how

Is this therefore, a

who

truth of this, concealed

says, that not only

they were.

to be similar to him.

with him contributed to

of

this

" Moses, however, though he knew the

ascribe the confusion of tongues to

conceived those

dis-

This, indeed,

Scythians, ami considers

the bodies of these differ from those of the Lybi&ru and Ethiopians.

respect to the celestial bodies

be

but has rendered us naturally adapted to

requisite, in the first place, that the natures of those

should be different, whose political concerns

much

And

that his mandates should be eternal.

such, they are either the natures of things, or conformable to the natures of things.

this

But

God
it is

nor doea he

very evident, that he

If, therefore,

confusion of tongues, they

it ;

descended, nor one

not the Lord only,

may justly be

'

In short, that the heavens and the

celestial bodies are

animated by certain divine souls, was not

only the opinion of the ancient poets and philosophers, but also of the mo?l celebrated fathers of
the church, and the

by Jerom in

On

most learned and acute of the schoolmen.

his exposition

of the 6th verse of the

who

his

book

to

receive the mandates of

Principles,

first

says that the heavenly bodies

God, which

is

Thus

for instance, this is asserted

chapter of Ecclesiastes.

And by

Origen in

must be animated, because they are

only consentaneous to a rational nature.

of

this

Thomas Aquinas

was the opinion of Albert us

in his treatise

Sccundo Sententiarum.
i

To

De

Magnus

in his

book

De

quatuor Coteqiuwis

Spiritualibus Creaturis; and of Johannes Scotus

these likewise

may be

added, the most learned Cardinal

indeed strenuously contends for the truth of

this

is

Among

inserted by Eusebius in his Theological Solutions, and by Augustine in bis Enchiridion.

the schoolmen too,

said

This too

Super

Nicolaos

<

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by.Google

IKTXODCCTIOH.
(

the celestial bodies with outward worship (dulia cultu) and to implore
says, that

Hence, though

be the occasion of idolatry.

he has no other objection to

may seem

it

ridiculous to

thin

most of

the present time, that divine souls should be placed in the stars, and preside over regions and cities,
tribes

and people, nations and tougues, yet

it

did not appear so to the more intelligent Christians

of former times.

I had almost forgotten however


them, I have done well
Syncsiuf .

This

tlie

wisest of the ancient Christians, but as he was the best of

hi reserving liioi to the last

cither of the

church therefore, in

Si, irartg

OUT Ml

xwpaw,

I it 'Ml,

ciMcyc;

amur.

<r

juv

Si Juxruutysi,

01 0JOI

ovs rtgi

kXiim

xt"*

s-f

fuA*?i

ynta. fuuMgaw.
I

Tff I HOVjUV,

Kara r/uv,

i t*

mfymt

afLQiPaTips,
0)

<

and

this

his third

iraja uKurtVf

u no

hymn,

other than the Platonic bishop

sings as follows

INTRODUCTION.

ITU

TS, Tf KO&|v

J*X

T* soXnnif,

Ml

" Thee,

vii.

father of the worlds, father of the

ones/

artificer

of the Gad*,

it is

hot/ to

O king, the intellectual Gods sing, thee, O blessed God, the Cotmagi, those fulgid eyes, and

Thee,

starry intellect*, celebrate,

rouDd which the illustrious body [of the world] dances.

All the race of

the blessed sing thy praise, those that are about, and those that are in the world, the tonic Gods,

and aluo the

szorTic,*

who govern

trious pilots [of the universe,]

the parts of the world, wise itinerants, stationed about the illus-

and which the angelic

series

pours

forth.

Thee

too, the

renowned

by occult paths pervades the

In

another

part also

preside over Thrace snd

of the same hymn, he

informs us

that

he adored the

powers

that

Chakedou.

' What these ire will be shortly eiplained, when we come to


speak of the Apostle PauL
*Syne*ius does not here speak conformably tothe Chaldean theelogists, from whom he has derived these apFor the i<n*M and the fmst, are according to tbem Goda, the farmer being the divinities af the stars,

pellations.

and the

latter

forming that order of Gods which

is called

by Proehis in the sixth book of

this

week amxvnfi &

Urated. Both these orders therefore, are superior to the angelic series. Thisunseiai

Jews, hut to

Ptoc.

all

the fathers of the church, and

all

th.Christjan divines tLt^succeede

Vol.

'

I.

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INTRODUCTION.

r curntifar

i.

in

e.

"

have supplicated the ministrant

Gods

that possess the

Thracian

soil,

and also those

that,

an opposite direction, govern the Chalcedonian land."

And

in the hurt place

he says

(in

Hymn

I.)

tXrya fur,
eur*{,

<AA*

uf

w iram)

xvn; oupovw ihttvtf


to

J*

Acr tvrs

ftAwrw,

8| XOI geiroiTi fl"rp*

^ttMSD

The
is

substance of which

totally diffused

which

it

lhat incorruptible intellect

present distributed in various forms.

and another part

I confess I

dogma,
is

"

am

is

bound

in

That one

were, their charioteer

it

terrestrial

part of this intellect

but another part

is

among

distributed

the angelic

form."

wholly at a loss to conceive what could induce the moderns to controvert the

that the stars

frieadly to the

which is wholly an emanation of divinity,

through the whole world, convolves the heavens, and preserves the universe with

the stars, and becomes, as

among
choirs

is

is,

tUfff*

and the whole world arc animated, as

it is

an opinion of

infinite antiquity,

and

most unperverted, spontaneous, and accurate conceptions of the human mind.

Indeed, the rejection of

it

appears to

me

to

be just as absurd as

it

would be

in a

maggot,

if it

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INTRODUCTION.
were capable of

syllogizing, to infer that

he walk*, because

The

it

man

is

never saw any animated reptile so large.

sagacious Kepler, for so he

and be rather embraced

it

modem writers,'

by the roost

called even

is

a conception of this great truth ; but as he was


truth only partially,

SIX

a machine impelled by some external force

as subservient to his

appears to have had

than a philosopher, he saw this

more an astronomer

own

astronomical opinions, than

Bat from what

as forming an essential part of the true theory of the universe.

1 have seen

of the

writings of Kepler, I have no doubt, if he had lived in the time of the Greeks, or if he hud

the stody of the works of Plato and Aristotle the business of his

adept

in,

and an

Mundi,

illustrious

lib. 4,

and zealous champiou of

p. 158) says,

a soul,

it

it

the

He

that there

an animated body,

is

propagated into

all the

amplitude of the world."*

For he

also be confidently asserts that the earth has a soul.

a body such as

is

that of

some animal

and

which are

light,

that

says,

He

nature which he investigates will be to the earth.'"

of the skin

hairs, thus also the earth

in the place

of

such

is

spirits

in

In the following passages

" That

the globe of the earth

adds,

For

" That he

is

the animated

as

produces [on

its

sees for the most part

testifies that

gam from

there

it

body produces

surface] plants

and

and marine monsters are produced. As the animated body likewise produces
recrement of the can, and sometimes

a soul of the

the sun, and

is

what its own soul is to an animal, that the sublunary

every thing which proceeding from the body of an animal

proceeds also from the body of the earth.

is

adds, that if there

must reside in the centre of the world, which, according to him,

from theoce by the communication of the rays of

ficies

Kepler then Cm Hanno-

dogma,

kt that book.

made

be would have become an

their philosophy.

" That he docs not oppose

he shall say nothing about

life,

trees

tears,

a soul in

it,

the super-

in

and as in the

mucus, and the

the pustules of the face, thus also the earth pro-

Dr. Or* gory, in the TOth proposition of.lbe fint book af hi< Element* of Aitronomy, aayi of Kepler, " Tint hi,
archetypal ratio, geometrical conciamtin, and harmonic proportions, bow urh a fore* of geniui at u not to be found

iaaay of the writari of physical attfoaeasy before him. So that Jeremiah Hovtoz, a very competent jodgc of tbeae mattan, though a littla avarw to Kapler, in the beginning af his aatrotwarical atadiea, after baring in rail tried other.,

jnUtftdman aSewaU mriU

aW

tAe rAoie (riie

/ tUf, thai

*<*

staisrt

4 pHUHphm.
hat Keller

I mm, aUl

Him aJ

kirn great,

aumt,

ew -wuiJumf r<

I* tat 6r* nag a/.-f/tm ,Um,

tkc

\vu*

k*U

pkiwpAer, read;

to b.

rW

Mag aortal

hwaUthawa."

I qaate this passage, aat from

UV ju.toeai

of the encomium

it

contaias; for

it is

eatraragant, and by no

menu

true,

Kepler.
1

" El primum qnidem de anima

cat tali* aliqua) in ccntro


iocia, qai lint
'

'

lotiiin

unireni eUi non rcpngno,

mondi, quod mihl

toco aptriuiuin

DaealoM tr riohm

in

ol eat, retidere,

indeque

nihil
in

omnem eju

corpora animali propagati."

rale

eonm eriL ooala ~i aJiron -oWi,

tamen hoc libro IV. dicam. ViJrtui emoi

(ai

araplitudiucm cammercio radioruiu

eat aua aaraaa, hoc erit tclluri

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INTRODUCTION.

XX
duces amber and bitumen.

And

rivers.

as the

At

the bladder too produces urine, thus likewise mountain*

be inflamed, so the earth produces sulphur, subterranean


the veins of an animal blood

body, so

is

it

sweat which

is in

as in

ejected out of the

is

the earth Ibe tense of touching, that

it

And

respire*},

in

tad

subject in certain parts to languors, mid internal vicissitudes of the viscera, and that subterranean

heat proceeds from the soul of the earth, he adds,

" That

a certain image of the zodiac

ent in this soul, and therefore of the whole nrinament, and

Bishop Berkeley also was by no weans


,

as

" Blind

fate

and blind chance are

Such

it

and regular course,

Egyptians thought
:

bodies within

at

bottom much the same

shows

the soul to

ail thing's

did partake of

be governed and directed by

world was an animal.

it

itself,

life.

we may

If

trust

and such
a

mind.

harmony,

was an opinion
die

This opinion was also 10 general and current

-sense

and

fueling, as well as appetites

and aversions

yet

it is

and

plain they

that

from

all

symphony, one animal

life to result.

" Ianiblichus declares the world to be one animal,

in

and connected by one

which the

common

parts,

nature.

however

teJiuri*

corpora.

Ut

ecira corpus in

ruin tuperticie

pilom, sic terra plaalae

pedtenfi, hie crocs, cicada*, variaqae insect* et owoatra marina nascontiir

r.fremrnta, est

iibi

et

gunni cx

faciei paalolia, tic telle* electron,

et at

distant each

And be

" Vidrtiam plereqne omnia, qu* ex corpore animantie proveaieatia, testaator animaiA

is their

It

the llermaic writings,

could not be touched or sensibly affected from without

an inward

other, are nevertheless related


'

one great

it

thine,

the various tones, actions, and passions of the universe, they supposed one

riiin

world

Greeks, that Plutarch asserts aD others held the world to be an animal, and governed by

attributed to

act and

resplend-

is

the sympathy of things

hostile to this opinion, that the

were, animated and held together by one soul

as

antiquity that the

of remote

bond of

the mutual relation, connect**

is

world, that they seem, 4*


order,

the

is

evident from the following extract from his Siris, (p. 131).

is

than the other-

nil

forth

And

thunder, and lightning.

fires,

generated, and together with

in the veins of the earth, metals, and fossils, and a rainy vapour are generated.-

cap. 7, p- 162, after having shown that there


is

pour

body produces excrement of a sulphureous odour, and crepitus which may als*

in

from

tenches, what is

Hlo ine*jr, proyeoirr

arboresqoc prolVrt; iaqoc

lis ibi

corpus lacbryraas, blaansm, anritim<iu

bitamro: Dtqua vesica ariaaai,

sie enonlra

flumma

et at carpus axcTeasentam aalpharei dorU, crepitaiqae, qui etiaio iefiamman potinot, tic terra tolpbar, ignes

" Retacet igitarlaa

7 o>fUua; reran

estlcstia

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KTtOOVCTION.

ixi

also a roc ei red

iMm of

he Pythagoreans and Platonic*, (bat there

no chasm

is

in nature, bat a

chain or >cal of beings rising bj gentle uninterrupted gradations from the lowest to the highest,

Aa

each nature being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher.


igneous, ao the purest

fire

becomes animal, and the animal soul become*

understood, not of la* change of

m nature iato another, but of

each lower nature being, according to those philosophers, aa


next above

u
die

to reside

tt

it

principle and

classes of life

animal there
the vegetable
vegetation.
trine implies

esemplar of

somewhat

somewhat

from whence, by

all,

and

lastly in

the whole

the faculties,

is

mixed bodies,

as

instincts,

and motions of

be

to

sometimes as a plant or vegetable.

alive,

Hut

posed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, which


it

inferior

For

Compare now the Newtonian with

and

harmonically round the sun, not as

his influence

and fountain of

and power,

when the

principle

and

in

it

it itself

animated by

mind; which

Which doe-

in their several

be mentioned as a

what has been

world

son/,

and

may
it

it

sup-

directed

be reduced

the concurrent

"

that the heavenly bodies are vitalized

bv their

move

urged by a centripetal force, but from an animated tendency

Hie

it is

but the

the rational

the result of this vitality, and that the planets

and from a desire of partaking as largely as possible of

in the former theory

on which
;

is

their right,

in the latter they are all natural.

and merely hypothetical

if

Stoici
u"

this theory,

informing souls, that their orderly morion

rational,

to long a* the

follows that all pmrtt thereof originally depend upon, and

Pulkaporeans
Platonics
doctrine of
9
*>
S
_J

to the principle

beings,

though sometimes

unto, the tame indivisible stem or principle, to wit, a tupreme


*^n^n*n

but so a*

somewhat

in this, notwithstanding

surmised by some learned men, there stem) to be no atheism.

by understanding,

is

metals aud mineral*, somewhat of

thought to be more perfectly connected.

" Both Stoics and Platonics held the world


sentient animal,

of living things,

different degrees, are derived the inferior

intellectual, again in the sensitive there

sensitive,

By 'which means
that all

be

and act m.

fir* the rational, then Ike sensitive, after that the vegetable,

is still

to

is

were, a receptacle or object for the

It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that intellect is the very life
first

becomei

air

which

intellectual,

the connection of differ eot natures,

former

founded

is

latter is the

all
is

the celestial morions are the effect of violence,

attended with insuperable difficulties, the biter,

admitted, with none.

And

the former is unscientific

progeny of the most accurate science, and

is

founded

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have said diat

XTKODfCTION.

should prove from the testimony of the Apostle Paul, that the Jews were not

consistent in confounding angels properly so called with

from the following passage

in the first place


?"!," "'i **f

f"I

and even admitting

what worlds Paul

we

Testament,

alludes.

it is

we

If

were framed by

place, the world*

first

we adopt

agei,

the ages

(tones

of the Valentinians.

follows

" 13v faith

we

is

it

is

means

Now we

learn

And

all

faith,

it

Paul

agreeably to

this,

is

first

to

New

shall rentier the

that all things

verse of this chapter, that

speaking in

this

we

say

what

shall

it is

passage of something
is ?

it

I answer, the

the whole passage should be translated as

understand, that the stones were framed bv the word of God, in order that

from such as do not appear

and Bishop Pearson

must

authors,

translates as I have

not clearly follow from

(i. e.

certainly

done the

from the second book of In-nxus against the

it

we

in the

require to believe, that by the

from things

latter part

To

" faith
the passage clearly accords with the assertion that

is

of

this verse.

the

the pleroma, or fulness of

the above version, that according

icoues arc the exemplars of visible or created things

invisible)."

be convinced that ; t

heretics, that according to

created things are the images of the (tones, resident

does

from the uncertainty


of the word

as he his elsewhere said,

given in the

clear, that

much conversant with Greek

m order that

Valentinians,
deity.

is

For

particular faith does

neither worlds nor ages,

And

things which are seen, might be generated

Every one who

evidently a forced interpretation of

the general sense

is

erro-

is

teen,"

Since then eumac

invisible.

which

the extreme.

In the second place, from the definition of

the evidence of things not

is

erro-

is

word of

say this

evident

rtoftuma;

the English version

in

a forced and ambiguous interpretation, but

trifling in

word of God," what

same word he framed

This

me to be

to

asmjf/rssvcu

understand, that the worlds were framed by the

not, leaves the passage very ambiguous,

shall indeed avoid

meaning of the Apostle


the

v.S.mvru nwpjn

ii.

were not made of things which do appear."

that things which are seen,

neously translated, because in the


(v{

Gods. And this appears

uwftr to fStoropom ytynmsu.

neously rendered; " Tliroogh faith

God, so

Hebrews

in

which we may add,

to.

Paul

too, the

that this sense of

the evidence of things not seen."

For

to the Valentinians, subsisting


here the things which do not appear are the aones; these, according

from our

version,

Paul might say with great propriety,

in deity.

So

faith, that

the (tones were framed by the

that

word of God,

that

" we understand by

in order that things which are seen, might be

naturally follows from his definition of


generated from such as do not appear," for this

1 farther

add, that

among

faith.

these tones of the Valentinians were wuj, fUs, cr/ys, A,.-,

INTRODUCTION.
i. e.

a profundity,

intellect,

rilence, truth,

XXlii

and witdon, which as Gale

well observe* in his note* ou

For

lamblichua de Mysteriis, &c. prove their dogmas to be of Chaldak origin.


petually occur in the fragments of the Chaldaic oracles.
gible triad

denominated *

is

theology of Plato, at

eon,'

i.

very satisfactorily

is

e.

eternity,

And

aud

shown by Proclus

and considered as the exem-

plars of the risible universe, they are analogous to the ideas of Plato,

evident from the Parmenides of that philosopher.


i

Again,

m the

for /

which also are Gods, as

According to Paul too, as die

of the visible world, they must be beings of a

be Gods

much

Epistle to the Ephesiaiis, chap.

"

And in

wgtvnrrtf.

higher order than angels, and con-

i.

v.

21. Paul says that

seems to comprehend

all

i.

e. the

seven planets,

Augustut' c oofesses that he

(principality,

God

has exalted Christ

mftan

s-arq;

agW

**

the 6th chapter and 12th verse be conjoins with princi-

powera, the rulers of the world,


'jet t*{ xtsaftQxqttTogai.

between those four words,

is

teones are the

productive power being one of the great characteristics of a

every principality, and power, and might, and dominion,"

Suwumsw

the

book of the following

in the third

According to the Chaldeans therefore, the a-ones are Gods

work.

these words per-

the middle of die Chaldean intellialso perfectly conformable to

is

is

-po (

power, might, and dominion,)

the celestial society.

" Quid

to; ufxaf, tqo; t$ #fow-

ignorant what the difference


in

is

which the Aposde Paul

inter se distent

quatuor Ula vocabula,

quibua univcraam ipsam caelestem societatem videtur Apostolus esse complexus, dicant qui poasunt,

Trallianos) speaks of the angelic orders, the diversities of archangels and armies, the differences of
the orders characterised by might and dominion, of thrones and powers, the magnificence

etonet* and the transcendency of


Uirau.ai vofir

r treufana,

xjxi

Cherubim and Seraphim,"

toj ayytKtn.au T{"5>

tj

rauv

tuu

yoy

of the

ryes eu xaS' o, ri &tSfuu, xai

agyayytA** not OTftmsv rfoMwyo;,

Proelos begins the ilxth book of die following werk with o Wring
that he hat celebrated in the preceding book the
at the intellect sal Godj, The <tetut therefore-, thouth the cause
of then rxiits in the intelligible, pro.

bebdanadlc

perly belong to the Intellectual order j and Ike Deainrgiu or artificer


of the universe
order. Bat the deminrgni according to Orpbew, prior to lbs
nuVrication

as

all katellectaal

conlunnably
1

Ad

ia each,

it

is

fell

at the extremlly of that

fnm

to the *<-Ttiun of Ptnl.

I refer the reader

dialogue, in vol.
5

natarn are

tabmts

of the world absorbed in himself Pbanet the


of Idea* of which the form, la theseasible anWene are the images.
And
evident Ibal tlurngt wtiek art
icr
mental
tkc

exemplar of the nriTene. Hence he became

who

is

dreiroas of being folly conviaeed of this to the notei accompanying

my

3 of any Plato.

Leerentium,

c. ifi.

HoreweseotUe-eae.areackaowledf.dby

trenssos to be beings of

so

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IMTIODDCTIOW.

>>

The

opinion of Grotius' therefore,

highly probable, that the

is

Powers, Dominations, and Principalities, from

Jews obtained

the

names of

Babylonic captivity; ami Gale in his notes on

their

Iamblichos* says, that certain passages of Zoroaster and Ostanes cited by the author of Arithm.

Theolog. confirm

this

the first of the four

Indeed, the appellation of aftpu principle*, which are

opinion of Grotius-

powers mentioned by Paul, was given by the

<

called by the Grecian uWogists supermundane and assimilative, the nature of

by Produs

book of

in the sixth

Commentary

On

the following

and

of4f, intelligible

at the

tome time

EiMfi

i.

" All things

e.

wiU of the

i.

" But

e.

Farther

hvknwr;

Gods denominated

the

bis

MS.

roersc nmt

Chaldean oracles' princi-

two following oracles

are cited

by him,

wrrgo f mini&t /buAi.

yield ministrant to the intellectual prcsters of intellectual fire, through (he perfather."

And

likewise such as are

still,

this,

and Prod us in the fourth book of

intellectual, is according to the

In proof of

concerning the empyrean, and the

first,

the Parmenides of Plato shows that the order of

pally characterized by domination.

the

work

Paul

subjection to the material Synoches.'*

m the Epistle to

the

Romans, chap.

viii. v.

38, says,

" For

am

nor powers, nor things present, nor things


that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities,
to

come, nor

height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be

of God, &c."

From

this

not the same with angels

>
:

Ad Cap.

arrangement therefore,

it is

able to

wparate us from the love

evident that principalities and powers are

Epistle
and as according to Paul they are beings *o exalted, that in his

IB. sftattfcaL

Myt.

.Hm

my

. *6.

Collection of tbt*

The SyuKlK. fo

Orde

in th old

tht secoed triad of

Uw

Montldy MagD*.

mUUir.,bW, aad at UM

sum USM iataOectusI trdei

of God..

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INTRODUCTION.
Co the Epbift.,he could not find nn
> thing
raised even

is

order.

It is

above them,

more magnificent

lu say of Christ,

than that he

follows that ihey must be Gods, since they are


superior to the angelic

it

remarkable too, that he courtages height and depth (vfout **

fi

a 6 a; ) with
|

ties

and powers

In the

first

and

curdiug to the Valentinians.

For be

Though

says,

Pmil

xprrs*ly assert* that tier*

there be that arc called

W,

Gods many uud Lord, many

in earth, fas there l>e

;)"

viii. v.

j.

i the pu.cuthcsi,

heathens he believed that


lar in asserting that this

second oliapterof his


:

wa ,

Coa only

ue

supreme and the father of all

admitted by Paul.

ev^y

Again, from the deife

For

Name*

treatise O., the Divi::e

become, dciform, many Gods are generate

the

singuin the

observe! concerning what

Nc\eilhelc?s,

supereiiehlially die suprcm-,

from him, united

distributed

he afterwards adds, " mat

the leader both of

is

him and

litis

to iiimsdf,

was

one

is >till

unmiugleH

mI,

employs

tlie

above cited verse.

source

on.

Hence Proclus

the Parmenides of Plato, speaking of

assume,

it is

IUU. rn
rr>;
t.

Si-.

Proc -

at the

to their great

the

same with ihe

um
x^r.

rw

,(

rx,
*U7. .V

:.

vt. .,,*,. e

K.. r-f nr. tw.

TW H ...^T,r .

, { ,
..

the

them are

,> K %fua

.,;

r.

And,

fifth

in

Dionysius also

rsv

book of

his

the separation

MS

i.

e.

.,f *, fu. urn. ,

among

..,,,

Tw

doe,

Commentary
these

each other, and are rooted

are'

Pad

that they have a dis-

when speaking of

l^rmn

is

the

to Plato and the best of

same time

divine unities says, " Whichever

tlie

others, because all of

in

unical."

is

producing cause.

for he says -bat the divine multitude

not depart from, but abides in the

Oo

Gods, conformably

very same expression which Proclus continually uses


iheir

manner understood by Paul, who was

from the one, and which

from, are profoundly united

of the Gods from

said to

who

and precede separations, and yet nevertheless


tbey

therefore, according to this Dionysiu*, considered the

tinct subsistence

ia

himself,

many, and void of multitude."

witli th*

in a transcendent

God

united, after the separation wliich does not in proceeding depart fioru
the one, and

his disciples, as deiform processions

its bili:y

remaining impartible

hli preceptor, to divine illumination," in


the

that in divine natures, unions vanquish

here said by Paul

is

consequence of which there appears and

in

inconas the

Pwido-Dionysius the Arcopagile

of God, by which vry thing according


to
:

heaven or

it i

weU
I

the chief deity, and

And

in

Nor am

things.

be a separation and multiplication of ihe one [spireme] God.

Gods

whether

of which verse,

evident that he adn.its the existence of a plurality


of Gods, though as

trovertibly

a* follows

Epistle to the Corinthians likewise, chap.

a divine multitude.

is

one of the *o

is

you

in tht

,
'

, r T.

4llM

. : .,

v.. ...

w,

,,t.,

*,.#,.

Vol.

I.

rf

Digitized by

Google

miKODUCTlOlt.

Ufi
Mr.

u 1mm by their

For

wine manner

earthly, after the

of then

ia

yaq ra hvlpa

nu< Mimr*

Taif

Aopn, turn

aXXtuc

iM^itwM t

I he -one,

i\vem

a*

which

is

like

follows,

train,

first

xcu iti

and each

aad

by

yima

their

aumaiu

scientific

beastly,

triad

order, according to him,

of

Goda

to Seraphim,
this

triad,

aad beauty

also, are

intelligible triad;

"it

it

as it

it*

Si ran

conaist* of

in the third

characteristics

of the Gods called

and of the Gods that arc


is

it,

Goodness, wisdom,

and 6try to
signifies

ymermt,

be appear*

and power.

subsist

and Dionyskis says 1

book of the following work to belong

X'r^^r*

otisoi intellectual alone,

characterized by dominion, might,

For symmetry,

Phikbua to

in the

wjotupoif ttttrrotm)

wirrai sum rwaai intelligible

from

pioceesions

work, classes

Seraphim, Cherubim, and

Diowyaiua aays, that according to the Hebrews, the word Cherubim


it

ftia

haa transferred the character-

by Plato

summit, wisdom to the middle of

knowledge, or an efution of witdom, ta*

km-

by dominion, might, and power.

Hence he

*Sig

continually borrow*

Cherubim, and Thrones.

are raid

rwrm

t ** awtiyxuro*

the following

in

were arranged in the vestibule* of deify."

ebowo by Proclu*

goodness to

m,

rueru Kmtang

arrangement of theae deiform

the divine essence* characterized

which characterize

bis first order that

which

H* ya*

m^orreu

xt" txuraf, Toy sutov Tpoiroy imu

by Proctus

unfolded

xcu

became he

lived posterior to Proclus,


that

ttrt,

m, am r,

vrwy rvf

ia the veetibule of the good ; (eri u* tcij t<w mytAov

And

the* are

m the one,

tba third of Principalities, Archangels, end Angels.

ise* of the iotclIigibU

fixed in lb* earth, and through

hi n AAaAjuf

mi mym>

admirably

so

The second of

Thrones.

ri,

confounding

barbaroutly

from

wturai

Montn Kgw$jf mSgvrrai Tp yy,

f*n]Ttv

worki,

Ami

we

al*o divine nature* are rooted

Thia Dioayaiui, who certainly


kia

rooU)

tbeir

(i. a.

a unity aad one, through uncoofuaed union with the one ittdf."

tv camp rmi

fiji,

ummiu

and

at the

its

to the

extremity.

a multitude of

yvvn n^tmf.

tame time

The

intellectual,

to buvc transferred to hi* middle triad

Aad be

has adapted hi* third triad consist-

ing of Principalities, Jrchaitgels, and Angelt, to the supermundane, liberated, and mundane

For the supermundane Goda are

orders of Gods.

lowing work x<u Principalities, or rulert, which

Aud

the

mundane God*

modated the

m>

peculiarities of the different orders of

powers

Hence

God*

yt>^f Jt/tt,

turn?

nmn

it is

the fol-

um.,wMMf

all

winged

life,

and

evident that Dtonysius has accom-

to the nine orders

and his arrangement has been adopted by

fin vty&ZwMH

book of

word employed by Dionjsius and Paul.

the

are said by Proclu* (in Parmenid.) to be the sources of a

angels are celebrated by Dionysius as having Brings.

celestial

called by Proclus in the sixth


is

which be denominates

succeeding Christian theologiata.

rv

|rx'.

CoUatt. Mitrarch.

c.ip. 7.

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IrfTBODtfCTlOH.

nay be

Vestiges therefor* of the theology of Plato

tad in a similar manner, a resemblance


pointed out, and

it*

the religions

of

men, and the worshipping men

Numerous

Gods form no

at

might be easily

it

Omitting however, discussion of

it

when

it ia

eooaidered according to

thu might be adduced, but

I shall

of this position, but this

Gods

immortal

is

On

and

Isis

from

his

The Gulden

Laws.

by law

as (hey are disposed

first

wees/

All the works of Plato indeed, evmce the truth

Osixi*.

particularly manifest

be honoured

it*

mennon for

thu purpose, as unexceptionable witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric
and the treatise of Plutarch

this

theology, that the deification of dead

this

part of

instances of the truth of

other nations to

all

universality be clearly demonstrated.

kind for the preterit, I (hall farther observe respecting

getrume purity.

Xivii

seen both i. the Jewish

verses order, that the

afterwards the illastrious Heroes),

under which appellation, the author of the verses comprehends also angels and daemon* property
to called

and

damons, i.

in the last place the terrestrial

But to honour
i

the

Gods as

e.

such good men as transcend

they are disposed by taw,

they are arranged by their fabricator and father j and this

beings superior to man.

Hence,

to

honour

inert,

honour them a*

to

ia

however excellent they may be, as Gods,

honour the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by
founding the divine with the human nature, and

is

in virtue the

as Hieroele* observe*,

is,

not to

is

their Creator, for it is con-

thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagorie

" Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, Tkat he charged kit ditcipUt net to grot equal drgreu of honour I* Ms
iiodt and heroes. Herodotus (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, Thai they worthtpptd Ucrtvlu two meyt, mimjs
imnurtal dcxty and to they HfriSrtJ to Mik
ami another at a Hero, and to they celebrated hit memory. Isoerata*
(Enoom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods, when he speaks of Menelaus

and Helena.

But the distinction

she statue of RegUla, wife


at

no where more

is

to Herodes

Triopium, and taken from tha statue

fully expressed

than in the Greek inscription upon

Atticu*. as Salmasiua thinks, which


itself

by Sirroondus; where

konour of a mortal, nor ytt that which vat proper to the Goth

n>i

it

is

turn *<;,

was

said,

m *~f

up

set

temple

in his

That tka had ntUhar tka


*'

It usilll

by

the inscription of Herodes, and by the testament of Epicteta extant in Greek in the Collection of Inscription*,
that

was

it

in the

power of particular families

give ktroiaU konourt to th.-m.

to

keep

festival

days in honour of seme of their

own

family,

and ra

In that noble inscription at Venice, we find three days appointed every year to

be kept, and a confraternity established

for that

purpose with the laws of

it.

The

first

day

to

bo observed in

be ofJcred to them as dritiej. The second and third days in honour of the
between which honour and tkat of deities, the/ shewed the difference by th? distance of
time between them, and tho preference given to the other. But wherein soever the differmca lay, that there

honour of die Mutes, and


Scroti

<>f

the family

sacrifices to

n mttincliun acknowledged among them spears by this passage of Valerius


i>iouyaius llalicainass. Antiq Roiu.

amUy
.

hat,

lit>.

11. p.

that belong to the lower

'"'greet of' divina


deities,

says Ua,the Godt

in his excellent oration

extant in

toaUxtt,mhou tem/>letand oitareamr

to

blame

for iL"

w^

nest to the Gods, as Celsus calls those

whom

tka duo

From which we take notice, that the Heathens did not confound all
the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the calnttai

damom.

wonkip, giving to

or the supreme Gad.

were not

call,

uurthipped a ilk conmnn tocrifcet; and next after them, J eoil tka Ganii of our natation, to

e give lHT. r{ f^ij, the tetond honenrt

honmri

694. I

So tnat

if

the distinction of divine worship will excuse from Idolatry, the Heathens

See StilttngHeefs answer to a book entitled Catholic* bo Idolater*,

p.

510,8 18,&c.

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INTRODUCTION.

xnv'di

Plutarch too in his above-mentioned treatise most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety

precept.

of worshipping

" Those

men

as

therefore,

Gods,

wbo

as

is

evident from die following extract

of

tliink that things

this

kind

[i.

e.

fabulous stories of the

Gods

were men] are but so many commemorations of the actions and disasters of kings and
through transcendency

wards

fell

in virtue or

power, inscribed die

title

and misfortunes, these employ the most easy method indeed of

into great calamities

arm longer than

white, and Osiris black, as

Orus

commander, and Canopus a

nated.

The

the

Dog

"

honour of

is

it

Typhon was

from

Greeks

become

whom

call

fear, however, that

this

almost

in

who

all

still,

make

to ride not far

move

and they

lliey

also call

name was denomi-

Argo, being the image of die ark of

a constellation, they

Hermes was

complexion red; but

they say the star of that

in

wbo

Osiris,

and

from Orion and

Isis.

things immoveable,

and

are under the influence of divine inspiration through piety to

any respect

fall

short of transferring from heaven to earth, such grta!

and venerable names, and of thereby shaking and dissolving


implanted

men

to

Simouides says, against a great length of time, but also against many

Gods; and would not

atheists,

in his

Farther

[according to the proverb] would be to

nations and families of mankind

men from

convert divine into

their very birth,

that

who

worship and

belief,

would be opening great doors

human concerns; and would

impostures of Eucuicrus of Messina,


'

men.

of which they consider the one as sacred to Orus, but the other to

to declare war, not ouly, as

these

pilot,

ship likewise, which the


in

the other; that

Gods

the Egyptians relate, that

they had been by uature

if

Otiria a

which therefore

For

doing by the narrations themselves.

as to his body, with one

who

of divinity on their renown, and after-

eluding the story, and not badly transfer things of evil report, from the
are assisted in so

as if they

tyrants,

which has been


to the tribe o#

likewise afford a large license to the

devised certain memoirs of an incredible and fictitious

mythology,* and thereby spread every kind of atheism through the globe, by inscribing all the
received God, tvithout any discrimination, by the names of generals, naval-captain*,

who

lived iu remote perituh

of

time.

except Euemcnis alone, who, as


have, nor ever bad a being.

Arnobius

ir.e4.i<rtiAf
O.-is-i.i,
J>.

therefore-

it

beems, sailed to the

Ami though

Assyrians, and those of Scs-jstris in

B .Hi

and

kingt,

further adds, that they arc recorded in golden characters,

Panchoa, at which neither any llarburian or Grecian ever arrived,

in a certain country called

'

He

and

Egypt

the

Pnnchuaus and Tiiphyllians,

that neither

actions of Semiramis are celebrated by the

and though the Phrygians even to the present time,

Mimrci-.:* Felix

wtrc

the ancients i*d formerly lean men.

3j0. 8vo. r*i'W'-, KH'j.

gnat

very-

unfortunate in

Vid. Artw/b.

lib.

-t.

.;i:e:;-g this

.V>r:;i

impov.or

Cem,

to

call

prove that

.Mlnxii Fc:;

INTRODUCTION.

tltoir

ancient king*,

whom some

Masdes, was a brave and powerful man

call

and farther

though Cyrus among the Persians, and Alexander atnon^ the Macedonians, proceeded
tories,

almost at

far as to the

boundaries of the earth, yet they ouly retain the

atill,

in their vic-

name of good

king*,

and arc remembered as such, [and not as God*.]

" But

if

certain persons, inflated

by ostentation, as Plato soys, having their soul at one and the

same lime inflamed with youth and ignorance, have


had temples erected

in their

honour, yet

this

insolently

assumed the appellulion of Gods, and

opinion of them flourished but for a short time, and

afterwards they were charged with vanity and arrogance, in conjunction with impiety and lawless

con luct

and thus,
Like smoke they flew away with swift-pae'd

And

being dragged from temples and altars

had celebrated him


close-stool-pan

in his

poems

now

have

nothing

left

who

us the offspring

knows no such thing of me.'

slave*, they

Arttigonus the elder said to one llermodotus,

like

Hence

them, but their monuments and tombs.

fate.

fugitive

who empties my

of the sun ami a God, 'he

Very properly also, did

I.) sip pus

the sculptor

blame

Apelles the painter, for drawing the picture of Alexander with a lliunder-bolt in his hand, whereas

he had represented him with a spear, the glory of which, as being true and proper, no time would
take away."

In another part of the same work also, he admirably reprobates the impiety of making the
to

common

be things inanimate, which was very

ages that accompanied the decliue and


ject

is

as follows

" In the

much

of the

fall

Roman

empire.

But what he

says

on

this

sub-

s-ccond plac*.

which

afraid, lest before they are

is

of

still

the season*, us those

greater consc-nuence,

aware, they tear

of wind, streams of water, semination*,

of the earth, and

is

then

in

men

should be careful, and very

pieces and dissolve divine natures, into blast*

arings of land, accidents of the earth, and mutations of

do ho male Bacchus

where says, that Persephoue or Proserpine


fruits

Gods

with Latin writers of the Augustan age, and of the

to be
is

tlaitt, (4cnv5firvc>'.)

Then when the youth

vt

ine,

ami Vulcan flame.

Cleanlhes also some-

the spirit or air that pasttt through ($tf/*nr) the

Aud

a certain poet says of reapers,

the limb* of Ceres cut.

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INTRODUCTION.
For

men do

the*;

not

anchor of a ship, to be the

mead,

yarn and the

pilot, the

names of Gods

destroyed by men,

who

to natures

are in

Gods;

subject to

human power.

can any thing be a

From

some of them

are peculiar to the

southern, and others northern

common

to all

preside over

men, yet are

to us,

Gods who bestow

conceive that the

Of

conceive the

the cable*, and the

tail*,

be the weaver, and the bowl, or the


dire

and

atheistical opinions,

to

by

we

not portable to conceive that these

it is

men, which

is

deprived of soul, or

are led to conceive those beings to

nor that

but others to the Grecians, nor that some are

but as the sun and moon, the heavens, the land, end the

differently

is

be

and snpply them perpetually and without ceasing.


these, aie different in different countries,

Barbarians,

$e, are

denominated by different nations; so the one reason that

nations, have different appellations

all

different countries.

For

God

these things however,

Gods, who both use them and impart them

Nor do we

to

and things deprived of sense and Soul, and that are necessarily

want of and use them.

since, neither

things are

web

But they also produce

or the ptisan, to be the physician.

firing the

who

any respect differ from those

and honours assigned them according to law by

those also that have been consecrated to their service,

some employ

obscure, but others clearer symbols, not without danger thus conducting our inteDectual conceptions to the apprehension

symbols, have entirely


mire, have unaware
it is

For some,

of divine natures.

slipt

fallcu

into superstition

upon atheism

as

deviating from the true meaning of these

and others again

flying

on a precipice. Heucc,

from

superstition as a quag-

in order to avoid these danger*,

especially necessary that resuming the reasoning of Philosophy as our guide to mystic

ledge,

we

should conceive piously of every thing that

Theodorus
them with
instituted

said,

said or done in religion

while he extended his arguments with his right hand,

their left, so

we should

about sacrifices and

The Emperor

is

fall

into dangerous errors,

festivals in a

manner

different

some of

from

his auditors received


vvr'l

their original intention."

Heathens arising from the dedication of men, and

by Cyril, he speaks of

it

the fragments of his

in

as follows

Judaic audacity, and the indolence and cuii/mion of the Ileathtnt.


is

knowthat, as

by receiving what the laws have

"

to consider the truth respecting you [Christians,] he will find that your impiety

which

lot

Julian, as well as Plutarch appears to have been perfectly aware of this confusion

in the religion of the

treatise against the Christians, preserved

that

the

Willi

evils.

tl..

there are accurate and venerable laws pertaining to religion, ami inuuiiieral.lv

precepts which require a


forbids the serving

composed of

For deriving from both, not

most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web of

Hebrew* ndeed,

If any one. wishes

is

all

in-jst

holy

life

and deliberate choice.

But ulnvn the Jewish

the Gods, and eisjoius the worship of one alone,

whose portion

is

legislator

Jacob, and

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IKT ftC*IOH.
Israel

not

ttwlim of k

revise the

way

nafc*ritsmce,

end not only say*

Uli

but also omits to odd, I think, yea

tkos,

Cod., the detestable wickedness and Mdacity of those

all religious

in after times,

wiping to

take

reverence from (be mukitude, (bought that not to worship should be followed by

blaspheming the Gods.


ihiug else between

Thia you hare alone tl>ece derived

you

Hence, from

them.

bik!

bat there

ia

no

srtnihivtde in

Hebrews, you bare

the innovation of the

any

seized

blasphemy toward* the venerable Goda; but from our religion you hare coat tuidt reverence
tvx'rtf

nature more excellent thou man, and the iov

" So

great au apprehension indeed, rays

Dr.

of paternal

Stillingfleet,'

to

tHetttsstes -

had the Heathen? of ihe Mceaarty of

appropriate acts of divine worihip, that some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them
to

We

what they did not believe to be God.

and Curtius* concerning CaUiathenes.

have a remarkable rtorv to

this

to have divine worship given him, and the matter being started out of design
either

by Anaxarchua, aa Arrian, or Cleo the

proposed,

viz.

purpose

in

Arrian

Alexander arriving at that degree of vanity, as to desire

Sicilian, as Curtius says

among

the courtiers,

and the way of doing

by incense and prostration; CaOUtheaea vehemently opposed

it

at that which

it,

would confound' the difference of human and divine worship, which had been preserved inviolable

among them.
sacrifices,

The

worship of the Gods had been kept up in temples, with

and hymns, and prostrations, and such

U4 to confound thete things, either by lifting

Gods
nity

to the honours

by the votes of

houonra to himself.

For

of men.

men

And

thing for any of them,

neither

sent on an embassy to

when Pelopidas and Ismenias were

but

it

it

the

suffer

Gods

that the

Answer

to Catholics

Viu Aruxen.

I.

4. et

Curt.

/Elian. Var. hist. lib.

to usurp his royal dig-

it

man

to take their

a mean and base

Therefore, says he,

nought to make

shift as Use Jesuits advising the crucifix to

no Idolaters Lond. 1876.

Arrian.de Exped. Alex.

man

disdain for any

in divine adoration.

" Conon* also refused to make his adoration, ns n disgrace


'

any

says he, for

the Gods, or depressing the

sent to Arlax erics, Pelopidas did nothing unworthy, but

hands while they made their adoration* in the Heathen temples

and images, and

of Persia, to prostrate themselves

the ground, and stooping for that was

which was altogether as good a

of

Greeka thought

the kings

among them

altars,

by no meant fitting,

to the honours

would Alexander

appears by Plutarch,

it

when

let fall bis ring to

up nun

how much more justly may

before them, because this was only allowed

Ismeniaa

like

in

be held

his adoration

in the

Mandarin*'

China.

to his city;

and Isocrates' accuses

p. tit.

lib. 8.

1. c.

tl.

Justin, lib. 6.
>

Paaegyr.

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IXTROBUCTIO M.
the Persians for doing

by prostituting

it*

because hertin they shewed, that they despised the

Gods rather than men,

Herodotus* mentions Sperchius and Brdis, who

their honours to their princes.

could not with the greatest violence bo brought to give adoration to Xerxes, because
the lavs
.

of

their country to give divhie

mans put Timagorat

honour

for doing

to death

it ;

And

to men.'

Valerius

Maximus*

was against

it

says, the

Jthe-

so strong an apprehension had possessed them, that

the manner of worship which the) used to their Gods, should be preserved sacred and inviolable."

The

philosopher Sallusl also in his treatise

ble to suppose that impiety

of the Gods, and yet despised


requisite to

make

On

World

the (Jods and the

a species of punishment, and that those

is

ineni, will in another life

be deprived of

who have honoured

the punisliment of those

says, " It is not

who bave had


this

unreasona-

a knowledge

knowledge.

their kings as

Gods

And

it is

to consist in

being expelled from the Gods."'

When
in the

the ineffable transcendency of the first

God, whith was considered

forgotten, this oblivion was doubtless the principal cause of dead

men

they properly directed their attention to this tram cendency they

Had

as the grand principle

Heathen theology, by iu most ancient promulgators Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was

so immense as to surpass eternity,

infinity, self-subsistence,

in reality belong to those veiu-rable natures which are as

and even essence

it

were

unfathomable depihsof that truly mystic unknown, about which


ignorance.

For

as Simplicius justly

observes, "

ple of things should investigate whether

posed principle

and

made

respecting that,

more

venerable.

no occasion

if
till

Nor

it is

we

we

first

principles

found, the

is

stop in our asceiit

which

is

kuowledgc

beyond the dignity of the

first

till

we

which we have no longer any

find this to

be the case.

greater and

know

mmt
'

'

firmly,

lliat

by

holy and primary

names and

God, and

him the
things,

n,o.-t

we

For then-

is

be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving some-

principles of things."

ascribing to

refunded into

same enquiry should again be

more transcendent than

their nature.

not possible for our conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and

extension [of the soul] to [ihe highest]

is

requisite that he who ascends to the princi-

arrive at the highest conceptions, Uian

should

to be

it

and that these

unfolded into light from the

first

all

itself,

possible there cau be any thing better than the sup-

something more excellent

to fear that our progression will

thing about the

It is

being deified by the Pagans.

would have perceived

He adds,
is

as

'

much

This therefore

much
is

as possible irreprel.enrille

venerable excellencies

we can

ascribe nothing to hi.n which

is

For

less to

it

is

pass

oue and the best


;

viz. to

couceive, and the

suitable to bis dignity.

r.ib.T.
l.:h.

6 Cap.

3.

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INTRODUCTION.

If

superior.'"
:

xixiii

we can

however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt,] that

It is sufficient

it is

attribute to

him

not possible therefore to form any idea, equal to tbe dignity of the

progeny of the ineffable,

e.

i.

of the

first

principle* of things,

how much

less

can our

conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkuess, in the reverential language of the Egyptians, 1

which

Had

even beyond these?

is

r
i

the Heathens therefore considered as they ought this trans-

cendency of the supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with the
and consequently would never have worshipped

divine nature,

however,
of

lu the

men aa'Gods.

Their theology,

not to be accused as the cause of this impiety, but their forgetfolness of the sub-

is

dogmas, and tbe confusion with which

its

last place,

this oblivion

wa

wish to adduce a few respectable testimonies to prove that statues were not

considered nor worshipped by any of the intelligent Heathens as Gods, but as the resemblance* of
the Gods, as auxiliaries to tbe recollection of a divine nature, and tbe

For

ance and favour.

purpose, I shall

this

first

Sallust says concerning sacrifices and the honours


treatise

On

formed

for the sake of

the

Gods and

But

our advantage

all

habitude

which

to animals; prayers imitate that

But from all


sion can be

"

Kat

is all

made

will

'

ntu

^v>',

every where

is

and on

this

He

account

power*

intellectual; but characters superior ineffable

is

Gods beyond what

Ivwit

"w

*>

*f*m

ovxjti riftoT<paf xfAn'nai

9fmc *fxa (
twt tpmn *(X""i *

*** V9i^fi*tmrm r;

mn[, m; n*mAnt*i

life,

irrational life

they already possess

But conjunction with our

lmt*f <x9atpn, mv

"C T*r

golden

requisite in order to receive their beneficent

souls and the

be proper to add a few things concerning

xf rn l ni "fX*! fimmrm

xm^JSaTwpuf,

is

and animals which are sacrificed the

to a divine nature

it

that

statues resemble

these nothing happens to the

think however,

fittir, live *'

and since the providence of the Gods

produced through imitation and simiUtude.

is

imitate the heavens, but altars die earth

herbs and stones resemble matter

its assist-

divinities, in his

" The honours, says he, which we pay to the Gods are per-

the World.

extended, a certain habitude or fitness

communications.

means of procuring

present the reader with what the philosopher

which were paid to the

pi

mm TV

fX'r "f*

mfinrtt,

rn

tmmnr

of oar souls.

for

what acces-

Gods

And

sacrifices.

m s/mitunt

T 'M vfwr nrnmnn ;. Ov ynf

,l,

by these

in the first

f**ft

Ovti J*f

rqXuirjTH

is

niMfiirm

*ii<\\jun

/a*

riiistu rn{

wrif*Tsw |u* fafavrs Vf


aftrrs, *t
wmnffAn nyaitn
Jvmtw t<M(TTf K.
), hi ayiwnn, o. jT t-)w, ui m^uira,
ipjfun v* nmlnnf
i.Jo.. iJ5a.t, mi i^t>n wriSnw^n {uw urn., it vur I* wrfif-K, n pvtn i Xn. nuixw WfTi/w.
Siniplic. in Epiet.
qurt(*{

tj fi

p.

Enchir.

307. Lond. 1670. 8vo.

Of the

first

principle, says

a darkness beyond

Dam&scius

all intellectual

(in

M.

S. f

conception, a thrice

"fx4") the Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it a*


nan; v*f #
darkness, ^nt/x"

unknown

mimn;

SM|m>, gn*rtv yo9r>f, Tt{ ravrt**i4SfA^ifT':.

Proc.

Vol.

1.

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INTRODUCTION.

IMtV

we pones*

place, fince

to the givers

every thing from the Gods, ami

bodies through ornaments


are words only

corroborating

this

and of our

life,

but

life

we

but just to offer the

gifts

pray that

we may be

medrum

is

words indeed

the

And

conjoined without a medium.

Life therefore

present day that are happy, and

is

human

but the

life,

much

distant

life

its

is

cause.
pri-

life

latter desires

be

to

be similar to the con-

men of

and hence

And

the ancirnts, have sacrificed animals.

to every

its

therefore

from each other cannot be

medium should

necessary that the

must necessarily be the medium of

all

a manner accommodated

it

Sbce

conjoined with the Gods.

for natures

gifts

of our

too, that the felicity of every thing

also a certain

is

required

Besides, without sacrifices, prayers

become animated words

Add

animating the words.

of

first fruits

through consecrated

fruitit

through sacrifices.

life

marily subsists in the Gods, and there

united to the former, a

but in

but the proper perfection of every thing consists in a conjunction widi

account

necteri natures.

it

offer the first

but accompanied with sacrifices they

proper perfection

And on

we

hence, of our possession*

this

the

indeed not rashly,

God, with many other ceremonies respecting

the cultiva-

tion of divinity.'"

In the next place, the elegant Maximum Tyrius admirably observes concerning the worship of
statues

as follows

'

"

It

appears to

me

no need,

that as external discourse has

in

order to

its

position, of certain Phoenician, or Ionian, or Attic, or Assyrian, or Egyptian characters, but

imbecility devised these marls, in which inserting


in like
cile,

manner a divine nature has no need of

aud as uiucb distant from

inserted the

who

statues or altars

as earth

by

one who recollects

divinity,

and who

is

not in want of

who

give

but

human

meet with

however, rare among men, and

is,

devised by writing masters for hoys,

its

this

in

See chap. 15 and 16, of my translation of this excellent work.

See Vol. t of

com-

human

memory

nature being very imbe-

is

in

which

it

robust, and

divinity, have, perhaps,*

uo

a whole nation you will not find

kind of assistance, which resembles that


;

by m riling over

i,

" Whether statues

them obscure marks as copies

my

recovers from them

Those, therefore, whose memory

directly extending their soul to heaven, to

This race

statues.

it

from heaven, devised these symbols,

names and the renown of the Gods.

are able,

need of

divinity

dulness,

its

translation of his Dissertations, Disserlat. 38, the title of

which

should be ddicatcd to the Gods."

The philosopher hidoru* was a man of

front his life preserved

TW?iTKf trrmt

inf.- i.n

For he says of him

by Photius.

tjvn Jiipw aTr^yTf Mat

imlsmm, mi m**< y>

this description, as

Tot***" tat r*f ti

nit,

\.

e.

we

are informed by

X>.ff * aytatrn;

Damnum?

.*>*,,

t/tt ifttf j

" He was not willing

to

xai

in the extracts

,i,

, vtw(

Tlw>.

rtm rturt $a^i, tvaetr u mufw

adore statues, hut approached to

the God. themselves, w ho aie inwardly concealed not in adyta, but in the occult itscllj whatever it may be of altUow therefore 10 them being such did he approach ? Through vehement love, this also
perfect ignorance.

being occult.

my
no

meaning

What
And what else indeed, could conduct him to them than a love which is also unknown
>*
those who have experienced this love know but it is impossible to reveal it by words "1
f

less difficult to

understand what

it is."

Di

INTRODUCTION.
hicb, their hand being guided by that of the matter, they become, through memory, accustomed
to the art.

me

appear* to

It

men, as

therefore, that legislator* devised these statues for

fur

if

certain kind of boys, as tokens of the honour which should be paid to divinity, und a certain

duction as

it

were and path to

" Of statues however,


the Greeks think
matter, the
the

it

human

there

rcaiiuiscctice.

neither one law, nor one

is

mode, nor one

human resemblance.

For

the

if

and

human

in the earth,

their opinion is not irrational

soul

is

who

divinity,

for

this

magnificent, superb, and

through

its

strength, nor

ness, nor repercussivc

through
city,
is

its

full

alone, of all the bodies

moved

with difficulty through

through

nor on grass through

its

but

its

is

its

laxity,

is

weight, nor slippery through

art, feeds

fit

to

com

many and

all-various statue*

embraced through indigcoce

some

the astonishment which they excite

among

can endure

t<>

some

all

smooth-

its

we were

to give laws to other

boundaries and our

and reason,

it is

it

air,

or

proper works, and

fruits,

and cultivates the

men

In the

in like

manner admit the

art,

After which

lie

and other* are

ami others are venerated through

utility,

arc considered as divine tlirough their magnitude, and

There

is

not indeed any nice of men, neither Barbarian nor

proper that statues of the

who were

fero-

its

adapted to walk by nature,

and

of them

life,

be without some symbols of the hononr of the Gods.

discuss the question whether

tlicse

its

through

these adopt different symbols."

Grecian, neither maritime nor continental, neither living a iwstonil

if

for

flesh

of which some are fashioned by

arc honoured through

others are celebrated for their beauty

is

coldness, nor precipitate

its

It ia also

on

and

high,

honour the Gods."

then observes, " Unit with respect to the Barbarian*,

subsistence of divinity, but different nations


adds, "

souls, light,

summit on

of a good colour, stands firm, has a pleasing countenance, and a graceful beard.

resemblance of such a body, die Greeks think

He

its

nor feeding on raw

dreadful to timid animals, but mild to such as arc brave.

not

magnitude, nor terrible

its

harmomcally composed

but winged by reason, capable of swimming by


earth,

earth, raises

hardness, nor groveling through

swim through

imbecility

its

on the

of symmetry, neither astonishing through

beat, nor inclined to

it is

most similar to himself with a most

is

deformed body, but rather with one which would be an easy vehicle to immortal
adapted to motion.

from a pure

fashion statues in

most near and most similar to

reasonable to suppose that divinity would invest that which

For

nor one matter.

art,

honour the Gods from things the most beautiful

Jit to

form, and accurate art

Gods

nor dwelling

How,

in cities,

which

therefore, dial! any one

should be fabricated or not

For

recently sprung from the earth, aud dwelling beyond our

fashioned by a certain Prometheus, ignorant of

might perhaps demand consideration, whether

this race

life,

and law,

should be permitted to adore

spontaneous statues alone, which are not fashioned from ivory or gold, aud which are neither

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INTBOBUCTION.
oaks nor cedars, nor

rivers,

the earth itself and the


sily

nor bird*, but the rising sun, (be splendid moon, the variegated heaven,

and

air, all fire

all

water ; or shall

of honouring wood, or stones or images

we

constrain these

however,

If,

this is the

men

also to the nec ea-

common law

of

all

men,

let

bola a* well as their names.

" For divinity indeed, the father and fabricator of

a)i

things,

is

more

ancient than the sun and the

excellent than time and eternity, and every flowing nature, and

more

heavens,

Not

out law, ineffable by voice, and invisible by the eyes.

and

silver, to plants

rivers, to the

summits of mountains, and to streams of water ; desiring indeed

him by the names of such

to understand his nature, hut tlu-ough imbecility calling

And

to us to be beautiful.

a legislator with*

is

being able, however, to comprehend his

in thus acting,

we

are affected in the

same manner

things as appear

as lovers,

who

are

delighted with surveying the images of the objects of their love, and with recollecting the lyre, the
dart,

and the seat of these, the circus in which they ran, and every thing

memory of
statues

What

the beloved object.

then remains for

But if

only to admit the subsistence of deity.

recollection of divinity,

condemn

the dissonance

me to

honour to animals the Egyptians, a


let

them ouly know,

whkh

love, let

excites tho

and determine respecting

river others,

them only

let

in short,

investigate

the art of Phidias excite* the

and

Greeks

fire others, I

to the

do not

them only be mindful of the

object they adore."

With respect

to the

ner in hi, treatise

"

It

now

bolical

On

worship of animals, Plutarch apologizes for


Isis

remains that

meaning

e\idcnl therefore

we

should speak of the

utility

the following excellent

man-

of these animals to man, and of their sym-

some of them partaking of one of these


tlifit tilt

in

it

and Osiris.

El^yptiHns

worsliijir/jcti tlic

ox^

tlic

only, hut
she*?^]

many of them of

sod

tlic

both.

ic b DC Uikk 00 j

OD

It is

3fcCC OUf)

of their use and benefit, as the Letnnians did larks, for discovering the eggs of caterpillars and

breaking them

and the Thessalians storks, because, as their land produced abundance of ser-

pents, the storks destroyed all of


that

whoever

and the
Gods,

killed

tbem

as

soon as they appeared.

a stork should be banished.

beetle, in consequence of observing in


like that of the

sun

in

But

them

drops of water.

Hence

the Egyptians

also ibey enacted a law,

honoured the asp, the weezle,

certain dark resemblances of the

For

at present,

many

power of the

believe and assert that the

weezle engenders by the ear, and brings forth by the mouth, being thus an image of the generation
of reason, [or the productive principle of things.]

But

the genus of beetles has

no female; and

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INTRODUCTION.
the males emit their

all

sperm into a spherical piece of

move forward

their hind feet, while they themselves

backwards with

XII VII

which they

earth,

about thrusting

roll

it

just as the sun appears to

revolve in a direction contrary to that of the heavens, in coasequence of moving from west to east.

They

esempt from old

also assimilated the asp to a star, is being


1

by organs with
>

but

the only animal that

is

ing through a silent path,

They

also say

the only animal living in water

it is

which descends from

film

with the

eggs, this

may

and accompanied with

God.

first

'

in

its

motions

by them without a

them as resemblance of divinity, as being

mat has

unindigent of voice, and proceed-

is

conducts mortal

justice,

affairs

according to

the sight of its eyes covered with

may

whatever place the female crocodile

lay her

with certainty be concluded to be the boundary of the increase of the Nile.

not being able to lay their eggs in the water, and fearing to lay them far from

it.

a thin
which

so thjt he sees without beinsr seen

his forehead

But

age, and performing

the crocodile honoured

For the divine reason

without a tongue.

is

Nor was

and ease

agility

said to have been considered by

For

they have such an

it,

accurate pre-sensation of futurity, that though they enjoy the benefit of the river in

its

access, during

the time of their laying and hatching, yet they preserve their eggs dry and untouched by the water.

Tbey

also lay sixty eggs, are the

*em,

same number of days

live just

so

many

" Moreover, of those animals that were honoured

But

dog.

the ibis, killing indeed

all

deadly

reptiles,

which number

for

both reasons,

was the

cal evacuation, in consequence of observing that she

Those

herself.

priests also, that are

crate water for lustration, fetch


neither drink nor

each other,

it

most

bill

"

We

or infected water

Thus

in their pictures

in Crete, there

and lord of

both

all

Instead of
i.

e.

was a

things,

if the

moon when

we have before spoken


taught

men

is

purified

by

they coose-

still,

for ahe will

the variety and mixture of

gibbous.

Egyptians love such slender similitudes, since the

and statues, employ many such

statue of Jupiter without ears.

should bear no one.*

when

with the distance of her feet from

Farther

she

of the

the use of medi-

had been drinking ;

ibis

that are the

of the measures

first

manner washed and

after this

she makes an equilateral triangle.

ought not, however, to wonder

also,

and those

the

attentive to the laws of sacred rites,

her black wings about die white represents the

Greeks

is

ia

first that

from that place where the

come near unwholesome

and her

in hatching them,

years

For

it

like
is

resemblances of the Gods.

fit

that he

who

is

the ruler

Phidias also placed a dragon by the statue of

read

Should be perfectly impartial.

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INTRODUCTION.

xxxviii

Minerva, and a

home and

ing at

by that of Venus

snail

Hence

also,

show

become married women.

silence

third region of the world,


air.

at Elis, to

that virgins require a guard, and that keep*

But

the trident of

by

is

a symbol of the

after the

heavens and the

The Pythagoreans

they thus denominated Amphitritc and the Tritons.

adorned numbers and figures with the appellations of the Gods.


triangle

Neptune

which the sea possesses, having an arrangement

For they

drawn from

three perpendiculars

uaded to

this

But

angles.

tbe three

Hie duad

For

the triad justice.

since injuring

this

odd numbers,
think
it

it

even

number

is

of multi-

signifies a privation

and

and being injured are two extremes subsisting according to

being the number 36, was, as

For

world.

divided

they denominated strife and audacity

But what

excess and defect, justice through equality has a situation in the middle.
tctractys,

it is

they called die one Apollo, being per-

by the obvious meaning of the word Apollo [which

tude] and bv the simplicity of the monad.'

likewise

called the equilateral

Minerva Coryphagenes, or begotten from the summit, and Tritogeneia, because

is

reported, their greatest oath, and

formed from tbe composition of the four

1
collected into one sum.

If therefore the

first

most approved of

is

called the

was denominated the

even, and the four

first

the philosophers did not

proper to neglect or despise any occult signification of a divine nature when" they perceived
in things

which are inanimate and incorporeal,

it

appears to me, that they in a

still

greater

degree venerated those peculiarities depending on manners which they saw in such natures as had
sense, aud

those

were endued with

who honor

soul, with passion,

these kings, but those

mirrors, and which are produced

ments or the

God by whom all

art of the

who

by nature,

and ethical

tlie

divinity

is

some one should

We

must embrace

therefore, not

a becoming manner, conceiving them to be the instru-

But we ought

things arc perpetually adorned.

inanimate being cau be more excellent than one that


being, not even though

habits.

reverence divinity through these, as through most clear

in

is

collect together

to think that

no

animated, nor an insensible than a sensitive


all

the gold and emeralds in the universe.

For

not ingeuerated either in colours, or figures, or smoothness; but such things as neither

ever did, nor are naturally adapted to participate of life, have an allotment more ignoble than that of

dead bodies.

But

knowledge of

tilings

the nature which lives and sees, and has the principle of motion from

appropriate and foreign to

its

Hence

the divinity

and stone, which

is

in

itself,

aud the universe

is

and a

governed.

not worse represented in these animals, than in the workmanships of copper

This then

I consider as the best

all

defence that cau be given of the adora-

of animals by the Egyptians.


Instead of

J'tm*i

translation >*t^ti tic


1

how both

a similar manner suffer corruption ami decay, hut arc naturally deprived of

sense and consciousness.


tion

itself,

being, has certainly derived an efflux and portion

of that wisdom, which, as Heraclitus says, considers

pWo

as in the original, which

is

nooscim,

it

is

necetsary to r*aJ, as in the above

:.

For+4+6+8=l0; and 1+S+S+7=1; and 20+16=30.

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is

INTRODUCTION.

about matter, which becomes and receives

and water,

and death, beginning and end

life

variety of colours, but have

been once used, they are

But

one only which

laid aside

all things, as

a coruscation,

and preserved

is intelligible,

and darkness, day and

For

for the intelligible

power

night, fire

is

the latter have

and intangible.

invisible

sensible things being in daily use


their

different mutations

and

at hand,

but the intellectual

genuine, and holy, luminously darting through the soul like

attended with a simultaneous contact and vision of

is

Hence when

simple and luciform.

is

many developements and views of

perception of that which

light

for her

but those of Osiris are without a shade and have no

the vestments of Isis are used frequently.

present us with

uiii

to the sacred vestments, those of Iais are of various hue*

With respect however

its

Hence Plato and

object.

who have through

Aristotle call this part of philosophy epoplic or intuitive, indicating that those

the exercise of the reasoning power, soared beyond these doxastic, mingled and all- various natures,
raise

themselves to that

simple, and immaterial principle, and passing into contact with the

first,

pure truth which subsists about

And

of philosophy.'

that

great reverence and caution

from that

divinity

who

is

it,

they consider themselves as having at length obtained the end

which the present devoted and


is

that this

called by the

God

and under the

is

not different

Greeks Hades and Pluto, the truth of which assertion not

being understood, disturbs the multitude,


in

who

suspeet that the truly sacred and holy Osiris dwell*

where the bodies of those are concealed who appear to have obtained an

earth,

end of their being.

veiled priests obscurely manifest with

the ruler and prince of the dead, and

is

But he indeed himself

is

at

the remotest distance

from the earth, unstained,

unpolluted, and pure from every essence that receives corruption and death.

