You are on page 1of 261

Brahmastras with akara Bhya

As Taught By Swami Dayananda Saraswati

At the Three-Year Course In Vedanta and
Sanskrit in Anaikatti, India, 2003

Transcribed and edited by John Warne
Copyright 2013

Table of Contents
Invocation 5
Introduction to the first four Brahmastras within Vysa's Samanvaya Chapter. 6
This tm is to be understood. 12
We have the inquiring stra for this the Brahmastras. 21
Adhysa is the problem. 24
akara bhya: Om Yumadasmatpratyayagocarayorviayaviayio. 27
Ayam tm Brahman. 29
Seeing one in the other is adhysa. 31
Erroneous knowledge alone is the cause for adhysa. 34
You will not discover the truth until you have adhihnajna. 38
This is the adhysalakaam. 42
The adhihna can be evident without prama. 49
Only after bdhita adhysa, adhysa becomes fun. 54
How could the vaidikakarmas be meant for avidyvn? 55
Without adhysa there is no Vednta, no moka. 65
For the gain of tm ekatvavidy, the Vedntastra is given. 68
Jijsdhikaraam: First Brahmastra: athto brahmajijs. 73
Atha has the meaning of nantaryam. 76
The adhikr vieaam that is to be told. 83
Between dharmajijs and brahmajijs there is no adhikta adhikratva. 85
Vivekdi are the minimum qualifications having achieved which one is
adhikr. 92
Brahmao jijs brahmajijs. 99
In the stra what is the meaning of Brahma? 100
This is Brahma avagati. 106
Brahman prasiddham aprasiddha ca. 109
They call them schools of thought but they are schools of error. 116
Once the brahmalakaam is there we can do vicra of Brahman. 122
Janmdyadhikaraam: Second Brahmastra: janmdyasya yata. 125
Brahman is both jagatkraam and sarvajam. 125
varatva sarvajatva sarvaaktimattva cetanatvam. 132
Brahmvagati is not a process of anumna. 138
Brahmasktkrkhya vidvat anubhava. 141
Dharmasya phalya karma apeka; brahmaphalya jnam apeka. 144
But as to Brahman there is no vikalpa. 145
strayonitvdhikaraa: Third Brahmastra: strayonitvt. 155
There are two ways of reading the stra. 155
Was the Brahmalakaa arrived at by anumna or by stra? 163
How is the vedntavkyaviaya going to be connected to the karmas? 171

Samanvaydhikaraa: Fourth Brahmastra: tattu samanvayt. 176

Tasmin brahmai eva sarve vedntn samyag anvaya. 176
What is samanvaya? 177
Akhaa Brahma lakyte vedntavkyai. 178
To gain ttparya nicayrtha of the stra we have six ligas. 179
Where is the question of karteatvam for Brahman? 184
Brahman is the svarpa of tm and has no heya or updeya. 186
Updhividhieatva brahmaa nsti. 188
The next vivaraka is Vednta, called vttikramatam. 192
Between Brahma as an object of a desire to know and dharma as a subject
for analysis there is vailakayam. 198
The form that sasra takes is told here. 207
Kastha nityatvam. 209
Avidynivtti is possible without Brahman being vttiviaya. 221
When you see li lo tavya vidhya in the stra 232
There is no kriyphalavattvam here. Jnamokaphala is here. 236
We have to prove phalam asti kasthabrahmavastuta. 243
Bhyakra finishes off the fellow with what is called naa bhya. 245
Brahmtmabhva is aham ayamtm brahmeti bhva. 250
ravaa manana nididhysana are meant for brahmajnam alone. 258
strapramaka Brahma tattusamanvayt. Vedntavkyasamanvayt iti
siddham. 258

Ait. Br.
B. S.
Bh. G.
Jai. S.
Ny. S.
P. S.

Aitareya Brhmaa
Brahma Stras
Bhagavad Gt
Bhadrayaka Upaniad
Chndogya Upaniad
vsya Upaniad
Jaimini Stras
Kaha Upaniad
Kena Upaniad
Muaka Upaniad
Nyya Stras
Pini Stras
Prana Upaniad
vetvatara Upaniad
Taittirya Upaniad

with akara Bhya

As Taught By Swami Dayananda Saraswati

uitSm&itpura[anamaly< k[alym! , nmaim gvTpadzr< laekzrm! .

sdaizvsmarMa< zracayRmXymam! , ASmdacayRpyRNta< vNde guprMpram! .
zr< zracay< kezv< badray[m! , sUa:yktaE vNde gvNtaE pun> pun> .
$rae guraTmeit mUitRd
e ivaigne , Vyaemvadehay di][amUty
R e nm> .
rutismtipurnmlaya karulayam |
nammi bhagavatpdaakara lokaakaram ||
sadivasamrambh akarcryamadhyamm |
asmadcryaparyant vande guruparamparm ||
akara akarcrya keava bdaryaam |
strabhyaktau vande bhagavantau puna puna ||
varo gururtmeti mrtibhedavibhgine |
vyomavadvyptadehya dakimrtaye namah ||

I salute akara, most venerable illuminate, the abode of the Vedas and the
Bhagavad Gt and the Puras and other sacred texts, the repository of compassion, the
one who bestows happiness on the world. I salute the lineage of teachers, beginning with
Sadiva, with akarcrya in the middle, and up to my teacher. I salute, again and again,
akarcrya who is Lord iva, and Bdaryaa, Vysa, who is Lord Viu, the divine ones
who wrote the Brahmastras and the commentaries. Salutations to Lord Dakimrti,
who is all-pervasive like space, but who appears as though divided as Lord, teacher, and

Veda has this vkya: svdhyyo adhyetavya. This vkya says that one has to study
one's Veda, at least one Veda. Among the four Vedas k, Sma, Yajur, Atharva one has
to study at least one Veda. This vkya is called the adhyayana vidhi. Technically, 'vidhi'
means a Vedic mandate asking you to do something. 'Svdhyyo adhyetavya' is a
vidhivkya. This particular vkya makes it clear that a vaidika is to study the Veda.
A question is raised here. Without knowing the vidhivkya would I ever enter the
Veda, and without entering the Veda would I ever know the vkya? Getting into a situation
like this and getting out is mms. You require vedamms. In a situation where your
own analysis needs resolution, take it to the ptavkyas, to those who know the Veda and
the dharma. Transferring gathered wisdom is the sampradya, the Indian teaching system.

The traditional life of study starts when the elders in the community initiate the children
by upanayanam, by gyatr upadea; they take the child to Veda adhyayanam. The parents
themselves, or the elders in the community, help the child enter the life of Veda.
Upanayanam taking the child near the Veda, into the study of the Veda. Gyatr
upadea itself is a vedamantra upadea. One who has that upadea can say that he is a
veddhyy - kkhdhyy itydi. The person is qualified to make a statement like this,
even without having gone to a phal. All that has happened to him is only upanayanam.
All the fellow knows is this one Vedamantra, the mantra popularly known as gyatr, the
mantra in gyatr meter. This mantra is in all the four Vedas. The one upadia, initiated
into gyatrmantra, can say this. The mahim of gyatr is like this. If this person chants the
mantra one thousand and eight times daily he can say that he is a student of Veda. The
adhyayana vidhiprpta is at least that saskra.
This mms is done, and through ptavkyas we understand that there is such a
vidhi. The Veda is to be studied. When the Veda is studied, certain vkyas come to be
known: brahmavit param pnoti; tm v are draavya; tmavit okha tarati; brahmavid
brahmaiva bhavati; vimukta vimucyate; rasa hyevya labdhv nand bhavati. When one
studies Veda, ktsnaveda, these kind of sentences come along with the Veda. How could a
person who studied Veda remain without an interest in looking into these vkyas which
promise nanda, which promise freedom from sasra? How could one be indifferent to
these vkyas which reveal more than recommendations and precautions as to actions and
their results?
The adhyayana vidhi brings in all other vidhis. 'Brahmavid pnoti param' means one
should know Brahman. This is how the vkya should be understood. 'tmavit okha tarati'
means tm must be understood. The vkya is converted into a kind of vidhi: one should
gain tmajnam. 'tm v are draavya', with the tavya pratyaya, is already a vidhi. Even
without the li lo tavya in the verb, such a vkya should be converted into a vidhivkya
that indicates an inquiry is to be made. One should look into vedntastram, the whole
vkyastra that will be able to fulfill the promise the vkya made. For that, one has to do

tmavit okha tarati this is a different type of a vkya, different from the ones
that ask you to do this karma or that karma for achieving this result or that result. The
result is mentioned okha tarati. But there is no karma mentioned. Generally, by doing
karma you get some result. Here, by knowing tm, one crosses sorrow. This is a different
type of vkya. There is going to be a great vicra with regard to vkyas and vidhi.
A person can study a cookbook and gain knowledge of the various recipes. He
will read of the ingredients and modes of preparation. If he or she is particularly happy
with one of the dishes he prepares from the recipes, he will tell others what he has learned
from the cookbook. His satisfaction comes after doing the study and after doing all the
other things required of a the dish acquiring materials, preparing the ingredients,
lighting the fire, mixing and fixing. The book leaves out many of the actions that need to
be accomplished, the ones a cook would know how and when to do. The cook shares the
knowledge of the dish that he gained from the cookbook and the basic steps needed to
complete the production of the desired results. His statement is a karmaeavkya. The
knowledge gained from the book had to be put into action to produce the desired result.
Without practice and completion of all the karmas, you cannot really gain cooking
But a different kind of vedavkya will not have anything to do with karma. It will
be knowledge that reveals the otherwise not-known self and confirms your absolute
freedom. The vedntavkyas, the Upaniads, have proven to be those vkyas. They are tools
that provide access where no other means of knowledge can go to the self. They are the
knowledge that fulfills the heart and the mind and reveals the complete, mature person.
You may have read or heard those vkyas and felt you had to do something to achieve this
knowledge. You want to know what you have to do to really cross sorrow. Here, with
regard to brahmajnam, the left out part, the part to be done, is mms. You cannot
understand the vedavkyas without analysis, without inquiry. Therefore mms.
Looking at the stra, one crya says tm is Bhagavn's aa, a fraction of
Bhagavn. He says a is the Lord and you are a fraction, a drop of water in the a
ocean. He says the relationship of an individual tm and Paramevara is a permanent
abhva. We say there is a relationship, but it is not an absolute relationship
between two, it is identity.
To become an crya all you require is a following. You will find cryas in every
forum. You need to see what they say; you can't simply dismiss them. Examine what they
say for truth; there is no need to dismiss anybody. Each one of them has his own way of
looking at the same stra. Each comes up with his own meanings. The cryas are all
vaidik. They are people who accept the ruti as prama. Beyond pratyaka anumna
arthpatti anupalabdhi, they accept ruti as prama. No matter how they group the other
pramas, they all recognize ruti as a way of knowing.
The different cryas are all vaidikh, otherwise called stikh, but they need not
accept God. The Prvammsaka, who analyzes the prvabhga of the Veda, the
karmakha of the Veda, accepts the five pramas as we do. The real Kapila Skhya, as
presented by varaka, is an stika who does not accept vara. He is nirvaravd,
anivaravd. A Skhya who does accept vara is a Yog, a sevaraskhya. They all accept

the Veda as a prama. The real Skhya says God does not exist. He wants you to say
what God is so he can prove you wrong. But he is going to be the one proved wrong. His
concept that God does not exist does not exist. We can prove this is wrong because all
that exists is God. Anything other than this is going to be wrong. If what he says is right
for you, you have not been exposed to the real mms. If you are exposed to mms
the problem will not exist. You need not make vague accommodations.
stikas themselves have contentions. One of them will dismiss another. Every one
of them dismisses others. They all dismiss each other, and they dismiss the vedntin.
akara says he will discuss the contentions and he will be victorious. The very fact that
there are many contentions shows they are wrong. They will try to prove you are wrong,
and this is exactly what we want them to do. This is exactly what mms is. They will
quote sentence after sentence of Veda. They will quote the Gt and the visphuliga firespark argument. They will cite the jvevara difference. There are enough vkyas to quote.
They will quote about Vaikua.
To come up with catchy quotes to counter theirs is not the point. They quote, and
we analyze their quotes. Then we quote and tell in the light of what we have understood
about their quote how their quote does not present or support their case. Their quote
presents our case. They will come up with another trick. You will get to know their tricks,
their other quotes. We will put those too into the proper light. This is mms: there
should be no inner contradiction in any subject matter that you present. It should not have
inner or outer contradiction. It is the same with a proposed scientific theory. There should
be no contradiction. It is a matter of proof, and it may cause all paradigms to change.
In the stra itself we look to find no contradiction. In the Upaniads we look for
the same. What Veda says should not contradict what is said at the end of the Veda. There
are serious efforts to find that there is such a self-contradiction. This is all mms,
analysis. Then there are those who will not accept even your quotes; they do not accept
Veda as a prama. The Bauddha have a certain argument and understanding. You must
deal with them without using ruti. You must be able to see where there is pramakopa,
any contradiction. If there is an external contradiction in terms of the other four pramas,
this has to be resolved. The Vaieika and Skhya will gladly jump out of the stika ring to
confront you from the nstika ring. You must be able to look from the broadest possible
perspective. You have to look at the whole thing. You cannot contradict the other
pramas. You have to be able to look into the Veda differently. You have to get into their
ring and fight. You must meet the street-fighters too, the Ekades. You must be able to
say how what the Veda says - that ayam tm brahma - stays and is unshaken. There is no
other way than this analysis which is undertaken by Bhyakra. The analysis has already
been done in the tradition, done in the form of stras.
In the stra literature we have mms, Skhya, Vaieika, dharmastra and ghi,
and grammar. It is a popular tradition. The vedastra is analyzed through stras of two
types. One has a few names, paryyapadas - prvabhga, Prvamms, dharmastra,
karmamms. The other type is Uttaramms, brahmamms, brahmastri. It is an
analytical tradition by which the vision of the Veda, the ttparya of the Veda, is unfolded.

If you live and teach it, it is called prakaraa. If you analyze it, if you ask why this is the
vision, why anything else cannot be the vision, it becomes mms. The rutivkyas and
smtivkyas are taken and analyzed, and without vkyas the subject matter is analyzed.
Vysa is Strakra, strakt for the Uttaramms, and akara is Bhyakra.
akara akarcrya keava bdaryaa. Lord iva is in the form of akara, called
avatra. The grace of iva, a special vibhti, is very much there. There is an exalted
puya. akara is not an ordinary person; Lord iva is there as crya. Bdaryaa Vysa is
Keava, the Lord Nryaa. If Lord Nryaa should write stras, then who should write
bhya? Between Viu and iva there is always some kind of understanding. Each day we
repeat our invocation to two bhagavns here. I salute Bhagavn in the forms of Vysa and
akara. It is a two-fold blessing the stra blessing and akara blessing. There are
many other bhyas; akara is the one who gives the sampradya, who gives the link to
the tradition. Others come and comment to establish their own theories, to justify their
own problems. But akara is the link to the writings of Vysa, Vedavysa. Vysa analyzes
the stra here, and akara becomes the commentator. Unfortunately two Patajalis and
Pini are also called Strakra. The end for a vedntin is here Strakra is Vysa,
Bhyakra is akara.
It is clear that the stra literature is based on common rules of composition.
Alpkaram asandigdha sravat vivatomukham astobhyam anavadya ca stra stravido
vidu. Those who know the stras, stravida, know the stras should be in this manner.
A stra should be alpkaram, alpni akar yasya. It should have the minimum number

of syllables. This rule lends itself to the use of compounds. Every syllable will have
meaning. No particles or interjections are found that would fulfill the requirements of a
meter. Pda purrtham, apiabda or ca or eva or tu are allowed and can be found but
not in a stra. Unless it is a nradabhakti stra. A stra is brief.
What is brief can be vague, ambiguous. A stra should be clear; there should be
no doubt, asandigdham. It does not leave you in doubt. It is sravat, it has meaning. It has
to have harmony with reference to what has already been said and what is going to be
said later vivatomukha. There should be no contradiction. To be without contradiction,
the whole of the subject matter has to be taken into account. There is a rule with regard to
law: there should be no law enacted anywhere in the country which contradicts the
constitution. Every state law has to conform with the cental law, and no central law
should contradict state law. It is a law of harmony. Similarly here, stras in a book should
be in harmony, and if a stra can serve more than one purpose there should be no need to
repeat it even when the usage has a different meaning. Anavadyam grammatically and
logically a stra should be free from defect. Astobhyam a stra should be free of useless
adjectives and unnecessary repetition.
All stras follow these general rules. Uttaramms, including Brahmastras,
follow these rules very well. Prvamms follows the rules, but there are some long
stras. There are also ghyastras, talking about rituals et cetera, which also follow the
rules. Certainly grammarian Pini follows the rules. He found a special method to
reduce the number of stras by grouping his subject matter into topics. Of course, that

means that in his grammar the sandhi rules are found spread all over. To reduce the
number of stras he went by his own principals, his own groupings.
There are two types of stra literature. One type is descriptive, such as Patajali's
Agayoga stras. The whole book discusses this yoga. He defines his own yoga cittavttinirodha. For this nirodha, for dratu svarpe, he gives the agayoga agas yama niyama sanam pryma pratyhra dhra dhynam samdhi. Even though he does
not give all the details of sana and pryma, the whole subject matter is presented.
The other type of stra literature is analytical Prvamms and Uttaramms
of the Veda. Vysa and the other authors of these stras were amazing people. Jaimini, one
of Vysa's five principal disciples, composed the Prvamms Stras. Prvabhga of the
Veda is analyzed as a topic dharmakarma is the topic. It is a beautiful, highly technical
analysis. It analyzes how to look at the vkyas, how to make use of the mantras, how to
know when a karma begins and ends, how to connect mantras to the various vidhis, what
are the satellite rituals that go along with main rituals, what is a staple food. The entire
analysis is meant to present the subject matter.
Vysa's Uttaramms not only presents the stra vision, it tries to prove this is
the vision. Without raising its voice or thumping the table it dismisses all other possible
meanings to the vkyas. The way the subject matter of Vednta is presented is an
ingenious method. It begins by stating the vedntasya ttparya, the vision of the stra. It
has to prove the vedntattparya is vedattparya, because elsewhere somebody else proves
Elsewhere we see 'mnyasya kriyrthatvt narthakyam arthadtnm'. Ktsna
vedasya there are those who say the entire Veda has meaning only in terms of action.
They say any sentence in the Veda that does not involve karma on your part is useless.
They say any such vkya should be hooked onto vidhi, asking you to do something. The
arguments are there. To have a place among the Vedntins you must prove the visions of
Vednta and Veda as a whole are the same. To do so you must know the stra and know
your opponents and their arguments. You must be able to let your opponents come to
terms with their own insupportable conclusions. If your knowledge and your logic are
correct and well-founded, and if you remain clear-headed, you will have what you need
to stand firm. In the first four Brahmastras Vysa presents the whole thing, and defends it
also. What he presents he defends.
The Brahmastras have four adhyyas, chapters, each with four sections.
'Samanavaya', mutual applicability to one meaning, is the first adhyya. 'Avirodha', noncontradiction, is the second adhyya. The third adhyya is 'Sdhana', means to achievement.
The fourth is 'Phala', result. 'Samanavaya'contains the four stras we will analyze. The
separate topics are the adhikaraas. Each of the first four stras is a separate adhikaraa.
Every topic has prvapaka, one or more contending views. The prvapaka gives his hetu,
the reason why he takes his stand. Then the siddhntin, in most cases the Vedntin, has to
prove his stand and dismiss the prvapak's stand. If the topic has another purvapakin,
Bhyakra takes that contender separately and goes through the same process. It is a
binary process of analysis which meets the rules of clarity and logic.


