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Author: LIM, P.

Esmeraldo Gatchalian Vs Comelec

Statutory Construction Concept: General words construed
Facts: Petitioner Gatchalian is a candidate to become a
delegate in the constitutional convention election in 1970.
In his petition he is assailing two Comelec Resolutions, RR707 and RR-731 that allegedly violate Sec.56 of The
Revised Election Code.
Comelec Resolution RR-707 states that donation of
billboards to the commission by foreigners or companies or
corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by
foreigners are not covered by the provision of sec.56 of the
revised election code.
Comelec Resolution RR-731 likewise states that to the
effect that the ban in sec.56 of the revised election code

immediately preceding a regular or special election. That in

line with RR-707 donations and contributions for the above
campaign may be received from foreigners, companies
wholly or partially by foreigners.
Sec.56 of the Revised Election Code states that No
foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly or
take part in or to influence in any manner any elections.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the comelec but was
denied and pursuant to Article 10 sec.2 of the constitution
filed a case for review of the comelec ruling. He is
contending that the ruling is null and void as being
contrary to law and was a grave abuse of discretion and
praying for a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction.
Issue: WON the comelec resolutions were violative of
sec.56 of the revised election code

does not cover the projected campaign for funds and other

Held: Yes it was violative of sec.56 of the revised election

contributions by the advertising council of the Philippines


and others similarly situated during the 120 days


Author: LIM, P.


The court divided its decision into four parts or four words 4.

The last word is Aid which refers to support , to help, to

that clearly showed the legislative intent in the statute:

assist or to influence the decision

The phrase any elections includes the election for the

Ruling: The Court ruled that if foreign donations are

delegates of the constitutional convention. Any election

allowed to influence our policy making bodies that we will

means that this includes elections provided by the laws

in effect open the floodgates to foreign control. The

and the constitution as well as any that may be established

respective resolutions are therefore void.

or required to be held pursuant to law


Foreigner in the statue refers to both natural and juridical

persons, associations and groups with or without legal
personality. The framers of the law intended to include

Claudio vs. COMELEC

Petition: certiorari and prohibition

juridical persons because they have a larger base of


members and are financially capable of influencing the

Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

outcomes of elections.


Any candidate refers to both some candidates and All

candidates It has been held that any candidate voted for
at any election refers to candidates and the term any
person is not limited to any person in the singular but is
applicable as well to two or more persons.


1) Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.
2) Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay
City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for
loss of confidence.
3) On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone
4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of
convening the PRA.
4) Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714,
was designated chair.

Author: LIM, P.
5) On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and

elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall

sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled

is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on


July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was


6) In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-

held that the petition was filed on time.

17) Hence, these petitions.

Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal
submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall.
7) As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of
service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
8) Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin
boards of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market

WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) . . . .
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos
St., all in Pasay City.
9) Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was
conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the
10) Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub,

B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the election period for
that regular election or simply the date of such election.

and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition.
11) In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and

1) YES. The COMELEC maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for

dismissed the oppositions against it.

12) On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the

case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the

COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more

recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this
recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total

Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in 74 refers to a

membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local

process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in

Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876.
13) In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had

paragraph (b) of 74.

been obtained in support of the recall resolution.

14) Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall

signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.

15) On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a

assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local

prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the

the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the

COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the

holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall"

case to delay the recall proceedings.

16) Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the

refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local

government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC,

official or elect his replacement.

Author: LIM, P.
First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On

the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation

the other hand, 69 provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters

of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b)

of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the

includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly

electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office,

curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such

the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the

assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the

term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA

expression of confidence in the incumbent.

and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least
25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in
paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his]

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the

attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political

purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls : (1)

partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in

that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official

politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and

concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular

criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically

local election.

motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of
partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an

shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may have the incidental effect of

elective local official. In the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held

providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under

that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before

the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the

petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly

performance of an elected local official.

elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and
decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary

Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed

proceedings to initiate recall

against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the
period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to

1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be

provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this

exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such

case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to

right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the

initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

one-year period provided in paragraph (b);

To construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for

of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the

judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and

constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on

Author: LIM, P.
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings


would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner
assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
2) The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the

Petition: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution
dated April 28, 1994 of COMELEC
Petitioner: Juanito C. Pilar
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Ponencia: Quiason, J.

campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said

DOCTRINE: Where the law does not distinguish

Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi

be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office

lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a

of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the

law where none is indicated.

period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year . This is a
period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation


must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local

1. On January 13, 1992, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations
Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local

government units "more responsive and accountable."