The

souls of

men

however, being here encompassed with bodies and passiuu*, cannot participate of divinity except
as of an obscure dream by intellectual contact through philosophy.

But when they are

from the body, and pans into the

this

and king, from

whom

invisible, impassive,

and pure region,

God

is

liberated

then their leader

they depend, insatiably beholding him, and desiring to survey that beauty

which cannot be expressed or uttered by men


always loving, pursuing, and enjoying

fills

and which

such things

lsis,

in these

as the ancient discourse evinces,

lower regions as participate of gene,

ration with every thing beautiful and good."

And

lastly,

the

Emperor

Julian, in a fragment of an Oration or Epistle

has the following remarks on religiously venerating statues


vation of unextinguished
as

fire,

and

in short, all

thete

For T-Xf xi.M<x.p U",

it is

on the duties of a

" Statues and

altars,

priest,

and the preser-

such particulars, have been established by our fathers

symbols of the preseuce of the Gods; not that

Gods, but that through

we should vorthip

tee

the God$.

should believe that thete tymboU art

For since we are connected with body,

necessary to read as in the translation, x. t ix" -x*rf *">

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INTRODUCTION.

xl

it is

Decenary that our worship of the God* should be performed

alio

And

they are incorporeal.

they indeed have exhibited to us aa the

ranks as the second genus of


heaven.

Gods from

the

For

propitious to us.

of statues, that which

was devised on the

who

as those

paid to these, because they are

earth,

by

those

by

who

in our

who

venerate the statues of the Gods,

this veneration to assist

power

who

sanctity

and

it is

words.

What

then

honour has been

among

is

resemblance,

For neither

(Is it therefore

is

are not

thus also

thing,

it

pursue the

performance of

Gods
tilings

who accomplishes

the

things in his power, and

and overlooks the

latter,

does not follow that on

this

account

he in want of celebration through the ministry of

reasonable that he should be deprived of this

legally established, not for three, or for three

" But [the Galilssans

is

By no means.

him through works; which

paid

thousand years, but in

preceding

all

of the earth.

will say,]

you who

hai

according to you tbey are formless and unfigured, you have fashioned in a corporeal

it is

not

fit

that

honour should be paid to

divinity

thaw

statues

do not we [heathens] consider as wood

of men*

O more

drawn by

the nose at

blances

very evident that he

he to be deprived of the honour which

all natiotis

whom, though

want of any

divinity is not in

to be offered to him.

Neither therefore

ages,

alacrity in the

pretends to desire impossibilities, evidently does not

For though
is

For

But he who despises

former, will in a greater degree possess the latter.

are not in want of any thing, persuade the

and be favourable to them.

document of true

is

which we

the worship of

reverence the images or kings,

want of any such reverence, at the same time attract to themselves their benevolence

in

Gods

a corporeal manner; but

and which circularly revolves round the whole of

first,

Since, however, a corporeal worship cannot even be

naturally unindigenl, a third kind of statues

render the

in

first

and

stones

stupid than even stones themselves

you are drawn by

to

men

are to be

Looking therefore to the resemblances of the

be either stones or wood

are these resemblances; since neither do

that all

execrable dwmont, so as to think that the artificial resem-

of the Gods are the Gods themselves*

Gods, we do not think them

then,

which are fashioned by the hands

Do you fancy

How,

through such works.

we

for neither

that tbey are the kings themselves, but the images of kings.

beholds with pleasure the image of his king

do we think

that the

Gods

say that royal images are wood, or stone, or brass, nor

Whoever,

whoever loves his child

loves his father surveys bis image with delight*

is

Hence

therefore, loves his king,

delighted with his image


also,

he

who

is

at bodies the celestial orbs, which in const quence of participating a divine

a lover of
life

from the

corporeal powers from which they are suspend*


*

Dt. Sullingteet quotes this part of the extract, in his

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INTRODUCTION.
and image* of the Gods; at the

divinity gladly surveys the statues

Gods who

with a holy dread the

The

Indeed,

their saints.

" Dio Chrysostome (says Dr.

it is

images, in bis Olympic Oration; wherein he

first

supreme God the father of all things; and that

mnpn

show*, thmt

this

work,

Cod was

most beloved image of God.

nature, by the instructions of the poets,

all

He says there

natural apprehension of one

made by Phidias of

and then describe* him to be the

calls the roost blessed,

ways of comiug

are four

that the

414) at large debates the case

me a have a

ting,

the most excellent, the most


to the

knowledge of God, by

by the laws, and by images; but neither

poets, nor lawgivers, nor arti-

who both

understood and explained the

were the best interpreters of the deity, but only the philosophers

ficers

divine nature most truly and perfectly.

p.

represented by the statue

btfert n-aom ire note art;

and father of all, both Gods and men. This image be

beautiful, the

Church of England,*

the doctrine of the

Stillingfleet in the before-cited

Jupiter Olympius, for so he said *f' r


ruler,

hint.'

Catholics have employed arguments similar to these, in defence of the reverence which they

pay to the images of


1

behold

invisibly

After this, he supposes Phidias to be called to account for

making such
an image of God, as unworthy of him; when Iphitus, Lycurgus, and the old Eleans, made none at all of him, as
being out of the power of man to express his nature. To this Phidias replies, that no man can express miud and
understanding by figures, or colours, and therefore they are forced to By to that in which the soul inhabits, and

from thence they attribute the *t of wisdom and reason to God, having nothing better to represent him by.

And by

means joining power and

that

art together, they endeavour

by something which may be seen and painted,

and inexpressible. But it may be said, we had better then have no image or
No, says be ; for mankind doth not love to worship God at a distauce, but to come
near and feel him, and with assurance to sacrifice to him and crown him. Like children newly
their parents, who put out their hands towards them in their dreams as if they were still present; so do
of the sense of God's goodness and their relation to him, love to have him represented as present with them, and
Thence have come all the 'representations of God among the barbaruus nations, in
so to converse with him.
to represent that which

representation of

him

is

at

invisible

all.

mountains, and trees, and stones."

The same conceptions also about


Monsieur Bernier when he was at

by the Brachmans in Benares on the Ganges. For


and was discoursing with one of the most learned men among

statues are entertained

their university,

tbem, proposed to him the question about the adoration of their idols, and reproaching him with it as a thing
very unreasonable, received from him this remarkable answer " We nave indeed in our temples many different
:

Mahadeo, Genick, and Gavani, who

statues, as those of Brahma,

(or Deities)

and we have

also

many

others of less perfection, to

are

some of the chief and most

whom we

perfect

Deutas

pay great honour, prostrating our-

them flowers, rice, oylcs, saffron, and the like, with much ceremony.
we do not believe these statues to be Brahma or Becben, Arc. themselves, but only their images
They are in our
lions, and we only give them that honour ou account of the beings they represent.
selves before them, and presenting

because

it is

necessary in order to pray well, to have something before our eyes that

when we pray, il is not the statue we pray to, but be that


way of defending their worship of statues, of which

ther

not only souls, but also whatever

but one and the same thing with

From

tome

ait.

is all

it

its

Proc.

may

fix

the mind.

The Brahmans have

is

And

also ano-

substance,

material and corporeal in the universe, so that all things in the world are

God

himself, as all

numbers are bat one and the same unity

repeated.''

Ber-

appears that the Brachmans as well as the ancient Egyptian*, believe that the

things.

For by being tie one,

See

it."

171. 178'

this Utter extract

supreme principle
to

3. p.

represented by

the same author gives the following account: " That

whom they call Achar (immutable) has produced or drawn out of his own

God, or that sovereign being

nier Metnoires,

is

But

Homilies, tome

it is

. p.

According to the best of the Platonists likewise, this principle


oil Miagi after the

most umpU manner,

1.

e.

so as to transcend

is

olitkingt prior

40.

Vol.

I.

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INTRODUCTION.
Catholic* form the game opinions of the saints whose images they worship as the Heathens did of
their

Gods

and employ the same outward

in the religious veneration

honouring their images, as the Heathens did

rites in

Thus

of their statues.

as the

Heathens had

were Belus to the Babylonians and Assyrians, Osiris and

lsis

Gods, such as

their luttlar

to the Egyptians, aad Vulcan to

the Leronians, thus also the Catholics attribute the defence of certain countries to certain saints.

Have

at

the safeguard of particular cities

Dii Provides of the Heathens.'

Carthage, Juno

and

whom

not the saints also to

as the

altars erected

and

at

Rome,

Such

And do

Quirinus.

committed, the same office

is

as were at Delphi, Apollo; at Athens,

not the saints to

correspond to the Dii Palrooi of the Heathens

whom

Such

were

as

Lady of Walsingham, our Lady of Ipswich,

Lady of Wilsdon, and

otir

Agrotera, Diana Coripbca, Diana Ephesia, Venus Cypria, Veuus


like

The

called

is

likewise,

the like, imitations of

our

Diana

Paphia, Venus Gnidin, and the

Catholics too, have substituted for the marine deities Neptune, Triton, Xereus, Castor

and Pollux, Venus,


as she

in the Capitol,

Are not

Jupiter, in the temple at Paphos, Venus, in the temple of Ephesus, Diana.

Minerva;

churches arc built

8tc.

Saint Christopher, Saint Clement, and others, and especially our Lady,

whom seamen

by them, to

their imitation of the

Pagans.

Ave Maris

sing

Neither has the

stella.

fire

escaped

For instead of Vulcan and Vesta, the respective guardians of

tire

according to the Heathens, the Catholics have substituted Saint Agatha, ou the day of whose nativity they

make

letters for the

purpose of extinguishing

Gregory; painters Saint Luke; nor are soldiers

who

of one

is

in

Thus

the venereal disease has Saint

ach Saint Apollin, &c.

Homily)

many

is

artificer likewise

want of a

saint

corresponding to Mars, nor lovers

Roche

who

arc invoked as possessing a healing

the falling sickness Saint Cornelius, the tooth-

Beasts and cattle also have their presiding saints

the horse-leach, and

Saint Antony the swineherd, &c.

for Saint

The Homily

men and

no Gods to be worshipped, which the Gentiles would never confess of

shame."
relics,

Loy

adds,'

(says the

"

that in

points the Papists exceed the Gentiles in idolatry, and particularly in honouring and wor-

shipping the relics and bones of saints, which prove that they be mortal
fore

and profession

scholars have Saint Nicholas and Saint

a substitute for Venus.

All diseases too haTc their special saints instead of Gods,

power.

Every

lire.

Thus

has a special saint in the place of a presiding God.

the

And

enumerating many ridiculous practices of the Catholics

Homily concludes with observing, "

tile idolaters,

In the

after

that they are not only

dead, and there-

their

in

Gods

for very

reference to these

more wicked than

the

Gen-

but also no wiser than asses, horses, and mules, which have no understanding."

wcond

place the Homilies shew* that the rites and ceremonies of the Papists in honour
'

Tome

a. p.

54.

p- *9-

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INTRODUCTION,
ing and worshipping their images or saints, are the
say (hey,

evident in their pilgrimages to

is

visit

xkfii

same with the

crutches, chairs, and ships, legs, arms, and whole

by Ihem, or saints (as they say)

lliey

" This,

of the Pagans.

images which had more holiness and virtue in them

up gold

In their candle-religion, burning incense, offering

than others.

rites

men and women

were delivered from

to images, hanging

up

of war, before images, as though

lameness, sickness, captivity, or shipwreck."

In spreading abroad after the manner of the Heathens, the miracles that have accompanied, images.

" Such an image was

sent from heaven, like the Palladium, or

Such a one came

image was brought by angels.

Some images

Fortune Bed to Rome.

Some

pity wept.

and here hangeth


behold here

where

is

Diana of

spake more monstrously than ever did Balaam's ass,

Such a one

his crutch.

And

this saint

in a

infinite

Dame

who had

life

and breath

of oak, and by and by he was made whole,

tempest vowed to Saint Christopher, and scaped, and

Such a one, by

bis ship of war.

his fetters bang.

Such an

the Epbesians.

from the east to the west, as

though they were hard and stony, yet for tender-heart and

Such a cripple came and saluted

in him.

itself far

Saint Leonard's help, brake out of prison, and see

thousands more miracles by

like,

or more shameless

lies

were

reported."

After
ing to

I appeal to every intelligent reader, whether the religion of the Heathens, accord-

all this,

its

genuine purity as delineated in

the best and wisest

whether

it is

all things,

these,

we

men of

infinitely

eternally centered

we become

and rooted

ineffable,

The

because they partake of

were the disgrace of human nature?

to the

Pap 11 is and

then

And

in reverencing

his nature,

and that

The Church

trust that every other sect

And

thus

much

in

of England a

of Protestant Christians

defence of the theology of Plato,

worship of the Heathens.

is

that I should speak of the following work, of

a scientific

ineffable principle

self-subsistence.

and to believe that

living,

religious

itself

him

Pagans

now remains

It

work

in

united with him,' than to reverence men, and the images of

unanimously subscribe to her decision.

and the

and as professed and promulgated by

preferable to that of the Catholics

whom when

sec prefers the

'

this Introduction,

not

same time reverence the

at the

men, many of

will

is

not more holy to reverence beings the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of

and which are

through these as media

we

antiquity,

development of

of things, as

Hence the

first

is

us.

author, and the translation.

The

demonstrated in tbe Elements of Theology io this work, is beyond


from him consists of self-subsistcnt natures.
As we

ineffable eroluliou

therefore are only the dregs of the rational tialure,

hnmeoscly exalted above

its

the deifonn processions from the meltable principle

And

many media arc

necessary to conjoin us with a yrimiple so

these media are the golden chain of powers that have deified summits, or

(hat have the ineffable united with the citable.

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INTKODUCTION.

xllV

of things, and
ing

ia

as

this,

k appears

to

me

id (he greatest perfection possible to

mm.

conclusions are the result of what Plato powerfully call* geometrical neceaaitiei.

of

work indeed, who haa not been properly

thia

who

and in the language of

unintelligible,

Thia, however,
it

the reason-

^^GfiifltfafM ^pA^^A

0^C^f

6f

at large.
,

tOJl4Wsw^

this

it

reader

studies,

will doubtless

and

appear to

nothing but jargon and revery.

cant,

critical

what Plato the great bierophant of

ia

was unfolded to the multitude

To the

and Academic

disciplined io Eleatic

haa not a genius naturally adapted to such abetruae speculations,

be perfectly

ever

For

every where consummately accurate, and deduced from eelf-evident priiiciplei ; and the

theology predicted would be the caae, if

" For a$

it

appears to me,^iayi he, there art


WlO^t

r^^s^l^We^Otf^J

fA^US t^99 *

to perceive them."'

In his seventh
all

thoae

who

the objects of

epistle also

oWrves

he

a* follows

" Thus much, however,

either have written or shall write, affirming that they

my

study (whether they have heard

them from

me

know

shall &ay respecting

those thinga which are

or from others, or whether they

have discovered them themselves) thnt they have not heard any thing about these things conformable to

my

opinion

for

never have written nor ever shall write about them. 1

For a thing of

ibis

kind cannot be expressed by words like other discipline*, but by long familiarity, and living in
conjunction with the thing
in the soul,

and there

itself,

itself

a light* as

that the particulars of which I

am

it

were leaping from a

And

nourish itself."

think,

mankind, and lead an

however,

that

on a sudden be enkindled

" But

if it

appeared to

me

speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude

by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful


benefit to

fire will

shortly after he adds

intelligible

in

life

than to impart a mighty

nature into light, ao as to be obvious to

an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few,

all

men i

who from some

small veatigea previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars.

But with

respect to the rest of

manund, some it

others with a lofty

and arrogant hope that they

Km nttvtamtomf*.

Epist. 9.

* Plato

means by

this, that

will

shall

fill

now

with a contempt by no means elegant, and


4
learn certain venerable things."

he has never written perspicuously about imuUigMa or true being; toe proper

objects of intellect.
'

This

light is

truths perceptible

a thing of a very

different

kind from that which

by the multitude, as those who have experienced

it

is

produced by the evidence arising from

well know.

m\Xm, >' wc mptnc itk, twnut in wti am y th <fuii


tpt tn jwypum( mini nitn. iv% m i/ae
mnn:,
r iif. um < 9vmw*, >tt im ntn ymrnr font yuf nimj*f irr, ( a>x *M>* x*n, >J.' a mxx rvm<r*n r>jniunc
l

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INTRODUCTION.
The

prediction of Plato therefore, has been but too truly fulfilled in the fate which baj attended

the writing! of the best of bis disciples,

among whom Proclut

certainly maintains the

This indeed, these disciples well knew would be the case

guished rank.

most

distin-

but perceiving that the

hand of Barbaric and despotic power was about to dettroy the school* of the philosophers, and
foreseeing that dreadful

naht of ifuorancc and

which succeeded so nefarious an undertaking

folly

they benevolently disclosed in as luminous a manner as the subject would permit, toe arcana of
their master's doctrines, thereby, as

preserving

book of

it

this

Plato expresses

giving assistance to Philosophy, and also

it,

as a paternal and immortal inheritance, to the latest posterity.

work has enumerated


that be

perceive his

mind

who does

most certain

the requisites which a student of

Proclus in the

ought to possess

not possess them, will never fathom the depths of


that admirable

irradiated with

extract, and which is only to

it

first

and

it is

this theology,

or

mentioned by Plato in the foregoing

light,

be seen by that eye of the soul which

is

better worth saving than tea

thousand corporeal eyes.

With respect to the diction of Proclus


clearness, copiousness,

Greek

work,

in this

writer as partially barbarous

who

critics, after

fastidious critic,

is

who

that of purity,

considers every

lived after the fall of the

ever unwillingly, be forced to acknowledge that Proclus

Kepler, whose decision on

general character

its

and magnificence ; so that even the

this subject,

outweighs in

a splendid exception.

is

my

opinion, that of a

The

sown

of

mo

having made a long extract from the commentaries of Proclus on Euclid, gives the

following animated

encomium of

his diction.

O ratio fluit ipsi torrcntis

"

gurgitesque occulta ns,

it."

i.

e.

dum

" His language flows

hiding the dark fords and whirlpools of doubts, while his

instar, ripas

bundans, et

mci

like

mind

a torrent,

full

of the majesty of things of such

a magnitude, struggles in the straits of language, and the conclusion never satisfying him, exceeds

by the copia of words, the simplicity of the propositions."

If

about the struggle of the mind of Proclus, and his never being
rest of bis eulogy is

we omit what Kepler here


satisfied

to

be combined with the

rigid

accuracy of geometrical

it is

am

i wu rv{<n, {vnr t " *"-7N *<yi<*ms (lej nhm) i(f$rr fwt, i, rj +XJ fntftnn mvn
> rir"< T1 "vrmi aaXfeir nil|w' i v"> " F fiv, V
h put i*w>i rp"" *' ""
*f*
>vn attfm t wynpM,
* *<*" * fr ***
*{
mxuf wit Wf
rr*4**>

ra; T arfftmtri fuym

um

possible for

9tf rt fayp> *vr,


S* if**-

says

with the conclusion, the

equally applicable to the style of the present work, so far as

\tyifxmt ayafa, h pi r-nt

"mi

Jnani minftn

mtm

1m>

paf>< niu(im,f ai

n1

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INTBODOCT10N.

xlvi

With respect
ons

to the

life

and a translation of

From

lished in 1788.

of Proclus,

it

me

by

have the translation of

in the

man

his

in

it

my

version of the commentaries of Proclus was pub-

by Fabricius, the following particulars

are extracted, for the information of the reader

According

possession.

Byzantium

Fabricius, Proclus was born at

of February, and died


Julian,

prefixed to

the edition of that life therefore,

relative to this very extraordinary

ror

his been written with great elegance by his disciple Mari-

it

in the year

to the

after the reign of the

As soon

virtue than their birth.

" For, he adds,

sciences, should

was bom,

as he

And

Xantbus, which was sacred to Apollo.


I think

His

father Patriciua,

this,

of Proclus was uncommonly beautiful

who was

he

that

in his last

and

also,

all

shelly

light as

it

" For

that

tbe moral and intellectual

in

it is

Gods

to

men

for the

we have

before observed,

his soul

was

efflorescent in his

his

body, and shone forth with au admira-

Marinus adds, " Indeed he was so

resemblauce

and

all

the pictures of

fourth place, he possessed health in such perfection, that he was not


the course of so long a

life

Such then were the corporeal

prerogatives

in the

above twice or thrice

in

which Proclus possessed, and which may be called

But he possessed

elements of a philosophic genius.'

was magnificent and

And

as seventy-five years.

the forerunners of the forms of perfect virtue.

facility,

ill

beautiful,

him which were

circulated, though very beautiful, were very inferior to the beauty of the original."

calls the

purpose

in the second place, he possessed so

life,

In the third place, he was, as

impossible to di-scribe."

no painter could accurately exhibit

Plato

Hence he

the most honourable of the

not only, says Marinus, did his body possess great symmetry, but a living

were beaming from

splendor, which

alt

person

was neither injured by cold, nor any endurance of labours, though

were extreme, both by night and day.

very beautiful.

ble-

it

The

vestment the body.

senses, sight and hearing, which, as Plato says, were imparted by the

of philosophising, and for the well being of the animal

Muses."

which are denominated the physical

possessed a remarkable acuteness of sensation, and particularly

great a strength of body, that

to be the leader of

deity of the

and he not only possessed

but the veatigies of them

were clearly seen, says Marinus,

his

says Martinis, happened to him by a certain divine

was necessary

it

and

le*s illustrious for their

brought him to their native country

his parents

be nourished and educated under the presiding

virtues in the highest perfection,

these

empe-

on the seventeenth day of the Attic Munichion, or the April of the Romans,

Nicagoran the junior, being at that time the Athenian archon.

virtues,

not

of Christ 412, on the 6th of the Ides

one hundred and twenty-fourth year

mother Marcella, were both of them of the Lyc'tan nation, and were no

allotment.

who may

accurate chronology then of

graceful, and the friend

in a

wonderful manner what

For he had an excellent memory, learned with


and

ally

of truth, justice, fortitude, and tern,

See the sixth bouk of the Republic of Plato.

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INTRODUCTION.
Having

pemnce.

was

andria in Egypt, and


lsauru*, and

in

Egyptians, and

Lycia to grammar, he weal to Alex-

for a short space of time applied himself in

there instructed in rhetoric

grammar by Orion, whose

who composed

art.

exhorted him to philosophy, and to

Athenian schools.

visit the

certain

For on

to the place of his nativity.

among

the

good fortune however,

his return his tutelar

Having

from

his lineage

ancestors discharged the sacerdotal office

elaborate treatises on that

him back

says iMarinun, brought

by Leonas who derived

Goddess

therefore, first returned to

Alexandria and bade farewell to rhetoric, and the other arts which he had formerly studied, he gave
himself up to the discourses of the philosophers then resident at Alexandria.

Here, he became an

auditor of Olyrnpiodorus, 1 the most illustrious of philosophers, for the sake of imbibing the doctrine of Aristotle

and eminently

and was instructed

in the mathematical

Alexandrian schools, went to Athens, " with a

by Hero, a

disciplines

Prod us however,

teaching those sciences.

skilful in

man,

religious

not being satisfied with the

certain splendid procession, says Martnus, of all elo-

quence and elegance, and attended by the Gods that preside over philosophy, and by beneficent
daemons.

Gods

led

For that the succession of philosophy, might be preserved legitimate and genuine, the

him

xr'

htf

met with
him

the

to the city over

way of

first

in his studies,

sophic

life,

who was

which

its

At Athens

made him

his

called

therefore, Proclus fortunately

of philosophers, Syrianus,* the son of Philoxenus,


but

Hence Proclua was

inspective guardian presides."

eminence, the Platonic Succetsor.

who

much

not only

assisted

domestic as to other concerns, and the companion of his philo-

having found him such an auditor and successor as he had. a long time sought

for,

and one

capable of receiving a multitude of disciplines and divine dogmas.

In less than

two whole years

therefore, Proclus read with Syrianus

And

all

the orks of Aristotle, vii.

being sufficiently instructed in these

his logic, ethics, politics, physics,

and theological science.

as in certain proteleia, or

preparatory to initiation, and lesser mysteries, Syrianus led

things

of Plato,

to the mystic discipline

He

oracle with a transcendent foot.

him

an orderly progression, and not according to the Chaldean

in

likewise enabled Proclus to survey in conjunction with him,

says Marinus, truly divine mysteries, with the eyes of his soul free from material daikness, and

with undefiled intellectual vision.

'

This Olympiodorus

But Proclus employing

not the fame with I he philosopher of that

is

tain dialogues of Plato are extant in

manuscript

sleepless exercise

nunc whose

and

attention, both

leurnrd commentaries on cer-

as in these, not only Proclus, but Darnascius

who

flourished

after Proclus is celebrated.


*

This truly great

the writings of the

man

appears to luu o been ihe

first

who

thoroughly penetrated the profundity contained in

moie ancient philosophers, contemporary with and

strated the admirable

agreement of

their doctrines with

each other.

prior to Plato,

and

to

have demon-

Unfortunately but few of bis works are

INTRODUCTION.
by

night and by

Syria ii in,

made

tiny,

and judiciously committing to writing what be beard from

arid avnoptically

so great a progress in a

little

adorned

and

Marinus
tion;

a.s

he advanced

after this,

in

rest hit

But from men a

are truly elegant and full of science.

science he

alone, withdrawing

twenty-eight year* of age,

commentarie

discipline as this, his

shows how Proclus possessed

the virtues in the greatest possible perfec-

all

and how be proceeded from the exercise of the

reason adorning the irrational part as

wu

time, that by then he

he had composed a multitude of work* and among the

political virtues,

which are produced by

instrument, to the cathartic virtues which pertain to reason

its

from other things to

itself,

throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain,

repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of

He

generation.

then adds, " Proclus having made a

proficiency, through these virtues, as

by certain mystic steps, recurred from these to such as are greater and more

ducted to them by a prosperous nature and

above generation, and despising


about the

No
it

first

essences,

its

thyrsus-bearers,'

were by simple

intuition,

H-SSU til 1 ^lj^

^ VlF

and beholding through


^Fs>llCs>l

0U2

and that which

is

adumbrated

truly blessed spectacles

intellectual energies tbe

which they coutain.

more venerable than

comprehended

He

it.

all

but

aud brought

by a

as, in

who

an harmonious agreement.
he found
this,

in

are

employed no

one day, he gave

less force
five,

At

the

same time

also,

them genuine, he judiciously

he entirely rejected as erroneous.

were contrary to

and perspicuity.

and sometimes more

For he was
lectures,

truth.
a

MS. comment

account of its divulaed continuity, whence also

in Pliasd.) is a

it is

man

and wrote

Socrates in the Phardo of Plato, Orphically calls the multitude thyrsus-bearers as living TilannicaMy.

tbe thyrsus, says Olymjriodorn*, (in

CP

Greeks and

into light, to those

diligent examination such doctrines as

his associations too with others, he

laborious beyond measure

it

Flat.}]

the theology of the

he found any thing of a spurious nature,

if

The

this.

explained likewise every thing in a mora enthusiastic man-

different theologies to

also strenuously subverted

paradigms in a divine

wWlCUl 0 a bttsi ^rYa*adl OU|j^ ll t

a^^ dcUOIHittea sjC^sI

the writings of the ancients, whatever

investigating

adopted

lOO^CT

in mythological fictions,

willing and able to understand

and brought the

110

still

gizing according to this virtue, easily

In

be was agitated with a divinely inspired fury,

and became an inspector of the

to be called wisdom, or something

He

were

it

being con-

purified, rising

longer collecting discursively and demonstratively the science of them, but surveying the in u*

tC.ll^t p

ner,

telestic,

For being now

scientific discipline.

For

symbol uf material and partible fabrication, on


" For it is txteaded, says he, before Bac-

a Titannic plant.

chus, instead of his paternal sceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. He adds, " Besides
the Titans are thyrsus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a read, whether by this we an to understand
that he draws

down celestial

whole of which

is

light into generation, or impels soul into body,

or calls forth divine illumination, the

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INTRODUCTION.
many

as

hundred verse*.

as seven

Betides

And

evening in conversation with them.

he went to other philosophers, and spent the

this,

these

all

employments he executed

in

such a manner as

not to neglect his nocturnal and vigilant piety to the Gods, and assiduously supplicating the huh

when

rising,

when

this

wise mouth, his eyes appeared to be

Hence

pate of divine illumination.

man of

veracity,

and

in

filled

that be did not

seem

his lecture, Rufinus rising,

to

be without

proceeded from

'

his

with a fulgid splendor, and the rest of his face to partici-

Rufinus, a

man

illustrious in the

Republic, and

other respects venerable, happening to be present with him

lecturing, perceived that his

tie

sets."

most extraordinary man, "

For words similar to the most white and thick-tailing snow

divine inspiration.

.1

and when he

at his meridian altitude,

M annus farther observes of

bead was surrounded with a

adored him, and

light.

And when

who was

also

when he was

Proclus had finished

by an oath the truth of the divine vision which

testified

had seen."

Marians also informs

us,

"that Proclus being purified in an orderly manner by the Chaldean puri-

was an inspector of

fications,

of his writing*.

By

he himself somewhere mentions

the lucid Heratic visions, as

in

one

opportunely moving Likewise a certain Hecatic spharula,* he procured shower*

of rain, and freed Athens from an unseasonable heat.


charms, he stopt an earthquake, and had made

been instructed by certain verses respecting

High abo?e

tins,

by certain phylactcria or

of the divining energy of the tripod, having

trial

its failure.

appeared in a dream to utter the following verses

Besides

For when he was

in

his fortieth year, be

a-ther there with radiance bright,

pure immortal splendor wings

its flight

Whose beams divine with vivUI force aspire,


And leap resounding from a fount of hre.

Alluding to the beautiful description given of Ulysses in the third book of the Iliad,

v.

n. which

is

thus

elegantly paraphrased by Pope.

But when he speaks what elocution flows!


8oft as the fleeces of descending snows

The

copious accents

Melting they

fall

fall

with easy art

and sink

into the heart.

Nicephorus in bis commentary on Synesius de Insomniis, p. 3da. informs us that the Heratic orb is a golden
sphere, which has a sspphire'stooe inclosed in its middle part, and through its whole extremity characters, aod
*

various figures.

He

adds, that turning this sphere round, the Chaldeans perform invocations which they call

Thus too, according to Suidas, the magician Julian of Chalda-a, and Arnuphis the Egyptian brought
down showers of rain, by a magical power. And by an artifice of this kind, Empedvcles was accustomed to
Ijnga:.

restrain the fury of the winds;


*

in

This

on which account tie was called t>Jiif,- ( mu erptlltr of wind.


which is the cause of the prophetic energy, would leave the

signifies that the divine splendor

consequence of the then Misting inaptitude of persons, places, and instruments, to receive

Proc.

Vol.

I.

earth,

it.

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INTRODUCTION.

And

io the beginning of his fortj-secoud year

Lo

on

my

he appeared to himself to pronounce with a loud

soul a sacred Arc descends,

Whose vivid power the intellect estends


From whence far beaming thro' dull body's
It soars to

xthcr deck'd with starry light

And with
The lucid

soft

murmurs

regions of tlie

thru'

night,

tbeaiura round.

Gods resound.

Besides, he clearly perceived that

tie

belonged to the Mercurial series

and was persuaded from

dream, that he possessed the soul of Nicomachus the Pythagorean."'

M annua adds,

last place,

In the

"

that the lovers of

no means among the but or middle, but among


this place the following

No opinion

is

more

scheme of his

its

the

first

studies

may be

able to conjec-

that the condition of his

we have thought

orders,

lit

was by

life,

to

expose

in

nativity."

16

6*

>

17

29

celebrated, than that of the metempsychosis of Pythagoras

By most of the present day

more generally mistaken.


veneration for

more elegant

was bom,

ture from the position of the stars under which he

it is

exploded as ridiculous

founder, endeavour to destroy the literal, and to confine

it

to

; but perhaps no doctrine is


and the few who retain some

an allegorical meaning. By some

t*> that thry conceived the human soul might transhuman bodies, but not into those of brutes. And this was the opinion of Hicroclcs, as may
Commentary on the Golden Verses. But why may not the Iti'inan soul l>ecome connected with

of the ancients this mutation was limited to similar bodies;


migrate into various

be seen

in his

subordinate, as w ell as wiili superior lives, by a tendency of inclination


is

there not in

all

kinds of

life

something similar and

common ?

Do not

similars love to be united;

Hence when the

aod

affections of the soul verge to

a baser nature, whilf connected with a human body, these affections on the dissolution of such a body, become
envelo|>cd as it were, in a brutal nature, and the rational eye, in this case, clouded with perturbations, is oppressed
bv the

But

irrational

this doctrine

lib. s. p.

entries of the bmlc, and surveys nothing but the dark phantasms of a degraded imagination.
is viudica'ed by Proclus with his usual acutenes*,ui his admirable Commentaries on the Tima-us,

39, aslollowsi "

And some

It is

tiMial,

others allow

it

may

it

be sent into brute;, because

were, be canied above

he

is tl.c

*;iys,

souls can descend into brute animals.

only

all

souls

mode

it,

of insinuation,

If however,

it

they

But true reason indeed, asserts that the human soul may be lodged

it lie

we have proved by a multitude of arguments,

is

in

requisite to take notice, that this is the opinion of I'lato,

<cjI descends into a savage Int. but not into a savage body.

be says

for

in

it may obtain its own proper life, and that the degraded soui may, as it
and be bound to the baser nature by a propensity aod similitude of affection. And that

that the <oul of Thcrsitrs assumed an ape, but not the body of an ape

this place

manner, as that

brutes, yet in such a

rim drtis.

bow human

become the soul of a savage animal. On the contrary,


are of one and the same kind; so that they may become

possible that the rational essence can

wolves and panthers, and ichneumons.

tins

says he, to enquire

indeed, think that there are certain similitudes of men to brutes, which they call savage lives

by no means think

changed

inc. a brutal nature.

For

life is

our Commentaries on the

we add

and

conjoined with

For a brutal nature

is

that in his Republic

in the
its

Phzdms,

proper soul.

that the

And

not a brutal body, but a brutal

in

life."

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INTKOPUCTION.
24

23

1\

41

29

50

ea

42

19

nr

42

Horos.

Mid.

Heaven. S

or the bead of the dr

24

The new moon


i

33

And

thus

much

for the

life

pr ccediug his

51

of Procliu.

W4.reject to the translation of the following work,


bat I

have endeavoured to render

the matter of the author


;

**

* C,Cnt,fic

tbi,

8CCUrac
sr

and the more excellent

the

e<

i,

the Theology of Plato,

as faithful as possible,
and to preserve the

it

can only s.y

manner

a, well a,

being mdisperuably necemry,


both from the importance of the sub-

* of

**i"g wh which

work complete;

it is

for without the

^ P" ual ancnaants,

discussed.

have added a .even*

development of the mundane God*,

would obviously be incomplete. From


the catalogue of the manuscript.
i the late French king'.
librarv> it is evident ,., Pfoc|ua
book,- as ,ome chapters
of it are mere id to be e.tan, in
that library.
These
I have endeavoured, bu,
without success, to obtain.
The want of this seventh book by Produs,
wi
oubtless be considered by all
the friends of Greek literature,
and particularly by all who are
lovers of the doctrme, of Plato,
a, a loss of o common
magnitude. It is, however, a fortunate
crcumstancc, that in the composition
of the seventh book I have been able to
supply the deficiency
ansmg from the want of that which was written
by Proclus, in . great measure from other works
of Proclu, himself, and particularly
from his very elegant and scientific
commentaries on the
of Plato. So that I trust the loss
is in some measure supplied
though 1 am sensible,
;
very madequately, could i, be
compared with the book which was written by
a man of such gigantic
it

wrmen seventh

IWus

U 4 ,hCe, d0fth e

him
Hat

wht h B

!.

Zl are extant
~ 1T
;

luT

mbwkofthi

^ My

P0Wm "

I
which
shows "J*""'
that another book

is

S
'

..

Uia

divine*

will

Wer' otdMebyhim
T

I* accuracy discoid bv
in

any onsoflbe u book,

warning.

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1NTBODUCTIOV.

u.

powers of mind as Proclus, and who had also sources of informatiou ou the subject, which
present period,

translation of the Elements of

Theology

Theology of Plato, more complete, and


most abstruse and sublime work;

that

In translating the treatise of Proclus


ter,

as the original

at the

impossible to obtain.

it is

Greek

is

all but barbaroia, remains.

lost,

is

added

On

in order to render the treatise

to assist the reader

who

for the former elucidates,

and

On

Providence and Fate,

the

wishes to penetrate the depths of


is

elucidated by the Utter.

had great

difficulties to

encoun-

and nothing but a Latin translation, which Fabricius observes,

If the reader

acknowledge the truth of my remark.

compares

that translation with mine, he will at

Indeed, that translation

is

in

some

is

once

parts so barbarous, that

nothiug but an intimate acquaintance with the writings of Proclus, and the philosophy of Plato

could enable any one to render them

intelligible in

partially applicable to the translation

of the Extracts from two other

The Greek

text of Proclus

and the deficiencies which

And

the

Having discovered

this to

scarcely think that any of

volume was
however,

abounds with

have supplied

Latio translation of Portus

translated

that in

what

is

errors, so

critical

treatises

that the emendations

now

which

have made,

in

so

many

places corrected the original, I

enemies will be hardy enough to say, that any part of

offered to the public, I

had no other view man

As

am

this

conscious

to benefit those

are capable of being benefited by such sublime speculations; that wishing well to all mankind,
"

is

volume, amount to more than four hundred.

in this

from the Latin, where the Greek could be obtained.


is

observation

of Proclus.

so very faulty, as to be almost beyond example bad.

be the case, and having

my

The same

another language.

who
and

particularly to iny country, I have laboured to disseminate the philosophy

and theology of Plato, as

good government, and most

hostile to lawless conduct

highly favourable to the interests of piety and

and revolutionary principles; and


worthy part of mankind,
malevolent, though
I

am

that I have

done

my

best to deserve the esteem of the wise and

wholly unconcerned as to the reception

have invariably observed the following Pythagoric precept

to

be

beautiful,

it

may meet

wish for the approbation of the candid critics of the day. For in

though

m doing

" Do

them you should be without renown ;

with from the


all

my labours

those things which you judge


for the rabble

is

a bad judge

of a good thing."'

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CONTENTS
or

THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK

CHAPTER
The

Preface, in which the scope of the treatise


self,

is

the
it is

unfolded, together with die praise of Plato him-

mode of

the discussion

is

and what preparation of the auditors of

previously necessary.

tneologist

is

III.

according to Plato, whence he begins, as far as to what hypostases be ascends,

and according to what power of the soul be

particularly energizes.

CHAPTER
The

U.

in the present treatise,

CHAPTER
What a

I.

and of those that received the philosophy from him.

CHAPTER
What

I.

theological types or forms according to

all

IV.

which Plato disposes the doctriuc concerning the

Gods.

CHAPTER
What

the dialogues are

orders of

V.

from which the theology of Plato may especially be assumed

and

to

what

Goda each of these dialogues refers us.

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CONTENT*.

lit

CHAPTER

VI.

collecting the Platonic tlicologv


"

into

CHAPTEK
A

from many dialogue*,

consequence of

in

it*

minute parts.

VII.

solution of the before ineiitiooed objection, referring to one

dialogue,

the Parmeuides, the

whole truth concerning the Gods according to Plato.

CHAPTER

VIII.

numeration of the different opinion* concerning the Parmenides, aud a division of


the objection, to then,.

CHAPTER
A

confutation of those
i

in

it

is

who

assert that the

IX.

Parmenides

is

CHAPTER
How

far they are right

a logical dialogue,

and who admit

that the

argumentative, proceeding through subjects of opinion.

who

X.

assert that the hypotheses

plea of things, and what

is

of the Parmenides are concerning the princito be added to what they say from the doctrine of
our preceptor

[Syrianus.]

CHAPTER
Many

CHAPTER
The

XI.

demonstrations concerning the conclusions of the second hypothesis, and of


the divuiou of
it according to the divine orders.

XII.

intention of the hypotheses, demonstrating their connexion with each other,


and their coascut
with the things themselves.'

CHAPTER
What

the

common

rules concerning the

Gods

XIII.
which Plato delivers

are,

in die

Laws.

And

also

concerning the hyparxis of the Gods, their providence, and their immutable perfection.

CHAPTER
How

the hyparxis of the

Gods

is

the
'

ter.

The
The

Laws, aud what the mode of

12th chapter

is

it

How

is

the providence of die

Gods

is

their providence is according to Plato.*

not market! in the original

15th chapter also

Perhaps

XIV.

delivered in the Laws, and through what

recurs to the truly existing Gods.

but

nut marked in the original

it

aud

my translation.
in my translation in the Uth

begins conformably to
ia

comprehended

should begin at the word*, " If tlierefore the Gods produce

all things," in p. 40.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XV.
Through what argument*
[for all things,]

tune

in the

Law*]

treatise [the

CHAPTER
What

it is

demonstrated that the Godi provide

immutably.

the axioms are concerning the

Gods which

XVI.

are delivered in the Republic, and what order

they have with respect to each other.

CHAPTER
What

the goodness of the


evil

Gods

u, and

according to every hypostasis

how

is itself

the immutability

impassivity are

is

of the Gods

and

how we

and that

where

their self-sufficiency,

and firm

all

good

adorned and arranged by the Gods.

CHAFFER
What

XVII.

they are said to be the causes of

also

XVIII.
it is

shown what

are to understand their possessing an invariable sameness of

CHAPTER XLX.
What

the simplicity

is

of the

Gods ; and how

that

which

is

simple in them appears to be various

in secondary natures.

CHAPTER XX.
What

the truth

is

the

Gods by secondary

Gods

and whence falsehood

is

introduced in the participations of the

natures.

CHAPTER XXI.
From

tbe axioms in the Phsedrus concerning every tiling divine


is

beautiful, wise,

CHAPTER
A

discussion of the

[it

follows] that every thing divine

and good.

XXII.

dogmas concerning the goodness [of

the Gods,]

and an

investigation of the

elements of the good in the Philebus.

CHAPTER
What

the

wisdom of

the

Gods

is,

XXIII.

and what elements of

it

may be assumed from

Plato.

CHAPTER XXIV.
nd tbe elements of it,

as delivered by Plato.

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CONT1NTI.

li

CHAPTER XXV.
Whit

the triad

is

which

is

aries to the theory

conjoined with the good, the wise, and the beautiful, and what auxili-

of

it,

Plato affords us.'

CHAPTER XXVI.
Concerning the axioms delivered
nature

is.

What

in the

What

Pruedo,* respecting an invisible nature.

the immortal, and the intelligible > are

the divine

and what order these possess with

CHAPTER XXVII.
What

the uniform and indissoluble are, and

how sameness of

subsistence [and the unbegotteu are]

to be assumed in divine natures.

CHAPTER
How paternal, and

bow

XXVIII.

maternal causes arc to be assumed in the Gods.

CHAPTER XXIX.
Concerning divine names, and the rectitude of them as delivered in the Cratjlu*.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK


CHAPTER
A method leading to

I.

the superessential principle of all things, according to the intellectual concep-

of the one and multitude.

tion

CHAPTER
A second

II.

method unfolding the

II.

hypostasis of the one, aod demonstrating

it

to be

exempt from

all

corporeal and incorporeal essences.

that

Such
is

is

the tide of this chapter in the Greek, which

which unites us

to tktgood ;

and that

it is

is

obviously erroneous. For the proper

divine faith."

What

is said

title is,

What

indeed in the Greek to be the con-

tents of this, belong to the preceding chapter.

For " f^'fr

it is

necessary to read nfthnt.


it should evidently be *t, Ike intclligMe,

Mn the Greek r. f-wnfc, tk* uniform, but

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER
Many

arguments

in

confirmation of the

Mine

Ivu

III.

and evincing the irreprehensible hypothesis of

thing,

the one.

CHAPTER
A confutation of those who say that the

principle

first

IV.
is

not according to Plato above

intellect,

ami

demonstrations from the Republic, the Sophists, the Philebus, and the Parmcnidci, of the
superessential hypostasis' of the one.

CHAPTER
What

modes

the

V.

are of ascent to the one according to Plato

analogy, and through negations.

and that the modes are two, through

Likewise, where Plato treats of each of these, and through

what cause.

CHAPTER
By

what, and by

how many names

VI.

Plato unfolds the ineffable principle, and

And how these names

such and by so main names.

CHAPTER
What

being.

it

How the

is

sun

divine natures, there


is

the cause of

all

is

shown,
is

how

it

is

is

is itself

to the first principle.

prior to

power and

Dionysius says the

first

analogy to the

And how

the

first

principle

energy.

VIII.
king

is.

And

admonitions, that the

first

God

discussed in that Epistle.

CHAPTER
things are about him.

beautiful things.

What

How

all

the order

IX.

things are for his sake.

is

of these conceptions.

CHAPTER
How

its

the three conceptions arc which arc delivered [in that Epistle] concerning the
all

by

it.

celebrated as the good, and as the most splendid of

monad analogous

beings, and

in his Epistle to

it

the offspring of the good; and that according to each order of

CHAPTER
What Plato

unfolds

VII.

the assertions are in the Republic concerning the first principle, through

sun ; where also

What

why he

accord with the modes of ascent to

this

he

is

first

king.

How

the cause of all

hypotheses they

X.

Parmenidcs, Plato delivers the doctrine concerning ike one,

in the first hypothesis of the

employing for

How

And from what

purpose negations.

And on what

account the negations are such and so

many.
'

Proc.

For ym>.ntl read

Vol.

I.

nim^.
A

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER
How

it is

XI.

nereiiary to eotwr on the theory concerning the one, through negations.

position of the soul

is

most adapted

to discussions

CHAPTER
A

And what

dis-

of th

XII.

celebration of the one, demonstrating through negative conclusions that

it

exempt from

all

the

orders of beings, according to the order delivered in the

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK


CHAPTER
That

III.

I.

common of the one principle of things, it is requisite to treat of the


show how many they are, and how they are divided from each other.

after the discussion in

divine orders, and to

CHAPTER
That the multitude of

unities according to

II.

which the Gods have

their hypostasis, subsists after

the one.

CHAPTER
How many

III.

the particulars are which ought to be demonstrated previous to the discovery of the
!

of the divine orders, and an uninterrupted narration of the doctrine of these.

CHAPTER
That

all
all

the unities are participate.

And

that there

only one truly su|ieressenlial one

but that

the other unities are participated by essences.'

CHAPTER
That the

IV.

is

participations of the unities

tases

V.

which are nearer to the one, proceed into moi

but the participations of those that are remote from the one, proceed into more

posite hypostases.

These four chapters are comprehended in one in my translation, as they are not marked in the Greek; and
bad not divided them, when this work u sent to the press, as I have done the chapters of the other books,
1

in

wukh there

is

a similar defect in the ordinal.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER
What

VI.

the natures are which participate of the divine unities, and what the order of them

And

pect to each other.

that being indeed,

intellect, the third; soul, the fourth

CHAPTER
A resumption of the

life,

is

with res-

the second;

which

the third thing is


it

that which
this

is

mixed.

it

That

it

is

it

may be

How

this

may be demonstrated.
in being,

which Socrates

in the

Philebus says

CHAPTER
Concerning the

is

primarily being.*

first intelligible triad in

which subsists from bound and

And how bound

and

infinity

infi-

are twofold

but the other existing prior to being.'

CHAPTER
is,

Socrates in the Philebus

X.

inferred, that the first thing

one order of these subsisting

the triad

Why

nothing else than that which

proceeds from the two principles, and from the one.

also,

nity is being.

calls

IX.

produced from the two principles.

CHAPTER
from image*

many

VIII.

two principles are of all things posterior to the one ; how Socrates the Philebus
them bound and infinity ; and of what things they are the causes* to beings.'

And how

What

that there aie also as

the

calls

How

And

VII.

CHAPTER
What

last.

doctrine concerning the one, and a discussion of the biformod principles pos-

CHAPTER
What

most ancient of these

the

is

and body, the

common

XI.
is

inherent in erery thing that

is

mixed

XII.

and how the second

triad proceeds analogous to

this.*

necessary to read mtmu.

For mntmt,

>

The seventh and

For w,

And

die ninth and tenth

'

This

is

'

It appears

the

in the original

the

it is

it is

eighth chapters form the third in

necrssary to read

my translation.

an the fourth and fifth chapters in my translation.


sixth chapter in my translation.

from this account of the contents of the twelfth chapter, that a -considerable part of
;

because nothing

is

said in

it

it

is

wanting

about the manner in which the second triad proceeds tualogou*

to

firrt.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER
What

the second intelligible triad

is.

predominates, from that which

is

XIII.

more accurate account of

participated, and

CHAPTER
What

the third iutclligible triad

And at

is ;

the end, a discourse in

what that

common

from

that

it,

as subsisting

that

XIV.

which predominates, and

is

from

which characterizes the mixture.

is

participated in this.

concerning die distinction of the three

triads.

CHAPTER XV.
How the intelligible

triads are delivered in the

[evincing] that

itself,

Timeus. And

has the third order in

it

intelligible*.

CHAPTER
Many

XVI.

demonstrations that eternity subsists according to the middle order of

CHAPTER
That the one

in

which

eternity abides is the

intelligible*.

XVII.

summit of

intelligibles.

CHAPTER XVIH.
common, according

the intelligible orders in

all

m the

of the peculiarities

And

to the doctrine of Timarus.

CHAPTER XIX.
intelligible forms,

and the doctrine unfolding the peculiarity of them.

they are four, and from what causes they

How

likewise

CHAPTER XX.
That

also
viz.

from what

said in the Sophista,

is

in that part

what ail

of the Sophista,

in

possible to discover die three intelligible orders;

it is

which

it

is

shown what

the one being, what whole, and

are.

CHAPTER XXI.
A summary

account of .what has been said concerning the

from Plato that

it

is

possible to divide

them

CHAPTER
How

in the

Phxdrus
i

it is

triads.

And

admonitions

XXII.

said that every thing divine

of these Plato delivers.

intelligible

into father, power, an

is

beautiful, wise,

And how from

these

it is

and good.

What

triple

possible to accede to the

separation of the intelligible triads.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER
How

Parmenides delivers the multitude of Gods

XXIII.

in the

And how we

second hypothesis.

about each order of them, employing for

this

should

purpose the conclusions of

that

CHAPTER XXIV.
What

the

first intelligible triad

is

according to Parmcuidcs.

proceeds, teaching concerning

Whence be

begins,

and how

far

he

it.

CHAPTER XXV.
What

the second intelligible triad

is.

And how

far

triad prior to

it.

How

by Parmenides

in

be produces the discourse concerning

it.

it

is

delivered

CHAPTER XXVI.
What

the third intelligible triad

is.

And bow Parmenides

unfolds

it

throngh the third conclusion.

CHAPTER XXVII.
the three conclusions in

And how

characterized.

common, through which

through these

it is

the three orders of intelligible* are

possible to dissolve the

most

difficult

of theolo-

gical doubts.

CHAPTER
A celebration of the intelligible Gods, unfolding at

XXVIII.
the same time

tite

union of

intelligible!)

themselves

with the good, and their exempt hyparais.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK


CHAPTER
What

the peculiarity
bleliie,

is

and are

of the

intelligible

in continuity

and

IV.

I.

intellectual

Gods.

How

they illuminate imparticipa-

with the intelligible Gods.

CHAPTER
How the intelligible and intellectual Gods

subsist

II.

from the

intelligible

Gods.

And how

they roni-

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CONTENT

ltii

CHAPTER
What

the division
ference

is

is

of the

intelligible

III.

and intellectual God. according to

of these triads with respect to the

CHAPTER
How

it

dif-

IV.

V.

not proper to understand the Heaven, and celestial circulation [celebrated in the Ph*-

drus] as pertaining to sensibles


that these are to

and many admonitions from the Platonic words themselves,

be referred to the

first

order of Heaven.

CHAPTER
That

the supercelestial place

about

it

[in the

VI.

not simply intelligible

is

Phcdrus,] that

it is

allotted

an

the subcclestial arch


peculiarities of

is

VII.

order of

this

Gods from

VIII.

the middle which

CHAPTER
delivers tbe

same mode of ascent

the supercelestial place


in intellectual*.

is.

And how

How

it

at

it

first intelligible*.

How

it is

supreme

power.

XI.

peculiarity of the

the negations are of the supercelestial place.

What

initiators into the

summit of

intelfigibles

and

intellectuals,

one and the same time affirmatively and negatively.

CHAPTER
What

by

X.

its prolific

CHAPTER
unknown

and why he celebrates

and deliver* the

contains,

IX.

proceeds from the

Plato demonstrates

Plato has indicated the

it

to the intelligible, as is delivered

CHAPTER

How

delivered

the boundary of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, evinced from the

CHAPTER

What

is

order at in intellectuals.

it.

Plato characterizes

That Plato

but demonstrations from what

intelligible

CHAPTER
That

Why

what the

Socrates in the Phssdra* leads us to this order of Gods.

CHAPTER
That

And

triad*.

intelligible triads.

XII.

That they are produced from

the divine orders.

kind of negations also designate the uncoloured, what, the unfigured, and what, the pri,

valiou of contact.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER
What

luii

XHf.

the things are which Plato affirm* of the s upercelcstial place, and from

he ascribes to

liarities,

affirmative sign*.

it

CHAPTER
What the

XIV.

three deities of the virtues, viz. science, temperance, and jujticf, are in the supercelestial

place

what order the; have with respect to each other ; and what perfection each of them

imparts to the Gods.

CHAPTER XV.
What

the plain of Truth, and

ment

What

is.

what the meadow-

What the unical form of intelligible nutriGods Lt which is distributed from this intelligible

are.

the twofold nutriment of the

food.

CHAPTER
Many

admonitions that the supercelestial place


hypostases in

is

XVI.
And what

triadic.

the signs are of the three

it.

CHAPTER
Who Adrastia

is.
What the sacred law of Adrastia
And on what account she does so.

CHAPTER
A summary account of what is said

XVII.
That she ranks

is.

in the supercelestial place.

XVIII.

about the sup

CHAPTER XIX.
Demonstrations that the connected!jr -containing order

And

that

it is

the intelligible

is in

and

intellectual

Gods.

necessary there should be three connective causes of wholes.

CHAPTER XX.
That according to Plato the

celestial circulation is the

same

CHAPTER XXI.
How we may obtain
deity.

auxiliaries

And why

from what

is

said

by Plato of the

he especially venerates the union

CHAPTER
What

the theology in the Cratylus

is

XXII.

concerning Heaven.

by a reasoning process the middle of the

triadic division in the connective

b tb

intelligible

And how
and

it is

possible to collect from

intellectual

it

Gods.

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CONTENTS.

Ixiv

CHAPTER
Thai

the

most

And that

liar order.

XXIII.

of the interpreter* have defined the subceleslial arch to be a certain

diviiiel) -inspired

our preceptor has unfolded

it

in the

most perfect manner.

CHAPTER XXIV.
Many

admonitions that the peculiarity of the subcelestial arch


;

it,

is

perfective,

and from the souls that are elevated to

from whit Plato ba

it.

CHAPTER XXV.
What

the triadic division

of the perfective order, which Plato has delivered in the subcelestial

is

arch.

CHAPTER XXVI.
What

the elevation

What

is

of souls separate from bodies to the

the most blessed tthtt

What mueas, and

is.

And what the

and unmoved visions are.

end

CHAPTER
How

Plato unfolds in the Pannenides, from


i

is

common, and

is

of

intelligible

cpopteia are.

all this

triads.

the entire, simple,

XXVII.

rotelligibles the intelligible

that

and intellectual

What

elevation.

which

is different are,

and

intellectual orders.

in the theology

<

CHAPTER XX VIII.
How

number proceeds from

the intelligible and intellectual

from

intelligible*.

And

in

what

it

differs

intelligible multitude.

CHAPTER XXIX.
How

divine

number adorns
i

all

beings.

the division of

And what

the powers in

it

are which are symbolically deli-

number.

CHAPTER XXX.
How

Pannenides has delivered the feminine and generative peculiarity [of

first

number]

in

what he

CHAPTER XXXI.
How we

may

discover in what

mtelligibles

and

is

delivered concerning number, the triadic division of the

summit of

intellectuals.

CHAPTER XXXII.
Whether

it is

proper to place number prior to animal

itself,

or in animal

itself,

or posterior to

it.

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Uv

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

XXXIII,

Whence Parmcnidrs begins to speak about uuinber.


And Imw lie unfold* the different orders in
iL

CM
What

the

unknown

is

in divine

these tilings from

what

in

What

tar Ik-

proceeds

what he says about

in

XX XIV.

\PTF.K

numbew.

Uuw
it.

generative lain them.

the

And

admonitions of

elsewhere said by Plato concerning number*.

CH APT till XXXV.


How

Parmcnidca delivers the middle order of


and

And what

Jiiute.

and intellectuals through the one, whole,

intelligible*

the peculiarities are of these.

chapter xxxvr
W

hence Parnienidcs begins

about

it.

How he

to

apeak about

And

order.

this

likewise unlolda the three

monad*

hoy*
in it

fai lie

proccedi

conformably

to

in

what

what he say a
is

*aid

iii

the

Phaedrus concerning them.

CHAPTER XXXVII.
How

Partnenides delivers the third order

of intelligible* and intellectuals.

the perfective peculiarity, and tiiadic division of

Ami how

he unfolds

it.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
An

admonition what the union


sion',

is

of the three

and intellectual

intelligible

triads,

from the conclu -

of Piiinienides.

CM A I'TKK XXXIX.
How

many

theological

Parruenidcs

dogmas wc may assume, through

in his

the order of the conclusions delivered by

discourse concerning the intelligible and intellectual God*.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK


CH A P K K
I

How

the intellectual order* proceed from the intelligible and intellectual God.-.

what peculiarities they

the division

is

And

according to

subsist.

CHAPTER
What

V.

I.

of the intellectual Gods.

And

II.

the progression according to

hebdomads

in this

order of Goda,

Proe.

VOL.

II.

CONTENTS.

chapter
Who tbe

nr.

three intellectual fathers are according to Plato.


i

deity

is,

that

it

co-arranged w

CHAPTER
How from the

What
ith tbe

the three tmdefiled

two

IV.

writing* of Plato, the procession of the intellectual

Gods

into .ere

be collected by a reasoning process.

CHAPTER
Who

the mighty Saturn

is,

V.

respect intelligible, and in a certain respect intellectual.

CHAPTER
the

kingdom of Saturn

of what

it is

In what manner

is.

the cause to the world, to the

it is

defirered

separation from

VII.

souls are said to be nourished by ioleUigibles.

Wlut

the ordors are which the mighty Saturn causes to preside over wholes.

is.

peculiarities

CHAPTER

is

that

is

And

this

bow

God

(Saturn]

is

Plato has delivered

the t ivitV

Goddess

it-

this peculiarity

Guest

is

of the

IX.

is

In which also, who

unfolded.

X.

How

she

is

ia.

XI.

the collector of the Satumian and Jovian kingdoms.

CHAPTER
the third father in intellectuals

How

And

of him.

what orders she possesses conjoined with bodt

Who

the Elean

peculiarly called by thoologisU insenescible, or free from old agr.

CHAPTER
Who

this circulation

what the difference

delivered in the Gorgias

CHAPTER
How

of

VIII.

CHAPTER
the Satumian intellect

And

partial souls.

How

of souls

it.

by Plato in the Politkus.

mundane Gods, asm to

CHAPTER
And what

its

the

life

VI.

What

Satumian

is in

In which also, the dogmas are dis-

cussed concerning the uniou of intellect with the intelligible, and

What

And how he

according to the theology in the Cratylaa.

And

XII.

be proceeds from the causes prior to him.

Aud

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CHAPTER
Demonstrations

thai lh

XIII.

whole demiargtu of the universe,

is

the third father of the

intellectual

God*.

CHAPTER

XIV.

through man)' arguments that the


in the third order of intellectuals.

CHAPTER XV.
That Timcus

especially delivers the peculiarity

of the demiurgus, by calling him

that this pertains to the third of the intellectual

CHAPTER
How according to another method
how

the demiurgus

is

it is

Tunaeus

aud where

and uatcnial

of the demiurgus.

In which also,

same time

at the

it is

And
clearly

effective, wliere the effec-

the effective oulv are. acconiimr to Plato.

CHAPTER
How following Timeeus,

aud father.

effector

shown, where the paternal, where the paternal and


tive

And

XVI.

requisite to discover the peculiarity

called in the

intellect.

Anil in short in

XVII.

according to a third method,

we may

purify our

the demiurgic monad.

CHAPTER
A

XVIII.

theological explanation of the speech of the demiurgus in

the Tinraus, distinctly evolving our

conceptions about the demiurgic energy.

CHAPTER XIX.
What

the second speech of the demiurgus

And bow

in this all the

is

to divisible souls.

measures of the

life

In what

it

differs

from the former.

of souls are defined.

CHAPTER XX.
of

all

that

is

said

about the demiurgus, following the

CHAPTER XXI.
from what

is

said iu the Cratylus, that Plato attributes fabrication to Jupiter.


" '".1

.J

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COHTIKTI.

Ufili

CHAPTER
Admonitions from what
concord
in the

is

is

XXII.

said in the Cratylus of tbe fsbricatioo of Jupiter.

CHAPTER

XXIII.

Admonitions of the fabrication of Jupiter from what


also

In which also the

demonstrated of the theology from name*, with the arrangement of the demiurgim

Tinwus.

is

shown, what the royal soul, and the royal

it is

demonstrated in the Philebiu.

In which

intellect are.

CHAPTER XXIV.
Demonstration* of the same thing, from what

is

said in the Protagoras about the political science.

CHAPTER XXV.
An

argument shewing that Jupiter

from what

is

the demiurgus and father of tbe universe* according to Plato,

said in the Politic us concerning the twofold circulation [of the uniTcrse.]

is

CHAPTER XXVI.
Admonitions of the same things, from what

is said in

Laws

the

concerning analogy,

viz.

that

it is

the judgment of Jupiter.

CHAPTER XXVII.
How

Jupiter subsists according to cause in animal

CHAFrER
How Tim ecu j

attributes to the

itself,

how animal

and

itself is in

Jupiter.

XXVIII.

demiurgus die unknown and

ineffable.

CHAPTER XXIX.
Why Timaus

thinks

fit

to denominate animal

leaves the demiurgus

unkuowu and

itself,

and

is

of opinion that

it

may be known, but

ineffable.

CHAFrER XXX.
Concerning the Crater
it,

and how

it is

in the Tiuiaras,

a theology teaching

w hat

tbe genera are that are mingled in

the tausc of the essence of souls.

CHAFrER XXXI.
Thai

tlie

Craler in the Timaius

is fontal.

And admonitions from

the writings of Plato, concerning

the principle and fouutaii) of souls.

Ivt * [,

it is

necessary to read t*.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXXH.
That the three vWific fountains co-arranged with the demiurgua, may be assumed from what
in the Timaeas, via. the fountain of souls, the fountain of the virtues,

is

said

and the fountain of

natures.

CHAPTER
Admonitions concerning the undc filed Gods

what the

peculiarity

is

XXXIII.

that there are such

Gods according

to Plato;

and

of their essence.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
More

manifest demonstrations of the hypostasis of the untie filed Gods, according to Plato.

CHAPTER XXXV.
Admonitions through many arguments how
ing to Plato.

it is

proper to denominate the undented Gods accord-

In which also, the tuiion of tbcm, what their separation, and what

their

pecu-

liarity are, is delivered.

CHAPTER XXXVI.
How

from what

is

mystically asserted

by Plato, auxiliaries may be obtained, concerning the seventh

monad of intellectuals.

CHAPTER XXXVII.
How

Plato delivers in the Parmcnides the summit of the intellectual Gods.'

How

Parroenidcs unfolds the middle order of the intellectual breadth, and through what signs

How

Parmenides defines the

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

CHAPTER XXXIX.
third order of intellectuals,

and through that

peculiarities.

CHAPTER XL.
A common

theory of the intellectual hebdomad, from the conclusions of Parmenides.

form the conclusion of the contents of


contents of chapter thirty-seren in the original erroneously
Uence what
it is therefore necessary to read .nchapter thirtv-sit. And instead of K m
*. *, anrt *. ^. It will be found also Uiat
.,',. x,, and f . >, should be marked
are marked
'

The

ehspter lojiy

m prn,

is

wantiug.

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CONTENTS.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK

VI.

CHAPTER L
That the ruling order of God*

is

in continuity with the intellectual

God*.

And that

the division

.and principles may be

CHAPTER
How

the ruling

What

tie peculiarity

Gods proceed.

And

CHAPTER
them.

how

is

of the ruling Gods.

And how

n.

supermundane

that the

the

to .Unintelligible

HI.

That the aantnilaUve

especially characteristic

the divisions are of the assimilative


i

their energies,

mundane

all

Gods.

natures.

V.

And

that the greatest part of the discourse

CHAPTER

CHAPTER
is

twofold

one of them.]

VI.

And bow

the three proceed

to Plato also, the demiurgic

Demonstrations of

is

ont

VII.

one indeed, being prior to the three sons of Saturn, [but the

from Saturn, and the one Jupiter.

CHAPTER
That according

about

middle orders in them.

demonstrations, that both according to Plato and other theologists, there

That Jupiter

of

IV.

What

powers are of the assimilative Gods.

CHAPTER

Many

i.

paradigm.

imparted by them to the world, and to

What

God*

the causes of assimi

CHAPTER
What

peculiarity pertain* to these

this

from what

V1U.

monad

subsists prior to the three sons of

is said in the Politicus,

and

in the

Laws.

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CONTBWT*.