If there are sub-arguments, alternate interpretations, they too are dismissed one by
one. The analysis takes a tremendous clarity and a certain leisure. You cannot crowd the
other fellow. The person is allowed to present his stand. Whether the contestant presented
himself as well as Bhyakra did we do not know. But Bhyakra consistently presents
the prvapakin with respect in his own language, with his own style, with all the
vehemence he could command. Granting all that to the contender, akara presents him
impartially, objectively. The way Bhyakra presents the prvapakin's stand, you feel the
contending view has some life and content. Then, when Bhyakra begins to demolish
the other fellow you can feel the contender saying to himself 'Why did I not understand
this before?' It seems so easy when Bhyakra shows you how. Though it is unlikely the
purvapakin took it easily. akara was a very effective and discerning adversary and
The stras of Vysa and Jaimini are divided into adhyayas, the adhyayas into pdas
and the pdas into adhikaraas or sections. According to the Mmsakas a complete
adhikaraa consists of five elements: viaya the subject matter, saaya the doubt or
question arising upon that matter, prvapaka the first side argument concerning it,
siddhnta the answer or demonstrated conclusion, and sagati the pertinency or
relevance, or niraya the final conclusion. The Vedntins put the siddhnta last.
In the process of analysis, your nih, your clarity, comes. Nih is not abiding
somewhere, not somewhere in Brahman, not exactly Patajali's drau svarpe avasthnam.
It does not come out from some kind of physical place. It is not some place to get to that
is not already with you. To insist that it is, that there is some special state or place you
need to get to, is a neurological mix-up. It means one's knowledge is not clear. When we
demolish the purvapakin's ideas your clarity comes. Strakra's and Bhyakra's hope is
that, with reference to different topics and different conclusions, by presenting certain
prvapakas and analyzing the fallacies in their arguments and by proving the vision that
the vedntastra talks about - jvevara aikyam - there will be gain of clarity.
This study is given for those who seek intellection, not the common seeker. It is
for those highly disposed to analyze everything intellectually. Some may ask what
analysis will help you know the sweetness of sugar? What analysis gives you an
experience of nanda? It is true that sweetness cannot be analyzed. But 'This Brahman is
to be experienced.' can be analyzed. 'Is Brahman meant for experience or is it meant for
understanding?' can be analyzed. This analysis is part of sdhana.
The idea of sdhana fascinates us. Some say they want to live alone and do
sdhana. They live alone, but we do not know how much sdhana they do. The analysis
we do here is sdhana. ravaa and manana are sdhanam because depending upon the
sdhya, sdhana is decided. The nature of the sdhya alone determines the process involved;
sdhana apeka. The connection must be there. To fulfill the requirements of prama you
have to put yourself in a situation where pram takes place. If it is karmasdhya you have
to do that karma. If it is pramasdhya, mms is a part of knowing. If you know the
stra nicaya, the strattparyam, then it is your ttparyam, not stra's ttparyam. That it


is your ttparyam is what nih is. This jnam should not be shaken, and there should be
no internal contradiction. Your growing clarity is the truth of this jnam.
Because of various inner situations the knowledge takes its own time. You find
that it is not redundant, that it is not repetitive as you gain clarity. The whole
Mmsstra is meant for nih. Nih means jnam. There is no such thing, no
categorical achievement that is nih. We are obliged to say nih because we cannot
plead ajnam. We see there is growing clarity, and Bhyakra concedes to this word
nih in the eighteenth chapter of Gt. We accept this process of knowing.
stra tells you about that which obtains in the arra, which is distinct from the
arra, which is the tm, the aha abdrtha. This tm is to be understood. Distinct from
the arra, the tm, the arr, when the body falls, survives death. This tm, the deh, is
to be understood. That which takes further bodies et cetera is called the vyvahrika jva.
Skmaarra avacchinna tm is called jva who is the ihaloka paraloka gm, the traveler
who goes from this body to another body - arrt arrm like grmt grmam. Uitv
asmin arre gacchati - the samakart for both the kriys is one and the same. Who? Jva.
This jva, having survived the body, goes out. This particular knowledge is not
given to you by the one who leaves from the body. If it were, you would run away in a
fever from that ghost. He cannot tell you, nobody else can tell you, only stra can tell
you that there is dehavyatirikta tm. This rraka tm, this arr, is the gm. You
believe this, but it is more than a simple faith in the stra. Because of your raddh in the
stra, because of your prmya buddhi in the stra, you have understanding of the stra
that takes you beyond faith. You can use the word faith, but that faith should be backed
by a particular knowledge. More than belief, it is prmya buddhi. This tmana jvasya
nityatvam, the survival of the body, is pekika, it is due to stra. It is straikavedya. With
this buddhi you can say that the jva, the deh, survives death. The Gt says this too:
vssi jrni yath vihya itydi. Just as you throw away old clothes and take up new
clothes, this deh takes up new arras, one after another. The deh is singular; the arras
are plural. Only ruti, and here smti, tell you this. Those who have done ramaya
karmi, good karmas, take good bodies. This vkya is there.
One part of stra tells us that this jva, the rraka, takes to various bodies, can go
to svarga, can go to brahmaloka. Questions can be asked. Is the deha the real tm? Is this
ihaloka paraloka traveler the real tm? What we hear should not contradict our knowledge.
We take ourselves to be our bodies. Old age and other attributes of the arra become my
own attributes. This is a very intimate anubhava, and you cannot go against this
knowledge born of indriyapratyaka skipratyaka anubhava. This body is me. The pain
anywhere in the arra is my pain. The witness perception is there, and thereby I come to
know that this tm is deha and deha is tm. If this is the vda, then what vedntastra
says is dismissed. There are those who do not care for the vedntastra. Therefore, here,
because it is subject to saaya, this tm is something that is subject to mms.
Koidvaya is there. Your own anubhava is like that. In deep sleep you a there, but
you have no experience of this deha. Deha vyatitrikto'ham anubhava is there. If anything


objectifiable by you is other than you, if the attribute of what is seen cannot be your
attribute, then yad dya na tm dryatvt ghaavata. Your own experience of deha bhinna
reveals the fact that you are different from everything. The deha is an object of your
experience. Your anumna tells you you cannot be what you experience. The deep sleep
experience reveals that the tm may be different than the deha. So there is sandigdha.
There is sandeha as to tm prayukta. Therefore you have to recognize what tm is.
You know you are always interested when someone talks about tm. You are
particularly interested if they are talking about yourself as being praiseworthy. You listen
carefully if they are saying something more than what you think you are. You want to
hear this, because tm is nandasvarpa pra vara sarvayaas. All vibhtis, all the
glories really belong to tm. You want to know tm; you present yourself as though you do,
but you never are quite sure. You want the self to enjoy all the best, and forever if
possible. Moreover, nobody wants to get decimated at the time of death. It is for one's
own survival that one has interest in progeny. One thinks 'Through my santati I will
survive'. People like tm being nitya, being secure. What they like is really the svarpa of
the tm. They know what they like, even though they do not know, do not even suspect,
that they can be the svarpa. Still, this is what they want to be. It really is the basic
problem. From the standpoint of the conclusion that one has about oneself there is no
possibilty that I can be what I am seeking, that I can be what I want to be. In spite of this
absence of basis for any such suspicion there is always a hope that I will solve my
problem of insecurity.
It is all sandigdha. There is enough basis for doubt: tm is saaya spada.
Whatever you think that you are, whatever you conclude about your condition or your
worth, you experience happiness. The sad person also experiences happiness. You know
a person who is shedding tears of bereavement for a dear one lost. You remind them of a
funny episode in the departed's life. The bereaved one laughs before his grief again takes
hold. Nobody gives up the hope. I conclude this hope is the hope that the person who
passed away really has not passed away, that nobody goes away, nobody dies away.
When your life is tied up this way with another individual, intertwined this way, this
person does not die away. Memories are all mixed up with this individual. If you take the
tm, it does not die at all.
Deha vyatirikta tm astti is a belief. It is what the stra says. There is a beauty to
this mms. We have enough anubhava to accept the stra. We have enough anubhava
to contradict what the stra says. It is not great jump at all to conclude that the I sitting
here is the deha, that deha is the tm. There is a basis for doubt as to what the ruti says.
The deh, the traveler, ihaloka paraloka gm, is also a belief. If I say I believe there
is such a traveler I put raddh in what stra says. But stra also says tm nitya, na
jyate na mriyate kadcit; na hanyate hanyamne arre. This is not faith, not due to raddh.
This is jnam, because it is not deha vyatirikta tm, not skmaarra avachinna tm.
Only in the sense of a skmaarra that travels is there belief. Whereas tm nitya is the
nature of tm, and this tmavit shoka tarati. This tm is draavya; it is to be
understood by you as well as you understand the objects you see with your eyes.


All the words in the paperbacks that you have seen that say deha vyatirikta tm
have gone into you. The half-baked ptavacanas written by authors with some vague
understanding of an infinite supreme eternal bliss consciousness do make an impression.
Even with the mistakes and the fuzziness and the misconception there is a curiosity and
an inquiry initiated. tm becomes a karma of jijs, an object of a desire to know, and
the mms becomes rrakamms. The Uttaramms is also called
The later portion of the Veda is the Vednta, and it deals with a specific, distinct
subject matter. It has upakrama and upasahra. The uttarabhga of the Veda has its own
subject matter. It is independent of the initial section, and there is a different type of
phalam, of viaya, of adhikr, and of sambandha. Now we study the rrakamms,
Uttaramms, Brahmastr. These are the paryyapadas for this text which is the
analysis of the Vednta. The Brahmastras were written by Vysa. Sampradya means those
who wrote stras also reveal their meaning to their disciples. Though the stras do not
leave room for ambiguity there is room for interpretation. Therefore there is a sampradya
initiation into that meaning.
When akara writes the bhya he is the latest, last, connection we have to Vysa.
To know the hdayam, the vivak, of Vysa, we are more likely to be correct if we read
akara. Those who came after akara initiated their own sampradyas. Nevertheless we
are not relying on the antiquity of the tradition. We rely only on what is the truth, what
stands abdhitam, abdhita satyam. That which is not subject to negation is satyam. We
do not care about a charismatic approach or the fame of a teacher. akara's name is big
because what he said cannot be negated. We stand with akara because what was
presented by Vysa is interpeted differently by different people. They all quote Vysa, all
rely on Vysa. We do not rely on Vysa, we do not rely on ruti, we rely on vastu. Vastu
alone is not subject to negation. We give ruti prmyam, no doubt. Our reliance is on
the vastu, vastutantratvt jnasya. The vastu reveals itself. The vastu is the self-revealing
Svaprakatvt vastuna, Bhyakra says, all your arguments resolve. The
kepakartu svarpa Brahma. Therefore you really cannot make kepa, objection, at all.
The one who raises an objection, his svarpa is what we are talking about as Brahman.
How can that be denied? We are not proposing anything else than what he can know as
the truth of himself. We do not want him to believe anything else. The veracity is all the
way. The validity of the stra becomes more and more clear as we do mms of the
In the vedavkyas there are important connections that have to be established
between the pururtha and the vidy. Is knowledge of the tm the pururtha? If it is,
then it is not pururtha at all. Pururtha means it must be sought after, prayed for, by all
persons. Really, kma and security and pya are not real artha. nanda tpti santoa
that is what arthyate. Dharma, growth, is arthyate because thereby I free myself from
conflicts and I can be free from guilt. Dharma is nirnimittasukha. That which is
tmsukham is arthyate. Kma and artha also have sukha, but it is nimittena sukha. At the

cost of dharma you cannot have even nimittasukham. Guilt and hurt will be there at the
back of all your accomplishments. Without dharma there is no real sukham. Therefore all
gained sukha is conditioned by dharma.
But what sukham arthyate by all persons? Moka arthyate. Because all people want
to be free of the dependence for their sukha on things they do not yet have or things they
have not yet been able to get rid of. Nobody is satisfied with any sense of personal
shortcoming or lack or incompetence. Everyone wants to get out from under their sense
that they are less than they would be. This desire for moka is at the back of all efforts to
be free, behind all wishes, whims, and pursuits. All fellows are driven by the desire to be
free, to be unbound by any wanting, and they are driven to seek freedom in the very
things that have them enthralled. He thinks the freedom will be found when he satisfies
his innumerable, compelling desires. The pursuit itself becomes his way of denial, his
defense from self-exposure and vulnerability. You might think his unexamined
compulsion would lack conviction, but he was born with unshakable, crippling certainty.
He is driven from one unachievable pururtha to another. Only dharma is meaningful in
this, in that it makes you mature and you may be able to emerge from rgadvea. Finally,
it is dharma that allows the grown-up person, the inner grown-up person, to come out. He
is the one who does not want to depend on anything else for his being secure and being
happy. This is called moka.
For whom is this vedntastra? For this one who has come out. He is the adhikr.
He wants moka. Does he want Vednta? Does he want Sanskrit and Pini? What is the
connection between moka and Vednta?
Between the pururtha and what you need to do to accomplish the pururtha is
simple sdhanasdhya jnam. Sdhana iti anena ida sdhyate. If one does not know, one
has to know. Between means and ends there is the sdhanasdhya connection. The Veda
also talks about sdhanas and sdhyas. In arthakma pursuits there are both laukikasdhana
and special vaidikasdhana. Certain laukikasdhya have alaukikasdhana - rains, for example.
The Veda asks you to perform a special ritual which involves japa and fire ceremony. This
particular ritual may take a month to complete, and rains do come. A vedaproktasdhanam
is invoked for a laukikasdhya. There is no other way than Veda for knowing that
connection. Putrakmei, the ritual for the birth of a son, is another example. For vittam
and other arthakma ends there are alaukikasdhanni.
Suppose you are interested in something that is revealed by the stra itself, an
alaukikasdhya such as a janmntara. You want to achieve a heaven, a svarga. For that
there is an alaukikasdhanam. Somayga and jyotioma will take you to svarga. Charities
are laukikasdhana which will also take you to svarga. Sometimes a laukikasdhana will
give you alaukikasdhya. When we know, we can do what we need to do to accomplish a
Moka is a sdhya we have seen. Is moka an aihikasdhya or mumikasdhya? This
is the question. Aihika means here, in this world, da, in this janma itself you should get
it. mumika means not in this life but after this janma. If moka is mumika, then it is
karmasdhya, karmaphala, puya is required. Then there is a connection between the jva


and the adakarma one acquires. It is Veda that tells you of the ada. Veda tells you the
good karmas which result in this karmaphalamoka which is mumika. Generally the word
moka is used for this.
But here we have to say moka aihika. If it is to be in this life itself it should be
either karmaphala or, if at all, jnaphala. But jnaphala we have never heard of. Moka is
aprpta not gained or not yet gained. Moka is dukha nivtti, bandhanivtti.
Bandhanivtti means in order to be secure and happy I do not depend upon anything else
except myself. Therefore moka is centered on the self. Centered on the self is what is to
be discovered. If moka were centered on the not-self you would be dependent on this notself. Dependence for my security cannot be elsewhere than my self. Dependence for my
nanda also cannot be elsewhere. Moka is freedom from dependence. My fullness,
adequacy, satisfaction, and security are centered on my self. tmani eva santua,
svatantra not paratantra.
Centered on the self means where you have sense of 'I' you are self aware. There
is I consciousness. The self is secure, and one is aware. Where there is the sense of 'I'
there is a sense of security I am secure. There is nothing more secure than 'I am'.
Adequacy is the nature of the self. It lacks nothing. This is moka, bandhanivtti.
Bandhanivtti cannot be there if I depend upon heaven. Karmaphala is anitya. It is called
phala because it is subject to perish. Karma is finite, done at a given time for a given result.
Limited karma will produce limited results. You cannot hold onto a perishable thing for
security, onto a limited thing for adequacy. If you expect to be able to, you expect
wrongly. Moka cannot be the result of karmaphala.
Bandhanivtti is atyantikamoka. It is not what they call amtatvam, an pekika
moka dependent upon heaven, dependent upon good puya. It is not a ciraklvasth
where you stay for a long time, which is not the same for everyone, where there will be
comparisons and complaints. This pekika moka is not moka, in neither asminloka nor
muminloka. Through karma there is no moka. Moka is not karmasdhya. It is not
aprptasdhya like svarga.
'Every sdhya is aprpta' is a wrong conclusion. 'Every sdhya to be accomplished
is asiddha' is a wrong conclusion. If it is to be accomplished and it is not yet accomplished
it is karmasdhya and only karmasdhya. It is karmaphala and therefore anitya and there is
no moka.
But moka, even though it is sdhya, is already siddha. How can something that is
to be accomplished be already accomplished? It is a special situation, like the very
glasses you are searching for, the glasses pushed up on your forehead. Do you possess the
glasses or not? You may not think you possess them, this is why you search. You are
convinced you do not have the glasses. The siddha has become sdhya sva ajnt.
Because of self-ignorance and self-disowning, tm has become sdhya. Due to ignorance,
the accomplished looks as though unaccomplished. By knowledge it becomes
accomplished. Here, the basic problem of a human being - that I am insecure, I am
unhappy is due to self-disowning. One has to know that I am what I want to be.


If there is such a thing as 'I am not dependent upon anything else for my security',
if limitlessness is centered on myself in terms of adequacy and satisfaction, if this is the
truth of myself, it is this self I have got to know. To be nitya, this security cannot be
created. One has to know oneself in order to be mukta, in order to gain moka. What
then is the sdhana for moka? tmajnam eva sdhanam for sdhyamoka. Between
knowledge and the pururtha there is sdhyasdhana connection. The pursuit is not moka,
the pursuit is self-knowledge. The end was moka, but the end has become self-knowledge.
Between the pururtha and jnam there is sdhyasdhanasambandha. tmajnam
is both sdhya and sdhana. This means it is not a sequence, not an arrival, not doing
sdhana to come to sdhya. This is knowledge. When you see me, for this daranam, eyes
are the sdhanam. It is not that you practice something through this sdhana.
Sdhyasdhanasambandha does not mean you do something with the sdhana to achieve
something. Instead, it means that without the sdhana, the sdhya is not possible. Di is
not possible without eyes. Cakus is the sdhana daranya. Similarly, jnam is the
sdhana for moka. There is no difference between moka and the jnam. This is why we
drop moka and go for jnam. Moka is in the form of tmajnam. tmasvarpajnam is
moka from the standpoint of bandha. tm nityamukta means moka is the very nature of
tm. Bandha means sasra, and tm is asasr. Knowing the tm as such is called
moka. Therefore jnam is to be accomplished.
If knowledge is to be gained, any knowledge, you require a pramam. Jnya
pramam apekate. Pramam is always for the anadhigata vastu. How can we say tm
anadhigata? Because all other things become known to tm through a prama.
Pratyakajnam, anumnajnam, even the absence of things is known because there is
the knower, the pramt. The pramas can be employed and objects can be known. If
knowledge of the pramt is to be gained, who will gain that knowledge? The pramt
must be self-existent; there is nothing else, no other self, to which it becomes evident.
From the very evidence of employing means of knowledge it is evident that the self, the
one who comes to know, is self-evident. Because this self is there, everything else
becomes evident.
What prama allows you to say that there can be tmajnam? That which
requires no prama to be revealed itself, whose existence is self-evident, is tm. That
which becomes evident to tm through one prama or another is called antm. What is
this self which is self-evident? Among your achievements and qualifications and degrees,
what is it that indicates you are what you want to be? Where is the freedom from
inadequacy, from wanting, from insecurity, from shortcoming, all that is said to be the
nature of the self? What suggests you are free from limitation?
We are addressing sarvai puruai rthyate iti pururtha. What are you doing for
that pururtha? What nicaya, what viveka, what vairgya says you know the connection
between what you do and what you want? The pururtha is limitlessness, and what you
do is a few things that have no connection to what you need to achieve. Seeing the
connection is vairgya. Seeing what you want and what you are doing are not correct is


viveka. Moka is pururtha. Moka sdhanam is tmajnam. As it is and as you are, this
tm that you know, is not the tm that is.

When you commit a mistake about something, you have to again bring that object
to the anvil of inquiry. This is how we spirit away the snake seen on the rope. By again
looking at the snake, the mistaken object disappears and resolves into the reality, the
vastu. You bring the object to focus. Do you then bring self-evident tm to focus? How
is the knower to know about the knower? The knower itself seems to be variable, to be at
different times a seer, a thinker, a dreamer, a sleeper et cetera. How can you objectify the
knower that you are? What is it that is to be known about the knower in order to really
solve the problem of my being limited in terms of time and space and knowledge? If I
need to be limitless what will achieve this?
If I am limitless there should be nothing other than me. There cannot be anything
or anyone like me. I should be, as stra says, all and the cause of all. Unless I am this all,
how can I achieve the limitlessness pururtha? Unless I am this all, where is moka,
freedom from being small? With the means of knowledge you have, you will never
recognize the self being limitless, being vara, being all that is here, being sarvakraam
vastu, being what we call Brahma. The Veda is the means of knowledge for all that, for
that di. The only difference between the rutivkyas talking about svarga and the vkyas
talking about this self-evident tm is that one is nitya parokaviayavkya and the other is
nitya aparokaviayavkya.
The nitya aparokaviayavkya is the self-evident, that which never becomes paroka.
You never go out of your own sight. What comes and goes out of sight is nitya
parokaviaya even if it is an object you see, a dream you have, a svarga you visit. It
becomes a question of knowing what the stra tells. Beyond 'You are the reality', there is
nothing for you to verify as real or not.
The stra is a prama for you which operates a little differently. Brahmtmana
anadhigatasya jnam is necessary. 'Brahman is jagatkraam' is only vedntavidy, and this
Brahman happens to be the tm. This is a fact to be known; this is the mahvkyajnam,
the vastujnam for which vedntastra is a prama. tm becomes vedntavedya.
Svatasiddhatvam is there for tm, but there is confusion. tm is taken to be a
vikravn purua, to be anitya. Avivekena and avicrata a variety of limitations are
superimposed on tm. Without a prama there is no way of knowing tm being
Brahman. It is not that an ajta tm is known. tm is jta and ajta. It is known as 'I
am', it is unknown because I do not know that I am Brahman. tmajnya you require a
prama other than the five pramas you have. Every one of the five is employed by the
tm and is inappropriate for seeing tm.
Jnam is both vastutantram and pramatantram. Knowledge is centered on the
means of knowledge and is as true as the object. Between moka and knowledge there is
sdhyasdhana connection. 'tm being Brahman' and the stra have pramaprameya
connection. You need this prama that is vedntastram. True, tm will not be found in
a book. Why look in a book? Why look in a mirror if you want to see your face? There is
no other way to arrive at the self as the cause of the whole universe. It is straikavedyam.