Elections on May 11, 1992) to implement the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166 on election
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus
Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90)
days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's
interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would

contributions and expenditures.

2. On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his CoC for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. However, on March 25, 1992, petitioner
withdrew his CoC.
3. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065, COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000 for

emasculate even more a vital right of the people.


failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his CoC 3 days after its filing.


Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political
contest, and should have either won or lost."

WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.
140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.

Author: LIM, P.
5. In M.R. No. 94-0594, COMELEC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, and deemed final
M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner then went to the COMELEC en banc, which also
denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994.
6. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
b. Also, Sec. 14 of R.A 7166 uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the
word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or

where public interest is involved. We must apply the general rule.

The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately
expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to

1. WoN petitioner cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and

pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and

compelling the publication of the same. It is not improbable that a candidate who


withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even
in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not

Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166

o An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral

all too remote.

d. It is worth mentioning that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation
where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure.

Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.

Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file

Every candidateand treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after

"[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no

the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,
true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election. . .

a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that
expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
e. Lastly, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines), it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his
candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

1. NO. Petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures.
a. Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner, however, argues that he is a
non-candidate, and such argument is without merit.
i. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish,


courts should not distinguish. In the case, as the law makes no

distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be

Manila Herald Publishing vs Ramos (1951)

Author: LIM, P.
4.) The first case was being handled by Judge Sanchez which was pending. The second
Petition: certiorari with preliminary injunction

case fell in the branch of Judge Pecson and he issued a writ of preliminary injunction to

Petitioner: MANILA HERALD PUBLISHING CO., INC., doing business under the name of

desist proceeding with the attachment of the said properties.

Evening Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc

5.) The second case was transferred to Judge Simeon Ramos granted the petition on a

Respondent: SIMEON RAMOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, MACARIO

bond but set aside the order on a motion for reconsideration


6.) Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit


memoranda on the question whether the subject matter of the 2nd case should be filed in an

Ponencia: TUASON, J.

independent action or by means of a complaint in intervention in the 1 st case. His Honor

declared that the 2nd case is "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the

Doctrine: Honestly, hindi ko gets. Huhu. Pero i did my best. And sana matanggap niyo yun at

case. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was

magawa akong patawarin. Nagmamahal, Czar.

intervene in the 1st case.


1.) Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit against Aproniano G. Borres (editor), Pedro

1.) W/N Judge Ramos has authority to dismiss the 2nd case at the stage when it was thrown

Padilla (managing editor) and Loreto Pastor (reporter) of the Daily Record, a daily

out of court

newspaper published in Manila. They were asking for damages and thus secured a writ of

2.) W/N the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should come as

preliminary attachment upon putting up a bond and the Sheriff levied an attachment upon

intervenors into the case for libel instead of bringing an independent action

certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. (1st case)

3.) W/N Judge R has interfered with the actuations of Judge S

2.) In response, the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with third-party


claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. The sheriff required of

The question of dismissal in the 2 nd case was suggested by Judge Ramos on a ground

Quirino a counter bond to meet the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and

perceived by him. To all intents and purposes, the dismissal was decreed by the court on its

another bond to meet the claim of Printers, Inc. These amounts, upon Quirino's motion filed

own initiative.

under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, were reduced by the court to P11,000 and

Section 1 Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it

P10,000 respectively.

specifically ordains that a motion to this end be filed. This is an express requirement which

3.) The Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against

does not give the court power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly

the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., in which the former sought (1) to


enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above

Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed,


mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. (2 case)

and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar
maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The only instance in which, according to said

Author: LIM, P.
Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the "plaintiff

the essential questions to be determined in the litigation between plaintiff and defendant;"

fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of

that "whether the property belongs to defendant or claimant, if determined, is considered as

time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court."

shedding no light upon the question in controversy, namely, that defendant is indebted to

The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity, intended to be observed with


diligence by the courts as well as by the parties for the orderly conduct of litigation and

Separate action was indeed said to be the correct and only procedure contemplated by Act

judicial business. In general, it is compliance with these rules which gives the court

No. 190, intervention addition to, but not in substitution of, the old process. The new Rules

jurisdiction to act.

adopted section 121 of Act No. 190 and added thereto Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of

The court acted with grave abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing

Procedure. Combined, the two modes of redress are now section 1 of Rule 13, the last

the case without any formal motion to dismiss.

clause of which is the newly added provision. The result is that, whereas, "under the old

SECOND ISSUE: (Ito ata yung pinakaimportant kasi may fancy terms) YUP

procedure, the third person could not intervene, he having no interest in the debt (or

Section 14 of rule 59 provides for the steps to be taken when the property attached is

damages) sued upon by the plaintiff," under the present Rules, "a third person claiming to be

claimed by the other person than that defendant or his agent. "Nothing herein contained

the owner of such property may, not only file a third-party claim with the sheriff, but also

shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper

intervene in the action to ask that the writ of attachment be quashed." Yet, the right to

action." What is "proper action"? Section 1 of Rule 2 defines action as "an ordinary suit in

inetervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound

court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a

discretion of the court to allow. This qualification makes intervention less preferable to an

right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong," while section 2, entitled "Commencement of

independent action from the standpoint of the claimants, at least. Because availability of

Action," says that "civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court."

intervention depends upon the court in which Case No. 11531 is pending, there would be

"Action" has acquired a well-define, technical meaning, and it is in this restricted sense that

assurance for the herein petitioners that they would be permitted to come into that case.

the word "action" is used in the above rule. In employing the word "commencement" the rule

Little reflection should disabuse the mind from the assumption that an independent action

clearly indicates an action which originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the

creates a multiplicity of suits. There can be no multiplicity of suits when the parties in the suit

instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc, and not any intermediary step

where the attachment was levied are different from the parties in the new action, and so are

taken in the course of the proceeding whether by the parties themselves or by a stranger.

the issues in the two cases entirely different. In the circumstances, separate action might,

The most liberal view that can be taken in favor of the respondents' position is that

indeed, be the more convenient of the two competing modes of redress, in that intervention

intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimants' right is not exclusive but

is more likely to inject confusion into the issues between the parties in the case for debt or

cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit. It is significant that

damages with which the third-party claimant has nothing to do and thereby retard instead of

there are courts which go so far as to take the view that even where the statute expressly

facilitate the prompt dispatch of the controversy which is underlying objective of the rules of

grants the right of intervention is such cases as this, the statute does not extend to owners

pleading and practice. That is why intervention is subject to the court's discretion.

of property attached, for, under this view, "it is considered that the ownership is not one of


Author: LIM, P.
The objection suggests the motion to discharge the preliminary attachment is that by doing


so one judge would interfere with another judge's actuations.

1. Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7,

It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the owner of the

1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners. The petition also asks for an order

property attached is appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such

directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-

action may render judgment ordering the sheriff of whoever has in possession the attached

Rosero from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner.

property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing it. It follows further that the
court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to

2. The questioned order was issued in connection with administrative complaint filed with the

release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action

Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft

includes jurisdiction over a interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed

and Corrupt Practices Act.

necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. This is

3. On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents to Comment on the petition and

The petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the respondents except the

thereafter, received a Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation

respondent Judge.

from petitioners dated September 14 and 22, 1992.

4. On the same day of September 22, 1992, the court Resolved to REQUIRE the
Buenaseda v. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719

respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS QUO pending filing of comments on the original

supplemental manifestation.

September 21, 1993

5. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of
Petitioners: Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Lt. Col. Isabelo Banez, Jr., Engr. Conrado Rey
Matias, Ms. Cora S. Solis and Ms. Enya N. Lopez
Respondents: Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and NCMH

Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 and in a Resolution dated
October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said

Nurses Association (represented by Raoulito Gayutin)

Ponencia: Quiason, J.

6. On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment

Petition: petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary

on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading

Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of


entitled Omnibus Submission.

Author: LIM, P.
7. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt

removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may

and to disbar them.

prejudice the case filed against him.

8. On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Supplement to Motion to

Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22 September 1992 Resolution
and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November
10, 1992, alleging that:
xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of

is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners preventive suspension, the

such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein

status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; xxx.


9. This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required respondent Secretary to
comply with the said status quo order stating that:

WoN the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and

xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx wherein
petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby

employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the

ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective

investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

positions xxx, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their
authority desist and refrain from performing any act xxx until further orders from the

YES. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman.


Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770Preventives Suspension. The Ombudsman or his

Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the
suspension: of a public official or employees, it referred to suspension, as a punitive
measure. All the words associated with the word suspension in the provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases (e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure).