CHAPTER
More

Uxi

IX.

manifest admonitions of the game things from what

is

Gorgias, nod in the

said in the

Cratyius.

CHAPTER
Who

the three

What

the

demiurp

are, and

what order they have with reference to each

CHAPTER
among

rivific triad is
i

the ruling

Gods.

of Plato concerning the union and division of

of the ruling

cottvertrve triad

Gods

Apollo with the sun

also, the union of

wid about Apollo we may be led

is;
is

ruling

Gods.

XII.

demonstrated

CHAPTER
What the undented order is of the
about it may be obtained.

Parmcnidcs forms

And

order.

that

his conclusions

and

it

is

it

contains.

shewn,

In which

how from what

is

of the solar orders.

XIII.

And how from

CHAPTER
How

derive

this triad.

and what die monad which

to the theory

other.

XI.

And whence we may

CHAPTER
What the

X.

the writings of Plato conceptions

XIV.

about the ruling Gods, in continuity with the demiurgic

he characterizes the whole order of them, through similitude and

dis-

CHAPTER XV.
Wlut

the

supermundane and

own medium

at die

same time mundane genus of Gods

they preserve the continuity of the

CHAPTER
How

die liberated
:

from

Gods
the-

are characterized.

common

universe, and arc co-arranged with the

power*, and what the

common

And how

through their

the demiargus.

XVI.

And how from

CHAPTER
Wliat the

is.

Gods that proceed from

their liberated peculiarity they are

mundane Gods.

XVII.
energies are of the liberated Gods, according

with the essence that has been dehSeied of them.

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CONTENT

bsii

CHAPTER

XVIII.

in the Phasdrus,

Concerning the twelve leaders or ruler* mentioned

and

that they

have a liberated

CHAPTER XIX.
Man; and

clearer demonstrations that the great leader Jupiter,

and

all

the dodecad of leaden,

are liberated.

CHAPTER XX.
An

explanation from precedaueous causes whence the

Gods

is

CHAPTER
What

the division of the liberated leaders


division of

them

the

dodecad

in the liberated

is

into

XXI.

two monads and one decad.

And what

the one

is.

CHAPTER
The

number of

derived.

XXII.

theology concerning each of the twelve Gods, unfolding the peculiarities of them from the
subjects of their government.

CHAPTER

XXIII.
Likewise concerning the

ing the mother of the Fates mentioned in the Republic.


the Fates.

What

What powers
And how Plato

orders they have with reference to each other.

delivered through divine symbols.

What

their energies are.

triad

of

of them are

the liberated peculiarity.

CHAPTER XXIV.
now

Pannenides forms
milatiTe

Gods.

his conclusions concerning the liberated

And how

Gods immediately

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK


CHAPTER
On

the

mundane Gods

in

after the

he characterizes the order of them by touching and not touching

general, the source of

VII.

I.

their progression,

their orders,

powers, ami

spheres.

CHAPTER
On the division,

II.

and allotments of the mundane Gods.

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COKTKHTS.

CHAPTER
That

(he

mundane do not

differ

the providence of the


like the light

nr.

from the supermundane Gods

Gods

of die sun,

is

is

That

habitudes to bodies, &c.

capable of receiving

CHAPTER
to the incorporeal essence of die

And

in

not circumscribed by place. That

whatever

fills

After what manner the visible celestial orbs are

Gods.

llini

Gods.That

all

things,

and

IV.

Gods.That

that the perfectly iurorporcal

h pervade*

it.

a celestial body

is

eminently allied

the visible are connected with

are united to the sensible

tire intelligible

Gods, through the

essence of each being characterized by the one.

CHAPTER
The

Timcus.

V.

mundane Gods unfolded from the speech of

nature of the

And what the whole conception of the speech


CHAPTER

What

the demiurgus effects in the multitude of

That

the words of the

to the animal which

whom

am

is

is

is

first

words of

his

speech*

Demiurgus are addressed to the composite from soul and animal, via.
divine and partakes of a soul.
The meaning of the words, " Of

the demiurgus and father," 8cc.

VII.

dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that

well composed,

is

the province of an

ill

following part of the speech of the

which

" Every
is

thing therefore which

beautifully

harmonized and

nature."

CHAPTER
The

to them, in the

VI.

of the words unfolded in the speech of the Demiurgus,

bound

Demiurgus

the

according to Proclus.

mundane Gods by the

CHAPTER
The meaning

is

VIII.

Demiurgus

to the

mundane Gods unfolded. The

differ'

ence between the primarily and secondarily immortal, and the primarily and secondarily

mdissoluble.-And

that

the

mundane Gods

are neither primarily immortal, nor primarily

indissoluble.

CHAPTER
That

part of the speech of the


'

in

which be says to the mundane God.,

my

Learn now therefore what I say to you indicating

CHAPTER
The

IX.

Demiurgus uufolded,

desire."

X.

developetneat of the remaining part of the speech of the Demiurgus.

Proc.

Vol. I.

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CONTIXTI.

txiiv

CHAPTER
Who

the junior

God* are, and why

XI.

they are thus called.

CHAPTER

XII.

Farther important particulars respecting the fabrication of the

mundane Gods,

collected from the

Timseus, and unfolded.

CHAPTER

XIII.

Continuation of the deYelopement of these particulars.

CHAPTER
The

peculiarities

of the

celestial

Gods

cotuprcheuds a multitude of

And that

XIV.

separately discussed. Why the

stars,

one sphere of the

fixed stars

but each of the planetary spheres convolves only one

each of the planetary spheres, there

in

is

number of satellites, analogous

star.

to the

choir of the fixed stars, subsisting with proper circulations of their own.

CHAPTER
The

nature of the

Moon, Mercury, Venus, and

the

CHAPTER
Extract from the Oration of the

Emperor Julian

MS.

God

are unfolded.

CHAPTER
nature of ihc

Muses unfolded from

the

above

nature of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, unfolded.

becomes an animal, and

tary divinities

of perfection

it

in

XVIII.

MS.

CHAPTER
The

Sun.

XVII.

Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato concerning Apollo, in which

the principal powers of the

The

unfolded.

XVI.

to the Sovereign

CHAPTER
Extract from the

XV.

Sun

Scholia.

XIX.
The manner

in

which

ea-h

of the seven plane-

suspended from a more divine soul

and what kind

affords to the universe.

CHAPTER XX.
That

all

the celestial

Gods

nre beneficent, and after a similar

manner

the causes of

good. And

the participation of them, and the mixture of material with immaterial influences,
causes of tbe abundant difference in secondary natures.

become

that
the

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CONTMNTS.

lllT

CHAPTER XXI.
Tlie nature of Minerva unfolded from the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeu*.

and

shield with

which

this

Goddess,

in the statues

CHAPTER
The

nature of the great

mundane

of her,

ia

The spear

represented aa armed,

XXII.

divinity, the earth,

unfolded from Proclus on the

Timams of

Plato.

CHAPTER
The manner

in

which the earth

is

said to bo the

XXIII.

most ancient, and the

first

of the Gods within the

explained.

s,

CHAPTER XXIV.
On

the essence of the sublunary deities.-What Plato says of them in the

Timwis

unfolded.

CHAPTER XXV.
Where the sublunary Gods

are to be arranged. And the

meaning of the subsequent words of Plato

developed.

CHAPTER XXVI.
The

nature of the sublunary

Gods more

fully

unfolded. On the dscmoniacal order. And that

about each of the fabricators of generation, there

ia

a co-ordinate angelical, demoniacal, sod

beroical multitude, which retains die appellation of its producing

What Pythagoras

says in the

CHAPTER XXVII.
Sacred Ditcours*. What the

Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus


the sublunary

Gods from Heaven and

monad.

Orphic

That

traditions are concerning

Plato begins the Theogony of

Earth, and not from Phanes and

Night. And whv he

does so.

CHAPTER XXVIH.
On

die

two

principles

Heaven and Earth.

What each

of them

is

and

particularly concerning the

power of Heaven.

CHAPTER XXIX.
The wble theory
i

of Earth unfolded And also the theory of Ocean and Tethys

are in the intellectual Gods, and likewise in the sensible

That the causes

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CONTENTS.

Uxvi

CHAPTER XXX.
The theory

of Phorcjs, Saturn, and Rhea, unfolded.

CHAPTER XXXf.
The

nature of the sublunary Jupiter aud

ennead,
the

viz-

Juno unfolded.

Heaven aud Earth, Ocean aud

Gods who

And

why Plato comprehends

in this

Tetfays, Phorcys, Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, and

Juno,

are the fabricators of generation.

CHAPTER XXXII.
Why

Plato denominates the sublunary

deities,

" such

as

become apparent when

they please."

General observations respecting the Gods that govern generation.

CHAPTER XX XI
On

the summit, or

monad of all

the

1 1.

mundane Gods, Bacchus. And on

the

mundane

soul which

is

the immediate participant of the Bacchic iutellect.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
How the

mundane Gods

arc characterized in the Parmenides of Plalo.

CHAPTER XXXV.
A developement of

what Plato says

the Pha*driu, about Boreas and Orkhya, the Centaurs,

Chimaras, Gorgons, Pegasuses, Typbons, Acbelous, and die Nymulis.

CHAPTER XXXVI.
The meaning

of Plato unfolded, in what

lie

says about Pan, Tartarus, Prometheus,

the Syrens.

CHAPTER XXXVII.
A developement of

Plato's theological conceptions respecting Nature, Fate,

aod Fortune.

CHAPTER XXXVIH.
What Time, Day and Night, Month and Year

are, so far as tbey are deities, according to the

theology of Plato.

CHAPTER XXXIX.
A discmsion

of the order of divioe souls,

who

are deified by always participating of the Gods.

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COMTIHTI.

IWVS

CHAPTER XL.
A derelopement of the Rata re

of Love, from the

MS. Commentary

CHAPTER

XLI.

CHAPTER

XLII.

of Proclus on the FurX Alcj-

of the same subject.

The

nature of

demon* more

fully

on the First Alcibiades, on

disclosed.An extract from the

MS. Commentary

of

Prod us

this subject.

CHAPTER XL1H.
On the

daemons

who are allotted

the superintendence of mankind.

CHAPTER XUV.
On

the daemon of Socrates.The peculiarily^of this daemon

and that

it

belonged to the Apolio-

niacal series.

CHAPTER XLV.
Important information concerning daemons from the
Plato.

CHAPTER
The

MS.

Scholia of

Prod us on

the Cralylus of

And also from the MS. Commentary of Olympiodorus on the Pluedo of Plato.

nature of those

human

XLVI.

souls that are of an heroic characteristic unfolded. What Plato says of

these souls in the Cratylus. His meaning elucidated from the

MS.

Scholia of Proclua on

that dialogue.

CHAPTER
How

XLVII.

the triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, are indicated in the

Parma*

nidea of Plato.

CHAPTER XLVIH.

An elucidation

from Proclus of what Plato says

World, ao

far as the

whole of

it

is

in the

Tinwus,

in celebration

of the divinity of die

God.

CHAPTER XLIX.
A

further elucidation from Proclus of the

same subject

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COMIIKTI.

lliriii

CHAPTER
Tfae atoning of the words of Plato,

heaven (i.

e.

" And casing

he established

the world) one, only, solitary nature," unfolded from Proclus.

CHAPTER
Whit

L.
circle to revolve in a circle,

Plato says in the Timreus about the

hi.

name of the World,with the

elucidations of Proclus.

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hui*

An

explanation of certain terms which are unusual, or have a meaning dif-

ferent from their common acceptation, and which there was a necessity of
introducing in the translation of this work.

Composite,

fft/vtrrsc.

have used the word composite iiutcad of compounded, became the

Utter rather denotes the mingling than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the
former, through

derivation from the Latin

its

Demihrcus op wholes,

word compositui,

nated, because be produces the universe so far as


tains,

solely denotes.

artificer

of the universe

a whole, and likewise

it is

all

own immediate energy other subordinate powers co-operating


of parts. Hence he produces the universe totally and at once.

by his

duction

The

&]/Mfys; raw t*jm.

Dksire,

an

Is

twtfo/ua.

gratification arising

irrational

is

thus denomi-

the wholes

con-

it

with him iu the pro-

appetite solely directed to external objecU, and to the

from the possession of them.

Diaxoia, hemm, from whence


tvipyn*) or according to

its

dionottic,\* the discursive energy of reason; (Swfofcxi) too

most accurate

scientifically, deriving the principles

signification,

it is

of iu reasoning from

Xsyw

power of the soul which reasons


or the power which sees truth

that

intellect,

intuitively.

Do x a stic,
knows thai a

formed from

thing

or a-Ay a thing

is,

but

is

!*, opinio*, is the last

This word,

CJn est, ef.

iu its

more ample

properly implies one lip receives another, or

is

word

this

it,

or

why

word occurs) wherever one of

gutit, as being

Hence

is.

The knowledge

Greek, tleuolrs a

himself received

an entertainment.

more conformable

in

thcTimaus,

at

work of Pioclus when he

the speakers

is

introduced as a $,

to the genius of Plato's dialogues,

called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in

guests.

it

signification in the

logue of Plato therefore, (and consequently in this


which

of the gnostic powers of the rational soul

ignorant of the cause of

and

of the fan,

being the province of dianoia.

is,

t ranger,

but

In the dia-

cites the dialogues in


I

have translated

this

which may be justly

them may be considered

as so

many

the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests from

having been feasted with discourse.

Hvpabxis,
Hence,

also,

vwaebi.

it is

the

The

first

principle, or foundation as

it

were, of the esseuce of a thing.

summit of essence.

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Ixxx

Impahticipadle,
to which

when

superior,

it i

Oi>e

pJ#xTOf.
it is

an

it is

to be imparticipable with respect to another,

not consubsistent with

Intellectual projection.
because

tiling i* said

it.

The immediate energy of

intuitive perception, or

an immediate darting

intellect

forth, as

it

thus denorniniled,

is

were, to

its

proper object,

the intelligible.

Monad,

ftora,-,

in divine

natures

which contains

that

is

distinct,

but at the same time pro-

foundly-united multitude, and which produces a multitude exquisitely allied to


ncnsible universe, the first

which

it

sphere.

is

monad

(he world

is

the cause (in conjunction with the cause of

all).

elements, which are in


^onrrtf, wholenesses,

Permanency,

a similar

is

fourth and last place are

in the

in lite

is

the iuerratic

also a

monad, com-

the spheres of the

All these mounds likewise are denominated

and have a perpetual subsistence.

The

rratrif.

observes, that not every a-rowij

employed by Plato

And

manner monads.

But

itself.

in itself all the multitude of

The second monad

In the third place, the spheres of the pluncts succeed, each of w hicb

prehending an appropriate multitude.

proper word for


is

ljftfuo,

in the Sophista, to

Greek,

is

but that only which

is

PriANTAfcT, or Imagination, ^amairia,


the perceptions of this

power

rest, in

qpifiia.

And

in

which place

is, /a4;pivrii| voijvi;,

it

i.

e.

Simplicity justly

after motion,

express one of the five genera of being,

nency, (orairi;), motion, sameness, and difference

all

which comprehends

itself,

'litis

word

viz. essence,

is

perma-

evidently does not signify rest.

a Jigured

intelligence, because

are intcard, and not external, like those of sense, and are

accom-

panied with figure.

Psychical, ^ux*xef

i.

c.

pertaining to soul, in the same manner as fuvmec, physical,

is

some-

thing pertaining to nature.

Reason,
definitive

of a

Uniform
that

in Platonic writers

Hence
that

twxiJijj.

inward discursive energy

or that which

is

indicative

and

Knyot or reasons in the soul, are, gnoslically producing principles.

whkh

is

characterized by unity.

This word when

it

occurs in Proclus, and other Platonic writers, signifies

which has the form of the one, and not as

itself.

signifies either that

or a certain productive and seminal principle

tiling.

Unical, man;,

to

This word

Aoyr.

called reasoning

ii>

Johnson, that which keeps

its

tcnour, or

is

similar

PROCLUS,
THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR,
ON

Cfjeolosp of $lato.

Cije

BOOK

I.

CHAPTER

o PERICLES,

to

me

I.

the dearest of friends, I

am

of opinion that the

whole philosophy of Plato was at first unfolded into light through the
beneficent will of superior natures, exhibiting the intellect concealed in
them, and the truth subsisting together with beings, to souls conversant
with generation (so far as

it

is

lawful for thein to participate of such

supernatural and mighty good); and again, that afterwards having received
its

perfection, returning as

many who

it

itself, and becoming unapparent to


and who earnestly desired to engage
again advanced into light.
But I

were into

professed to philosophize,

in the investigation of true being,

it

particularly think that the mystic doctrine respecting divine, concerns,

which

is

purely established on a sacred foundation, and which perpetually

subsists with the

Proc.

gods themselves, became thence apparent to such as are

Vol.

I.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

capable of enjoying

it

BOOK

for a time, through one man,'

err in calling the primary leader

whom

I.

I should not

and hierophant of those true mysteries,

into which souls separated from terrestrial places are initiated, and of

those entire and stable visions, which those participate

who genuinely

embrace a happy and blessed life. But this philosophy shone forth at
first from him so venerably and arcanely, as if established in sacred
temples, and within their adyta, and being unknown to many who have
entered into these holy places, in certain orderly periods of time, proceeded

much as was possible for it into light, through certain true priests,
and who embraced a life corresponding to the tradition of such mystic
concerns. It appears likewise to me, that the whole place became
splendid, and that illuminations of divine spectacles every where
as

presented themselves to the view.

These interpreters of the epopteia

(or mystic speculations) of Plato,

who

have unfolded to us all-sacred narrations of divine concerns, and who


were allotted a nature similar to
the Egyptian Plotinus, and those

mean Amelius and Porphyry,

their leader, I should

who

determine to be

received the theory from him, I

together with those in the third place

who

like virile statues from these, viz.: Jamblichus and


Theodoras, and any others, who after these, following this divine choir,
have energized about the doctrines of Plato with a divinely-inspired

were produced

mind.

From

these, he*

who, after the gods, has been our leader to every


manner the most

thing beautiful and good, receiving in an undented

genuine and pure light of truth in the bosom of

his

soul,

made

us a

communicated to us that
arcane information which he had received from those more ancient than
himself, and caused us, in conjunction with him, to be divinely agitated
partaker of

all

the rest of Plato's philosophy,

about the mystic truth of divine concerns.


To this man, therefore, should we undertake to return thanks adequate
to the benefits which we have received from him j the whole of time

would not be sufficient. But if it is necessary, not only' that we should


have received from others the transcendant good of the Platonic
'

Meaning

Plato.

Meaning

his preceptor Syrian us.

'

The word jmwv is

omitted in the original.

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CHAP.

OF

II.

PMTO

we should leave to posterity monuments of those


of which we have been spectators, and emulators to

philosophy, but that


blessed spectacles

the utmost of our ability, under a leader the most perfect of the present
time, and

who

arrived at the

summit of philosophy

perhaps

we

shall

act properly in invoking the gods, that they will enkindle the light of
truth in our soul,

and

and ministers of
and lead it to the all-perfect, divine,
For I think that every where

in supplicating the attendants

better natures to direct our intellect

and elevated, end of the Platonic theory.

who

he

participates in the least degree of intelligence, will begin his

undertakings from the Gods, and especially in explications respecting


the

Gods

for

we can no otherwise be

able to understand a divine nature

than by being perfected through the light of the

Gods

nor divulge

it

to

and exempt from multiform opinions,


and the variety which subsists in words, preserving at the same time the
Knowing therefore this, and complying
interpretation of divine names.
others unless governed by them*

with the exhortation of the Platonic Timteus,


the

Gods

as leaders of the doctrine

we in

the

first

place establish

respecting themselves.

But may
and

they in consequence of hearing our prayers be propitious to us,

benignantly approaching, guide the intellect of our soul, and lead

it

about

the Vesta of Plato, and to the arduous sublimities of this speculation

we shall receive all the truth concerning them, and


end of our parturient conceptions of divine concerns,
desiring to know something respecting them, inquiring about them of
where, when arrived,
shall obtain the best

others, and, at the

same

time, as far as

we

are able, exploring them

ourselves.

CHAPTER
Akd

much by way of preface. But it is


mode of the proposed doctrine, what

thus

unfold the

II.

necessary that I should


it is

requisite to expect

and define ihe preparatives which a hearer of it ought to


possess
that being properly adapted, he may approach, not to our
discourses, but to the intellectually-elevated and deific philosophy of
it will

be,
;

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For

Plato.

BOOK

I.

proper that convenient aptitudes of auditors should be

it is

proposed according to the forms of discourses, just as in the mysteries,

who

those

are skilful in

concerns of

kind,

this

previously

prepare

and neither always use the same inanimate


particulars, nor other animals, nor men, in order to procure the presence
of the divinities ; but that alone out of each of these which is naturally
capable of participating divine illumination, is by them introduced to the
receptacles for the Gods,

proposed mystic

The

rites.

present discourse, therefore, will

three parts.

of all be divided by

first

In the beginning, considering

all

those

common

me

into

conceptions

concerning the Gods, which Plato summarily delivers, together with the

power and dignity every where of


of

this

theological axioms

but in the middle

work, speculating the total orders of the Gods, enumerating their

peculiarities, defining their progressions after the

manner of

referring every thing to the hypotheses of theologists

speaking concerning the

Gods which

Plato,

and

and, in the end,

are in different places celebrated in

supermundane or mundane, and

the Platonic writings, whether they are


referring the theory respecting

them

to the

total

genera of the divine

orders.

In every part of

and simple,

this

work, likewise, we shall prefer the clear, distinct,

And

to the contraries of these.

such things as are delivered

through symbols, we shall transfer to a clear doctrine concerning them

but such as are delivered through images,

we

shall transmit to

their

Such things too as are written in a more affirmative way,


examine by causal reasonings ; but such as arc composed through
demonstrations, we shall investigate and besides this, explain the mode
of truth which they contain, and render it known to the hearers. And

exemplars.

we

shall

of things enigmatically proposed,

we

shall elsewhere discover perspicuity,

not from foreign hypotheses, but from the most genuine writings of Plato.

But with respect

to the things which immediately occur to the hearers,

of these we shall contemplate the consent with things themselves.

from

all

present

And

these particulars, one perfect form of the Platonic theology will


itself to

our view, together with

the whole of divine intellections,

its

truth which pervades through

and the one

intellect

which generated

all

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CliAP.

OF PLATO.

II.

the beauty of this theology,

and the mystic evolution of

this

theory.

Such, therefore, as I have said, will be my present treatise.


But the auditor of the proposed dogmas is supposed to be adorned

who has bound by the reason of


and inharmonious motions of the soul, and
the one form of intellectual prudence
for, as

with the moral virtues, and to be one


virtue

the

all

illiberal

harmonized them to
Socrates says,

But every

it is

vicious

not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure.

man

is

perfectly

impure

and the contrary character

He must likewise have been exercised in all the logical methods,


pure.
and have contemplated many irreprehensible conceptions about analyses,
and many about divisions, the contraries to these, agreeably, as it appears
to me, to the exhortation of Parmenides to Socrates. For prior to such a
contest in arguments, the knowledge of the divine genera, and of the truth
established in them, is difficult and impervious.
But in the third place,
he must not be unskilled in physics. For he who has been conversant
with the multiform opinions of physiologists, and has after a manner
explored in images the causes of beings, will more easily advance
to the nature of separate and primary essences.
An auditor therefore
of the present work, as I have said, must sot be ignorant of the truth
contained in the phenomena, nor unacquainted with the paths of erudition,
and the disciplines which they contain for through these we obtain a
more immaterial knowledge of a divine essence. But all these must be
bound logether in the leader intellect. Being likewise a partaker of the
is

which arc separate


from corporeal powers, and desiring to contemplate by intelligence* in
conjunction with reason [true] beings, our auditor must genuinely apply
himself to the interpretation of divine and blessed dogmas, and fill his
dialectic of Plato, meditating those immaterial energies

soul,

according to the Oracle, with

somewhere observes,

for the

profound love;

apprehension of

this theory,

since, as Plato

a better assistant

than love cannot be obtained.

He must
things,

likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through

and must excite

his intelligible

eye to

real

and perfect

truth.

all

He

Instead of

tws >"t* Aoyw, iU necessary to read,

vo^w prr*

Xayov.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK

I.

immovable, and safe kind of divine


knowledge, and must be persuaded not to admire any thing else, nor even
to direct his attention to other things, but must hasten to divine light

must

establish himself in

firm,

with an intrepid reasoning energy, and with the power of an unwearied


short, must propose to himself such a kind of energy and
; and in

life

becomes him to possess who intends to be such a coryphaeus as


Such then is the magnitude of our
hypothesis, and such the mode of the discourses about it.
Before,
however, I enter on the narration of the things proposed, I wish to speak
about theology itself, its different modes, and what theological forms
rest as

it

Socrates describes in the Theaetetus.

Plato approves, and what he rejects

we may more

what

easily learn in

that these being previously

follows, the auxiliaries of the

known,
demon-

strations themselves.

CHAPTER
All,
things

therefore, that

first,

science

is

III.

have ever touched upon theology, liave called


Gods ; and have said that the theological

according to nature,

And

conversant about these.

some, indeed, have considered a

corporeal essence, as that alone which has any existence, and have placed
in a secondary

rank with respect to essence,

all

the genera of incorporeal

natures, considering the principles of things as having a corporeal form,

and evincing that the habit

But

by which we know

others, suspending indeed all bodies

defining the
it

in us

first

hyparxis

to

be

these, is corporeal.

from incorporeal natures, and

and the powers of soul, call (as


and denominate the science
;
and which knows these, theology.

in soul,

appears to me) the best of souls, Gods

which proceeds as

But such

far as to these,

as produce the multitude of souls from another

more ancient

and establish intellect as the leader of wholes, these assert that


the best end is a union of the soul with intellect, and consider the
intellectual form of life as the most honourable of all things.
They
principle,

Hrparxis,

it

the

summit of any nature, or blossom,

as

it

were, of

Its

essence.

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

III.

doubtless too consider theology, and the discussion of intellectual essence,


All these, therefore, as I have said, call the first

as one and the same.

and most

self-sufficient principles

of things, Gods, and the science

respecting these, theology.

The

divine narration however, of Plato alone, despises

all

corporeal

natures, with reference to principles. Because, indeed, every thing divisible

and endued with

interval,

is

naturally unable either to produce or preserve

and passivity through soul, and the


But Plato demonstrates that the psychical
essence [i.e. the essence pertaining to soul] is more ancient than bodies, but
is suspended from an intellectual hypostasis. For every thing which is moved
according to time, though it may be self-moved, is indeed of a more ruling
nature than things moved by others, but is posterior to an eternal motion.
He shows, therefore, as we have said, that intellect is the father and cause
itself,

but possesses

being, energy,

its

motions which soul contains.

of bodies and souls, and that


it,

which are allotted a

life

all

things both subsist and energize about

conversant with transitions und evolutions.

exempt from
more incorporeal and ineffable, and from which all things, even
though you should speak of such as ore last, have necessarily a subsistence.
For all things are not naturally disposed to participate of soul, but such
things only as are allotted in themselves a more clear or obscure life.
Nor are all things able to enjoy intellect and being, but such only as
subsist according to form.
But it is necessary that the principle of all
things should be participated by all things, if it does not desert any thing,
since it is the cause of all things which in any respect are said to have a
Plato, however, proceeds to another principle entirely

intellect,

subsistence.

Plato having divinely discovered

this

first

principle

of

more excellent than intellect, and is concealed in


inaccessible recesses ; and having exhibited these three causes and monads,
and evinced them to be above bodies, I mean soul, the first intellect, and
a union above intellect, produces from these as monads, their proper
numbers one multitude indeed being uniform,' but the second intellectual,
and the third psychical. For every monad is the leader of a multitude
wholes,

which

is

Wherever this word occurs

in this translation,

it

signifies that

which

is

characterized by unity.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

8
coordinate to

But

itself.

But he converts

of beings.

having run back us

far as

all

and these again with the

unities

And

to this unity, he considers himself as having

obtained the highest end of the theory of wholes


truth' respecting the

and which

Gods, which

is

and that

this is the

conversant with the unities of beings,

their progressions

delivers

I.

things to one ira participate unity.

intellectual forms,

he connects souls with

BOOK

as Plato connects bodies with souls, so likewise

and

peculiarities, the contact of

beings with them, and the orders of forms which are suspended from these
unical' hypostases.

But he

teaches us that the theory respecting intellect, and the forms

and the genera revolving about


is

conversant with the

Gods

intellect, is posterior to the science

themselves.

which

Likewise that the intellectual

theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms which are capable of being

known by

the soul through the projecting energy of intellect

the theological science transcending

this,

is

but that

conversant with arcane and

ineffable hyparxes, and pursues their separation from each other, and
their unfolding into light

from one cause of all

that the intellectual peculiarity of the soul


intellectual forms,

is

whence,

am

of opinion,

capable of apprehending

and the difference which subsists in them, but that


dower of intellect and hyparxis, is conjoined

the summit, and, as they say,

with the unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of
the divine unities.

we

all

For as we contain many gnostic powers, through

of being conjoined with and


For the genus of the Gods cannot be
nor by
apprehended by sense, because it is exempt from all bodies
opinion and dianoia,' for these are divisible and come into contact with

alone

this

are naturally

capable

participating this occult union.

multiform concerns

knowledge of

Gods

rides

wholes.

this

nor by intelligence in conjunction with reason, for

kind belongs to true beings; but the hyparxis of the

on beings, and

is

defined according to the union itself of

It remains, therefore, if

it

be admitted that a divine nature can

any respect known, that it must be apprehended by the hyparxis


For wo
of the soul, and through this, as far as it is possible, be known.
be

,in

i.

e.

i.

e.

Of the nature of the one.


The ducursire energy of reason,

or the power of the soul that reasons scientifically,

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II

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

Ji.

say that every where things similar can be

known by

the similar ; viz.

the sensible by sense, the doxastic' by opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia,


and the intelligible by intellect So that the most unical nature must be
known by the one, and th: ineffable by that which is ineffable.

Indeed, Socrates in the [First] Alcibiades rightly observes, that the soul
entering into herself will behold

verging to her
titude,

own

all

other things, and deity

union, and to the centre of all

and the variety of the

all

life,

itself.

For

laying aside mul-

manifold powers which she contains, she

And

ascends to the high<st watch-tower of beings.

of the mysteries, they say, that the mystics at

first

as in the most holy


meet with the multi-

form, and many-shaped* genera, which are hurled forth before the Gods,
interior parts of the temple, unmoved, and guarded
by the mystic rites, they genuinely receive in their bosom divine illumination, and divested of their garments, as they would say, participate or
a divine nature ; the same mode, as it appears to me, takes place in the
For the soul when looking at things posterior to
speculation of wholes.
herself, beholds the shadows and images of beings, but when she converts
herself to herself she evolves her own essence, and the reasons which she

but on entering the

And

contains.

when she

at

first

indeed, she only as

it

were beholds herself ; but,

more profoundly into the knowledge of herself, she


When however,
finds in herself both intellect, and the orders of beings.
she proceeds into her interior recesses, and into the adytum as it were of
penetrates

the soul, she perceives with her eye closed, the genus of the Gods, and

For

the unities of beings.


this

we

all

and through
by exciting the

things are in us psychically,

are naturally capable of

knowing

all

things,

powers and the images of wholes which wc contain.


And this is the best employment of our energy, to be extended to a
itself, having our powers at rest, to revolve harmoniously

divine nature

round

it,

to excite

all

the multitude of the soul to this union, and laying

such things as are posterior to the one, to become seated and


conjoined with that which is ineffable, and beyond all things.
For it is
aside

all

lawful for the soul to ascend,

i.

e.

The

froc.

object of opinion.

till

she terminates her flight in the principle

i.

e.

Vol.

EtU demon*
I.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

10

BOOK

1.

thither, beholding the place which is there, de; but arriving


scending thence, and directing her course through beings; likewise,

of things

evolving the multitude of forms, exploring their

numbers, and apprehending intellectually how each

monads and

their

suspended from its


proper unity, then we may consider her as possessing the most perfect
science of divine natures, perceiving in a uniform manner the progressions
is

Gods into beings, and the distinctions of beings about the Gods.
Such then according to Plato's decision is our thcologist ; and theology is
a habit of this kind, which unfolds the hyparxis itself of the Gods, seof the

parates and speculates their


rity

unknown and

of their participants, and announces

energy, which

is

unical light from the peculiato such as arc worthy of this

both blessed and comprehends

CHAPTER
After

it

all

things at once.

IV.

comprehension of the first theory, we must


modes according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions
of divine natures. For he appears not to have pursued every where the
same mode of doctrine about these but sometimes according to a deific
energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth concerning
this all-perfect

deliver the

And

sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable pecubut at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers
in them the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phsedrus being inspired

them.

liarities,

by the Nymphs, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better


possession, fury, he unfolds with a divine mouth many arcane dogmas
concerning the intellectual Gods, and many concerning the liberated
rulers of the universe, who lead upwards the multitude of mundane Gods
to the monads which are intelligible and separate from [mundane] wholes.
But relating still more about those Gods who are allotted the world, he
celebrates their intellections, and mundane fabrications, their unpolluted
providence and government of souls, and whatever else Socrates delivers
entheastically [or according to a divinely-inspired energy] in that dialogue,

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CHAP.
as be

OF PLATO.

IV.

clearly asserts, ascribing at the

same time

this fury to the deities of

the place.

But

about being, and the

in the Sophista, dialectically contending

separate hypostasis of the one from beings, and doubting against those

more ancient than hiniseJf, he shows how all beings are suspended from
their cause, and the first being, but that being itself participates of the
unity which is exempt from the whole of things, that it is a passive one,
but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the one, but not
being that which is primarily one. Iu a similar manner too, in the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from the one,
and the transcendancy of the one, through the first hypotheses, and this,
as he asserts in that dialogue, according to the most perfect division of
this

And

method.

again, in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning

the three demiurgi [or fabricators] and their demiurgic allotment, which

indeed

is

But

not only a fable, but a true narration.

speaks concerning the union of Love.

And

distribution of mortal animals from the

in the

Banquet, he
about the

in the Protagoras,

Gods;

in

a symbolical manner

concealing the truth respecting divine natures, and as far as to mere in-

most genuine of his hearers.


If likewise, you are willing that I should mention the doctrine delivered through the mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine

dication unfolding his

mind

to the

concerns from ethical or physical discourses, of which

templated in the Timaeus,

many may be
be apparent.

Politicus,

figures

of the

here likewise to you

for instance,

five

the fabrication

in

the heavens.

and

who

But the

elements delivered in geometrical proportions

the parts of the universe.

con-

knowing divine concerns through images, the method will


For all these shadow forth the powers of things divine.

Timaeus,' represent in images the peculiarities of the

that dialogue

many may be

in the dialogue called the Politicus,

seen scattered in other dialogues

are desirous of

The

many

shadow

And

in

the

ride

on

the divisions of the psychical essence in

forth the total orders of the

omit to mention that Plato composes

Gods who

rtfuum is omitted

Gods.

polities, assimilating

them to

in the Creek.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

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I.

divine natures, and to the whole world, and adorns them from the powers

which

it

contains.

All these therefore, through the similitude of mortal

to divine concerns, exhibit to us in images, the progressions, orders,


fabrications of divine natures.

And such

and

are the modes of thcologic doc-

employed by Plato.
however, from what has been already said, that they are
For those who treat of divine concerns
necessarily so many in number.
in an indicative manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or
through images. But of those who openly announce their conceptions,
trine

It is evident

some frame

their discourses according to science, but others according to

from the Gods. And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic, and in short, accords with those who
But he who docs this through images
write fables concerning the Gods.
inspiration

is

For the mathematical

Pythagoric.

disciplines

were invented by the

Pythagoreans, in order to a reminiscence of divine concerns, at which,

For they refer both


Gods, according to the testimony of their hiswho is under the influence
of divine inspiration, unfolding the truth itself by itself concerning the
Gods, most perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these

through these as images they endeavour to arrive.

numbers and
torians.

figures to the

But

the entheastic character, or he

do not think proper


their familiars,

to unfold the divine orders, or their

through certain

veils,

peculiarities to

but announce their powers and their

numbers, in consequence of being moved by the Gods themselves.


the tradition of divine concerns according to science,

is

But

the illustrious

For Plato alone, as it appears


tome, of all those who are known to us, has attempted methodically to
divide and reduce into order, the regular progression of the divine genera,
their mutual difference, the common peculiarities of the total orders, and

prerogative of the philosophy of Plato.

the distributed peculiarities in each.

But

the truth of this will be evi-

dent when we frame precedaneous demonstrations about the Parraenides, and all the divisions which it contains.

At

present

we

shall

observe that Plato does not admit

all

the fabulous

figments of dramatic composition, but those only which have reference


to the beautiful

and the good, and which are not discordant with a

di-

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IV.

j$
v

For that mythological mode which indicates divine concerns through conjecture is ancient, concealing truth under a multitude
of veils, and proceeding in a manner similar to nature, which extends

vine essence.

sensible figments of intelligibles, material, of immaterial, partible, of im-

partible natures,

and images, and things which have a false being, of


But Plato rejects the more tragical mode of my-

things perfectly true.

who thought proper to establish an


arcane theology respecting the Gods, and on this account devised wanthologizing of the ancient poets,

rapes and adulteries of the Gods,


and many other such symbols of the truth about divine natures, which
this mode he rejects, and asserts that it is in
this theology conceals
every respect most foreign from erudition.
But he considers those mythological discourses about the Gods, as more persuasive, and more
adapted to truth and the philosophic habit, which assert that a divine
nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of all
mutation, ever preserving its own order immutable, and comprehending
in itself the fountain of truth, but never becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology, Socrates delivers in the

derings, sections, battles, lacerations,

Republic.
All the fables therefore of Plato, guarding the truth in concealment,

have not even

their externally

apparent apparatus discordant with our

undisciplined and un perverted anticipation respecting the Gods.

they bring with them an image of the

both the apparent beauty


vine than this,

Gods.

is

mundane composition,

in

But
which

worthy of divinity, and a beauty more diand powers of the


one of the mythological modes respecting di-

is

established in the unapparent lives

This therefore,

is

vine concerns, which from the apparently unlawful, irrational, and inor-

and bound, and regards as its scope the comand good.


But there is another mode which he delivers in the Phaedrus. And
this consists in every where preserving theological fables, unmixed with
physical narrations, and being careful in no respect to confound or
exchange theology, and the physical theory with each other. For, as a

dinate, passes into order

position of the beautiful

divine essence

is

separate from the whole of nature, in like manner,

it is

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ON THE THEOLOGY

14

perfectly proper that discourses respecting the

BOOK t

Gods should be pure from

physical disquisitions. For a mixture of this kind is, says he, laborious
and to make physical passions the end of mythological conjecture, is the
employment of no very good man ; such for instance, as considering
through his [pretended] wisdom, Chimaera, Gorgon, and things of a similar kind, as the same with physical figments.
Socrates, in the Phtedrus,

reprobating this

mode of

mythologizing, represents

its

patrons as saying

under the figure of a fable, that Orithya sporting with the wind Boreas,
and being thrown down the rocks, means nothing more, than that Orithya

who was a
to

mortal, was ravished by Boreas through love.


For it appears
me, that fabulous narrations about the gods, should always have their

concealed meaning more venerable than the apparent.

So

that if certain

persons introduce to us physical hypotheses of Platonic fables, and such


as are conversant with sublunary affairs, we must say that they entirely

wander from the intention of the philosopher, and that those hypotheses
alone, are interpreters of the truth contained in these fables, which have
for their scope, a divine, immaterial, and separate hypostasis, and which
looking to this, make the compositions and analyses of the fables, adapted'
to our inherent anticipations of divine concerns.

CHAPTER
As we have

therefore

enumerated

V.

all

these

modes of the Platonic

theology, and have shown what compositions and analyses of fables are

adapted to the truth respecting the Gods,


whence,

place,

and from what dialogues

let

us consider, in the next

principally,

we

think the

dogmas of Plato concerning the Gods may be collected, and by a speculation of what types or forms we may be able to distinguish his
genuine writings, from those spurious compositions which are ascribed
to him.

The

truth then concerning the

For

<>..(,

it

Gods

is

pervades, as I

may

say, through

necwaaiy to read *,.

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CHAP.
all

OF PLATO.

V.

the Platonic dialogues, and in

all

15

of them conceptions of the

first

venerable, clear, and snpernatural, are disseminated, in


some indeed, more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously ; con*
ceptions which excite those that are in any respect able to participate of
them, to the immaterial and separate essence of the Gods. And, as in
each part of the universe, and in nature herself, the demiurgus of all

philosophy,

that the world

all

things might be converted to a divine na-

ture, through their alliance with

it,

in like

manner

am

of opinion, that

the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions about the


his writings,

unknown

resemblances of the

established

contains,

hyparxis of the Gods, that

Gods

in all

and leaves nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that


may be obtained, and

from the whole of them, a reminiscence of wholes


imparted to the genuine lovers of divine concerns.

If however, it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out


of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the
gods, I should not err in ranking among this number, the Phsedo and

Phedrus, the Banquet, and the Philebus, and together with


Sophista and Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus.
full

through the whole of themselves, as I

of Plato.

But

may say,

For

these, the

all

these are

of the divine science

I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in

the Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras


the providence of the

Gods

; likewise the assertions about


Laws, and such things as are delivered

in the

about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the
universe, in the tenth

book of the Republic.

Again, you may,

please, place in the third rank those Epistles, through

able to arrive at the science about divine natures.


is

made

of the three kings ; and very

the Platonic theory are delivered.


these, to explore in these

It

many
is

For

if

you

which we may be
in these,

other divine

mention

dogmas worthy

necessary therefore, looking to

each order of the Gods.

Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one
good, and the two first principles of things, together with the triad*
which is unfolded into light from these. For you will find all these
'

rpm&> (

is

omitted in the origin*].

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ON THE THEOLOGY

!6

by Plato

distinctly delivered to us

BOOK
But from

in that dialogue.

I.

the Ti-

you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration


about the demiurgic monad: and the most full truth about the mundane
Gods. But from the Phaedrus, [you may acquire a scientific knowledge
of] all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and of the liberated orders

njaeus,

of Gods, which are proximately established above the

From

tions.

the Politicus, you

may

celestial circula-

obtain the theory of the fabrica-

tion in the heavens, of the uneven periods of the universe, and of the
intellectual causes of those periods.

But from the Sophista, the whole

sublunary generation, and the peculiarity of the Gods


the sublunary region, and preside over

But with

respect to each of the Gods,

its

who

are allotted

generations and corruptions.

we may obtain many conceptions


many from the Cratylus,

adapted to sacred concerns from the Banquet,

and many from the Phsedo. For in each of these dialogues, more or
mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those
who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process
less

the peculiarities of each.


It is necessary

however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords

with Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists.


all

the Grecian theology

pheus

Pythagoras

first

is

of

For

the progeny of the mystic tradition of Orall

learning from

Aglaophemus the

orgies of

the Gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science

of the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings.

For in the

Philebus referring the theory about the two species of principles [bound

and

infinity] to the

Gods, and truly


us in writing
brating their

Pythagoreans, he calls them

blessed.

men

dwelling with the

Philolaus therefore, the Pythagorean, has left

many admirable conceptions about these principles, celecommon progression into beings, and their separate fabri-

But in the Timjeus, Plato endeavouring to teach us


about the sublunary Gods, and their order, flies to theologists, calls
them the sons of the Gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth
cation of things.

about those divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary Gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by them of the intellectual kings. Again, in the Cratylus he fol-

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

VI.

yj

lows the traditions of theologtsts, respecting the order of the divine processions.
But in the Gorgias, he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting the triadic hypostasis of the demiurgi. And in short, he every
where discourses concerning the Gods agreeably to the principles of
theologists

rejecting indeed, the tragical part of mythological fiction,

but establislung first hypotheses in

common

CHAFrER

with the authors of fables.

VI.

Perhaps, however, some one may here

object to as, that

we do not

in

a proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and'
that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different dia-

we were studious of collecting together many things into one


all from one and the same fountain.
For if this were the case, we might refer different dogmas to different
treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a preccdaneoos doc*
trine concerning the Gods,' nor will there be any dialogue which presents
us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and their
But we shall be similar to those who "enco-ordination with eacH other.
deavour to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior
logues, as if

mixture, instead of deriving them

to parts, and to weave together the perfect from things imperfect; when,'
on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its generation in the perfect. For the Timseus, for instance, will teach us the theory
of the intelligible genera; and the Phaedrus appears to present us

with a methodical account of the first intellectual orders. But where will'
he the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles ? And what will be the
generation of second from first natures ? In short, after what manner the
progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of
things,

the one,

all

and how in the generations of the Gods, the orders between


and .all-perfect number, are -filled up, we 'shall be unable to'

evince.

Farther

Troc.

still,

it

may be

said, where- will -be the venerableness

Vol. I.

of your

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ON THE THEOLOGY

IB

For

boasted science about divine natures ?

it is

BOOK

I.

absurd to call these dog*

are collected from many places Platonic ; and which, as yoo


acknowledge, are introduced from foreign names to the philosophy of
Plato ; nor are you able to evince one whole entire truth about divine na-

mas which

tures.

Perhaps, indeed, they will say, certain persons, junior to Plato,

hare delivered in their writings, and

left to their disciples, one perfect


form of theology. You, therefore, are able to produce one entire theory
but
from
Timoeus
the Republic, or Laws, the most
the
from
;
nature
about
beautiful dogmas about manners, and which tend to one form of philoso-

phy.
all

Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which contains


first philosophy, and which may be called the summit

the good of the

of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect knowledge
of beings, unless you are so much infatuated, as to boast on account of
fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind abounds with

much of
this

the probable, but not of the demonstrative.

Besides, things of

kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic dialogues

as

the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake of the politic
In like manner, the fable
science, and the demonstrations respecting it.
in the Republic

is

inserted for the sake of justice; but in the Gorgias,

For Plato combines fabulous narrations

for the sake of temperance.

with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables, but
for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the intellectual part

of the soul, through contending reasons, bat that the

divine,

may more perfectly receive the knowledge of beings,


sympathy with more mystic concerns. For, from other dis-

part of the soul

through
courses,

its

we appear

similar to those

of truth ; but from fables we

who

suffer in

an

are compelled to the reception


ineffable

manner, and

call forth

our un perverted conceptions, venerating the mystic information which


they contain.

Hence, as
that

it

appears to me, Timoeus with great propriety thinks

we should produce

bles as the sons of the Gods,'

it fit

the divine genera, following the inventors of fa-

and subscribe

to their always generating

tmhm, m omitted is tbt original.

Di

CHAP.

OP PLATO.

VI.

secondary natures from such as are

out demonstration.

For

this

entheastic, and was invented


for the sake

first,

though they should speak with-

kind of discourse

by the

is

not demonstrative, but

ancients, not through necessity, but

of persuasion, not regarding mere discipline, but sympathy

with things themselves.

But

if you

are willing to speculate not only

the,

some
of them nre scattered in the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical,' and
For
in
considerations.
the
Philebus, Plato
others for the sake of physical
discourses concerning bound and the infinite, for the sake of pleasure and
a life according to intellect For I think the latter are species of the former. In the Timams, the discourse about the intelligible Gods, is assum-.
causes of rabies, but of other theological dogmas, you will find that

ed for the sake of the proposed physiology. On which account it is every


where necessary that images should be known from paradigms; but
that the paradigms of material things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and that the paradigms of physical forms should be
separate.

But again

in the Phaedrus, Plato celebrates the supcrcclcstial place,

the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this, for the sake of

amatory mania : the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes


place, and the passage to these from hence.
But every where, as I may
say, the leading end is either physical or political, while the conceptions
about divine natures take place, either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable
and supernatural* and worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is
neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which
is.precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but

is

destitute of all these, is

and not sppntaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an adventitious order, as in a drama ? And such are the objections which may
violent

be urged against our design.

For fuAtam,

k U aetmrj

to read, ra

nhnm*.

OH THE THEOLOGY

CHAPTER
I,

hoveteb,

to

UOOK

I.

VII.

an objection of this kind,

shall

make

a just and per-

Plato every where discourses about the

spicuous reply.

I say then, that

Gods agreeably

to ancient rumour,

and

to the nature of things.

And

sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he
reduces them to the principles of the dogmas ; and thence, as from a

But someFor in the

watch. tower, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed.

times he establishes the theological science as the leading end.

Phaedrus his subject respects

intelligible

beauty pervading from thence through


respects the amatory order.

But
fect,

if it

beauty, and the participation of

all

things; and in the

Banquet

be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue, the

whole, and connected, extending as far as to the

of theology, I

shall

it

all-per-

com pleat number

perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be


We ought however to dare, since we have

apparent to our familiars.

entered on such like arguments, and affirm against our opponents, that

the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions

it

contains, will accomplish

you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine genera proceed inorder from the first cause, and evince their mutual connexion and dependence on each other. And those which are highest indeed, connate
with the one, and of a primary nature, are allotted a unica), occult and

all

but such as are last, are multiplied, are distri;


buted into many parts, and are exuberant in number, but inferior in
power to such as are of a higher order ; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes,

simple form of hyparxis

but more simple than their.proper progeny. And in short, all the axioms
of the theologic science, appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the
divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion.

thing else than the. celebraled; generation of the

So that

Gods and the

this is

no-

procession

of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes.
The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole

and

perfect light of the theological science.

But

after this, the before

men-

tioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods,

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CHAP.

and

OF PLATO.

VIII.

of them, as I

all

may

say, participate

of divine wisdom, and excite

a divine nature. And it is nethe parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogue*,

our spontaneous conceptions respecting


cessary to refer

perfect,

to the one

and all-perfect theory of the Parmenides. For


we shall suspend the more imperfect from the
and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to

and these again


thus, as

all

it

appears to me,

things, of which, according to the Platonic Timacus, they are interpreters,

Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us ;
and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides ; just as the*
Timams is acknowledged by all who are in the least degree intelligent, to'
contain the whole science about nature.

- - -

CHAPTER
I appear, however,

by

fold contest against those

and I see two

VIII.

these means, to have excited for myself a two-

who attempt to investigate the writings of


who will oppose what has been

of persons,

Plato

said.

One of these does not

sorts

think proper to explore any other design in the

Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in


this

dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign

who are more venerable than


one of the hypotheses is about the
first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an intellectual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this, whether
they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind of beings.
from

its

these,

intention.

But

the other sort,

and lovers of forms

assert, that

For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain to the present
discourse.

These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner.

But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of
Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and
mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore

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ON THE THEOLOGY

12

For according to them, though Plato

them.
treats

and

BOOK
in the

I.

second hypothesis*

about intellectual beings, yet the nature of

intellect is one, simple


Against both these therefore, must be contend, who

indivisible.

Parmenides, which we have before men*


The contest however against these is not equal. But those
who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again attacked by those,
who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And those who do upt,
entertains that opinion of the
tioned.

unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of divine natures, are in-

Homer

and skilful menj but


we must doubt against them,'
most holy and mystic truth. It is
proper likewise to relate as far as contributes to our purpose, what appears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses of the Parmenides \
for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace the whole thedeed, as

says, is every respect venerable

yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy,


following in this our leader to the

ology of Plato.

CHAPTER
,

Ijr

the

first

IX.

place then, let us consider those,

who draw down

the

design of this dialogue from the truth of things to a logical exercise, and
see whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato.
therefore evident to every one, that

It is

Parmenides proposes to himself to


and that with this view he curso-

deliver in reality the dialectic method,


rily

assumes

it

in a similar

manner

in

each of the things which have a

real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion,

and permanency, &c. ; exhorting at the same time, those who desire to
discover the nature of each of these in an orderly method, to this exercise,
as to a great contest. He likewise asserts that it was by no means an easy
undertaking to him who was so much advanced in years, assimilates himself to the Ibycean horse, and presents us with every argument to prove
that this method is a serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in

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CHAP.

OP PLATO.

IX.

How

mere words.

S3

therefore, is it possible, that

we can

refer to

empty

arguments those conceptions ' about which the great Parmenides, evincing that they require

How likewise

is it

much

serious discussion,

composed

reasonable to suppose that an aged

this discourse ?

man would busy

who loved to speculate


much study on this method, he
who
watch-tower of being itself? Indeed, he who ad-

himself with mere verbal contests, and that he


the truth of things, would bestow so

who

considered every thing

ascended to the high

else, as

having no real existence, and

is satirized by Plato in this diaby thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from
the most intellectual visions of the soul.
But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what
***rmenid ei ^ onuses, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered
on thb discussiOw- Wp., it p otthen about being according to his doctrine, and the unity of all beiugsTtj WlUtliwwiondj np; him self, hi s design
was concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to conSP^ipPMfc

mits this must suppose that Parmenides


logue,

tude of beings into one undivided union


being, or that which

is

above the reasons conversant with opinion,

dogmas about

If,

therefore, this is the

the highest, and which

is

is it

one

perfectly established

not absurd to confound

with doxastic arguments?

Tor indeed, such a


is not adapted to the hypothesis about true beings, nor
does the intellection of unapparent and separate causes harmonise with
dialectic exercises; but these differ from each other, so far as intellect is
intelligibles

form of discourse

established above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only,

but likewise the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of


this kind, exhorts us to

make our

investigations, ueitber

perfectly unapparent to us, nor about such as are


It

is

far therefore

from being the

about things

more known.

case, that Parmenides,

who

places

the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those

rank sense before

intellect,

intellective nature, since a

and unstable

who

should introduce doxastic knowledge to an

knowledge of

this

kind

is

dubious, various,

or that he- should speculate true being with this doxastie

For nurrcXoi,

it if

uecxttuj to read rr<0A f

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I.

wisdom, and inane discussion.


For a varioiw fnrm rf
,
,
~f knofW
i
"
?^
not harmonise'
8 docs
,a
th*r whlch
*,hi,h
* simple, nor the multiform
\ with Umt
.,
with
lth t)
un.fonn, nor the doxastic
with the

intelligible

But
course

still
i,

further,

nor must

this be omitted, that


such
perfectly foreign from the
discussion of
all beings and deliver,
the order of

discourses about

mnA

*ZT\u

Does it not therefore appear, *a


Plato
ant hypothesis to Parme^es,
if
it

nZ Z

8 aTd

th^

exercise through opposite


arguments, and
employed in this exercise, he
excites the- whole of

L^"^ * dUcorf^

^ evilT*IT"

tha^ tLTkl of

attributes hypotheses to
each of the

bar

tenets.

pWIosonhenLaL**^

_
jg}LL^flVnio their pecu^^^^p^^P^ffffT^TiTthp. doctrine about nature ; to
Republic; to the Elean guest, that about being and

W*

Thus to T

Sf^T-atp^diMtf

to the priestess Diotiraa, that respecting love.

other dialogues confines

itself to

Afterwards, each of the

those arguments which are adapted to

But Parmenides
alone will appear to us wise in his poems, and in his diligent investigation of true being, but in the Platonic scene, he will be the leader of a
juvenile muse. This opinion, therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude of
the writings of the principal person of the dialogue.

imitation, though he himself

condemns the

poets, for ascribing to the

Gods a love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of


How, therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and
passions.

sons of the
the

empty arguments

to the leader of the truth of beings ?


be necessary that omitting a multitude of arguments, we
should make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will

But

if it

cite if you please

what is written in the Thcaetetus and Sophista for from


what we assert will be apparent In the Tbesetetus then
Socrates being excited by a young man to a confutation of those who assert
that being is immoveable, attacks among these an opinion of this kind
;

these dialogues

For

pm* cLfiuHrnot,

it is

necemry

to

rod

tk$

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IX.

by Parmenides, and at the same time assigns the cause.


" I blush," says he, " for Parmeoides, who is one of these, more than
for all the rest ; for I, when very young, was conversant with him when
he was very elderly, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profundity perfectly generous. 1 am afraid therefore, lest we do not understand what, has been asserted, and much more am I fearful that we fall
short of the meaning of Parmenides." With great propriety therefore do
we assert, that the proposed discussion does not regard a logical exercise, and make this the end of the whole, but that it pertains to the
For how could Socrates using a
science of the first principles of things.
power of this kind, and neglecting the knowledge of things, testify that
the discourse of Parmenides possessed a depth perfectly generous P And
what venerableness can there be in adopting a method which proceeds
doxastically through opposite reasons, and in undertaking such an invenentertained

tion of

arguments ?

Again, in the Sophista, exciting the Elean guest to a perspicuous evolution of the things proposed by him, and evincing that he was now

Accustomed to more profound discourses " Inform me," says he, " whether it is your custom to give a prolix discussion of a subject which you are
able to demonstrate to any one by interrogations ; I mean such discussions
as Parmenides himself formerly used, accompanied with all-beautiful
reasons, and of which I was an auditor when I was very young, and he
:

was very elderly ?" What, reason then can be assigned, why we should
not believe Socrates, when he asserts that the arguments of Parmenides
and possessed a generous profundity, and why we
it from essence and
and empty contest, neither
being, and
considering that discourses of this kind are alone adapted to youth, nor
regarding the hypothesis of being characterized by the n, nor any thing
else which opposes such an opinion ?
were

all-beautiful,

should degrade the discussion of Parmenides, hurl


transfer it to a vulgar, trifling,

But

I likewise think it is

proper that the authors of this hypothesis,

should consider the power of dialectic, such as


tes in the

Republic

how,

as he says,

it

it is

surrounds

defensive enclosure, and elevates those that use

Proc.

Vol.

I.

it,

by Socraa
good itself, and

exhibited
all

disciplines like

to the

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ON THE THEOLOGY

36
the

first

unities, purifies the

and the one

and ends at
power of this

principle of all things,

longer hypothetical.

For

the

if

the end of this path so mighty,

it

is

is

is

it

last in

dialectic

in true being*,

that which
is

so great,

is

no

and

not proper to confound doxastic

For the former regards the opiby the vulgar. And the one

arguments, with a method of this kind.


nions of men, but the latter

BOOK t

eje of the soul, establishes

called garrulity

perfectly destitute of disciplinative science, but the other

sive enclosure of such sciences,

and the passage to

Again, the doxastic method of reasoning has for

its

it is

end

is

the defen-

through these.
the apparent,

but the dialectic method endeavours to arrive at the one itself, always
employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last, beautifully ends
in the nature of the good.

By no means

therefore,

is it fit

arguments, a method which

is

that

we should draw down to doxastic


among the most accurate sci-

established

For the merely logical method which presides over the demona secondary nature, and is alone pleased with
our dialectic, for the most part, employs
; but
divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as imitating the progres*
sion of beings from the one, and their conversion to it again.
But it
likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to
these the definitive method, and the dividing method prior to this. On
the contrary, the doxastic method is deprived of the incontrovertible
ences.

strative phantasy, is of

contentious discussions

reasonings of demonstration. Is it not, therefore, necessary that these


powers must be separated from each other, and that the discussion of
Parmenides, winch employs our dialectic, must be free from the empty

mere argument, and must fabricate its reasonings with a view


and not to that which is apparent? And thus much may
answer to those who reprobate our hypotheses. For if all this

variety of
to being
suffice in

itself,

cannot convince them, we

shall in vain

endeavour to persuade them, and

urge them to the speculation of things.

tiM{

is

omitted in the origin*].

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

X.

CHAPTER
But

a greater and more

X.

difficult contest

lovers of the speculation of beings,

who

remains for me, against those

look to the science of first causes,

as the end proposed in the hypothesis of the Platonic Parmenides

and

we will accomplish, if you please, by numerous and more


known arguments.
And in the first place, we shall define what that is, about which our

this contest

discourse against them will be employed ; for this, I think, will render the
mystic doctrine of Plato concerning divine natures, apparent in the

There

highest degree.

are, therefore,

nine hypotheses which are dis-

cussed by Parmenides in this dialogue, as


mentaries upon

it.

And

we have evinced

in our

com-

the five precedaneous hypotheses suppose that

a subsistence, and through this hypothesis, that all beings,


mediums of wholes, and the terminations of the progressions of things,
be supposed to subsist. But the four hypotheses which follow these,

the one has

the

may

introduce the one, not having a subsistence, according to the exhortation

of the dialectic method, show that by taking

away

the one, all beings,

and such things as have an apparent existence, must be

entirely subvert-

and propose to themselves the confutation of this hypothesis. And


some of the hypotheses evidently conclude every thing according to rea-

ed,

son, but others (if I

things

may be

more impossible than

prior to us perceiving, as

it

which circumstance some

appears to me, necessarily to happen in these

hypotheses, have considered

on

allowed the expression) perfectly evince

impossibilities

it

as deserving discussion/ in their treatises

this dialogue.

With

respect to the

first

of the hypotheses therefore, almost

all

agree

in asserting, that Plato through this celebrates the superessential princi-

unknown, and above

the ancient Platonists,

But

do
For
and those who participated the philosophy of

ple of wholes, as ineffable,

not explain the hypothesis posterior to

For

this after

all

being.

all

the same manner.

toajTv, I read tiarfifa.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

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Plotinus assert that an intellectual nature presents

I.

the view in

itself to

from the superessenti&l principle of things, and


endeavour to harmonize to the one and all-perfect power of intellect,
such conclusions as are the result of this hypothesis. But that leader of

this hypothesis, subsisting

ours to truth about the Gods, and confabulator of Plato (that I


the language of

Homer) who

transferred

what was

may

use

indefinite in the theory

of the more ancient philosophers, to bound, and reduced the confusion


of the different orders to an intellectual distinction, in the writings which

he communicated to

his associates

this

our leader, in

his

treatise

on

the present subject, calls upon us to adopt a distinct division of the conclusions, to transfer this division to the divine orders,

the

first

and most simple of the things exhibited

and

to the

to

first

harmonize
of beings;

but to adapt those in the middle rank to middle natures, according to


the order which they are allotted among beings ; and such as are last and
multiform, to ultimate progressions.

For the nature of being

is

not one,

and indivisible but as in sensibles, the mighty heaven is one,


yet it comprehends in itself a multitude of bodies ; and the monad connectedly contains multitude, but in the multitude there is an order of
progression and of sensibles, some are first, some middle, and some last
and prior to these, in souls, from one soul a multitude of souls subsists,and of these, some are placed in an order nearer, but others more remote
from their wholeness, and others again fill up the medium of the exsimple,

tremes

in like manner,

it is

doubtless necessary that

among

perfectly

true beings, such genera as are uniform and occult, should be established
in the
all

one and

multitude,

bond of these,

first

cause of wholes, but that others should proceed into

and a whole number, and


in a middle situation.

It

that others should contain the


is

likewise by no

means proper

harmonize the peculiarities of first natures with such as are second, nor
of those that possess a subject order, with such as are more unical, but
to

among these, some should have powers different from


and that there should be an order in this progression of true
beings, and an unfolding of second from first natures.
In short, being which subsists according to, or is characterized by the
one, proceeds indeed from the unity prior to beings, but generates the
it is

requisite that

others,

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. X.

whole divine genus, viz. the intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, and


But our preceptor
that which proceeds as far as to the mundane order.
likewise asserts, that each of the conclusions is indicative of a divine pe-

And

culiarity.

though

all

the conclusions harmonise to all the progres-

by the one, yet I am of


by no means wonderful, that some conclusions should more
accord with some hypotheses than with others. For such things as express the peculiarity of certain orders, do not necessarily belong to all the
Gods ; but such as belong to all, are doubtless by a much greater reason
present with each. If, therefore, we ascribe to Plato, an adventitious
division ot the divine orders,' and do not clearly evince that, in other
dialogues, he celebrates the progressions of the Gods from on high
to the extremity of things, sometimes in fables respecting the soul, and
sions of the one being, or of being characterized

opinion,

it is

at other times, in other theological modes,

we

shall

him, such a division of being, and together with

But

of the one.

if

we can

absurdly attribute to

this,

of the progression

evince from other dialogues, that he (as will

be manifest in the course of

this

work) has celebrated

of the Gods, in a certain respect,

is it

all

the kingdoms

not impossible, that in the most

mystic of all his works, he should deliver through the first hypothesis, the

exempt transcendency of
to being

itself,

the one with respect to all the genera of beings,

to a psychical essence, to form,

and

to matter, but that

he should make no mention of the divine progressions, and their orderly


separation ? For if it is proper to contemplate last things only, why do

we touch on

?
Or if we think fit to
why do we pass by the
genus of the Gods, and the divisions which it contains ? Or if we unfold the natures subsisting between the first and last of things, why do
we leave unknown the whole orders of those divine beings, which subsist

the

first

principle before other things

unfold the multitude of the proper hypotheses,

between the

one,

and natures that are

in

any respect

these particulars evince, that the whole discourse

is

deified ?

For

all

defective, with re-

spect to the science of things divine.

But

still

farther, Socrates, in the Phiiebus, calls

'

For wp (.w,

it i$

upon those that love

necessary to read ..

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

so

BOOK

I.

and always to
or any other

the contemplation of beings, to use the dividing method,

explore the monads of total orders, and the duads, triads,


numbers proceeding from these. If this then is rightly determined,

it is

doubtless necessary that the Parmenides, which employs the whole dialectic

method, and discourses about being which

is

characterized

by

the one, should neither speculate multitude about the one, nor remain in

the one
all

monad

of beings, nor in short, introduce to the one which

beings, the whole multitude of

unfold, as in the

and are

first

allied to the one

Gods which

first

is

above

beings immediately, but should

order, such beings as have an occult subsistence,

but as in the middle rank, those genera of the

subsist according to progression,

and which are more divided

than the extremely united, but arc allotted a union more perfect, than
such as have proceeded to the utmost ; and should unfold as in the last
rank, such as subsist according to the last division of powers, and together
with these, such as have a deified essence.
hypotheses

is

about the one which

is

above

necessary that the hypothesis which follows

If,

therefore, the first

all

multitude,

this,

it is

of the

doubtless

should not unfold being

and indistinct manner, but should deliver all the


For the dividing method does not admit, that we
should introduce the whole of multitude at once to the one, as Socrates

itself in

an

indefinite

orders of beings.

tcsclics us in the Philebus.