stra is not to be seen as a book but as a means of knowledge. When you read a book

you have an attitude, a correcting attitude, a nodding attitude, a yes/no attitude, an

authority. But prama does not operate like this. It does not need or seek your approval.
Your will and wish and thinking and memory have no role to play. Only the means of
knowledge has a role to play. Of course your mind is there if you are there, and the
prama brings you knowledge. Your memory gives you the corresponding word and
If there is a question, then further vicra is required. In the same way, if what you
observe is too small, you bring in a magnifying glass or a microscope. It is all seeing. It is
all operating the means of knowledge. Here, we have to find out what the stra says,
what does it convey about tm. This is not reading-a-book attitude. Vedntavicra
kartavya until it gives me what it has got to give without any kind of internal or external
contradiction. This is our attitude as we approach these stras.
These words, abda, are the prama for tmajnam. Sarvakraa Brahma alone
can release you from being small. Being free from any type of limitation is to be pra
Brahma. For the knowledge that sarvakraa Brahma is myself, which alone is called
moka, the only prama is abda. In fact the self cannot be anything but Brahman when it
is understood. The self is Brahman, and self can be but Brahman. The prama for this is in
the form of words in the vedntastra.
The attitude to a means of knowledge is one of total surrender. When I hold up a
flower, even if vara comes and says it is a mango, you surrender to your eyes. Really, it
is not surrender. The prmyabuddhi means your will and ego have no place, no role to
play. When you have a choice as to whether to do something or not, your will comes into
play. It can dismiss your inclination and rule your life there. But here will does not rule.
Will has to be suspended; it should not interfere. Knowledge is as true as the object, not
as you wish or want it to be.
You use your eyes and ears with confidence that you will not be taken for a ride,
that you are in control. But when stra is the prama you may seem to lose your status
of being in charge. In fact you do not lose anything. It is purely the proper attitude
towards a prama. I let the prama prove itself. The fear of losing control is a
manifestation of immaturity alone. I look upon it as my holding on to one end of my
mother's sari for the sake of security. It is a childish lack of understanding.
When you say you surrender to the book, to the Veda, you must know that it
comes along with a person. Gurum eva abhigacchet rotriya brahmaniham. Your problem
is only with a person, it is a problem of authority. You do not want to give up your sense
of being in charge. The book has to be taught by a teacher, and surrender to the book
amounts to surrender to another person. This person is another limited person. With an
impersonal prama you do not feel threatened. With a person you take the chance that he
will reject you, may chide you, may ignore you, may look at you wrongly. A book will
not do that. The book is no problem, a person is a problem.
What comes along with the prama is the teacher. The gurukulam comes too, and
all this implies. The package is a problem. If your being in charge is immature it needs to
be put in its proper place. Your whole life tells you that you are in charge, and still you


want to be in charge. Here, you are better off not being in charge. In this area, for the
prama to be there, you need to be not in charge. As long as you are in charge, ego is
there. Here, that you are not in charge is exactly what counts. As long as the teaching is
proper there is nothing for you to lose or to ask for. This is how it has to be.
The teacher has to be aware that he is handling a prama. What is to happen by
exposure to the prama is tmadaranam. We have seen that between jvevaraikyajnam
and the stra there is pramaprameyasambandha. And between jnam and moka there is
sdhyasdhanasambandha. The Vednta is to be listened to, not just read, and tm is to be
seen. The stra says the same: tm v are draavya rotavya. Gurumukht
vedntaravaa. The prama has gone now from the Vednta to a teacher. It is transferred
totally. The whole responsibility is with the teacher. When you read, you make
exceptions for your need to be in control. You underline and make stars on the corner of
the page and you roll on. Either you know what it is all about or you think you know
what it is all about. Whereas when you listen you have to suspend your own processes if
you are to stay with the teacher.
The nature of this tmajnam being what it is, ravaa does the magic. To
Upaniad ravaam you can add Bhagavad Gt, because that is also Bhagavad vacanam. We
give the same status to both. What, then, is the connection between me, a jijsu, and
these brahmastri? Is this a pramagrantha? It is a valid doubt. Definitely the
Brahmastras are not necessary. tm is to be recognized, and Upaniad and Gt can do
this. For vetaketu it was enough. But if it is not enough, what are the possibilities for
dealing with the pratibandhakas, the inhibiting factors, impediments to your understanding?
If they are not dealt with you will remain the same, and you will go and teach others that
they can wait for some transcendental transformation. Anyone can be indoctrinated to a
particular type of thinking and laugh at every other type of thinking. The seminaries are
full of intelligent people with this kind of buddhi. They can give up their own
commitment to universal values and swallow double standards without knowing they are
double standards. Even in Vednta you will find indoctrination. It is an attitude born of
not understanding, an attempt for control, an expression of insecurity, of an authority
Prmyabuddhi is when you analyze what the stravkyas have to say, what the
guru has to say. You cannot say as you like. If you have any doubt, then again look at the
whole thing. Look at what you want. Look at whether the stra is fulfilling the pururtha
for you, because the book is meant for you. It is phalavat arthabodhakatvam, and because it
is mokaphalam it should be final. Can this ultimate end be given by the stra? You have
to see if your interpretation of the stra gives you this. If it does not, your interpretation
may be wrong. You may have doubt as to the stra ttparya. Overall, the prama has to
help you see. By the knowledge oka tarati, you must gain moka. The teaching here
should be in keeping with what you want, with what your heart wants.
Therefore the vedntavkyas have to be enquired into. The vkyas should have
samanvaya and not contradict each other or your other knowledge. Vedntattparyanicaya
is arriving at the vision of the stra. All pramasaaya about the vkyas goes away by
the inquiry. We have the inquiring stra for this the Brahmastras.

Nicayrtha vicrtmakanyyastra vedntammsstram rabdhavyam because

there is pramaak. We analyze the vedntavkyas to arrive at the ttparya of the
Upaniads. No matter your view of the ttparya of the stra, this analysis is the only way
to be prepared to answer all the questions and objections that are raised. Without proper
analysis there is no way to avoid innocently swallowing some incomplete or incorrect
vision of Vednta. Without this analysis there is no nih, no assimilation. A consistent
argument will challenge you. For example, how can you say jnam, in 'satyam
jnamanantam', is pure japti? How can the j dhtvartha take you to pure
consciousness? Dhtvartha is always in some kind of kriy. But akara uses
'bhvasdhana' for jnam. 'J is pure japti' will not be acceptable to a prvapak.
Suppose somebody argues from the definition of tm that the anantam means
limitless jnam, sarvajatvam, as it does for vara. Sarvajatvam is what is pointed out
anantaabdaprayogt. What is the answer? Do you have sarvajatvam? And the prvapak
can quote left and right to support his contention. For Upaniad he will go to
Matsyapura, Varhapura, Kurmapura. You need to know how to face them, to face
the prvapak's commitment, their theologies. Your capacity to see through the fallacies
of their arguments is ttparyanicaya. Otherwise it is not nicaya, it is wobbly. For nih,
vedntammsstram is included in the ravaa. There should be no doubt as to the
prama ttparya.
The first chapter of the Brahmastras analyzes different types of vkyas.
Everything that is to be said is said in the first four stras. Afterward it is expanded. What
does this nandamaya mean in 'tasya priyameva ira | modo dakia paka | pramoda
uttara paka | nanda tm | Brahma puccha pratih iti'. What does that brahmaabda
mean there? What does this nandamaya mean? Is it the jva tm or is it partm.
One interpretation that is given is that priyamodapramodnandabrahman is all one in
the same. Brahman is said to be viia with these qualities. This interpretation is to be
negated, and it can only be that the Brahman mentioned there as the nandamayapuccham
is not really a part of nandamaya. nandamaya, like the qualities, is also Brahman, but
Brahman is not nandamaya. This is the guhnihitatvam. What was praktam in the
beginning - that Brahman is not puccham or anything, that Brahman is sarvasya adhihnam,
that Brahman is nothing but nandasvarpam - alone is pointed out here. This is how the
vkyas are analyzed.
'katernabdam' is the fifth stra. The Skhya says pradhnam is jagatkraam.
Wherever jagatkraam Brahma is brought in, he will take Brahman as pradhnam. For him,
pradhna trigutmaka jagatkraam, the cause of the entire jagat. He says pradhnam,
prakti, whatever he calls it, has nothing to do with tm. For him the kryajagat is jaam,
and the kraam too is jaam. He says that the jatmakajagat comes from acetana. Isn't it
true that when you cut your jaa hair or fingernail there is no problem?
But the katernabdam vkya says that there is no prama for the Skhya
contention. Nowhere is it said that the jagat has come from prakti. Only from Brahman
has the jagat come, from sadvastu, sadkhyavastu, alone. This akti's satya sa tm


tattvamasi vetaketo. This is the kater argument. This kaa ruti being there, this 'saw',
means your Skhya pradhnam was not there to plan. Jaam does not plan.
First the various doubts, pramaak, are taken up. The incorrect positions, such
as pradhnam, are negated. Second, spaaligabrahmavkyas and aspaaligabrahmavkyas
are cited, including smti vkyas. ka Brahma ka is jaam, what does this mean
for Brahman? The prvapaka conclusion is given, then the siddhnta points out the
fallacies. The hetu and sometimes the upakrama and upasahra are cited, and the
meaning is given. In the first chapter of the Brahmastras both ruti and smti vkyas are
analyzed. By studying that, one gets the capacity to analyze other vkyas.
Why is there a second chapter? Because the popular Bauddha is there. Because the
Jaina is there. Because the Crvkas are there. They are there with their revered teachers.
They do not accept Veda as a prama. They are nstikas. The Vaieikas and Skhyas and
Nyyaikas and Prvammsakas are there too. They accept stra; they are all vaidikas.

But they have philosophies of their own. You cannot say that these schools of thought
and viewpoints are irreligious or unethical. They have their jpa and guru and stra and
pilgrimage and their stras too. They are real scholars and they have serious objections to
the very vision of the stra and you cannot just dismiss them offhand.
raddhvn labhate jnam, but you cannot live with just raddh. Here one has to
know. The sdhanam for moka is jnam, and moka is to be gained in this life. The
knowledge cannot be with doubts, even if we have to raise the doubts ourselves. The
doubts and objections must be answered. The Brahmastra is meant for the gain of nih.
The first chapter is called Samanvaya, samyak anvayt. It tells what the entire Veda
is talking about alone, including Karmaka. It gives the vision, and there is no internal
conflict. In this vision alone all the vedntavkyas resolve. The vkyas are committed to
unfold this vision. The second chapter is 'There is no virodha. There is no external
contradiction. This vision does not contradict.' - in the sense that this vision cannot be
negated by any other prama. Because they have dismissed stra as a prama, the
nstika viewpoints use arthpatti, anumna and pratyaka. With these pramas alone they
have to attack you. What is arrived at as the ttparya of the stra does not contradict any
other prama, and no prama can contradict the vision.
The Bauddha will take a position and we will point out the logical fallacies and the
contention falls apart. A Jain will do the same. An Ekade is one who does not have his
own philosophy. Generally he is vidagdhavda. Vidagdha means anything you say is wrong
because you said it. These contenders have to be met on their own grounds, because they
do not enter the Vedic ring. Theirs is the rational ring. You enter and box with them. The
stikas are our sparring partners, but you do not find them after akara. What you find
are the Yogis, sevara Skhyas, and bhaktis. But they generally do not argue. There are a
variety of Bauddhas and various Jains, vetmbaras who wear white and Digambaras who
wear nothing, to argue with.
You deal with prameyaak, doubts with reference to what is to be understood by
the stra. Is tm a thing to be understood or a matter of experience? What is the tm?
To the jain, tm is the size of the body, and it takes on the impurities of the mind and

buddhi. Therefore a Jain lives a life of tapas to remove the impurities and render tm pure.
The Jains talk about it in terms of the jva.
You deal with what is to be understood by ravaa. This rotavya tm, prameytm,
is it parambrahma? Is the equation 'jagatkraabrahma is yourself' acceptable as the ttparya
of the ruti? Is there a self? Is there a being within the objects? Is there a mithy without
satyam? This is the prameyaak. The Skhya, Yog, and Vaieika appear in the
The vkya 'tm v are draavya rotavya mantavya' ties together all the
Brahmastra chapters. tmana manana kartavya. tm becomes the mananaviaya.
Mananam is the methodical removal of prameyaak. 'I see jvevaraikyam' is the ttparya
of the ruti, but this is not the seeker's ttparya. In the Upaniads there are many upsanas
and their roles and results are discussed in the stras. The various sdhanas and phalas are
covered in the third and fourth chapters. If you follow the adhyayana vidhi of the
mmsstra you will see, understand, tm. All four Vedas are cited because all four
talk about this knowledge being available. The subject matter is brahmtm, Brahman that
happens to be tm.
akara is the Bhyakra for this vicrtmakagrantha called mmsstram, the
Brahmastri. Before entering this work he has to ask whether this Brahman is known or

unknown. If it is known it is not a matter for desire, for knowledge. Would you desire to
know what is already known? Jta Brahma na jijsyam. And if Brahman is not known
how can it be an object of a desire to know? Ajtam it is also not jijsviayam. Brahman
cannot be totally unknown. As self it is known, but the limitlessness aspect is not known.
Brahman is ananta jagatkraam is not known.
The discovery about Brahman will never come about by looking into yourself with
the pramas you have, because pramtapramaprameya is itself a denial of Brahman.
When this pramtapramaprameya division, duality, is a reality to you there is no way of
knowing Brahman, because Brahman is non-dual. All the three are Brahman, an ropa, a
mithy, upon Brahman. Here we have an introduction not just to the Brahmastras but to
vednta in general. It is an introduction to moka, though there is no introduction to moka.
There is no possibility of moka if bondage is purely a notion, a superimposition due to
aviveka upon the tm, if 'I am a sasr' is an error, is avidy. With that error gone, any
pursuit is also erroneous. If the pursuit is meant to remove this error, it confirms the error.
It is compounded confusion, and this is what happens all the time, until one gets the hang
of it. If you pull on the wrong end of the knot it gets more tight.
A human being's orientation is a strong commitment to sdhanasdhya, to goals
through means. Even the lazy have goals and means to achieve them. The goals are
always in terms of time and place and objects. They are always goals away from the
person. A position, a benefit, an authority, an item all will require at least some waiting.
Without sdhana no sdhya is possible. From appeasing hunger and thirst onwards, even
learning Vednta, it is all sdhanasdhya orientation. One brings this orientation even to
paramapururtha, to freedom from sasra. Sasra goes on changing from one thing to


another, and the Veda talks of going from life to life. One concludes that there must be a
sdhana for moka.
The prvapaka questions: How can mere jnam of Brahma be the sdhana for
moka? How can mere knowledge pay off? What do you have to do to make it pay off?
Knowledge of idli will not feed you. I suppose you could eat the recipe book. By
knowledge how can there be moka? Don't you need a realization of Brahman? Isn't this
what tm v are nididhysitvaya means? If moka is a krya, you need karma to achieve this.
Even if jna is moka, brahmajna is only an object for you to contemplate upon. After
contemplation you can get that jnam. Only jna with dhyna can give moka. Indirect
knowledge needs to be transformed into direct, aparoka, knowledge.
The prvapaka arguments - from karma, to karma and upsana, to pure upsana, to
jnam accompanied by meditation, to Brahma upsana that produces knowledge - make
Brahman a product of sdhana. In these you will find accommodation for the whole world
of spirituality, accommodation outside the halls of Vednta, outside of the Vedas. None of
these solutions has come up with the real problem. You can only come up with a solution
within your sense of the problem. Of course, once you have quoted a sentence in Sanskrit
you are authentic. Mana eva manuyn kraa bandhamokayo - the cause for both
bondage and liberation is only mind. Aha, immediate authority. Then they say the vkya
means you must snuff out, extinguish, the mind to have liberation, knock off the mind.
This is wrong thinking. It is not a problem of the mind. Mind does not exist for two
moments together. Which is the mind that you are talking about? A thought occurs and it
is gone. There is no such thing as thought control occurring it is gone.
It is not clear what is the problem, and everybody goes after one thing or another
to solve it. If you think the problem is wrinkles you will go after wrinkles. After wrinkles
you will find another thing to go after. The real problem is there is no problem. The real
truth is there is no problem. A mistake is the problem atasmin tad buddhi. Adhysa is
the problem. That I am baddha, I am wanting, I am small, I am insignificant, inadequate,
imperfect, subject to puyappa, subject to disease and old age and death, that I am
subject to be an object, that I am subject these are all problems. All these will cause
problems: I am guilty of omission and commission, I am hurt because of others'
omissions and commissions, I fear death. All these will be there. These problems are all
born of a mistake of non-recognition of what I am. What I am not is taken to be what I
am. What I am not is assumed to be a reality, and I begin solving my problem in keeping
with my mistaken conclusion of the reality of what I am. What I am is not going to be
clear, what the world is will not be clear, what vara is will not be clear.
The conclusion as to the solution is wrong and every pursuit is wrong. All the
religious pursuits are wrong and all theological concepts are wrong and all belief systems
are bluffs, not in keeping with any reality. When a mistake is the problem, knowledge is
the solution, knowledge that is free from all doubts. To remove all possible doubts,
pramaak and prameyaak, one needs an analysis of the stra that unfolds the fact
that all these notions are not true with reference to yourself. All the untruths and notions
need to be accommodated in the vision. How to accommodate? When you see a pot and
you know it is only clay, you can accommodate the pot the pot is clay, clay is not pot.
You can accommodate.

When you see the pot, it is not a mistake. Both pot and clay are visible. This is the
difference in the example. This is why we have to focus on the 'I am sasr' mistake.
This is why you also employ the rope-snake example. We do not dismiss vyvahrikasatt.
The pot is accommodated empirically it is neither real nor false, it is in-between. So too
here, the entire jagat can be accommodated. Your mind and every thought can be
accommodated if the mistake is corrected. Atasmin tad buddhi is the snake. Sasritvam is
a superimposition upon tm. This is to be corrected. Bandha is false, and therefore moka
from any real bandha is false. But moka can be freedom from false bondage. If bondage is
real, you really will be bound again. Bondage is false and you have to see it as such.
Therefore an introduction to Vednta should be only in this form. That is akara's
adhysabhya. Your three years of learning will help you enter that bhya.
In the sampradya, before even akarabhya, there was vtti from Bhartprapaca,
brahmastravtti. In a vtti there is just the explanation of the stra. Now there are many
vttis available. Popular now among scholars in the North is the Sadivabrahmedra vtti.
Another early vtti was that of Dravicrya. Bhyakra had those palmleaf vttis; he
refers to them, though the texts themselves are not available to us. In his
nandamaydikaraa Bhyakra discusses one of vttikra Bhartprapaca's topics, the
nandamayo 'bhyst, and then dismisses the interpretation. Brahmastrabhya study
became many mumukus', jijsus', refuge. In fact all the other bhyas are studied in order
to study this strabhya. I saw this commitment among some of the sdhus in Rishikesh. I
do not subscribe to that attitude. Pramabhya is only upaniadbhya. But you can
appreciate the reverence they have for this bhya.
Bhya gives strrtha and then, in keeping with the strrtha, why that meaning is
given is defended. The defense makes it bhya. Then the bhya is presented by a kkra,
a commentator. He gives vykhynam padacheda padrtha vigraha et cetera. k may have
a k. A ippa is a footnote. 'Bhmatkra' is Vcaspatimira's k. His is a k with a k,
Amalnanda's 'Kalpataru'. The 'Kalpataru' has a k by Appayya Dksita. He is a ghastha
found in the svm tradition. Generally the tradition is only sannyss. Vcaspati's work is
highly respected. After writing it he gave it his wife's name, Bhmat bh praktmaka
mati yasya. These are all works of great scholars.
Stra, bhya, k, k's k and that k's k. It is a pyramid. At the top is athto
brahmajijs. By the time you finish one sentence of the bhya one month is gone. The
nandagiri bhya is also very popular. Ratnaprabh's k throws light on the bhya. He
borrows freely from nandagiri. Ratnaprabh's disciple Prnanda has written a k. He
has a very refined style like Pinian stra, a mahbhya style. It looks very simple and is
very profound, prasanna and gambhra. Even one comfortable with Sanskrit can think he is
following the k when he is not. The arguments are all packed in. The prasannat is from
clarity. You can see the sampradya in this form.
Then there is another style. A vrttika is an independent work dealing with a
bhya. A vrttikam tells what is uktam, what is anuktam, and what is duruktam. What is
said is sometimes said in a language that needs to be explained. Some things that are


unsaid but connected are presented. Duruktam is that which is difficult to understand.
Vrttikakra is Surevara. He wrote vrttika in verse form for the Bhadrayaka Upaniad
bhya. Vrttika is in the form of verses; k is prose. There is also a Taittirya vrttikam
attributed to Surevara.
A stra is an original text of any subject matter. Kapila's Skhyastra is presented
in an independent book of verses called a krik. The vision of the Mkya Upaniad is
independently presented in Gauapda's Krik. Skhyakrik is by varaka. More
than another book of verses, you need a k to understand a bhya.
Sarvajtmamuni of Kanchi wrote an excellent book, Sakeparrakam. You can
understand the range of the sampradya. You can sense the reverence in which the bhya
is held. They work to understand the bhya. In those days to write a book meant
palmleaves and the discipline of making copies. This was the tradition; every copy had to
be hand written. This was the job of the iyas, and it was their raddh.
Ratnaprabhkra is rmnanda, a rmabhakta. His iadevat is Rma, and he offers
salutation to Rma. I will take one of kkra's introductory prayer verses:
yimh kai[k< zr[< gtae Pyirshaedr ,
tmhmazu hir< prmaye jnkjamnNtsuoakitm! .
yamiha kruika araa gato 'pyarisahodara |
tamahamu hari paramraye janakajkamanantasukhktim ||

I seek refuge in the Lord who is Hari, who was sought for refuge by Rvaa's
brother Vibhaa and not refused, who is all compassion and mercy. Do we not all know
that it was here that Vibhaa gained moka at the feet of Lord Rma whose form is
nothing but anantasukh? There is no other way to understand Rma than as this
anantasukh. Both Rma is his form and the formless param is his form. He is St's aga.
The Lord is always taken as endowed with the other akti. Both the lakaas are there
taasth and svarpa, sagua and nirgua, as one to be understood and as vara.
He also says:
imNjalimd< jgt! ,
sTy}ansuoanNt< tdh< inRym! .
yadajnasamudbhtamindrajlamida jagat |
satyajnasukhnanta tadaha Brahma nirbhayam ||

He remembers himself: nirbhaya Brahma aham asmi. One becomes nirbhaya, free
from fear. Where did you hear this? Yato vco nivartante | aprpya manas saha | nanda
brahmao vidv | na bibheti kutacaneti | Taittirya. This is advaya Brahma I am. There
is anantam always included because there is nothing other than this vastu. Saccidnandam
ananta Brahma aham asmi. Out of ignorance for whom this jagat is born as though it is
something separate from me, that Brahma aham asmi.
Next you find the Ratnaprabh vkya I started with:


Iha khalu 'svdhyyo 'dhyetavya' iti nitydhyayanavidhindhtasgasvdhyye

'tadvijijsasva' 'so 'nveavya sa vijijsitavya', 'tm v are draavya rotavya'
itiravaavidhirpalabhyate |

For the one who has studied the stra and the agas, the ravaavidhi becomes
very clear. The agas are: ik phonetics, kalpam the know-how of rituals, vykaraam
grammar, niruktam etymology of Vedic words Yska's nirukta, chandas - prosody,
various meters, and jyotiam astrology and astronomy. The ravaavidhi is tm v are
draavya rotavya, tm jijsitavya. tm should be inquired into, should be known.
For the student, tm becomes an object of desire to know. Ratnaprabh takes you to
brahmajijsyam; the first stra is athto brahmajijs. Out of respect for the kkra I
started there and then went away. I come back just to connect you. This particular
vidhiprpta alone is brahmajijs. We work on that.
This is brahmajijsyam because moka is the pururtha. Jnd eva moka because
bandha is due to error. tmajnena eva moka. Bhya introduction is adysa, talking
about error. Ahysd eva this mokasiddhi. Because there is adysa there is moka.
akara bhya:
aretarabhvnupapattau -

You could spend two months reading the commentaries on this one first sentence.
Here, this compound yumadasmat - is only abda; we are not talking about abdavcya.
With abdavcya it becomes 'tvamaham'; dea, the substitute, will be there. Here, only
abda, and yumadasmat stays there as it is. In Pinis eighth chapter you have a stra (P. S.
8.1.20); you can see both the words are kept as they are. But if the sambodha case is there,
if someone is addressing 'you,' the dea will be tvam. In that case you cannot say yumat;
you do not see 'tat yumat asi'. If the person is right there, if there is abdavcyam, then the
substitute is found.
Yumat ca asmat ca yumadasmadi te pratyayau. Gocaraca gocaraca gocarau
dvandva. Yumadasmatpratyayaca pratyayau, and then, again, gocarau. Then
yumadasmatpratyayagocarayo. Tasmin yumadasmatpratyayagocaraye viayii. Viayii is
the word. Yumadasmatpratyayagocara is the adjective to viayii.
Viaya means an object. It also means what binds you. What you objectify is
viaya. That which is not objectified is the viay. You cannot say that the viay is also
objectified. Who would be the viay of that? Viay is the objectifier; viaya is what is
objectified. We say one is the subject and one is the object. More than subject and object
is said here prakaka and prakya, dpaghaavat. Dpa prakaka, ghaa prakya. In
other words, the prakya is not svaya praka. You understand that the ghaa does not
emerge svaya praka. It is prakya prakyatvt. Being an object of light, being what
is lighted and what needs to be lighted, it is prakya.