Author: LIM, P.
Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word suspension should be given the
same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is


equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by

Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. After setting

considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with
the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, COMELEC informed him that his Certificate of Candidacy was given due
course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers citing a provision in the Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for candidates
"to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was the
COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped


voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material and subject to confiscation.

The petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

WON the usage of jingles in mobile units equipped with sound systems is prohibited by the
Constitutional Convention Act as it falls within the scope of and the like stated in the provision.
Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or

Mutuc vs. COMELEC

distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes,

Petition: Prohibition

and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."

Petitioner: Amelito Mutuc

Respondent: COMELEC


Ponencia: Fernando, J

NO the use of jingles is not prohibited as it does not fall within the scope of and the like
stated in the provision.
A well known principle is ejusdem generis which states that the general words following any

DOCTRINE: (Use of Associated Words)

enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.

Ejusdem generis - general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the

In this case, what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to

same kind or class as those specifically referred to.

as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Author: LIM, P.
Therefore the order of the COMELEC is not justified as the using of jingles in mobile units equipped
with loud speakers cannot be considered as a distribution of gadgets.

Tondena or Ginebra San Miguel.

21) The Lower Court finds in favor of Cagayan, and the CA reverses the decision.
22) Hence, these petitions.

Also if the provision is to be construed to probity the use of a taped jingle, it would be unconstitutional
as it could be considered an abridgment of free speech or free press.

RA 623, as amended by RA 5700:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated

Cagayan Valley Enterprises v Court of Appeals (1989)

waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels and other similar containers, or in
the manufacturing, compressing or selling of gases such as oxygen, acytelene, nitrogen, carbon dioxide ammonia, hydrogen,

Petition: certiorari

chloride, helium, sulphur, dioxide, butane, propane, freon, melthyl chloride or similar gases contained in steel cylinders, tanks,
flasks, accumulators or similar containers, with the name or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of

Petitioner: The Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio Lim

ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or marks, and

Respondent: CA and La Tondena, Inc.,

the purpose for which the containers so marked and used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made

Ponencia: REGALADO, J.

applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has


succesfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such

18) La Tondena registered with the Phil. Patent Office the 350 c.c. white flint bottles used for

bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for

Ginebra San Miguel back in 1953.

19) On 1981 La Tondena filed a case against for injunction and damages at tlehe lower court

the purpose of sale, or to sell, disposed of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, to use the

against Cagayan Valley Enterprises for using its bottles, with the mark La Tondena and

manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or

Ginebra San Miguel stamped out and filling it instead with petitioners product, an alcoholic

same, for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that registered by the
imprisonment of not more than one year or both.

labeled Sonny Boy. They did this without the consent of LTI.
20) Cagayan answers: LTI has no cause of action, because it failed to comply with Sec. 21 of RA

SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without written permission of the latter

166. This provision allegedly requires LTI to include the mark Reg. Phil. Pat. Off. For their

possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs boxes,

patented bottle. Further, they aver that LTI has no protection under RA 623, as amended by

steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered

RA 5700, because its product (hard liquor) is not contemplated. What IS contemplated by the

as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.

of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the

law are beverages like Coca-Cola, Sprite, and other products that have the mark Reg Phil
Pat Off.
a. Therefore, LTI has no defense for their product is not exactly pantented. Therefore,
Cagayan was not infringing any rights whatsoever. And as far as marks were
concerned, the bottles used by Cagayan for Sonny Boy was not marked with La

WHETHER, under RA 623 as amended by RA 5700, there is apparently no need to place the term
Reg Phil Pat Off, since the law only requires that this phrase be printed on the CONTAINER.

Author: LIM, P.
WHETHER there is no need to distinguish between bottles that state PROPERTY OF La Tondena
and those simply marked as La Tondena


WHETHER the mark La Tondena and Ginebra San Miguel constitute sufficient notice to Cagayan

WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

that the bottles were property of LTI

Petitioner is held in CONTEMPT OF COURT and ordered to pay a fine of 1000 pesos.

WHETHER the product of LTI is not within the contemplated beverage protected by RA 623 when it


cites other lawful beverages, as Ginebra is alcoholic thus not necessarily lawful.