Besides,

we may evince the truth of what we assert from

the very

method

of the demonstrations. For the first of the conclusions become immediately


manifest from the least, most simple, most known, and as it were com-

mon

conceptions.
But those which are next in order to these, become
apparent through a greater multitude of conceptions, and such as are

more

various,

And

the last conclusions are entirely the most composite.

For he always uses the

first

tion of those that follow,

conclusions, as subservient to the demonstra-

and presents us with an

intellectual

paradigm

of the order observed in geometry, or other disciplines, in the connexion

of these conclusions with each other.


fliqm

an image of the
'

If,

therefore, discourses bring with

things of which they are interpreters,

For

ixww,

it is

necessary to read

and

if,

as are

x*p4mr.

Digitized by

Google

Chap.

of PLATO.

xi.

31

such must the order necessarily


appears to me to be necessary, that such

the evolutions from demonstrations,

be of the things exhibited,

it

most simple principles, must be


more primary nature, and must be arranged as conjoined with the one ; but that such as are always multiplied, and suspended from various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the
things as derive their beginning from the

in every respect of a

subsistence* of the one.

For the demonstrations which have two conclusions* must necessarily


but those which contain primary, spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily united
contain the conclusions prior to themselves

with such as are more composite, which are exhibited through more

abundant media, and which are

farther distant from the principle of

It appears therefore, that

beings.

some

of the conclusions are indicative

of more divine orders, but others, of such as are more subordinate;

some, of more united, and others, of more multiplied orders

and again,

some, of more uniform, and others, of more multiform progressions. For


demonstrations are universally from causes, and things first. If, therefore, first are the causes

and things caused,


confound

of second conclusions, there

is

an order of causes,

in the multitude of the conclusions.

all tilings,

and speculate them

For, indeed, to

indefinitely in one, neither ac-

cords with the nature of things, nor the science of Plato.

CHAPTER
Again,

XI.

therefore, let us discuss this affair in another

with the dianbetic power, where any thing

be said,
of

this

if you please,

and we

will first

of

all

allow

second hypothesis are about true being.

and* not only one

itself,

it,

it

necessary to read

For

let it

that the conclusions

But as this

like the one prior to beings

For acmetoffmi,

way, and view

futile is delivered.

wmi(.

for

is

multitude,

being

is

that

ON THE THEOLOGY

32

BOOK

I.

which is passive to the one, as the Elcan guest in theSophista informs us


and as it is universally acknowledged by our opponents, who establish
that which is first as the one, but intellect, as one many, soul, as one and
as therefore, this has been asserted a
many, and body, as many and one

thousand times, I

mean

that in true being there

is

multitude together with

union, whether will they say that these things harmonise with the whole

of being, but not with its parts, or both with the whole and its parts ?
again, we ask them, whether they attribute all things to each part of

And

being, or whether they ascribe different things to different parts


If, therefore,

they are of opinion, that each particular should alone

harmonize with the whole of being, being will consist of non-beings, that
which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things deprived of permanency, and universally, all tilings will consist of their
opposites, and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of Parmenides,
who says that the parts of being characterized by the one, are in a certain

and that each of them

is one and being, in a manner


But if we attribute all things to each part, and
there is nothing which we do not make all things, how can the summit of
being, and that which is most eminently one, contain a wholeness, and
an incomprehensible multitude of parts ? How can it at one and the same
time contain the whole of number, figure, motion and permanency, and
in short all forms and genera? For these differ from each other, and the

respect wholes,

similar to the whole.

hypothesis will assert things impossible.

For things near

to, will

be simi-

remote from the one, and that which is first,


not be a less multitude than that which is last ; nor again, will the
of things be a less one than the first, and things in the middle will

larly multiplied with things


will
last

have no difference with respect to division from the extremes.

As

therefore,

it is

not proper to ascribe

all

this

multitude of conclu-

sions to the whole alone, nor to consider all things in


all

the parts of being,

with different things.

it

a similar manner

in

remains that different conclusions must harmonize


It

is

necessary, therefore, that either the

ration of the conclusions should

be inordinate, or ordinate.

But

enumeif

they

say they are inordinate, they neither speak agreeably to the dialectic

method, nor to the mode of demonstrations, which always generate things

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO,

I.

secondary from such as are

accompanies the order of


gular, I think

things

first

33

nor to the science of Plato, which always

first,

things.

But

if

they say the conclusions are re-

entirely necessary, that they should either begin

it is

according to nature, or from things

last being characterised by the one will

according to time, the

be the

last,

This, however,

first.

last.

But

and that which

is

moved

For that

impossible.

is

from

from things

if

which participates of time, must by a much greater priority participate


of first being. But that which participates of first being, does not necesof time.

sarily participate

Plato begins from

First being, therefore,

he proceeds supernal ly from the

Hence, the

is

above time.

first

to the last parts of true being.

conclusions are to be referred to the

first

first

middle, for the same reason, to the middle orders, and the
dent, to such as are

If then

being, but ends in that which participates of time,

first

For

last.

it is

orders,

the

as

evi-

last,

is

necessary, as our discourse has evinced,

that different conclusions should be assigned to different things, and that

a distribution of

kind should commence from such things as are

this

highest.

But likewise, the order of the hypotheses, as it appears to me, is a sufficient argument of the truth of our assertion.
For with us the one which
is exempt from all multitude, is allotted the first order, and from this the
evolution of all the arguments commences.
But the second order after
this, is about true beings, and the unity which these participate.
And
the third order in regular succession,
is it

is

about

about every soul or not? In answer to

Whether, therefore,

soul.

this,

we

shall observe, that

our

leader Syrianus has beautifully shown, that the discourse about whole
souls

is

comprehended

in the

second hypothesis.

If,

therefore, the order

of these three hypotheses proceeds according to the nature of things,


evident that the second

is

produced from the

first,

and the

last

it is

from the

For I would ask those who are not entirely unskilled in discourses
what can be more allied to the one, than being characterized
by the one, which the first of the conclusions of the second hypothesis un

second.

of

this kind,

folds? Or what can be more allied to soul, than that which participates
of time, which subsists divisibly, and which is the last thing exhibited in
this hypothesis?

Proc.

For the

life

of partial as well as of total souls

Vol.

I.

is

according

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ON THE THEOLOGY

34

And

to time.

through

its

first

being

is

first

participates of the one,

I.

and

connexion with being, has a redundant hyparxis with respect

But

to the imparticipable unity.

we

that which

BOOK

if this

hypothesis

is

the middle, and if

aptly harmonize the highest conclusions with things highest,

we should

doubtless harmonize middles with middles.

For

mencing from first being, proceeds through


till it ends in a nature participating of time.

the genera posterior to

all

hypothesis com-

this

it,

But, farther, from the common confession of those interpreters of Plato,


who were skilled in divine concerns, we can demonstrate the same things
ns we have above asserted.
For Plotinus, in his book On Numbers, enquiring whether beings subsist prior to numbers, or numbers prior to beings,
clearly asserts that the

first

being subsists prior to numbers, and that

it

generates the divine number.

But

and being

is

first

being,

not proper to confound the order of these genera, nor to collect

it is

generative of the

if this is rightly determined by him,


number, but number is produced by

them into one hypostasis, nor, since Plato separately produces first being,
and separately number, to refer each of the conclusions to the same order.
For it is by no means lawful, that cause and the thing caused, should
have either the same power, or the same order
but these are distinct
:

from each other; and the science concerning them

and neither the nature, nor the definition of them

On

But, after Plotinus, Porphyry in his treatise

many and

beautiful arguments, that intellect

same time, it contains in itself something


which it is conjoined with the one. For

is

is

is

likewise distinct,

one and the same.

Principles, evinces

the one

is

above

the eternal has a second, or rather third order in intellect.


to

me

to

be necessary that eternity should be established

that which

At

the

is

prior to the eternal,

and the

same time, thus much may be

and through

all eternity,

For
in the

it

this, therefore,

we

middle of

But of this hereafter.


from what has been said,

eternal.

collected

which

is

is

a whole and parts, and

all

moved, and, that which

is

is

Ad-

ask the father of this assertion, whether this

something better than the eternal


one, but

but

appears

that intellect contains something in itself better than the eternal.

mitting

by

eternal, but that at the

prior to the eternal,

not only being characterized by the


multitude,

number and

figure, that

permanent; or whether we are to

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XI.

ascribe

some

of the conclusions to

it,

35

but not others ? For

it is

impossible

a nature prior to eternity, since every inand likewise permanency, are established in eternity.
But if we are to ascribe some of the conclusions to it, and not others, it is
evident that other orders in intellect are to be investigated, and that each
that all these can accord with
tellectual motion,

of the conclusions
ticularly adapted.

appeared to be to

to be referred to that order, to which it appears parFor intellect is not one in number, and an atom, as it
some of the ancients, but it comprehends in itself the

is

whole progression of first being.

But the
blichus,

third

who, in

who makes for our purpose


his treatise

after these,

is

the divine

Jam-

who

place

Concerning the Gods, accuses those

the genera of being in intclligibles, because the number and variety of these

more remote from the one. But afterwards he informs us where these
ought to be placed. For they are produced in the end of the intellectual
How the genera of being, howorder, by the Gods which there subsist.
ever, both are, and arc not in intclligibles, will be hereafter apparent.
But
is

if,

according to his arrangement of the divine orders,

exempt from the genera of


similitude

all

intelligibles

are they

are

exempt from

Each of the conin a similar manner to be accommodated


them to the whole breadth of the intelligible,
Hence from what the best of the interpreters have

ought not

things, so as to refer

or intellectual order.
said,

much more

and dissimilitude, equality and inequality.

clusions, therefore,

to

being,

when philosophizing according

to their

own

doctrines, both

the

multitude of the divine orders, and of the Platonic arguments, are to be


considered as proceeding according to an orderly distinction.

In addition, likewise, to what has been said,

this also

may

be asserted,

we cannot, on any other hypothesis, obtain a rational solution of the


many doubts which present themselves on this subject, but shall ignothat

rantly ascribe
.

first

place,

less ?

what

why

is

rash and vain to this treatise of Plato.

are there only so

many

cannot assign the reason of


with things themselves.

this,

unless

For

in the

more nor
many, we

conclusions, and neither

For there are fourteen conclusions.

we

But as

there are so

distribute

them

in conjunction

In the second place, neither shall we be able to

find the cause of the order

of the conclusions with respect to each other,

ON THE THEOLOGY

3d

and how some have a

prior,

and others a

hook

f.

posterior establishment, accord-

ing to the reason of science, unless the order of the conclusions proceeds
in conjunction with the progression

do some of

the conclusions

of beings.

In the third place,

become known from

why

things proximately de-

monstrated, but others from preceding demonstrations

For that the one

a whole and contains parts, is demonstrated from being, which is characterized by the one ; but its subsistence in itself and in another, is placed

is

a proximate order, after the possession of figure, but is demonstrated


from whole and parts. Or why are some things often demonstrated, from
two of the particulars previously evinced, but others from one of them ?

in

For we

be ignorant of each of these, and

shall

tifically to

shall neither

be able scien-

speculate their number, nor their order, nor their alliance to

each other, unless following things themselves, we evince that


hypothesis
all

is

the middle genera, as far as to the termination of

Again,

if

we

cally only, in

whole of

should say, that

what respect

shall

this discussion consists

a mere verbal contest ? But


monstrative,
of,

this

whole

a dialectic arrangement, proceeding from on high through

it is

all

being.

first

the conclusions demonstrate syllogisti-

we

differ

from those, who assert that the

of doxastic arguments, and only regards

if it is

not only syllogistic, but likewise de-

doubtless necessary, that the middle should be the cause

and by nature prior

to the conclusion.

As, therefore, we

make

the

conclusions of the preceding reasons, the media of those that follow, the
things which the arguments respect, must doubtless have a similar order

as to being,

and

their

progeny must be the causes of things subject, and

generative of such as are secondary.

we

allow that

all

But

if this

be admitted, how can

of them have the same peculiarity and nature

cause, and that which

is

?
For
produced from cause, are separated from each

other.

But this likewise will happen to those who


be explored in all the arguments, that they

how
but

in the three first


is first

separated in the fourth conclusion.

conclusions, the one


Is

it

one nature is to
by no means perceive
conclusions, the one remains unseparated from being,

is

assert that

will

But

in all the following

explored considered as subsisting

not therefore necessary, that these orders must

itself

differ

by

itself.

from each

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

xt.

other? For that which

is

37

without separation,

in

consequence of having

an occult and undivided subsistence, is more allied to the one, hut that
which is separated, has proceeded farther from the first principle of things.
Again, if you are willing to consider the multitude of the arguments,
and the extent of the hypothesis, how much it differs from that which
neither from this will it appear to you to be entirely about one
follows it,
and an unseparated nature. For reasonings about divine concerns, are con-

tracted in the more principal causes, because in these the occult is more
abundant than the perspicuous, and the ineffable than the known. But
they become multiplied and evolved, by proceeding to divine orders more
proximate to our nature. For such things as are more allied to that

which is ineffable, unknown, and exempt iu inaccessible places, are allotted


an hyparxis more foreign from verbal enunciation. But such things as
have proceeded farther, are both more known to us, and more apparent
to the phantasy, than such as have a prior subsistence.
This,

therefore,

being abundantly proved,

second hypothesis, should unfold

all

it

is

necessary that

tlie

the divine orders, and should pro-

ceed on high, from the most simple and unical to the whole multitude,

and

all

the

number of divine

ends, which indeed

same time
liarities.

is
If,

is

natures, in which the order of true being

spread under the unities of the Gods, and at the

divided in conjunction with their occult and ineffable pecutherefore,

we are not deceived

in

admitting

this, it follows,

that from this hypothesis, the continuity of the divine orders, and the progression of second from
peculiarity of
is

all

first

natures,

the divine genera.

be assumed, together with the


And indeed, what their communion
is

to

with each other, and what their distinction proceeding according to

measure, likewise, the auxiliaries which

may

be found in other dialogues

respecting the truth of real beings, or the unities which they contain, are
all

to be referred to this hypothesis.

total progressions of the

theological science.

Gods, and

For, here

we may contemplate the

their all-perfect orders,

according to

For as we have before shown that the whole

of the Parmenides has reference to the truth of things, and that

not devised as a vain evolution of words,


the nine hypotheses which

it

it

is

treatise
it

was

doubtless necessary, that

discusses, employing the

dialectic

method,

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

38

BOOK

I.

but speculating with divine science, should be about things and certain
natures, which are either middle or

knowledges that

his

subsists with respect to

in that

which

is

all

will

other things,

commence from

speculation of the one, must

end

and

itself,

If, therefore, Parmenides acbe about the one, and how it

last.

whole discourse

the last of all things.

it is

evident that the

that which

is

highest, but

For the hyparxis of

the one

proceeds from on high, as far as to the most obscure hypostasis of things.

CHAPTER
As

the

hypothesis, however, demonstrates

first

fable supereminence of the

exempt from

XII.

first

principle of things,

essence and knowledge,

all

it is

by negations the inefand evinces that he is

evident that the hypothesis

proximate to it, must unfold the whole order of the


For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essen-

after this, as being

Gods.
tial

peculiarity of the

Gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their


this hypothesis.
For what other one can

hyparxis through the whole of


that be which
divine,

is

participated

and through which

all

by being, than that which

one ? For as bodies through their


through their

is in

every being

things are conjoined with the imparticipable


life

intellective part, are

are conjoined with soul,

extended to

total intellect,

and as souls
and the first

manner true beings through the one which they contain


an exempt union, and subsist in unproceeding union with

intelligence, in like

are reduced to
this first cause.

But because

this hypothesis

commences from

that which

is

one being,

or being characterized by the one, and establishes the' summit of intelligibles


as the

first

after the one,

but ends

and deduces divine souls

in

an essence which participates of time,

to the extremities of the divine orders,

cessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate


clusions, the

whole multitude of partial

souls,

and the

it

is

ne-

by various condiversities

which

Digitized by

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XH.

And

they contain.

thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis

proceeds.

After this follows that nature which

is

divisible

about bodies, and

in-

separable from matter, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally


suspended froni the Gods. And the last hypothesis is the procession of
matter, whether considered as one, or as various, which the
thesis

demonstrates by negations, according to

But sometimes,

to the first

fifth

hypo-

dissimilar similitude'

its

indeed, the negations are privations, and


all the productions.
And what is the

sometimes the exempt causes of

most wonderful of all, the highest negations are only enunciative, but
some in a supereminent manner, and others according to deficiency. But
each of the negations consequent to these

is

affirmative

digmatically, but the other iconically, or after the

But

the one para-

manner of an image.
it is composed from

the middle corresponds to the order of soul, for

affirmative

and negative conclusions.

But it possesses negations co-oralone multiplied, like material natures/


possess an adventitious one ; but the one which it contains,

dinate to affirmations.

nor does
though

it

it is still

progressions

is,

Nor

is it

one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its


it were, absorbed by essence.
And such are the hypo-

as

theses which unfold

all

beings, both separable

and inseparable, together

with the causes of wholes, as well exempt, as subsisting in things themaccording to the hyparxis of the one.

selves,

But

there are four other hypotheses besides these, which

by taking away
must be entirely subverted, both beings and
things in generation, and that no being can any longer have any subsistence ; and this, in order that he may demonstrate the one to be the cause
of being and preservation, that through it ail things participate of the
the one, evince that all things

nature of being, and that each has

And
one

in short,

is, all

we

its

hyparxis suspended from the one.


through all beings, that if the

syllogistically collect this

things subsist as far as to the last hypostasis,

being has any subsistence.

'

The

For owfMwnjTa,
Ixtitead of or? a*

one, therefore,

it is

ra

is

and

if it is not,

no

both the hypostatic and

necessary to read
read tvri w; t nvKx.

ON THE THKOLOGY

40
preservative cause of

all

things

at the end of the dialogue.


the Parmenides,

have
'

its division,

sufficiently treated in

hook

r.

which Parmeoides also himself collects

With respect, however,


and the speculation of

to the hypothesis of
its

several parts,

our commentaries on that dialogue

we

so that

it

would be superfluous to enter into a prolix discussion of these particulars


But as from what has been said, it appears whence we may
at present.
assume the whole of theology, and from what dialogues we may collect
into one the theology distributed according to parts,

place treat about the

common dogmas

we

shall in the

next

of Plato, which are adapted to

all the divine orders, and shall


is defined by him according to the most perfect
For things common are prior to such as are peculiar, and are

sacred concerns, and which extend to


evince that each of these
science.

more known according

to nature.

CHAPTER
In the

first

place, therefore,

we

XIII.

assume the things which are de-

shall

monstrated in the Laws, and contemplate

how

they take the lead, with

respect to the truth about the Gods, and are the most ancient of

other mystic conceptions about a divine nature.


are asserted

by Plato

providence extends to

in these writings
all

things

Three

that there are

and that they administer

all

the

things, therefore,

Gods ;
all

that their

things ac-

cording to justice, and suffer no perversion from worse natures.

That these then obtain the first rank' among all theological dogmas, is
For what can be of a more leading nature, than the
hyparxis of the Gods, or than boniform providence, or immutable and
undeviating power ? Through which they produce secondary natures uniformly, preserve themselves in an undefiled manner, and convert them to

perfectly evident.

themselves.

But
'

the

Gods indeed govern

For pX?

ifurffa, it

other things, but suffer nothing

necessary to read

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XIII.

41

from subordinate natures, nor are changed with the variety of the things
shall learn, however, how these
to which their providence extends.

We

things are defined according to nature, if

we endeavour to embrace by a

reasoning process the scientific method of Plato about each of them


prior to these, survey by

are

this

Of

all

and

and thus afterwards consider such problems as are conjoined


dogma.

Gods

with

irrefragable arguments he proves that there

what

beings, therefore,

it

is

necessary that

some should move

only,

but that others should be moved only, and that the natures situated beAnd with respect to these
these, should both move and be moved.

tween

test it is necessary, either that

moved by

they should

others, or that they should

stases likewise, are necessarily placed in

move

others being themselves

be self-motive.

These four hypoan orderly series, one after another;

moved only and suffers, depending on other primary causes


moves others, and is at the same time moved, being prior to
that which is self-motive, and which is beyond that which both
this
moves and is moved, beginning from itself, and through its own motion
imparting the representation of being moved, to other things ; and that
which is immoveable, preceding whatever participates either producing
or passive motion. For every thing self-motive, in consequence of possessing its perfection in a transition and interval of life, depends on another more ancient cause, which always subsists according to sameness,
and in a similar manner, and whose life is not in time, but in eternity.
For time is an image of eternity.
If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves, are moved according to time, but the eternal form of motion is above tluit which is
carried in time, the self-motive nature will be second in order, and not the
But that which moves others, and is moved by others,
first of beings.
must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature and not this

that which

is

that which
;

alone, but likewise every alter-motive fabrication, as the Athenian guest

demonstrates.

For

if all things,

says he, should stand

still,

ualess self-

motive natures had a subsistence among things, there would be tin such
For that which is immoveable, is by
thing as that which is first moved.

no means naturally adapted


Proc.

to

be moved, nor

Vol.

I.

will there

then be that

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OS THE THEOLOGY

42

BOOK L

which is first moved ; but the alter-motive nature is indigent of another


moving power. The self-motive nature, therefore, alone, as beginning
from its own energy, will move both itself and others in a secondary

For a thing of

manner.

this

kind imparts the power of being moved to

same manner

as an immoveable nature impower to all beings. In the third place, that which is
moved only, must first of all be suspended from things moved by another,
but moving others. For it is necessary, both that other things, and the
series of things moved, which extends in an orderly manner from on high

alter-motive natures, in the

parts a motive

to the last of things, should be filled with their proper media.

All bodies, therefore, belong to those things which are naturally

moved

For they are productive of nothing, on account


f possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating of
only, and are passive.

magnitude and bulk since every thing productive and motive of others,
and moves, by employing an incorporeal power.
;

naturally produces

But of
others

are

natures, some are divisible about bodies, but


exempt from such a division about the last of things.

incorporeal

Those incorporeals,

therefore,

which are

divisible

about the bulks of

bodies, whether they subsist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to

the

number of

others.

For

things

moved by

another, but at the

these, because they possess

same time moving

an incorporeal allotment, parti-

power but because they are divided about bodies, are


deprived of the power of verging to themselves, are divided together with
their subjects, and are full of sluggishness from these, they are indigent
of a motive nature which is not borne along in a foreign seat, but possesses
an hypostasis in itself. Where, therefore, shall \vc obtain that which
moves itself? For things extended into natures possessing bulk and interval,
or which are divided in these, and subsist inseparably about them, must
But it is
necessarily either be moved only, or be motive through others.
cipate of a motive

necessary, as we have before observed, that a self-motive nature should


be prior to these, which is perfectly established in itself, and not in others,
and which fixes its energies in itself, and not in things different from
itself.
There is, therefore, another certain nature exempt from bodies,
both in the heavens and in these very mutable elements, from which bodies primarily derive the power of being moved. Hence, if it be requisite

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XIII.

43

what such an essence as this is, (rightly following Socrates,


and considering what the end of things is,) which by being present to altermotive natures, imparts to them a representation of self-motion, to which
of the above mentioned natures shall we ascribe the power of things being
to discover

moved from themselves? For


and whatever the}'
externally

suffer,

all

inanimate natures are alone alter-motive,

they are adapted to suffer, through a certain power

moving and compelling.

It remains, therefore, that

animated

natures must possess this representation, and that they are self-motive

a secondary degree, but that the soul which

is in them, primarily moves


and that through a power derived from itself
itself, and is moved by
as it imparts life to bodies, so likewise it extends to them from itself a representation of being moved by themselves.

itself,

the self-motive essence

If, therefore,

matures, but soul

motion

is

it is

will

is

more ancient than

self-

be beyond bodies, and the motion


be the progeny of soul, and of the motion it contains.
will

necessary that the whole heaven and

possessing various motions, and being

according to nature

alter-motive

primarily self-motive, from which the image of

imparted to bodies, soul

of every body,

Hence

is

(for

a circulation

all

moved with

is

the bodies

it

contains

these different motions,

natural to every

body of this kind)

should have ruling souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies,

and which are moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with
It is necessary, therefore, that these souls
the power of being moved.
which dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it contains, and who impart to every thing corporeal which is of itself destitute
of life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose, with the
cause of motion, should either
after a contrary
this

world and every thing

and

is

moved

move

manner, which
in it

it is

all

things conformably to reason, or

not lawful to assert.

which

is

But

if

indeed,

disposed in an orderly mauner,

equally and perpetually according to nature, as

strated, partly in the mathematical disciplines,

and partly

is

demon-

in physical dis-

suspended from an irrational soul, which moving itself moves


also other things, neither the order of the periods, nor the motion which is
bounded by one reason, nor the position of bodies, nor any other of those
cussions,

is

things which are generated according to nature, will have a stable cause,

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ON THE THEOLOGY

44

BOOK.

I.

and which is able to distribute every thing in an orderly manner, and according to an invariable sameness of subsistence. For every tiling irrational is
naturally adapted to be adorned by something different from itself, and is
Hut to commit all heaven to
indefinite and unadorned in its own nature.
a thing of this kind, and. a circulation revolving according to reason, and
is by no means adapted, either to the nature of

with. an invariable sameness,


tilings,

or to our undisciplined conceptions. If however, an intellectual soul,

and which employs reason, governs

and if every thing which is


by a soul of this kind, and there
is no one of the wholes in the universe destitute of soul (for no body is.
honorable if deprived of such a power as this, as Theophrastus somewhere
says) if this be the case, whether docs it possess this intellectual, perfect,

moved with a

perpetual lation,

and beneficent power, according to


For if, according to essence, it
be of

But

tliis

if,

participation, or according to essence?


is

necessary that every soul should

kind, since each according to

according to participation, there

in energy,

and by
wholes

all things,

is governed

cording

more ancient than

its

it is

its

own

nature

is

self-motive.

be another intellect subsisting

which essentially possesses

very being pre-assumes in

since
to.

soul,

will

itself

intellection,

the uniform knowledge of

also necessary that the soul

which

is

essentialized ac

reason, should possess that which pertains to intellect through

participation* and that the intellectual nature should be twofold ; the


one subsisting primarily in a divine intellect itself; but the other, which,
To which, you may
proceeds from this, subsisting secondarily in. soul.
add, if you please, the presence of intellectual illumination in body. For

whence is the whole of this heaven either spherical or moved in a circle,


and whence does it revolve with a sameness of circulation according to
one definite order? For how could it always be allotted the same idea and
power immutably according to. nature, if it did not participate of specific
formation accordiug to intellect? For soul, indeed, is the supplier of
motion; but the cause of a firm establishment, and that which reduces
the unstable mutation of things that are moved, into sameness, and also
a life which is bounded by one reason, and a circulation which subsists

with invariable sameness, will evidently be superior to soul.


Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to things

CHAP. XUL
which are

OF
But

alter-motive.

soul

PLATO".
is

45

self-motive, binding ro itself

all

cor-

and prior to this is intellect which is immoveable. Let


poreal motions
ho one, however, suppose that I assert this immobility of intellect to reis sluggish, destitute of life,' and without respiration,
;

semble that which

the leading eause of all motion, and the fountain, if you are
denominate it, of all life, both of that which is- converted to
itself, and of that which has its hypostasis in other things.
Through these
causes also, the world is denominated by Timccus, an animal endued with

but that

it is

willing so to

and intellect ; being called by him an animal according to its own


and the life pervading to it from soul, and which is distributed
about it, but animated or endued with soul, according to the presence of
a divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual
domination. For the supply of life, the government of soul, and the participation of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven.
soul

nature,

If,

however,

this intellect is essentially intellect, since

cating that the essence of intellect

minates

is

same with

the

Timaeus indi-

its intellection,

he says, that soul receiving a divine

deno-

aa
be the case, it is necessary that the
whole world should be suspended from its divinity, and that motion indeed should be present to this universe from soul, but that its perpetual
permanency and sameness of subsistence should be derived from intellect,
and that its one union, the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its allperfect measure should originate from that unity,* from which intellect is
uniform, soul is one,' every being is whole and perfect according to its
divine

it

upright and wise

own
own

nature,

for

life

if,

intellect led

therefore, this

and every thing secondary together with perfection

in its

proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity,

from an order which

is

always established above

it.

For that which

is

corporeal being alter-motive, derives from soul the representation of self-

motive power, and


participates of

is

life

through

it

'

*
'

But

an animal.

according to

soul being self-motive

and energizing according to


and an ever-vigilant life from its

intellect,

time, possesses a neverrceasing energy,


For read a^tn.
For

**< n)f emios, read, xat core nj$ tvafof.

Eor

xai e vou,

ivoiiSi] fita

xai n

^r/7l> resM

***

wu^Vt

^-Xl '/*"**

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OS THE THEOLOGY

4C
proximity to

And

intellect.

subsisting essentially in energy/

once

in intellect,

is

BOOK

intellect possessing its life in eternity,

and

I.

always

fixing all its stable intellection at

entirely deific through the cause prior to

For

itself.

has two-fold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others


as being inebriated with nectar.
And elsewhere he observes, that this in-

it

tellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect,


same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul,
as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.

we have

All things therefore, as


intellect

and

And

soul as media.

but soul has the form of

said, are

is

a god

is

intellect;

in the

and

suspended from the one through


form of unity

intellect indeed has the

and the body of the world is vital.


But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to itself. And of
the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate, but the other in
a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed*
is

intellect

prior to intellect, being primarily carried in

an intellectual nature ; but


most divine, as being deified prior to other things ; and soul is
so far as it requires an intellectual medium.
But the body which

intellect is

divine,

participates of a soul of

divine

yet

to intellect, and living from

My

kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself


of divine* light pervades supernally as far as
it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking

ttxis

for the illumination

to the last dependencies

itself, is

primarily divine.

the same about each of the whole spheres, and


about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven,

reasoning

is also

since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to the
sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation, but they

abide

in the universe

according to their wholenesses, and contain in themFor every wholeness has posterior to itself more

selves partial animals.

As, therefore, in the heavens, the number of the stars


proceeds together with the whole spheres, and as in the earth the multi-

partial essences.

tude of partial
thus also

it

terrestrial

appears to

For atxt

The

me

animals subsists together with their wholeness,


to be necessary that in the wholes which have

ivtgytta, read,

sense requires

etfi

cur

lliat f. MU

mgytia.
should be here wpplied.

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XIII.

an intermediate subsistence, each element should be filled up with approFor how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior
priate numbers.
to parts, be arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy
of them in the intermediate natures ?
But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established after
the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as possessing life
indeed,

own

it will

always primarily participate of

order immutable in the world,

it will

soul,

but as preserving

be comprehended by

its

intellect,

and as one and a whole, and the leader and ruler of its proper parts, it
Not only the universe, therefore,
will be illuminated by divine union.
but each also of its perpetual parts is animated and endued with inFor each
tellect, and as much as possible is similar to the universe.'
its kindred multitude.
In
one corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe,
but there arc many others under this, depending on this one ; there is one

of these parts

is

a universe with respect to

short, there is indeed

and after this, other souls, together with this disposmanner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled
one intellect, and an intellectual number under this, participated
purity
by these souls and one god who connectedly contains at once all mun1
dane and supermundane natures, and a multitude of other gods, who
distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these, and
soul of the universe,

ing in an orderly
;

all

the parts of the world.

productions of nature

wholes and the

first

is

of

For

it is

not to be supposed that each of the

generative of things similar to

mundane

itself,

but that

much

beings should not in a

greater

degree extend in themselves the paradigm of a generation of this kind.

For the similar

is

more

allied,

and more naturally adapted

to the reason

of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner as the same than the
different,

and bound than the

infinite.

accurately survey in what follows.

These things, however, we

But we

shall

now

providentially attend at once to wholes


'

Instead of tftam

fu] xmra. luittftn, it is

and

parts,

shall

direct our attention

to the second of the things demonstrated in the Laws,

viz. that the

and

necessary to read k%% xora fc/vapir

Gods

shall

summarily

veam

tfvm, ts both,

rtf

the sense of the whole sentence and the version of Portus require.
'

It

seems requisite to supply here the word uxi'jx$&fmt>

sii

in ill trails mi ion.

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OH THE THEOLOGY

43

discuss the irreprehensible conception

of Plato

BOOK L
-about the providence of

the Gods.

CHAPTER
Fhom what has "been
Gods being
vivific,

said, therefore,

the causes of

all

XIV.
it is

evident to every one, that the

motion, some of them are essential and

according to a self-motive,

others of

them are

intellectual,

self-vital, and self-energetic power. But


and excite by their very being all secon-

dary* natures to the perfection of


principle of all second

and

unical, or characterized

life,

according to the fountain and

And

third progressions of motion.

by

unity, deifying

by

participation

all

others are

the whole

genera of themselves, according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown


power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but
are not the principle of another.
But again others supply to secondary
natures motion according to place or quality, but arc essentially the

causes of motion to themselves.


essence to other things

is

much

For every thing which

is

the cause of

prior to this the cause to itself of

own

its

proper energies and perfection. Farther still, that which is self-motive is


again the principle of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to
every thing in the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds

of motion, but the progression into being

is

from

soul,

and by a much

greater priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the

of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause

all

And

life

in

still

greater degree

do motion, being, and

proceed from a

unical hy pant is, which connectedly contains intellect and soul,

source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things.


life

iudecd, not

all

life

temporal energy.

is

the

For of

the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor

of intellect and a gnostic power ; but of the one

all

things participate, as far

For bvrffw read fevnga.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XIV.
as to matter

nature,

itself,

49

both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to

and the contraries

to these

and there

is

not any thing which

is

de-

prived of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being,
if it is

it

If, therefore, the Gods produce all things, and


unknown comprehensions of themselves, how is

deprived of the one.

contain

the

all things, in

possible there should not be a providence of

all

things iu these compre-

hensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial natures

every where

it is

their causes.

And

all

alter-motive are the progeny of self-motive natures.

things which subsist in time, cither in the whole of time, or in

of it, are the effects of eternal natures

cause of that which sometimes exists.


give subsistence to
short, there

all

because that which always

a part

is, is

multiplied natures, precede them in existence.

generation from the one.

It

is

the

And divine and unical genera, as they

no essence, or multitude of powers, which

is

For

that offspring should enjoy the providential care of

fit

But

necessary, therefore, that

all

In

not allotted iu

is

these should be

partakers of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from

and
;
and at the same time a stable condition of forms

the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods


participating of sameness

from the

gods

intellectual

;'

but receiving into themselves the presence of

union, of measure, and of the distribution of good from the


It

is

necessary, therefore, either that the

dential care of their

own

offspring

is

Gods

should

know

also previously

comprehend

cause of the goods they contain, or, which

being Gods, they are igooraut of what

is

in

it is

Gods.

and should not only

natural to them,

give subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with

and union, but

first

that a provi-

life,

essence

themselves the primary


not lawful to assert, that

proper and

For what ignorance can there be of beautiful

fit.

things, with those

who

who are allotted


But if they are

are the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those

an hyparxis

defined

ignorant, neither

do

by the nature
souls

of the

goodf

govern the universe according to

intellect,

nor are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the
unities

of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves


1

It is

Proc.

necessary here to udt>1t the words,

Vol.1.

ex

ru> vhcm;

all

know-

$r*v.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

50
ledge, which

BOOK

I.

we have acknowledged they do through the former demonstrathey are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers,

tions.

If, therefore,

leaders

and governors of every thing

in the world, and' to

them as

being,

such a providential care of the things governed by, and following them,
and generated by them, pertains, whether shall we say that they knowing
the law which

according to nature, accomplish this law, or that through

is

imbecility they arc depri\ed of a providential attention to their possessions

or progeny, for

it is

of no consequence as to the present discussion which

of these two appellations you are willing to adopt? For if through want
of power they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of

want of power ? For they do not move things externally, nor are other
indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government of
the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from the
stern of a ship, themselves supplying being* themselves containing the
this

tilings

measures of

life,

and themselves

distributing to things their respective

energies.

W hether also, are they unable to provide at once for all


do not leave each of the
if

things, or

parts destitute of their providential care ?

they

And

they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether do they pro-

videntially superintend greater things, but neglect such as are less

Or

do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater ?
For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly y
through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them a greater
thing, viz. the production of all things, can we refuse to grant that which
is

naturally consequent to this, a providential attention to their produc-

tions

For

it is

to dispose in

the province of the power which produces a greater thing,

a becoming manner that which

is

less.

curators of less tilings, and neglect such as are greater,

But if they are


how can this mode

For that which is more allied, and more similar


more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the
participation of the good which that thing confers on it.
If, however*
of providence be right?
to any thing,

the
tial

Gods
care,

is

think that the

first

of

mundane

natures deserve their providen-

and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable
is omitted in the original.

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CHAP. XIV.

OF PT.ATO.

51

to extend their regard to the last of things,

the presence of the

Gods from pervading

what

is

it

to all things

can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy

which can restrain


?

What

How

is it

which

can those who

are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less?

Or how can those who produce

the essence even of the smallest things, not

be

tlie

all

these things are hostile to our natural conceptions.

lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power?

For

It remains, there-

the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they
must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and
to the government of the whole of things.
But if they know that which

fore, that

is

according to nature, and

this to those

who

are the generating causes of

and an exuberance of power, if


this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this
kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of
providence in them ? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge
and power? And on this account are things deprived' of their providential
care ? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able to
accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own
all

things

is

to take care of

all

things,

be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance


perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis according to which they are essentialised. For the very being of the Gods
is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence.
But to
offspring, they will

will

provide for things of a subject nature,

is to confer on them a certain


can we deprive the Gods of providence, without
at the same time depriving them of goodness? And how if we subvert
their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly
subvert

good.

How,

therefore,

which we established by the former demonstrations ? Hence


necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the
that they are good according to every virtue.
And again, it is con-

their hyparxis
it is

Gods

this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential


attention to secondary natures, either through indolence, or
imbecility,
or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with

sequent to

For oTjagqrM

it is

requisite to read,

xaj w*tk

ON THE THEOLOGY

52

them the most


and exuberant

BOOK

excellent knowledge, unpolluted power,

From which

will.

trhole of things,

it

I.

and unenvying

appears that they provide for the

and omit nothing which

is

requisite to the supply of

good.
Let, however, no one think that the

about secondary things, as


this is the case

Gods extend such a providence

either of a busy or laborious nature, or that

is

with their exempt transcendency, which

mote from mortal

For

difficulty.

their blessedness

is

is

established re-

not willing to be de-

with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men
accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation and pain.
But
labours and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If;

filed
is

all

however,

it

be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods,

must be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and


For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating
ineffable.
what is fit, or exploring the good of every thing by ambiguous reasonings,
or by looking externally, and following their effects as men do in the pro*
vidence which they exert on their own affairs ; but pre-assuming in themselves the measures of the whole of things, and producing the essence of
every thing from themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead
and perfect all things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them
Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to
with good.
nature, energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deliberate choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in conit

junction with

will,

are they deprived of production according to essence

but they contract both these into one union, and they will indeed such
things as they are able to effect

by

their very being,

essence being capable of and producing

all

but by their very

things, they contain the cause

of production in their unenvying and exuberant

will.

By what

busy

energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the punishment of what


Ixion,

is

or of the

the providence either of whole souls, or of intellectual essences,

Gods themselves accomplished,

impart good

in

any respect

according to nature
rious to fire to

is

is

unless

laborious to the

it

should be said, that to

Gods ?

not laborious to any thing.

But

that which

For neither

impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor

is it

is

labo-

in short to

Digitized by

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OP PLATO.

CHAP. XIV.

bodies to energize according to their


bodies, neither

is it

own proper

And

powers.

prior to

laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase.

For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it laboFor these indeed produce many energies from deliberate
rious to souls.
choice, many from their very being, and are the causes of many motions
by alone being present. So that if indeed the communication of good is
according to nature to the Gods, providence also is according to nature.
And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility,

and by

But

their very being alone.

Gods be

these things are not according to

if

For the good is the supand intellect is the


source of intellectual illumination. And every tiling which has a primary
subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary
nature, neither will the
plier of

good

just as

life is

naturally good.

the source of another

life,

subsistence.

That however, which

is

especially the illustrious prerogative of the

Platonic theology, I should say

is this,

that according to

it,

neither

is

the

exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary natures, through a providential care for things subordinate, nor
all

is

their providential presence with

things diminished through their transcending the whole of things with

undefiled purity, but at the

same time

it

assigns to

them a separate

subsist*

ence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also

the beipg extended to all things, and the taking care of and adorning their

own

progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through

not corporeal, as that of light


bodies, in the
natures, in the

is

through the

air,

nor

is it

all

things

divisible

is

about

same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate


same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate

from body, and without conversion to it,


and exempt.

is

strained, uniform, primary

immaterial, unmingled, unre-

In short, such

a mode of

the

providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For it is


evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods.

For soul indeed,

said to provide for secondary natures in

is

intellect in another.
lect is

And

But

the providence ot divinity

who

is

one way, and


prior to intel-

exerted according to a transcendency both of intellect and soul.

of the

from that

Gods

themselves, the providence of the sublunary

of the celestial divinities.

Of

the

is

different

Gods also who are beyond

the

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

4
world, there are

many

orders,

BOOK

and the mode of providence

is

I.

different

according to each.

CHAPTER XV.
The
survey
all

third

problem

how we

after these

we

subvert

its

boundary, or

attention to

shall

connect with the former, and

are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods,

things according to justice, and

all

its

who do not

other things, and in the mutations of

think therefore, that this

is

who perform

in the smallest degree

undeviating rectitude, in their providential

human

affairs.

apparent to every one, that every where that

which governs according to nature, and payB

all

possible attention to the

manner becomes the leader of that which


it governs, and directs it to that which is best.
For neither has the pilot
who rules over the sailors and the ship any other precedaneous end than
the safety of those that sail in the ship, and of the ship itself, nor does
the physician who is the curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things
for the sake of any thing else than the health of the subjects of his care,
whether it be requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative
medicine. Nor would the general of an army or a guardian say that they
look to any other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded,
and the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any other to whom
fehcity of the governed, after this

it

belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour to

subvert the good of those that follow him, which

it is his

business to pro-

which he disposes in a becoming manner every


thing belonging to those whom he governs.
If therefore we grant that the
Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their providence excure,

and with a view

tends to
it

to

all things, since

they are good, and possess every virtue,

how

is

possible they should neglect the felicity of the objects of their provi-

dential care?

Or how can

they be inferior to other leaders in the provi-

Digitized by

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GF PLATO.

CHAP. XV.
dence of subordinate natures?
that which

is

better,

and

65

Since the

Gods indeed always

establish this as the

end of all

their

look to

government,

but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than
consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved.

virtue, in

And
rulers,

universally,

whether you arc willing to

call the

Gods

leaders, or

or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will appear to be in want

of no one of such names.

For

all

able subsist in them primarily.

things that are venerable and honor-

And on

this

account indeed, here also

more venerable and honorable than others,


because they exhibit an ultimate resemblance of the Gods. But what
occasion is there to speak further on this subject ? For I think that we

some

things are naturally

hear from those

who are wise

in divine

and peeonian powers celebrated.

concerns paternal, guardian, ruling

How

is

it

possible therefore that the

images of the Gods which subsist according to nature, regarding the end

which

is

adapted to them, should providentially attend to the order of

the things which they govern, but that the

Gods themselves with whom

there is the whole of good, true and real virtue,

and a blameless life, should

not direct their government to the virtue and vice of

can

it

be admitted, on

in the universe,

this supposition, that

and vice vanquished?

men

And how

tbey exhibit virtue victorious

Will they not also thus corrupt

the measures of justice by the worship paid to them by the depraved,

subvert the boundary of undeviating science, and cause the

appear more honorable than the pursuits of virtue


providence

is

follow them.

gifts

For

this

of vice to

mode

of

neither advantageous to these leaders, nor to those that

For to those who have become wicked, there

will

be no

from guilt, since they will always endeavour to anticipate justice,


and pervert the measures of desert. But it will be necessary, which it is
not lawful to assert, that the Gods should regard as their final end the
liberation

vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect their true salvation,

consequently be alone the causes of adumbrant good.


tnd the

whole world

will be filled with disorder

depravity remaining in
in

badly governed

and

This universe also

it,

cities.

and incurable perturbation,


and being replete with that discord which exists

Though

is it

not perfectly impossible that parts

ON THE THEOLOCY
should be governed according to nature in

human than

BOOK

I.

greater degree than wholes,

divine concerns, and images than primary causes

men in governing them,


honoring some, but disgracing others, and every where giving a proper
Hence if men

properly attend to the welfare of

by the measures of virtue, it is much more


Gods should be the immutable governors of the whole
of things. For men are allotted this virtue through similitude to the Gods.
But if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and well-being
direction to the works of vice

necessary that the

of those

whom

they govern, imitate in a greater degree the providence of

the Gods, we shall ignorantly at one and the same time entirely subvert
die truth concerning the Gods, and the transcendency of virtue.

For

this

is evident to every one, that what is more similar to the Gods is


more happy than those things that are deprived of them through dissimiSo that if among men indeed, the uncorrupted and
litude aud diversity.
un deviating form of providence is honorable, it must undoubtedly be in a
much greater degree honorable with the Gods. But if with them, mortal
gifts are more venerable than the divine measures of justice, with men
also earth-born gifts will be more honorable than Olympian goods, and the
blandishments of vice than the works of virtue. With a view therefore to
the most perfect felicity, Plato in the Laws delivers to us through these

I think

'

demonstrations, the hvparxis of the Gods, their providential care extend-

ing to

all

common

things,

and

their immutable energy ; which things, indeed, are


Gods, but are most principal and first according to
For this triad appears to perthe most partial natures in the divine orders, originating

to all the

nature in the doctrine pertaining to them.

vade as

far as to

For a uniform hyparxis, a


power which providentially takes care of all secondary natures, and an
undeviating and immutable intellect, are in all the Gods that are prior to
and in the world.
supernally from the occult genera of Gods.

'

For

mm* it ii

necemry

to re*d

mrrm

OF PLATO.

CHAP. XV!

CHAPTER
Ac a ix,

from another principle we


all

XVI.

may be

logical demonstrations in the Republic.

divine orders, similarly extend to

57

able to apprehend the theoFor these are common to all the

the discussion about the Gods, and

unfold to us truth in uninterrupted connexion with what has been before


said.

In the second book of the Republic therefore, Socrates describes

certain theological types for mythological poets,

and exhorts his pupils to


some do not refuse

purify themselves from those tragic disciplines, which

to introduce to a divine nature, concealing in these as in veils the arcane

mysteries concerning the Gods.

Socrates therefore, as I have said, nar-

and laws of divine

fables, which afford this apparent


meaning, and the inward concealed scope, which regards as its end the
beautiful and the natural in the fictions about the Gods,
in the first

rating the types

place indeed, thinks


tion about the

fit

Gods and

to evince, according to our

un perverted concep-

their goodness, that they are the suppliers of all

good, but the causes of no evil to any being at any time.


place, he says that they are essentially immutable,

In the second

and that they neither

have various forms, deceiving and fascinating, nor are the authors of the
greatest evil lying, in deeds or in words, or of error and folly.
These
therefore being

two laws, the former has two conclusions,

Gods are not the causes of evils, and that they are
The second law also in a similar manner has two
these are, that every divine nature

from falsehood and

artificial

is

variety.

viz.

the causes of

that the
all

other conclusions

immutable, and

is

good*
;

and

established pure

All the things demonstrated there-

depend on these three common conceptions about a divine nature,


For
viz. on the conceptions about its goodness, immutability and truth.
the first and ineffable fountain of good is with the Gods ; together with
eternity, which is the cause of a power that has an invariable sameness of
subsistence and the first intellect which is beings themselves, and the
fore,

truth which

Proc.

is

in real beings.

Vol.

11

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

.38

CHAPfER
That

therefore,

XVII.

which has the hyparxis of

essence defined in the good, and which by

BOOK

its

itself,

and the whole of

very being produces

its

all things,

must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil. For if there


was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps some one might
say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that he does not impart to
beings every good.

which

is

If,

however, not only every

primarily boniforra and beneficent

is

God

God,

is

good, but that

(for that

which

is pri-

marily good will not be the second after the Gods, because every where,
things which have a secondary subsistence, receive the peculiarity of their

hyparxis from those that subsist primarily) this being the case,
fectly necessary that divinity should

goods as proceed into secondary descents, as far as to the

lor

as the

power which

is

it is

per-

be the cause of good, and of all such


last

of things,

the cause of life, gives subsistence to

all life,

as

the power which

is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the


power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as well

tl>e

beauty which

is

in words, as that

which

is

every primary cause produces all similars from

in the

phenomena, and thus

itself and

binds to

itself

the

one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form,after the same
manner I think the first and most principal good, and uniform hyparxis, establishes in and about itself, the causes and comprehensions of all goods at
once. Nor is there any thing good which does not possess this power from
it,

nor beneficent which being converted to

it,

does not participate of

this

For all goods are from thence produced, perfected and preserved
a nd the one series and order of universal good, depends on that fountain.
Through the same cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers
of all good, and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsistence to every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment concause.

trary to itself; since that which

is

productive of

life, is

not the cause of

and that which is the source of beauty is exempt


from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and from
the privation of

life,

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XVII.

5g

Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is


not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny but the nature of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.
the causes of this.

And

the divine cause indeed of goods

extending to

all

pation of good.

is

established eternally in

itself,

secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant partici-

Of

its

participants, however,

some

preserve the partici-

pation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good in undented

bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess inevitably an al-

But those natures which are arranged


whole of things, entirely indeed enjoy according to their

lotment of goods adapted to them.


in the last of the

nature the goodness of the


destitute of

good should

Gods

for it

either have

is

not possible that things perfectly

a being, or subsist at

first

but

re-

ceiving an efflux of this kind, they neither preserve the gift which pervades

and unmingled, nor do they retain their proper good stably,


and with invariable sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material,
and filled with the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to
order indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue,
to them, pure

the contrary to

it,

vice.

And

with respect indeed to the natures which

is exempt from a perversion of this kind,


them always having dominion according to nature.
But partial natures through a diminution of power always diverging 1 into
multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed the participation of good,
but substitute the contrary in the mixture with good, and which is van.
quished by the combination. For neither here is it lawful for evil to subsist
unmingled, and perfectly destitute of good ; but though some particular
thing may be evil to a part, yet it is entirely good to the whole and to the
universe. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect
parts, and which subsist according to nature.
But that which is preternatural is always evil to partial natures, and deformity, privation of symmetry, perversion, and a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For

rank as wholes,' each of these


things

more

that which
its

perfect in

is

corrupted,

is

indeed corrupted to

proper perfection, but to the universe

it

is

itself,

and departs from

incorruptible and inde-

structible.
'

For
For

aMn

it is

rfifiaiKirrst

necessary to read o\x*.

read txfbuwna.

Digitized by

Google

ON THE THEOLOGY

CO

And
to

\
y

every thing which

itself,

and

but

turc

For

it is

its

good to the whole, and so

it is

BOOK

far as it is

not possible that either a privation of

a part of the universe'

life,

or deformity and im-

moderation, or in short privation can be inserted in the universe

whole number
wholes.

I.

deprived of good, so fur indeed- as pertains


own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility of nais

is

And life

but

its

always perfect, being held together by the goodness of


is every where present, together with existence, and the

being perfect, so far as each thing gives completion to the whole.


vinity therefore, as

we have

said, is the cause

of good

Di.

but the shadowy

subsistence of evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility
of the natures which receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil
in wholes, but in partial natures, nor yet in all these.

and

partial natures

But

the media

partial intellectual

among

these,

For the first of


genera are eternally boniform.

and which energize according

to time, con-

necting the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion,
are incapable of preserving the

gift

of the Gods immoveable, uniform and

simple; by their variety obscuring* the simplicity of this

multiform

its

uniform nature, and by their commixture

gift,

its

For they do not consist of incorruptible

incorruptibility.

by

purity
first

their

and

genera r

have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but such as arc
composed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere says in the
Phaedrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also materia), in
For they are mingled
a much greater degree pervert their proper good.
with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling that of an
v.ox

image, since
to each

it is

other,

replete with

much of non-entity,

consists of things hostile

and of circumstances which are mutable and dispersed

through the whole of time, so that they never cease to evince


that they are given

up

to corruption, privation

in every thing

of symmetry, deformity,

and all-various mutations, being not only extended in

their energies, like the

natures prior to them, but being replete both in their powers and energies

with that which

is

preternatural,

and with material

imbecility.

For things

which become situated in a foreign place, by co-introducing whole together


here to supply the word ru.

It is necessary

'

For .afWTMuatyvra

it

U requisite

to read mftnmtfirr*.

Digitized by

Google

OF PLATO.

chap. xvir.

with form, rule over the subject nature


is

their proper wholeness,

from

partial,

becility,

war and the

division

6l

but again receding to that which

and participating of partibHity, im-

which

the source of generation, they

is

are necessarily all-variously changed.

Neither, therefore,

is

every being

would not be the corruption and generation of


bodies, nor the purification and punishment of soak.
Nor is there any
for the world would not be a blessed god, if the most
evil in wholes
principal parts of which it consists were imperfect.
Nor are the Gods
perfectly

good

for there

the causes of

evils, in

the

same manner

as they are of goods

but

evil

and a subsistence
shadowy subsistence in

originates from the imbecility of the recipients of good,

Nor is

in the last of things.

the evil which has a

partial natures

unmingled with good.

certain respect,

by

short,

is it

its

But

this participates

of

very existence being detained by good.

it

in a

Nor

in

possible for evil which is perfectly destitute of all good to have

m no respect
beyond that which is
perfectly being.
Nor is the evil which is in partial natures left in a disordered state, but even this is made subservient to good purposes by the
Gods, and on this account justice purifies souls from depravity. But
a

For

subsistence.

evil itself is

even beyond that which

whatever has an existence, just as the good

itself fa

another order of gods purifies from the depravity which


All things

the Gods.

is

in bodies.

however are converted as much as possible to the goodness of


And wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and

also the perfect

and beneficent genera of

imperfect natures are adorned and

beings.

arranged

in

But more

partial

and

a becoming manner,

to the completion of wholes, are called upward to the


changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the

become subservient
beautiful, are

good, so far as this can. be accomplished by them.

For there cannot be a greater good

to

each of these, than what the Gods

impart according to measures to their progeny

but all things, each sepaand all in common, receive such a portion of good, as it is posthem to participate. But if some things are filled with greater,
and others with less goods, the power of the recipients, and the measures
of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of this. For different
things are adapted to different beings according to their nature.
But the
rately,

sible for

ON THE THEOLOGY

62

BOOK

I.

good, in the same manner as the sun always emits


For a different thing receives this light differently according to its

Gods always extend


light/

and receives the greatest portion of light it is capable of receiving.


For all things are led according to justice, and good is not absent from any
order,

thing, but

is

present to every thing, according to an appropriate boundary

And as the Athenian guest says, all things are in a


good condition, and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore sav,

of participation.

that there are precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or intellectual

o
x
r

paradigms of

evils, in

a malific

the same,

manner

as there are of goods,

an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor


let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good.
For all
these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being more remote from
or that there

is

soul, or

wander into barbaric

the truth

folly,

and gigantic mythology.

Nor if

certain persqns speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise things of


this kind, shall

we make any

they indicate.

and

in the

mean

But the

alteration in the apparent apparatus of

truth indeed of those things

time, the science of Plato

is

what

to be investigated,

must be genuinely received

the pure bosoms of the soul, and must be preserved undefiled and

in

un-

mingled with contrary opinions.

CHAPTER

XVIII.

In the next place, let us survey the immutability and simplicity of the
Gods, what the nature of each of them is, and how both these appear to
be adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration of
Plato.

The Gods, therefore, are exempt from the whole of things. But
as we have said, with good, they are themselves perfectly good

filling these,

each of them according to his proper order possesses that which

and The whole genus of the Gods


nance according to an exuberance of good.

excellent

is

is

most

at once allotted predomi-

But here

again,

we must

Digitized by

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OF PLATO-

CHAP. XVIII.

6s

oppose those who interpret in a divisible manner that which is most excellent in the Gods, and who say, that if the first cause is roost excellent,
that which

posterior to the

is

first

not

is

For

so.

it

is

necessary, say

by which it is proby them. For it is necessary


duced. And this indeed
in the Gods, to preserve the order of causes unconfused, and to define
But together with a proseparately their second and third progressions.
the unfolding into light of things secongression of this kind, and with
dary from those that are first, that which is most excellent must also be
surveyed in each of the Gods. For each of the Gods in his own characteristic peculiarity is allotted a transcendency which is primary and perthey, that

what

is

produced should be

inferior to that

rightly asserted

is

'

One of them

fectly good.

known,

is

indeed, that

and

allotted this transcendency,

we may speak of something


is

most excellent as possessing

a prophetic power, another as demiurgic, but another as a perfector of


works.

And

Timfeus indicating

For the world, says he,

miurgus the best of causes.


of generated natures, and
intelligible

artificer is the best

its

paradigm, and which

But

this to us, continually calls the first de-

is

is

the most beautiful

of causes

though the

the most beautiful of intelligibles

is

prior

most beautiful and at the same time most


and the maker and at the same
excellent, as the demiurgic paradigm
time father of the universe is most excellent, as a demiurgic God. In the
Republic also, Socrates speaking of the Gods, very properly observes,
to the demiurgus.

this is

that each of

them being

as

much

most beautiful and most

as possible

excellent, remains always with a simplicity of subsistence in his

own

form.

For each of them being allotted that which is first and the summit in his
own series, does not depart from his own order, but contains the blessedness and felicity of his
his present for

own proper power.

a worse order

for

it is

And

neither does he exchange

not lawful for that which possesses

changed into a worse condition nor does he pass into a


For where can there be any thing better than that which is
most excellent? But this is present with each of the divinities according
to his own order, as wc have said, and also with every genus of the Gods.
all

virtue to be

better order.

For

to

it it

netewary to read

tj.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

(J4

It

BOOK

I.

necessary therefore that every divine nature should he established

is

immutably, abiding

in its

own accustomed manner.

things the selfcsufficiency, undefiled purity,


sistence of the

Gods

is

apparent

For

if

Hence from

these

and invariable sameness of sub'


they are nol changed to a more

excellent condition of being, as possessing that which

nature, they are sufficient to themselves, and are not in

is

best in their

own

want of any good.

Aod if they are not at any time changed to a worse condition, they remain undefiled, established in their own transcendencies. If also they
guard the perfection of themselves immutably, they subsist always with

What

invariable sameness.

the self-sufficiency therefore of the

what their immutability, and what

tlieir

sameness of subsistence,

Gods

we

is,

shall

in the next place consider.

The world then is said

to be self-sufficient, because

its

subsistence

is

per-

from things perfect, and a whole from wholes ; and because it is filled
with all appropriate goods from iU generating father.
But a perfection
and self-sufficiency of this kind is partible, and is said to consist of many
fect

tilings coalescing in one,

participation.

as being
its

own

ciency

is

full

The

and

from separate causes according to

is filled

order of divine souls also,

is

said to be self-sufficient,

of appropriate virtues, and always preserving the measure of

But here likewise the self-suffiwant of powers. For these souls have not their intellections
intelligibles
but
they
energize according to time,
;
the same

blessedness without indigence.


in

directed to

and obtain the complete perfection of their contemplation in whole periods


of time. The self-sufficiency therefore of divine souls, and the whole
Again, the intellectual
perfection of their life is not at once present.
world is said to be self-sufficient, as having its whole good established in
eternity, comprehending at once its whole blessedness, and being indigent
of nothing, because all life and all intelligence are present with it, and
nothing is deficient, nor does it desire any thing as absent. But this, in-

deed,

is

sufficient to itself in its

sufficiency of the

ness

itself,

Gods.

nor primarily good

parxis and goodness.

own

For every

The

order, yet it falls short of tho self-

intellect is

boniform, yet

is

not good-

but each of the Gods

peculiarity

progression of the goodness of each.

is a unity, hyhowever of hyparxis changes the


For one divinity is a perfcetwe

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XVIII.

a goodness connective of the whole of things, and


another is a collective goodness. But each is simply a goodness sufficient
Or it may be said, that each is a goodness possessing the selfto itself.
goodness, another

is

and the all-perfect, neither according to participation, nor illumiby being that very thing which it is. For intellect is sufficient
by 'participation, and soul by illumination, but this universe, ac-

sufficient

nation, but
to itself

cording to a similitude to a divine nature.

The Gods themselves, however,

are self-sufficient through and by themselves,

filling

themselves, or rather

subsisting as the plenitudes of all good.

But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall
we say it is ? Is it such as that of a [naturally} circulating body ? For
neither
it filled

this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures, nor is


with the mutation arising from generation, and the disorder which

is

occurs in the sublunary regions.

immaterial and immutable.


corporeal hypostases, yet

But

For the nature of the celestial bodies is


this indeed is great and venerable, as in

it is inferior

every body possesses both

its

to the nature of the Gods.

being, and

But

its

For

perpetual immutability from

and the immutable in the Gods such as the immutability of souk.


For these communicate in a certain respect with bodies, and are the media of an impartible
Nor again is the imessence, and of an essence divided about bodies.
mutability of intellectual essences equivalent to that of the Gods. For
intellect is immutable, impassive, and umuingled with secondary natures,
on account of its union with the Gods. And so far iodeed as it is uniform,
but so far as h is manifold, it has something
it is a thing of this kind
which is more excellent, and something which is subordinate, m itself.
other precedaneous causes.

neither is the impassive

But the Gods alone having established

their

onions according to-this trans-

cendency of beings, are immutable dominations, are primary and impassive.


For there is nothing in them which is not one and byparxis. lint as fire
it and of a contrary power, as
and as lightning proceeds through all things without defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite all multitude, and
abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and all-perfect division. But

abolishes every thing which is foreign to

light expels all darkness,

they deify every thing which participates of them, receiving nothing from
Froc.

Vol.

I.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

66

and do not

their participants,

diminish their

'

BOOK
owu proper union by

I.

the

participation.

Hence
from

all

also the

things,

Gods being

and containing

things they contain


filed.

it is

things are vanquished by

this world
it is

At

preserved indissoluble.

corporeal form,

all

but they are unminglod with

In the third place,

riable sameness, so far as

exempt
no one of the
things and unde-

present every where, arc similarly

indeed

allotted

the

is

all

said

an order

to subsist with inva-

in itself

same time however,

which

since

is

always

possesses a

it

not destitute of mutation, as the Elean guest observes.

The psychical

order likewise is said to obtain an essence always established

iu sameness

and

this is rightly said.

ing to essence; but

it

says in the Pbaedrus, at different times

and

in

forms.

its

For it

is

entirely impassive accord-

has energies extended into time, and as Socrates

progressions about intellect

it

understands different

intelligibles,

comes into contact with

Besides these also, much-honored intellect

is

different

said both to subsist

and to understand with invariable and perpetual sameness, establishing at


once in eternity its essence, powers, and energies. Through the multitude
however of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible species
and genera, there is not only an invariable sameness, but also a difference
of subsistence in intellect. For difference there is consubsistent with
And there is not only a wandering of corporeal motions, and
sameness.
of the psychical periods, but likewise of

intellect itself, so far as it pro-

duces the intelligence of itself into multitude; and evolves the

intelligible.

For soul indeed evolves intellect, but intellect the intelligible, as Plotinus
somewhere rightly observes, when speaking of the intelligible subjections.
For such are the wanderings of intellect and which it is lawful for it to make.

we should say that a perpetual sameness of subsistence is priGods alone, and is especially inherent in them, we shall not
deviate from the truth, and we shall accord with Plato, who says in tlie
If therefore

marily in the

an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence alone permost divine of all things. The Gods, therefore, bind to thema sameness of this kind, and guard with immutable

Politicus, that

tains to the

selves the causes of

'

nx

is

omitted in the original.

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CHAP. XIX.

OF PLATO.
<

sameness

proper hyparxis established accord ing to the uuknown union


of themselves. And such is the immutability of the Gods, which is contheir

tained in self-sufficiency, impassivity and sameness.

CHAPTER

XIX.

I n the next place, let us consider what power the simplicity of the

Gods

possesses

for this Socrates

adds

nature, not admitting that which

in his discourse

various,

is

concerning a divine

and multiform, and which

appears different at different times, but referring to divinity the uniform

and the simple.

Each of

own

simply in his

form.

the divinities therefore, as he says, remains

What

then shall

we conclude

respecting this

That it is not such as that which is defined to be one in


number. For a thing of this kind is composed of many things, and abundantly mingled.
But it appears to be simple so far as it has distinctly a
common form. Nor is it such as the simplicity which is in many things
according to an arranged species or genus. For these are indeed more
simplicity?

simple than the individuals in which they are inherent, but are replete with
variety,

natures.

communicate with matter, and receive the diversities of material


Nor is it such as the form of nature. For nature is divided

about bodies, verges to corporeal masses, emits many powers about the
composition subject to it, and is indeed more simple than bodies, but has

an essence mingled with their variety. Nor is it such as the psychical simplicity.
For soul subsisting as a medium between an impartible essence,
and an essence which is divided about bodies, communicates with both

And by that which

the extremes.

is

multiform indeed in

head

conjoined with things subordinate, but

its

according to this

and

Nor

again

is

every intellect

it is

especially divine,

the simplicity of the

is

is

by which

it is

nature

it is

on high, and

allied to intellect.