Any viaya is what is objectified, and what objectifies is viay. This viay and
viaya have parasparavirodha, mutual opposition in the sense that one cannot become the
other. One is prakaka, that which lights up; one is prakya, that which needs to be
lighted and otherwise never comes to light. Properly presented, it seems simple enough
that you would not need to fight with it. 'Viruddhasvabh' points out the vkya's first
compound. Viruddha means opposite here. The opposite svabhva one is prakaka, the
other is prakya. The nature of the objects is opposed to that of the prakaka.
Now, how can they be together? If you ask the milkman he will say that water and
milk do join together. They join together because they have no virodhasvabhva.
Tdtmyam means tatsvarpa; two compatible substances or objects join and become as
though one object itself. The water becomes one with milk. Milk gains tdtmyam with
water - depending upon the milkman. One milkman puts water in the milk, another puts
milk in the water. Both are white, the density of the two liquids is different, but there is
no virodha, therefore the milk mix gains tdtmyam. The tdtmyam is called itaretara
bhva, two different things joined together as one. It is the milkman's delight. Milk and
water are both viayas, samnajti. They are different, but there is no virodha and they can
There can be an limitation based on the natures of the two things. Water and oil
are both viayas, but they do not join. They do not join because they have bhinnasvabhva,
different svabhva, different gocara. Even though viayatvam is there for both oil and water,
samnasvabhvatvam is not there and tdtmyam is not possible. There is svabhve virodha.
The tdtmyam, itaretara bhva, is anupapatti, impossible.
A viaya is an object and a viay is something that is conscious. Can cetana and
acetana have tdtmyam ? A light and a pot do not become one another. Who is this viay
in the vkya's first compound? Aham iti asmatpratyaya. First let us take abda. Asmatabda
cannot become yumatabda. Where you can use one of these words you cannot use the
other. Virodha because the gocara, the object, of the asmatpratyaya is pratyak, that which
cannot be objectified, and the object of yumatpratyaya is park, that which is objectified.
Ida pratyayagocara means an object of cognition, of 'this'. It means object of 'this'
cognition, something of this jagat, ida jagat. This sun, this moon, this star, this space,
this sky, this person, this father, this spouse, this body all objects of cognition of 'this'.
Lord Ka uses this in 'ida arra kaunteya ketram iti abhidhyate'.
You cannot use the word aham for the ida pratyayagocara. You cannot use aham
with reference to the body. The body is ida pratyayagocara yes, now the whole world is
gone. The whole heaven, the whole brahmaloka, every devat, every ghost is gone. You
cannot use aham for ida abdrtha. One single word that is what teaching is. Ida
pratyayagocara means everything, and that includes your body, your senses, whatever
happens in your mind, whatever happens when your vtti changes.
The aha pratyayagocara is sk. Viay becomes pratyaktmask. The
parkpratyayagocara, yumatpratyayagocara, the object of 'this' cognition, the object of 'you'
cognition and the object of 'I' cognition are absolutely opposed to each other. There is no
way of one becoming the other.


Why does Bhyakra use yumadasmat? Because abda. He wants the 'you'
cognition object, not just ida pratyayagocara. Because sometimes the ida pratyaya is
used as pratti, not as pratyaya. The very nature of consciousness is called pratti. Where
is it used for idam? 'Ayam tmbrahma'. stra uses it all the time. We say 'this self'. It is in
fact mahvkya. Ayam is, of course, masculine of ida abda.
Why ayam tm Brahma? Because nitya aparoka. Every idam becomes tat. 'This
person' becomes 'that person'. 'This object' becomes 'that object' a shift of the reference
point. 'This' is used for pratyaka, and every pratyaka becomes paroka. This emotion that emotion, this memory - that memory, even ahakra. Only one will never become
'that' ayam tm; the nitya aparoka ayam tm will never become 'that'. Ayam tm this
because of which everything comes to sight, this because of which everything goes out of
sight. The absence of sight is also known to you. This which never goes out of sight, even
in sleep, this which exists, is ayam tm. Ayam iti ida abdrtha is, then, used for
pthagtm, but you cannot use yumat. Why does Bhyakra want abda, idam aha
Again, where asmatabda is used you cannot use yumatabda. Yumat is always
park. Asmat is pratyak. I is always pratyak, this which cannot be objectified. It is
abdaprayoga. It is abda that is pointed out here, not abdavcya. Tvam dea is not possible,
as Pini states.
Bhyakra uses the yumatabda and asmatabda it is a kind of a prayer. Keeping
his iadevat in view, he uses the yumatabda. 'You, Bhagavn, please bless me. I am
starting this bhya. Please bless me to complete this.' Yumat also indicates buddhistha
vara, somdistha vara. When you are thinking of your ia, and that ia is you, how
are you going to ask him? It is not your grandfather you are asking. But Bhagavn is
always yumatpratyayagocara. Therefore you ask him straightaway. For Bhyakra,
Bhagavn is always yumatpratyayagocara and asmatpratyayagocara also. Bhagavn is also
asmatpratyayagocara. He is both yumadasmatpratyayagocara. Who is Bhagavn? If you say
yumatpratyayagocara, he is buddhistha iadevat. When you have understood him, he is
asmatpratyayagocara also. He is ida pratyaya and aha pratyaya. Both are Bhagavn. vara
- both subject and object and more than both subject-object. As humans, our greatness is
that we are able to mix up that which cannot be mixed up. We achieve the impossible.
But akara is not mixed up here. He will tell you why.
isaya< tmaR[amip sutraimtretravanuppi>, #Tytae =SmTTyygaecre iv;iyi[ icdaTmke
yu:mTTyygaecrSy iv;ySy tmaR[a< caXyas> tipyRy[
e iv;iy[StmaR[a< c iv;ye =Xyasae imWyeit ivtu<
Siddhy taddharmmapi sutarmitaretarabhvnupapatti | ityato
'smatpratyayagocare viayii cidtmake yumatpratyayagocarasya viayasya taddharm
cdhysa, tadviparyayea viayiastaddharm ca viaye 'dhyso mithyeti bhavitu yuktam
Pratyaya means cognition, pratyate anena pratyaya. The object of cognition is,
here, gocara, viaya. So the cognition is one thing, and the object of the cognition,


pratyayaviaya, is different. If the pratyaya is viaya, you have subjective idealism.

Purposely Bhyakra uses all these words. abda is not pratyaya. abda alone does not
produce pratyaya; abda is understood, then pratyaya. Then there is an object for this
pratyaya. Therefore there is a prama.
When you say 'pratyaya', an artha is involved, and the artha is either gocara or
agocara, pratyaka or paroka. Pratyayagocara is pratyaka and abdrtha is paroka. We do
not accept that the cognition is the object. Idealism is 'I think therefore it is'. But whether
you think or don't think, the object is. You had better think if a bus is in front of you. The
object is the pratyayagocara. The cognition thereof is yumatpratyaya; it is always ida
pratyayaviaya. Pratyaya itself idantay ghyate. The pratyayaviaya, needless to say, is
idantay ghyate. Both the cognition and the object of cognition are objects of 'this'. This
is why there cannot be a mistake when you say yumat. Whereas the ida pratyaya is not
very safe when you want to point out the pthagtm is entirely prakika and the other
thing is prakya. Prakikaprakayo itaretarabhva anupapatti is being established. When
it is, you must make the mistake impossible. To make it impossible, make it asmat yumat.
Where asmat can be used, yumat cannot be used. Where yumat can be used,
asmat cannot be used. What is tvadyam is not madyam. What is madyam is not tvadyam.
This is abda, true in usage. Anything that you objectify is park. This is 'this' situation.
Tdtmyam is upapatti. The impossibility is siddha. Any prama you take, one cannot be
the other. Look at all things as objects of consciousness; see that they cannot mix with
this which lights them up. A white pot the two, white and pot, can be seen in one place
because there is vieavieyasambandha. Milk and water, on the other hand, two different
objects, two different abda, two different pratyaya, two different pratyayrtha, both
objects of consciousness. Synonyms are two different words for the same pratyaya.
Opposites, tama prakavat, are viruddhasvabhva. One is prakaka, the other is not even
prakya. The darkness cannot become light; in the wake of one the other is gone. All
objects and all qualities are objects of consciousness and are opposed to consciousness.
There is no yukti and there is no anubhava which shows that viay and the viaya
can become one. They are opposed to each other. The dharma, the svarpa, of the viay is
citsvarpa, caitanya. Everything else is prakya, object of consciousness. The dharmas of
viay and viaya cannot mix-up. For the time being, viayidharma is amness, viayadharma
is isness. Later we will swallow the amness isness difference. Viayidharma is
consciousness, cetanatvam; viayadharma is object of consciousness, jaatvam, acetanatvam.
One is prakaka, the other is prakya. The viay always has anvayatvam. The viaya
always has vyabhicritvam. At one time the viaya is ghaa, at another time the viaya is
paa. Ghaa is replaced by paa. One thing has gone, the other has come. The viaya is
variable, it goes on changing. No object can stay; this is the nature of pratyaya.
But the viay is always the same. The avyabhicritvam, anvayatvam, is the
viayidharma. In all situations he is invariable, always there. While seeing, the sighted
objects are variable; the seer is the same. Form and color are seen, the seer is the eyes.
What is seen, colors and qualities, are many and various; the seeing eyes are the same.
Eyes too are variable, not viay. Mind is variable; fear, shyness, courage come and go.


Pratyayas differ, emotions differ, sakalpavikalpa - there is nothing more variable than
mind. In fact all variable things you recognize because mind is variable. The viay is the
one seeing all of them, all antm. Viay is invariable, viaya is variable. With different
dharmas, how can they become one?
The tm's attributes should not get mixed up with the body, and the body's
attributes should not get mixed up with the tm. But you say: I am here; I am there; I am
short; I am tall; I am white; I am male; I am mortal. All these really are dharma of the
yumatpratyayagocara. And the asmatpratyayagocarasya dharma is entirely viruddhasvabhva.
Sutarm means totally, always. Always they are opposed. But in the tm, cidtmake,
citsvarpe, pthagtmani ityartha, the yumatpratyayagocara, the ida pratyayagocara, the
object of the cognition of the viaya and the tm become one in the other. Not only that,
the dharmas of both become one in the other.
It is by adhysa; there is no other way. Seeing one in the other is adhysa,
superimposition, one viay being mistaken for a viaya. Atasmin tad buddhi; what is not
there, seeing that that is adhysa. Tdtmyam is not possible. How can you mistake
something for its opposite? Can you mistake light for darkness? tmani antm adhysa;
tmani antmadharma adhysa. Antmadharma is sthlatvam karttvam bhokttvam. Tad
viparyayea means conversely. Taking the tm for antm or for its attributes is adhysa.
Conversely, taking the body for I and taking the body to have cetanatvam is adhysa.
For the objects of the cognitions of yumat and asmat, for the viaya and viay,
since they have opposing svabhvas, just as do darkenss and light, it is impossible for one
to be taken for the other. It is equally impossible for the dharmas of either of them to be
taken for the other's dharmas. Therefore it is appropriate to see as impossible the
superimposition of the dharmas of yumat on the viay, on the tm which is cidtmake, on
this which has the caitanyasvarpa. This being so, Bhyakra has proven that there cannot
even be adhysa; the adhysa nsti, mithy. The word mithy is used in this sense because
of the correlative sense of yadyapi and tathpi.
Bhyakra has established two things. One is: one becoming the other is not
possible. Even if there is a mix-up of dharmas one does not become the other. Milk does

not become water. Water does not become milk. Second is: even a mistake is not possible.
One being mistaken for the other is not possible either in terms of two substantives or
in terms of the imputing of their attributes. ama prakavat viruddhasvabhvatvt tayo is
the whole argument. Their natures being opposed, one substantive cannot become the
other. The mix-up of what is satyam and what is not satyam it is inconceivable. One is
nirgua Brahma that is viearahita tm; the other is some kind of reality that is not a
substantive and depends entirely for its existence on the tm. Between the two, what
kind of mix-up is possible? tm and antm have no chance to get mixed-up. The
limitless is there getting limited? It is proper to say that any adhysa is not possible. Then
he says it over again.


e ATyNtivivyaexRmx
R imR[aeimRWya}aninim> sTyan&te imwunIkTy Ahimd< mmedimit nEsigRkae=y< laekVyvhar>,
atyantaviviktayordharmadharmiormithyjnanimitta satynte mithunktya, ahamida
mamedamiti naisargiko'ya lokavyavahra |

In two sentences he has finished the whole thing. In the first sentence two things
were explained: itaretarabhva anupapatti and na adhysa between viay and viaya. He
goes right into cidtmake. Cidtmake viayii pthagtmani is because of whose presence
everything else becomes evident, to whom everything becomes evident, because of
whom everything becomes known. In the Bhagavad Gt, Lord Ka starts: The whole
jagat is called ketram; pacamahbhtni ahakra are all ketram. Ka does not start
with the indriyagocara, he starts with 'ida arra kaunteya ketramityabhidhyate'. He does
not start with 'ida jagat ketram' because there is no confusion there. Nobody takes other
than the physical body as oneself. Even the closest t-shirt to the body is not taken as
oneself. Wearing a white t-shirt, one does not say 'I am white'. The shirt is not taken to be
the tm; 'I sense' is not there in the shirt. Whereas in the deha there is 'I sense'. The
dehadharma are taken to be the tmdharma. Therefore Lord Ka first establishes the
body as a distinct object of knowledge. He says the person is the knower of the ketram.
Cidtm is the ketraja. All objects, indriyagocaras, are ketra. Bhyakra kept all this in
mind when he wrote this bhya.
'The body is as good as myself' is a simple conclusion. The Bauddha talk about
dehavyatirikta tm. For them, the tm survives death and the jva continues. Their
commitment to rebirth is not what we are interested in. Even though we accept it, we do
not try to establish it. For them, there is a nirva possible only after many births; even a
boddhisattva is required to have so many births. Yet they have no prama for this. They
are not really nstikas; there are places where they say what karmastra says. It is the
same for Jains.
Lord Ka goes on telling what is the ketra. The ketra includes the sense objects
and the ten organs of the senses by which you know the world and the mind. It includes
icch dea sukha dukha rgadvea all experiences and emotions. Then he includes
ahakra. Even the ahakra is ketra. Therefore ketraja is cidtm, asmatpratyayagocara.
The ahakra is the status part of aham. When you say 'I', there is no problem.
When you say 'I am a seer' there is a status. That status part is ketra,
yumatpratyayagocara, ida pratyayagocara. Anything skibhsya, anything an object of
your witness, any object of your perception, of your cognition, is yumatgocara. Anything
you objectify is not I. The I is the one who objectifies. Dgeva na tu dyate this is
asmatpratyayagocara. Therefore Bhyakra goes straightaway to the topic. He points out
what is tm. Negation, and all that, take place automatically; deha is not the tm, pra
is not the tm; indriyi mana buddhi citta ahakra need not be told. Asmatpratyayagocara
is tm; yumatpratyayagocara is na tm. One is called viay, the other is called viaya.


Viaya is badhnti, it is that which binds one. The one bound is not viay. Between
the viay cidtm and the viaya there is no itaretarabhva. There is no mix-up possible for
the two and no mix-up possible of their attributes. When the becoming one of two
substantives is impossible yet one is mistaken for the other, atasmin tad buddhi, adhysa is
possible. Tasmin tad buddhi jnam is an error based in non-recognition and
superimposition based on similarities in two things. But here, for viaya and viay, the
adhysa is impossible because smagr abhvt, the proper circumstances are not available.
For adhysa, a certain similarity, sdya, must be there for the two factors involved.
Sdya abhvt adhysasya ayuktatvam. Therefore, here, adhysa nsti. One is cidtm,
sk tm, the other is skibhsya, skya. There is no similarity.
For adhysa, prvasaskra must be there along with the similarity. For you to
make this mistake there must be something there, something like the ropesnake,
something you already know. You know snake and you know rope. But tm is not
known totally. If you knew cidtm you would never commit this mistake. And where is
the similarity between cidtm and the deha? Is there a little bit of limitlessness there?
There is another smagr involved. There is your fear and your desire. You fear the snake,
and you want the corner of the gold wrapper of the chocolate you see sticking out of the
beach sand to be a gold coin. These are your rga and dvea. Nivtti is running away from
the snake; pravtti is going for the gold.
There is no sdya between the cidtm and the cidbhsya. One cannot become the
other. One continues to be one. Cidtm continues to be cidtm. It is called viay but
there is no viaya in it; it cannot be bound. And the dharma of antm,
yumatpratyayagocaradharma, are confined to the objects alone, they cannot travel to affect
the tm. All sthlaarradharma, all the attributes of the body, confine to the body. Even
mistake is not possible. Only where itaretarabhva is possible is adhysa possible even
that is not possible here. Impossibility is established, but - tathpi.
Is the absence of adhysa ayuktatvt, or abhnt because direct anubhava of the
ongoing superimposition is not there? Is adhysa impossible kraa abhvt? Is it vastu
aviveka? Questions like this are called vikalpa. Ayuktatvt would mean the adhysa is not
logically possible, because the ingredients are not there. Although there cannot be adhysa,
even so tathpi, adhysa asti. Because there is adhysa there is moka. Adhysa is the
saving grace - otherwise bandha would be real, no bandha could be removed, bandha
would be absolute. Because there is adhysa, tathpi you are saved already. Ayuktatvam,
adhysanstitvam, is for us alakra. It is a blessing because adhysa bhti. Kraam api asti
itaretar aviveka. Mithyjna nimitta means adhysakraam asti.
You might say that for the tm to be mistaken for the jva and the jva to be
mistaken for the tm is an adhysa that has no beginning, but you cannot say there is no
experience of adhysa. Abhnatvam you cannot say if only because you are talking. tm
cannot talk, and a tongue cannot talk. You cannot say there is no experience of adhysa. I
am brhmaah, I am katriya, I am kart, I am bhokt sukh dukh sasr you cannot say
any of these is there unless there is some kind of itaretarabhva adhysa. Anyonyadharma


adhysa is there. The arra enjoys the being of tm, and the deha attributes are assumed to
be the cetanatma. That is the itaretarabhva.
The absence of adhysa cannot be abhnatvam because you are there. This adhysa
is your anubhava, manuyatvam. Ahamidam is one thing and mama idam is a further
declension. The at is further adhysa, sasarga adhysa. You say mama idam arram and
destroy the asaghatvam. You have a sambandha. It is the viay saying he has a viaya. But
it gets worse, the fellow says mama tm the dehaviaya now says he has himself. This is
the experience of all human beings. There must be kraa. You can say only that aviveka
is the cause, tmntmano aviveka.
Even knowing the tm, adhysa continues. Even when you know that the crystal

