RIGHT TO EQUALITY

1. Art. 14 is the embodiment of the idea of equality envisaged in the Preamble to the Constitution.
2. While Art. 14 is the general clause, Articles 15, 16 and 17 are the specific application instances of
Article 14. Therefore, Article 14 encompasses the core idea or the fundamental of EQUALITY while
the other clauses are instances of its application.
3. In Indira Sawhney v. U.O.I. AIR 1993 SC 477, the court held that Art 14 is a part of Basic structure of
the Constitution.
4. Article 14 contains two facets of Equality: a). Equality before Law (owes its origin from the British
concept of Rule of Law propounded by A.V. Dicey) & b) Equal protection of the law ( is borrowed
from the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment)
5. Equality before Law: is a negative concept i.e. it denies (abstains the State from giving) any special
protection or privilege to any person irrespective of his/her status, class, background, etc. Thus, it
ensures that no one is above the Law of the land and therefore it is the law that rules (Rule of law).
6. Equal protection of law: is a positive concept i.e. it provides (empowers the State to act so as to
ensure) equality of treatment in equal circumstances. It means that only such persons are to be treated
alike (i.e. governed by same set of rules/principles of law) who are in the same circumstances. Thus,
like should be treated alike and not that unlike should be treated alike.
7. Therefore the underlying principle of Art. 14 is that all persons similarly circumstanced should be
treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
8. The right is available to all persons i.e. natural as well as artificial/juristic.
9. Certain Exception to Equality: After a proclamation of Emergency under Article 359, the enforcement
of Article 14 may be suspended (please keep in mind that Article 14 is not suspended but its
enforcement only till the operation of Emergency) ; The President as well as Governor of a State shall
not be answerable in a court of law in matters relating to anything done in exercise of their powers and
duties (article 361); Under Article 105 and 194 of Constitution the M.P.(s) and M.L.A.(s) cannot be
questioned in any court of law for anything done or said within the House (i.e. Parliament and
Legislature); Foreign Diplomats, ambassadors, etc are also granted immunity from court proceedings in
our country, etc.
10. Reasonable Classification vs Class Legislation under Art 14: Classification means segregation in
classes which has a systematic relation. By employing the process of classification the State is allowed
under Article 14 to determine who shall be regarded as a class (i.e. having common properties or
characteristics). However, this classification should be made on a rational basis and should not be done
Class legislation is prohibited. Article 14 empowers the State to subject persons in similar circumstance
or situation to same law but does not allow the State to universally apply, to all persons, every law. Thus
article 14 allows the State to treat different persons differently if circumstances so justify. In fact,
identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. Therefore, the State has power
to club/group persons, objects, transactions, etc., with a view to attain specific objectives/goals. Hence,
a reasonable classification is permitted (as it is necessary) if society is to progress.
Class Legislation is not allowed as the discrimination is arbitrary and unreasonable. When any law
purports to confer specific privileges on a group to the exclusion of others, then selection of members to
such a group must be based on reasonable distinction which justifies the inclusion of the members or
non inclusion of the others. Thus, what Art. 14 prohibits is class legislation & not classification for the
purpose of legislation.
11. Tests of Reasonable Classification : The classification must not be arbitrary or artificial and should also
fulfil two essential criterias:
It must be based on an intelligible differentia which clearly brings forth the basis of
differentiation/distinction between those grouped as a class and others left out;
Such differentia must have a rational relation or rational nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the legislation.
12. Thus these two tests establish the reasonable basis for a classification.

13. Various Court decisions have further clarified or highlighted the concept, scope and limit of reasonable
classification :
A. A single individual may also constitute a class if there exist such special and extra ordinary
circumstance (Chiranjit L. Choudhary v. UOI)
B. The presumption is always towards or in favour of the constitutionality of the constitution and
therefore the onus is on the petitioner to prove that the law is devoid of any reasonable
classification and hence violative of Article 14.
C. This presumption of constitutionality of the legislation is based on several factors, for example,
the necessity to do away with historical injustices, to provide for a common/level playing field
to all, the Law as need of the hour, legislature as a reflection of peoples will and needs acts to
their betterment, Legislature can make discrimination to ensure cumulative and holistic
development of society, etc.
D. Mere inequality cannot be the parameter to decide the constitutional validity of any Act because
the very idea of classification.