Gods such

as that of intellect.

impartible and uniform, but at the

multitude and progression

its

established

same time

evident that

it

it

For

possesses

has a habitude

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ON

68
to secondary natures, to

TliK

BOOK I.

THEOLOGY'

and about itself.


multiform, and as it

itself,

It

b also

in

itself,

and

is

is said, is one nwny.


It
not only uniform, but also
is therefore allotted au essence subordinate to the first simplicity.
But

the

Gods have

indeed from
vision

and

their hyparxis defined in

all

one simplicity alone, being exempt

multitude so far as they are gods, and transcending

interval, or

habitude to secondary natures, and

all

all di-

composition.

And they

indeed are in inaccessible places, expanded above the whole of


and eternally ride on beings. But the illuminations proceeding
from them to secondary natures, being mingled iu many places with their
participants which are composite and various, are filled with a peculiarity
Let no one therefore wonder, if the Gods being essentia
similar to them.
alized in one simplicity according to transcendency, various phantasms are
hurled forth before the presence of them ; nor, if they being uniform
the appearances are multiform, as we have learnt in the most perfect of
the mysteries. For nature, and the demiurgic intellect extend corpothings,

real-formed images of things incorporeal, sensible images of intelligible,

and of

tilings

without interval, images endued with interval.

crates also in the

Phadrus indicating things of

this

For So-

kind, and evincing

that the mysteries into which souls without bodies are initiated are roost
blessed, and truly perfect, says, that they are initiated into entire, simple
and immoveable visions, such souls becoming situated there, and united

with the

Gods

themselves, but not meeting with the resemblances which

Gods into these sublunary realms. For these are


more partial and composite, and present themselves to the view attended
with motion. But illuminated, uniform, simple, and, as Socrates says,
immoveable spectacles exhibit themselves to the attendants of the Gods,
and to souls that abandon the abundant tumult of generation, and who
ascend to divinity pure and divested of the garments of mortality. And
thus much is concluded by us respecting the simplicity of the Gods. For
are emitted from the

it is

necessary that the nature which generates things multiform should be

simple,'

and should precede what is generated, in the same manner as the

uniform precedes the multiplied.


1

If, therefore,

After aAw ia.che original,

it

U requisite

the

Gods

to insert

are the causes of

hvm mi.

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CHAP XX
all

OF PLATO.

competition, and produce from themselves the variety of beings,

certainly neoessary that

whole of

tilings,

me aw

should have

of their nature which

its

is

it is

generative of the

subsistence in (simplicity.

For as incor-

poreal causes precede bodies, immoveable causes things that are moved,

and impartible causes all partible natures, after the same manner uniform
intellectual powers precede oiuitiibrm natures, unmingled powers, things
that are mingled together, and simple powers, things of a variegated nature.

CHAPTER XX.
Iir

Gods

the next place, let us speak concerning the troth which


;

for this in addition to

because a divine nature

is

what has been

said

is

without falsehood, and

is

in the

concluded by Socrates,
is

neither the cause of

We most underexempt from the truth which consists


in words, so far as this truth is composite, and in a certain respect is mingled
with its contrary, and because its subsistence consists of things that are
not true. For the first parts do not admit of a truth of this kind, unless
some one being persuaded by what Socrates asserts in the Cratyl us, should
say that these also are after another manner true. Divine truth also is exdeception or ignorance to us, or to any other beings.
stand therefore, that divine truth

empt from

psychical truth, whether

ces^ far as
but
in

is

it is

surveyed in opinions or in scien-

inacertain respect divisible, and

is

not beings themselves,

assimilated to and co-harmoniied with beings,

and as being perfected

it is

motion and mutation

falls

and of a principal nature.


intellectual truth, because
is

is

said to be

and

is,

Divine truth
though

its

is

is

always firm, stable

likewise again

this subsists

exempt from

according to essence, and

beings themselves, through the power of sameness,

yet again, through difference,


preserves

short of the truth which

it is

separated from the essence of them, and

peculiar hypostasis unconfirmed with respect to them.

The

ON THE THEOLOGY

70

Gods

truth therefore of the

Gods, surpasses

alone,

And

communion of them.

is

the undivided union

all

and

Gods contractedly comprehends


all

But

this

all

knowledge alone of

these secondary forms of knowledge,

beiogs according to an ineffable union.

Gods know

all-perfect

secondary forms of knowledge

participate of an appropriate perfection.

the

and

through this the ineffable knowledge of the

knowledge, and

all

BOOK

things at once, wholes

and

And

through

the

this

and non-beings,
the same manner as intellect by
parte, beings

and tilings temporal, not in


knows a part, and by being, non-being, but they know every
thing immediately, such things as are common, and such as are particulars,
though you should speak of the most absurd of all things, though you

things eternal

the universal

should speak of the infinity of contingencies, or even of matter


If,

however, you investigate the

mode of

itself.

the knowledge and truth of

things that have a subsistence in

the Gods, concerning

all

whatever,

and incomprehensible by the projecting energies of

the

it is

human

ineffable

intellect

but

is

alone

known

to the

Gods

any respect

themselves.

And

indeed admire those Platonists that attribute to intellect the knowledge of


things, of individuals, of things preternatural, and in short, of evils,
and on this account establish intellectual paradigms of these. But I
much more admire those who separate the intellectual peculiarity from
divine union.
For intellect is the first fabrication and progeny of the
Gods. These therefore assign to intellect whole and first causes, and such
as are according to nature, and to the Gods a power which is capable of
adorning and generating all things. For the one is every where, but whole
And of the one indeed matter participates and every
is not every where.
being; but of intellect and intellectual species and genera, all things do
not participate. All things therefore are alone from the Gods, and real
For on this account
truth is with them who know all things unically.
also, in oracles the Gods similarly teach all things, wholes and parts, things

all

For being
eternal, and such as are generated through the whole of time.
exempt from eternal beings, and from those that exist in time, they contract in themselves the knowledge of each and of all things, according to
one united truth. If therefore any falsehood occurs in the oracles of the

Gods, we must not say that a thing of this kind originates from the Gods,

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XX.

71

bat from the recipients, or the instruments, or the places, or the times.
For all these contribute to the participation of divine knowledge, and
are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they receive a pure

when they

illumination of the truth which

are separated from the

is

But when they

established in them.

Gods through

inaptitude,

and become discordant

with them, then they obscure the truth which proceeds from them. What
kind of falsehood therefore can be said to be derived from the Gods, who
produce all the species of knowledge? What deception can there be with
those wh establish in themselves the whole of truth
ner, as

it

appears to me, the Gods extend good to

that which

is

willing

In the same man-

all things,

but always

and able receives the extended good, as Socrates

And

says in the Phaedrus.

a divine nature indeed

but that which departs from


through, itself ; thus also, the

it,

is

causeless of evil,

and gravitates downward,

Gods indeed

is

elongated

are always the suppliers of

by them, who are lawfully their


For the Elean wise man says, that the eye of the soul in

truth, but those natures are illuminated

participants.

the multitude,

is

not strong enough to look to the truth.

The Athenian guest also celebrates this truth which


the Gods for he says that truth is the leader to
;

good, and likewise of every good to men.

them with

souls conjoins
tlie intellectual
tlie

intellect,

filled

with

all

Gods of every

all

Gods

is in

unites

good, with which being conjoined,

For every where the hyparxis of


one ; since in the
proceeding from the good, and which conjoins

boniform power.

truth has a cause which

Republic

the

For as the truth which

intellectual truth conducts all

orders to the one, thus also the truth of the

divine unities to the fountain of

they are

and as

subsists primarily in

also, the light

is

collective of multitude into

denominated by Platp truth. This chawhich unites and binds together the natures
and the natures that are filled, according to all the orders of the
Gods, must be arranged as originating supernally and proceeding as far

intellect with the intelligible, is

racteristic property theref ore,

that

fill

as to the last of things.

ON THE THEOLOGY

7;

CHAPTER

BOOK

I.

XXI.

To us however discussing what pertains to every divine nature, what


we assert will be known from those commonly received truths adduced in
the Phaedrus, and which

we have

says that every thing divine

that this triad pervades to


fore

is

With

before mentioned.

beautiful, wise,

Gods

respect to the goodness of the


it

indicates

What thereGods ?

therefore,

we have

before ob-

preserves and gives subsistence to the whole of things, that

every where exists as the summit, as that which

and

Socrates therefore

and good,' and he

the progressions of the Gods.

the goodness, what the wisdom, and what the beauty of the

served, that
it

is

all

fills

as pre-existing in every order analogous to the

subordinate natures,
fir*t

principle of the

For according to this all the Gods are coo joined with the
one cause of all things, and on account of this primarily derive their
subsistence as Gods.
For in all beings there is not any thing more perfect
than the good, and the Gods. To the most excellent of l)eiiigs therefore,
and which are in every respect perfect, the best and most perfect of
divine orders.

things

adapted.

is

CHAPTER
Btt

XXII.

in the Philebus, Plato delivers to us

ments of the good,


it is

necessary that

and

that

it

vis. the desirable,


it

should convert

the three most principal ele-

the sufficient, and the perfect.

all

things to

itself,

and

fill

all

For

things,

should be in no respect deficient, and should not diminish

its

Let no one therefore conceive the desirable to be such as


that which is frequently extended in sensibles as the object of appetite.

exuberance.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXII.
For such

is

apparent beauty.

Nor

let

73

him suppose

it

to be such as

is

in-

deed able to energize upon and excite to itself the natures which are able
to participate it, but which at the same time may be apprehended by intelligence, and is educed by us according to a projecting energy, and an

For it is ineffable, and prior to all


For all things desire the good, and are

adhesion of the dianoetic power.

knowledge extends
converted to

to all beings.

But

it.

ristic peculiarity

if it

be requisite summarily to unfold the characte-

of the desirable, as the supplier of light proceeds by his

rays into secondary natures, converts the eye to himself, causes

and to resemble

solar-form,

conjoins

it

with his

own

himself,

and through a

it

to be

different similitude

fulgid splendour, thus also I think the desirable

of the Gods allures and draws upward

all things to the Gods in an ineffmanner by its own proper illuminations, being every where present
to all things, and not deserting any order whatever of beings.
Since even
matter itself is said to be extended to this desirable, and through this

able

desire

is filled

with as

many goods

fore the centre of all beings,

essences, powers

and

as
all

and energies about

of things towards

it is

able to participate.

beings,
this.

this is inextinguishable.

and

And
For

all

the

It is there-

Gods have

their

the extension and desire


all

beings aspire after this

is unknown and incomprehensible.


Not being able thereknow or receive that which they desire, they dance round

desirable which
fore either to
it,

and are parturient and as

it

were prophetic with respect to

it.
But
unknown and inunable to embrace and

they have an unceasing and never-ending desire of


effable

nature, at the

same time

that they

are

its

For being at once exempt from all things, it is similarly


present to and moves all things about itself, and is at the same time by all
By this motion also and this desire it
of them incomprehensible.
But by its unknown transcendency through which
preserves all things.

embosom

it

it.

surpasses the whole of things,

with secondary natures.

But

the sufficient

extends to

is full

Such

it

preserves

therefore

is

its

proper union un mingled

the desirable.

of boniform power, proceeds to all things, and

For we conceive such a


power pervading and protending to the last
extending the unenvyiug and exuberant will of the Gods, and
Vol. I.
all

beings the gifts of the Gods.

sufficiency as this to be a

of things,
Proc.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

74

ROOK

I.

but unically comprehending the super-plenitude, the


never-failing, the infinite, and that which is generative of good in the
divine hyparxis. For the desirable being firmly established, and surpas-

not abiding in

itself,

sing the whole of things, and arranging


cient begins the progression

which
lific

all

is

primary

in the

all

beings about

the suffi-

itself,

and multiplication of all good,

calls forth that

uniform hyparxis of the desirable, by

own

its

pro-

exuberance, and by the beneficent replenishings which pervade to


and copiously produces and imparts it to every being. It is

'

things,

owing to the sufficient therefore, that the stability of divine natures, and
that which proceeds from its proper causes is full of goodness, and that,
in short, all beings are benefited, abiding in, proceeding from,

and being
Through

united to their principles, and essentially separated from them.


this

power

therefore, the intellectual genera give subsistence to natures

similar to themselves, souls desire to generate,

to souls, natures deliver their productive

and

all

and imitate the beings prior

principles into another place,

things possess, in short, the love of generation.

For the sufficiency

of the goodness of the Gods, proceeding from this goodness,

nated

in all beings,

of good

and moves

intellect indeed to

is

dissemi-

unenvying communication
the communication of intellectual, but soul
things to the

all

of psychical, and nature of natural good.

and gene-

All things therefore abide through the desirable of goodness,

rate

and proceed into second ami

But

the third thing, the perfect,

third generations through the sufficient.

is convertivc of the whole of things, and


them to their causes and this is accomplished by divine,
psychical and physical perfection.
For all things participate

circularly collects
intellectual,

of conversion, since the

infinity

of progression

is

through

this

again re-

and the perfect is mingled from the desirable and


For every thing of this kind is the object of desire, and is
generative of things similar to itself.
Or in the works of nature also, are
called to its principles

sufficient.

not perfect things every where lovely and


their

beauty

prehends them

The

in itself.
1

prolific

desirable therefore establishes

The

sufficient excites

Instead of pwi/i?

it it

through the acme fof


all

them

things,

into

and com-

progressions

necessary to read yw.p.

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CHAP. XXIII.

OF PLATO.

And

and generations.

75

consummately leads progressions to


conversions and convolutions.
But through these three causes, the good*
ness of the Gods fixing the unical power and authority of its proper hypostasis in this triad, is the primary and most principal fountain and
vestal seat of things which have any kind of subsistence whatever.
the perfect

CHAPTER
After

this,

XXIII.

wisdon\is allotted the second order, being the intelligence

of the Gods, or rather the hyparxis of their intelligence.


indeed,

is

ligible

is

this in the

but the wisdom of the Gods

intelligence
is ineffa-

united to the object of knowledge and the intel-

union of the Gods.

surveyed

may

knowledge

intellectual

ble knowledge, which

For

But

it

appears to

me

that Plato especially

triad [of the beautiful, the wise

be inferred from the conceptions scattered about

and the good,] as


it

in

many

places.

Diotima in the Banquet is of opinion that wisdom is full


of that which is known, and that it neither seeks, nor investigates, but
Hence, she says, that no one of the Gods phipossesses the intelligible.
I say then that

become wise ; for a God is wise. Hence that


and indigent of truth but that which
is wise is full and unindigent, and has every thing present which it wishes
and desires nothing. But the desirable and the appetible are proposed
losophizes, nor desires to

which

is

philosophic

is

imperfect,

Socrates, however, in the Republic considers that

to the philosopher.

which

is

generative of truth and intellect, as affording an indication of

wisdom, to our souls indeed the ascent to divine plenitude being accomplished through knowledge,' but to the Gods intellect being present from
1
the fulness of knowledge.
For the progression in them is not from an
'

For ymqnots

it is

requisite to read ynxrinf.

The same emendation

is

necessary here as above.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

76

imperfect habit to the perfect

But

in

the Theatetus he indicates

that the perfective of things imperfect, and that which calls forth

cealed intelligence in souls, pertain to wisdom.

me

I.

but from a self-perfect hyparxis a power

proceeds.

prolific of inferior natures

BOOK

For he says,

it

con-

compels

but prevents me from generating. It is evident


from these things, that the genus of wisdom is triadic. Hence

to obstetrication,

therefore,
it is full

of being and truth,

generative of intellectual truth, and

is

is

and itself possesses a


must admit therefore, that these things pertain to the
wisdom of the Gods. For this wisdom is full indeed of divine goodness,
generates divine truth, and perfects all things posterior to itself.
perfective of intellectual natures that are in energy,
stable power.

We

CHAPTER XXIV.
In
it

the next place let us consider the beautiful,

primarily subsists in the Gods.

It is said

what

it

is,

and how

therefore to be boniform

beauty, and %telligiblc beauty, to be more ancient than intellectual


beauty, and to be beauty

add

all

itself,

And

such like epithets.

only from the beauty which

symmetry which

is

in

is

and the cause of beauty to all beings


rightly said.
But it is separate not

it is

apparent in corporeal masses, from the

these from

psychical elegance,

and

intellectual

splendour, but also from the second and third progressions in the

and subsisting
all

and

in the intelligible place of survey,

the genera of the Gods,


all

Gods

proceeds from this to

their superesscntial unities,

the essences suspended from these unities, as far as to the appa-

rent vehicles of the Gods.

the

and illuminates

it

Gods

knowledge

As

therefore through the

are boniform, and through intelligible


ineffable,

and

first

goodness

established above intellect, thus also, I

through the summit of beauty, every thing divine

all

wisdom they have a


is

lovely.

think,

For from

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXIV.

Gods

derive beauty,

77

and being

filled

with

it, fill

the

thence all the


exciting all things, agitating them with
natures posterior to themselves,
and pouring supernally on all
Bacchic fury about the love of themselves,
beauty.
things the divine effluxion of
supplier of divine hilarity,
Such therefore, in short, is divine beauty, the

and
and friendship. For through this the Gods are united to
communicating with
each other, admire, and are delighted in
replenishings, and do not desert the order
each other, and in their mutual
the distributions of themselves. Plato
which they arc always allotted in
familiarity
rejoice in

indications of this beauty,


also delivers three
denominating it the delicate ; for the perfect
blessed, accedes to

the beautiful through the

in the Banquet indeed,


and that which is most

participation of goodness.

dialogue "That which is truly beautiBut hethus speaks of it in that


and most blessed." One of the indications thereful is delicate, perfect
But we
thing of this kind, viz. the delicate.
fore of the beautiful, is a
:

another indication of it from thePhtedrus, viz. the splendid.


" It was then that we
beautiful says
For Plato attributing this to the
shining upon us Sec" And afterwere permitted to see splendid beauty
"
:
arriving hither we apprehended it shining most

may assume

And
wards he adds
the sepses." And at last he says
manifestly through the clearest of
" But now beauty alone has this allotment to be most splendid and most
indications of
These two things therefore are to be assumed as
lovely."

beauty is this, that it is the object of love,


beauty. Another indication of
And
to have called most lovely.
which now also Plato appears to me
shows that the amatory fury is conversant with
in many other places he
of
monad
the
from
defining, and in short, suspending love
the beautiful,

" For love, says he, is conversant with the beautiful."


moves all things to itself,
Because, therefore, beauty converts and
love,
energize enthusiastically, and recalls them through

beauty.

causes them to

of the whole amatory series,


the object of love, being the leader
and exciting all things to itselr
walking on the extremities of its feet,
But again because it extends to
through desire and astonishment.
conjunction with hilarity and
secondary natures plenitudes from itself, in
pouring on
alluring, enflaming, and elevating all things, and

it is

divine facility,

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ON THE THEOLOGY

78

them

illuminations from on high,

BOOK
and

1.

be so by
And because it bounds this triad, and covers as with a veil the
Plato.
ineffable union of the Gods, swims as it were on the light of forms,
it

is

delicate,

said to

is

causes intelligible light to shine forth, and announces the occult nature
For
of goodness, it is denominated splendid, lucid and manifest.

Gods is supreme and most united their wisdom is


now parturient with intelligible light, and the first

the goodness of the

in a certain respect

forms

but

their

beauty

ous precursor of divine

established in the highest forms,

is

and

light,

is

the

first

thing that

the lumin-

apparent to

is

ascending souls, being more splendid and more lovely to the view and to

embrace than every


through
filled

all

luciferous essence,

and when

This triad therefore

with astonishment.

it

appears

filling all things,

is

received

and proceeding

the natures which are

things, it is certainly necessary that

should be converted to and conjoined with each of the three through

same media.

kindred, and not through the

For of different things that


and different powers
are converted to a different perfection of the Gods.
I think therefore,
it is manifest to every one, and it is frequently asserted by Plato, that
which
congregates all secondary natures to divine beauty,
the cause
are

filled

which
it,

by

this triad there is

familiarizes

and of

them

to

their derivation

it

a different

and

is

medium

the source of their being

from thence,

is

filled

with

nothing else than love, which

Gods,
first
and the more excellent genera, and the best of souls. But again, truth is
certainly the leader to, and establishes beings in, divine wisdom, with
which intellect being filled, possesses a knowledge of beings, and souls
always conjoins according to the beautiful, secondary to the

full

participation

effected through truth, since this every

where illumi-

participating of this energize intellectually.

of true wisdom
nates

is

intellective

the intelligible.

To

For the

and conjoins them with

natures,

intellection, just as truth also

and

'

is tfie first

those however

the objects

of

thing that congregates intellect

who hasten

to be conjoined with

the good, knowledge and co-operation are no longer requisite, but collocation, a firm establishment

'

Instead of wp

and quiet are necessary.

mntr

it

requisite to read

^wrwTWf.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXV.

79

CHAPTER XXV.
What therefore is it which unites us to the good? What is it which causes
in us

a cessation of energy and motion

divine natures in the


it

first

and

What

is it

which establishes

ineffable unity of goodness

And how

conic to pass that every tiling being established in that which

to itself according to the

good which

posterior to itself according to cause

which ineffably unites

happy

all

souls to the good.

is

in itself, again establishes things

is

It

is,

it is

Gods,
and of

in short, the faith of the

the genera of the Gods, of daemons,

For

all

does
prior

necessary to investigate the good neither

up to the divine light,


and closing the eyes of the soul, after this manner to become established
For such a kind of faith as
in the unknown and occult unity of beings.
this is more ancient than the gnostic energy, not in us only, but with the
all
to
this
the Gods are united, and
according
Gods themselves, and
about one centre uniformly collect the whole of their powers and prognostically, nor imperfectly, but giving ourselves

gressions.

If however

it

be requisite to give a particular definition of

this faith,

no one suppose that it is such a kind of faith as that which is converFor this falls short of science,
sant with the wandering about sensibles.
and much more of the truth of beings. But the faith of the Gods sur-

let

passes

all

knowledge, and according to the highest union conjoins secon-

dary with

first

natures.

Nor

again, let

species with the celebrated belief in

common

him conceive a

a similar

faith of

common conceptions

for

we

believe

reasoning.
But the knowledge of
by no means equivalent to divine union and the
science of these is not only posterior to faith, but also to intellectual
For intellect is established beyond all science, both the first
simplicity.
science, and that which is posterior to it.
Neither, therefore, must we
in

these

is

conceptions prior to

divisible,

and

all

is

say that the energy according to intellect


this.

For

intellectual

energy

is

is

similar to such

multiform, and

is

faith as

separated from the

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ON THE THEOLOGY

80

objects of intellection through difference

and

BOOK
in short,

I.

intellectual

it is

motion about the intelligible. But it is necessary that divine faith should
be uniform and quiet, being perfectly established in the port of goodness.
For neither is the beautiful, nor wisdom, nor any thing else among beings,
so credible and stable to all things, and so exempt from all ambiguity,
apprehension and

divisible

motion, as the good. For through this


embraces another union more ancient than intellectual

also

intellect

energy, and prior to energy. And soul considers the variety of intellect
and the splendour of forms as nothing with respect to that transcendency
of the good by which it surpasses the whole of tilings. And it dismisses
indeed intellectual perception, running back to its own hyparxis but it
;

always pursues, investigates, and aspires after the good, hastens as


to

embosom

it,

and gives

But why

hesitation.

itself to

is

this

alone

among

necessary to speak of the soul

it

mortal animals, as Diotima somewhere says, despise

it

were

things without

all

For these

and
and being, through a desire of the nature of the good ; and
all things have this one immoveable and ineffable tendency to the good
but they overlook, consider as secondary, and despise the order of every
even

life itself

thing

else.

This, therefore,

This also
this the

is

is

the one secure port of

especially the object of belief to

conjunction and union with

it is

love

tome

to

be the case) the alliance of

that he

who has a conception of

their contraries, infers the


this triad.

hood

is

it

From

And
by

with truth and

therefore are

when

through

theologists,

may speak what


ignorant,

discoursing about

to the deviations from

Laws

that the lover of false-

is

who

is

not to be believed

is

void

necessary that the lover of truth should be

worthy of belief, and that he who


to friendship.

(if I

same thing with respect

not to be believed, and that he

Hence

beings.

faith

this faith

these things,

Plato then clearly asserts in the

of friendship.

all

beings.

all

The multitude

proclaimed in the Laws.

is

other things,

denominated

and not by them only, but by Plato likewise,


appears

all

is

worthy of belief should be well adapted

these things therefore,

we may survey

divine truth,

and love, and comprehend by a reasoning process their stable communion with each other. If, however, you arc willing, prior to thesp

faith

things

we

will recall to

our memory that Plato denominates that virtuo

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXVI.
fidelity

wars, I

81

which conciliates those that disagree, and subverts the greatest of

mean

For from these things

seditions in cities.

to be the cause of union,

communion and

And

faith

appears

such a
power as this in us, it is by a much greater priority in the Gods themselves.
For as Plato speaks of a certain divine temperance, justice and
science, how is it possible that faith which connectedly comprehends the
quiet.

if

there

is

whole order of the virtues should not subsist with the Gods ? In short,
there are these three things which replenish divine natures,

are the sources of plenitude to

wisdom and beauty.

ness,

again, there are

collect together the natures that are filled, being

former, but pervading to

and

love.

But

all

some

is

more excellent than

which

the divine orders, and these are faith, truth

and are conjoined

all

and others through theurgic power,

human wisdom, and which comprehends

prophetic good, the purifying powers of perfective good, and in short,

such things as are the


things therefore,

effects

we may

to

things indeed, through the amatory mania,

others through divine philosophy,

which

three things

secondary indeed to the

things are saved through these,

primary causes

their

all

and which

the superior genera of beings, viz. good-

all

And

of divine possession.

alt

Concerning these

perhaps again speak more opportunely.

CHAPTER XXVI.
Again, let us, if you are willing, from other dialogues investigate the
common dogmas of Plato about divine natures. Whence therefore, and
what dogmas shall we assume, while we proceed in our search according
to nature? Are you willing that we should in the next place recall to
our memory what is written in the Phsedo ? Socrates therefore says in
the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul which are derived from
its

similitude to divinity, that the essence which

Proc.

Vol.

I.

is

superior to the soul,

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ON THE THEOLOGY

82

(and to which the soul

is

naturally similar,

of an immortal allotment)
indissoluble

is

BOOK

I.

and being similar participates

divine and immortal, intelligible and uniform,

and possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence; but that

the essence which


also

it

kind

is inferior to the soul, is entirely the contrary, to which


and to be passive. For a thing of this
and multiform, and is dissoluble because it is a composite

pertains to be corrupted

is

sensible

and he predicates among these all such things as pertain to a corporeal


subsistence.
Let us therefore direct our attention to these common dogmas, and examine after what, manner each of them pertains to the Gods.
In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak
of that which
is

is

said to be divine

evident that every

For

beings.

God

From what

has been said therefore,

subsists according to the

to us ascending

highest union

from bodies, the Gods have appeared

to

it

of

be

sujxi essential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers of essences,

and who bind


is

all first

essences to themselves.

But

that

which

is

divine,

not only hyparxis and the one in each order of being, but at the same

and that which is participated ; of which


the latter is a God, but the former is divine.
Whether however, prior to
the participated unities, there is something which is separate and particiBut at present we shall define
pated will he evident in what follows.
that which is divine to be a thing of this kind, viz. being* which partici-

time

that which participates

is

pates of the one, or the one subsisting contractedly together with being.

For we assume all things in the Gods except the one, as suspended from
them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do
not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these in
But it is necessary not to be
themselves, but are not defined in them.
ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each other.

many
the

In

places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the participants of

Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods. For not only
Laws calls a divine soul a God, but also Socrates

the Athenian guest in the


in the Phsedrus.

Gods

clearly,

For

For he says " that

all

is it

" and

this is the life

and charioteers of the


and afterwards still more

the horses

are good and consist of things good

of the Gods."

;"

But

this is

not yet wonderful.

not admirable that he should denominate those beings

Gods who

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXVI.

S3

who together with them give


For in many places he calls daemons Gods,
series ?
though they are essentially posterior to, and subsist about the Gods. For
in the Phaidrus and Timrcus, and in other dialogues, you will find him extending the appellation of the Gods even as far as to daemons. But what
arc always conjoined with the Gods, and

completion to one

is still

tain

more paradoxical than these

men Gods;

things, he does not refuse to call cer-

for in the Sophista

he thus denominates the Elean

guest.

From

must be assumed, that with


simply a God, another according to union,
another according to participation, another according to contact, and anthat has been said therefore, this

all

respect to a

God, one thing

is

For of super-essential natures indeed, each

other according to similitude.


is

primarily a

God

of intellectual natures, each

union; and of divine

men

these however

each

is,

posterior to the

we have

as

deity, in the

first

God

according to

Gods

to contact with the

than a God.

Since the

but that which

same manner as

that which

and the

Each of

is
is

divine

united

is
is

and that which


And always those natures that are more uniform

animated, to soul.

Let

is

according to participation. But

said, rather divine

is

and simple have the precedency


is

God

calls intellect itself divine

posterior to the one, that which

itself.

are allotted this appellation through similitude.

Athenian guest

is

is

Gods according

divine daemons are


souls of

souls,

intellectual, to intellect,

but the series of beings ends in the one

be the definition and distinction of that which

this, therefore,

divine.

In the next place,

many

let

us survey the immortal.

For with Plato there are

orders of immortality, pervading from on high as

of things

and the

last

echo, as

natures that are perpetual

it

were, of immortality,

which the Elean guest,

titr

is

in his discourse

the circulation of the universe, says, are allotted from the

vated immortality.

For every body

dent on another cause


adorn, or preserve

but

itself.

more manifest and more

is

not

is

allotted

The immortality of
;

fatlier

a being and a

itself naturally

perfect than this

as to the last

in those visible

life

about

a reno-

depen-

adapted to connect, or

partial souls

is,

I tlrink,

which Plato evinces by many

demonstrations in the Phacdo, and in the 10th book of the Republic.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

84

But

mean by

BOOK

the immortality of partial souls, that which has a

I.

more

principal subsistence, as containing in itself the cause of eternal perma-

nency.

Wc shall not,

however, err

if

prior to both these

we

establish the

For the genera of these through which they


and they neither verge to mortality, nor are
filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted.
But
I infer that the immortality of divine souls is still more venerable and essentially more transcendent than that of daemons; which divine souls we
say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and principles of the
life divided about bodies, and through which bodies obtain a renovated
immortality of daemons.

subsist aie incorruptible,

If, however, prior to these you conceive the Gods themand the immortality in them, and how in the Banquet Diotima
does not attribute an immortality of this kind even to daemons, but defines

immortality.
selves,

it

to subsist in the

you

to be separate,

Gods alone, such an immortality as this will appear to


and exempt from the whole of things. For there eter-

nity subsists, which

the fountain of all immortality,

is

things live and possess

a
is

life

life,

dispersed into non-being.

immortal so far as

For

life.

it is

of a divine

such a

life,

it

as deifying

life intelligible,

In the next place

life itself,

let

we

numerate

it

gible,

in

and

but as the supplier

life,

opposition to that which


in

sensible

is

conjunction with sense.

of this allotment,

is itself

rather think

with the

which

is

by

divine

us direct our attention to the intelligible.

an essence separated from them.


gible; for

is

whether you are willing to

For

unfolded into light in the most principal causes.

intelligible, is

it all

but others

call

or by any other name.

apprehended by opinion

is first

deed

life,

In short, therefore, that which

immortal, not as participating of

and

and through

things indeed a perpetual

generates and comprehends in itself a perpetual

denominated, therefore,
is

some

first

it fit

exempt from

is

For soul

sensibles,

is

in-

and obtains

Prior to soul also intellect

is intelli-

to arrange soul in the middle, than to con-

essences.

more ancient than


itself perfective

is

It

and which

the intelligible

of

That likewise is denominated

intellect,
it,

intelli-

which replenishes intelligence,

and which Timams arranges prior to

the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy, in the order of a paradigm.

But beyond

these

is

the divine intelligible, which

is

defined according to

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OF PLATO.

CHAP.XXV1I.

8 .5

For this is intelligible as the object


and comprehending intellect, and as
In one way, therefore, we must denominate the
the plenitude of being.
in another way as true being
intelligible as the hyparxis of the Gods
and the first essence in another way as intellect and all intellectual life
psychical
order.
It is likewise necesthe
and in another way as soul and

union

itself,

of desire to

aud a divine hyparxis.

as perfecting

intellect,

sary not to fashion the different natures of things conformably to names.

Such, therefore,

is

the order of this triad; so that

umningled and ranks as the

and that which


being

intelligible

is

the second

Gods; and the

first

is

third

life

that which

the third.

is

what

is

divine indeed

immortal

For the

first

is

is

the second

of these

is

deified

subsisting according to the immortality of the

is intellect,

which

is

denominated

intelligible in

con-

sequence of being replete with union.

CHAPTER
A fter

this, it

XXVII.

follows in the next place, that

we

should consider the

uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness of

same causes, and these

subsistence, from the

pervading through

all

highest subsistence,

is

as the precursors of,

and

For the uniform, indeed, has the


present with the divine monad, and appears to lie
the divine orders.

especially adapted to that which

is

primarily being,' and in which also

every participable genus of unities ends.

be evident as we proceed.

But

For the one

is

prior to these, as

For
comprehends and binds the extremes according to divine union since
the dissoluble is such as it is through the want of connexion and of a
power which collects multitude into one. And that which has an invariwill

the indissoluble

it

is

the second.
;

able sameness of subsistence

'

For t

is

eternal,

o> it is

and

is full

of the perpetuity of the

necewarj to read ry om.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

86

Gods; from which


ness

is

immortal

must

The

derived to other things.

same thing
;

BOOK

1.

and eternal same-

also tle participation of immortality

uniform, therefore, pertains to the

but the indissoluble to the same thing as the


and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we
as the divine

refer to the intelligible.

And do you
to each other?

not see

how

For the

ticipated by being

is,

as

these are severally after a

of

first

tliesc,

it is fit it

according to the one, that which

But

that which through one cause of


life is

the

first

manner co-adapted
unity which

For

should be, uniform.

sists

dissoluble. For

through the

is

if

is

God

par-

sub-

divine will doubtless be uniform.

life is

immortal,

bond of dissoluble natures

is

also similarly in-

which also Timaeus

indicating to us, opposes the dissoluble to the immortal: " for

you are not

immortal, says the demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be
subject

soluble

'

to the fataJity of death."

but the immortal

renovated immortality
mortal.

For being

is

for the

is

Every thing mortal,

indissoluble.

same reason

middle of both

in the

But

cording to each opposition.

therefore,

is

dis-

That, however, which has a

it is

neither indissoluble, nor

neither of the extremes, ac-

the third of these being established ac-

once and is inFor tlie intelligible is the cause of sameness and of


eternal permanency; and intellect through this is entirely eternal. These
triads, therefore, proceed from the first and most principal causes, in the
cording to the plenitude of whole

intelligible^ subsists at

variably the same.

same manner as we demonstrated of the before-mentioned


these things, indeed,

we

These things, therefore, being discussed,

let

that

all

But

us direct our attention to

the uobegottcn in divine natures, and unfold what

we say

triads.

shall consider hereafter.

[true] being

is

we

assert

it

to be.

For

without generation, and Socrates demon-

strates in the Phajdrus, that souls are unbegotten.

Prior to these, also,

Gods themselves are established above generations and a subsistence


according to time. How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when
the

applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason


divinity

is

exempt from

all

'

Is

it

because

generation, uot only from that which subsists

For yw-vif read

twkt9.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXVII.

wc

in the parts of time, such as

to be, nor from that only which

87

assert the generation


is

of material natures

extended into the whole of time, such

as Timseus demonstrates the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but


also from the psychical generation

?
Since Timseus denominates this to
be unbegotten according to time, but to be the best of generated natures.

And

a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential


For the progression of the Gods is always according to a
union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the natures
prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves the things
in short,

separation.

The

produced.

indivisible, therefore, the

So that

in reality unbegotten.

unscparated and the united are-

if certain

generations of the

spoken of by Plato

in fabulous figments, as

generation of Venus

is

and of Love at the

celebrated,

Gods

are

m the fable of Diotima, the


birth of

Venus,

it

is-

necessary not to be ignorant after what manner things of this kind are as-

and that they are composed

serted,

and

tliat

first

For

through causes, generatioti.

light

cause

reason,

cause

is

it is

may

on

this

Orphic writings, indeed, the

thus denominated, in order that a subsistence according to

Gods from

the

neration according to time.

adapted to devise things of


lie

in the

account denominated Time ; since again, for another'

be the same as a subsistence according to time.

gression of the

when

for the sake of symbolical indication v

fables for the sake of concealment call the ineffable unfolding into

is

of causes

liest

To
this

is

the pro-

Plato, therefore, mythologizing,

it

is

kind conformably to theologists; but

discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding

divine natures intellectually

and not mystically,

it is

to celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods.


establish in themselves the
tual nature

And

properly denominated ge-

in

is

chical essence.

then adapted to him

For the Gods primarily

paradigm of non-generation.

But an

a secondary degree unbegotten, and after

And

in bodies there

is

this

intellec-

the psy-

an ultimate resemblance of unbe-

gotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have indefinitely

shown

that the whole heaven

unl>egotten.

But

there

is

is

unbegotten.

an order

in

them of

The Gods,
first,

therefore, arc

middle, and

last

pro-

and a transcendency and subjection of powers. There are also


them uniform comprehensions of causes ; but multiform progenies of

gressions,

in

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ON THE THEOLOGY

88

BOOK

I.

And all things, indeed, are consubsistent in each other


but the mode of subsistence is various. For some things as replenishing
subsist prior to secondary natures ; but others, as being 61led aspire after
more perfect natures, and participating of their power become generative
things caused.

of things posterior to themselves, and perfective of their hyparxis.

CHAPTER
Looking

XXVIII.
we may

to these things, therefore,

unfold what

powers of mothers

is

said of pa-

For every
where, we may suppose that the cause of a more excellent and more uniform nature is paternal ;* but we may say that the cause of a more subternal causes,

and of the

prolific

in fables.

ordinate and partial nature pre-exists in the order of a mother.

the

Gods a

father

is

but a mother, to the duad, and to the


of beings.

The

tablished in a
it,

and

For with

analogous to the monad, and the cause of bound


infinite

paternal cause, however,

is

power which

is

is

es-

more elevated order than the natures which proceed from

subsists prior to its

progeny

in

the allotment of the desirable.

Again, the maternal cause has the form of the duad


presents itself to the view in fables as

and
more excellent than

but at another time as essentially subordinate to


Plato calls Poverty the mother of Love.

And

it

this is

at

one time

its

progeny,

as in the Banquet,

not only the case in

fabulous figments, but also in the philosophic theory of beings, as

dent

generative

with Plato uniform, and

in the Timaeus.

For there Plato

calls

is

evi-

being the father, but matter

The powers, therefore, which are


and perfective of secondary natures, and the suppliers of life and

the mother and nurse of generation.


prolific

causes of separation are mothers, being established above the natures

produced by them.

But the powers which

rfwr is onytted in

receive the natures that pro-

the original.

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OF JfLATO.

CHAP. XXtX.
ceed into

light,

8g

which multiply their energies, and extend even the subor-

dinate allotment of the progeny, are also themselves called mothers.

Again, however, the progeny of such like causes, at one time indeed, proceed according to union from their proper principles, and are

both the paternal and maternal cause

bond of them, being arranged

the

filled from
but at another time they contain

in the middle,

conveying the

gifts

of

the fathers to the maternal bosoms, and converting the receptacles of them
to the completions of primary causes.

But of the natures which

subsist

from twofold preexisting principles, some arc assimilated to the paternal


cause ; and such like genera of Gods are productive, defensive, and com-

For to produce,

prehensive.

But

cause of bound.
arc

prolific,

and

vivific,

to contain,

and the

first

and

For

Thus much

therefore
It

now

names

and

these are the progeny of

may

suffice

XXIX.'

concerning the unbegotten hyparxis

remains, I think, to speak of divine names.

Socrates in the Cratylus thinks


rectitude of

all

multitude.

CHAPTER

of the Gods.

to defend, pertain to the

the suppliers of motion, of the multiplication

of powers, of variety and progressions.


infinity

and

others are assimilated to the maternal cause,

fit

For

to unfold in a remarkable degree the

in divine natures.

And Parmenides

indeed, in the

known,
But
in the second hypothesis, besides all other things he shows that this one
may be spoken of and that it has a name. In short therefore, it must
be admitted that the first, most principal and truly divine names are esBut it must be said that the second
tablished in the Gods themselves.
names, which are the imitations of the first, and which subsist intellectufirst

hypothesis, as he denies of the one every thing else that

and

all

knowledge, so likewise he denies of

it

name and

is

language.

'

'

Proc.

**

it

omitted in the original.

Vol.

I.

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ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO.

90

BOOK

I.

a demoniacal allotment. And again, we may say that those


names which are the third from the truth, which are logically devised, and
which receive the ultimate resemblance of divine natures, are unfolded
ally, are

by

erf"

men, at one time energizing divinely, and at another


and generating moving images of their inward spectacles.

scienti6c

lectually,

intel-

For

as the demiurgic intellect establishes resemblances about matter of the


first

forms contained in himself, and produces temporal images of things


images of things indivisible, and adumbrated images as

eternal, divisible
it

were of true beings,

after the

same manner

I think the science that is

with us representing intellectual production, fabricates resemblances of


other things, and also of the Gods themselves, representing that which is
void of composition in them, through composition

through variety

and that which

is

that which

united, through multitude

is

simple,

and thus

fashioning names, ultimately exhibits images of divine natures.

generates every

name

as if

it

were a statue of the Gods.

And

For

it

as the

theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the exuberant and unenvy-

ing goodness of the

Gods

into the illumination of artificial statues, thus

by the compositions and


Gods. Very prothe Pbilebus say, that on account of his

also the intellectual science of divine concerns,

divisions of sounds, unfolds the occult essence of the

perly therefore, does Socrates in

reverence of the Gods, he


their

names.

For

it is

is

agitated with

the greatest fear respecting

necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of

the Gods, and venerating these to become established

digms of them.
sent

may be

Plato.

And

thus

much concerning

sufficient for the

For wc

in

the

first

para-

divine names, which at pre*

purpose of understanding the theology of

shall accurately discuss

them when we speak of

partial

powers.

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BOOK

II.

CHAPTER

I.

The

most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by us is


we may be able to discover the first cause of all beings.
For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our conthat from which

'

ceptions purified respecting


tinguish other things.

it,

About

the beginning as follows

It

we shall

with greater facility be able to dis-

these things therefore


is

necessary that

many only,

all

we must speak from


beings,

and

all

the

no one in them,
neither in each, nor in all of them ; or that they should be one only, there
being no multitude, but all things being compelled into one and the same
power of existence ; or it is necessary that they should be both one and
natures of beings should either be

there being

many, and that being should be one in order that neither multitude itself
by itself may vanquish beings, nor that we may be forced to bring together
into the same thing all things and their contraries at once.
These things
therefore being three, which of them shall we chuse ?
And to which of
the above mentioned assertions shall we give our suffrage.
It is necessary
which attend these
what manner the truth subsists.

therefore severally to discuss the absurdities

and thus

to survey after
*

For

ewr.r

it

u Decenary

to read arnca.

positions,

ON THE THEOLOGY
many, and

If then beings are

in such

BOOK

If.

a manner many, as we have menis not any where to be found,

tioned from the Ijcginning, so that the one

many

absurdities will hap|>en to be the result, or rather all the nature of

first be destroyed, as there will immediately


be nothing which is capable of participating the one.
For it must be
admitted that every being is either one certain thing, or nothing. And
that indeed which is a certain being, is also one ; but that which is not
even one being, has not any existence whatever. Hence, if many things

beings will at once from the

have a subsistence, each of the many is something or a certain one. But


if each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for
the

many

to exist

no

the one in

many

for the

multitude exists.

If,

are

therefore, the

many so far as each individual of the


many alone have a subsistence, and
the many exist. For things which

respect is, neither will

are in no respect one have not any existence whatever.


not,

For

by a much
it

greater

consist will

Farther

the

many

the one is

aloue have a subsistence (as has been said)

you

receive

whatever, this also will be immediately

infinite.

and

to the things from which this consists


likewise will be

which we say

own

if

have a subsistence.

still, if

things will be infinitely infinite


finites

But

have the many an existence.


none of the things from which the many

priority neither

necessarily follows that

is

infinite.

For

if

and which are

And

infinite,

something of the

let

any one of the

with respect

each of these

many be assumed*

not one, this therefore will be multitude according to

nature, since

it

belongs to beings, but

is

not nothing.

many

things,

energy.

And

art

in-

If

however

its

it

and
be many.
you assume something of these manys, this will immediately appear
to you not to be one, but many.
There will likewise be immediately the
same reasoning in these, and in a similar manner each, (because we falsely

is

multitude, this also will consist of

And

if

speak of each)
will

be

which
similar

will

be multitude

infinite, or rather will


will

proceeding

be

not be something of

manner
will

never stop, nor


one.

in

infinitely infinite.

this

the part of a part

of the nature of the


is

will

kind

and

For there

since a part

this to

infinity, in

To make

each, as I

is

infinity.

may
is

say,

nothing

many, and in a
For multitude

consequence of being deprived

beings however, to be infinitely infinite,

impossible both with respect to truth, and to the thing proposed by us.

Digitized by

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CHAP.
For

being

if

vered

OF PLATO

I.

is

infinitely infinite,

since the infinite

also being

is

the infinite.

But

if

be

finite,

therefore, there is
infinite

and unknown.

be something more

is

more

infinite, this will

is less infinite,

since

it

so far as

it falls

is

is

infinite

infinite

If

than

be less infinite.

not perfectly

infinite, will

short of the nature of the infinite.

something which

than that which

If,

according to multitude more


in multitude there will be something
is

itself

and the infinite will be less, yet not according to


This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely

more than the


multitude.

being can neither be known, nor disco-

entirely incomprehensible

that something

That, however, which


evidently

is

infinitely infinite, there will

infinite,

infinite.

Again

therefore, according to this hypothesis, the

according to the same, similar and disimilar.


not one, and each thing according to

not one

will evidently suffer the

vation of the one.

all

For

things

same passion

in

is

same
if all

things will be

the

manys are

not one, that which

consequence of the

is

pri-

All things therefore being deprived of the one, after

same manner, they will on this account subsist similarly with respect
But things which subsist similarly, so far as they thus subHence the many will be similar
sist, are evidently similar to each other.
They will likewise
to each other, so far as they are deprived of the one.
according to this privation of the one be perfectly dissimilar. For it is
necessary that things which are similar should suffer the same passion
so that things which do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be
But things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also
similar.
one thing. Hence things which arc deprived of every one, will not suffer
any thing that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and disBut this is impossible. Hence it is imsimilar according to the same.
)K>ssible for the many to exist which are in no respect one.
Moreover, tl>e many will be the same with and different from each other
according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of the
one, so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they Mill be the
the

to caeh other.

same according to this privation; since things which subsist after the
same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which are
after the same manner deprived according to privation. Bu t so far in

ON THE THEOLOGY

94
short, as

each of them

different

from each other.

is

BOOK

deprived of every one, so far the

For

if the

one in the

many

is

many

will

II.

be

the same, that

no respect one, will in no respect be the same. The many


same and not the same with each other. But if they
are the same and not the same it is evident that they are different from
each other. For that which is the same and not the same, so far as it is
not the same, is not the same, by nothing else thau the different.
Farther
still therefore, these many will be moveable and immoveable, if the one
is not.
For if each of them is not one, they will be immoveable according to the privation of the one.
For if that which is not one should be
changed, each of them would have the one since privations being changed,
which

is

in

therefore will be the

entirely lead into habits the things that are changed.

however that what

is

the privation of the one, though this very thing

that the

many

should stand

something which

same
is

place.

the same.

is

still.

the same, via.

necessary

still

not participate of the one.

is

in

But

is

itself

impossible, viz.

For every thing which stands


it is

But every thing which is


For the same in which

therefore which stands

It is

not one should remain immoveable according to

either in the

is

in

in the

is in one thing which


one thing. Every thing
The many, however, do

in the same,
it is, is

one thing.
it

still is

same form, or

perfectly impossible that things

which do not participate of the one, should be in one certain thing.


things which are not in one thing cannot stand

still,

And

since things which

same thing. It is impossible thereand remain immoveable. It has


been demonstrated however, that the many must necessarily stand immoveable. The same things therefore, and the same passion, (I mean
the privation of the habit of the one,) are moveable and immoveable.
For things immoveable, and things which stand still, so far as they are
unstable, so far they must necessarily appear to be moveable.
Moreover, there is no number of beings if the one in no respect is; but
For the particle of number,
all things and each thing will be not one.
For if there are five
the monad, is one, and every number itself is one.
monads, there is also the pentad ; and if three monads, the triad. But
the triad itself is a certain unity, and so is the pentad. So that if there
For
is no one, there will neither be any part, nor the whole of numbers.
stand

still

are entirely in one and the

fore, that the

many

should stand

still,

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

95

any number the one not existing ? For the one is the
But the principle not existing, neither is it posprinciple of numbers.
sible that the things which proceed from this principle should exist.
Hence the one not existing, neither will there be any number.
Again, therefore, neither will there be any knowledge of beings if the

how can

one

is

there be

not.

For

it will

For each thing

being.

we impress

in which

not be possible either to speak or think of any


itself,

Hence neither

For discourse

any knowledge.
if it is perfect.

and every thing of which we can speak, and


no existence, because
will there be any discourse nor

the nature of the one, will have

neither does the one exist.

And knowledge

is

one thing consisting of many things,

then exists, when that which knows be-

comes one with that which is known. .But union not existing, there will
at tin; same time be no knowledge of things, and it will be impossible to
speak about things which we know. To which we may add, that the inexplicable in the several infinites, will necessarily always

fly from the


For immediately each apparent infinite which he
who possesses knowledge desires to understand, will escape the gnostic
power hastening to come into contact with, and adhere to it, since it in

bound of knowledge.

incapable either of contact or adhesion.

If,

therefore, the

many

alone

have an existence, the one having no subsistence whatever, so many absurdities, and a still greater number must necessarily happen to those who
adopt such an hypothesis.

But
is

which
if

is

the one itself alone has a subsistence,

and there

there were there would not only be one but

many

and another thing are more than one, and are not one
thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among all things either
whole, or that which has parts.
For every thing which has parts is many,
and every whole has parts. But the one is in no respect many. Neither
Farther still,
therefore will there be a whole, nor that which has parts.
neither is it possible that there should be a beginning, or end of any thing.
For that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, is divisible. But the
one is not divisible, because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a
things

the one

if

nothing else (for


;

since one

beginning, nor a middle,nor an end. Again,


ence, no being will have figure.
rectilinear or circular,

if the

one alone has a subsist-

For every thing which has figure is either


or mixt from these. But if indeed it is rectilinear,

ON THE THEOLOGY

g6
it will

have for

its

parts, the middle,

Moreover, neither
that which

If

it is

II.

circular,

a middle, but other things as extremes, to


if it is mixed from the right and circular
consfst of many things, and wHl not be one.

there will be one thing in

it

which the middle extends.


line, it will

BOOK

and the extremes.

is

in

will

as

And

any being be

another thing

is

in itself,

different

nor in another thing.

from that

in

which

it

is.

For
Bui

and nothing else (for it will by no means be in


be no being which is in another thing.
Hut
that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend and be comprewill
not be the same thing as to be
hended ; and in this, to comprehend
comprehended nor will there be tlie same * definition of both. There
will therefore be two things, and no longer the one alone.
Again, neither
For being moved indeed, it must necessarily
will any being be moved.
be changed. But being changed it must be in another thing. If the one
however alone has an existence, it is not possible for any thing to appear
the one alone existing

another thing) there

will

be

something

else.
I^ence it is not possible for any being to be
But every .thing which stands still is necessarily in the same
thing.
And that which is in the same is in a certain same thing. The
one however is in no same thing. For that which is in a certain thing,
But it has been demonstrated,
is either in itself, or in something else.
Hence neither is it in a certain
that it is neither in itself, nor in another.
same thing. Neither therefore does any being stand still.
Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different
from any thing. For if there is nothing besides the one itself, there is not
any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another
For there will not be any other being. And the one itself will
thing.
not be different from itself ; for it would be many and not one. Nor will
For this thing which is same is in another,
it be the same with itself.
and same is not the one itself. For the one is simply one, because it is
But that which is same is the same with another thing.
not many.
Again, neither is it possible for any thing to be similar or dissimilar to any
For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion ; but every
thing.

to

in

changed.

'*

For wT>i

it 1

neceWarj to read

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

I.

97

The

thing dissimilar a certain different passion.


fer

any

one, however, "cannot suf-

thing, nor can this he the case with

since no tiling else has

any thing else besides the one ;


any existence whatever, if the one alone has a sub-

sistence.

Farther

in addition to these things

still,

any thing

we say

that neither

is it

possible

be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else


besides the one. For how can things which have no existence be separate,
or conic into contact with any thing? But neither can the one either be
for

to

separate from

or touch

For

would thus be passive to the


the one suffers no other tlung
likewise requisite that no one thing should either be

itself,

itself.

besides

It

itself.

is

equal or unequal to any thing.

it

But

being touched, and the being separate.

For that which

is

equal to another thing,

be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be


Another thing, however, has no existence,
said of that which is unequal.
But neither can the one be equal or
if the one alone has a subsistence.
is said to

unequal to
the one

is

less

equal to

will

it

as greater,

be two things and not one. And if


measure itself. This however is im-

measure and be measured by


Neither therefore

itself.

or inequality in beings.

it will

the one will

itself,

not be the one

unequal, there will be one thing in

if

so that

For the one

possible.
will

For

itself.

but another as

itself,

so that

it

be any equality

will there

If however these things are impossible, neither

can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be
similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be

moved, or

in short

parts, if the
is

without

om

all

be

in

any thing, or have

figure, or

alone has a subsistence which

these things.

Neither however,

is

i3 it

be a whole, or have

void of multitude, and


possible for the

And

alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated.


is

necessary that every being should be both


If this however

is

the case, either the

or the one of the many, or both

many and

many must

many

hence

it

one.

participate of the one,

must participate of each

other, or neither

of each other; but the many indeed must, be separate, and the one must
also be separate, in order that the

evinces.

many of

If,

Proc.

many and

the one

may

subsist, as reason

therefore, neither the one participates of the

the one, the

same absurdities

will

Vol.

I.

many, nor the

ensue as we brought together in

ON THE 'IDEOLOGY

93
the hypothesis of the
will

and

many alone having a

HOOK

II.

For again there

subsistence.

be the many separate from the one. For if the one subsists by itself,
the many do not in any respect participate of the one, the many will be

infinitely infinite,

moved and

they

stable,

will

be similar and dissimilar, same and different,


will neither be any number nor any know-

and there

For the absence of the one compels


in the many.
It is impossible

ledge of the many.

quences to be apparent
neither the

many should

thce conse-

therefore,

that

participate of the one, nor the one of the many.

If however, the one participates of the many, and the

and both

all

many of

the one,

these are in each other, itis necessary that there should be another

nature besides these, which

is

neither one nor

many. For both these being

mingled in each other, it is necessary that there should be a cause of their


mixture which conjoins multitude to the one, and the one to multitude.

For

it is

necessary that every thing that

the mixture.

For

in short, if the

other, neither the one

is

is

mingled, should have a cause of

the cause of essence to multitude, nor multitude to

the one, but a certain third thing

which

is

one and multitude participate of each

prior to these.

is

For what

multitude, and that to be one

the cause of essence to both,


will that

And what

and association with each other,


any communication with the many ?
tion

is

be which makes

the cause of this

the one so far as

be

communica-

one never having

it is

For the many so

and

this to

far as

many, and

one arc different from each other. And so far as neither


from neither, they have no sympathy with each other. What therefore

the one so far as


is

which collects these into one, since they

fly from and are unmingled


For being thus discordant with each other, they cannot
desire each other, or if they did their congress must be fortuitous.
For

is it

with each other?

if this

should happen to be the case, there was a time when these were

separate from each other, since

now

also they subsist

together casually.

many to subsist separate from the one.


The mixture therefore is not casual. But neither is the mixture from the.
many, if neither the one is the cause of the many, nor the many of the one.
What, therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the
mixture?] For it is either one, or not one.
But if indeed, it is the one
itself, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates of
It

is

however impossible

for the

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

I.

For

multitude or of nothing.
other thing prior to

and

same reason present itself to the view,


But if a thing of this kind is entirely
which was asserted at first will not be true,

to infinity.

roid of multitude, again that

that the many do not participate of the one, nor


mean however that which is the most principal and

viz.

there

primarily one.

But

is

and which

If however that which

blc one,
is

the one of the many.

indeed a certain one in the many, and there

is

prior to both,

more

evident tbat some

the

this, will for

be the case

this will

99

if this participates, it is

is

simply one, and nothing

not

is

one,

'

excellent than the

All

things however arc,

And

rated what they are, through the one.

every being
ruption of

preserved

is

also the imparticipa-

necessary that this not one should be

is

it

one.

else.

and are gene-

together with the one indeed

but separate from the one proceeds to the cor-

The mixture also of the one and multitude, which the


The one* therefore,
to beings, is communion and union.

itself.

non-one affords

and that which

is

not one,

'

are the cause of nothing else to beings than

If however the one

of their being one.

is

the cause of a thing of this kind,

which is more excellent


is more excelmore excellent thing, according to its own power. For thus it will be more excellent as being more
good, and as the cause from its own nature of a greater and more excellent good to those things to which a less good is the cause of less goodness.
From these things therefore it is necessary, that the many should
that which

is

not one will not be the cause of that

But

[than union.]

every where necessary that what

it is

lent should be the cause to beings of another

participate of the one, that the one should be unmingled with multitude,

and

that nothing should be better than the one, but that this should also be

the cause of being to the many.

For every thing which

the one, flies immediately into nothing,

which

For

is

not mauy,

to the one that

many

that which
'

Ou%

is

The
is

aud

to

its

own

which
not

is

nothing, or not one,

many

is

opposed.

If,

is

is

deprived of

corruption.

dot at one and the same time not

But that

many and

nothing.

opposed, and to the

therefore, the one

and

the

omitted in the original.

* Instead
'

is

is

of to

or it is

necessary to read to .

in the original

which immediately precedes ox

seems to be superfluous, and

therefore omitted in the translation.

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY
many are not the same, the not being many

From

nothing.

one

is

BOOK

not be the same with

will

thus considering the affair therefore,

beyond multitude, and

II.

it

appears that the

the cause of being to the many.

is

CHAPTER

II.

It is necessary however, that discussing the same subject after another


manner, we should again see if we can in a certain respect follow what
has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore, that
there should either be one principle, or

should begin from hence.


either possess

And

sympathy with each

each other, and they must be either


principle, this
this

must

must

either

either

other, or they
finite

be corporeal or incorporeal.

we

must be divulscd from


But if there is one

And

if

from bodies.

be moveable or immoveable.

rather,

they must

or infinite.

either be not essence, or essence.

cither be separate from, or inseparable

must

many principles or
many principles,

if there are

But

if it is

And

if it is essence,

incorporeal,

And if

it

must

separate,

not essence,

it

it

must

by essence, or imparticipable.
and which have no sympathy with
each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will they be
common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what communication can there be between things which are naturally foreign, or tvhat
co-operation between things which are entirely of* a different kind? In
addition also to these things, there will be the many which do not participate of the one.
For if there is a certain one common in all of them, they
either be inferior to all essence, or participated

If therefore there are

will not

many

principles,

be perfectly separated essentially from each other.

they are different, and there

is

nothing which

is

the

If therefore

same about them, they

many and by no means one. But if there are many principles,


and which possess sympathy with each other, they will have something
are alone

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

II.

common, which

them

leads all of

For we

of them to the view.

call

same thing.
participating one form and one

But

to be passive to the

is

necessary that that

all

101

sympathy, and similarly unfolds all


those things sympathetic, which happen
to

similars are entirely similar

nature.

from

If however this be the case,

[or universal] which

is

every where, and in

it

all

more principal nature than the many. This


them the power to generate sympathy with each other, and

the principles, should be of a


therefore gives
affords

them communion according

Again,

if

to nature.

there are indeed infinite principles, either the things which

infinite, and there will thus be the infinite twice,


and thus all the principles will not be principles. For
things finite in number, will entirely proceed from finite principles. The
principles therefore are in vain infinite. To which may be added, that infinity makes both the principles to be unknown, and the things which

proceed from them are


or they are

finite,

For the principles being unknown, it is necessary


them should be unknown ; since we
then think that we know any thing when we know the causes and the first

proceed from them.

that the things which proceed from

principles
will

of

But

it.

multitude.

the principles are

that there

number

is

from one
will

and

evident that there

for

this, viz.

is

the one

is

the principle of numbers.

one, and the end in the

bounds the many by that which


this

be the principle of principles, and the cause of

number itself

multitude, since

and

finite, it is

we say that number, is a definite


If however, there is a number of the principles, it is necessary
For every
should be a cause of the whole number of them.

This therefore

it

if

be a certain number of them

being essence,

it is

porcal or incorporeal, that

is

necessary

it

many

is

finite

one, and

But the principle being one,


admitted to be cither cor

one.

if this is

must be acknowledged

to be the principle of

other things.
If therefore,

body

sary indeed, that


is

in its

and
I

own

it

is

the cause of the generation of beings,

nature divisible

that which

is

not participate

it.

since every

magnitude

a whole consists of parts.

mean each of them) must

it

is

neces-

For every body

should be divisible and have parts.


is

a certain whole

These parts

therefore, (but

either severally participate a certain one, or

If therefore they do not participate

it,

they wdl be

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

102

many

BOOK.

If.

will that which conalone, and by no means


from them be a whole. For there being no one, that which consists
of them will not be one. But if each of the parts participates of
something of this kind, and there is something which is the same in all
of them, a thing of this kind must necessarily be incorporeal, and impar-

Hence, neither

one.

sists

of

all

tible

according to

either wholly in

its

own

deed wholly in each,


in

which

it is

For

nature.

if this

also

is itself

each of the parts, or not wholly.


be separated from

will itself

it

are separate from each other.

each of the parts,

this also will

But

be divisible, aud

will

corporeal,

If therefore,

in-

For the parts

itself.

if it is

it is

it is

not wholly in

have parts

after the

same manner as the above mentioned parts ; and there will again be the
same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something
common, or nothing since if there is nothing common, we shall place
the many separate from the one.
Let us however consider the whole for every body is a whole, and has
;

What therefore
For
are many ?

parts.

they

will that
it

be which

is

connective of the parts, since


that the whole

necessary to say either

is

unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that

prior to both, which

is

unites the whole with

its

some

is

third thing

any part, connects and


and the parts with the whole. But if the
whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and
impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will be indigent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts and this
neither a whole, nor has

parts,

will

be the case to

how can

infinity.

But

if

the parts are connective of the whole,

many be connective of

the

'Ac one ;

and things divided, of that

which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary that the
one should have the power of uniting the many, and not the many of uniting the one.
And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor
has parts,

it

will

be perfectly impartible.

necessarily without interval.


parts,

and is divisible.
body possesses

for every

Farther still,
every being

is

it is

But

impartible, itis also


interval has

being without interval it is incorporeal

interval.

necessary that the principle should be perpetual

perpetual or corruptible.

principle of beings

But being

For every thing which has

is

Hence

perpetual or corruptible.

it

for

must be admitted that the

But if we should grant that

Digitized by

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. II.
this

may be corrupted,

ple being destroyed,


will

will

it

another thing be generated from

nerate itself (since

not,

it is

thing be abje to generate


is

incorruptible,

power

will

be

it,

if it is

For

it.

is

it

can neither be able to ge-

not perpetual)

the principle of

order that

For every

all

it

may

fore, I

But

will

as

is finite

if it is

And

be incorporeal.

it is this

since if

But

itself.

this*

the

is

This

infinite there-

either impartible or partible.

indeed, there will be the infinite in a finite body. For

if it is partible

besides

if it

power of existence pertains naturally to


But an infinite power pertains to perpetual

the infinite according to power,

the principle

But

exist to infinity through

natures, the existence of which continues to infinity.

mean

nor can another


things.

finite

corruptible.

is

if it

have the power of not being corrupted, and

will

infinite, in

whole of time.
that which

it

103

be no beiug incorruptible. For the princineither be itself generated from any tiling, nor

there will

it

were

infinite, there

impartible, the

will

power of

the principle of beings

power through which the subject of

it

is

be nothing else

infinitely existing

incorporeal,' so far

always

is.

impossible therefore, the principle of beings can be corporeal

is

That

it

is

from these

things evident.

must either be separate, or inseparable


have all its energies in
it will
For that is inseparable from body
and
which is not any where naturally adapted to energize except in and with
But if the principle is a thing of this kind, it is evidently nebodies.
cessary that none of the things which subsist according to it should be
If however

from bodies.
bodies,

it is

incorporeal,

But

if

it

inseparable indeed,

subsisting about them.

more powerful, or possess greater authority than the principle of all beings.
If however, nothing is more excellent in bodies than the power which
subsists in and energizes about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will
not any where be intellect and the power which energizes according to inFor every such

tellect.

like motion,

[i,

e.

energy] proceeds from a power,

which

is

nor

lawful for generated natures to surpass the

is

entirely in

its

For every thing which


'

But it neither was,


power of their causes.

energies independent of body.

is

The words

in the things begotten

is

from primary natures,

aavyjrtoi i<rn are omitted in the original.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

104

and the

latter are the lords

the principle of beings

is

BOOK

of the essence of the former.