colored by a nearby red cloth is a clear crystal and not a red stone, the crystal will still
appear to be red. Here, with or without viveka of the vastu, you cannot say there is no
kraam. Uniformly there is a mistake committed against limitless Brahman, but at least
you have company. If you commit a mistake against the limitless you become limited.
The mistake can never prove to be a blessing. The mistake is a limitless loss. In this
lokavyavahra, ahamida mamedam is naisargika. It seems I must be a limited being to be
born; the limitless is never born. To be born, the adhysa has to be there already. The
jvtm is born and reborn in order to have the bhoga of karmaphala. This aviveka,
mithyjnam, is there.
Erroneous knowledge alone is the cause for adhysa. There is no other cause for it.
The vastu is not known as it is, and therefore there is erroneous knowledge. You can say
it is either mithyjnanimitta or ajnanimitta. Mithyjnanivtti is ajnanivtti,
The first bhya sentence is adhysa abhvasiddhi. The hetu is 'tama prakavat
virodht'. Tama praka is the example. Atyantavirodhaviaya is both yumatpratyayaviaya
and asmatpratyayaviaya. Between the meaning of the word 'I', cidtm, and the meaning
of the word 'this', antm, jaa, there is no 'one becoming the other' possible. Moreover,
adhysa itself is not possible. Adhysa abhvasiddhi grantha. This knot is called
akgrantha, adhysasya siddhigrantha. Yadyapi means even though this adhysabhvstti
hetu does not seem to be there, tathpi adhysa asti. Why? Lokavyavahra is there. Adhysa
is generally subjective. When you see ropesnake it is not true that everyone sees the
ropesnake, and you yourself do not always see it as ropesnake. Sometimes snake is taken
as rope. There is no rule. Generally the mistake is subjective.
Here, lokavyavahra means it is loknubhava. Mnuya is the loka here. All the
human notions reveal adhysa. The adhysa revealed is tmani antmandhysa or
dharmdhyasa. Both dharm adhysa and dharma adhysa are there as our anubhava siddha,
sarvai anubhyate. It is vyvahrikasiddhi, and people who make the mistake are taken as
normal. Being lokavyavahra it is hetumat vyavahra. The hetu must be universal. The
mistake is not what is universal, what it starts with is universal. What it starts with is
ajnam. The ajnam is universal; one is born without knowledge of tm. One is also
born without knowledge of antm. The mother's voice, even while in the womb, may


provide a sense of security to the baby. There may that much sense of antm, of
something other than oneself. But the child is born tmntmajna vin.
Then the eyes and ears all open up and the child picks up on antmajnam. The
cascade of information from outside the child also denies the opportunity to know what is
what. The antm becomes satyam. The child is indoctrinated; the jagat is separate from
him, and his sense of smallness is confirmed and emphasized. Nobody has to tell the
child that he is small - mosquitoes and viruses take him for a ride. Theologies come and
tell him that he is different from everything, and from God of course. Without vicra,
avicrasiddha, I am different from everything.
Durvicra is also there. I have a clean example for this. In the village where I grew
up, I tried to warn fellows who came from the city to be sure to duck down below the low
threshold entering our home. One fellow I failed to tell; he did not know about the
possibility of getting a bump - he was avicrasiddha. Another fellow came and I told him
to mind his head. The front door is low; mind the threshold too. A good five feet before
the door he started bending. Bending he walked. Then, walking to exactly where the
threshold was low, he stood up. The avicrasiddha fellow got a bump, the vicrasiddha
fellow got one too. Durvicra is, after the study of philosophy and theology and all the
books, you still think 'I am small.' The avicra is better - he can be taught. The second one
is a problem because of the indoctrination, the orientation, the thinking that makes you
away from vara.
Nothing other than thinking makes you away from vara. And not being allowed
to think is the goal of theology. It is the most unfortunate and the most dangerous thing to
happen to someone. It is dangerous because he can destroy others, unfortunate because he
does not know what he is doing. Everything he is he has bought in the market, he has
been sold. This sasra is lokavyavahra ajnasya smnya.
Tathpi anyonyasminnanyonytmaka mithunktya. Anyonya is the assumption that
two dharms are here, tm and antm. One is yumatpratyayaviaya, the object of 'this'.
The object of 'this' is ahakra antakaraa pra arra svagraha et cetera - all mama. Once
you establish yourself as this much alone, all secondary mamatvam comes into play all
your relationships.
You require saptam for adhysa because atasmin tad buddhi. The saptam is the
adhikaraa, and on that is the ropa. The object, the rope, the tm, is the dhra, the
asmatpratyaya. The ropa takes place viayii. 'Anyasya' refers to the other dharm, the
antm. One dharm is taken for the other. Then you say that I am as good as this body,
body is as good as myself, this is me. This is dharmyadhysa.
Dharmdhysa is brhmao'ha vrddho'ham et cetera. The dharma of the body is
taken to be the very nature of the tm. This is also called samsarga adhysa. The
attributes of antm are superimposed on tm.
Mutually the dharms are confused. Antm becomes satyam, a reality enjoyed by
the deha because being pervades every cell and particle of everything that you see. The 'is'
is satyam, and the body is taken to be satyam. The deh assumes satyatvam of the tm in
order to have existence independent of everything else and to become small also. The


caitanya that is the tmasvarpa is there for this body 'This is me'. Up to the skmaarra

the 'This is me' goes, and the whole body becomes a conscious entity, assumed to be
caitanytm. Avivekena it is ktv. Avivekt is the hetu. Vivekajna abhvt. Aviveka of what?
tm antm. Anyonya is another word for itaretara. Anyonya svarpa avivekena adhysa
How are tm and antm together? Like satyam and antam. Satyam is trikla
abdhitam. What exists is satyam. 'What does not exist' is not antam here. The jagat being
neither what exists nor what does not exist, it is in-between. It is not tuccha, you cannot
dismiss it. Between satyam and tuccham what exists is here called antam. Like the pot:
with reference to the pot the clay is satyam, and the pot cannot be dismissed as nonexistent. Do not say the pot exists by itself, the weight of pot is the weight of clay. The
ghaatvam is antam, because you cannot see pot without seeing clay. You cannot think of
pot without thinking of clay or some other substance. You cannot think of pot without
thinking of something else that is called antam. Antam is what we otherwise say is
mithy, but Bhyakra is not using that word now. We will use antam.
Avivekena, one satyam and the other vcrambhana vikro nmadheyam, two things
are mixed up. This mithun, the mixing up, when did it come into being? Naisargiko'yam.
In deep sleep this tm antm atyantikavivikta mix-up is not there, but one lives with this
mix-up. The atyantavivikta, the totally different viay and viaya, satyam and antam, are
born with you togerther as adhysa. With the straprama you can resolve this adhysa.
In the sentence, mithyjnanimitta goes with lokavyavahra. Bahuvrhi: mithyjna
nimitta yasya vyavahrasya sa. It is not just aviveka which is mithyjna; mithyjna is
false knowledge.
Adhysasya ayuktatvam means the untenability of adhysa. That untenability is not
a defect; this is exactly what adhysa is. The untenability is alakra, bhaa na tu
daam. Vedntadeika wrote a book called aadai, The One Hundred Defects in
Advaita. You can see all our prvapakas as defects, but there is no doa. Adhysa is not
possible and still it is possible avidyay. There cannot be a logical adhysa. But you cannot
say it is abhna, because you are there. Lokavyavahra is due only to adhysa. Aha kart,
aha bhokt, sthlo' ham itydi manuyn vyavahra itself reveals adhysa.
If you examine the nature of tm with the help of the stra you will see that
stra cannot be contradicted. This is the vicra we are going to do. The vision of the
stra is not contradicted, but your own notion of yourself is being contradicted. You say
you are sasr and yet now and then you laugh. You are contradicting yourself. You are
the subject matter to be inquired into by you, and by me also. Self, tm, becomes a
matter of doubt. Your own experience provides a contradiction; are you unhappy and
become happy or what? What is the truth? It is a matter for inquiry, for viveka. Where
there is a mix-up, the inquiry is called viveka. After the inquiry, the mix-up continues but
there is no mix-up in your knowledge. It is jndhysa.
Arthdhysa means a mix-up is there, and after inquiry and the knowledge of
what is there, the artha disappears, the snake disappears into the rope. Here there is no


disappearance of the jagat after knowledge. After the sunrise we found out the sun does
not rise at all. But that does not mean the sunrise does not occur. The next day it appears
again to rise. This is called sopdhikdhysa, jndhysa. The adhysa is in the knowledge
alone, like your knowledge that the blue sky is not blue. Sopdhikdhysa can be explained
away, but the appearance will continue.
The experience being there, adhysa must be there, and smagr must be there.
Adhysasmagr must be there. The principal ingredient is mithy jnam; for adhysa there
is no other cause than false knowledge, erroneous knowledge. Knowledge is always
sakarmakam. The verb j is transitive. Your knowledge is always of something, even
erroneous knowledge. Mithyjnam involves an object. The adhysa locus is always seen
by you. The unseen rope does not become the locus for the snake. The unseen rope does
not become an object for mistake. You must have a general, smnya, knowledge, ida
vastujnam. Something is there that you see. What is there? If you see rope, no problem.
That is called tasmin tad buddhi. This is knowledge that cannot be negated. There is no
pramadoa, and the jnam is vastutantram. As the object is, so is this rope knowledge.
There are two components in this knowledge. One is 'this is'; the other can be
fraught with doubt. 'What is this? Who is this?' you ask all the time. You have to make
some identification. If in a non-snake you have snake buddhi it is atasmin tad buddhi. If
what you see is not there, what is there you don't see. That is the problem. What is there
you don't see makes you see something else. The something else is going to be in keeping
with your saskra, your disposition, your fear et cetera. There is going to be a definition
of adhysa to answer the question of what is this adhysa.
Aah - kae=ymXyasae nameit, %Cyte - Sm&itp> pr pUvRavas>, t< keicdNyaNyxmaRXyas #it
vdiNt, keicu y ydXyasStivekahinbNxnae m #it , ANye tu y ydXyasStSyEv
ivpirtxmRTvkLpnamac]te #it,
ha - ko'yamadhyso nmeti | ucyate - smtirpa paratra prvadvabhsa | ta
kecidanyatrnyadharmdhysa iti vadanti | kecittu yatra yadadhysastadvivekgrahanibandhano
bhrama iti | anye tu yatra yadadhysastasyaiva viparitadharmatvakalpanmcakate iti |
Smtirpa smte rpam iva rpa yasya sa. This is an upam samsa, a

compound in which an example is involved. The example demonstrates that a form seen
will be in keeping with the form of memory one already has. uktiky rajatadaranam.
If you see a mother-of-pearl shell and you think it is a silver coin, you will go after it.
Here, the example shows pravtti, whereas the ropesnake shows nivtti. The objects of
your pursuit and your fear need not be true. Adhysa can be enough. The shell mistaken
for coin is mithyjnam. Both shell and silver have ida pratyayaviayatvam. The ida
pratyayaviayatvam of the silver goes in the wake of knowledge. In order to have adhysa
you must have the object known to you in some form, to some degree - not properly, just
adequately known for you to make a mistake.
The locus of the mistake here in the teaching is tm, asmatpratyayagocara. The
object of 'I' sense is I. That object cannot become an object of 'this' sense. Even ahakra


is an object of 'I' sense. The 'kra' part of it belongs to that which undergoes change.
Anything you objectify is yumatpratyayagocara. Only cidtm is asmatpratyayagocara.
Yumatpratyayagocara taken as asmatpratyayagocara is called atasmin tad buddhi. The locus
of the adhysa, what is evident, here is tm. If the locus is a rope and there you see snake,
you will not discover the truth until you have adhihnajna. You are not removing the
adhysa; you are only attempting to know the truth of the snake. Sarpasya adhihnam is rope.
The sarpa goes adhihnajnena, not dhra jnena. dhra only provided the
opportunity for mistake, and another mistake can come. This is true of the ahakra.
One fellow found out that the tm was distinct from the body, and then he heard
that tm was a sinner. He traded in one mistake for a worse error.
Adhysa mithyjnanimitta. Mithyjnanimitta is a vieaa to adhysa.
Vieaa explains the hetu for adhysa, nimittaabda being there.
Question: The adhysa itself is mithyjnam, how can you say mithyjnam is the
nimittam for adhysa? The silver you see there for the shell is mithyjna, you cannot say
it is the cause of itself. The silver is mithyjnam because in the wake of knowledge it
goes away. It is not reasonable to say that mithyjna is the cause for adhysa. What is
the use of grinding what is already ground? Grinding will not give you roti. How can
mithyjnam be said to be the cause of mithyjnam?
Siddhnta: Pacapdika is a wonderful book written by Padmapda, disciple of
Bhyakra. If you read Pacapdika you will feel you are reading an improved version of
a bhya. The language and style are excellent. Surevara wrote Bhadrayaka Vrttika,
and before that he wrote Naikarmyasiddhi. I was disappointed reading and teaching from
Naikarmyasiddhi because nowhere does he talk about vara. He talks only about
pthagtm, tvampadrtha. Tatpada is not there at all. He does mahvkyavicra without that.
What kind of vicra is that?
Padmapdcrya looked at this vkya in akara's strabhya and reinforced it. He
said mithyjna as the cause for adhysa should not be a meaningless statement.
Bhyakra defines adhysa as atasmin tad buddhi. Padmapda said that mistake being the
cause for mistake would be a meaningless interpertation and akara would not write
such a thing. Padmapda said that adhihnasya ajnam is the cause of adhysa. The
dhra is already evident it does not become evident to become cause of the mistake.
dhra is evident enough to commit a mistake. What is not evident, the adhihna, alone
has to become evident by knowledge. Adhihna is exactly what we want to know.
tm is Parambrahma. Satya jnamananta jagatkraa Brahma is the
tattvamasi mahvkyasya meaning. The cause of the entire jagat, satya jnamananta
Brahma yat jagata kraa tat tvam asi. This sat alone tvam asi, sadeva satyam, sa tm tvam
asi vetaketo. This satyam, this is the tm, and this is you. This is the Chndogya rutivkya.
What is not known here? The 'I am' is self-evident. 'I am jagatkraa Brahma' is what is
not evident. This is the adhihna to be known. By knowledge the error goes away.
Adhihnajnena adhysasya nivtti. Adhihnajna is 'I am Parambrahma'.
Parambrahma is adhihnam. dhra is tm, self-evident tm, 'I am'. So 'I am' will join


Parambrahma. When you discover the truth of the silver on the seashell you understand
the adhihnam of the ropa. With reference to ropa alone there is adhihnam. There is
no adhihnam; ropa is there, therefore we call it adhihnam. ropitsya adhihnam is

the shell.
When you come to know the shell and that the silver is in this, the silver aa will
join the shell. When you know the rope, the snake aa has to join the rope. Adhysa is
only when the rope does not go away. What is there always remains there. Do you see the
problem if both go away? It is the nirvikalpa savikalpa problem: when you see Brahman,
the sasr goes away. When Brahman goes away the sasr is back. When the mind
went away, bliss came. When bliss went away, thought came. Only because what is there
always is known can you say 'Oh, that was a mistake.' This is called jnam. The aham is
always retained; sasritvam is ropa. Dharmyadhysa or dharmdhysa it does not make
any difference. There is no second dharm at all. One dharm is there and he has no dharma.
tm becomes this dharm this is the truth about this adhihna.
Aha sasr adhysa iti nivartate by this knowledge we would call this an
outcome. What nivartate is not adhysa, what nivartate is whatever is the hetu for adhysa.
Adhysa na nivartate jnena, another adhysaparampara will be there. Vastu ajnam
nivartate alone. Later Bhyakra will say the anarthahetu is avidy. Adhysa is anartha, it is
not anarthahetu. Adhysa is anarthha sasr, and anarthahetu is ajnam. Ajna is
adhihna ajnam. Adhihna ajna nena iva this adhysasya nivtti. Adhihnajnam
ayam tm Brahma apekyate.
What is ayam tm? This is why yumadasmatpratyayagocara. Ayam tm is
nityopalabdhtm nityparoktm ida abdrtha. What is the adhihna? Brahman. This is
not known, rather one knows 'ayam tm sasr'. stra is very clear: ayam tm Brahma,
prajna Brahma, aha brahmsmi. Is tva sasr? No. Yasya jnena vijta bhavati tat
satya sa tm vetaketo. I know 'I am', but the adhihna is not known. The tvamartha is
self-evident adequately for committing the mistake. To know 'I am' I do not require a
prama. I am self-evident, and with reference to mind/buddhi/senses I become a pramt.
Pramapravtti takes place. All that is necessary is only adhihna ajna nimitta.
Therefore ajnanimitta aya adhysa. Naisargikam adhysa. Due to adhysa alone there
is a jva, kart is there it is all andi. Sargika means created. Naisargikam means not
Question: Does that mean this ajna is the kraa for the adhysa?
k: It is not a question of krya and kraa. We use the words this way this time,
but sometimes there is ajna without adhysa. Your ajna. In an avyakta state your
ajna alone is there there is no question of vyakta adhysa. Saying that ajna always is
the cause of adhysa creates a parallel reality. We do not say tm and ajnam are two
different things. There is no tm plus ajna. Ajnam is antam. Mithy has two
meanings anirvcyam and apahavam. Apahuvarte originally meant mithy iti bhavitu
yuktam. Here it is mithy ca ajna ca. It is mithy and it is ajnam. It is sadasadbhym


anirvacanyam. You cannot say ajnam asti like satyam asti. Tasya na nivtti. What is the
use of proposing nitya ajnam?
Ajnam is there until it goes. Yat kicit bhvam asti. It is not jna abhvam that is
ajnam, jna virodhi is ajnam. It is there, and therefore the error. Without this, there is
no error. Adhihna ajnam is not a parallel reality. This ajnam is not satyam; it is also
mithy. Anything other than satya Brahma that anyone suggests is mithy. If ajnam is
mithy, adhysa, everything, is mithy. Everything is either subjective mithy or objective
mithy. Subjective mithy is in the wake of arthdhysa, jvasi. Objective mithy is
jndhysa, varasi. Mithyjna iti mithy ca ajna ca. Mithyjnam eva nimitta
yasya sa. Mithyjnanimitta aya lokavyavahra. Now you can understand satynte
mithunktya as though they are two realities, satya ca anta ca. Mithunktya
without really any viveka. Whatever we say is there saccidnanda tm, varasi, arrdi,
is satynte mithunktya, naisargika mixed up due to adhysa. This lokavyavahra adhysa
is due alone to ajnam of the only one reality. What is taken as another reality can be
only mithy, because it goes away. It is there only as long as it is there. It is a kalpitam
ajnam, and there is only one satya jnamananta Brahma. We should salute
Padmapdcrya for his contribution.
This asmatpratyayagocara is that which is the viaya of asmatpratyaya. Pratyaya
means cognition. When you say 'This is a pot', this is ghaapratyaya ghaa is the object of
the pratyaya. But even though it is a ah tatpurua compound it is not ghaasya pratyaya.
It is not that there is knowledge on the part of the ghaa for the pratyaya. In the compound
ghaapratyaya, what does the ghaasya mean? The answer is a function of karma a -

the sixth case is used in the sense of object.

When you say asmatpratyaya, it means mama pratyaya. Unlike the ghaa, the first
element in the compound is cetana. You can add a third element the object, the
cognition, and myself. But what Bhyakra is talking about here is asmatpratyayagocara
the object of 'I sense', of I cognition. The object of the I cognition is aham iti pratyaya,
aham asmi pratyaya, asmat pratyaya, aham eva. This aham is not understood. This aham is
not understood because you place the aham all over. It is even placed in the ida
pratyayaviaya. How is asmatpratyayaviayatvam idapratyayagocare, yumatpratyayaviaye,
possible? How is it placed where there is virodha sthlo'ham, I am mortal et cetera? The
attribute of the deha is assumed by the tm, is seen as the attribute of oneself. We see the
adhysa all over.
'Manuyo'ham' means there is also dharm adhysa. Whatever is there as
pramttvam is adhyasta upon the tm. When there is aviveka, everything becomes dharma
anyway. After that, everything is dharmdhysa, arthjnam. Asmatpratyayagocaratvam is
there in the tm. The gocaratvam is only upacra. In the self-evident tm, the object of 'I
cognition', anyonya tdtmya is not possible. The first bhya sentence establishes the
impossibility; the second sentence reveals the reality that such a confusion exists. We
need do no more to establish adhysa.