E. The classification made need not be scientifically perfect by all means. Article 14 provides for
Equal treatment and not identical treatment. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment
does not, per se, amount to discrimination. Discernible classification based on reasonable
differentia is allowed.
F. Substantive law and procedural law are both subject to the mandate of Article 14.
14. The basis of classification may be different depending upon the objective sought to be achieved.
15. Leading Case laws :
A. A single individual as a Class: Chiranjit Lal Choudhary v. UOI
Facts: Acquisition or takeover of a company functioning in Sholapur by the Government by passing
the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. (Emergency Provision) Act A shareholder of the
company challenged the constitutional validity of the Act arguing that the Act denies him and the
company the right to equality before law as the Act only applied to one particular company (and
therefore also to its shareholders) and took away their right to manage their own affairs while
leaving out all other companies or their shareholders from its application- thus the treatment is not
identical
Observation and Decision: The apex court upheld the validity of the Act observing that a law may
be valid even if applies only to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances
which are applicable to him and not to others, that single individual may be treated as a class itself
unless it is shown that there are others who are in similar circumstance as him. The legislature is
free to recognize the degree of harm and it may confine its restriction to those cases where the need
is deemed to be the clearest.
The court said that in the present case, the Sholapur Company formed a class by itself because the
mismanagement of the companys affairs prejudicially affected the production of an essential
commodity and had caused a serious unemployment amongst labourers. Therefore, in the larger
interest of all the stakeholders the Legislature has treated the company as a class by itself and made
special legislation applicable to it alone.
B. Special Courts and Procedural Inequality: State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar
Facts: In this case, the validity of trial of Anwar Ali and others by a special court established
under section 5(1) of West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1850, was at issue. The Act was passed to
provide for speedier trial of certain offences. It also provided for a special procedure for the
courts to follow in the trial of cases referred to it.
Observation and Decision: The Supreme court observed that if the Act clearly laid down or
classified what kind of offences , class of offences or cases or class of cases are to be tried by
special courts, then it will not be violative of Article 14. Moreover, the special procedure so
prescribed under it must also not be contrary to the procedure under ordinary law (i.e. CrPC,
IPC ,etc.).
The court further explained that the differentia (in the present case, certain kind of offences like
dacoity, communal riots, gang rape, etc., which due to their peculiar quality, are distinguished from

other ordinary and not so violent crimes like theft, battery, defamation, etc. and therefore require a
speedier trial) which is the basis of a classification is different and distinct from the object
(speedier trial of offences) of the Act. The object by itself cannot be the basis of classification.
Without such a differentia, the object of speedier trial would be desirable in disposal of all offences
or cases.
The Act did not lay down any basis for classification of offences or cases nor did it mention clearly
what kind of cases were to be directed for trials by special courts. The object speedier trial of
certain offences is too vague, uncertain and illusive to be a basis for any reasonable classification.
Moreover, section 5(1) of the Act authorises the Govt. to direct cases to be tried by the special
court, allows violation of Article 14 as it confers arbitrary powers on the Govt. to classify offences
or cases at its pleasure. Also, the special procedure varied substantially from the procedure laid
down in CrPC for trial of offences. The Act held to be unconstitutional.
Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra
Facts: An Ordinance was passed with an object to provide for public safety, public order and
preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra. As the incidents of violent crimes
committed by certain notorious gangs and dacoits kept on increasing, the Ordinance was amended
to constitute Special courts for speedy trial of cases arising out of activities of dacoits and other
criminals guilty of violent crimes.
Observation & Decision: The court held that the present Ordinance is different and distinct from the
West Bengal Act (Anwar Ali Case) as it clearly laid down the guiding principle, i.e. to provide for
public safety, public order & preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State, which helped in
determining the cases or class of cases or offences or class of offences that required speedier trial.
The court held that discrimination with reason is permitted. The Doctrine of Classification is based
on such a discrimination, which is necessitated by circumstances which one set of persons or
objects but do not govern others. In the present case, there exists a nexus between the differentia
(certain class of offences/cases which are distinguishable from the others due to their special
character) and the object (speedier trial in the larger interest of the society) and therefore the
classification is reasonable. If certain crimes or offences require immediate attention and must tried
as expeditiously as possible, then the Legislature is sufficiently empowered to treat such offences as
a class different from other crimes. It is only when there is a palpable abuse of power and the
differences made have no rational relation to the objectives of the legislation.