If therefore,

able to generate intellect and wisdom,

on account of and

II.

how

is it

For
one of two
no respect to beings, or that it is inferior to them and that if
These things however, it is impossible
it exists it acts in bodies only.
possible

it

should not generate


things

is

it,

tains in

itself ?

But

to assert.

if

that which

ciple of all things

mit that

in

necessary, either that intellectual perception per-

it

is

is

the

first

of beings, and which

separate from bodies,

is

either

is

it

is

the prin-

perfeotly necessary to ad-

immoveable or moved. And if indeed it is moved,


it, about which it is moved.
For

there will be something else prior to

every thing which


thing else which

is

moved,

is

is

naturally adapted to be

permanent.

through desire of another thing.

And

farther

For ift

is

still,

moved about someit is moved

besides this,

necessary indeed that

it

should

be moved in consequence of desiring a certain thing because motion


But the end of it is that for the sake of which
itself by itself is indefinite.
;

it subsists.

It desires however, either something else, or

itself.

But every

For why should any thing that


For of things which
is present with itself want to be in another thing?
are moved, the motion of that is less to which the good is nearer, but the
motion is greater of that to which the good is more remote. But that
which possesses good in itself, and for the sake of which it subsists, will
thing which desires

itself is

immoveable.

be immoveable and .stable ; siuce being always in itself, it is in good.


That however which is in itself is in same for each thing is the same
But of that which is in itself we say indeed that it stands
with itself.
while that which is not immoveable, is not in
still and is immoveable
itself but in another, is moved towards another thing, and is perfectly indigent of good. If therefore the principle of beings is moved, but every
thing which is moved is moved through the want of good, and towards
;

another thing which

is

the object of desire to

it,

there will be something

itself, and about


which possessing a sameness of subsistence, wc must say it is moved.
This however is impossible. For the principle is that for th<- sake of which
all thiugs subsist, which all things desire, and which is indige nt ol nothing.

else

which

For

if it

is

desirable to the principle of beings besides

were in want of something,

it

would be

entirely subordinate to

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

II.

that of which

it is iu

ject of desire.

But

mains,)

it is

105

want, and to which ib energy


the principle

if

necessary that

it

is

immoveable

is

directed as the ob-

(for this is

what

re-

should be one incorporeal essence, possessing

an eternal sameness of subsistence. After what manner, however, docs it


And how is it one essence I For if essence and the one
possess the one ?

must be admitted that the principle of beings is essence.


different from the one, it must be granted that to be the
one is not the same thing as to be essence. And if, indeed, essence is
better than the one, according to this it must be said to be with the prinBut if the one is better than essence and beyond it, the one is also
ciple.
are the same,

But

if

essence

it

is

And

the principle of essence.

many

will

be prior to the one.

before demonstrated.

It

is

they are co-ordinate to each other, the

if

This, however,

is

impossible as

evident, indeed, that essence

we have

not the same

is

as the one.
For it is not one and the same thing to say one, and that essence is one ; but the former is not yet a sentence, and the latter is. To

which may be added, that if essence and the one are the same, multitude
will be the same as that which has no existence, and which is not essence.
This, however, is impossible. For in essence the many are contained,

and

in tliat

which

is

not essence

is

But

the one.

if

essence and the one

arc not the same, they will not be co-ordinate to each other

were co-ordinate there


cessary that
these

is

all

essence

be some other

better than the other, either the one

is

But

if the

the principle of

one indeed

the one will


is

passive to essence,

all

And

all

for if they
if ii is

And

if

prior to essence, or essence

prior to essence, this


it is

and not

necessary that nothing

if essence is prior to the

such things as arc essence should be one.

But

For essence and the one being two things

If,

one t

if the

There

will,

therefore,

however, this be the case,

will participate of the

many,

i.

e.

of the

firtt

or two.

Proc.

ne-

one of

it is necessary that the one and essence should be


such things as arc one should be essence, but not

be a certain essence deprived of the one.

'

them,

be passive to essence, and not essence to the one.

every thing, and that


that

is

is

For

all things.

should be better than the principle.

one

tiling prior to

things should subsist from one principle.

prior to the one.

is

will

Vol.

I.

it

mauy,

ON THE THEOLOGY

106
will

be nothing.

the one

But

is

For that which

is

BOOK

deprived of the one

is

nothing.

n.

Hence

prior to essence.

if that

which

is first is

something which

to assert that it is subordinate to essence.

is

not essence,

For the principle

it is

is

absurd

that which

has the greatest power and the most absolute authority, and
cient to itself,

many.

And,

and

is

in short,

it is

belter than the principle

governed badly.

is most suffimost ignoble, and indigent of the


necessary that no secondary nature should be

not that which

But

if,

for it is requisite that beings should not

it, all

be

indeed, the principle has an order subordinate to

the things which proceed from


better than

is

it,

and the things proceeding from

it

are

things will be badly confounded, nor will the principle

according to nature be any thing else than something which

is

not the

most excellent of things, nor will things which proceed from the principle
possess from it a power of ruling over their principle. The principle of
beings, therefore, will indeed be fortuitous, and also the beings which' arc
its progeny.
But this is impossible. For things which are fortuitous (if
to have a fortuitous subsistence is this, not to exist according to intellect,
view
nor with a
to a definite end) are disorderly, infinite, and indefinite,
and are all of them things which have a less frequency of subsistence. But
the principle is invariably principle, and other things proceed from it. If
however, that which is not essence is better than all essence, it will either
be participated by it, or it will be entirely imparticipable. If, however,
essence participates of the principle, of what will it be the principle ? And
how will it be the principle of all beings? For it is necessary that the
since if it were any one
principle of beings should be no one of beings
of them, it is necessarily not the principle of all beings.
But every thing
which is participated by another thing is said to be that by winch it is
participated, and in which it primarily is. The principle, however, is separate, and belongs in a greater degree to itself than to other things.
Besides, every thing which is participated proceeds from another more excellent cause; since that which is imparticipable is better than that which
is participate.
It is not, however, possible to conceive any thing better
;

than that which


it is

is

most

excellent,

and which we

call

the principle.

For

not lawful to assert that things secondary to the principle, and which

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

III.

proceed from
therefore of

and

is

it,

all

arc in

beings

107

auy respect better than tlieir principle. The cause


above all essence, is separate from every essence,

is

neither essence, nor has essence as an addition to

such an addition as

this is

its

For

nature.

a diminution of simplicity, and of that which

is

one.

CHAPTER

III.

See, therefore, the third argument after these, leading us to the same
For it is necessary that the cause
of all beings should be that of which all beings participate, to which they
conclusion with the former arguments.

and which separates itself from nothing


an existence. For this alone
which primarily, or in some other way, is

refer the subsistence of themselves,

that in any respect whatever


is

said to have

is

the object of desire to beings,

cause of their subsistence. And it is necessary that every thing


produced with reference to, and on account of it, should have a
certain habitude with relation to it, and through this also, a similitude to
itself the

which

is

For every habitude of one thing towards another,

it.

predicated in

is

two-fold respect, either from both participating of one thing, which affords
to the participants a

communion with each

other

or from one of

participating of the other; of which, indeed, the one as being


lent,

imparts something to that which

other, as being inferior,


as

it

participates of

sess a

it.

is

is

subordinate to

assimilated to the

Hence

habitude to that which

it is

more excel-

itself ;

but the

more excellent nature, so

necessary, if

is first,

them

all

aspire after,

far

sensible natures pos-

and

subsist about

it,

cither that there should be a certain third thing the cause of the habitude,
itself, a
and that desire, through which every thing is preserved,
Nothing else, however, is more excellent than that which is
Hence, the habitude of beings, their existence, and their tendency

or that the principle should impart to the natures posterior to

tendency to

and
first

itself,

exists.

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ON

108
to the

Tilt:

THEOLOGY
And

are derived from thence.

first,

principle of themselves, if

it is

all

necessary that this which

should from thence become apparent in

all

beings, since

of all things, and deserts no being whatever.


nature be, which

But

is

every where, and in

there are indeed

many

all

What,

beings? Is

in all things?

But

II.

of the

participated,

is

it is

the principle

therefore, will this


it life

and motion?

things which are deprived of these.

permanency every where, and

fore,

BOOK
tilings participate

neither

Is, there-

this true.

is

For motion, so far as it is motion, will not participate of permanency. Is


much-honoured intellect, therefore, so far as it is intellect,-participated by
But this also is impossible. For all beings would have intelall beings?
lectual perception, and no being would be deprived of intellect.
Shall

we

say, therefore, that being itself and essence are participated

by

any respect whatever have a subsistence? But how is


this possible?
For that which is in generation, or passing into existence,
Nor must we wonder, if it also,
is said to be, and is destitute of essence.
all

things that in

since

it

far as it
it is

among

ranks
is in

now

beings, should

generation,

it is

not; but

by

all

that

is

What

things participated?
to

which

all

participate of essence.

For so

ends in existence and essence when

and

actually generated,

things, therefore, that have in

participate of essence.

now
it

is no longer rising into existence.


All
any respect whatever a subsistence, do not

then will that be which

is

every where and

Let us consider every being, and see what

beings are passive, and what

it is

which

is

common

in

permanency, and motion.


Can we say, therefore, that each of these is any thing else than one thing,
and not only separately, but this is also the case with the things which
subsist from them ; and in short, it is not possible in a certain respect to

all

of them, as

in essence, sameness, difference,

this, that all things, and each thing is


any thing should be deprived of the one, though you should
speak of parts, or of beings, immediately, that which becomes destitute of
Or with what intention do we say
the one, will be altogether nothing.
that a thing which is not is perfectly nothing, [or not even one thing] un-

speak otherwise of all things, than


one.

For

less the

to

one

become

one.

if

For

is

the last thing which deserts beings?

that which in no respect


it

is

is,

and

possible for that which

is

This

it is,

therefore,

to be perfectly deprived of the

not moved to be, aud for that

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

If.

which has no being to have an hyparxis

and which

thing,

Hence

the one

multitude
for if

it

is

itself, it is

but that which

not even one

is

destitute of the one itself, will be entirely nothing.

is

present with

beings; and though

all

you should speak of

necessary that this also should participate of the one;

docs not become one thing,

it

is

not possible for

to subsist.

it

even you divide the whole to infinity, immediately nothing else


than one occurs. For either that which is divided does not subsist, or becoming to be, or subsisting something else, it will be immediately one.'

And

if

The one, therefore, which is every where apparent, and is in all beings,
and which deserts no being whatever, is either derived from the one which
For it
is simply one, or from that which is more excellent than the one.
is

not possible for the one to be otherwise passive,

with something else] than from the


present, but which

first

to be consubsistent
is

no longer

arrive at the

same con-

the one itself, or nothing else tlian one.

is

Again, therefore, from another principle


clusion,

[i. e.

one, to which the one

by speaking as follows

It

is

we may

necessary either that the causes of

beings and things caused should proceed to infinity, and that there should

be nothing

first

or last in beings

or that there should be no

first,

but that

there should be the last of things, infinity existing in one part only.

on the contrary,

it is

Or

necessary that beings should proceed to infinity from

a definite principle, or that there should be a certain first and last, and a
boundary of beings each way. And if there are boundaries of beings,
things either proceed from each other, and the generation of beings is in a
circle

or if they are not from each other, either one of them

other, or the

first

indeed

is

both are one, or each

is

of beings are

each

infinite,

is

from an-

one, but the last not one, or the contrary, or

not one.

If, therefore, first

tiling will consist

of

things,

infinites.

and the causes


For that which

proceeds from a certain principle, must necessarily participate of that


principle from which

from many causes,

many
will

powers.

have

it

will

And

But

proceeds.

be in

its

that which

is

For

t>

it is

its

subsistence

multiform, as participating of

produced from

infinite peculiarities derived

that which derives

own nature

infinites prior to itself,

from the principles, and adapted to

necessary to read n.

'

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ON THE THEOLOGY

no
will

II.

and consisting of infinites,


and there will neither be a knowFor the power of the
perfectly uuknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to

Every being,

itself.

BOOK

render

all

therefore, being

infinite,

things infinitely infinite,

ledge of any being, nor any evolution of powers.


infinite

whom

is

it is infinite.

But

if things are infinite in

a descending progression, whether

is

each

of them infinite always proceeding most downward, in the same manner


as

we

say

all

things do, or

is

each whole indeed

which arc produced from these are


to the beginning of itself

is

infinite?

definite,

For

if

but the beings

finite,

every being according

but according to

its

end

is

infinite,

there will neither be in parts nor in wholes, a conversion of beings to their

proper principle, nor

will

that which

is

second

in order ever

sistence so as to be assimilated to the extremity of

have a suba pre-existent order;

though as we frequently say, the summits of inferiors are conjoined with


the boundaries of superiors. For where there is no last, by what contrivance can such a similitude of progression as this, and such a mutual coheleft, according to which secondary things are always

rence of beings be

conjoined to the natures prior to them


infinity
self,

But

if all things

of this kind, each being bounded by that which

wholes

naturally

will

is

alone ha\e an
posterior to

be subordinate to parts, and the parts of beings

more perfect [than wholes.]

will

it-

be

For wholes, indeed, will be without

conversion to the principle prior to themselves; but parts will be converted to

it

after their progression.

By how much

every being hastens to conjunction with that which


itself,

And

by so much the more must

it

the more, however,


is

more

necessarily excel, as

it

perfect than

appears to me.

whole proceeding to infinity is not couvolvcd to the summit of


and circularly converted and perfected according to such a converIf, however, we admit that there
sion [it will not desire its proper good.]
is an infinity both ways these things must necessarily happen.
if this

itself,

In addition to these things, also, there will be no common object of


all beings, nor any union nor sympathy of them.
For things

desire to

which are perfectly


beings,

infinite

have not that which

is first in

we shall not be able to say what is


and why some things are more excellent, but

having a

first,

the

them

but not

common end

of

others are allotted a

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

III.

For we

Ill

one thing better and another less excel*


lent, from proximity to that which is best, just as we define the more and
the less hot from communion with that which is hot in the first degree.
subordinate nature.

And

call

we form a judgment of the more and the less from a referis a maximum.
It is necessary, therefore, that the

boundary in beings should be that which is first and that which is last.
But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be older
and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and each thing
For it makes no difference, whether these are from
will be first and last.
in short,

ence to that which

each other, or the things which subsist between these. For the extremes
being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation according to essence

But

should intervene?

if

the one

is

from the other, whether

is

the

first

some say, who generate things more excellent


from things subordinate, and things more perfect from such as are more
imperfect? In this case, however, must not that which is allotted the
power of generating and producing the perfect, by a much greater priority
perfect and adorn itself by its present power? And how is it possible
derived from the

last,

as

that leaving itself to be of an inferior allotment

it

should definitely assign

a more excellent order to another thing? For every thing aspires after its
proper perfection, and simply desires good ; though not every thing is
able to participate of a thing of this kind.

If,

therefore,

of producing this most perfect thing, that which

it

has the power

is last will

energize

account of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and
fection, will

But

be

first

established in

that which

all

on

per-

itself.

produced from that which

is first, and the


most perfect, whether, is each of them
one, or is this one, but that not one ? If, however, that which is first, or
that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be first or last.
For, as
there will be multitude in each, each of them will have the better and the
worse ; and neither will that which is best be unmingled with that which
is inferior to it, nor that which is the most obscure of all things according
to being, have so great a subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect
nature; but there will be something more extreme than that which is last,
and something more perfect than tlis^t which is first. For every where,

if

is last is

most imperfect from that which

is

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ON THE THEOLOGY

H2
that which

best

is

another addition through that which

if it receives

more

ferior will be

BOOK
is

II.

in-

perfect than that which docs not abide in the best,

[through not receiving this very addition.]

If, therefore,

we

rightly assert

is the principle of all things, and the last of beings is


For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the progression of beings
should be assimilated to the principle, and that as far as to this, the power

these things, the one

one.

of the

should proceed.

first

Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have


either that the

many'

first

first

principles, or

ticipating of one.

But

one containing multitude

if there are

there are

many

principles,

many

it is

necessary

and there

is

first

in itself, or

many

par-

principles only, there will

make one and a whole, if


nothing which produces one ? For

For what

not be one thing from them.

it is

said,

principle should be one, or that there should be alone

will

certainly necessary that things posterior to the principles should be

assimilated to them.

being, or

it will

Either, therefore, there will not be the one in any

not be from these principles

*o that each of the things

any respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multitude alone. And again each of the parts of any being will be a tiling of
this kind, and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute
For all things will be many, and the one
parts essence and existence.
which

will

in

be no where in the universality of things, nor

will either

wholes or

parts be apparent..

But

if it is

necessary, indeed, that there should be

many

principles,

and

that they should participate of the one, the one will be co-ordinated in the

many.

Again, however,

it is

necessary, that the unco-ordinated should

every where be more ancient than the co-ordinated, and the exempt than

For how is the one in each of the many except from


one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself acthe participated.

cording to the

communion of the one? Again, if the first one were multifor at the same time it will be one and not

plied, the one will be passive

one, and will not be that which

is

one [only.]

in each genus of things, that there should

'

in, which

It

is

necessary, however,

be that which

is

unminglcd with

are multitude only without any participation of the one.

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IV.

inferior nature, in order that there

an
the

same manner

as

we

may be

113
that which

say respecting forms.

is

mingled, in

For from the equal

itself,

things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal,

though they are

filled

with a contrary nature

primarily being, that which

is

; and
from that which is
mingled with non-being is derived, and

which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where th6
simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which
through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. The one
therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude and that which is one,
and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended from
that which is primarily one ; through the principle, indeed, participating
;

'

of the one, but through the diminution arising from multitude,


festly exhibiting in itself the

now mani-

cause of separation.

CHAPTER

IV.

That the one therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause,
and that all other things are posterior to the one, is I think evident from
what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpreters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do
not venerate the ineffable transcendency of the one, and its hyparxis
which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder
that tliis should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of
same erudition with

For Origen ends in intellect and


is beyond every intellect and every
being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all
knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is
But if he
neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things.
the

the

first

For

Plotinus.

being, but omits the one which

c]pi|Ti it

necessary to read ffcymrraj.

The

punctuation also of the text in this place,

tnust be altered agreeably to the translation.

Proc.

Vol.

I.

ON THE THEOLOGY

114
omits

it

sistence,

because the one

and because

BOOK

If.

and without any subthe best of things, and that which is

perfectly unhyparctic,

is

intellect is

the same as that which

is primarily one, we cannot assent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and connumerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind
is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innova-

primarily being

is

you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against


dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and

tion. If
this

we

cording to him the

contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that acfirst cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all

beings, as Plotinus

and Porphyry, and

will strenuously

all

those

who have

received the

philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert.

We. shall

begin, therefore, from the Republic

shows that the good

is

established above being,

order, following the analogy of the

the sovereign sun

is

first

for here Socrates clearly

and the whole

natures according to the power generative of light, so

good should be with reference to


cause productive of truth,

intellect

if this

intellectual

goodness to the sun.

to generation, to every thing visible,

and

and to

it is

intelligibles,

For

if,

as

all visive

necessary the

according to a

be the case, we must say that the sun

is

exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and
must admit that the good transcends the natures which are always intellective, and also those which are eternally intelligible.
It is better, however, to hear the Platonic

words themselves: "

You may

say that the sun

not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that

he

is

the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being him-

self generation.

Certainly.

We may

say, therefore, that things which are

known, have not only this from the good that they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself
is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in
power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good
and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only
the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, according to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all
How,
visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light.

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IV.

therefore, following Plato,

and the cause of all things ?


essence are the same with the
vine progressions

115

can we admit that intellect

How can we

For essence and

is

the best of things,

assert that being itself*

principle which

is

the leader of

all

and

the di-

intellect are said to subsist primarily

from the good, to have their hyparxis about the good, to be filled with the
from thence, and to obtain the participation

light of truth proceeding

which

is

adapted to them from the union of

this light,

which

more

is

di-

vine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from
the good,

and affording

the light which

in beings

a similitude to that which

is

For

first

emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be

is

And

solar-form.

the participation of the light of truth renders that which

boniform and divine.

Intellect, therefore, is a god through


more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself,
and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates
is intelligible

light

which

is

of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately


it.*
And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said
on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all
By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the
beings.
same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more

imparted to
to be,

ancient than

all

the hyparxis of the whole of things, since

it is

even sub-

ordinate to the light proceeding from the good, and being perfected by

conjoined according to

this light, is

we must not say


manner as the
good

is

that the intelligible

light [of truth

established in

light, participates

solar light

is

its

it

;]

is

own order

with the good

united to the

first after

For
same

itself.

the

but the latter through continuity with the

without a

medium

while the former, through this

of a vicinity to the good

since in sensibles also, the

primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends

and subsists on all sides about


But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun,
to
its
according
own
nature
being
filled with solar-form illuthem
each of
as far as to the centre of the whole sphere,

it.

These things, therefore,

mination.
1

For wno

This sentence

to

i, it is

above translation.

is

necessary to read

aim

to

will

be

sufficient

to recall into the

or.

very erroneous in the original,

will

be evident from comparing

it

with the

ON THE THEOLOGY

110

memory

of those

who

BOOK

IT.

love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of

this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary


exempt transcendency of the one.
If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testimonies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines

Plato on
to the

He says,

concerning these things.


titude of

pended from the one being,


but that the one being

we

call the

therefore,

it is

necessary that the mul-

beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be sus-

all

itself

[i.

from being characterized by the one ;]

e.

should be suspended from the one.

hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being,

denominate each of these as the same with being itself.


nency were being itself, motion would not be being or,

For
if

For when
we do not
if

perma-

motion were

such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of

But

being.

and

it is

evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion,

to every multitude of beings

This very thing, therefore, which

which

on

participated by

is

this account, as it

however, being

but

itself

all

from one thing which


is

other things,

is

being alone,' so also

is

indeed, and

is

primarily being.
all things,

a participant of

this one,

primarily being.'

it is

not allotted

one according to participation, and on

it is

is

the cause of essence to

to &e,

this

and
and

It

is,

from participation

account

it is

passive to

the one.
But it is being* primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to the one
a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in

wholes

is

supposed by him to transcend beings, how

being should not be posterior to the owe, since


this

account

is

denominated one

Moreover, Socrates

in the

it

is it

possible that

participates of

it,

and on

Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing

who arc able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has
not the same order as the first cause of all. Investigating, therefore, the
good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every reto those

spect sufficiently

he -in the

first

this intellect,

For

Here

it it is

it

will

reap the

because neither

necessary to read

also o

fruits

of a

felicity

adapted to

its

nature,

place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after


is this

replete with

all

the elements of the

must be substituted for n.

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IV.

ll7

the intellect which

good.

If, therefore,

tellect,

and the good of the whole of our

ing to this alone,

is it

in us

is

an image of the

is

first in-

not to be defined accord-

life is

not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good

must be established above intellectual perfection ? For if that which is


primarily good subsisted according to total intellect, in us also and all
other [intellectual natures,] self-sufficiency and appropriate good would
be present through the participation of

and

disjoined from the good,

is

intellect.

pleasure in order to the attainment of


intellect

For

it

human

is

intellect, indeed, is

account requires

this

perfection.

always participates of the good, and on

this

infers that the

good

first
is

deity.

It

is

the

exempt from the

But a divine

account

boniform through the participation of good

being suspended from the

which

Our

and on

indigent,

is

divine.

but divine, as

same reasoning, therefore,


first intellect, and which

defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in the all-perfect

presence of the

gootl.

For the

intellectual

prolix?

form of energy

And why

self defective with respect to blessedness.

For Parmenides teaches us most

is

it

by

it-

requisite to

be

is itself

clearly the difference of the one

from essence and being, and shows that the one


things and from essence

for this

is exempt from all other


he evinces of the one at the end of the

hypothesis.
But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and
which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also
be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in in-

first

tellect there is

permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates

that the one transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to

the ineffable cause of all things, which

every intellect

is

converted to

itself,

is

and

prior to every intellect?


is in itself,

but the one

is

And

if

demon-

itself, nor in another, how can we any longer consame with the first cause of all ? In what respect,
one which is prior to being differ from the one being, which

strated to be neither in
sider intellect as the
also, will the
is

the subject of the second hypothesis, if intellect

and the

first

principle of

all ?

is the best of things,


For the one being participates of the one ;

but that which participates

is secondary to that which is participated.


That the one, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect
and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

118

CHAPTER
Ik

the next place, if the one

is

BOOK

II.

V.

neither intelligible nor intellectual, nor

power of being, let us survey what will be the


modes of leading us to it, and through what intellectual conceptions
Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to his familiars, the ineffable and unknown transcendency of the first. I say then, that at one time he unfolds
it through analogy, and the similitude of secondary natures ; but at another time he demonstrates itg exempt transcendency, and its separation
from the whole of things, through negations. For in the Republic, indeed,
he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the good, through
in short participates of the

analogy to the sun

but

in the

Parmenides, he demonstrates the

differ-

ence of the one with respect to all things posterior to it through negations.
But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold the progression from the

first

the divine orders.

cause of

all

For on

this

the natures produced by

above

effects

its

because

all

and on

it,

other things, and prior to other things, of

account the

first

cause

exempt from

is

because every where cause

this

account the

things proceed from him.

For he

the principle of

both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings.

But

all

things,

all

things,

again, accord-

ing to the other of these modes, he adumbrates the conversion to the

of the things which have proceeded from

through similitude to

it

there

is

monad

it.

For

all

the orders of the Gods.

The

analogous to the good, which has


it,

that the good has

cause, however, of this similitude

entirely the conversion of the whole of things to the good.


fore,

proceed from thence and are converted to

indeed of
gations

all

it.

And

things demonstrates to us the ascent to the

but the conversion of all things demonstrates

analogies.

first

in each order of beings,

the same relation to the whole series conjoined with


to

all

established

nothing of

first is
is

is

is

These, therethe progression

first

through ne?

this to us

through

Let not, however, any one considering these negations to be

such things as privations despise such a

mode of

discussion, nor defining

Di.

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

V.

19

the sameness in words analogously, and words in habitudes, endeavour to

calumniate

this

anagogic progression to the

first

For negations,

principle.

appears to me, extend a triple peculiarity in things. And at one


time, indeed, being more primogenial than affirmations, they are procreaas

it

tive

But

and perfective of the generation of them.

at another time, they

are allotted an order co-ordinate to affirmations, and negation

no

more venerable than

respect

And

affirmation.

is

then in

again, at another time,

they are allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else
than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with

which there

is

also a negation

of beings, at one time considering

we say that it is the cause and


another time we evince that it is equivalent
yond

to being

[in the Sophista] that

Elean guest demonstrates


less, if it
it

the supplier of beings

being,

it

as be-

but at

just as I think, the

non-being

in

is

no respect

be lawful so to speak, than being ; and at another time we leave

as a privation of,

mode, we

call

For indeed, according

and indigent of being.

every generation, and matter

itself,

to this

non-being.

Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the
similitude of secondary natures to the

communion

reason, nor habitude, nor


terior to

it,

becomes apparent from

of such a kind as
the

is

For

these.

good transcends the whole of things

exempt nature

its

in

much

however, and every god,

is

first

gree

all

allotted

since thus

tude to

all

and not some

in

we should introduce a

secondary natures.
things,

It

and

is

it is

not

but

be the demiintellect
intellect

the cause, inferior to that

for this principle similarly

a greater, but others in a


greater

and

less

less

habitude of

necessary, however, to preserve

similarly

a transcendency with respect to subor-

principle has to every being


things,

it

some other
Every

those that are called divine.

dinate natures, and those things of which

transcends

is

greater degree than

whether

urgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole world, or

from among the number of

any

neither

beheld in the second and third orders of beings

intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself,

which the

And

principle.

first

of this principle with things pos-

it

exempt from the whole of

deit

to

without habithings.

But

of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote

from

it.

For each thing proceeds from

it,

since

it

produces

all

things

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ON THE THEOLOGY

30

according to one cause.

And

in a different manner, this principle in the

mean

tude or communion with things posterior to

CHAPTER
mode

Tiie

we have

demonstrates

time, receiving

no habi-

VI.

is,

as

For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names


In the Republic indeed he calls it the good, and

to be the fountain

it

intelligibles.

II.

itself.

of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to the one

said, twofold.

of the ineffable cause.

and

BOOK.

different things are indeed converted to it

of the truth which unites intellect

But in the Parmenides, he denominates such a prinand shows that it gives subsistence to the divine

ciple as this the one,

Again

unities.

therefore, of these

names, the one

is

the image of the

progression of the whole of things, but the other of their conversion.

For because indeed all things derive their subsistence and proceed from
first principle, on this account referring the one to it, we demonstrate

the

the cause of all multitude and every progression.

For whence
But because
again the progressions from it are naturally converted to it, and desire its ineffable and incomprehensible hyparxis, we denominate it the
good. For what else is that which converts all things, and which is extended to all beings as the object of desire, but the good f For all other
things subsist distrihutedly, and are to some beings honourable, but to
And every thing which in any respect whatever is said to
others not.
have a subsistence aspires after some things, and avoids others. But Me
good is the common object of desire to all beings, and all things according to their nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however

that
is

it

is

multitude unfolded into light except from the one*

of desiring natures

The good
natures.

is

every where to the appropriate object of desire.

therefore converts, but the one gives subsistence to all secondary

Let

not, however,

any one suppose that the

ineffable

can on

this.

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

VI-

account be named, or that the cause of


indeed we transfer to

it

12!

all

union

is

names, looking to that which

is

posterior to

to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to

deed, multitude subsists from

one

but because

all

it,

we

it

it,

and

Because, in-

it.

the appellation of the

things even as far as to things that have the

most

we denominate it the
know the unknown nature of

prin-

obscure existence, are converted to

We endeavour therefore
ciple,

ascribe to

For here

doubled.

to

good.

it,

the

first

through the things which proceed from, and are converted to it


also attempt through the same things to give a name to that which

and we

This principle, however, is neither known by beings, nor is


by any one of all things but being exempt from all knowledge,
and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it produces from
itself according to one cause all knowledge, every thing that is known,
comprehended by speech.
all words, and whatever can be
But its
uuical nature, and which transcends all division, shines forth to the view
is ineffable.

efiable

dyadically in the natures posterior to


all

things abide in, proceed from,

it,

which
it.

exempt from

is

And

natures,

or rather triad ically.

and are converted

one and the same time, they are united to

it,

the whole of things,

to the one.

are in subjection to

and

and which

But

subsists in

union

desire the participation of

union indeed imparts a stable transcendency to

of them.

For
For at

its

all

secondary

unproceeding conjunction with the cause

subjection defines the progression of beings,

paration from the imparticipable and

unity.

first

\nd

and

their se-

desire-perfects the

conversion of the subsisting natures, and their circular tendency to the


ineffable.

ineffable]

First natures therefore, being

some more remotely, but

always entirely united, [to the

others

more proximately, and

receiv-

ing through this union their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we en-

deavour to manifest through names the progression and conversion of the

But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it


in the first, and their union with the ineffable, this
as being incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge,
those who were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by
words.
But as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places,
and isexemptfrom all beings, thus also the union of all things with it isocwhole of things.

be lawful so to speak,

Proc.

Vol.

I.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

122
cult, ineffable,

neither

by

and unknown

to

BOOK

For every being

beings.

all

intellectual injection, [or projection] nor the

is

things deprived of
it.

all

it,

energy of essence

since things which are destitute of knowledge are united to the

conjunction with

II.

united to

first,

and

energy, participate according to their order of a

That which

is

unknown

therefore in beings according

union with the first, wc neither endeavour to know, nor to maby names, but being more able to look to their progression and
conversion, we ascribe indeed to the first two names, which we derive as
to their
nifest

resemblances from secondary natures.


ascent to the

first,

conjoining that

We

the appellation of the good, but that which


appellation of the one

deed

calls the first the

through analogy

also define

mode which
is

is

two modes of

through analogy with

through negations with the

which Plato also indicating,

in the

Republic

in-

good, and at the same time makes a regression to

but in the Parmenides establishing

it

it
he
exempt from beings, through
negative conclusions. According to both these modes therefore, the first
principle transcends both gnostic powers, and the parts of speech ; but
all other things afford us the cause of knowledge and of appellation.
;

unfolds the transcendency of

And

the

first

it

which

as the one Uaelf,

is

principle indeed unically gives subsistence to

and hyparxes of secondary natures

but

all

the unions

the things posterior

cause participate of it in'a divided manner. These also, as

to this

we have

before

by abiding, proceeding and returning but the


one is at once perfectly exempt from all the prolific progressions, converWhat the modes theretive powers, and uniform hypostases in beings.
fore are of the doctrine about the first, and through what names Plato endeavours to indicate it, and whence the names and the modes of this indication which is unknown to all things are derived, is, I think, through what
observed, become multiplied

has been said sufficiently manifest.

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

VII.

CHAPTER
It, however,

it

VII.

be requisite to survey each of the dogmas about

which are scattered

in the writings

it

of Plato, and to reduce them to one

science of theology, let us consider,

if

you are

willing,

prior to other

things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the Republic,


conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through analogy
he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of the good with respect to
In the first place
all beings, and the summits of the whole of things.

therefore,

he distinguishes beings from each other, and establishing some


intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the

of them to he

knowledge of beings.

But he

conjoins sense with sensibles, and giving a

one exempt monad over intelliand a second monad over sensible multitude, according
Of these monads also, he shows
to a similitude to the former monad.
that the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible

twofold division to

all

things, he places

gible multitude,

And

light.

he evinces that by the

intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles

are deifomi, and boniform, according to participation from the

but that by the sensible


sun,

all

light,

first

God

according to the perfection derived from the

sensible natures are solarform,

and similar

to their

one monad. In

addition also to what has been said, he suspends the second


that which reigns in the intelligible.

And

thus he extends

all

monad from
things,

both

and the last of beings, I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to the


Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears to me to
good.
be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology viz. to congregate
all the Gods in the world into one union, and suspend them from their
proximate monad ; but to refer the supermundane Gods to the intellectual kingdom
to suspend the intellectual Gods from intelligible union ;
and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and all beings through these,
the

first

to that which is first.


For as the monad of mundane natures is supermundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual, and of
intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it

is

necessary that

first

intelli-

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ON THE THEOLOGY

124
gibles should

BOOK

II.

be suspended from the monad which is above intelligible*


it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secon-

and perfected by

dary natures with intelligible light.

But

it

is

necessary that intellectual

natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but

of good and a uniform hyparxis from the

first

cause, should connect su-

permundane natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the


Gods prior to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the intellectual Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a
unical light from the father of the whole of things, should send into
apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess. On

account, the sun being the summit of

from the

etherial profundities,

mundane

natures,

this

this

and proceeding

imparts to visible natures supernatural

perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be similar to the suThese things therefore we shall afterwards mpre
pcrcelestial worlds.
abundantly discuss.

The

present discourse, however, suspends

mentioned manner from the good, and the

first

all

things after the above

unity. "For if indeed the

sun connects every thing sensible, but the good produces and perfects
every thing

intelligible,

and of

these,

the second

monad

[i. e.

the sun]

denominated the offspring of the good, and on this account causes


that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good,

is

because
all

it

imitates the primogeuial cause of

things will thus participate of the good,

itself,

and

will

if this

be the case,

be extended to

this

one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without
a.medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun.]
Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this
For he susextract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle.
pends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for
itself, all good things from
and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he conbut the sumsiders some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles
mits of them ait; uniformly established in intelligibles. Again, from these
intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a
greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends

instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful


the good,

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

VII.

125

and the monads which they contain, subsist and are


For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad
perfected through it.
uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the

that

nil intelligibles,

multitude of sensibles derives

its

subsistence, so

intelligible

multitude to another cause which

telligibles,

and from which they are

is

it is

necessary to refer the

not connumerated with in-

allotted their essence

and

their divine

hyparxis.

however, any one fancy that Plato admits there

IiCt not,

order of the good in intelligible forms, as there

is

the

is

same

prior to intelligibles.

But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the beautiful, must be
considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelligibles.
For the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we
are accustomed

to call royals* or the good, is admitted to

and more excellent than

superessential,

be something

beings both in dignity and

all

when discussing the beautiful and the good,


one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus
says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly
considered as many. Again, particularly considering each thing as being
power

since Socrates also,

calls the

one,

we denominate each

thing that which

and thus Socrates leading


and in short from
and are multiplied,
and the first essences, from

it is,

us from sensible tilings that arc beautiful and good,


things that are participated, subsist in other things,
to the superessential unities of intelligibles

these again, he transfers us to the

and good.

For

tiful things,

and the good

itself

subsistence to things similar to

cause of what

where says

is

exempt cause of every thing

in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader

of

many goods, and each form

itself.

But the

first

good

is

beautiful

many

of

beau-

alone gives

not only the

good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato else-

and "

all

things are for

its

sake,

and

it is

the cause of every

thing beautiful."

For again,
forms

is

intelligible

good prior to forms


ledge.

And

what has been said, the good which is


and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but

in addition to

is

beyond beings, and

the former

latter is the supplier, of

is

is

established above

the source of essential perfection

good to the Gods so

far as they arc

all
;

in

the

know-

but (he

Gods, and

is

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ON THE THEOLOGY

II.

We

must not therefore


generative of goods which are prior to essences.
from the
apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle the good,

name of idea, that he dkectly

calls it the intelligible

goodness

but though

language and appellation, we permit


beautiful and good, transferSocrates to call it the cause of every thing
which are proximately filled by it, appellations
ring through the things
that he says
For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all
the

to

first

principle

is

superior to

all

it.

that are known,


it is beyond knowledge and things
being, according to its analogy to the
and likewise beyond essence and
admirable manner be presents us with an epi,un. And after a certain
For the assertion
in the Parmeaides.
tome of the negations of the one
truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one
that the good is neither
and every
unities,
from the supereaseotial
and the same time separates it
from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and
s of the Gods, and
But these axe the first things, and
from every psychical subsistence.
hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from

about the good, that

through the

first

whole of things.
the principle of the
the good the leader of the divine
Moreover, neither when he celebrates
of being, does he denominate it most splendid
orders as the most splendid
For the first light proceeds from it to intelligias participating of light.
cause of the light
he gives it this appellation as the
bles

and

which

intellect,

but

the fountain of every intelligible, or


every where diffused, and as
For this light is nothing else than the

is

mundane deity.
hyparxis. For as all things become boniform
narticipation of a divine
and are filled with the illuminat.on pro.
through participating of the good,
are
the natures which are pnmanly beings
ceeding from thence, thus also
and intellectual essences become
deiform and as it is said, intelligible
that
of deity. Looking therefore to all
divine through the participation.

intellectual, or

has been said,

we

with reference to
order of beings,

shall preserve
all

the

exempt transcendency of

beings and the divine orders

we must grant

that there

is

Bu

the

good

aga.n ,n each

a monad analogous to

it,

not

says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane


onlv in sensibles, as Plato
to these.
of Gods arranged from the good prior
genera
the
in
and
natures
first cause and
the natures which are nearer to the
is evident that

For

it

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

VII.

which participate of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it.


And as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which are
the leaders of more partial orders.

tudes under the

monads

And

but extends

and

ciple of the whole of things,

all

Plato indeed arranges the multi-

monads to the exempt printhem uniformly about it. It

the

establishes

necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded con-

is

formably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should
be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things. And

we

should survey indeed

and perfected about

monads

in beings,

it

all

but

secondary natures, subsisting according to

we should

establish

it

as transcending

all

the

according to one excess of simplicity, and as unitfclly

arranged prior to the whole orders [of Gods.] Pot as the Gods themselves
enact the order Which

is

in them, thus also

necessary that the truth

is

it

concerning them, the precedancoUs causes of beings, and the second artd
third

progeny of these should be definitely distinguished.


is the one truth concerning the first principle, and which

This, therefore,

possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis,


viz.
it

that this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that

gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that

fountain of superessential goodness, and that

extended towards
united to

it,

Uftprolific,

and

but

pre-eftablishes

Nor

does

its

it,

are

filled

things posterior to

with good, after an ineffable

subsist uniformly about

it is

all

For

it.

its

it is

manner are

unical nature

by so much the more generative of other

the

being

it

is

not

things, as it

a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence-

fecundity tend to multitude and division

undented purity concealed

but

it

abides with

For in the natures also


which are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires
to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its
plenitude.

In a

much

in inaccessible places.

greater degree therefore

nature which contains in one

good, but good

itself,

and

all

perfections,

super-full, (if it

it is

necessary that the

and which

is

not a certain

be lawful so to speak) should

be generative of the Whole of things, and give subsistence to them producing all things by being exempt from all things, and by beitig imparti;

cipable, similarly generating the

first

and the

last

of beings.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

128

You must
is

BOOK ,11.

not, however, suppose that tlus generation

and progression

emitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied,

or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since

all

these are secon-

dary to the singleness of the first. For whether the good is moved, it will
not be the good; since the good itself, and which is nothing else, if it were

How,

moved would depart from goodness.

can that which

therefore,

the source of goodness to beings, produce other things

is

when deprived of

good ? Or whether the good is multiplied through imbecility, there will


be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not
through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs
from

proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not

its

but through a diminution and want of its own


good produces all things by employing power, there
For it will be two things and
will be a diminution of goodness about it.
not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of
power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. But if to be the
good ittelf is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to
the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition? For
additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let the good
therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy.
For all energy is
the progeny of power.
Neither, therefore, does the good energizing give
subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power docs
through

prolific perfection,

power.

But

it fill

thiugs with powers, nor being multiplied

all

if the

of good, nor being


the good precedes

motion

therefore
tures.

moved do

all

powers, and

since each of these


is

the

most

final

is

of

do all things participate

first principle.
For
and every multitude and
referred to the good as to its end. The good

all

all

beings' enjoy the


all

energies,

ends, and the centre of

All desirable natures, indeed, impart

all

desirable na-

an end to secondary beings

but that which pre-subsisls uncircumscribed by

all

things

is

the

first

good.
'

For tmtix rufevr*,

read wmrrm t sit*.

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CUAP.

OF PLATO.

VIII.

CHAPTER
After

129

V11L

these things, however, let us direct our attention to the concep-

tions about the

first

principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius,

survey the manner in which he considers

its

ineffable

and
and immense tran-

But perhaps some one may be indignant with us for rashly


drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato, and may say that
the three kings of which he speaks are all of them intellectual Gods ; but
scendency.

that Plato docs not think fit to co-arrange or connumerate the good with
secondary natures. For such a connumeration ought not to be considered
as adapted to the exempt transcendency of the good with respect to other
things, nor in short,

must

it

be said that the good contributes as the

first

with reference to another second or third cause to the completion of a


triad in conjunction with other natures

but that

it

in

a greater degree

precedes every triad and every number, than the intelligible precede the

Gods. How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings


good which is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and coarrange one as the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the

intellectual

the

third

Some one may

transcendency of the

Such a one, however,


ably accord with us
all

the intelligible

adduce many other

things, indicating the

principle with respect to every thing divine.

in thus interpreting the

who

and

also

first

assert the good to

intellectual genera,

words of Plato

remark-

will

be im participate, to transcend

and

to

be established above

all

the divine monads.

That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things,
and says that all things arc for his sake, and that he is the cause of all
beautiful things, does not I think require

much proof to those who consiown conjectures, by intro-

der his words by themselves apart from their

ducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato.

we do

not assert these things connumeratiug [the

Vol.

Proc.

I.

first

God

But that

with secondary

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jgQ

BOOK

II,

natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first king the first,,
but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that some things are about

him, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and
third things about that which is third, but* he says, in short, that alt

And

things are about him.

to the other kings, indeed, he introduces

number and a divided kingdom

but to the king of all things he neither


number, nor a distribution of dominion opposite toSuch a mode of words, therefore, neither connumerates
;

attributes a part of

that of the others.

him as the
For of a triad ic divifirst orders, and which are
sion the first monad, indeed, is
co-ordinate with itself ; but the second of second ; and the third of third
If, however, some one should apprehend that the first monad isorders.
the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and
third allotments ; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension is different from that which similarly pervades to all things.
And to

the king of

things with the other kings* nor co-arranges

all

leader of a triad with the second

and

third power.

the leader of

the king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one reaV

son and one order

but to the

according to the same order

first

and

of the triad, things


it is

first

are subjected

necessary that things second and

be subservient according to their communion with the remainDoes not, therefore, what is here said by Plato remarkably
exempt nature of the first cause, and his un-coordinatioa
with the other kingdoms of the Gods ? Since he says that this cause similarly reigtis over all things, that all things subsist about biro, and that
for his sake essence and energy are inherent in all things.

third should

ing kings.

celebrate the

If also Socrates in the Republic clearly' teaches that the sun reigns

over the world analogous to the good,

let

no one dare

logy as connumerating the good with the king of


unless*

For

we

x<u here,

think

it it

For

In the original

<ro$at{, it is

fit

to preserve that

For

natures.

together with the similitude of secondary causes to

principles,

to accuse this ana-

mundane

the

first

exempt dominion [of the

first

necessary to read aXXmi

necessary to read

is

wanting

after

u.

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OF PLATO.

chap. vm.
it will

cause]

131

be impossible for us to evince that the super-mundane kings

have their allotment analogous to the first cause, who subsists prior to the
whole of things according to one transcendency. But what occasion is
there to be prolix ? For Plato indeed calls the first God king; but he
does not think

fit

to give the others the

same

appellation, not only in the

beginning of what he says about the first, but shortly after, he adds
" About the king himself and the natures of which I have spoken there
is

nothing of this kind."

But he

is

The

first

God,

therefore, alone is called king.

called not only the king of things

in the

first,

same manner as

the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the
all beauty.
Hence the first God precedes
exempt and uniform manner, and according to a
transcendency of the whole of things, and is neither celebrated by Plato

cause at once of all being and


the other causes in an

as co-ordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.


things, however, are asserted by Plato about the first God
by recurring a little to the preceding words, which are as
" You say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the
particulars respecting the first nature.
I must speak to you, therefore, in
enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted, either by .land or

That these

we

shall learn

follow

sea,

he who reads

it

may

not understand this part of

things are situated about the king of all

and he

is

and

the cause of every thing beautiful."

all

all tilings,

the whole of things beautiful and good.


all

things, except the unical

duces

all

God who

things from himself, and

is

is

and

contents.

All

In these words, therefore,

Plato proposing to purify our conceptions about the

enigmas, celebrates the king of

its

things are for his sake

first

refers to

Who,

principle through

him the cause of

therefore, is the

exempt from

the leader of

all

all things,

king of

who

pro-

orders according to

one cause ? Who is he that converts all ends to himself, and establishes
them about himself? For if you call him, for whose sake all things subsist, the end of all ends, and the primogenial cause, you will not deviate
from the truth concerning him. Who is he that is the cause of all beautishining upon them with divine light, and who encloses that
deformed and without measure, and the most obscure of all
things in the extremity of the universe?

ful things,

which

is

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ON THE THEOLOGY

132

BOOK

It,

you are willing also from the words of Plato that follow the preceding, we will show that to be the recipient neither of language nor of
knowledge is adapted to the first principle. For the words " This your
If

inquiry concerning the cause of

due

to unfold

of

it,

is

as of a nature en-

with a certain quality," are to be referred to this principle.

not possible to apprehend

it is

beautiful things

all

you

it,

because

it

is

it

uncircumscribed

speak as of a certain thing

will

For
unknown, nor
but whatever you may say
and you will speak indeed

intellectually,
;

because

it is

For speaking of the things of which it is


about it, but you will not speak
the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend through intelligence what
it.

Here

it is.

soul,

remove

it

redundancy of

down

and the busy energy of the


exempt from all things, by the

therefore, the addition of quality,

from the goodness which


its

conceptions about

participation of the good.

This likewise draws the soul

it.

and multiform

to kindred, connate,

from receiving that which

is

is

intelligiblcs,

and prevents her

characterized by unity, and

And

it is

is

occult in the

not only proper that the

human

soul

should be purified from things co-ordinate with itself in the union and

communion with
leave

that which

the multitude of

all

ticipate of his light, as


intellect also,

which

is

is first,

itself

approach with closed eyes, as

much

and that

for

this

purpose

behind, and exciting

it is

said, to the

as this

prior to us,

is

and

king of

lawful for

all

it

its

to

own

it

should

hyparxia,

things,

all

and par-

accomplish

but

divine natures, by their highest

unions, superessential torches, and

first hyparxes are united to that which


and always participate of its exuberant fulness and this not so
far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from
things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all.
For

is

first,

the cause of

all

disseminated in

all

things impressions of his

own

all-per-

and through these establishes all things about himself,


and being exempt from the whole of things, is ineffably present to all

fect transcendency,

things.

Every thing therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature,
symbol of the father of all. All tilings too naturally vene-

finds there the

rate him,

and are united

sion, divesting themselves


his impression alone,

and

to him, through

of their
to

own

participate

an appropriate mystic impres-

nature, and hastening to

him alone, through the

become

desire of

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IX.

133

and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they


his
have run upwards as far as to this cause, tlicy become tranquil, and are
liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally
possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcenBut that what is here said is concerning the first God, and
dent] v full.
that Plato in these conceptions leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt

unknown

nature,

from the other causes, has been,

I think, sufficiently evinced.

CHAPTER
Let

IX.

us in the next place consider each of the dogmas,

to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these

by a reasoning

and adapt them

we may comprehend

process, the scope of the whole of Plato's theology.

then one truth concerning the

first

Let

principle be especially that which

and all-transcending nature ; which estaabout him, but does not assert that he generates or pro*

celebrates his ineffable, simple,


blishes all things

duces any thing, or that he presubsists as the end of things posterior to

For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown,
exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above
all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to
him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short, does it announce that
it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the
second and third natures which subsist after him.
Such then being this indication of the first God, and such the manner

himself.

who

in

is

which

it

desire to

precedes

is that which conhim as the object of


according to one cause which

venerates the ineffable, the second to this

verts all the desires of things to him,

and

celebrates

and common end of all things,


other causes. For the last of things

all

sake of something

else,

other things subsist

but the

and

all

first is

subsists only for the

that only for the sake of which

all

the intermediate natures participate of these

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ON THE THEOLOGY

134

two

BOOK

Hence they genuinely adhere

peculiarities.

to the natures

U.

which

surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to

subordinate beings.

The

speculation of the principle of things

third

is

preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to

For to celebrate him

as the supplier of good,

two

orders of things,

that

all

far inferior to tlie

all

beautiful things.

and as end preceding

tlie

not very remote from the narration which says,

causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from him,

as well those which ace paternal, and the sources of good, as those that
are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing
cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the
For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary
it must not he said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of
beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this
If, however, as we
perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes.
endeavour to ascribe to him the good and the one, we in like manner attribute to him cause, and that which is fin*l or paternal, we must pardon

and generative
first.

natures,

the parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspirin? to perbut, at the
ceive hkn with the eye of intellect, and to speak about him
same time, the exempt transcendency of the one which is immense, must be
considered as surpassing an indication of this kind. From these things
therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order*
adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the first part of this
;

sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity,* transcendency, ami in short


the uncoordination with

that

all

but leaves that which


things posterior to it

the

all

things of the king of alL

For the assertion

things -subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second,

Gods*

is

beyond

But

all

things without any connexion with

the second part celebrates the cause of all

as prearranged in the order of end.

highest of aU causes,

cause; but of

this

kind

For *f a$ iv, k

'

For

t>)( aiXffTi^r{

For

tw

is

is

For that which

immediately conjoined with that which


is

is

is

the

prior to

the final cause, and that for the sake of which

necessary to read tw.

liov, it is

I read T^t Xvn]ra.

necessary to read tmf 9r.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. IX.
all

This part therefore

things subsist

woven together with the order of

posterior to the otW, and is


and the progression of the Pla-

is

things,

tonic doctrine.

Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things,

and thus adds

to

him a

species of cause

inferior to the final.

also Plotmus, I think, does not hesitate to call the

first

God

Whence

the fountain

which is best
he may be the cause of all, and in reality
But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable
prior to cause.
circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these
three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the good,

of the beautiful.

It is necessary therefore to attribute that

to the best of all things, that

and

this ineffable

eause to
Is

fit it

it.

nature, nor does

But the second dogma

to collect the final cause

of which

all

for it

things subsist.

sake of the goodr

it

And

the third

beautiful things.

But

good

first

the end, but to conjoin with


it

appears to

does not refuse to call

But when it

it

ineffable, as it

me

it,

enables us

that for the sake

asserts that all things are for the

communion andi

the object of desire with the desiring na-

is

dogma
this

to the simplicity of the

And

permit us to refer any species of

leaves indeed the

excites in us the conception of the

co-ordination of that which


tures.

it

should, but from the habitude of things- posterior to

evinces that the good

is

the cause of alh

to say something concerning

it,

and

to

add

cause, and- not to abide in the conceptions of


the producing principle of things second.

it

that Plato here indicates the natures which are

proximately unfolded into light after the

first.

Pork

is

not possible to say

any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from'
all things, and at another from the best of things
for it is the cause of
hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the
:

peculiarities of these.

We ascribe

to

from the donation which pervades to


things of which all participate,

which

is

we

For muty

it

therefore the one

things from

say there

established prior to all these.

'

it

all

But

u ocewwry

is

it.

and the good,


For of those'

no other cause than that

the about which

( npi

,)

the

to rtad ur<j.

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ON THE THEOIX)GY

!36
on account of which

(to

BOOK

II.

and the from which (n a^'ov,) particularly


Gods and from these they are ascribed to the

h,

subsist in the intelligible

*),

For whence can we suppose the unical Gods derive their peTo this summit of
culiarities, except from that which is prior to them ?
intelligibles therefore the term about is adapted, because all the divine
orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them.

God.

first

But the term on account of which


gibles

pertains to the middle order of intelli-

for all things subsist for the sake of eternity

And

fectly entire.

the term

from which

is

and an hyparxis per-

adapted to the extremity of

and adorns them uniformly.


produces
These things, therefore, we shall indeed make more known in the doctrine
which will shortly follow concerning the intelligible Gods.

intelligibles

for this first

all things,

CHAPTER
In the next place,

let

X.

us finish the discussion concerning the

first

God,

with the theory of Parmcnidcs, and unfold the mystic conceptions of the

For we shall
most perfect interpretation of them to our comit
is
the
first
place
therefore,
requisite to
In
determine this concerning the first hypothesis, that it comprehends as
many conclusions negatively, as the hypothesis which follows it does affirmatively.
For this latter demonstrates all the orders proceeding from
the one ; but the former evinces that the one is exempt from all the divine
hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose.

first

refer the reader for the

mentaries on that dialogue.

From

genera.

how

it is

both these hypotheses however,

his productions.

For

HbgJhuU

fc-

it is

obvious to every one

necessary that the cause of the whole of things should transcend

du it is

For because

necessary to read If

o i

the one is the cause of all the

Gods, he

since the former denotes the inttrumtntal, but the latter

cause.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. X.
transcends

And

things.

all

because he

is

137

exempt from them through

transcendency, on this account he gives to all things their hypostases.


For through being expanded aboveaall things he causes all things to subsist.
Since in the second and third orders also of beings, causes which are entirely exempt from their effects, more perfectly generate and connect their
progeny than those causes do which are coordinate with their effects. And
the one by ineffably producing all the divine orders, appears to be unically
established above all. For in the productions posterior to it, cause is every
where different from the things caused. And on this account nature
indeed being incorporeal, is a cause which transcends bodies ; but soul

being perfectly perpetual,

being immoveable
fore,

is

is

the cause of things generated

the cause of every thing that

is

; and intellect
moved. If, there-

according to each progression of beings effects are denied of their

causes,

it is

cause of

certainly necessary to take

away

all

things similarly from the

all.

In the second place, I think

it is

necessary that the order of the nega

by those who receive theology according to the


intention of Parmenides
and that it should be admitted that they protions should be defined

ceed indeed from the monads which subsist primarily in the divine genera,
and that Parmenides takes away from the one all second and third natures,

For that which transcends more


a much greater degree subsist prior to those that

according to an order adapted to each.


principal causes

must

are subordinate.

the

Gods that are

in

Parmenides, however, does not begin his negations from


united to the first: for this genus

tinguished from the one

is

with difficulty dis-

because being arranged naturally [immediately]

most unical and occult, and transcendency similar to its pro*


Parmenides therefore beginning where prior to all other
things division and multitude are apparent, and proceeding regularly
after

it, it is

ducing cause.
through

all

the second orders as far as to the last of things, again returns

from the Gods that are

to the beginning,

and shows how

most similar to

and which primarily participate of it, according to one

it,

the one differs

ineffable cause.

In the third place, in addition to what has been said, I determine conmode of negations, that they are not privative of their sub-

cerning the
Proc.

Vol.

I.

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ON THE THEOLOGY
but generative of things which are as

jects,

because the
cause

first

principle

not many, the

it

who

thinks

it

And

II.

were their opposites.

many

not a whole, wholeness proceeds from

it is

ner in other things.


Plato,

is

BOOK

proceed from
it,

and

in

it,

For
and be-

a similar man-

in thus determining, I speak conformably to

proper to abide in negations, and to add nothing to

For whatever you add, you diminish the one, and afterwards
it is not the one, but that which is passive to [or participates]

the one.

evince that
the one.

For

it is

thus not one only, but in addition to this possesses some-

thing else also by participation.

This

mode

therefore of negations

is

exempt, unical, primary, and is a departure from the whole of things, in an


unknown and ineffable transcendency of simplicity. It is likewise neces-

mode as this to the first God, again to


exempt him from the negations also. For neither does any discourse, nor
any name belong to the one, says Parmenides. But if no discourse belongs
to it, it is evident that neither does negation pertain to it.
For all things
are secondary to the one, things knowable and knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge, and after a manner that which is impossible
presents itself at the end of the hypothesis.
For if nothing whatever can
sary, having attributed such a

be said of the
is

it

at

all

one, neither

is

Nor
know the

this discussion itself adapted to the one.

wonderful that the discourse of those

who wish

to

by words should terminate in that which is impossible ; since all


knowledge when conjoined with an object of knowledge which does not

ineffable

at

all

pertain to

it

loses its power.

tained to that which

is

For sense,

if

we should say that

it

the object of science would subvert itself ;

per-

and

would be the case with science and every kind of knowledge if we


should say that they belonged to that which is intelligible ; so that language when conversant with that which is ineffable, being subverted about

this

itself,

has no cessation, and opposes

itself.

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XI.

CHAPTER
Let

us

now

therefore, if ever,

minate from ourselves


near to the cause of

and phantasy be at
gic impulse to the

verse itself be

XI.

abandon multiform knowledge,

exter-

the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach

all

For this purpose, let not only opinion


nor the passions alone which impede our anago-

all things.

rest,

first,

still.

139

be at peace ; but

And

let the air be still, and the uniextend us with a tranquil power to
Let us also, standing there, having transwe contain any thing of this kind,) and with

let all things

communion with the ineffable.


cended the

intelligible (if

it were the rising sun, since it is not lawful


any being whatever intently to behold him let us survey the sun

nearly closed eyes adoring as


for

whence the light of the intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets
say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity
descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of
the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are from which, in this

And let us as it
progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt.
were celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as
giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of

produced these indeed, but among the

last

of things

all

animals

for

he

but, prior to these,

us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intel-

let

lectual genus of

Gods, together with

the

supermundane and mundane


all unities,

all

the

first

than

all

all silence,

And
an

is

called

intelligi-

again after these things descending into a reasoning pro-

intellectual

For a&MXTon,

Phanea

in

holies,

ble Gods.

cess from
1

all

and beyond
as the God of Gods, the unity of
adyta, as more ineffable than
and more unknown
essence, as holy among the
and concealed
the

divinities

it is

hymn, and employing the

necessary to read aXinat.

by Orpheus the adytum.

So

that

irreprehensible science

For the occult and

invisible order

of Night and

by the Jint adyta, Proclus means the highest

order of intelligible*.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

140

of dialectic, let us, following the contemplation of

first

11.

causes, survey the

And
in which the first God is exempt from the whole of things.
our descent be as far as to this. But opinion and phantasy and sense,
prevent us indeed from partaking of the presence of the Gods, and draw

manner
let

us

down from Olympian goods

the intellect that

is

in us,

to earth-born motions, Titannically divide

and divulse us from an establishment in wholes

to the images of beings.

CHAPTER

XII.

What therefore will be the first conception of the science proceeding


from intellect, and unfolding itself into light ? What other can we assert
and the most known of all the
it to be than that which is the most simple
conceptions contained in this science ? What therefore is this ? The one,
says Parmenides,if it is the one will not be many." For it is necessary that
the many should participate of the one ; but the one does not participate
itself. Neither is that which is primarily one parwould not be purely one if mingled with the many, nor
that which is one, if it received the addition of that which is subordinate.
The one therefore is exempt from the many. The many however subsist primarily in the summit of the first intellectual Gods, and in the intelligible
place of survey, as we are taught in the second hypothesis. The one, therefore, entirely transcends an order of this kind, and is the cause of it. For
the not many, is not privation, as we have said, but the cause of the many.

of the one, but

ticipate.

is

For

the one

it

This, therefore, Parmenides does not think it requisite to demonstrate, but


as a thing most manifest to every one, he first evinces this, through the
it were of the many to the one. But employing this he takes
away that which follows ; and he takes away that which is posterior to this
by employing the conclusions prior to it, and this he always does, after the

opposition as

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CHAP.

OP PLATO.

XII.

And

1 41

one time indeed, he assumes the elements of the


demonstrations from proximate conclusions, but at another time from
those that are more remote. For after this intelligible order of Gods, as
we have said, he gives subsistence to that order which connectedly con-

same manner.

at

and bounds the extent of them, from their exempt cause. But this
is called by him in the second hypothesis parts and a whole. These
therefore he denies of the one employing the many for the purpose of
distinguishing the subjects and the one. For, as he says, that which is
a whole and has parts is many ; but the one is beyond the many. If,
therefore, the one transcends the intelligible simplicity, but whole and that
which has parts proceed from it in order to become the bond of the whole
tains

order

of

this distribution, is it

not necessary that the one should neither be a

whole, nor be indigent of parts

And

I think

it is

through

this trans-

cendency that the one presubsists as the cause of this order of Gods,
that

it

produces

this order,

and

but in an exempt manner.

In the third place after these,

we may

survey the order which

is

allotted

and at the same time intelligible Gods,


and may behold the one perfectly expanded above
it.
For this order indeed subsists from the second genera, and from the
But the one, as has been demonintellectual wholeness of the genera.
strated, is exempt according to cause from this wholeness. The one therethe boundary of the intellectual

Me

proceeding from

one,

fore has neither beginning, or middle, or end, nor has

any

it

extremes, nor does

For through these Gods, the before menWhether therefore, there be a


perfective summit, or what is celebrated as the middle centre in these
Gods, or a termination converting the end of these divinities to their beginning, the one is similarly beyond every triple distribution. For the
one would have parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of
it

participate of

tioned order of

figure.

Gods becomes apparent.

But it has been demonstrated that the one unically subsists


many, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause
of them.
And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one negation of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of
the last order. Besides this also, he shows that the one has no extremity.
this kind.

prior to the

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ON THE THLOLOGY

142

But the infinite

is

wise shows that the one

Again

And

a thing of this kind.


is

unreceptive of

Gods

we must direct our

attention to

and receiving a

tripartite di-

subsisting from these,

vision,

and must demonstrate that the one transcends these

such

the one, says Parmenides, since

is

11.

all figures.

therefore, after these triple orders

the intellectual

BOOK

separately from this he like-

it is

neither in

itself,

also.

For

nor in another.

For if it were in another, it would be on all sides comprehended by that


which it is, and would every where touch that which comprehends it.
But in this case, it would have a figure, would consist of parts, and on
And if it were in itself it
this account would be many and not one.

in

would entirely comprehend itself in itself. But comprehending and at


the same time being comprehended, it will be two, and will be no longer

The discourse therefore proceeds to the same conclusion,


and evinces that the one will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual
order, if any one endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence the one
being perfectly exempt from this summit also, gives subsistence to it, this
summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods
placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and
being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.
primarily one.

Moreover, the one likewise generates the second intellectual order, being

unmingled with

it.

For

the one neither stands

participates therefore of neither of these

still,

nor

is

moved.

It

but being similarly exempt

same time transcends the middle orders of the intelof the Gods.
For if it were moved, it would be
moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according to a change in quality,
or local motion.
But it is not possible that the one can be changed in
quality for being thus changed it will be not one, and will fall off from
a unical hyparxis. Nor can it be locally moved. For it is impossible
from both,

it

at the

lectual progression

that it should be moved in a circle, because it would have parts, viz. middle
and extremes. And if it changed one place for another it would be partible.
For it would be necessary that it should neither be wholly in that
place to which it is moved, nor in that whence it begins to be moved.
For if it were wholly in either of them, it would be immoveable, in consequence of partly not yet being moved, and partly having now ceased

CHAP.
its

OP PLATO.

XII.

motion.

But

if the

one stands

But

should abide in the same thing.


one

is

Hence

no where.

it is

still, it

it

neither in

143
is

certainly necessary that

it

has been demonstrated that the

nor in another thing.

itself,

In

no respect therefore is the one moved, or does it stand still, which things
motion and permanency] particularly belong to the middle order of
intellectuals, as will be evident from the second hypothesis.
For the first
God produces this order also, being exempt from it.
In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last
order of intellectuals, proceeding from the one, and subordinate to it. For
in,this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly.
But at the same

[viz.

time the one subsists prior to both these.