Question: What do you mean by this adhysa? How do you look at this adhysa?
What is the lakaam?
Bhyakra presents this question because the whole book is a nyyagrantha. The
whole bhya is a discussion with those who feel there are mistakes and who raise
objections. It is a continuous process of question and answer, of dialogue. It is a book of
analysis so he introduces a dialogue ha.
One fellow says there is no adhysa, no error at all. Khyti means perception, and
it came to mean mistake, wrong perception. Akhyti has come to mean no mistake.
uktik is the mother-of-pearl on a seashell. That uktik is the locus taken for a silver
coin. We will use the words uktik rajatam. We use the example because there is pravtti
toward rajatam. Both pravtti and nivtti here indicate their expression as action. The
person who sees silver takes action toward this. There is icch toward an object. The icch
comes after jnam. His desire and action are directed at an object he knows.
Jnam is due to prama. The prama here is indriya, indriyasannikarajnam.
Indriyaviayasannikart jyate yajjnam iti indriyasannikarajnam. In other words,
pratyakam. The visually perceived object gives rise to the knowledge that this is silver,
and this creates a desire in the person for the silver. Therefore there is an impulse to go
towards the object and pick it up. The pravtti is due to icch, the icch is due to jnam,
the jnam is due to prama, prama is indriya, indriya and the object come to a
relationship where there is a possibility of perception. There is a doa. There is no silver
there. Whatever is necessary for you to commit the mistake is there.
One fellow says that both the silver and the seashell are real. The silver is real as
smti, as memory, but silver itself is elsewhere. You see the shell is. He says that between
the remembered silver which is real and the perceived shell which is real there is a
difference. You do not see the difference, and therefore there is adhysa. There is no
mistake because both the things are real; there is just the not-seeing the difference. The
object is real and the silver is real. In the two aas of the perception you do not see the
difference. The not seeing the difference is also real. He says there is mistake made, but it
is only bheda darana abhva. Therefore akhyti, no mistake.
Another fellow, the anyath khytivdin says the adhysa is abheda daranam.
There are two types of indriyasannikarajnam, laukika and alaukika. Laukika
sannikara indicates an alliance has taken place between the object and the sense organ. If
the object is within the range of sight, sight will take place. Alaukika is when the object
itself is not there, such as here where we have memory of silver. Then it is alaukika.
Rajatam is alaukika sannikara. The anyath khytivdin says between the memory and what
is seen there, abheda daranam takes place. He says that seeing them both as the same is a
mistake. He says this is adhysa.
The mistake itself is viewed differently by khytivdin and the anyath khytivdin.
Anyath khytivdins include the Nyyaikas and Mmsakas, Rmnuja among others. For
both vdas everything is real. Their commitment is to prove everything is real, not to the
prama. Their commitment is to their own schools of theology, their own schools of
thought. They have already decided what is right and wrong, and after that they try to


read this into the stra. The stra does not talk about khyti. stra corrects the mistake.
stra talks about advaita. The one who sees things as separate and different and real is
subject to sasra. The one who does not see the second thing is free from sasra. stra
talks about mistake, and when it does it talks about it as iva, it dismisses it as iva. It talks
about it in terms of reality: vcrambhaa vikro nmadheyam.
What is a pot? There is no mistake here. Pot exists. Ghaatvam is there, and then it
is explained away. The potness belongs to clay; you cannot put the potness elsewhere.
You must put the potness to whatever is the substance. For the clay pot, clay is the
substance and pot is an attribute. But there is no potness that is an attribute to the clay or
the metal or the plastic. The potness is an incidental, not an intrinsic, attribute to the clay.
Where, then, will the potness go? It need not go, because it does not categorically exist.
The potness is neither existent nor non-existent. In dealing with the reality of the pot, you
have to say it is anirvacanyam.
Mithy has the meanings of false and of what is not there, but anirvacanyatvam is
also its meaning. Anirvacanyatvam is not inexplicability, it is that which defies
categorical definition or statement in terms of its reality. A mistake, too, is anirvacanya
because you cannot dismiss your sasritvam, your susceptibility to sukhadukha. Neither
can you prove who is this sad person. The body is not sad. Mind is only a karaa and you
cannot say mind is sad. Asmatpratyayagocara is not subject to sadness. 'I am sad' defies
definition; therefore it is a mistake. It is not asat khyti; it is not akhyti; it is not anyath
khyti; it is anirvacanya khyti. Even the mistake is anirvacanya. If you have become a
sasr, then I will have to say you have to become Brahman. Then you will have to be
ready to become a sasr again. If Brahman somehow managed to become sasr, the
same mistake will come again. Sukh - mukta, dukh - bound, all you are doing is
changing the words.
'You are Brahman' is the vkya. For the question how it became sasr there is no
answer, because the question is wrong. There is no answer. How many horns are there on
a rabbit? If sasritvam is existent it will not go; if it is non-existent it would not be the
problem that you have. So Bhyakra gives a definition for adhysa that will lend itself to
all these fellows. Each will look at Bhyakra's adhysalakaam and commit in his own
way a mistake about the mistake.
Here we have adhysalakaam in the form of question and answer. Ko'yam
adhysa nmeti? What is this adhysa word? Ucyate - smtirpa paratra
prvadvabhsa. This is the adhysalakaam. Adhysa is said to be a perception
similar to memory and based in past experience that comes to be centered on an object
different from the original source. Paratra avabhsa this is adhysa. Yasmin avabhsa.
Paratra means anyatra atasmin, vastuna anyatra. Rajatasya anyatra avabhsa: in that
which is not rajata, rajata avabhsa atasmin tadbuddhi. When you see silver where there
is no silver it is adhysa. Bhyakra will also use his 'atasmin tadbuddhi' definition.
ha they also say in the definition 'prvada avabhsa'. This accommodates the
akhyti fellows. Prvasmin kle dasya avabhsa. What is perceived , the silver, is not
there at the time of seeing, but you have seen it before. Adhysa is the cause for you to


give the silver an appearance. Look at what happens and where. It happens right up here.
The object of your cognition, of your consciousness, shines in your buddhi. Even when
you say it shines somewhere out 'there', it shines only here in your buddhi. Rope or
seashell, it shines here as indriyasannikarajnam. The silver too shines here only.
Idampratyayagocara, yumatpratyayagocara, that which is the object of 'this', is not uktik,
it is rajatam. This is bhrama, not seeing what is there, ayatrthajnam, atasmin tad buddhi.
The bhramasthala is where you have that misapprehension. Your knowledge is not as true
as the object. Yathrthajnam is when the object of your cognition is exactly the object
You take the object which is not silver to be silver; that it is silver is your
knowledge. You are going to look at it only as rajatam. Therefore, in this world of
knowledge you do not look at the world. You look only at what happens in the buddhi.
But we do not say that the world is created by your buddhi. Buddhi is a si, and that is
why vara comes. Whether an object is there or not there, pratyaya is only in the buddhi.
But Bhyakra says yumatpratyayagocara; he does not say there are only pratyayas -there
is an object there. Paratra avabhsa is rajata. Where the shell is there, there appears this
rajata it is smtirpa. Smtirpa smte rpa yasya, an upam samsa. Smtirpa
prvadvabhsa is just memory. Paratra means that in a locus other than the object, you
see the object of which you have memory.
uktirajatam is an example revealing adhysa. You cannot say rajatam does not
exist. A non-existent rajatam does not become a pravartik, a cause for your pursuit of
rajatam. A mistake takes place due to pramdoa. The mistake becomes pravartik.
Rajatajnam is pravartik for icch and kriy. Now apply this to tm. Paratra refers to this
which is the meaning of the I cognition. I say 'meaning of' rather than 'object' so that you
do not commit any mistake about it being an object. In the meaning of the I cognition,
viayii cidtmake, in this which is in the form of consciousness, you see
yumatpratyayagocara, idampratyayagocara, this arram. You objectify this tm with what
is yumatpratyayagocara, and the body is taken to be asmatpratyayagocara. Paratra avabhsa
is clear here. But what is this prvada avabhsa, smtirpa iti? You wake up from deep
sleep. In sleep this adhysa, manuyo'ham sthlo'ham iti, was not there. Now you again
have the adhysa, and it is not a new person who is there. This is the prvada avabhsa.
The same cidtm is taken as so'ham s'ham. It is the good old adhysa.
The child is born identified with this body alone. From there tm and antm are
one and the same. Asmatpratyayagocara and yumatpratyayagocara are mixed up.
Smtirpa prvada avabhsa points out the anditvam of the jva. It is paratra avabhsa,
instinctual smti - the kind that does not mean you should remember your previous name
et cetera. Prvada avabhsa is the adhysalakaam. This tmntmano,
viruddhasvabhvayo, itaretara bhvnupapattau tayo can only be naisargika adhysa. The
baby is born with that adhysa and grows into the adhysa. The birth of the body confirms
the adhysa. avikravn jyate asti vardhate vipariamate apakyate vinayati - aham asmi.
When did mithyjnam start?


It is andi, but it can come to an end because it is not satyam. It is snta, it can
come to an end, it can be negated by knowledge. Therefore the mms; therefore the
stra. Bhyakra's definition of adhysa accommodates all the mistakes, and with that we
This adhysa, khyti, bhrama, mistake, itself becomes a matter of contention.
Some say it is anyatra anyadharmdhysa. tmakhyti and anyath khyti are both also
covered by this. We will look at the arguments - first the tmakhyti.
tmakhyti I am the mistake; there is no other mistake. The error is purely
subjective. Jeya jna jt the difference is itself adhysa. Anyatra means 'other
than what is'. Anyadharmdhysa entirely subjective adhysa of the tm. Whatever I
think is adhysa. One kaika vijnam itself becomes the jt. An impermanent vijnam,
a momentary cognition, becomes a jt. You superimpose a jt, a knower. You
superimpose jna and jnaviaya also. Navara means anityam, that which is dying all
the time. Jt adhysa jna adhysa jeya adhysa - these anyadharmdhysa are the
kaika superimpositions on the tm. With the addition of the nya anyadharmdhysa
argument to this one, all the Bauddhas can come.
All the other fellows accept paratra avabhsa. The logicians - Nyyaikas, and
Vaieikas, are all one group. They see the world as satyam. They develop a logic based
upon certain categories of reality. There are dravyas, substances. There are guas,
attributes. There is samyoga, a particular type of connection like yarn in a cloth. There is
samavaya sambandha, a connection like that between pot and clay. They have categories of
abhva. They have a reasoning to establish the categories. They also create a certain
concept of moka from karma. They talk about a certain si sthiti sahra. By logic they
establish vara. The Nyyaikas and Vaieikas are vaidikas. If they find something missing
in their logic they create a logic to supply it. They create a system of logic to establish
what is not true. They consider themselves great scholars. They have a logic of adhysa. I
will discuss it. I can give you a headache right now.
Anyatra anyadharmdhysa. For the logicians there is no real mistake, whereas the
adhysa is a reality. There is a perception; the dharmas of another are superimposed on a
vastu. This is khyti, and for them it is not a mistake. In the superimposition there is
abheda daranam. They take the two things as one, and the non-difference is said to be
seen. They have a way to explain this. They say the seashell is direct perception, laukika
perception, and the silver is alaukika perception. You see both at once, and there is no
mistake because you have knowledge of both. The perception is indriya artha sannikara
jnam both direct and remembered - and meets the definition of pratyakam.
Here is an example. When I hold the flower and say 'sugandhi pupam', the flower
is pratyakam and the fragrance is parokam. You get knowledge of the flower and of the
fragrance. But the fragrance is not anumna, not inference. It is not the same as inferring
there is fire on the mountain because the smoke is seen. The flower is direct pratyakam;
the fragrance is parokam, alaukika pratyakam, alaukika sannikarajnam. The Nyyaikas
give two more types of jnam: smnya sannikara alaukika jnam and yogajadharma


sannikara jnam. An example of smnya is when you see a cow you generalize all cows.
Without seeing all cows you know the gotvam that all cows share. Yogajadharma is

knowledge by special power. You see what is beyond. You see what is not seen by others.
It too is alaukika sannikara.
When you see the rajatam there, you remember rajatam. The rajata knowledge is
there sannikara. There is a certain sdyam, and the rajatadharma invokes the smtirpa,
alaukika sannikara jnam. And therefore rajatam is anyath khyti. Like the fragrant
flower, you have indirect perception of rajatam and what you see is uktik. From
elsewhere, you remember silver, and the silver remembrance is not distinguished from
the object of perception which is uktik. The difference is not seen; you have abheda di.
The uktik seen and the rajatam are both true, and both are seen together as one. This is
adhysa, called anyath khyti by the Vaieikas and logicians.
The Kaikajnavdin says everything is momentary. He does not really have an
example because everything is kaikajna. There is no extension of an example to tm.
He says the mistake itself is tm. He says vijnam is kaikam, and on that kaikajnam,
jnttva upalabdhi jna upalabdhi jeya upalabdhi are superimposed. He says that is
anyatra anyadharmdhysa. We ask how he came to know the kaika adhihnam of this
adhysa. Leave alone the adhihna, how did he come to know the adhysa? What is the
difference between the two? A moment cannot be an adhihna for adhysa. Adhysa
cannot stay if the adhihna na. To come to know what he calls anyatra is not possible.
No kraka exists if the prathama does not exist. There are many holes in the argument of
the Kaikajnavdin.
The rajatam is seen by me and the idamaa of the uktik is seen by me. The shell
joins with the silver and creates icch and a pursuit. Adhihna and object and adhysa
must all be there in one instant. As long as I see the silver, during vyvahrikakle, when
there is pravtti, it is not kaikam. Rajatam is there yavat klam. In the wake of
knowledge it goes away and we understand that it is atasmin tad buddhi. For us to say this,
the vastu must be available during the vyavahrakla. This is why vyvahrika satta is
accepted by us. Kaikajna is not possible.
We have to consider the arguments of the anyathkhytivdin and the anyatra
anyadharmasya adhysa. Smtirpa means you see an object shell and because of the
sdyam it evokes the memory of the silver, which you superimpose on the shell
perception. The Nyyaikas and Vaieikas say the shell is direct perception; the silver is
indirect perception, alaukika perception, some kind of non-worldly perception, not usual
perception, extra-sensory perception. The seen silver is also knowledge, indirect
knowledge, and we base much of our lives on indirect knowledge. You live your life
based on parokajnam. Parokajnam is not usual sense pratyaka, it is skipratyaka.
But the Nyyaikas and Vaieikas want to establish parokajnam as a perception of a real
The logician says that due to doa, both shell and silver are seen together in the
same place at the same time. He says anyatra anyadharmasya adhysa. Why is it anyatra?


Because the Nyyaikas and Vaieikas accept that it is two different perceptions. But there
are not two different perceptions. If you see the shell and simply have a memory of the
silver you will not have pravtti unless you are a shell collector. There is nothing to
gain by having perception of two real objects. This entire anyathkhyti is all unnecessary.
This is just another attempt to have the ghaa be seen as satyam. If the pot and the clay are
both real, why, whenever I see pot, do I see clay also? Why do I not see a pot without
some substance? To defend his stand the logician comes up with a new idea.
The Nyyaikas and Vaieikas say that between pot and clay there is an inherent
connection, samavya sambandha. The samavya he says is another reality. But we say this
samavya has no meaning. You would have to have another samavya to connect this first
samavya to the clay. There is no way to make any sense of a real connection that joins
the real pot and the real clay. It is meaningless. This anyathkhyti does not work. There
would be no pravtti, and there would be no nivtti from the ania.
What works? Anirvacanya khyti alone is acceptable. Satynte mithunktya
avivekena andi naisargiko'ya lokavyavahra. Lokavyavahra is because of this
combination of what is satyam with what depends entirely upon satyam. Yumadartha
depends upon asmadartha, and asmadartha does not depend upon yumadartha. Asmadartha
does not contain any bit of yumadartha, but then avivekena adhysa. And because of
adhysa, sarvapravtti.
The khyti is viewed differently to suit each one's particular school of thought. It
is a straight mistake, adhysa, paratra avabhsa. Each one has to prove this adhysa in a
particular way because they have to account for dvaita. If we can account for the
tmntm mistake based on the anvayavyatireka argument then advaita will be established.
The world we accept as mithy they want to prove as satyam. They are under pressure to
establish the satyatvam of the jagat, and the pressure, inner pressure, creates the problems.
If jagat satyatvam is true, there is no moka. Bhyakra discusses adhysa to prove there is
moka. There is moka because there is adhysa. Mokya vedntastra, therefore
adhysasiddhi must be there.
Sasritvam must be adhyasta, a superimposition upon the tm due to ajna. To
cover the different approaches extant in his time, Bhyakra accommodates them here
because whichever way they say adhysa is means they accept adhysa. That is good
enough for Bhyakra. All of them accept this paratra avabhsa is the adhysalakaa.
In the bhya sentence, 'tu' differentiates from the preceding definition of khyti.
The Mmsaka presents the akhytivda - different from anyath khyti and different from
tm khyti. This is akhyti. The Mmsaka says there is no real khyti, no real mistake.
There is only aviveka. No abheda is there one object is not mistaken for another. The
anyathkhytivda talked about what is seen and what is remembered. He said both of
them are seen together. The Mmsaka says no, they are not seen together, only the bheda
is not recognized. The difference between what is remembered and what is seen is not
recognized. He says the appearance of the silver on the shell is viveka agrahaam.


In the vastu, on the shell, there is the superimposition of silver. Between the seen
vastu and the other vastu, the remembered vastu, the sthala in the form of buddhirpa,
there is a bheda. One is silver, one is uktik. He says this difference is agrahaam. This
difference is not seen, and there is adhysa, bhrama. But one object is not mistaken for
another object. Two different objects are not recognized as two different objects this is
all. Viveka agrahaam is the kraam, nibandhanam for adhysa. All you require is viveka;
there is no ajnam says the Mmsaka.
These fellows think that they see uktik. You do not see the uktik, you see an
object. Idamaa of the object is all that is seen. But for the logical schools of thought,
they must have real objects. Then karttvam is real. If tm is explained away by viveka
agrahaam, if there is no ajnam, tm is kart and karttvam is the very real nature of
tm. They explain away the mistake in this way. They do not accept adhysa in terms of
satyam and mithy. They have a real heaven they can go to that is their moka. The
Mmsaka is the akhytivdin, he says there is no mistake.
I am staying with the uktik example because I do not want to bring in the other
fellow here. 'Tasya' is adhihnasya here. For the adhysa of the silver, there is the
superimposition, kalpana, of a dharma on the adhihna that is other than the nature of the
adhihna, a vipartadharma. This is what the Vedntins, the anirvacanyakhyti, say. An
object is mistaken for another. There is no this and that, no smtirpa, just one object
mistaken for another, making you desire the object. Ida rajatam is superimposed on the
object. This is called the anirvacanyakhyti because you cannot say the rajatam is satyam.
If it is asat you could not see it; if it is sat it will not go away after more knowledge. The
rajatam cannot be negated, but it resolves in the wake of uktik jnam. Ida rajatam
becomes iya uktik. The idamaa is always retained. It is the dhra, and it goes and
joins the adhihna. 'cakate iti' refers to all the schools of thought.
svRwaip TvNySyaNyxmaRvasta< n Vyicrit, twa c laek=
e nuv> - zuika ih rjtvdvaste,
@kN> sitIyvdit,
Sarvathpi tvanyasynyadharmvabhsat na vyabhicarati | tath ca loke'nubhava uktik hi rajatavadavabhsate, ekacandra sadvityavadati |

In all the pakas, the viewpoints already discussed, one thing is evident: anyasya
anyadharma avabhsa, paratra avabhsa, the adhysalakaa. The appearance of another
dharma in a given place does not transgress what any of them say. A given vastu
appearing differently is accepted by all of the matas. It is the same whether you add
memory or aviveka or whatever. They do not transgress, vyabhicarati, the original
definition. If the uktik is aparoka, if you see the shell, it makes no sense to say that you
see it, then it becomes paroka, and then you take it as parokarajata. In the anyath khyti,
even if you remember the silver from elsewhere you are not seeing it here. Before your
conclusion that it is a silver coin, all you can say is the object looks like silver. You
cannot say the silver is categorically real or unreal, existent or non-existent.


The anirvacanyakhyti answers all the questions, and if there is a nyavdin who
says there is only the non-existent rajatam, we say, 'What about the ukti? ' And if the
rajata is non-existent, how is it going to make you go after it? How can there be nye
nyadaranam? There is not much to argue with the nyavdin. He has no prama and
therefore no certitude and no knowledge possible. Since all of the schools agree there is
adhysa, there is further yukti necessary. Do not ask how the rope can appear snake, just
see yourself jump and scream. Anubhava does not have a logic to explain itself true of not.
You can analyze the blue sky and the sun rising and setting. What you see is true, why
you see it so we can discuss.
tm is also anubhava. It is anubhtisvarpa. Every anubhava is parambrahma. How
is to be assimilated. You need not realize Brahman, just realize the mistake. The mistake
of superimposition, that it is not true, is your experience and requires no yukti. You say
you are dukh, that that is your experience. stra says you are nanda. How do you
accommodate your experience? Hey, you are dukh and you are nanda. But you do not
know how. That is the problem, you do not know. We are not establishing dukhitvam by
yukti. In the world you have experience, and that is prasiddha. After the uktik is known,
you realize uktik alone rajatavat avabhsate. The k puts it in the past tense after
negation the uktik is known to have appeared - but it is the knowledge that this is uktik
that is now the experience of the knower. You are there with the experience - the
understanding is for your sake.
One fellow says he sees two moons. The uktirajata example was 'what is there
appears differently' nityavastuna anityavat avabhsate. This moon example is 'what is
there is one and it appears many' eka vastu dvaitam iva avabhsate. The adhysabhrama
in both is viparta dharmatva kalpana.
kw< pun> TygaTmNyiv;ye=Xyasae iv;ytmaR[a<,
Katha puna pratyagtmanyaviaye'dhyso viayataddharmm |
Question: How is it that on the pthagtm, which is the locus, which is not available for
objectification, the dharmas of the ahakara are superimposed?
Siddhnta: 'Aviaya' here is viaya virodh. There can be neither dharm adhysa nor
dharma adhysa for tm. Either dharm, the object itself, is mistaken for the tm, or
antmadharma adhysa. Things that belong to the mind are attributed to tm: sakalpavn
vikalpavn aham, kart aham asmi, sukhidukh aham asmi. The entire ahakra becomes the
dharm. They are all dharm adhysa. In fact the adhysa is all dharmdhyasa there is no
other dharm. It is all as though there is dharm adhysa.
svaeR ih purae=viSwte iv;ye iv;yaNtrmXySyit, yu:mTTyyapetSy c TygaTmnae=iv;yTv< vIi;,
Sarvo hi puro'vasthite viaye viayntaramadhyasyati, yumatpratyaypetasya ca
pratyagtmano'viayatva bravi |
Prvapaka: Everyone superimposes an object upon another object which is in
front of the senses, which is objectified. This pthagtm is aviaya, and aviayasya
indriyasannikaratva nsti. An adhihna needs to be objectified, needs to be


indriyasannikara uktikym. Here the object of adhysa is aparoka, pratyaka, na paroka.