Sarmiento v. Mison
1) YES. According to RA 623, there is no need for there to be strictly any literal indication that
the bottles are patented. All that is required is that they are labeled with the name of the
manufacturer. The phrase Name or Mark of Ownership simply means the name of the
applicant or his principal. That the law only protects the containers of the bottles is specious.
Why would congress pass a law with the title that reads below for the CONTAINERS of the
2) YES. There is no need. To omission of the phrase Property of does not remove the bottles
from the ambit of protection that RA 623 provides.
3) YES. They constitute sufficient notice. So long as the name of the manufacturer is present, it
is in compliance with the law.
4) NO. Ginebra, thus the bottles of LTI, are indeed within the protection of RA 623. The title of

Petition: Petition for prohibition

Petitioners: Ulpiano Sarmiento
Respondent: Salvador Mison
Ponencia: Padilla
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments
to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.

the law reads: An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks,
Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers. Thus, the contemplated intent of the legislature
is to provide protection for the VESSELS of these beverages. When the law discussed other
lawful beverages, it meant beverage in a general sense. And although alcohol is regulated it
is not prohibited.
a. The court ruled in Destileria Ayala Inc. vTan Tay & Co. that the whole point of RA 623


Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, alleging that his appointment was without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments, in accordance with Section 16 of Article VII.

was for people to be able to immediately identify the make and the manufacturer of


The respondents counter by saying that the confirmation of the Commission of Appointments

the beverage he is partaking in. Thus, he may ascertain and identify if the beverage

in this case was not needed, an appointment to his position does not require the confirmation of the

is congruent with the companys product.

COA but is vested solely on the President alone.

Author: LIM, P.
3. Looking at the historical background, the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments

No, the President need not get the confirmation of the COA in appointing the respondent. From the

required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our

aforquoted provision it may be surmised that there are four groups of officers contemplated. The first

political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935

group clearly provides that their appointments need confirmation by the Commission on

Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar

Appointments. The second, third, and fourth group of officers, to which the respondent belongs to, are


the ones contented in this case. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory

4. On the other hand

construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow

On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was

that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent

molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the

(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover looking at the intent of the

President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

constitutional framers, it may be seen that except as to those officers whose appointments require the

Hence this issue

consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.


VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the

WoN the appointment of the respondent needed the confirmation of the Commission on

Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that

Appointments as provided for in the 1987 Constitution?

the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the
foreseable effects thereof.


The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or

ARTICLE VII, Section 16

qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the

qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of

heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of

Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein

the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are

enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to

Without costs.

appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether


voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the

LABOR (1999)

Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Petition: Certiorari related to 3 cases filed with the Med-Arbiter


Author: LIM, P.
Petitioner: Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.

1. WoN a supervisors union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file

Respondent: Secretary of Labor, Med-Arbiter Napoleon Fernando, Pepsi-Cola Supervisory

Employees Organization UOEF (GR 96663); Office of the Secretary Department of Labor and Hon.
Celenio N. Daing, In His Capacity as Med-Arbiter Labor Regional Office No. X, Cagayan De Oro City,

unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as
amended, by Republic Act 6715
2. WoN confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file

Cagayan de Oro Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union (UOEF) (GR 103300)

Ponencia: Purisima


Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by, RA 6715

o Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor

Necessary implication may be invoked if an unreasonable construction of the provision of the law with

organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in

regard to people/items who/which are or are not included in said provision results in a withdrawal

a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or

from the clear purpose and intent of the law

form separate labor organizat ions of their own



1. Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a petition for certification election

1. NO. A supervisors union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank

with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-

and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code

Cola Philippines (Pepsi).

2. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition, but with the explicit statement that PCEU was affiliated
with Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the
PCLU and the PEUP.
3. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines then filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set

(PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715

a. Despite a resolution of the Union withdrawing from the Federation, the Court still
decided to provide a guideline for future reference
b. In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, the court ruled that if the intent of
the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file

Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-UOEF

or where the supervisors labor organization would represent conflicting interests,

on the grounds that

a. The members of the Union were managers
b. A supervisors union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the

then a local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national

rank and file union of the same company

4. Pepsi also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the certification election
5. PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a
local union composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which
has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.

federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively


participates in union activity in the company

The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file
union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors local union applying for membership
in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file

d. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors
will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit

Author: LIM, P.
2. NO. Confidential employees cannot join the labor union of the rank and file
a. In the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) A confidential employee

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of

is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or

classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in

care and protection of the employers property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code

any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to

singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor

preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are

similarly disqualified
b. In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on


the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no

2.) A preliminary investigation resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged was
committed by defendant.
3.) He pleaded not guilty, and moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of

the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests

the peace, the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election

are well protected

The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are


union members
d. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential

4.) The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the
purview Section 54. However, defense counsel cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the

employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the

prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the

disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision

lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the
case cited by the defense.