For

be difmanner
and with other things. But the one is not
because that which is different from the one
not the same with other things, lest becoming

ferent both from itself and from other things.

same

is

the

same with

indeed different from


will

the same with them,

And

is

said to

in a similar

itself,

itself,

And

be not one.

different

it is

should latently pass into their nature.

Moreover,
would be at the same
time one, and would have as an addition the power of difference. For
so far as it is different it will not be one; since difference is not the one.
neither

is

it

the one different from other things.

For

it

Hence being one and different, it will be many and not the one. Nor
For if the one and the same differ only in
the one the same with itself.
name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness
with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become one
by participating of the many. But if the one and sameness are essentially
different, that which is primarily one does not participate of sameness,
lest by receiving sameness in addition to the one, it should become a pasIf however the extremity
sive one, and not that which is primarily one.
is

of intellectuals

is

characterized

by

this tetrad, it is

ing beyond this also supernally unfolds

it

evident that the one exist-

into light,

and places over the

wholes of the universe a tetradic monad, the source of ornament to

secondary natures.

munication with the

all

For from hence other things primarily receive a comone which are also indeed produced and connectedly

contained by the one.

But after the

intellectual

Gods, the ineffable transcendency of

the one

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ON THE THEOLOGY

144

BOOK

arranges the extent of the supermundane divinities, the one in the


time, being occultly

exempt from

its

And

supermundane progeny.

If.

mean
this

extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but uni-

formly receives

its

hyparxis from the

ides produces through similitude

and

first

God.

This, therefore,

dissimilitude,

Parmen-

from the deity which


For the similar is that

encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads.


which is passive to sameness, in [the same manner as dissimilitude is
that which is passive to difference.
Parmenides therefore demonstrates
that the one transcends according to one simplicity such a peculiarity of
the Gods also as this. For that which is established above the power of
same and different, in a much greater degree transcends the genera which

are allotted

What

a subsistence according

titude of the
celestial,

to similitude

therefore remains after this

mundane Gods ?

But

but the other sublunary.

and

dissimilitude.

Is it not evident that it

is

the mul-

one being
the genus which

this also is twofold, the

Of

these, therefore,

revolves in the heavens, proceeds together with the equal, the greater

the

less.

But

in the sublunary genus the equal

multitude from the

celestial equality,

the power of the more and the

less.

is

allotted

but the unequal

is

and

a difference in

again divided by

According to another genus there*

fore of the divine orders, there will be a

monad and

a duad, but above

indeed, they are allied to the one and to sameness, and beneath to multii

and the intellectual cause of difference. Hence the one transcends


For the equal indeed every where consists of the same parts.
By what contrivance therefore is it possible that the nature which at one
and the same time is exempt from sameness, and the difference which is
associated with it, should participate of equality and inequality ?
Besides all these divine orders therefore we must intellectually survey
the genera of deified souls, and which are distributed about the Gods,
For in each of the divine progressions and in the progressions also of souls,
tude,

all these.

the first genus presents itself to the view connascent with the Gods ; since
both in the heavens, and in the sublunary region divine souls receive the
division of the

Gods

place demonstrates.
time,

into the world, as the Athenian

The

to time,

Guest

in

a certain

by
But the peculiarity of divine souls.

psychical extent therefore,

and by a life according

is

characterized

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CHAP.
is

OF PLATO.

XII.

shown by Pannenides

145

to consist in their being younger

time older both than themselves and other things.

and at the same

For revolving always

according to the same time, and conjoining the beginning with the end, as
at one and the same time proceeding to the end of the whole period they

become younger, but as at the same time circulating to the beginning of


they become older. All their ages however, perpetually preserve the
same measures of time. Again, there is sameness in them and difference,
it,

the former indeed preserving equality, but the latter inequality, according

The one therefore

to time.

subsists prior to divine souls,

We now

these also together with the Gods.

the whole distribution of

therefore

more excellent natures

and generates
to the end of

come

and the cause of

all

genera that follow the Gods,


and that are triply divided by the three parts of time. But this cause is
intellectual
the
projections
of Parmenides to be also
by
demonstrated
intelligibles at

exempt from
is

once unfolds into

light the

For that which

these.

is

beyond

all

time and the

life

which

according to time, can by no contrivance become subservient to the

more partial periods of time.


That which is the first of all things therefore, unfolds into light all the
Gods, divine souls, and the more excellent genera, and is neither complicated with its progeny, nor multiplied about them but being perfectly
exempt from them in an admirable simplicity, and transcendency of
union, it imparts to all things indifferently progression and at the same
;

time order in the progression.


intelligible place

Pannenides therefore beginning from the


first intellectual Gods, proceeds thus

of survey of the

according to the measures of generation, giving subsistence to the

far,

genera of the Gods, and to the natures that are united to and follow the
Gods,' and perpetually evinces that the one
things.

But

is

ineffably

exempt from all


and imitating

again, from hence he returns to the beginning,

the conversion of the whole of things, separates the one from the highest,
viz.

from the

intelligible

For thus especially we

Gods.

may

transcendency of the one, and the immense difference of


all

other things, if

we not only demonstrate

that

it is

its

survey the

union from

established above

'

Proc.

For

m> famit

is

necessary to read

Vol.

i.

146

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK

the second or third progressions in the divine orders, but also that

it

II.

sub-

the intelligible unities themselves, and this in a manner conformable to the simplicity of their occult nature, and not through a variety

sists prior to

of words, but through intellectual projection alone.


naturally adapted to be

known by

intellect.

For

intelligibles are

This therefore, Parmenides

also evinces in reality, relinquishing logical methods,

but energizing acis above essence, and being


For this assertion was not collected from the
preceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first Gods themselves would be without demonstration, if it derived its credibility from
things subordinate. At the same time therefore, Parmenides contends
that all knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the
transcendency of the one, and beautifully end in the ineffable of that
God who is bevond all tlii lij^s. For after scientific energies, and intelleccording to intellect, and asserting that the one

characterized by the one.

tual projections, a union with the unknown follows, to which also Parmenides referring the whole of his discussion, concludes the first hyposuspending indeed all the divine genera from the one f but evincing
that the one is unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the
participation of intelligibles and sensible*, and in an ineffable manner
thesis,

giving subsistence to the participated monads.

Hence

also, the

one

is

beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the


same time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities.
said to be

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BOOK

III.

CHAPTER
Such
it

therefore

the theology with Plato concerning the

is

appears to me, and so great

with respect to

I.

is

the transcendency which

other discussions of divine concerns

all

same time venerably preserving the

ineffable

union of

first

God,

it is

allotted

at one

this

as

and the

God exempt

from the whole of things, uncircumscribed by all gnostic com prehensions,


and apart from all beings ; and unfolding the anagogic paths to him, per-

which souls always possess of the father, and


and enkindling that torch in them, by which they

fecting that parturient desire

progenitor of

all

things,

are especially conjoined with the

unknown transcendency of the

one.

But

and truly superessential cause, which


power and energy, the discussion of the
Gods immediately follows. For to what other thing prior to the unities
is it lawful to be conjoined with the one, or what else can be more united

after this imparticipable, ineffable,


is

separated from

to the unical

we

God

all

essence,

than the multitude of Gods

next place unfold the

Concerning these there-

theory of Plato, invoking the Gods themselves to enkindle in us the light of truth. I wish
however prior to entering on the particulars of this theory, to convince

fore,

shall in the

the reader, and to

make

it

inartificial

evident to him through demonstration, that

many orders of the Gods, as the Parmenides of


Plato unfolds to us in the second hypothesis.

there are necessarily as

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ON THE THEOLOGY

148
This therefore

is

I think prior to all other things

BOOK

III.

apparent to those whose

conceptions are not perverted, that every where, but especially in the
divine orders, second progressions, are completed through the similitude

of these to

their

For nature and

proper principles.

and every

intellect,

generative cause, are naturally adapted to produce and conjoin to themselves things similar, prior to

such as as are dissimilar to themselves. For


of beings should be continued, and

if it is necessary that the progression

that no
bodies,

vacuum should
it is

intervene either in incorporeal natures, or in

necessary that every thing which proceeds naturally should

For

proceed through similitude.

caused should be the same with

it is

its

by no means lawful that the thing


since a remission and deficiency

cause

of the union of the producing cause generates secondary natures.


again, if that which

would be

is

second were the same as that which

similarly the same,

the thing caused.

is first,

For
each

and one would not be cause, but the other


one by its very being, or essentially,

If however, the

an exuberance of productive power, but the other falls short of the


power that produced it, these are naturally separated from each other, and

lias

the generative cause precedes in excellence the thing generated, and there
is

not a sameness of things which so greatly

second

is

not the same with that which

is

differ.

But

first, if

indeed

if

that which
is

it

is

different

only, they will not be conjoined to each other, nor will the one participate

For contact and participation, are indeed a communion of


sympathy of participants with the natures they
But if it is at the same time the same with and different
participate.
from that which is first, if indeed the sameness is indigent, and vanquished
by the power which is contrary to it, the one will no longer be the leader
of the other.

things conjoined, and a

of the progression of beings, nor will every generative cause subsist prior
to things of a secondary nature, in the order of the good.

And

For the one

good converts
But the conversion and friendship of
generated natures to their causes.
things secondary to such as are primary is through similitude, but not
through a dissimilar nature. If therefore the one is the cause of the whole
is

not the cause of division, but of friendship.

of things, and
it will

if

the

good

is

in

the

an exempt manner desirable to

all things,

every where give subsistence to the progeny of precedaneous causes,

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

1.

I49

through similitude, in order that progression may be according to the one,


and that the conversion of things which have proceeded may be to the

For without similitude there

good.

will neither

be the conversion of things

to their proper principles, nor the generation of efFepts.

a thing admitted

fore be considered as

the second thing besides this, and which

But

this, is, that it is

dinate to

an

monad

necessary every

Let

this

there-

in this place.
is

demonstrated through

should produce a number co-or-

nature indeed a natural, but soul a psychical, and intellect

itself,

number.

intellectual

For

every thing generative generates similars

if

prior to dissimilar*, as has been before demonstrated, every cause wilt


certainly deliver

before

it

its

own form and

peculiarity to

its

gives subsistence to far distant progressions,

are separated from

its

and conjoined with

it

nature,

it will

own

progeny, and
and things which

produce things essentially near to

through similitude.

Every monad

it,

therefore, gives

subsistence to a multitude indeed, as generating that which

second to

is

and which divides the powers that presubsist occultly in itself. For
and contractedly in the monad, present
themselves to the view separately in the progeny of the monad. And this
indeed the wholeness of nature manifests, since it contains in one the
itself,

those things which are uniformly

reasons,

and

[i.

in the

e.

productive principles] of

sublunary region

natures which are divided from

of

fire,

all

things both in the heavens

but distributes the powers of

it

about bodies.

and form, and energizes together with

liarity

itself to

the

For the nature of earth,

and of the moon, possesses from the wholeness of nature its pecu-

tains its

own

allottment.

This also the

For

ences and of numbers manifests.

this wholeness,

monad of

this

being

all

and con-

the mathematical sci-

and

things primarily,

spermatically producing in itself the forms of numbers, distributes different powers to different externally proceeding numbers.

possible that

of

its

what

generator.

is

generated, should at once receive

And

it

is

'

itself

therefore gives subsistence to

'

For

not

it is

the abundance

necessary that the prolific power of every

thing that pre-exists in the cause

monad

all

For airua

it

should become apparent.

a multitude about

Decenary to read r<a.

itself,

The

and

to

ON THE THEOLOGY

150

number which

BOOK

III.

distributes the peculiarities that abide collectively in itself.

Since however, as was before observed, the similar

is

always more

allied

to cause than the dissimilar, there will be one multitude of similars to the

monad, proceeding from the monad and another of dissimilars. But


again, the multitude which is similar to the monad is that in a divided
manner which the monad is indivisibly. For if the monad possesses a
peculiar power and hyparxis, there will be the same form of hyparxis in
;

the multitude together with a remission with reference to the whole.

After this however,

it

is

necessary to consider in the third place, that

of progressions, such as are nearer to their cause are indicative of a greater

multitude of things, and are at the same time in a certain respect equal
to their containing causes
less

but that such as are more remote possess a

extended power of signification

and on account of the diminution

of their power, change and diminish at the same time the amplitude of

For

production.
is

more

if,

of progressions, that which subsists the

first

in order

and that which gives subsistence to the

similar to its principle,

number

both with respect to essence and power more similar


to the generating principle of all things, it is necessary that of secondary

greatest

is

natures, such as are nearer to the


it,

monad, and which receive dominion after

should give a greater extent to their productions

but that such things

more separated from their primary monad should neither pervade in


a similar manner through all things, nor extend their efficacious energies to
as are

far distant progressions.

And

again, as similar to this,

it is

necessary that

the nature which gives subsistence to the greatest number of effects, should

be arranged next to the


rative of

monad

its

principle

a more numerous progeny, because

and that the nature geneit is more similar to the

supplying cause of all things than that which is generative of a few, must
be arranged nearer to the monad, according to hyparxis. For if it is more
remote,

it

will

be more dissimilar to the

dissimilar, it will neither possess

first

principle

similar natures, nor an energy abundantly prolific.

cause

is allied

rative of

to the cause of

a more abundant,

that which

is

is

all.

but if

it is

more

a power comprehending the power of

And

For an abundant
which is gene-

universally, that

more naturally

allied to its principle than

productive of a less numerous progeny. For the production

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

I.

of fewer

effects is

tion of essence

151

a defect of power ; but a defect of power is a diminuand a diminution of essence becomes redundant on ac-

count of dissimilitude to

its

cause, and a departure from the

first

prin-

ciple.

Again therefore, in addition to what has been said, we sball assert this
which possesses the most indubitable truth, that prior to the causes which
are participated,

it

is

every whe re necessary that imparticipable causes

should have a prior subsistence in the whole of things.


sary tbat a cause should have the
to

the nature of beings, and that

all

towards things secondary

exempt from
case,

same

it is

all

it

relation to its

For

is

imparticipable, being similarly

beings, as unically producing

all

things

; if

requisite that every other cause which imitates


things, should

all

neces-

should naturally possess this order

but the one

dency of the one with respect to

if it is

progeny as the one

this

be the

the transcen-

be exempt from the

natures which are in secondary ranks, and which are participated by them.

And

again, as equivalent to this,

and primary cause should

it is

establish

requisite that every imparticipable

monads of secondary natures

to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

I say, for instance,

it is

similar

requisite

many souls to different natures ; and one


many souls. For thus the first exempt
where have an order analogous to the one. And secon-

that one soul should distribute

intellect participated intellects to

genus

will

every

will be analogous to these


and through the similitude of these will he conjoined with their
imparticipable principle.
Hence prior to the forms which are in other
things, those are established which subsist in themselves
exempt causes
prior to such as are co-ordinate ; and imparticipable monads prior to such
as are participable.
And consequently (as that which is demonstrated at
the same time with this) the exempt causes are generative of the co-ordinate, and imparticipable natures extend participable monads to their

dary natures which participate kindred causes


causes,

progeny. And natures which subsist from themselves produce the powers
which are resident in other things. These things therefore being discussed,
let us consider how each of the divine genera subsists through analogy,'
and survey following Plato himself, what are the first and most total
'

For

mAotn*

it

U neceMWy to mdmmXoymf.

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ON THE THEOLOGY-

152
orders of the Gods.
shall

It
is

BOOK

For having discovered and demonstrated

lit.

this,

we

perhaps be able to perceive the truth concerning these several orders.


necessary therefore, from the before-mentioned axioms, since there

is

one unity the principle of the whole of things, and from which every
its subsistence, that this unity should produce from itself,

hyparxis derives

prior to all other things, a multitude characterized

ber most allied to

its

cause.

For

if

by unity, and a num-

every other cause constitutes a pro-

to that which is dissimilar, much more must


manner tilings posterior to itself, since
and
Me one itself must produce according to union
it is beyond similitude,
For how can the one give subsistthings which primarily proced from it.
ence to its progeny except unically ? For nature generates things secon-

geny similar to

itself prior

the one unfold into light after this

itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually.


The one therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to union,
and the progression from the one is uniform. But if that which primarily produces all things is the one, and the progression from it is unical, it

dary to

is

certainly necessary that the multitude thence produced should be self-

perfect unities, most allied to their producing cause.

every

Farther

still, if

monad constitutes a number adapted to itself, as was before demonby a much greater priority must the one generate a number of

strated,

For

this kind.

in the progression

frequently dissimilar to
ference

for

such are the

their proper principles.

with the one,


its

cause.

its

is

For

of things, that which

is

produced

is

producing cause, through the dominion of diflast

of things, and which are far distant from

But the

first

number, and which

is

connascent

uniform, ineffable, superessential, and perfectly similar to


in the first causes, neither does difference intervening

separate from the generator the things begotten, and transfer them into

another order, nor docs the motion of the cause effecting a remission of

power, produce into dissimilitude and indefiniteness the generation of the

whole of things
all

but the cause of

all

things being unically raised above

itself a divine number, and


The one therefore prior to beings has

motion and division, has established about

has united

it toits

own

simplicity.

given subsistence to the unities of beings.

For again, according

to another

mode

[of considering the subject]

it

is.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. I.

1.53

necessary that primary beings should participate of the


their

proximate

unities.

first

cause through

For secondary things are severally conjoined to


; bodies indeed to the soul which

the natures prior to them through similars

ranks as a whole, through the several souls [which they participate]


souls to universal intellect through intellectual

monads

For being
For essence and that which

through unical hyparxes to the one.


similar to the one.

is
is

in its

in

and

and with the

first

but

own nature

dis-

want of union ex-

ternally derived, are unadapted to be conjoined with that which


essential,

beings,

first

union, and are far distant from

it.

is

super-

But the

unities of beings, since they derive their subsistence from the imparticipa-

exempt from the whole of things, are able to conthem to themselves.


It appears therefore to me, that Parmenides demonstrating these tilings

ble unity,

and which

is

join beings to the one, and to convert

through the second hypothesis, connects the one with being, surveys

all

things about the one, and evinces that this proceeding nature, and which
is the one.
For
was necessary to constitute the unities ; since it
which is the best of
things to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.
But
To the
this is in a remarkable degree most similar to that which is best.

extends

its

prior to true

progressions as far as to the last of thing!

beings

neither was nor

is

it

lawful, says Timaeus, for that

one however, a unical multitude

is

most similar ; since the demiurgus of

the universe also being good, constituted

through goodness

itself.

Much more

all

things similar to himself

therefore, does the fountain of all

good produce goodnesses naturally united to itself, and establish them


is one God, and many Gods, one unity and many
unities prior to beings, and one goodness, and many after the one goodness, through which the demiurgic intellect is good, and every intellect is
And that
divine, whether it be an intellectual or intelligible intellect.
which is primarily superessential is the one ; and there are many superessentials after the one.
Whether therefore, is this multitude of unities imparticipable in the same manner as the one itself, or is it participated by
in beings. IJence there

and is each unity of beings the flower as it were of a certain


and the summit and center of it, about which each being subsists ?

beings,

being,

'

Proc.

For

n it U oeccisary
Vol. I.

to read

y.

Digitized by

Google

ON THE THEOLOGY

j54

But

if

these unities also are imparticipable, in

BOOK
what do they

differ

111.

from

For each of them is one, and primarily subsists from the one.
what being more redundant than the first cause were they constituted by it ? For it is every where necessary that what is second being
subordinate to that which is prior to itself, should fall short of the union
the one ?

Or

in

of

its

producing' cause, and by the addition of a certain thing should

hav e a diminution of the monadic simplicity of the


therefore,

these also

first.

can we adduce, or what redundancy besides


is

by

itself

one?

What

addition

the one, if each of

For if each of them is one and many, we


them the peculiarity of being. But if each is

appear to transfer to
one only, in the same manner as the one itself, why does this rank as the
cause which is exempt from all things, but eac h of these is allotted a
shall

secondary dignity

of the

first

Neither therefore shall we. preserve the transcendency

with reference to the things posterior to

that the unities proceeding from

it

it,

nor can we admit

are unconfuscd either with respect to

themselves, or to the one principle of them.

But neither shall we be persuaded by Parmenides who produces


together with being, and demonstrates that there are as

many

the

one

parts of the

one as there are of being; that each being* also participates of the one,

but that the one

who

is

every where consubsistent with being

asserts that the one

and

in short,

of the second hypothesis participates of beings

and

is

For

the one indeed participates of being, as not being primarily one,

participated by being, the participation in each not being the same.

nor

exempt from being, but as illuminating truly-existing essence. But being


participates of the one, as that which is connected by it, and filled with
divine union, and converted to the one itself which is imparticipable. For
the participated monads conjoin beings to the one which is exempt from
the whole of things, in the

same manner as participated intellects conjoin


a whole, and as participated souls
which ranks as a whole. For it is not possible

souls to the intellect which ranks as

conjoin bodies to the soul

that the dissimilar genera of secondary natures should be united without

'

For *a;wof

Here

it

appears requisite to read rngxyomi.

also for iv

it is

necessary to read

o.

Digitized by

Google

CHAP.
media

OF PLATO.

ir.

to the cause

which

is

155

exempt from multitude

that the contact should be effected through similars.


titude, so far indeed as

but so far as

it is

it is

but

it is

necessary

For a similar mul-

multitude, communicates with the dissimilar

similar to the

monad

prior to

itself, it is

conjoined with

Being established therefore, in the middle of both, it is united to the


whole, and to the one which is prior to multitude. But it contains in
itself remote progressions, and which are of themselves dissimilar to the
Through itself also, it converts all things to that one, and thus all
one.
things are extended to the first cause of the whole of things, dissimilars
it.

indeed through
itself

by

itself

similars,'

but similars through themselves.

conducts and binds the

many

to the one,

secondary natures to the monads prior to them.


similars so far as they are similars

is

account similitude

to possess

is

that which

For the very being of


Hence, it con-

derived from the one.

joins multitude to that from which it


this

For similitude
and converts

is

allotted its progression.

it is,

causing

many

And on

things to be allied,

sympathy with themselves, and friendship with each other and

the one.

CHAPTER
If however

it

II.

be requisite, not only by employing the intellectual pro-

Parmenides to unfold the multitude of Gods participated by


beings, but also concisely to demonstrate the theory of Socrates about

jections of

these particulars,

we must recollect what

he says that the

light

is

written in the Republic, where

proceeding from the good

is unific of intellect and


For through these things the good is demonstrated to be exempt from being and essence, in the same manner as the sun is exempt
from visible natures.
But this light being in intelligibles illuminates
them, in the same manner as the solar-form light which is iu visible na-

of beings.

'

For m>/uu>

it

necessary to lead tp>tm.

Digitized by

Google

O.N

156
tures.

For

THE THEOLOGY

to the sight, than through the light


intelligibles
light,

good.
the

therefore

and through

this

its

is ingenerated
in them.
All
through the participation of
every true being is most similar to the

light,

makes no

difference to speak of this light, or of

subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity

proceeding from the


participable.

But each of
he

which

one (for this light conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one,

as deriving

is

III.

become boniform

therefore, it

If,

BOOK

become apparent, and known

natures no otherwise

visible

is

first is

And that

participable,

indeed which

and
is

the multitude of unities

all

truly supercssential

is

the one.

the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by which

a superessential

by essence and

God,

being.

appear to us to be

similar to the

is

According

first

to this reasoning therefore, the

and participable

unities,

but they are participated

Gods

unities, binding indeed all

beings to themselves, but conjoining through themselves to the one which


similarly transcends all things, the natures posterior to themselves.

Since therefore each of the

by some being, whether

shall

Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated


we say that the same being participates of

each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are
more, but of others less numerous ? And if this be the case either the par-

must be more, but of the inferior must


For it is necessary that there should
be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that of numbers
principle,
their
others more remote from it.
nearer
to
but
And
some are
that some are more simple, but others more composite, and exceed indeed
But it is well that we
in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power.
have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to survey the order of
the first monads with respect to each other, and their progression about
beings, from these as images, in these also the monads which are nearer
to the one will be participated by things which arc more simple in essence,
but those which are more remote from it, will be participated by more
composite essences. For thus the participation will be according to the
analogous first monads being always participated by the first beings, but
second monads by secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt
ticipants of the superior unities

be fewer

in

number, or vice

versa.

oirr<{

omitted in the original.

CHAP
from

OF PLATO.

II.

all

things,

and

is

the most simple nature and the one

than that which

is

157

imparticipable, but that which


is

more

is

connascent with

similar to the imparticipable

connascent with a more various and multiform nature,

and which has more powers suspended from

it,

if this

be the case,

it is

perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to the one are necessarily participated by the first and most simple essences ; but that those
which are more remote are participated by more composite essences,
which are less in power, but are greater in number and multitude. For

in 6hort, additions in these unities are ablations of

which

is

powers

and that

nearer to the one, which surpasses the whole of things by an

admirable simplicity,

And

total orders.

simplicity of the

it

first

is

more uniform, and

is

consubsistent with

more

happens according to the ratio of power, that the


For those things which arc
unities is transcendent.

the causes of a greater

number of

effects, imitate as

much

as possible the

which are the causes of fewer

effects, have
an essence more various than the natures that are prior to them.' For
this variety distributes inio minute parts and diminishes the power which
abides in one. Moreover, in participated souls also, such as are first and
all

things, but those

most divine

subsist in simple

cause of

and perpetual

connected with bodies that are simple, but


material bodies also.

And

in

bodies.

Others again are

conjunction with these with

and the same


For the celestial souls
have an immaterial and im-

others are connected at one

time with simple, material and composite bodies.

indeed rule over simple bodies, and such as

mutable subsistence. But the souls that govern the wholes of the elements,
are at the

same time invested with

time through these are carried

etherial garments,

in the

and at the same

wholes of the elements, which as

wholes indeed are perpetual and simple, but as material receive generation

and corruption, and composition from dissimilar natures. And the


which proximately inspire
life their luciform * vehicles, but also attract from the simple ele-

souls that rank in the third order, are those

with
1

Instead of

n jut yaf

*miXri{an> xmret
"""!
1

tij

For avTMifarir

it if

rat wctvno* mrrmi xarct Tip ivra+ur rant *f* avrwr


necessary to read ra pr, yaf *X|ior cutix, xcu raw wairaw

*Aiw* out**, xcu

owiav tow,

it

xarm fovofuv pyuvno*, T ttrwv

i\atr<ronov toi> wjg

requisite to read

j^miW*

xvtwy ireixiATff xot nf cvmw ten*.

ON THE THEOLOGY

158

BOOK

material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary

ment

III.

and through
these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain
this participation

through
If,

life.

however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some of

these are arranged

mundane

divine of

But

another third

life,

which rank as wholes, and in the most


which also they govern in a becoming manner.

in the souls
souls,

more excellent genera, are


and are partiBut again they arrange
And according as the power

others being arranged in the souls of the

proximately participated by the rulers that are in them


cipated secondarily by more partial

essences.

third intellectual orders in partial souls.

which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion is participation


them more various, and far more composite than the participation of

in

the natures

that,

are prior to them.

ticipation in all beings,

it

is

If,

therefore, this

certainly necessary

is

mode of
Gods

the

that of the

those that are nearer to the one, should be carried in the

paralso

more simple parts

of being, but that those which have proceeded to a greater distance


should be carried in the more composite parts of being.
cipations of second genera are divided after this

For the

parti-

manner according

to

similitude to them.

Again

therefore,

we may summarily say, that after the one principle


Gods present themselves to our view as self-

of the whole of things, the

monads, participated by

perfect

there are of beings

we

beings.'

How many

shall afterwards unfold,

orders therefore

and show what beings are

more simple, and what a more various hyparxis. Of all beings


is that which is corporeal. For this derives its being, and all
perfection from another more ancient cause, and is neither allotted sim-

allotted a

then, the last


its

plicity

nor composition, nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from

its

own

For no body is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten ; but every


tiling which is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from
And in short, that which is the
cause, is incorporeal and impartible.

power.

cause of hyparxis to

itself,

imparts also to

In the original here, about a line and a half

deficiency,

hare not attempted to translate

is

itself

an

infinite

power of ex-

so defectire, that not being able to supply the

it.

Digitized by

Google

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

II.

15g

Tor never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or depart from
its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted through
being separated from the power that supplied it with being. But that
which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated from itself, is allotted
istence.

through

itself

a perpetual essence.

cause of perpetuity to

itself, will

No

body however, since it is not the


For every thing which is
But body being finite is not the
power is incorporeal, because all power

be perpetual.

perpetual possesses an infinite power.

cause of infinite power. For infinite


is

But this is evident, because greater powers


But no body is capable of being wholly every where.
no body imparts to itself power, whether the power be

incorporeal.

are every

where.
fore,

but that which

finite,

is

self-subsistent imparts to itself the

and of existing perpetually, no body


therefore

is

will

power of being,

be self-subsistent.

being imparted to bodies, and what

proximately to supply them with being

If thereinfinite or

which

is it

Must wc not say

Whence
is

adapted

that the cause

that which

by being present renders the


nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are deprived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the province
of being to bodies primarily

is

of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence of secondary

What

natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of essence.


fore

is

there-

that of which bodies participating, are said to be better than the

bodies which do not participate of it ? Is it not evident that it is soul?


For we say that animated bodies are more perfect than such as are
inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily beyond bodies and it must be
admitted that all heaven and every thing corporeal is the vehicle of soul.
;

Hence, these two orders of beings present themselves to our view


indeed being corporeal, but the other which

With respect

ferent from intellect


fect,

is

to soul itself however, whether


?

thus also the soul

above
is it

this,

the

the one

psychical.

same with or

For as the body which participates of soul


is

of the soul indeed, which

perfect which participates


is

of intellect.

able to live according to reason,

all

is

dif-

per-

And

things

do

but of intellect and intellectual illumination rational

souls participate,

and also such things as partake of any kind of know-

not participate

ledge.

And

soul indeed energizes according to time

but intellect com-

Digitized by

Google

ON THE THEOLOGY
prebends

And

both

in eternity

its

not every soul indeed

essence,
is

diminution the perfection of

and

tual

genus therefore

essentially

is

but every

III.

same time its stable energy.


preserve immutably and without

at the

adapted to
itself

and possesses a never-failing power of

BOOK

its

intellect is

own

always perfect,

The

blessedness.

beyond the psychical

intellec-

since the former,

neither in whole nor in partial intellects, admits the entrance of the na-

ture of evil

but the

from

partial souls

Shall

beings?

soul indeed

and most
intellect

latter

being undcfiled in whole souls, departs in

own proper

we say
and

as

What

blessedness.

therefore

itself

we have

with

said,

life;

and

an eternal

and

vital peculiarity.

Whether

life itself.

But

cellent thing?

It

therefore

is

above

intellect,

it

But the
is

is

life

life

the

first

of

or intellect the more ex-

life,

number of

being the cause of a greater

of beings

For

this is impossible.

life

mingled from

(for

we say

certainly necessary that life should be arranged

parting by illumination more gifts from


Is

of

For

beings only participate of intellect, but

if gnostic

is

first

necessary however, that there

such beings as are destitute of knowledge participate of


that plants live)

the

intellect is the best

life.

indeed in a certain respect intellectual, and

is

is

or prior to this the extent of life?

intellect,

supplying

is self-vital,

perfect,

the intellectual

should be

its

And

is to live

the

that which

if life is

effects,

than intellect.

itself

is

same thing

and im-

What then ?

as to be f

But

primarily being, and to be

same thing as to have being, and there is the same definition of


and being, every thing which participates of life would also
and every thing which participates of existence
would likewise participate of life. For if each is the same thing all
things would similarly participate of being and life.
All vital natures

vital is the

both

life

participate of being,

indeed have essence and being


titute

of

which

is

but there are

many

nearer to the one, as has been before demonstrated.


that which
soul

being

is

life is
is

beings that are des-

Being therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that


more universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is
life.

Soul therefore

primarily established above bodies; but intellect

more ancient than intellect

established above
'

all these.

Instead of

fa s

here

is

is

beyond

and being which is primarily


Every thing also which participates

it is

necessary to read

Digitized by

Google

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

II

of soul, by a

much

l6l

greater priority participates of intellect; but not every

thing which enjoys intellectual efficiency,

is also adapted to participate of


For of soul rational animals only participate ; since we say that
For Plato in the Republic says, that the
the rational soul is truly soul.
work of soul is to reason and survey beings. And every soul [i. e. every

soul.

rational soul]

is

immortal, as

written in the Phaedrus

it is

soul being mortal, according to the


short, it

in

is

many

demiurgus

in the

the irrational

And

Timaeus.

in

places evident that Plato considers the rational soul

to be truly soul, but 'others to be the images of souls, so far as these also
are intellectual

and

vital,

and together with whole

that are distributed about bodies.

Of

intellect

souls produce the lives

however, we not only

admit that rational animals participate, but also such other animals as
possess a gnostic power ; I mean such as possess the phantasy, memory

and sense

since Socrates also in the Philebus refers

the intellectual series.

For taking away

intellect

all

such animals to

from the

life

which

according to pleasure, he likewise takes away not only the rational

but every gnostic power of the irrational


.

life.

For

progeny of intellect, in the same manner as allreason


Moreover,

all

is

is

life,

knowledge is the
an image of soul.

by a much greater
more obscurely, but others

things which participate of intellect,

priority participate of life,

more

all

manifestly.

But

some

things indeed

all living

beings do not participate of intellectual

power, since plants indeed are animals, as Timaeus says, but they jieither
participate of sense, or phantasy

have a co-sensation of what


orcctic powers every

and the

last

intellect

productions of

and without any

also, they are

Again

is

where are
life

some one should say that they


and painful. And in short, the
the
images of the whole of life*
and

unless

pleasing
lives,
;

but they are of themselves destitute of

participation of the gnostic power.

Hence

of themselves indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge.

therefore, all animals indeed receive

a portion of being, and

different animals a different portion, according to their respective natures;

but

all

beings are not similarly able to participate of

and

life ;

since

we say

and the last of bodies, receive the ultimate


effective energy of being, but we do not also say that they participate of
life.
Being therefore is more ancient than life ; life than intellect and
Proc.
Vol. I.
X
that qualities

all

passions,

ON THE THEOLOGY

162
than soul. For

intellect

it is

BOOK

necessary that the causes of a greater

III

number

of effects being more ancient and according to order more principal,


should preside over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer

Very properly

effects.
*

ence to soul from

But

nature.

therefore, does Plato in the

intellect, as

being secondary to

Laws he

says that intellect

in the

sphere fashioned by a wheel.'


participating of
in the Sophista

and

life,

is

For that which

nothing else than real

he exempts being from

all

Timeeus give subsistaccording to

it

its

own

moved similarly to a
moved, is moved by
life about motion. And
is

is

the total genera of things,

and

from motion. For being, says he, according to its own nature, neither
stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither stands still nor is moved,
is

beyond eternal

life.

These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence,


essence,

life,

intellect

and

vis.

soul, soul indeed participates of all the causes

itself, being allotted reason from its own peculiarity, but intellect,
and being, from more ancient causes. Hence it gives subsistence to
a fourfold manner. For according to its being

prior to
life

things posterior to itself in

indeed,
all

it

produces

all

things as far as to bodies

according to

things which arc said to live, even as far as to plants

its intellect, all

most

and according

natures that are able to participate of it.


soul,

its

life,

according to

things which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the

irrational natures;

beyond

and

to

its

But

existing as the plenitude of

things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed

of the intellectual peculiarity to

all

reason,

intellect

the

first

of the

being established

life and being, adorns all


by illumination the power

gnostic beings, but supplying the

and of being to all those to


But life being arranged above intellect, presubsists as the cause of the same things in a twofold respect, vivifying secondary natures indeed, together with intellect, and filling from
participation of

whom

itself

life

to a

still

primary being imparts

with the rivers of

life,

greater number,
itself.

such things as are naturally adapted to

live,

but together with being supernally producing essence in all things. But
being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist'

For

For urw{ read

flrrsMi; it is

necessary to read

sv

npwic.

avnjf.

Digitized by

Google

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

II.

163

and intellects and souls, and is uniformly preseot to all


exempt from the whole of things according to one cause
things, and
which gives subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all
things to the one, and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to the
first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings, and nonbeing, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms subsist, which
privations do not necessarily participate of being, but it is entirely neces-

ence,

lives,

all

its

sary that they should participate of the one.

These things as

when

phista,

only being

being

is

it

appears to

me

discussing that which


there,

but also life,

persuaded the Elcan guest in the Sois

perfectly being, to admit that not

intellect

and

venerable and honorable, intellect

is

is

For if true and

soul.

there in the

first

real

place, says

For it is not lawful for that which is of itself venerable and immatebe without intellect. But if intellect is in that which is perfectly
For it is not possible for intellect
being, intellect will entirely be moved.
be.

rial to

But if

ever to subsist, either without motion or permanency.

moved and

stands

still,

there are in being both

life

intellect is

and motion.

Hence,

from what has been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, life
and intellect. Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through
For it is necessary, says lie, that life and intellect which
these things.
before were by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a
plenitude of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean
guest indicating adds, " Shall we say that both these are inherent in it,

but yet

it

does not possess these in soul ?"

says in a certain place,

is

For to possess, as some one

secondary to existing.

And

soul indeed parti-

cipates of each of these according to the peculiarity of itself; but

mingles the rational form of

power.

But both

intellect

being moved and standing

its

own

and

it

hyparxis, with the intellectual vivific

life

subsist prior to soul, the former as

and the same time, and the latter as


being motion and permanency. These four monads also, soul, intellect,
life and being are not only mentioned by Plato here, but in many other
places.

And

still

at one

as in soul all things subsist according to participation, so in

which are prior


For we say that life

intellect the things

to

prior to

exists, or

life.

it

subsist,

i*be said to be arranged in being unless

it

and

in

life

has a being.

that which is

Or how could

participated of being?

We

Digitized by

Google

ON THE THEOLOGY

1G4

likewise say that intellect

of being.

Hence

it

is

is

and

BOOK

III.

For it is moved, and is a portion


of the more comprehensive monads.

lives.

the third

Prior however to beings which are participated,

it is

every where neces-

sary that imparticipable causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated,

conformably to the similitude of beings to the one.


is

primarily being,

yet

is

is

imparticipable

it

exempt from

imparticipable, being

indeed from being and


natures posterior to

but

but

life;

is

Being therefore which

life first

participates of being,

And

intellect.

intellect

filled

in the

by illumination the participation of life and being; but being imparti-

cipable subsists prior to bodies.


to which bodies are annexed

The last order of


celestial bodies

beings therefore

the progression of beings, through

life,

is

that

indeed primarily, but sub-

lunary bodies with the addition of material [vestments.]


is

is

imparticipable in souls, and

Intellect also presides over soul, imparting to

itself.

intellect

and

This therefore

soul,

ending in a

corporeal nature.
If,

however,

which derive

it is

Gods

necessary that the super essential unities of the

their subsistence

from the imparticipable cause

should be participated, some of them indeed, by the

first

'

of all things

orders in beings,

by the middle, and others by the last orders, as was before demonit is evident that some of them deify the imparticipable portion
of being, but that others illuminate life, others intellect, others sou), and
others

strated,

others bodies.

And

of the

last unities

indeed, not only bodies participate,

and essence. For intellect in itself is a


But from the unities which are above this
plenitude of life and being.
world intellect is suspended, and the psychical power, which preexists in
intellect.
From the unities above these, imparticipable and intellectual
intellect is suspended. From those that are beyond these, the first and imbut likewise soul,

participable
itself,

life is

and which

intellect, life

suspended.

is

And

from the highest unities, the

the most divine of beings,

is

suspended.

first

being

Hence Par-

menides beginning from the one being, produces from thence the whole
orders of the Gods. These things therefore being previously determined by
us, let us

speak concerning the divine dialogues, beginning from on high,

and producing from the one the whole orders of the Gods.
'

For tm

it is

necemry

to read

Let us

also,

wru*

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

III.

following Plato, in the

first

!gA

place demonstrate the several orders from

other dialogues, by arguments which cannot be confuted.

Afterwards,

and assimilate the conclusions of Parraenides to the

let us thus conjoin

divine progressions, adapting the

conclusions to the

first

first,

but the last

to the last progressions.

CHAPTER
Aoaiit
sumed by

III.

therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning the one


us, in order that

celebrate the second

and

proceeding from the

third principles of the

Gods

beings therefore, and of the

must be

principle,

first

whole of

tilings.

that produce beings, one

re-

we may

Of

all

exempt and

tilings into light

a cause ineffable indeed by all language,


knowledge and incomprehensible, unfolding all
from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to, and converting all

things to

but existing as the best end of

imparticipable cause preexists,

and unknown by

therefore,

itself,

which

ence unically
beings,

and

is

all

truly

exempt from

to all the unities

causes,

their progressions, Socrates in

and through

its

analogy to the sun reveals

transcendency with respect to

denominates

all

it

the one.

And

all

things.

all

This cause

and which gives

of divine natures, and to

all

subsist-

the genera of

the Republic calls the good,


its

intelligibles.

admirable and unknown

But

again, Parmenides

through negations demonstrates the exempt


the cause of the whole of things.

and

ineffable hyparxis of this

But

the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas,

celebrates

it

one which

is

us that about which all things subsist,

and

as the cause of all

In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates it as that


which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it is the cause of
all deity.
For all the Gods derive their existence as Gods from the first
beautiful things.

God.

Whether

therefore,

it

be lawful to denominate

it

the fountain

Digitized by

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BOOK

ON THE THEOLOGY

166

III.

of deity, or the kingdom of beings, or the unity of all unities, or the goodness which is generative of truth, or an hyparxis exempt from all these
tilings,

and beyond

all

causes, both the paternal and the generative, let

be honored by us in silence, and prior to silence by union, and of the


mystic end may it impart by illumination a portion adapted to our souls.
But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding from

it

and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange after the
union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles ? What the two
*

principles therefore are of the divine orders after the

first

principle,

we

For conformably to the theology of our


In the Phiancestors, Plato also establishes two principles after the one.
lebus therefore, Socrates says, that God gives subsistence to bound and
infinity, and through these mingling all beings, has produced them, the

shall in the next place survey.

nature of beings, according to Philolaus subsisting from the connexion


of things bounded, and things

from these,

And

beings.

infinite.

If,

therefore, all beings subsist

evident that they themselves have a subsistence prior to

it is

secondary natures participate of these mingled together,

if

these will subsist unmingled prior to the whole of things.

For the pro-

gression of the divine orders originates, not from things coordinated

and

which exist in others, but from things exempt, and which are established
in themselves.

which

As

therefore the one

is

prior to tilings united,

and

as that

passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable

is

union, thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of

and commixture with beings, arc themselves by themselves the causes of


For it is necessary that bound should be prior to
the whole of tilings.
things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the similitude
For again, if we should proto the one of things which proceed from it
duce beings immediately after the one, we shall no where find the pecuFor neither is being the same with
liarity of the one subsisting purely.
the one, but it participates of the one, nor in reality is that which is the
first

the one

Where

for,

therefore

as has been frequently said,


is

that which

'

For Tin*

is

it is

better than the one,

most properly and entirely one ? Hence

it is

neceisary to reail

rm s

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

in.

a certain one prior to being, which gives subsistence to being,


and is primarily the cause of it ; since that which is prior to it is beyond
union, and is a cause without habitude with respect to all things, and
im participate, being exempt from all things. If however this one is the
there

is

cause of being, and constitutes

it, there will be a power in it generative


For every thing which produces, produces according to its
own power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces
and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it were
extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause.
For
being which is produced from these, and which is not the one itself, but
uniform, possesses its progression indeed from the one, through the power
which produces and unfolds it into light from the one; but its occult
union from the hyparxis of the one. This one therefore which subsists
prior to power, and first presubsists from the imparticipable and unknown
cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philcbus calls bound, but he
denominates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But
he thus speaks in that dialogue, " God we said has exhibited the bound,

of being.

and

also the infinite of beings."

The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated
by him God because each of the second Gods is participated by being,
and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as being
;

from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the inthe unical alone, and superessential.
But the bound and

exempt

'

effable

itself,

unknown and imparticipable


bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective
infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things
and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every
generative distribution. For all union and wholeness, and communion of
beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended* from the first bound.
But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, deHence, when we
rive their subsistence from this most principal infinity.
the infinite of beings, unfold into light that

cause
deity

but the

'

For (floral

Here

alio

it it

it it

necessary to read rfafmjTiti.

neceuary

for iftpfrai to read fftfnrrat.

ON THE THEOLOGY

1 68

BOOK

III.

say that each of the divine orders abides ' and at the same time proceeds,
we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but

proceeds according to

of bound, but

and that at one and the same time

infinity,

unity and multitude, and

we must suspend

from that of

the latter

opposition in the divine genera,

we must

excellent to bound, but that which

these

two principles

far as

infinity

ticipates of

bound

of existing,

it

it is

so far indeed, as

but so far as

is

more

the

For from

itself participates at

once of

the intelligible measure,

it is

it

par-

the cause of a never-failing power

it is

And

participates of infinity.

it is

which

refer that

For eternity

uniform, and whole, and so far as

measures, so far

in short, of all the

things have their progression into being, even as

all

to the last of things.

bound and

And

subordinate to infinity.

is

has

it

the former from the principle

infinity.

it is

intellect, so

far

indeed as

connective of paradigmatical

the progeny of bound.

But

again, so far as

it

pro-

duces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its

own power

undiminished, so far

the progeny of infinity.

it is

indeed, in consequence of measuring

own
its own

its

life,

by

And

restitutions

soul

and pe-

motions, is referred to the


and introducing a boundary to
; but in consequence of having no cessation of
motions,
the
period
beginning
one
of the whole of a second
end
of
the
but making

riods,

cause of bound

of

vital circulation, it is referred to the order

heaven

also,

according to the wholeness of

of its periods, and the mcasores of


cording to

its prolific

powers,

revolutions of its orbs,

it

its

infinity.

itself, its

its restitutions, is

bounded.

But

ac-

various evolutions, and the never-failing

participates of infinity.

generation, in consequence of

The whole of this

connexion, the order

all

its

Moreover, the whole of

forms being bounded, and always

permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle
which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again,
in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their
unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the
And in addition to
participations of forms, it is the image of infinity.
these things, every natural production, according to
'

furu*

its

form indeed,

is

(Knitted in the original.

Digitized by

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IX.

similar to bound, but according to

its

these are suspended in the last place

'

to the one,

and as

extends.

Each of

these also

things in capacity, so far as

There, however, power


imperfect, and

is

is

one, but form

of their productive power


is

a greater degree one.

in

is

is

it

derives

its

generative of

For

from the two principles posterior

far as to these the progression

dary of matter, and

is

169

matter, resembles infinity.

the measure and boun-

Matter however

subsistence from the

all things.

first

is all

power.

But the power of matter

indigent of the hypostasis which

is

generative

'

of all

Very properly therefore is it said by Socrates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two intelligible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For
that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds itthings according to energy.

self into light

indeed

through

derived to

is

of the two orders of

beings

is

the one prior to the duad.

things through that which

is first

And

union

but the division

generated from these primary causes, and

extended to the unknown and ineffable principle.

Let
what the two principles of
which become proximately apparent from the one, according

through these
it

all

all

tilings is

is

therefore be manifest through these things,

beings are,

to the theology of Plato.

CHAPTER
In

the next place let us

itself to the

that which

show what the

view from these principles.

is

IX.

mixed, as deriving

its

third

It

is

'

thing

is

which presents

every where therefore called

subsistence from bound and

infinity.

bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of


beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both

But

if

'

For 13^ straw

The word ynmrnxq; u

TfiTn

is

it is

necessary to read tv^antf.

omitted in the original.

onutted in the original.

Proc.

Vol.

I.

N THE THEOLOGY

70

BOOK

II!.

these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of
This, however, is nothing else than
things mingled, is the first of beings.

that which

is

My

being.

highest in beings, which

meaning

we demonstrate

that this

is,

that what

things intelligibly,

is

being

itself,

and nothing

else

than

evident through those things by which

is

primarily being,

is

and of life and

intellect.

is comprehensive of all
For we say that hfe is triadic

and intellect intellectually and also that these three things being
and intellect are every where. But all things presubsist primarily
and essentially in being. For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and
the summit of beings. Life however is the middle centre of being, which
But intellect is the boundary of
is denominated and is intelligible life.
For in the intelligible there is intellect,
being, and is intelligible intellect.
and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelli-

vitally,

life

gibly, but in intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.

And

that which

is stable in being, and which is woven


and does not depart from the one. But
life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with inAnd intellect is that which converts itself to the principles,
finite power.
conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle.
The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first principles, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially,
another vitally, and another intellectually, but all things presubsisting in
I mean however by the first of beings essence.
it essentially.
For
essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad

essence indeed

together with the

first

is

principles,

of the whole of things.


in

each thing that which

In

all

is

things therefore, essence

essential

is

is

the

first.

And

the most ancient, as deriving

its

For the intelligible is especially


Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence,
this.
and being is intelligible.
If however every being is mingled, but
subsistence from the Vesta of beings.

essence
sists

is

being

itself,

prior to

all

other things essence

is

that which sub-

as mingled from the two principles proceeding from the one.

differs

how

the

Hence

mode

of generation in the two principles


from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and

Socrates indicating

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. IX.
For they

infinity."

171

are unities deriving their subsistence from the one, and

were luminous patcfactions from the imparticipable and first union.


respect to producing a mixture, and mingling through the first
principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into light,
and generation to pate/action, by so much is that which is mixed allotted

as

it

But with

a progression from

That which

is

tfie

one, inferior to that of the

mixed

marily from [the

first]

two

principles.

and subsists priand bound are de-

therefore, is intelligible essence,

God, from whom

infinity also

But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the


God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which
is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause
should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause,
but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds
But after him are the two principles bound
into light the two principles.
rived.

unical

and

And

infinity.

the mixture

cause of the mixture

be the

will

ther

still,

fifth

is

different

the fourth

is

from the

first

If therefore the

thing.

divine cause, this cause

and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says

in addition to

these

we say

things, if

God

that

it
is

is.

Far-

especially

the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles

a union

into the hypostasis of being,

primarily.
is

Moreover, Socrates

God

is

in the Republic clearly evinces that the

the cause of being and essence 1o intelligibles, in the

sun
ed
its

is

is

to visible natures. Is

it

primarily being, to refer

progression from

him

not therefore necessary,


it

to the

first

God, and

infinity

which

for the soul

according to

is

good
same manner as the

if

that which

is

mix-

to say that .it receives

If also the demiurgus in the Timauis, consti-

tutes the essence of the soul itself by itself


tible essence,

is

also certainly the cause of this

from an impartible and a par-

the same thing as to constitute

according to bound

infinity, to the partible

is

it

from bound and

similar to the impartible, but

essence; if therefore the demiurgus

mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately, from

same and

and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes


the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the
cause of the first essence ? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as
different,

ON THE THEOLOGY

17 2

we have said,

from the

first

(Jod,

and does not

BOOK

III.

subsist from the principles

alone posterior to the one, but proceeds also from these, and is triadic.
in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union,

And

and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis,
and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. And from infinity, it receives
power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things. For in short,
since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bound,
but the non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both
That which is
these, and its wholeness, arc derived from the first Cod.
mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the one; and it is
biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles but it is a triad,
.

so far as iu every mixture, these three things are necessary according to

and symmetry.

Socrates, viz. beauty, truth,

however, we

shall

Concerning these things

speak again.

In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall


now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz.

what that
says

which

is

for it

is

what manner
shown. For
to

have

its

is

primarily being, as the Elcan guest also

most dubious how being

is

not

and

infiuity are superessential,

subsistence from non-essences.

Or

How

somewhere

than non-being.

bound and

therefore essence subsists from


if bound

less

In

must be
essence may appear
infinity

therefore can non-es-

not this the case in all other things which


For that which is produced
subsist through the mixture of each other ?
not
the same with things that are not mintogether,
is
mingled
from things
sences produce essence

gled.

is

For neitheris soul the same with the genera, from which, bcingmingled
it, nor is a happy life the same with the life

together, the father generated

which

is

sure, nor

according to
is

intellect,

or with the

the one in bodies the

wonderful, if that which

is

life

same with

its

which

is

according to plea-

elements.

primarily being, though

it is

Hence

neither

it is

not

bound nor

infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures themselves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions
from thein coalescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore
being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the

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CHAP.

OF PLATO.

IX.

173

uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude

from

it

beings

all

is

all

things occultly,

and on

this

account,

which also the Elcan guest indicating to

is

the

us, calls

power, as subsisting according to the participation of the


power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power

being the
first

from

first

is

every where the cause of prolific progressions, and

multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multi-

all

but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds

light,

prolific

For power

formly.

tude

Afterwards however, the Elcan guest defines being to be


and generative of all things, and as being all things uni-

infinity.

power, as
of

For

infinity.

cause of

being the cause of all-perfect multitude.

Through

this

itself into

cause there-

every being, and every essence has connascent powers.


participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound,

fore, I think, that

For

it

but

its

many

power from

infinity.

-And being

is

nothing else than a

monad of

powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being

The many however

is

and without separation


but with separation in secondary natures. For by
in the first natures
Bow much being is nearer to the one, by so much the more does it conceal
multitude, and is defined according to union alone. It appears to me
also that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things,
produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as analogous to the one, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter.
one many.

subsist occultly

'

And

if

this, they speak rightly.


But if they ascribe a
and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they apwander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject For

indeed they say

certain formless

pear to

me

the infinite

to
is

not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor

the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of

it.

But being

is

bound

consists of

both these, as not only standing in the one, but receiving a multitude of
unities and powers which are mingled into one essence.

'

For w\tfti in the original

it is

necessary to read

ON THE THEOLOGY

174

CHAPTER
That

therefore which

it,

generation also

finite

indeed

in this

is

is

through these things denothrough the similitude of

mingled from bound and

is

imperfect power; but the bound in

On

this

And

mixed.

is

the morphe of this power.

If

X.

primarily being

is

minated by Plato that which

BOOK

And

infinity.

account we establish

the in-

form and
power to be
be bounded

it is

this

matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to

by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the


power of being matter, since it is generative of energies, produces all
beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings.
For the
power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being;
and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of multitude in the power of being."
Moreover, the form of matter imitates
ultimately bound, since
nity.

But

it is

it

to matter,

gives limits

multiplied and divided about

it.

and terminates
It

is

its infi-

also miugled

with

the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis

of being, by
to decay.

its

essence always advancing to existence, and always tending

For those things which subsist

in the first natures according to

transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency.

For that
which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of inBut that which consists of the last ' of
finite life, and is the cause of it.
also

forms and the

first

matter,

sesses life in capacity.

to their progeny,

is in its

own

nature void of

life

For there indeed generative causes

and things perfect

since

it

pos-

subsist prior

But

prior to such as are imperfect.

here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses

'

x<u

The punctuation in the


tv v fwnjrotf nXt)twf

latter part

of this sentence in the original

Suwfui ynw/MHj, re

Xi{<0f

*x<w*T,

is
it

erroneous

for instead of

should be xcu n]

txtivp

tow wfcjfotff oi* Sowifif i yoojWKfl to Xi]of , owuxau-aro.


*

For wgonw here, it

is

necessary to read

Tot in this place, Froclus

is

speaking of body.

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. X.

175

are subject to the things which are produced from them.

This however,

I think, happens naturally, because the gifts of the first principles pervade
as far as to the last of things,

and not only generate more perfect natures,

but also such as have a more imperfect subsistence. And on this account
that which is mixed is the cause of generation, and of the nature which is
mingled

The bound and

here.

however, which are prior to being,

infinity

are not only the causes of this nature, but also of the elements of

which that which

bound and

is

mixed

is

not the cause, so far as

And one

infinity are twofold.

the things mingled, but another kind

mixture.

For

think

it

is

is

assumed
where

every

it,

of

For
exempt from

mixed.

it is

kind of these

is

to the completion of the

necessary

that

prior

to

things that are mingled, there should be such as are unmingled, prior to
things imperfect, such as are perfect, prior to parts, wholes,
things that are in others, such as are in themselves

persuades us to admit not


metry, and in

all

forms.

in

one thing only, but also

If therefore the second

and forms

subsist prior to their participants,

bound and

infinity

which pervade through

all

and

and

in

and

prior to

Socrates

this

beauty and sym-

third genera of being

how can we

assert that

beings have their

first

sub-

must be admitted therefore, that they are


unmingled and separate from being, and that being is derived from them,
and at the same time consists of them. It is derived from them indeed,
sistence as things mingled

It

because they have a prior subsistence

but

it

consists of them, because

they subsist in being according to a second progression.

The genera of being

also are twofold

some of them indeed being

fa-

bricative of beings, but others existing as the elements of the nature of

each being. For some of them indeed presubsist themselves by themselves,


as possessing a productive

power

but others being generated from these*

Let no one therefore any longer wonder, how Socrates indeed in the Fhilebus establishes that which is mingled, prior to bound and infinity, but we on the contrary evince that bound
and infinity are exempt from that which is mixed. For each is twofold,
and the one indeed is prior to being, but the other is in being and the
one is generative, but the other is the element of the mixture. Of this
kind also, are the bound and infinity of the mixed life, each being the
constitute each particular being.

176

ON THE THEOLOGY

element of the whole of

felicity.

And

neither

is

intellect

by

Hence

HOOK

also each

itself desirable,

mixed.

all these, viz.

It

is

of the

Bound itself therefore and inwhich are separate, subsist according to cause prior to that which is
But the bound and infinity which are mixed are more imperfect

desirable, the sufficient,


finity,

III.

indigent of each.

nor perfect pleasure.

necessary however, that the good should consist of

and the

is

perfect.

Hence, from what has been

than the mixture.

said,

it is

evident what the

things are of which the mixture consists.

CHAPTER
Ik the next

place,

we must speak of

For every mixture,

with this mixture.

XI.

the triad, which


if

it is

says, requires these three things, beauty, truth,

any thing base,

ther will

if it is

is

consubsistent

rightly made, as Socrates


and symmetry. For nei-

introduced into the mixture, impart recti-

error, and of inordinate prerogative, nor


auy time separated, will it suffer the mixture to consist of
things that are pure, and which are in reality subdued, but it will fill the
whole with an image and with non-being. Nor without symmetry will
there be a communion of the elements, and an elegant association. Sym-

tude, since

it will

if truth

at

is

metry, therefore,

be the cause of

is

necessary to the union of the things that are mingled,

and

to an appropriate

And

beauty to order

each thing

in

communion.

But truth

is

necessary to purity.

which also renders the whole lovely.

the mixture has a place adapted to

itself,

it

For when

renders both

the elements, and the arrangement resulting from them, beautiful.


therefore, in the first mixture, these three things are apparent,
truth,

and beauty.
is one

that being

beauty

is

And symmetry
truth

the cause of

truly being.

That

is

its

also

indeed

is

the cause to

the cause of the reality of

being

which

is

intelligible.

its

Here
symmetry,

the mixture,

existence

and

Hence it is intelligible and


is more uuiform, and in-

primarily being

Digitized by

Google

CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XII.

conjoined to

tcllect is

it r

according to

177

its familiarity

with the beautiful.

But each participates of existence, because it is being derived from


That which is mixed however, is supreme among beings, because
being.
it is

united to the good.

And

it

appears to me, that the divine lamblichus

perceiving these three causes of being, defines the intelligible in these

and beauty, and unfolds the intelligible


In what manner indeed,
the intelligible breadth consists of these, will be most evident as we prohas
it is perfectly manifest
Now
from
what
been
said,
ceed.
however,
why Socrates says that this triad is found to be in the vestibules of the
good. For that which is primarily being participates of this triad through
For because indeed the good is the measure of
its union with the good.
Because the
all beings, the first being becomes itself commensurate.
former is prior to being, the latter subsists truly and really. And because

three, viz. in

symmetry,

Cods through

these in the Platonic theology.

the former

good and

is

the beautiful
this

truth,

desirable, the latter presents itself to the view as

Here

itself.

account the one

therefore, the first beauty also subsists

h not only

as Plato says in his Epistles.


since this order comprehends

and on

the cause of good, but likewise of beauty,

all

Beauty however

from the principles [bound and

and how beauty

is

unfolded into

subsists here occultly,

things uniformly, in consequence of sub-

sisting primarily

light,

we

infinity].

But where

shall shortly explain.

CHAPTER
Such

XII.

therefore, is the first triad of intelligible*, according to Socrates

Ph Helms, viz. bound, infinite, and that which is mixed from these.
And of these, bound indeed is a God proceeding to the intelligible summit, from the imparticipable and first God, measuring and defining all

in the

things,

and giving subsistence to every paternal, connective, and undefiled


Vol. I.
Z

Proc.

ON THE THEOLOGY

178

genus

of"

But

Gods.

folding into light

all

prior to essence,

is

the generative orders,

and that which

ceeds as far as to the last matter.

is

and

completion indeed through the

cally

power of

all infinity,

essential,

And

and
all

is

III.

God, un-

this

both that which

which pro-

also that

that which

and highest order of tbe Gods, comprehending


its

BOOK

infinite is the never-failing

mixed,

is

the

first

things occultly, deriving

connective triad, but uni-

intelligible

comprehending the cause of every being, and establishing


exempt from the whole of things.

its

summit

in the first intelligibles,

CHAPTER
After

XIII.

and conjoined with the one, we


this, and deriving its completion through things analogous
to the triad prior to it.
For in this also
it is necessary that being should participate, and that the one should be
participated, and likewise that this one which is secondarily one, should
this first triad subsisting from,

shall celebrate the second,

proceeding from
'

be generative or that which

is

For every where parti-

secondarily being.

it.

Thus

and

partial

cipated deity constitutes about itself that which participates

whole souls render bodies consubsistent with


therefore,

Hence, as the

do the Gods produce

first

conjunction with the Gods, irrational souls.

souls generate, in

more

their causes

Much

in conjunction with the one all things.

of the unities generates the summit of being, so

like-

But every thing


and every thing which makes or produces, possesses a

wise the middle unity constitutes the middle being.

which generates,

power

prolific

of the things produced, according to which

corroborates and connects

second
indeed,

its

progeny.

Again

therefore,

triad unfolded into light analogously to the


is

the

summit of it, which we call one,


1

For oAoywv

it is

first.

deity,

necessary to read uvatoymi.

it

produces,

there will be a

And one

and hyparxis.

thing

But

OF PLATO.

CHAP. XI!
another thing

the middle of

is

extremity of

tiling is the

This however

being.
gible, as

is

it,

it,

which wc say

intelligible life.

was before demonstrated, viz. to

And

lectually.

the

179

which we

that which

is

For

power.

call

all

is

and

secondarily

to energize intel-

of being into manifest

And

light.

things

intelligible order, is all

according to cause, and as we have frequently said, occultly.

middle of it, causes multitude to shine

another

things are in the intelli-

be, to live,

summit indeed, of the

And

forth,

But the

and proceeds from the union

the extremity of

it,

is

now

all

intelli-

and the order of intelligible forms.

For forms have their


subsistence at the extremity of the intelligible order.
For it is necessary
that forms should subsist first and become apparent in intellect.
If therefore being abides exemptly in the first mixture, but now proceeds, and is
generated dyadically from the monad, there will be motion about it and

gible multitude,

there is motion, it is also necessary that there should be intelligible life.


For every where motion is a certain life, since some one calls even the
motion of material bodies life. That which is first therefore, in this second
that which is second in it, infinity ; and that
triad, may be called bound
which is the third, life. For the second triad also is a God, possessing prolific power, and unfolding into light from, and about itself, that which is
Here however also, the triad is analogous to the first
secondarily being.

if

triad.

But again,
of

and

cally,

it is

necessary to comprehend by reasoning the peculiarity

For the

this triad.

as

first

may say,

bound, the second triad

triad being all things,

but intelligibly and uni-

speaking Platonically, according to the form of


is

indeed

all things,

but

vitally,

and

as I

may

say, following the philosopher, according to the form of infinity, just as

the third triad proceeds according to the peculiarity of that which

For as

mixed.

mixed presents

in

the progression according to breadth, that which

itself to

is

is

the view as the third, so likewise in the progres-

sion according to depth of intelligibles, the third has the order of that

which

is

mixed with reference

therefore,

is

indeed

all things,

to the superior triads.

but

is

The middle

triad

characterized by intelligible infinity.

For the three principles after the first, orderly distribute for us the intelliGods. For bound indeed, unfolds into light the first

gible genus of the


triad

but infinity the second

and that which

is

mixed, the third.

It is

.Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY
infinite

rized.

BOOK

III.

power therefore, according to which the second triad is characteFor being (he middle, it subsists according to the middle of the
being

first triad,

things from

all

and that which

infinity,

For

all.

mixed.

is

But

in,

each

bound*

triad, there is

monads

the peculiarity of the

being respectively different, evolves the intelligible order of the Gods.


triad however, Uiub subsisting, but I say thus* because it con.

The middle
sists

of

all

the things of which the triad prior to

it

consists,

yet

it

contains

and connects the middle of intelligibles- according to infinite power, and


indeed from a more elevated union* but fills the union posterior to
And it is measured indeed, from thence
itself with the powers of being.
is filled

uniformly, but measures the third triad

abides indeed* in the

which

is

which
forth

is

And

next in order.

and

centre,

establishes

one

in short, it binds

intelligible

comprehending

it

on

Ae

and

it

causing indeed that


first triad,

to shine

and
The being however, which gives complethe same manner as the being of the triad

intelligible

multitude of the third triad,

all sides.

tion to this triad is mixed, in


it,

And

itself.

to itself the intelligible

coherence

occult and. possesses the fiorm of the one in the

but collecting

prior to

by the power of

triad stably, but it establishes in itself the triad

first

receives the peculiarity of

For the

life.

infinity in this

generates hfe.
It is likewise necessary that this triad should participate of the three

things*

symmetry,

truth,

and beauty.