The court further clarified that if the impugned legislation indicated the policy which inspired it and
the object which it seeks to achieve, then the mere fact that the legislation does not make a complete
and precise classification is not a sufficient ground for declaring it as invalid.
C. In Re special Courts Bill, 1978, the Parliament set up special court for the speedy trial of offences
committed by the holders of high public offices during the emergency period (1975-77). The
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Bill establishing special courts after observing that Bill
clearly classified the offences as well as the class of offenders during the Emergency period.
Moreover, this differentia had a clear nexus with the object of the Bill which was to decide these
cases involving high offices speedily. The offences alleged to have been committed during the
period of Emergency constitute a class by themselves and so do the persons who have utilized the
high public offices in commission of different offences. Thus the requirements of Art 14 are
satisfied.
16. Article 14 and Arbitrariness : While the traditional concept of Equality under Article 14 focussed on
Doctrine of Classification, there has occurred a shift with the emergence of new concept which is based
on Doctrine of Arbitrariness since arbitrariness is the very antithesis to Equality. Natural Justice in turn
is an antithesis of arbitrariness. Therefore, the principles of Natural justice (Rule against bias; Right to
fair hearing, etc.) are imbibed in and are a requirement of Article 14.Any action not in conformity with
principles of Natural justice is violative of Article 14.

17. In E.R. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, the court observed that equality is a dynamic concept and
therefore cannot be restricted to any traditional approach. In Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, the court observed
that the principle of reasonableness is an essential element of equality or non arbitrariness under
Article 14. The Article strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of
treatment. Thus if the State action is arbitrary, it cannot be justified even on the basis of Doctrine of
Classification. In A.L. Kalra v. Project & Equipment Corporation (1984), the court held that the scope
and ambit of application of Article 14 has been widened and that existence of discrimination in favour
of some to the detriment of others is not the only test. Arbitrary or unreasonable action is per se
discriminatory. However, what amounts to arbitrary or discriminatory action is to be decided on the
facts and circumstances of each case. In Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerela (1997) the court held that
policy decision is the exclusive domain of the legislature and courts have a limited role to play. The
courts cannot judge the wisdom of the legislature in formulating or adopting one policy over the others.
Unless the policy decision is clearly arbitrary and not found on any reason, it shall be deemed to be
constitutional for the purpose of the courts and no enquiry can be made into the intention of the
legislature. In Common Cause v. UOI (1996) the court held that exercise of discretionary power must be
transparent, fair and non arbitrary.
18. Other Important Case laws:
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib : A regional engineering college made admissions on the basis of
oral interview after a written test. The court opined that allocation of 1/3 of total marks for
interview is plainly arbitrary and violative of Art 14. The oral interview cannot be regarded as a
very satisfactory test for evaluating the calibre, as it is subjective and capable of abuse. Its
weightage should not be so large that arbitrariness and unreasonable discrimination creeps in
the selection process.
Air India v. Nargesh Mirza : Certain provisions regulating the condition and termination of
service of flight attendants/hostess and stewards was challenged in this case. The Rules
provided that such employees could be retired at the age of 35 or if they got married within 4
years of their service or on first pregnancy, etc. The court held that such conditions made the
service Rules arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore violative of Article 14. Moreover, the
provision for extension of service of Air Hostesses at the option of MD confers a
discretionary power on him without any guiding principle.
Mithu v. State of Punjab : the court struck down section 303 of IPC as unconstitutional on the
ground that the classification between persons who commit murders whilst under the sentence
of life imprisonment and those who commit murders whilst under no imprisonment, for the
purpose of making death sentence mandatory in case of former class and option for the latter
class, was not based on any rational principle.
Daniel Latifi v. UOI : the validity of Muslim Women (protection of rights on divorce) Act,
1986 which made section 125 of CrPC (providing for maintenance to divorced women by their
former husbands) inapplicable to divorced Muslim women. The Act was alleged to be violative
of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The court held that the Act compelled a Muslim
husband to provide a reasonable and fair maintenance amount to secure the future of the
divorced wife and also section 5 of the Act gave an option to Muslim women to ask for
maintenance either under the Act or under section 125 of CrPC. Thus, the Act was valid.