That is okay for the shell. But what about for the drnta? The pthagtm is not subject
to adhysa. A postulate is called vypti for example, yatra yatra dhma tatra tatra vani.
Once you know it is not fog, you can say there is fire. Vyptijnam is the basis for

Yatra yatra aparoka adhysa adhihnatvam tatra tatra indriyasannikaratva.
Without an adhihna, the locus, there is no adhysa, and the adhysa adhihna must be
aparoka. Pthagtm does not have indriyasannikaratva, it cannot be an adhihna for
adhysa. Vypaka abhva pthagtmana. Pthagtm is not available for objectification,
for 'this' cognition. How are you going to commit a mistake about tm?
This is what the akhyti says; this is what they will all say. They say the adhysa
does not take place. They say this is what akara said in the first sentence of the bhya:
adhysa is not possible; one cannot get mixed-up with the other.
The prvapak goes on. tm cannot become the object of idampratyaya. Everyone
who commits the mistake sees something in front of them which is indriyasannikara. The
object is objectified by the senses, by mind, by you and you do adhysa. tm is not an
object for yumatpratyaya, for 'this' cognition. The never-objectified pthagtm, aviaya,

cannot be a locus for committing a mistake. You are not going to commit a mistake about
tm. Your mistake, siddhnt, is that you think tm is subject to mistake. tm cannot be
mistaken. It is not available for adhysa. The adhysa does not take place. And even
though you give the examples of rajata and eka candra, there is no connection between the
examples and the tm. The pressure to establish tmntma adhysa has forced you to
make a mistake, forced you to say that tm is a viaya. To say that tm has viayatvam
goes against what ruti says as well negating what siddhnta says. Adhysa is not
acceptable, not possible.
Siddhnta: Who told you about this indriyasannikaratva and the adhihna? It is
something you made up. We say yatra yatra adhysa tatra tatra adhihna prasiddhatvam.
Wherever there is a superimposition, the locus of the superimposition is evident. We do
not say it must be evident to senses or any prama you have, we say the adhihna can
be evident without prama. Either it is evident through prama, or it is evident without
prama. Here, the adhihna is evident without prama.
tm is nitya aparoka. Eyes are not the only means for an object to become
evident and for you to make a mistake. Sound and other senses as well allow you to make
a mistake. The pramt is tm. tm is the tm of the pramt. This is the real viay.
tm is svapraka svatasiddha; tm is not totally unknown.
Question: If tm is known, why do I need Vednta? What I need is good karma.
Siddhnta: tm is evident enough to commit a mistake. If tm, in its svarpa,
were totally evident to you, it would not be the locus for a mistake. If tm were not
evident to you at all, it would not be the locus for a mistake. What you are totally
conscious of is 'aham asmi'. With this you can ask a question and come to a conclusion
about yourself.


%Cyte-n tavdymekaNtenaiv;y>, ASmTTyyiv;yTvat! ,Aprae]Tva TygaTmise,

Ucyate-na tvadayamekntenviaya, asmatpratyayaviayatvt, aparokatvcca
pratyagtmaprasiddhe |
Ucyate for this objection, tm is aviaya, and being aviaya it is aprasiddha. The
popular take on viaya and aviaya is that one is yumatpratyayagocara and the other is
asmatpratyayagocara, but do not go by what is popular. We are not talking about
pramaprasiddhatvam. Without pramaprasiddhatvam, tm is evident. Note that even
here we are using ayam, idamabda, for tm. This pthagtm, ayam, is not a totally
unknown subject matter. It has been used previously as the viaya of asmatpratyaya.
Pratyayaviayatvam asti. True, it is not an object of 'this' cognition, but pthagtm is the
object of 'I' cognition. And it is prama anapeka. This is the nityparokatvam. This is the

Yasya prasiddhe prama apekatvam. This is antm, yumatpratyayagocara.
Suppose you say svarga asti. This means svarga is yumatpratyayagocara,
idampratyayagocara. Yasya svargasya prasiddhavtvam, then what is the prama? It is not
pratyaka anumna arthpatti upamna anupalabdhi. It is abdam. But tm prasiddhi has no
prama apeka svatasiddhatvt asmatpratyayagocaratvt nitya aparokatvt. Yadyat prama
apeka tattat na nitya aparokam. It may become aparokam. Indriya sannikaratve sati
Now, so'yam tm nitya aparoka. Pthagtm is always prasiddha. Now you
know nitya aparokatvam is prama anapekatva prasiddhe. tm does not depend upon

a means of knowledge for its coming to light. It is this by which everything else comes to
light. tmana nitya aparokatvam aparokatvt. Aparokatvcca pthagtm prasiddha. The
vyptis are all there. Adhysa is there, but prama is not there. Svatasiddhatve aha
brahmeti jnam is not there and it needs to be. Therefore it is clear: ajnam asti. tm
ajnam asti. This means adhysa asti. This means prama apekate. What pramam?
Not a useless prama, not one for that which is prama anapeka. Only the other prama
can work here. Brahmtmana prama anapekatve sati tmana brahmatve anadhigatatvam.
stra is the prama.
n caymiSt inym> purae=viSwt @v iv;ye iv;yaNtrmXyistVyimit, ATy]e=ip akaze
balaStlmilnta*XySyiNt, @vmiv> TygaTmNyPynaTmaXyas>,
Na cyamasti niyama puro'vasthita eva viaye viayntaramadhyasitavyamiti |
apratyake'pi hyke blstalamalinatdyadhyasyanti | evamaviruddha
pratyagtmanyapyantmdhysa |

Even though this pthagtm is not available for objectification, it is adhysa

adhihna. It becomes the locus for adhysa prasiddhatvt. Adhihnaprasiddhi must be
there. There is no rule that a locus of superimposition be objectifiable by you. The rule is
that the locus be evident. Evident through a prama, it is objectified, like the seashell.
Even one's psychological self is mistaken by oneself. This is why you require a specialist


to analyze you and tell you what you are. Because everyone continues to feel guilty for
omissions and commissions as a child. The child was innocent and not responsible. But
the child was made to feel guilty because of the environment mother and father,
grandmother, whoever was around. Even your own emotion of being guilty is purely a
mistake. Obviously, it is not indriyapratyaka alone that becomes an object for
superimposition. The only requirement is the locus must be prasiddha, evident. Its
existence, its being there, must be known to you either as self-evident or as evident to the
'Aham asmi' is there in the ahakra. But there is what we must call a self-evident
element or component, the pthagtm, that is not objectified. This viay, pthagtm, is
aparoka, evident to you without a prama. It is known to you as the asmatpratyayaviaya.
It can be the ahakra, or it can be an unidentified aham asmi. Pthagtmana
asmatpratyayaviayatvena viayatvam prasiddha. Pthagtmana prasiddhe aparokatvt. We
are talking about what is lokaprasiddhi, not saccidnanda. We are talking about 'I am', the
common perception of the self-evident self.
Moreover, there is no rule that superimposition must be on something that is
directly in front of you. The seashell is there, and there is adhysa. Another example will
demonstrate the lack of a rule. Space is not available for your eyes. You do not see space.
It has no form or color. Even though indriya aviayatve, other viayas are superimposed on
space. Space is seen as a vast dome or as having tint or discoloration. Space is
skipratyaka, here described as puro'vasthita. You are the witness and you see the light
reflected in dust particles in what you see as blue sky. Those who do not know see an
unclear sky in the shape of a vast cap. But we well know that space is not seen by the
eyes. Even though not an object of the senses, space is seen to have attributes of sense
Just so, the body-mind-sense complex adhysa upon the tm does not contradict
any rule of adhysa. tmani antm adhysa antmanyapi tm adhysa aviruddha.
Therefore bondage becomes false, mithy, and moka is already there. As such, one has to
understand. Jna apeka is there. Jnd eva moka. Knowledge of what? Knowledge of
tm being Brahman. The dhra of the adhysa is aham asmi. This is the prasiddha aa,
the locus for adhysa. And if you say you are sasr, that sasrtvam is ropita on the
tm, because tm is jagatkraa satya jnamananta Brahma. This is not known.
Therefore moka is by jnam. When you know this, pravtti vicrtmake stre, prama
apeka. There is the connection to the Brahmastras. So even if it is there, adhysa is a
matter for celebration because moka is there. In the adhysasiddhi itself, even if it begins
with the snake, there is some nanda.
Question: Is the pramt born of tmntm adhysa, or is it the pthagtm?
If you say the pramt is pthagtm, then there are many tms. If the pramt is
the reality of tm, if pramttvam is the nature of tm, there is no moka. If pramttvam
were intrinsic you could not sleep, you would be bombarded with stimuli. Pramttvam is
itself due to adhysa. Adhysa means mithy. If you know, it is mithy; if you don't know,


it is adhysa. As I told you, the adhysa mistake will always continue whether you know
or you don't know. That means it is mithy.
There is tmntm sambandha. tm cannot become antm, antm cannot
become tm because antm is tm. Mithybodha is the sambandha. It is
dhysikasambandha alone. There is no real sambandha. This is varasi. This is myakti.
There is sambandha and sambandha is not possible there is no antm when you analyze.
The pramt is born of tmntm adhysa, and he has no clue that he is parambrahma. To
say pramt, prameya and prama are all one and the same, to say the vastu transcends all
the three, this fact has to be unfolded by another prama. This other prama must create
a jnam which removes this avidy born of aviveka. It is the only vidy where pramt
himself goes away.
Your Nyyaika, Vaieika, Mmsa, Skhya fellows all retain the pramt. These
are schools of consistent confusion. The Brahmastras will take the whole thing as
nothing but tmntm adhysa. Vedntavkyavicra kartavya iti. The first stra will be a
vicra on prama itself.
tmetmev< l][mXyas< pi{fta Aiv*eit mNyNte, tivekn
e c vStuSvpavxar[< iv*ama>,
Tametameva lakaamadhysa pait avidyeti manyante | tadvivekena ca
vastusvarpvadhraa vidymhu |

Those with strajnam know the adhysa pointed out by the adhysalakaa to be
avidy. Why Bhyakra says this here I do not know. He thought it would not cause
confusion, but it has. What is that avidy? Bhyakra says this adhysa is avidy. He says
that anything that you do based upon the original adhysa, adhering to the adhysa, will
not address the original avidy. Keeping to tmntm alone, all our lokavyvahras, all our
activities, all our spiritual activities will be based on the rudimentary adhysa.
Begin with tmntm adhysa. Without this adhysa there is no pramt, and
neither knowing nor employing a means of knowledge is possible. There is no knower
there. Pthagtm is not a knower. Antm is not a knower. But tmntm is a knower,
and from this come all your activities. tmntm adhysa is also the bhokt and the kart.
Vaidika karma or whatever karma, tmntm adhysa continues. With or without
understanding, tmntm adhysa can continue. There may be a pramt, but there is a lot
of ignorant groping and complaining involved. The whole thing is called avidy. You
require vidy.
The vastu svarpa nirdhraa vidy alone can eliminate avidy. What is tm, what
is antm has to be very clear. Vicra leading to knowedge after negating what is not true
addresses atasmin tad buddhi. Nirdhraa vidy is what you require. The avidy is a
dynamic form of avidy, this because of which all your activities are taken up. And yet
the pursuit of this knowledge is not one of your activities. Bhyakra wants you to
understand the profundity of the whole thing.
All vyvahras, even mokavyavahras, all activities, activities employing a means of
knowledge to know something and activities doing or enjoying or experiencing


something, are possible only because of tmntm adhysa. tm is taken for antm,
antm is taken for tm. Mostly, antm dharmas are superimposed on the tm. Upon
analysis, this so-called antm is nothing but nmarpa. There is no such thing as antm.
The nmarpas, vyvahrayogya, including this dehdi, have certain attributes in fact they
are attributes alone. These attributes are taken to be entities. Their entityhood is because
of the being that is tm. Adhysa means an attribute is taken to be an entity. Attributefree tm is given all these attributes. When you say 'I am a mortal', the mortality
becomes an entity, and the actual entity is reduced to an attribute. This is itaretara adhysa.
Without this, there is no vyvahra. All vyvahras are centered on this adhysa.
Laukika and vaidika activities, religious and spiritual, are based upon this adhysa.
All activities depend on the krakas. That without which there is no action, no kriy
nipatti, is called kraka. The object, that which is revealed by the second declensional
case; the means, that which is revealed by the third case; the purpose, that which is
revealed by the fourth case, and so on are all revealed by the krakas. All these other
krakas are centered on the prathamakraka, and all activities are centered on the krakas.
All knowing and all action is centered on the adhysa aham idam, mama idam. All
activities are centered on a basic mistake. The adhysa will continue even after the
mistake is corrected, but atasmin tad buddhi will not continue.
Once the crystal is understood as crystal, whether it appears with color or not, the
crystal is understood as without color. tm is free from any gua because adhysa does
not leave any of its qualities to the adhihna. The silver on the shell, the poisonous snake
on the rope what is the connection? The rope does not become poisonous. The doa or
the gua, the poison or the value of the silver, is not going to be there in the shell. The
adhihna remains always the same.
As long as this is not understood, all our vyvahras are of no consequence really.
The individual is self-conscious, self-judging, sensitive and defensive, and the judgment
is 'I am a pramt bhokt kart.' One's knowledge is in service of actions fulfilling desires,
ambitions, choosing and not choosing bhogas and artha. Education is all connected to
provision. It seems only a confused pramt wants moka. Most lives are based on
confusion, tmntm confusion, on avidy. Without resolving the confusion, people stay
busy, busy. Why? Because there is self-judgment - I am inadequate, I need to be adequate,
in order to be adequate I need to get this and that.
The inadequacy itself is due to my being a pramt. The pramt's svarpa is
adequacy, the pramt is inadequate. This adhysa is avidy. It is going around the circle of
sasra. All theologies come under this one head avidy. The vicra here is prama,
vidy that is virodh, not abhva. Abhva cannot do anything; in fact abhva does not exist.
There is no abhva of Brahman; there is no abhva of tm; there is no abhva of knowledge.
tm is jnasvarpa. This avidy that denies you the fact of the self being parambrahma is
vidyay nivartate. Ajnanivtti eva jnaphalam means avidy is not jna abhva. Abhva
has no nivtti.
Adhysa nivtti is not what we are interested in; one adhysa will go and another
will come. It is the adhysasya kraam avidy bhta that goes away, yay ayam tm

sasr bhavati nivartate. Vastusvarpanirdharaam eva vidy. If after vidy the adhysa had
no existence, no one would be interested in this jnam. Only after bdhita adhysa,
adhysa becomes fun. Pait avidyeti manyante those who know honor it as avidy. It is
given an honorable existence for the time being, because in the wake of vidy it goes
away. It is by a certain viveka, because this is a different type of knowledge, because even
when you are looking at the stra you are a pramt. The tmntm is already mixed-up.
Therefore this is vivekajna.
The knowledge here is all the dharmas of the tm are only superimposed dharmas.
Really there is no antm antm is tm. Bhyakra does not say tmntmajnena, he
says vastusvarpvadhraa vidym hu. This whole grantha is vicrtmakagrantha. The
bhya is the ascertainment of strattparya, removing all doubts about the prama, and
responding to those who have questions about this vision of that stra. We consider the
different contentions and see their fallacies. With this, vidy is niraya
The inquiry starts with what is mixed-up. You hear this and that about tm. You
read this and that and what do you find? You find you have more questions about tm
and more about those who think they know. tm is a subject matter of contention and
saaya. There is a feeling inside of uncertainty, of vagueness, doubt and error. What is
Brahman is not known. The mistake is all over, in the eternal and the supreme and the
inifinite and the divine and in consciousness. Vastusvarpaniraya is the nicaya after
vicra. This nirdhraam is called vidy .
tEv< sit y ydXyasStTktn
e dae;[
e gu[n
e va=[umae[aip s n s<bXyte,
tmetmiv*aOymaTmanaTmnaeirtretraXyas< purSkTy sveR ma[meyVyvhara laEikka vEidka v&a>,
svaRi[ c zaai[ ivixit;exmae]prai[,
Tatraiva sati yatra yadadhysastatktena doea guena v'umtrepi sa na
sambadhyate | tametamavidykhyamtmntmanor- itaretardhysa purasktya sarve
pramaprameyavyavahr laukik vaidikca pravtt | sarvi ca stri
vidhipratiedhamokapari |

The object that is superimposed upon is not, even at an atomic level, one bit
affected by either the gua or by doa. Here, the pthagtm is adhihna for this itaretara
adhysa. The adhihna is not affected. tmntm has become the pthagtm; pure
pthagtm cannot perform any action. The itaretara adhysa is the basis for every pursuit.
Whether the pursuit is for karmaphala or for knowledge it is the same. The tmntm
adhysa purasktya; it is kept as the basis for all activities.
The kkra says pramam ha, but it is not prama. The two things are mixedup, but Bhyakra is not proving any adhysa. The adhysa is anubhavasiddha; it requires
no other prama. The avidyvn is the pramt who is due to tmntmdhysa, and
antm is a dharma only - not an entity, jaa, it cannot do anything. Neither can
saccitsvarpa tm do anything. Uktalakaam adhysa, adhysa as has been defined, is well


established. It has been said to be skipratyaka. Moreover, it is bdhita avidy adhysa;

after vidy the adhysa remains. Therefore the avidy is both krya and kraa. The adhysa
remains as avidy krya, bdhita avidy, after jnam.
Pramaprameyavyavahra are laukika and vaidika. The vaidika is
abdapramavyavahra. Prameya determines the prama, but, as well, prama brings in
prameya. So, pramaprameyavyavahra. All of them are centered on the pramt. All
vaidika karmas, vidhi and pratiedha stra, where there is li - imperative mode, lo potential mode, or tavya used both in the positive and negative senses, are for the kart,
the one with phala icch. Mokatra vkyni are meant for the one who says 'I am sasr'.
If he thinks that karma, even upsana, will give him anything but sasra, he is confused,
Purposely Bhyakra said 'avidykhyam.' He knew saying adhysa was avidy
would disturb some. How could the vaidikakarmas be meant for avidyvn? All vyavahras
are meant for avidyvn? Pramt is born of confusion? All valid knowledge gained
through senses and inference and the other pramas is gathered by a fellow who is not
valid? akara says, "Yes, Sir."
kwm! punriv*avi;yai[ Ty]adIin ma[ain zaai[ ceit,
Katham punaravidyvadviayi pratyakdni pramni stri ceti |
Bhyakra calls adhysa avidy because he wants this discussion. It allows him to
enter into Vednta. He will confront the Karmakain who says karma moksa.
Bhyakra says the avidyvn adhysavn tm pramt is the raya, the viaya, the
subject matter for the stra. Vidhi and pratiedha are the subject matter of the stra, and
those are for the kart bhokt, the sasr. The entire dharmastra and mokastra are for
the avidyvn.
Prvapakin: How can valid knowledge gained through the pramas be for the
avidyvn? The shell and the silver are both real. The connections between the pramas
and prameyas are real. Means and ends are real; given karmas have given results. How can

all these be for the confused fellow?

%Cyte - dehie Nyaid:vh<mmaimanrihtSy mat&TvanuppaE ma[v&ynuppe>,
Ucyate - dehendriydivahammambhimnarahitasya pramttvnupapattau
pramapravttyanupapatte |
Siddhnta: How can the pthagtm, which cannot be objectified, which according
to the stra has no attributes, not be the same for all? How can it not be the same for
ghastha and bramacr and mosquito. How, for all, can the object of 'I' cognition become
an object, yumatpratyayaviaya? I have said from the start that asmatpratyayaviaya and
yumatpratyayaviaya can never combine.
There is no difference between the asmatpratyayaviaya of the bramacr and the
asmatpratyayaviaya of the ghastha, but a ghastha alone can perform agnihotra. Bramacr
is not the dharma of pthagtm. Grhasthya is not the dharma of pthagtm. If you say


vidhipratiedastra is for a ghastha, you have tmntm adhysa. All the ramas are all
based on adhysa. Nevertheless, adhysa as the basis for pramttvam is in no way a threat
to pramaprameyavyavahra, to varasi. What is not true is that pramttvam is the
dharma of the tm.
How can adhysa be avidy is the crux of the question. How can the pramas be
valid means of knowledge for an avidyvn? If you move a flute made from a gourd in

front of a ropesnake, it will not raise its hood. Even if you bring a real mongoose the
ropesnake will not get up. The prvapakin says that Bhyakra is saying that the
ropesnake is being made to do all of vyavahra.
Siddhnta: Vidhiniedhastra, much less mokastra, does not address a jaa tm,
antm. And pthagtm does not require vidhiniedha or moka. Always, itaretara adhysa
must be there. In deha mana indriya there must be abhimna, aha mama buddhi. Without
this, there would be no pramttvam. Pramt has two things: pramaprerakatvam and
prama rayatvam. Pramaprerakatvam means when you want to see something you
open your eyes and only your own eyes. Mama abhimna must be there. The entire
antakaraa, avacchinna tm, the pramt itself, is due to this anyonya adhysa. Prama
rayatvam means all the pramas are centered on the pramt. When you employ a
means of knowledge, all pramaphala go to the pramt. The pramaphalapravtti itself is
due to pramt.
nhIiNya{ynupaday Ty]aidVyvhar> s<vit,
Nahndriyyanupdya pratyakdivyavahra sambhavati |

Then Bhyakra tells the contrasting aspect, the negative aspect. Without
employing the senses et cetera, there is no way of pratyakavyvahra, direct perception.
What you have is hallucination. When with the eyes you see smoke, you know there is
fire. With your senses you get the liga, the hetu, that bring you jnam through anumna
and then, through the anumnas, arthpatti. Without employing the indriyas there is no
question of pratyaka.
The kkra confirms that when the pramt is there, there is tmntm adhysa,
and without the dehdiu abhimna there is no question of any vyavahra, of adhysa. In
sleep you do not find any vyavahra. When there is vyavahra, dehdi abhimna is there.
You know this by anvayavyatireka. Again the k is trying unnecessarily to prove adhysa.
Why did I look into this?
n caixanmNtre[ie Nya[a< Vyvhar> s<vit, n canXyStaTmaven dehn
e kiaiyte, n
cEtiSmNsvRiSmsit AsSyaTmn> mat&Tvmupp*te , nc mat&TvmNtre[ ma[v&iriSt,
tSmadiv*avi;ya{yev Ty]adIin ma[ain zaai[ c,
Na cdhihnamantareendriy vyavahra sambhavati | na
cnadhyasttmabhvena dehena kacidvypriyate | na caitasminsarvasminnasati
asagasytmana pramttvamupapadyate | naca pramttvamantarea pramapravttirasti |
tasmdavidyvadviayyeva pratyakdni pramni stri ca |


All vyavahra is centered on this tmntm adhysa. Without the adhihna, do the
indriyas function? Have you ever heard me say something like, 'You must control the
senses'? You will not, because the poor senses do not do anything. You cannot blame the
senses for what you do. You see sentences like 'indriya nigraha' and 'indriyi
indriyrtheu nigraha ki kariyati' in the stra. But what stra is saying there is that
with regard to sense pursuits one must have one's own say. One cannot just go by one's
fancies. stra is talking to the individual. The indriyas are not themselves active. The
pramt is the pramraya and pramaprerakata. Adhihna can be taken here as the
pramt, or you can go one step further to pramtu adhihna, the pthagtm which is
caitanyasvarpa. Without the pramt who is the locus for all the senses, enjoying his own
caitanytm adhihna, there is no sense activity.
Without the deha taken as yourself, you cannot do a thing. Without a body on
which tm is superimposed and tm taken to be with a body, there is no vyavahra at all.
I do not say there is association between pthagtm and deha indriya mana antakaraa
pramt. I never say that. There is neither attachment not detachment; association does
not exist for tm. Asaga hi tm. Asagasya tmana pramttvam is not possible when
kryakraasaghta adhysa is not there. All pramapravtti is because pramttvam is
there. The person who has this avidy, adhyasavat viayi, adhysavn purua, is the
subject matter, the hero, for all activities including all stras.
In order to use the pramas you require to be a pramt. The pramt itself is not
possible without adhysa. So adhysa is only mithy. What mithy? Like ghaamithy.
Vyvahrika mithy; tdtmyam is mithy. The word adhysa can be confusing. tmntm
tdtmyam is mithy. The word adhysa is to be understood that way, because all
vyavahras are mithy. tmntm adhysa is avidy.
This adhysa itself being avidy, all the pramas become avidyvat viayi.
tmana pramttvam is due to avidy alone. tmana karttvam bhokttvam are due to
adhysa. The stra that offers dos and don'ts does so to the kart. Without kart, vedastra
has nobody to address and ceases to be a prama without this adhysa.
Question: Were the is confused when they received vedajnam? We cannot
tolerate the conclusion that avidy is the basis for all prama activities. Valid knowledge
cannot be based upon a confusion. You cannot say the basic person is a confused person
and everything else is okay. The vedastra was revealed to the is in their Sanskrit
language; therefore you are saying the gotras too are confused. We cannot accept that the
avidyvn purua is the pramt. The vyavahra of a person and the valid knowledge he
gains through his senses et cetera are not based on confusion.
Siddhnta: You need not be informed as to saccidnandasvarpa tm to conduct
these activities. All these activities can take place within vyvahrikamithytvam. Because
that vyvahrikamithytvam is there, there can be a bdhita adhysa. There is no association
possible for tm and antm, for satyam and mithy. The 'other' being mithy, there is no
'other'. There is no association. Look at the pot and clay. Pot and pot can have a
relationship, but between two different orders of reality there cannot be association.