That which

is

primarily being

however, principally subsists according to symmetry, which unites


conjoins

it

to the

gwd. But the second

it,

and

triad, principally subsists accord-

For because it participates of that which is primarily being,,


and truly l>eing. And the third triad principally subsists
according to the beautiful. For there intelligible multitude, order and
beauty, first shine forth to the view.
Hence this being is the most beau-

ing to truth.
it

is

being,

tiful of all intelligihka.


This however will be discussed hereafter. As.
there is a triad therefore, in each of the mixtures, the first indeed, symmetry especially comprehends and connects ; the second truth, and the
third beauty.
And this induced the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato

in these three defines the

in each, but

whole of the

intelligible fjorder].

one of these predominates more

in

one of the

For

all

are

intelligible

Digitized by

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XIV.

monads than

181

Moreover, the third triad presents

in another.

itself

to the

For it is necessary that the extremity of being should


this.
be deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings

view after
also

are not
uuities

more in number than the unities, as Parmenides says, nor are the
more numerous than beings ; but each progression of being par-

ticipates of the one


itself, is

since this universe also, according to each part of

governed by soul and

must the

therefore,

intellect.

intelligible in its first,

By a mnch
middle, and

greater priority

hypostases,

last

participate of the intelligible Gods.

CHAPTER XIV,
As

the

first

unity therefore, after the exempt cause of

into light intelligible being,

the third constitutes about

and the second unity,

itself, intelligible intellect,

union, constituting poweras the

which

it

all

things, unfolds

intelligible life, thus also

and

fills it

medium between itself and

gives completion to this being, and converts

it

to

with divine

being, through

whole of

this

being

is intelligible

being does, but

Hence

also,

it is

it is

sion of beings

most similar

as

Farther
itself

cause

it

and essence. And it


same manner as that which

all

things according to energy,


all

the second,

;
;

as the

every thing that

first
is

is

and openly.

For since the progres-

intelligiblcs.

first

being

is

and

is

parturient with multitude,

is

but the third,

itself, intelligible

is

things to shine forth, as the second

accomplished according to similitude, the

to the one

still,

all

the boundary of

is

the origin of separation


into light in

it

were

this

For the

intellect, life,

neither all tilings according to cause, in the

primarily being, nor docs

In

itself.

therefore, every intelligible multitude shi ncs forth to the view.

is

now

all-perfect,

and unfolds

multitude and form.


triad abides occultly in

stable in intelligibles

bound, and

fixes in

but the second abides

ON THE THEOLOGY

182

and

at the

same time proceeds

BOOK

so the third, after progression converts

the intelligible end to the beginning, and convolves the order to

For

it is

itself.

every where the province of intellect to convert and converge to


All these likewise are uniform

the intelligible.

and

HI.

have the form of one]

the abiding, the proceeding, and the returning.

intelligible, viz.

each of these

[i. e.

not asserted after the same manner in

is

genus of Gods

For

And

intelligibles.

and occult, conjoining


and unfolds 1 into light
nothing else than the transcendency of the one. For these three triads,
mystically announce that unknown cause the first and perfectly imparticipable God. The first of them indeed, announcing his ineffable union
and
the second his transcendency, by which he surpasses all powers
For as they are able to
the third, his all-perfect generation of beings.
comprehend the principle which surpasses both the union and the
the' intelligible

itself to

the one itself

which

'

is

unical, simple,

is

prior to beings

powers of

all

beings, so they exhibit to secondary natures, his

transcendency
nion of the

first

receiving indeed separately the unical

God

which

plicity

is

For these Gods though they arc allotted a simexempt from all the divine orders, yet they fall

equally

short of the union of the father.


all intelligibles to

the

admirable

but unfolding into light intelligibly the cause which

prior to intelligibles.

is

power and domi-

first

Of this

principle,

triad therefore, which converts


and convolves the multitude apparent

union of the whole of things, one thing is bound,


and unity and hyparxis ; another, is infinity and power and another is
that which is mixed, essence, life, and intelligible intellect. But the whole
triad subsists according to being, and is the intellect of the first triad.
in itself to the stable

For the

first

triad

is

an

intelligible

God

primarily.

But

the triad posterior

and intellectual God. And the third triad is an inThese three deities also, and triadic monads, give comtellectual God.
pletion to the intelligible genera. For they are monads according to their
deities ; since all other things are suspended from the Gods, and also
to

it is

an

intelligible

The word*

rm> ftn-a in the original immediately before T

nnrn

lw ynof

are to be rejected

a superfluous.
*

,*?>n.

For

is

omitted in the original.

txiiwi;, it is necessary to

read exuvw.

Digitized

CHAR

OF PLATO.

XiV.

J8S

But they are triads according to a separate division.


For bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, have a threefold subsistence but in one place indeed, all things are according to bound ; in
another, all things are according to infinity
and in another, all things
are according to that which is mixed.
And in one place, that which is
mixed is essence in another, it is intelligible life and in another, intelIn this last therefore, forms subsist primarily. For the
ligible intellect.
powers and beings.

of

separation
being, but

being
being,

is

is

intelligiblcs, unfolds

is

the order of forms; because form

Hence

not simply being.

and

itself,

that which

is

that which

But

being.

power, proceeding indeed from the

is

primarily being,

that which

first

being,

is

and

is
is

the second

existing as

it

were a duad generative of the multitude of beings, but not yet being
And that which is the third being, is itself the multitude of

multitude.

beings

being there existing with separation.

For being

cause of those things which forms constitute divisibly.

of which being

is

paradigms of beings.
but

is

and

Being however,

also because forms are called the


is

the cause of all things posterior

not the paradigm of them. For paradigms are the causes of

things which are separated according to existence,


rent characters of essence.
beings, that which is

account,

it is

exempt

separation. Because forms indeed, are causes produc-

tive of separation in their effects,

itself,

the

of the things

productive collectively, of these, forms are the cause in a

way attended with

to

is

And

one-many

that which

is

and which have

After the one therefore which


occultly,

and the united

diffe-

is

prior to

subsists.

On this

divided into multitude, and which tends from

the uniform to the splendid.

But the

last

of

intelligibles, is that

which a certain distribution into parts originates, and which

is

from

compre-

hensive of intelligible multitude.

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

CHAPTER
Socrates

III.

XV.

therefore, in the Philebus, affords us

the theory of the intelligible triads.

It

such

like auxiliaries to

requisite however, not only

is

but also to demonstrate the theology of

in these conceptions,

to abide

BOOK

Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from them to point out
one truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall assume therefore,

what

written in the Timaeus,

is

and shall follow our leader [Syrianus^ who

has unfolded to us the arcane mysteries of these triads, and conjoin with
the end of what has been said the beginning of the following discussion,

in the Timaeus therefore, Plato investigating what the paradigm of the


whole world is, discovers that it is comprehensive of alt intelligible anithat

it is

only-begotten, and that

likewise denominates

every

am mal, and

animal

it

of

intelligibles,

though there

is

is

itself,

itself,

is

the most beautiful of intelligible*,

intelligible

is

the object of sense.


it is

all-perfect,

m the demiurgus, yet it

not the most beautiful of

In the demiurgus

For

animal

itself is

The demiurgus

it is ne*.

is

rather intel-

all intelligibles,

For primary beauty

also, there are

forms of the things contained in the world, but there


of forms.

Hence

and the most beauFor

m the intelligible orders.

second to them in beauty and power.

the intelligible Gods.

paradigm of

as being the intelligible

because

animal

and

He

the intelligible of the demiurgus.

should be established

lectual than intelligible,

but

it is
it is

of that which

cessary that this animal


tiful

that

it is all-perfect,

mals, that

is all

is

in

not only four


the multitude

him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But


totally constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad.
in

likewise

is

not like animal

itself

only-begotten

among

be-

but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together with which
he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in the crater or
bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the things of which in-

ings,

telligible

animal

demiurgus

is

is

effective

and at the same time generative, of these the

allotted the cause in

a divided manner,

in conjunction with

Digitized by

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XV.
Hence, as

the crater.

mi urgus, and

is,

have said, animal

it

exempt from the de-

asTimseus every where denominates

Nevertheless, because forms are


all-perfect,

185
itself is

first

separated in

intelligible.

it,
it,

subsists in the third order of intelligibles.

and because it is
For neither that

which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily being, is all-perfect.


For the former is beyond all separation but the latter generates indeed,
and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings.
If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be allperfect multitude ? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the
third triad of intelligibles, as wa9 a little before demonstrated, but animal
itself is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible ani1

mals,

is

an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with any other


it is necessary that animal itself should be established accord-

principle)

For

be an intelligible paradigm,
be images of intelligibles? or how
will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of the whole of things >) or tf
For the natures which are prior
there is, it is the third in intelligibles.
ing to this order.

(and in

this case,

how

either there will not

will sensibles

to the triad in intelligibles, are not all-perfect

since they are

exempt

from the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not
only-begotten. For they proceed together with others ; the male indeed,
with the female, and those that are of a demiurgic together with those
that are of a generative characteristic

of

intelligibles

perfect,

for beauty

therefore,

is

Nor

are they the roost beautiful

in the intelligible.

arranged in the third triad of

itself is

eternal, as

animal

is

paradigm

is

And

through

all

power of

if it is

'

eternity being."

is

ro.

if

If therefore

it is

that which participates

eternal,

is

it

par-

every where

participated, animal itself is secondary to eter-

through

eternity.

Proc.

itself is all-

paradigm of beings
Moreover, animal

For says he, "the nature of


again, in another place he asserts, " that the

And

secondary to that which

And

But animal
first

intelligibles.

Timeeus himself says.

eternal."

ticipates of eternity.

nity.

is

and at the same time only begotten. The

all

eternity being,

it is

If this however be the case,

Intelligible life,

or

Vol.

life iuelf,

I.

filled

it

or the fir*

with the whole

subsists proximately

life.

Digitized by

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ON THE THEOLOGY

186
after eternity.

BOOK

For that which enjoys the whole of causes,

is

III.

arranged

proximately after them.

CHAPTER
Moreover,

if eternity

time has to that which

XVI.

has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which,

is sensible,

but the universe proximately

partici-

pates of time (for time was generated together with the uiyverse)
certainly necessary that animal itself should

Eternity therefore

eternity.

is

beyond the

indeed measures the existence of animal

itself

sured and

To which may

we

filled

with perpetuity from

it.

but animal

be the cause of immortality to

assert eternity to

that which

For

paradigm.

first

all

it is

participate of

primarily

eternity

itself is

mea-

bemadded, that

things.

Hence

For as that which is primarily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is
effective of form is itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause
of perpetuity and immortality, is itself primarily inunortal. The daemoniacal Aristotle also rightly- calls eternity immortal and divine, and that
from whence the existence and life of all things are suspended. If however it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to participation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, possessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power of perpetuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is naturally adapted to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subsists together with
eternity

life.

is

Hence Socrates

primarily immortal.

is

in the Phredo," after

many and

strations of the psychical immortality, says,

Cebes, and the form

itself

of

life,

are

"

God

much more

beautiful
therefore,

immortal."

demon-

my

dear

Hence,

in-

and the God who is connective of this life, primarily posthe immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity.
But

telligible life,

sess

'

For

<Pa>lf*> it

necessary to read

tfsuW

Digitized by

LiOOQle

OF PLATO.

CHAP. XVI.

Eternity therefore has

this is eternity.

be established
Farther

in the

still, it is

middle of the

187
subsistence in

will

intelligible order.

it subsists either

is one of
according to being, or ac-

or according to intelligible intellect.

life,

and

life,

necessary to assert that intelligible eternity

these thiee things, viz. that

cording to

its

But

being, as the

Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is
moved. For if being is being to all things, and essence is a thing of

much more must

this kind,

be the case with

this

intelligible

essence

and

For they are nothing eke than essence


But being unfolds motion and permanency, and the other genera
only.
of beings, in the second and third progressions of itself. The first being
therefore, as we have said, is at one and tlie same time exempt from

that which

is

primarily being.

motion and permanency. But eternity according to Timeeus abides in


Hence also time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency

one.

of

Eternity therefore does not subsist according to

that

primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.'

For

eternity.

which
neither

is

is

soul time, which

is

moved through

short, in divine beings, that which

is

therefore
it

is

mal
For

is

which

is

itself is

But the

eternal participates of

temporal participates of time.

prior to intelligible intellect,

established

in

participated is every where esta-

blished above that which participates.


eternity, just as that

And

the whole of time.

and posterior

to being

And

in the middle of the intelligible breadth.

eternal, so likewise eternity is that

which

is

Eternity
;

so that
as ani-

always being.

as animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates of

being, and

the cause of existence, of perpetual

is

and measures the

It is

essences, powers

and energies of

here necessary to supply

XV

ovfc

t*

life,

and

intellection,

all things.

vow tw

mpw-

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ON THE THEOLOGY

188

CHAPTER

BOOK

III.

XVII.

Stock, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of inand animal itself according to the extremity of them, and the
most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which is the first
of intclligibles, and how is it denominated by Timaeus? He says thereteliigibles,

lore of eternity, that while

abides in one, time proceeds according to

it

number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of eternity,


but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which
Timaeus says eternity abides ? For it is necessary either to say that it is
the one of eternity, or the one which transcends

one of the first


one,

from

how

triad.

But

Of secondary natures with

we

is

say

we say

all intelligibles,

that

any thing can abide

possible that

is it

indeed,

it is

which

is exempt
communion
For every thing which abides in any

in that

in

it

itself?

a certain respect on

abides.

It is

all

sides

comprehended by that

however perfectly impossible that the

in

any one should suppose that

it is

it

in that which

is

by having

should abide in

itself,

prior to

For to abide

itself.

its

itself.

It is necessary

subsistence in abiding

in that

which

better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the

as

it is

more

one

But

the one of eternity, in which Timaeus

says eternity abides, in this case, eternity will be in

however, that

which

first

should either comprehend any being, or be coarranged with beings.


if

or the

the imparticipable

things; and which neither admits the habitude nor

all

thing,

if

is

prior to, is

same manner

perfect than the collocation of better in less excellent natures.

itself, to what shall we primarily assign


permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this
being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is infe-

If therefore eternity abides in

rior to

it.

which

is

Timaeus,

If therefore eternity can neither abide in


prior to beings,
it is

it

is

itself,

nor in the one

evident that abiding in one according to

established in the one of the first triad, or rather in the

whole

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/
CHAP.

OF PLATO.

XVIII.

of that

we have

For, as

triad.

of stability to

all

IQQ

before observed, the

beings, in the

same manner

first

triad

is

the cause

as the middle triad

is

the

cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their
principle.

CHAPTER
Again therefore,

XVIII.

three orders of intelligibles present themselves to our

view, according to the doctrine of Timaeus, viz. animal

And

and the oue.

eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom.


itself defines the

itself,

eternity,

through this one, and the firm establishment in

boundary of the

petual and invariable sameness.

But through

intelligible

And

eternity,

it,

animal

Gods, according to a peritself indeed, having pro-

animal

For eternity
But the duad in eternity participates
of the intelligible monad, which Timams on this account denominates
one, as being the monad and principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since

ceeded tetradically,
is

is

suspended from the duad in eternity.

tlu ever in conjunction with being.

otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the

of
it

its

But he

from bound.

necting the names


jiower.

first

triad one, in

consequence

being especially characterized according to bound, denominating

And

lie

calls the

because

denominates the third

appellation to the whole of


triad therefore

is

middle triad dyadically, eternity, con-

this triad

it,

is

defined according to intelligible

triad

animal

itself,

from the extremity of the

transferring the
triad.

The

first

the union ofull the intelligibles, being in a certain respect

For the union is different from this which is exand im participate. It is also the supplier of
stable power.
For all things are established on account of it. But eternity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established.
Hence,
with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the

coordinated with them.

empt from

intelligibles

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nooK m.

ON THE THEOLOGY

190
first triad is

that on account of which this

the second triad

ment

of beings

of the

first.

is

is

that by vrhich

permanency is effected
For the firm

produced.

it is

but that

establish-

indeed according to this second triad, but is on account

But the second

triad

is

the proximate measure of

all

beings,

and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There arc also
at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity ; bound indeed, so far
as it measures intelligibles but infinity, so far as it is the cause of perpeFor according to the oracle, eternity is the cause of
tuity, and the ever.
Neverthenever-failing life, of unwearied power, and unsluggish energy.
by infinity [than by bound.] For it comcharacterised
less, eternity is more
;

prehends
in

in itself infinite time.

according to the
nity establishes

And

power.

now

And

For according

a divided manner.

it is

bounded.

bound and

infinity in

time indeed has bound and infinity


to its continuity, it

is

infinite;

but

For the now is a bound. But eterthe same. For it is a unity and

according to the one indeed,

it is

bound

but according to

which time * also demonstrates as from images ; because


the middle triad [of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is
mixed. For whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal

power

infinite

bound? For the temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner
bound of eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of the one.

as the

likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except


from the power of the infinite ? For the latter is a stable infinity, but the
former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still according to the one, so the former is moved according to number. Since

Whence

whence
[of

life,

i6

the alliance of time with lives, except from the

eternity

?]

But time proceeds through

Again, therefore, from these things

it is

all

temporal

first

principle

life.

evident, that eternity

subsists

For here there is infiand that which


nite life,
But eternity is the father and supplier of insubsists partibly in bodies.
finite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpeAnd Flotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the
tuity.

according to the middle of the

and the cause of

intelligible

Gods.

all life, intellectual,

xfovo;

psychical,

omitted in the original.

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OF

chap. xrin.
peculiarity

be

'

PLATO".

of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, defines

infinite life, at

once unfolding into

light the

whole of itself, and

it

its

to

own

For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the
one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior to itself,
but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds indeed the uniformtranscendency of the first triad, but defines the termination of the Gods,
and extends from the middle on all sides, and to all the intelligible

being.

breadth. Moreover the third triad

on

this

account

is

an

intelligible

is filled

indeed with intelligible

animal, and the

marily participates of the whole nature of


in itself the

first

first

this life

life,'

For

animal.

and

it pri-

but unfolds into light

of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect extending

itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the intelligible universe,
and the apparent world the sensible universe. Hence also, Plato denominates animal itself all-perfect
Or rather, if you are willing we will speak
thus that in this third triad, there are bound, infinity, and that which kv
mixed, which we have called intelligible intellect. Hence the whole triad
is denominated only-begotten from the father which is in it.
For the
cause of bound imparts, that which is uncoordinated with other things,,
and an exempt transcendency. For that which comprehends, says fiinreus, all such animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with
any other since again, it would be requisite that there should be another animal about it.
Hence that which comprehends in one all intelligible animals is a whole.
But every where whole is referred to bound,
and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itself is only-begotten, it will possess this peculiarity according to bound.
But again, it
is denominated eternal according to the power of it.
For this power
:

'

For eternity is infinite


that which is eternal.
and proceeding stably. Animal itself, however, is
according to intellect. For that which unfolds in itself all the

especially pertains to

power abiding
all-perfect

in one,

intelligible separation

'

Instead of aTiiozrrra,

* {anij is
1

it

of being,

is intelligible intellect.

And

that intel-

necessary to read itivnpa.

omitted in the original.

Instead of wpo rtu xtpuras, ai

*?<>

ms

*mfi*f,

it is

necessary to read

Tf t S

aru5.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

19^

BOOK

lect, according to the decision of Plato, will be all-perfect,

hends

all intelligibles,

and

boundary of the

defines the

in.

which compre-

intelligible order.

only-begotten, therefore, the eternal, the all-perfect, bound, infinity,

The

and that which is mixed, manifest the nature of intelligible animal. On


this account, Timreus also, in these three conclusions, reminds us of the
paradigm, viz. in the conclusion which shews that the universe is onlybegotten, and again, in the generation of time, and in the all-perfect

com-

prehension of all animals.


If likewise Timieus says, that animal itself

is

the most beautiful of

all

and that this has the third order in intelligibles, it will not
be wonderful. For it has beeu before asserted by us, that every where
the cause of the best mixture is the triad symmetry, truth, and beauty.

intelligibles,

But beauty

principally shines forth in the third progression of being,

exhibits

luminous nature together with

its

shines forth in the second,


If,

however, truth

the third,

it is

is

and symmetry

indeed the

first,

and

intelligible forms, just as truth

in the first progression

of being.

beauty the second, and symmetry

by no means wonderful, that according to order, truth and


; but that symmetry being more ap-

beauty should be prior to symmetry


parent in the

first

triad than

the other two, should shine forth as the

third in the secondary progressions.

the

first triad.

And

in the second triad

ledge.

is

truth indeed, so far as

but beauty so far as

For that

third triad.

that truth

For these three


it is

it is

But beauty, which pervades

is

knowledge,

the form of forms

this triad subsists there first, is

primarily in that which

subsist occultly in

intelligible

is

evident from

especially being, prior to

as far as to the last of beings,

is

in the
this,

knowis

ne-

from which the last of beings are derived.


symmetry is in that which is primarily mixed. For every
mixture requires symmetry, in order that what is produced from it may
be one certain thing. Though these three things, therefore, presubsist
cessarily in the first being,

And

the

first

we assume, as acknowledged universally, that symmetry is


and the most beautiful of intelligible animals, as Timaeus says, yet
at present we shall dismiss the further consideration of them, as we have
elsewhere preccdaneously discussed them, and have especially endeavoured to enforce what we conceive to be the opinion of Plato concernthere, for
there,

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OF PLATO.

C1IAP. XIX.

ing their order.


ing of one t>ook,

symmetry

philosopher, beauty to the lover, and


that such as

is

193

For we have spoken of these things


in which we demonstrate that truth

the order of these lives, such also

in
is

treatise consist-

co-ordinate to the

to the musician;
is

and

the relation of truth,

beauty, and symmetry to each other.

Animal

itself,

therefore,

beautiful, so far as

beauty

is

wont

to

be carried

unfolding that which


forth,

and attracting

about

it.

tendency
motion.

And
;

to the

is

is

and

in forms,

is

as

intelligible
it

to its

own

splendor the desire which

good indeed,

ail

as being the

it sees,

and

is

it

is

concealed

and arcane
with astonishment and

it, and its efficacy, acutely pervade


most similar of all things to the good,

that surveys

arcane shining forth as

mires that which

For

diings possess a silent

but we are excited to the beautiful

and

beauty.

were the form of forms,

occult in the good, causing its loveliness to shine

converts every soul

which

with the greatest justice, be called most

For the illumination from

throng!) every soul,


it

may

eminently coutained in

it is

it.

The

soul also, beholding that

were to the view,

astonished about

it.

rejoices in,

And

and admost

as in the

holy of the mysteries, prior to the mystic spectacles, those that are initiated, are seized with astonishment, so in intelligibles prior to the partici-

pation of the good, beauty shining forth, astonishes those that behold
converts the soul to

itself,

good] shows what that

is

and being
which

is

it,

established in the vestibules [of the

in

the adyta,

and what the transcen-

dency is of occult good. Through these things therefore, let it be apparent whence beauty originates, and how it first shines forth ; and also
that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles.

CHAPTER

XIX.

Since, however, Timazus says that the primary and intelligible paradigms have their subsistence in intelligible animal, and that all these are
Proc.
Voi I.
2 B

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BOOK

ON THE. THEOLOGY

194

four, unfold iug themselves

trad,

this

first

ill.

into light, according to the all-perfect te-

being the case, in the

first

place

it

deserves to be considered,

that as species or forms present themselves to the view in the intelligible,


it is

necessary by a

much greater

pre-subsist in intelligibles.

For

the genera of beings should

pi iority, that
it is

not possible to admit that forms arc

But

but that genera are intellectual only.

intelligible,

intelligibly indeed,

according to their

first

as forms exist

subsistence, but the pleroma,

gods, and divides


more partial decrements, produces the uniform
and expands that which is exempt into co-ordinate causes,
thus also the genera of being are occultly and indivisibly in intelligibles,
but are accompanied with separation in intellectuals. And on this account the first triad indeed has essence for that which is mixed ; but the
second has life, where there was motion and permanency, life both abiding
and proceeding ; and in the third there are sameness and difference.

or plenitude of them shines forth in the intellectual


that which

'

total into

is

into multitude,

For the all-perfect multitude indeed, is through intelligible difference,


but the united and that which is comprehensive in common of parts
according to genera, and according to one, is through intelligible sameness. And all these subsist intelligibly, essentially, and uniformly in
these triads.

In the

first

place therefore,

this

deserves

love to survey the nature of things, and

it is

more must

be

it

fit

For

bute co-ordinate genera to intelligible forms.


be lawful for genera to shine forth secondarily

be inferred by those who

to

also

(hat they should attri-

it

neither

after forms.

was nor

above-mentioned manner, by those who admit that there are


forms.

will

Hence much

admitted that genera subsist in the intelligible after the


intelligible

In the next place, in addition to these things we must sur-

how

and how it shines forth in intelliFor it is divided into a monad and triad. For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged
prior to the others, it is defined according to a div ine cause.
It appears
vey

this

tetrad of forms subsists,

gible intellect analogous to the principles.

For mr>s

* For Sttrnps

it

it

U neeemry to read
U nectwary to read

myoif
htuTtpat-

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XIX.

193

however to me that intelligible intellect returning to the principles of the


whole of thing*, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the plenitude of forms, and is all things intellectually and at the same time intelligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and being full of
the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes the monad of the
gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of the gods. But receiving the intellectual causes of the three principles posterior to the one,

it

exhibits three ideas after this, one of them indeed, being the cause of air-

wandering and volant animals, this cause proceeding analogous to bound.


Hence also it constitutes gods that are uniform, elevating, undefiled,
united to the celestial gods, and which receive measures second in dignity
to theirs,

and have the same

relation to those

gods that govern generation

co-ordinately, as the celestial gods have to these, according to

But

transcendency.

it

exempt

exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, co-ordi-

nate with generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that
are

suppliers of motion

tl>e

spective guardians of

of sense
ncss.

is

and

prolific

abundance, and that are the

since also this water itself which

under the dominion of effusion,

Hence

likewise

it is

manner adapted

who

generates gods

who subdue the


mundaue

seat of

and

And

attributed to vivific powers.

to the nature of that

which

is

indefiniteintelligible

formless nature of matter

by the

seat.

Thus

it

and fix the


For deriving

last Ibrms,

natures in the one centre of the universe.

mundane

It also

who arc stable,

were, or seat of brings, they sta-

therefore forms

first

unfold them-

selves into light in intelligible intellect, possessing their progression

order according to the

first

principles.

It

is

to this

triad, the

and

necessary however, in addi-

tion to these things, to infer this in the third

that according

in-

the object

mixed.

contain the end of the whole of things,

their subsistence from the first Vesta as

bly define this

infinite lation

is

the precedancous cause of terrestrial and pedestrious

intellect exhibits

gods, in a

life

place,

following Timaeua,

multitude of intelligible parts shines

and the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts. For


that, says he, of which other iutclligible animals both according to one,
and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm

forth,

of die universe.

But

if

other intelligible animals are parts of

this, it is

OS THE THEOLOGY

BOOK

III.

evident that it is a whole, comprehending in itself the multitude of intelligible parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts.
It must

be

inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production

fabrication.

For

if it

contains the primary paradigms of things,

it is

and
evi-

dent that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it.
And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent,

and

all

the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence

will also

comprehend the

intelligible causes

and

it

of all the vivific and demiurgic

orders.

CHAPTER XX.
Sue ii conceptions

therefore, as these,

may be assumed from what

is

written in the Timaeus concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably


is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity,
and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we will show from
what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as
we have concerning the first principles. The Elean guest therefore, in
that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the universe is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and showing how it is suspended from the one, at first indeed, he argues from the one being [or being
characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passiveto/Ae one, and
participates of the one, but is not the one itself, nor that which is primarily one.
But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction
between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one
being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has
parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not
be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the

to what

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XX.

197

For that which ii perfectly divided, and is connective of


many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirely
one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of multitude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in
the demonstration of this through three arguments. And at one time
indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at
another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of
Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves
through the following words. " But what with respect to those who
Must we not enquire to the utmost of
assert that the universe is one ?
our power what they say being is? Certainly. To this question therefore
they may answer Do you say there is one thing alone ?
We do say so.
Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call
being any tiling ? Yes. Do you call it the owe, employing two names
What will be their anrespecting the same thing? Or how do you say ?
swer after this O guest ?' Through this therefore, Plato separating the one
and being from each other, and showing that the conception of the one
is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each
other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the
one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void
of multitude and possessing the form of one. But the one itst/fn exempt
from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will diHence it is necessary to arrange
minish its supreme and ineffahle union.
the one prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that
which is one alone. For if the one and the one being were the same, and
it made no difference to say one and being (since it' they differed, the one
would a <rHm be changed from the one being,) if therefore the one differs
in no respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will
not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things,
For being exlest there should be two things, the thing and the name.
all-perfect.

all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a name of


any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the
same with the thiug. And neither will a name be the name of a thing,

empt from

ON THE THEOLOGY

198

name of a name,

BOOK

a thing

III

the same with a

but a name
name, and a name is the same with a thing,' and a tiling will be the thing
of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the same as about
a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If theretore, these
things are absurd, and theone is, and also being, and being participates of
the one, the one and the one being are not the same.
But that whole also is not the same with the one, Plato afterwards demonstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: " What then?
be die

will

if

is

is different from the one being, or that it is the


Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole
as Parmenides says, " that which is every where similar to the bulk of

Will they say that whole

same with
is,

it?

a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for

nothing

is

greater or

more

stable than this :"

cessary that being should have a middle


these, there

is

every necessity that

it

and

if this

be the case,

extremities.

Or how

should have parts.

ne-

it is

And

having
shall

we

Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it


may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and
Undoubtedly. But is it not impossible that that
one.
be
whole may
which suffers these things should be the one f Why ? Because according
to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely without parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have
say?

just

Just

so.

now mentioned,

in

consequence of consisting of many parts would

not accord with the one'' Through these things therefore, the Elean guest

arguing from wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of
For if whole
the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one.
is in

beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies

theone.

Vox the one

therefore

is

ness

whole

but whole
;

for

is

not the one

it is

is

it is, all

things will not be

but whole possesses parts. Whole


;
For that transcends all things and whole-

impartible

itself.

passive to the one.

not the one

itself.

Hence

Hence
all

also

it

is

denominated

things are not one void of

separation and multiplication.

Moreover, the

'

all is

comprehensive of many parts.

lojteid of to rpayna

r<f

*np*rt,

it it

For whole indeed,

Decenary to read t *>i

r<y wpoyn-orri.

Digitized by

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XX.
consists at

first

of two parts

but the

all

I99
possesses

and participating of wholeness at the same time

a multitude of

is all,

distributed into parts. This therefore is not the one

parts,

as being perfectly

itself,

but

is

passive to

But it is impartible in such a


manner as to be exempt from all parts. Hence the all is not the same
with the one.
We therefore, have divided whole and the all, but Plato
conjoins them, when he says " Nothing however hinders but that when
it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that
thus the all and whole may be one." At the same time however, they are
the one.

For

the one itself \s impartible.

From these three arguments


Elean guest separates the one from the participants of the

divided after the above mentioned manner.


therefore, the
one,

and doubts against those who assert all things


and the all ; of which the all indeed

being, whole

and

is

to begone, viz. the

a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts

ticipates

of being.

one

participates of whole,
;

For being is not whole, as Parmenides

but whole partestifies.

These

therefore, having such

an order as this, is it not necessary that the arguments of Plato should be made conformably to the three intelligible
triads ?
For it was requisite, since Parmenides defined the one being in
intelligibles, that

Plato should from thence derive his demonstrations of

the distinction between the one prior to intelligibles, and the one which

is

For the doubts against Parmenides, evince in many


places that tlie one which is participated derives its subsistence from the
union.
The one * therefore is not in these triads, but the
participate
im
one being and whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is
For that which is in every
in the extremity of the intelligible order.
respect perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that
But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the
extremity.
For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior to
intelligible breadth.
For the
the all ; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all.
in

intelligibles.

all is

divided multitude

which
nity.

is

but that which contains multitude in

not yet separated

For eternity

For vwpaf hera

It

it it

U requisite here

is

is

whole.

And

the measure of

itself,

and

this especially pertains to eter-

all intelligible

multitude, just as

nfcemry to read
Wppty n it.

to

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BOOK

ON THE THEOLOGY

200

the coherence and union of the

lit.

all.

But the one being

first

indeed according to the

whole is
For the me is especially the peculiarity of this triad, as
the first triad.
Timseus also has demonstrated. And being which is occultly and intelligibly being, and which is the cause of essence to all other things, primaAgain therefore, following the Eiean guest, three
rily shines forth there.
triads present themselves

one being
the

all.

to our view

the

the second according to whole

To which

and the

is in

third according to

demiurgus of the universe looking, adorns

also the

the sensible universe, defining the visible nature with reference to that
intelligible all

but time with reference to the

intelligible wholeness.

On

which account also time is continued. And as the intelligible whole comprehends two parts, but contains the parl6 in one boundary, after the same
manner, time also is bounded by the now, but by its twofold parts is inThese things therefore, we shall shortly after more fully discuss
finite.
when we speak concerning the Parmenides. For the conceptions of the
Blean guest are the pretekia of the mysteries of the Parmenides. Before
however we turn to the Parmenides, let us discuss, if it is agreeable to you,
the three triads from the beginning, collecting the conception of Plato

from

his assertions that are scattered in

CHAPTER

many

places.

XXI.

There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and


they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that which
mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple inBnities, and
But of every intelligible triad, the bound in each is denominated father; the infinite, power; and that which is mixed, intellect.
And let not any one apprehend that these names are foreign from the

is

triple mixtures.

philosophy of Plato.

For

it will

appear that he uses these appellations

Digitized by

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CHAP XXI.
in the before

the

first

as the

OF PLATO.

God father and lord in


God surpasses oven

his Epistles-

and that

It

For be denominate*
evident however, that

is

the paternal order, the

first

the intelligible Gods.


to the one,

201

mentioned triads more than any one.

paternal

first

For these arc they that are most eminently

intelligibly unfold

God

his ineffable

is

in

allied

and unknown union.

denominated one and father from the nature*


if this be the case, as the intelligible
Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily fathers. For
Plato gives names to the inefTable in a twofold respect, either from the

If therefore the

first

is

that proximately proceed from him,

all beings.
For through these the transcendency of the one is known. Moreover, the Elean guest calls being that
which is powerful and power. The first power therefore exists prior to
being, and is united to the father
but it particularly accords with being,
which also it fills. Hence being as participating of power is denominated

summits of beings, or from

powerful; but as united to


it is

and producing

all

beings according to

it,

If however both Plato himself, and his most genuine

called power.

disciples, frequently

many

it,

places they

call all [true]

make

beings intellect (on which account, in

and

three principles, the good, intellect

denominating every [true] being

intellect)

you

will also

soul,

have the third in

But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference.


For with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with reference to
hyparxis.
For when we denominate the unity in each triad intelligible,
these intellect.

as the abject of desire to being,

which ranks as the

and as

being, then

filling

For

third in the triad intellect.

it

we

call that

is intelligible

as

essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father and

For every participated deity

deity.

of

its

essence

the intellect of that which


lect,

we

according to which

is intelligible,

But another kind

participant.

is

is

intellect

as being the plenitude

which

the intellect of

is

say that the being of the third triad,

primarily being.

For

is

this is essential intel-

its own essence by energising.'


For all things are
and both the more simple genera, and the primary pa-

being allotted

essentially in

radigms

it,

for it

'

Proc.

is

But

intelligible intellect.

For svro r* ntfytm

the third kind

is

intellectual

it

Vol.

I.

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BOOK

ON THE THEOLOGY
intellect,

and

it,

which subsists analogous to

is filled

from

it,

intelligible intellect, is

possessing intellectually those things which are in

the other intelligibly.

And

such things as are

according to each

first

111.

conjoined with

in short,

the things that are prior to them.

it

necessary every where that

is

Hence

should have the form of

series,

also they are called things

first,

and possess a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate naSince therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first
tures.
intelligibles are Gods and unities.
And since the intelligible is essential,
the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect is every where according to

its

own nature

intellectual, the first souls are intellectual.

Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes of life, the first of bodies are
most vital. And because the bodies that are perpetual are moved in a
circle,

the summits of material

bodies are

moved

those bodies that are perpetual. This therefore

is

in conjunction with

the cause

why

the unities

are frequently called intelligibles, and beings intelligible intellects.

That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect,
shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order.
For in this the triad is
most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things in a more
divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity. Immediately

we

therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the Timaeus, the demi-

" Of which works

am

the demiurgus and


" Imitating my power
in your generation."
This therefore is also wonderful, that he lias delivered to us the most theological conception concerning power.
For in

urgus calls himself father,

father."

the

"

first

But

place indeed, he calls

Of which works

his, [is

shortly after he unfolds his power,

am

it

ing to Plato power

is

when he says,
and that the power is
power :" so that accord-

the power of the father,

the demiurgus

and

father,"

evident from the words,] " Imitating

of the lather.

And

my

in the

next place, he ascribes

power a peculiarity generative of the whole of things for this is


evident from the words " In your generation." Power therefore is the
cause of generation and of the progression of beings. And in the last
place, he delivers the intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. " Having
to this

thus spoke, again into the former crater in which he

had tempered the

OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXI.
soul of the universe,

mixture.*

For

lie

to pour, to mingle, mixture*

Though what

pertain to intellect.

203

poured mingling the remainder of the former

and

necessity

is

to be productive of soul,

there for asserting these

A Whatever

things, since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect.

ideas therefore intellect perceived

such and so

Hence

many he conceived

the demiurgu

esses these things as

is

father,

much

by the dianoctic energy

it

in

animal

itself,

necessary for this universe to contain."

and power and intellect. And he posson account of intelligiblcs. For he

as possible

on account of them. He is also power, and the geneand knows beings intellectually, on account of them.
Much more therefore
For in them intelligible knowledge first subsists.
are father, power and intellect in intelligibles ; from which also the demiof
triad.
this
filled,
participates
For
Plato
assumes each of
urgus being
For as the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subthese analogously.
sistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be
And as in intelligibles, eternity
indissoluble of which he is the father.
proceeding according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so
the demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are perpetual and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which
That any one therefore may assume
is generative of mortal animals.
these names from Plato is evident from what has been said.
Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is
primarily being and prior to the eternal ; but another is secondarily being,
and the first eternity and another is being ultimately, and is intelligible
and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but there eternity,
and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive than intellect;
but being than eternity. For every intellect is eternal, but not every
thing eternal is intellect. For soul according to its essence is eternal, and
every thing which participates of eternity, participates also by a much
is

God

as father,

rator of wholes,

For with perpetuity of existence, existence is


that which participates of existence is not
For bodies also participate in a certain resuniversally eternally being.

greater priority ot being.


entirely consubsistent.

But

pect of the nature of existence, but they are not eternal.


fore constitutes

an

Intellect there-

intellectual essence only, so far as it is intellect

since

ON THE THEOLOGY

204

book

nr.

and being it constitutes uil things. But eternity


constitutes both the intellectual and psychical essence.
For the mixture
But being constitutes the in[in the second triad] was intelligible life.
so far as

also life

it is

tellectual, the psychical,

[most obscurely,] and

and the corporeal

is

For matter

life.

being, falling offfrom the participation of being.

should say that

And

thus

it

is

much concerning

But what

is

being

however, some one

If,

being in power or capacity, yet

For capacity

from being.

also

capacity indeed, but formless being, and non-

it

has this power

the forerunning participation of energy.

is

these things.

argument of division does Socrates afford us in tlio


?
And how from what it

sufficient

Fbttdrus, concerning these intelligible triads


delivered by

him may we recur

most principal Gods ?

by

the

Nymphs,

celebrates every thing divine as beautiful, wise and good,

and 6ays that by these the aoul


is

to the conception of the hypostasis of the

Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired

a thing of this kind, this

And

greater priority.

all

is

is

But

nourished.

if

every thing divine

the case with the intelligible

by a much

these indeed are every where, but in the

first

good principally subsists in the second the wise ; and in the


third the beautiful.
For in this there is the most beautiful of intelligible*.
But in the second triad truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in
the first there is the commensurate, which we say is the same as the good.
But Socrates in the Plnlebus says that the clement of the good is the deThe desirable therefore pertains
al ruble, the sufficient, and the perfect.
indeed to bound for it is the union and goodness of all the triad, and
the triad converges about it.
But the sufficient pertains to infinity. For
sufficiency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being
triad, the

present to
dint which

all
is

things without impediment.

mixed.

every mixture has

its

For

this is that

And

which

is

coalition from the triad.

the perfect pertains to

primarily triadic

The elements

since

therefore

fir*t triad ; and the elements of intelligible


But every thing wise is full of being, is gene-

of the good unfold to us the

wisdom, the second


rative of

The full

truilt,

and

triad.
is

convertive of imperfect natures to their perfection.

Uterefore pertains to the second

bound

with the participation of the natures prior to

for this is uniformly filled

itself.

For the full

is

every

OF PLATO.

CHAP. XX1L

203

where adapted to bound, just as that which cannot be fitted is adapted to


the infinite. But the prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity.

For that which does not abide in the


generative of other things,

is

fulness of

itself,

but

the convertive pertains to that which

mixed.

is

For

this as

the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the


itself prior to

is prolific

especially indicative of divine infinity.

and

And

being allotted

full,

and unite*

other things to the bound of the whole triad.

CHAPTER

XXII.

MoftOTm, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third


of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, the
lovely, the delicate, and the splendid.
The lovely therefore, being arranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the delicate
being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite power which is
And the splendid is of an intellectual peculiarity. For
in the beautiful.
is that which illuminates all things, and
this is the beautiful of beauty
triad

astonishes those that are able to behold

shining most manifestly,

is

the objects of this sense have

and

this sense

many

pervades farther than the

form.

And on

And

as apparent beauty

this

the senses (for

differences according to Aristotle*


rest) so likewise intelligible

appears to the intellect of the soul shiuiug


telligible

it.

seen through the clearest of

intelligibly.

For

account the splendor of beauty

to iutellect. Splendid beauty therefore, us Socrates calls

the extremity of die intelligible order.

For

this is the

it is
is

beauty

an

in-

apparent

shines forth at
most splendid of

it,

and is that which emits the intelligible


when it appeared astonished the intellectual Gods, and made
them admire their father* as Orpheus says. Such tlierefore is the prepa-

intelligibles, is intelligible intellect,


light, that

ration to the science of the intelligible

be assumed.

And now

it

will

Gods which may from

appear how beauty

is

these tilings,

indeed occultly

in.

ON THE THEOLOGY

206

BOOK

111.

but subsists in the third triad so as to


have manifestly proceeded into light. For in the former it subsists according to one form only ; but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also

the end of the

first intelligible triad,

how each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a
For the first triad being characterized according to the good,derives
But the second
its completion from the three elements of the good.
being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad of wisdom.

evident
triad.

And

the third subsisting according to the beautiful,

If however the beautiful

the triad of beauty.


triad,

and shines

forth triadically in the third,

intellect loves the first triad,

And

it is

is

is

all-perfect through

occultly in the

and has love conjoined with

this is the intelligible love

of the

first

first

evident that intelligible

beauty.

From

its

beauty.

these there-

and truth, as we have


monads, the good, the wise

fore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith

For the three

before observed.

intelligible

and the beautiful, constitute three powers which lead upwards all other
things, and prior to other things the intellectual Gods.
Concerning these
things however,

we

shall

speak hereafter.

CHAPTER
Let
But

us

now then

direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides.

I wish again to

strated.

It has

XXIII.

remind the reader of what we have before demon-

been shown therefore, that

it is

necessary to divide the

second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one being


this hypothesis

is

and that

nothing else than the generation and progression of the

Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union of

intelligible* as

For the discussion is not, as some say it is, in


God and the Gods. For it was not lawful
to Parmenides to conjoin multitude with the one, and the one with mul-

far as to a deified essence.

the

first

hypothesis, concerning

Digitized by

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XX1I1.
For the

titude.

But in

the

from the

first

first

to the other

first

God

hypothesis essence,

God. That such an

Gods

is

207

exempt from the whole of things.


and even the one itself, are taken away

perfectly

is

ablation, however, as this

evident to every one.

is

not adapted

Moreover, neither does Par-

menides in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they
say he does ; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods, because
they are conjoined with the one, and in simplicity and union precede ' all
thedivine genera. For how can the similar or the dissimilar, or contact
the privation of contact, and

all

and

the other particulars which are denied

Gods ? They appear indeed to me


away are similido not speak rightly when they say that all

of the one, be inherent in the intelligible

to be right in asserting that the things which are taken

tudes of the

Gods

but they

of them are similitudes of the intelligible Gods.

added,

in

To which

opposition to this assertion, that the discussion

Gods

cerning the intelligible

which are denied


therefore, as I

in the

second hypothesis.

in the first, are affirmed in the

have

said,

is

is

it

may

be

again con-

For the things

second hypothesis. This

demonstrated that the conclusions with

refer-

ence to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and
effects.
It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the beginning, we
should adapt the

first

conclusions to the

sions to the middle orders,

and the

should demonstrate that as

many

gressions of the divine orders.

last

first

orders, the middle conclu-

conclusions k> the hist orders, and

questions arc asked, us there are pro-

.And in the

first

place,

we must

deliver

whom we
many places,

the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of

have proposed to speak


partly indicating,

since Plato speaks about these in

and partly

clearly untbldinghis meaning.

we should collect into one the elaborate


and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now
to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on
But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I
that dialogue.
will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following
It

is

necessary however, that

in so doing thedivine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus].

For ffxiTi{

it it

For wealsa

neccwary to reid xgo^omf.

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ON

208

THEOLOGY

T,* K

BOOK

III.

through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths
about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury,

and wakened as from a profound sleep to

And

thus

much concerning

But from hence

mode of

the

this
tle

I shall pass to the narration

arcane mystic discipline.

whole of the conclusions.

of the things proposed.

The first and im participate one therefore, which preexists beyond the
whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also
those that are participated,

is

celebrated

being demonstrated to be the cause of

ull

through the

first

hypothesis,

things ineffably, but not being

defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity

of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable
one,] that which is aloae supercssential and surpassing, and unmingled
with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about
itself

the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming

more redundant than

that which

is primarily one.
This however is a
and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad.
As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. the one and
being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former

superesscntial hyparxis,

perfects,

but the

latter is perfected,

it is

necessary that the middle of both

should be power, through which and together with which the one constitutes

and

me, and

its

is

perfective of being.

conversion to the one,

is

For the progression of being from the


through power.
For what else con-

joins being to the one, or causes the one to be participated by being

except power?

Hence,

being.

generations.

of

intelhgibles.

duced

For

it is

the progression of the one, and

in all the divine

its

extension to

genera powers precede progressions and

This triad therefore, the one, power and being,

The first of these indeed producing

and the second being suspended from

is

the summit

the third being pro-

the one, but coalescing with

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXtV.

209

CHAPTER XXIV.
This

triad therefore,

Parmenides delivers immediately

in the

beginning

of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participa-

But he calls it the one being, and says that being parand the one of being. The participation however of
these is different.
For the one indeed so participates of being, as illuminating and filling, and deifying being ; but being so participates of the
one, as suspended from the one, and deified by it.
But the habitude
which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither
is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much
more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude
is biformed.
For it is of the one, and is connascent with being. For it
is the motion of the one, and its progression into being.
Parmenides de" See therelivers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows
tion of essence.

ticipates of the one,

'

fore from the beginning if the one

Is

is.

it

possible then for

it

to be,

and

is not possible." But he ends speaking


" Will therefore that which is said be

yet not to participate of essence ? It

about it in the following words


any thing else than this, that the. one participates of essence, when it is
summarily asserted by any one that the one is ? It will not." This therefore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both,
:

through which being


fectly admirable

is

of the one and the one of being, in a

the father of intellect, and that intellect


that power

is

per-

of the triad, and bein*;

is

the intellect of the father, anil

concealed between the extremes.

is

manner

Plato indicating through these things, that the father

For deity is the father


Yet it is not intel-

the intellect of this deity.

is

same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence.


For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says.

lect in the

Proc.

In the original

o,

but the true reading

Vol.

I.

is

eridemlf

alone.
*2

ON THE THEOLOGY

*10

But

that which

is

BOOKIH.

primarily being, neither stands

still,

nor

moved, as
since power is
is

he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being


here occultly. For the triad docs not proceed from itself ; but subsists
without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according
Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which
to divine union.
participates of the one through power as the middle, which collects togeAnd it is supcressential inther and separates both the one and being.
;

deed, but

is

conjoined with essence.

We

must never think therefore

that

For the powers of the Gods are superessential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods.
And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly there-

all

power

fore,

is

the progeny of essence.

does poetry every where assert that the

For

things.

things

essential

are able to do

since they are not constitutive of supcrcssential

triad therefore,

first

Gods

is

all

powers indeed are not capable of effecting


natures.

all

The

through these things unfolded to us by Parinenides.

CHAPTER XXV.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression,
which Parmenides characterises by intelligible wholeness, as we have
shown

For the first triad being uniform, and possessing


and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that
power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being,
is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the extremes with each other, the second triad proceeds, being characterized by

all

the

in the Sophista,

things intelligibly

first intelligible

from each other.


the
also

power, and having the monads in itself distinguished


all things being uuited and without distinction in

For

Being
distinction and separation shine forth in this triad.
and power arc more divided from each other. And that which con-

first triad,

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXV-

211

no longer one being [or being characterized by the


a whole, so that it has the one and being in itself as parts.

sists

of these

but

is

is

above indeed [i.


But
wholeness.

e. in

the

one,]

For
and
and a whole, power

triad] all things are prior to parts

first

ip this triad there are both parts

unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts
and the w hole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called
intelligible wholeness.
But the parts of it, the one and being, I call the
extremes.
And power being here the middle, connects the one and being,
and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first

Since also

triad.

with being,
the vnc,
sists

it

it is

the middle of both, through

renders the one one being

And

perfectly causes being to be one.

it

of two parts,

the one which

is

viz.

of being which

is

its

but through

thus the one being con-

characterised

us say

if

by the

and of

one,

characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says.

begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows


let

communion indeed
communion with

its

the one

is

what will happen.

" Again

Consider then

He

therefore,

if it is

not ne-

cessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a

f But- he ends in the following words * That


one therefore is a whole, and has a part."
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of
intelligible* to be a wholeness.
For as existence is derived to all things
from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an nil-perfect division
from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Wholekind as to have parts

which

is

ness therefore

is triple,

being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts,

or .subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato.

For

in the

Politico* indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus

derives

its

completion from species, but exists prior to

Timseus he says that the world


indeed derives
parts
fore,

is

its

n whole, not

being triple as

intelligible

is

a whole of wholes.

as the universe

we have

said,

is,

but partially.

and occult cause of these


itself,

And
all

in the

the world

but each of the

Wholeness there-

according to Plato, the unity, and the


is

now

hending and constituting three wholenesses


indeed of

it.

And

completion from parts that are wholes

the wholeness prior to parts

delivered, unically

compre-

according to the hyparxis

but according to

its

power,

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ON THE THEOLOGY
the wholeness which
ness which

is in

from parts

is

For

part.

BOOK

and according

the one

is

prior to

to its being the whole-

multitude

all

III.

but power

a certain respect with both the extremes, and comprecommunicates


hends in itself the peculiarities of them and being in a certain respect
Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which
participates of the one.
For it is a monad,
is prior to parts is derived from a unical hyparxis.
in

and of the multitude which is in them.


For it derives its completion
the power which is collective of the one and being,

constitutive of parts,

and

is itself

But

the second wholeness

from parts, just as in

from power.

is

the extremes in a certain respect shiue forth to the view.

wholeness

is

power and

And

the third

For being is a part, and is the progeny both of


and possesses each of these partially. After the in-

from being.
the one,'

telligible therefore, three

three unically,

and

way extending

wholenesses are divided according to the differ-

But the

ent orders of beings.

intelligible

wholeness comprehends the

the intelligibly connective

is

monad of this triad,

every

the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible

and occult order.

CHAPTER XXVI.
Immediately
which

after this triad

all intelligible

we may

sec

another proceeding, in

multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed

constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of


after the occult

union of the

second, the progression of the third

subsistence from parts, but the parts are many,

which the triad prior to

and power, and being.


'

it is

many

parts.

For

and the dyadic separation of the


is generated, which has indeed its

first triad,

parturient.

But

the one

Instead of vro;

it is

is

For

with

the multitude of

in this triad there is a unity,

multiplied,

necessary to read

and

m;.

also being

and

OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXVI.

And

power.

thus

all

the triad indeed

tremes, viz. the one and being, as

it is

is

213

a wholeness; but each of

its

ex-

multitude conjoined through collec-

For

again divided and multiplied.

this power conjoining


some of these it causes
each through progression to be being characterized by the one, but of
others each according to participation to be the one characterized by beFor here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and
ing.
being but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it and

power,

tive

is

unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of

The one of being therefore, is again dividand being generate a second unity conjoined with the
part of being. But being participating of the one, is again separated into
being and the one. For it generates a more partial being suspended from
a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings,
and is a more specific monad. The cause however of this progression is
power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of
For the one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being conmultitude.

being participates of the one.


ed, so that the one

verts to the participation of the divine unities.

Parmenides begin to teach us -concerning


conclude his discourse about
says on this subject

of the one being,


shall not

is

it?

as follows

viz. the

where docs he

be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one t It


But he ends thus " Will not, therefore, the one being after
:

manner be an

In the

therefore does

And

one and being, desert each other, so that the one

cannot be.'"
this

Whence

this triad?

The beginning, therefore, of what he


" What then ? Can each of these parts

first

infinite

multitude

place, therefore,

it is

It

seems

so."

proper to understand the manner of

the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intel-

monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad


it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.]
But we say that it
consists of two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible

ligible

posterior to

multitude presents

when

all

itself to

the view from the

monad and

the duad.

For

things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things,

and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then
1

It

raw tow

necessary to cornet the text here, and to read as follow*

$ orr{ to, ti it

xi ts oy ap* (nroXfnrraim, q to

it. . r.

tuw;

raw p*pun

immpn

rov

K.

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ON the

214

HOOK

ti]j:olo<;y

lit.

Parmenides delivers the union which pervades from the monad to the
But when power separating and conjoining the unities and
third triad.
beings gives completion to multitude, then the participation of the duad
becomes perfectly apparent, as 1 think Parmenides demonstrates when
he says, " so that it is necessary two things should always he generated,

and that there should never be one thing (only.)" This triad, therefore, proceeds according to both the preexistent triads, flowing according to the
Oracle, and proceeding to

all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is


and of the incomprehensible nature of power.
place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is

indicative of this flux,

Hence,

in the

first

through these things demonstrated to


to

And

it.

nides,

is

l>e

suspended from the triads prior

Parmepower of being generated;

in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to

For

primogenial.

this first imparts the

and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generation, [i.e. becoming to be, or rising into existence^] For he says " And the part w ill
be generated from two parts at least." And again : " Whatever part is
:

And

generated, will always have these parts."


that

it is

never

necessary

be* one."'

what follows

in

So

should always be generated two things, and should

it

Does not

he, therefore,

who

frequently uses the word ge-

Deration in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligible multitude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are

other?

But

this

nature of the triads prior to


prolific

more united

each

to

order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult


itself,

and

is

primogenial, unfolding in itself

power.

In addition to these things also,

of multitude, not as those think

fit

it

is

necessary to consider the infinity

to speak,

who assume

the infinite in

quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of things, there are

bound and

infinity,

the

former being the cause of the union, but the

latter of the separation of multitude^


ligible

own

multitude

nature,

infinite,

is infinite,

telligible multitude,

multitude,

because

Parmenides

calls the first

however,

is

itself.

and

intel-

multitude indeed, according to

as being the progeny of the

and multitude

of intelligible infinity.

all

a thing of

first infinity.

this kind.

But multitude

For

it is

its

All inthe

first

itself is the first

progeny

on

this ac-

Intelligible multitude, therefore,

is

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXVII.
count

infinite, as

unfolding into light the

the

same with

the all-perfect.

and

as far as

requisite

it is

the power which

is

an

415
first infinity,

comprehensive of

is

primarily

quisite to

all intelligible

was

admit that the

however, the

infinite

But

infinite,

ing to the power which

be requisite to relate

my own

is

power,

For

infinite.

intelligible

it

multitude

indeed that which

if

according to quantity,

it

would be

re-

multitude of this kind. Since,

it is

necessary that the partici-

should cause infinity to shine forth accord-

comprehensive of

is

For

multitude.

intelligible is infinite

intelligible is infinite

pant of the primarily

to the all,

nature should proceed, through

generative of the whole of things,

infinite,

this infinity is

For that which has proceeded


intelligible

cannot be comprehended by any other thing.


is

and

all

prior natures.

opinion, as that which

primarily bound, so that which

is

primarily- multitude

And

if it

primarily one

is

is infinite

is

multitude.

power of infinity, and producing all unities, and


most individual natures, it possesses never-failing
power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an incomprehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude, it bounds
and measures it by iufinite power, and through wholeness introduces
bound to all things. These tlnngs, therefore, may be assumed from ParFor
all

it

receives the whole

beings, as far as to the

uienides concerning the third intelligible triad.

CHAFFER
Let
triads.

XXVII.

common about

us in the next place speak in

With respect

to the first triad, therefore,

allotted the intelligible

summit

ing from the union which

in intelligibles,

is in it,

and

spect to the other triads, denominates


nity, says he, abides in one.
triad of intelliibles.

its

it

all

which

is

the intelligible
occult,

and

is

Plato at one time proceed-

exempt transcendency with

For eter-

one, as in the Tiinacus.

Hut reason evinces that

this

one

re-

is

the

first

But at another time proceeding from the extremi-

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK

HI.

and that which participates, he calls it the one being, considering the power which is comprehended in these as ineffable, in consequence of its subsisting uniformly
and occultly. And at another time, he uufolds the whole of it, according to the monads which are in it, bound, infinity, and that which is
ties

which arc

in

it,

viz.

that which

is

participated,

mixed; bound indeed indicating its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative
power, and that which is mixed, the essence proceeding from this power.
Plato, therefore, as I have said, teaches us through these names the first
at one time indeed through one name, but at another
intelligible triad
through two names, and at another again through three names, unfolding
;

For there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is


and a duad according to which the extremes communicate
with each other and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and
unical nature of the first, through its own monads.
But the second triad after this, Plato denominates in the Timseus indeed, eternity but in the Parmenides the first wholeness. How these,
however, arc allotted the same peculiarity we may learn by considering
that every thing eternal is indeed a whole; viz. if it is perfectly eternal,
and has the whole of its essence and energy at once present. For every

it

to our view.

characterized

intellect

a thing of this kind, perfectly establishing at once in

is

whole of

intellectual perception.

being, but

is

It likewise does not possess

deprived of another part, nor does

it

itself,

the

one part of

partially participate of

summarily comprehends the whole of being, and the whole


of intelligence. If, however, in its energies it proceeded according to
time, but had an eternal essence, it would be allotted the whole of the

energy, but

latter,

and

it

this

always stably the same, but would possess the former

riably, so as to exert different energies at different times.


fore,

is

every where the cause of wholeness to the natures to which

primarily present.
petuity.

tion

ture.
it is

But whole

also

is

For on

this

a whole, and

is

its

essence or

its

primarily corrupted and vitiated

account also the whole world

this is likewise the

and with each of the elements.

it is

every where comprehensive of per-

For no whole abandons cither

but that which

va-

Eternity, there-

case with

all

is

proper perfecis

a partial na-

perpetual, viz. because

that the heavens contain,

For every where wholeness

is

connective

OF PLATO

CHAP. XXVII.

Hence

of subjects.

eternity

is

U7

consubsistent with wholeness,

and whole

and eternity are the same. Each also Is a measure, the one of things
and of all perpetual natures, but the other of parts and of all mulSince, however, there are three wholenesses, one indeed being
titude.
prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in a part,

eternal,

through the wholeness which

is

prior to parts, eternity measures those

which are exempt from beings ; but through the


wholeness which derives its subsistence from parts, it measures the unities
that are co-ordinate with beings ; and through the wholeness which is in
unities of divine natures

a part,

it

measures

all

For these wholenesses

beings and whole essences.

being parts of the divine unities, they possess partibly what pre-exists

And, moreover,

unically in the unities.

eternity is nothing else than the

ever shining forth from the unity which

whole consists of two

parts, viz.

is

connected with being.

But

of the one and being, power existing as

According to both these conceptions, thereduad pertaining to the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypostasis of the first triad.

the collector of the parts.


fore, the

Moreover, in the Timseus, Plato


animal

itself, intelligible, all-perfect,

menides he denominates
hensive of

many

it infinite

And in
into many

parts.

intelligible distributed

arc the progeny of one science,

when Tim* us
all-perfect,

cording to

calls the third triad

and only-begotten.

of

intelligible?,

But in

the Par-

multitude, and a wholeness compre-

the Sophista he perpetually calh


beings.

and tend

to one intelligible truth.

animal, he also asserts

Parmenides, when he shows that the one being


demonstrates that

it is

be all-powerful and

is

it

these being

Proc.

And

consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will

all-perfect, as

more

total,

says, both according to one,

animal

to

all-perfect multitude,

wc have

before observed, comprehend-

ing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which also

calls

For

be
and comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts, both acone and according to parts. Hence nnimal itself is according
calls this triad intelligible

to this a whole, comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts.

tome of

the

it

All these assertions, therefore,

itself eternal

it

generates;

but others more partial, and as Tiroaeus

and according to genera. Farther still, as he


and only-begotten, so Parraenidcs first attriVol. I.
2

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ON THE THEOLOGY

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butes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude,

"

And

thus, according to the

always possess these two parts: for the one

and

being the one

Who, therefore,

so that

and no part

will

ever

ever,

the
to

will

always contain being,

necessarily always be gene-

first

assuming

and the primoand the

in this order generation

and so continually using each of these ? The same thing, therefore,

first infinity

it,

and receiving from

all-powerful

intelligible

it

a division into parts,

think

it

proper to call

thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which dis-

turbs the multitude.

we must not

For

being power, and every intelligible subsisting according

cult to understand,

it

will

one."

both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful intelligible multitude.

is

it

two things
l>e

so clearly reminds us of eternal animal,

gcnial triad, as Pannenides,

III.

says,

same reasoning, whatever part is generated

will

rated,

when he

That, however, which in these things

and

for

is

both

diffi-

which Plato especially deserves to be admired,

omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth.

animal comprehends four

intelligible ideas,

For

according to which

not only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent

kind of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves
generating

it

for

extends the idea of air- wandering, the idea of aquatic, and

the idea of terrestrial animals, from the

Gods

as far as to mortal animals.

comprehends four

ideas, and through the


same paradigms produces totally divine, demoniacal and mortal animals,,
this deservedly produces a doubt in those who love the contemplation of
truth, how, the causes being the same, and the same primary paradigms
preexisting, some of the natures which arc constituted are Gods, others
daemons, and others mortal animals. For all these being generated with
reference to one form, how is it possible they should not have the same
form and nature since it is requisite that one idea should every where
be generative of things that have a similar form ? For on this account we

Since animal

itself,

therefore,

admit the hypothesis of

may

possess

natures.
logically

to multitude

This doubt,' therefore, being so

by saying, that

genus of Gods
monads productive of similar
difficult, some oue may solve it

ideas, in order that the intelligible

and contain prior


all

things which subsist according to one form

Instead of mnifu> h

it is

necessary to read b<jji ; .

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OF PLATO.

CHAP. XXVII.

219

are not synoniinous, and that they do not similarly participate of their

common

some

cause, but

each form

is

things primarily,

and others

For according

siding as fur as to the last of things.

to the oracle, all

things begin supernally to extend their admirable rays to the

Hence

place.
exist as

For
and sub-

ultimately.

the leader of a certain scries, beginning supernally,

downward

not be wonderful that the same idea should pre-

it will

the cause of Gods, daemons, and mortal animals, producing

all

and delivering the more partial separation of things to the


demiurgic order, in the same manner as this order delivers the production
of individuals to the junior Gods. For intelligibles are the causes of
things totally,

whole

scries;

but intellectuals of divisions according to

common

Supermundane forms

are the causes of specific differences

of things which are

now

genera.

but mundane

For they are causes which are

individuals.

moved, and are the leaders of mutation to their progeny.


If however it be requisite to survey the thing itself by itself, and how
one intelligible form is the cause of Gods, and daemons and mortals,
Parmenides alone is able to satisfy us about the parts which are contained
For he characterizes some things according
in the intelligible multitude.
'

to being, but others according to the one.

absorbed by the one, but being which

is

For the one being, indeed, is


is rather absorbed by being,

one

and the one being, and being which

is one, contain in themselves each of


According to the one being, therefore, Parme-

the intelligible animals.

nides constitutes the divine genera, together with an appropriate peculiarity.

But according to being which

to the

Gods.

And

is

one, he constitutes the genera posterior

according to the one being indeed of being which

one, he constitutes the genera of daemons, but according to being which

And

one, the mortal genera.


being, he constitutes the

ing to the being which


angelic order.

And

first

is

thus

is
is

again, according to the one being of the one

and highest genera of the Gods but accordit, the second genera, and which have an
things are full of Gods, angels, daemons, ani;

one of
all

mals, and mortal natures.

And you

sec

how

the

medium

is

preserved of

the more excellent genera.

For being which is one is the angelic boundary of the one being which produces the Gods. But the one bciag is the