DISPOSITION: Petitions in consideration DISMISSED


Subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is
MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly
confidential employees not eligible for membership in a supervisors union

ISSUE: W/N a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code law library
1.) Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. - No judge of the First Instance,


justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil

Petition: appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan

service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take

dismissing the information against the defendant

part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.


Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission


revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.

Ponencia: REGALA, J law library

The court however points out that the above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. Under


Section 449, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while

1.) Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged for violating Section 54 of the Revised Election

under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices

Code. Section 54 of the said Code reads:

of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because
the kinds of judges therein were specified. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity

Author: LIM, P.
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed

When the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace",

itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or

found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the

phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, such as justices of the peace.

obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges,

A justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice

whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of

of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed

Industrial Relations.

with judicial authority.

4.) The Courts applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the

2.) Based on a narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised

conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Where a statute appears on its

Election Code, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of

face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,

Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code. However, in the two instances when the

but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been

words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word

included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est

"judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In

exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. The legislature had not intended to exclude a justice of

other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the

the peace from the purview of Section 54 for there appears no reason for the alleged change.

words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words

Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

"justice of the peace" were omitted.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion

this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not
intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as
already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani

3.) The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendantappellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of

Petition: Appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela

the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

Respondent: Teodoro Tamani

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has
already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the


enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were

"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate

merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices
of the peace were just called "judges."


The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

FACTS (Procedural):

Author: LIM, P.
Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that

Tamani and Cadawan crossed the Mrs. Ibarra's yard, where Mrs.

Ibarra saw Tamani carrying a gun.

According to Mrs. Ibarra, they were headed to Pua's store where

Mayor Domingo was.

Tamani fired two volley's hitting Siyang with through and through

gunshot wounds and hitting Mayor Domingo on his palm

Tamani signed and thumbarked two sworn statements before the

the notice of appeal was forty-seven days late which appellant's counsel

did not oppose.

Lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was served on his

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail to defendant's

counsel through his wife.

He had eleven days within which to appeal. He filed his notice of appeal

only on September 10, 1963 or 48 days after.

Defendant's counsel, filed a sworn statement that the court's order was


never brought to his attention and averred that his wife must've lost the


envelope containing the order.

The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted
but the trial court gave due course to the appeal

FACTS (Substantive): *sorry mejo magulo ito*

Two different set of facts were presented to the Court.

o At the time of the murder he was at the house of his cousin
o A confession was forced out of him by NBI Agent Almeda
o According to the father of the deceased, Francisco Siyang, it was
Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng who fired the shots and killed

Jose Siyang
o Ibarra and Tumaneng were hired by Mayor Domingo to kill Siyang
o Villamor Tamani, respondent's cousin, functioned as acting mayor

NBI agent wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot
Siyang and Mayor Domingo

2. WoN the appeal should be effected only within the 15-day period after promulgation
3. WoN Tamani's alibi can be given serious consideration

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within

fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be
interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice
of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant or his attorney.


when Domingo was suspended.

When Domingo came back, Villamor Tamani returned to his position

Procedural Issue: The clear terms mentioned in the specific provision in the Rules of Court

as Vice Mayor and summoned Tamani and one Cadawan to liquidate

of the judgment.

the Mayor.

leaves no room for doubt that the appeal should be affected within 15 days from promulgation

Author: LIM, P.
In Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court the word "must" is synonymous

that the briefs have been submitted, the Court has resolved to review the
record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice

with "ought" which connotes compulsion.

The word "promulgation" should be construed in the same section as

referring to "judgment"; "notice" as "order"

The construction is sanctioned by the rule REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

Substantive Issue: No. It cannot be given serious consideration.

the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or

meaning "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its

appropriate object" or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the
words should be taken distributively"

When the order was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's

The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude

its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was
not corroborated by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. Its
concocted character is manifest.

counsel, he had only 1 day to file his notice of appeal, and not eleven days

That kind of construction is an application by analogy of the rule

Disposition: the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant.

governing appeals in civil cases (Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)

So ordered.

However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case

was lost by reason of his counsel's inadvertence and considering further