Tdtmyam is not possible. The association between clay and pot can be said only to be
dhysika sambandha.
Adhysa is mithy. Adhysa means s dhtu adhiktya ste. The pot exists, it is,
because mt adhiktya ste ghaa. This resting on or abiding in is the sense of adhysa, also
expressed as atasmin tad buddhi. There are two types of mithy. One mithy is between
vyvahrika, the ghaa, and pramrthika, the clay. Assume clay is pramrthika. That
sambandha between the two is not established by me that is what vara is. This is where
there is confusion in so many books. The sambandha between vyvahrikam and
pramrthikam is mithybhta sambandha, dhysika sambandha.
The other one is also mithy. The sambandha between the vyvahrika and the
prtibhsika is ropesnake sambandha, prtibhsika sambandha. The example itself gives a
problem. It must be limited to where we are talking about prtibhsikam. It too is dhysika
sambandha. The rope is vyvahrika and a snake is also vyvahrika two different objects,
one alive, one jaa. But the ropesnake has a sambandha with the rope, dhysika sambandha.
Unlike the pot, this mithytvam is of that which is not varasi. If it were non-existent
you would not see the snake there. If it were existent it would not be bdhita in the wake
of knowledge. The sambandha between the vyvahrika and the prtibhsika is dhysika.
There are no two different things: prtibhsikam is vyvahrikam, and the vyvahrikam is
That is why you cannot bypass psychology. There is so much prtibhsika, and
there is no direct relationship between prtibhsika and pramrthika. There is a parampara
relationship: the prtibhsika must be reduced to vyvahrika vyvahrika means vara.
Settling accounts with vara is what is so important. There is no direct way from
prtibhsika to pramrthika. Prtibhsika is nothing but vyvahrika, and vyvahrika is not
understood. Vyvahrika is mistaken that is prtibhsika. The ropesnake is the example

that we give for people's confusion.

What is corrected by knowledge is prtibhsika. What continues to exist in spite of
knowledge, whether you have knowledge or not, is vyvahrika. What exists for a wise
person is dhysika, bdhita adhysa. Bdhita means it is already negated in terms of
knowledge. The jtjnajneyabheda is bdhitabheda. Pramt is negated, but I am a
pramt. It is something like an actor knowing he is not the role. But whether or not he
knows, the adhysa will be there. The pramas and the stra all begin with the
assumption of the tmntm adhysa. Even after jnam, the indriyapramas and stra
operate in terms of the avidyvn.
Pavdibhicviet |

It is the same for animals. Animals, including reptiles and birds, have perceptions
and make inferences. Some can interpret certain things. Yumatpratyayagocara and
asmatpratyayagocara are mixed up for a bat also. Yet it is able to conduct all its activities.
One need not remove this adhysa. For animals and humans the pramt is good enough;


you need not know tm vijnam. But this avidy can be taken care of. And unless it is
taken care of there is no respite from insecurity and self-judgment and pressure to
ywa ih pady> zBdaidi> aeadIna< s<bNxe sit zBdaidiv}ane itkle jate ttae invtRNte Anukl
c vtRNte, ywa d{fae*tkr< pu;mimuomupl_y ma< hNtumyimCDtIit plaiytumarNte,
R ai[mupl_y t< TyimuoI viNt,
Yath hi pavdaya abddibhi rotrdn sambandhe sati abddivijne pratikle
jte tato nivartante anukle ca pravartante | yath daodyatakara
puruamabhimukhamupalabhya m hantumayamicchatti palyitumrabhante,
haritataprapimupalabhya ta pratyabhimukh bhavanti |

The example of the animals that Bhyakra uses here has a hetu. It has to for you
to make a conclusion. In terms of logic, the pakadharma should be extended to where you
want to make a sdhya. All animals will interpret the information from their senses in
terms of their desires and aversions. A cow will ignore the stick in your hand until you
raise your hand and approach him. Seeing your actions the cow makes an inferential
conclusion that you intend to hurt him. The cow does not want this, and he begins to
move away. Now if you approach the cow with a bunch of green grass and call to him,
the cow will look up and infer that there is something he wants. The cow makes a
decision based on his pramas and bases his actions as a result of the knowledge. A
human being does exactly the same.
This is the hetu. Humans go after and come away from, pravartante and nivartante,
the objects they come to know in the same way as animals. It is pramaprameya
vyavahra. Avidyvattvam is there for both the pau and the person, and they both conduct
their activities based on gained knowledge. You can be a pramt and at the same time
@v< pu;a Aip VyuTpica> rInaaezt> Svae*tkraNblvt %pl_y ttae invtRNte,
tiprItaNit vtRNte, At> sman> paixi> pu;a[a< ma[meyVyvhar>,
Eva puru api vyutpannacitt krradnkroata svagodyatakarnbalavata
upalabhya tato nivartante, tadvipartnprati pravartante, ata samna pavdhibhi puru
pramaprameyavyavahra |
Adhysa purasktya eva sarve vyavahra all pramaprameyavyavahras are
centered on the pramt. Pramttvam is not there for the pthagtm. Whatever creates the
yumatpratayaviaya is not possible without adhysa. The yumatpratayaviaya, the dya, is
antm. There is no dk dya sambandha possible without adhysa. This adhysasambandha
purasktya sarve vyavahra. This is the pramttvam.
The pravtti and nivtti of the cow are based on pramaprameyavyavahra.
Pratyakajnam precedes the other pramas and the choices the cow makes. It is the
same for you. The prvapakin's argument here is that the actions of the cow do not prove


there is adhysa in the cow and in the human. He says the dnta has no sambandha with
what Bhyakra is trying to prove. Just because a cow does things based on the
knowledge gained by his means of knowledge and a human does too does not mean there
is adhysa for a human.
Siddhnta: We are not trying to prove adhysa. Pramaprameyavyavahra does not
require tmntmvivekajnam. From its own behavior we see that the cow does not have
viveka, does not have buddhi, does not have choice, does not have self-judgment. The cow
does not wear clothes or stand in front of mirror. Self-confusion is not there and selfknowledge is not possible. But tmntm adhysa is there, and asmatpratayaviaya is there.
In accord with adhysa animals participate in vyavahra. The adhysa is prasiddha, and
avidyvattvam is in no way a contradiction to or denial of having
tTsamaNydzRnauTpimtamip pu;a[a< Ty]aidVyvharStTkal> sman #it inIyte,
Tatsmnyadaranhyutpattimatmapi puru pratyakdivyavahrastatkla
samna iti nicyate |
Vyavahra adhysakla is samna for animals and even highly educated people,
those who can use arthpatti. When adhysa takes place, then there is vyavahra for all
animals and humans. In terms of logic, that is the paka. Anvaya and vyatireka, adhysa and
vyavahra, are either both there or both not there. Avidyvattvam is not a pratibandha for
Question: What about stra and strakarma? Is adhysa there for this as well? We
accept that adhysa is there in laukika vyavahra. The cow runs away from an angry man
with a stick, and a man would do the same. Decisions about pravtti and nivtti and means
and ends, that they are based in prama, are the same for men and animals. But decisions
about rituals and vaidikakarma are not based on adhysa. An animal cannot do these things.
One must know that tm survives death, that you can acquire puya, that puya stands in
your credit, that puya will take you to a better birth after death. This knowledge is
abdajanya; Veda has to give you that jnam. Only when one knows this tm survives

death can he perform those rituals. There is no similarity between animals and humans in
zaIye tu Vyvhare y*ip buipUvk
R arI naividTvaTmn> prlaeks<bNxmixiyte twaip n
vedaNtve*mznaya*tItmpet]aidedms<sayaRTmtvmixkare=peyte, Anupyaegadixkarivraexa,
strye tu vyavahre yadyapi buddhiprvakr nviditvtmana
paralokasambandhamadhikriyate tathpi na vedntavedyamaanydyattamapetabrahmakatrdibhedamasasrytmatattvamadhikre'pekyate, anupayogdadhikravirodhcca |
Siddhnta: I said that avidyvattve and pramaprameyavyavahravattve there is
avieatvam for animals and humans. But, of course, there is a difference with regard to
pramaprameyavyavahra itself. Cows do not vote or apply to medical college or do
rituals. stryakarmi are not applicable to animals. Only the person with viveka is


qualified. If he believes in the survival of the tm, he will do the strakarmas that he
thinks will give him rebirth in svargaloka. He will do jyotioma and do rddham for those
who have gone before. For the fellow who believes in an tm with a connection to
svargdi there is strakarma. But the stra he knows has something more to give,
something he does not know. As long as he does not know, dehavyatirikta tm astti
jnam will not remove the adhysa. Therefore all strakarma also has avidyvatviayatvam.
These karmas are for the avidyvn purua.
Does an animal have adhysa, but not a person who does vaidika karma? Unless he
is a Crvka, a human does not have the body mixed up with self in the way a cow does.
To answer the doubt as to katha vaidikakarmaa adhysa janyatvasiddhi, the k makes a
vikalpa: for vaidikakarma do you need tmajnam that the deha is distinct from the tm, or
do you need tmatattvajnam? For a vaidika, dehavyatirikta tm asti; there is puya, there
is pp. For vaidikakarma you require tm kart, karmaphalabhokt. And this knowledge dehavyatirikta tm astti will actually keep adhysa going. You may have some more
comfortable results within sasra, but this knowledge will keep it going. Vaidikakarmas
have use only when kartbhokt are there. This dehavyatirikta tm astti knowledge has no
capacity to negate adhysa.
tmatattvajnam, on the other hand, will negate the adhysa. Yet even for that
jnam you require adhysa. The one with tmatattvajnam is not who is being talked
about here strye karmai. That which is known only through Vednta is that which is
beyond hunger and thirst, that which is not subject to the differences of brhmaa
katriya et cetera. Aham asamsrijnam has no application to karma. The adhikr for this
knowledge is the one who does not want to have all these karmaphalas. This tmajnam is
of no use for karma. Bhyakra is now introducing the subject matter, Vednta, the
negation of the kart, tm akart.
Prvapaka: The question is whether there is a difference in the
avidyvatviayatvam. The whole argument is that the avidyvnpurua, the one who has
this tmntma confusion, this adhysa, is not the one using the pramaprameyavyavahra.
The pramaprameyavyavahra is for the pramt. Vyavahra itself is meant to eliminate
avidy. You should not say this pramt is a confused person. He may be ignorant of
certain things, but he is not confused. A confused person cannot be the pramt. Pramt
knows sdhyasdhana. He goes about removing ignorance, gathering pram, and you
cannot say he is a confused person.
Siddhnta: No, there is no difference in the presence of adhysa for animals and
humans. tmntma aviveka is not in any way a deterrent to pramaprameyavyavahra.
Adhysa must necessarily be there. If there were no adhysa, the pthagtm would have to
be come a pramt, and it cannot do that. There is no association between pthagtm and
mind possible which would allow pthagtm to become pramt. Bhyakra has said that
the asmatpratyayaviaya cannot become yumatpratyayaviaya, cannot have any component
of yumatpratyayaviaya. Since, here, pthagtm is taken for pramt, there is adhysa.


In terms of the stra, there is a difference between humans and animals.

Pramaprameya vyavahra does not in any way require tmntma viveka. So animals and
humans are the same in that. For the human with tmana paraloka sambandha jnam, for
the one who sees tm distinct from the body, for the jvtm, for the survivor tm, there
is a connection to karmaphala. This is called jnam because with raddh you have given
the status of pramam to the vedastra with regard to karmaphala. This karmaphala
knowledge is nitya parokajnam. No other prama will give you this jnam. It is
bdajnam, anadhigatam, nitya parokam. Really speaking, it is a belief. But we say it is
parokajnam because we give prama status to the stra. That jnam is not available
to animals.
If the stra is a prama, can it give nitya aparokajnam?
It can give tmajnam.
Does that mean that I do not know tm? I know that I am.
You are already aparoka, but that aparoka tm happens to be aparicchinna Brahma.
This Brahman is unknown. If it is known that you are brahmtm, there is no attraction to
the strya karmi. Those karmas become useless. Does parambrahma want to go to
Remember the vikalpa. The dehdi vyatirikta tm astika says jvtm can travel to
another body. This punarjanma knowledge comes from the straprama. The
strakarmas are for him. There are karmas for temporary results such as rain, but most
karmas are for heaven-going. And heaven-going karmas require the belief that the body is
distinct from the tm. This is the first section of the Veda, general vedavidy
prvamms karmaka.
Here, we are discussing vedntavedya uttaramms upaniadvedya. It is a part of
the Veda because there is anadhigatatvam for this subject matter also. tm being Brahman
is anadhigata bdajnam. But with punarjanmdijnam you have adhysa going.
Because who is born? Whoever is born is due to adhysa. All vyavahra, all karma for
phalabhoga, is adhysa purasktya. But this which is known through the Vednta is free
from pra, free from skmaarra, free from that which travels. It is beyond hunger and
thirst, beyond the varas. There is no sambandha between pthagtm and this body. One is
satyam, the other is mithy. The sambandha dhysika, mithybhta. The one who knows
he is this which is not reborn, knows he is the asasr, is not an adhikr for strakarma.
This tmatattvajnam is anti to karma. The karmapravtti is negated by this knowledge.
Karmaphala, punarjanma, svarga, all are swallowed by this viveka. The subject matter of the
Vednta, like the strakarmas, is also stryam, but the adhikritvam is entirely different.
atwaUtaTmiv}anaTvtRman< zamiv*avi;yTv< naitvtRt,
Prkcatathbhttmavijntpravartamna stramavidyvadviayatva ntivartate |
Nigamayati - he concludes. The stryakarma have adhysajanyatvam; kart and
bhokt are necessary. All the stryakarmas are born out of adhysa only. The stra that is
understood before the knowledge of the tmatattva does not transcend the fact of


avidyvat viayatvam. Avidyvn tm alone is the viaya of the first part of Veda. It
addresses the bhokt with regard to svargaloka. It says to do karma. It holds nothing for the
one with vivekavairgya except in terms of antakaraauddhi. The one with vivekavairgya
will use what is in the Karmaka for antakaraauddhi in order to gain knowledge of the
tmatattva. But there is this difference in terms of adhysa, bdhita adhysa.
twaih - a[ae yjet! #TyadIin zaa{yaTmin v[aRmvyae=vSwaidivze;aXyasmaiTy vtRNte,
Tathhi 'brhmao yajet' itydni strytmani varramavayo'vasthdiviedhysamritya pravartante |
stra does not make an exception for avidyvat viayatvam. Avidyvat viayatvam
is not only for karmastra, it is there for mokastra as well. The mumuku has a desire
for moka from sasritvam. What is sasritvam? Adhysa, tmani adhysa. Obviously,
avidyvat viayatvam na ativivartate. It is not a matter of antmavijnam, indeed it is
tmajnam, what one takes oneself to be.
All karmastra has 'brhmao yajet' iti. To illustrate this Bhyakra quotes stra:
brhmao yajet iti. Generally speaking, all three varas can do strakarmas. But certain
karmas only a brhmaa is asked to do. In fact there are a number of considerations as to
who should do the karmas. There are avasth: snt one who has completed the
ceremonial bathing after the valedictory from the gurukulam, jtaputra one who has
fathered a son, kakea one whose hair has not turned gray. There are varas,

positions such as king, and other attributes and conditions involved in the qualifications.
The individual interested in karma takes all these conditions into consideration.
Whereas the one who understands the truth of his being nirgua tm does not
become an adhikr for all this karma and all the considerations. This is the yath bhta
tmavijnam. It is not antmavijnam. Brhamao'ham is not antmavijnam. The one
who sees himself as qualified for strakarma, whatever the considerations, suffers from a
mix-up of tmntm. It is tmavijnam, but tmavijnam that is a kind of confusion.
Since tmntm mix-up is impossible, it is adhysa. This adhysa is purasktya and
therefore there is karmastra and brhmao yajet itydi. Pthagtm cannot have the vieas
such as brhamao'ham. Centered on that adhysa alone, the karmastra, the vieastra, is
valid. That is the purpose of the illustration here, and Bhyakra is not trying to prove
that gama is another prama. Karmastra, even when it talks of moka, coming before
Vednta, has avidyvat viayatvam. This tmntmdhysa is to be known as avidy.
AXyasae nam AtiSm<StiirTyvaecam,
Adhyso nma atasmistadbuddhirityavocma |
Bhyakra has said before that the pait call this adhysa avidy. He said that
for removing the adhysa which is avidy you require jnam. Knowing by viveka the
superimposition to be a matter of knowledge, one needs jnam for vastusvarpadhraam.
Jnam is the avidy virodh. Adhysa is atasmin tad buddhi, and that is avidy. Though it is
not possible for the object of asmatpratyaya and the object of yumatpratyaya to mingle,


each is taken for the other. This is atasmin tad buddhi; this is adhysa. Tasmin tad buddhi is
Does that mean tasmin tad buddhi abhva is ajna?
No, this would be going too far. That which is abhva cannot be negated. Already
it is not there. Who can remove that? It is the Nyyaika who says you can remove abhva.
Abhva does not require nivtti. Indeed, jnam is ajna virodh.
Does that mean there is no one who has the knowledge 'I am not a sasr' ?
We are not talking of the negation of sasritva; the notion 'aham sasr ' is
wrong. We are not working for the absence of 'I am sasr.' Nor do we bring in the
asasr. Only from the standpoint of the untruth of 'I am sasr ' do we say aham
asasr. Atasmin tad buddhi means the one who is not a sasr has a notion of
sasritva pthagtmani. With that superimposition kept in view, with all the different
aspects that are superimposed kept in view, there is dharmastra. The stra that
addresses you and your assumption of varas and karma et cetera goes along with your
t*wa puayaRid;u ivkle;u skle;u va Ahmev ivkl> sklae veit baxmaRnaTmNyXySyit
Tadyath putrabhrydiu vikaleu sakaleu v ahameva vikala sakalo veti
bhyadharmntmanyadhyasyati -

An example is given. Skalyam and vaikalyam are superimposed on oneself,

pramparyapthagtm alone. How does aham become dehaviia? Bhya is, of course, an
interesting word bhya to what? You have to draw the line somewhere. The whole body
is taken as one sense organ for the sensation of touch. The other sense organs are located
within this body. Bhya to this body are one's wife and child. By one's identification with
what is bhya, you become sakala and vikala. What is outside becomes the source of
satisfaction and disappointment. In this loka you have numerous overlapping spheres of
personal invovement, This is how you enjoy the drama. The bhyadharma are adhysa
tmani. I do not say it is attachment to what is outside, it is adhysa.
twa dehxmaRn! - SwUlae=h< kzae=h< gaErae=h< itaim gCDaim l'"yaim ceit, tweiNyxmaRNmUk> ka[>
Ib> bixr> ANxae=himit, twa=Nt>kr[xmaRNkams<kLpivicikTsaXyvsayadIn!,
tath dehadharmn - sthlo'ha, ko'ha, gauro'ha, tihmi, gacchmi, laghaymi
ceti | tathendriyadharmnmka ka klba, badhira, andho'hamiti |
tath'ntakaraadharmnkmasakalpavicikitsdhyavasydn |

There is pravtti on the part of a person for the strya karmi because the person
is a kart. This kart is tm aham kart. Aham kart iti buddhi can be adhysa. This is an
introduction to mms, so we are not talking of bdhita adhysa here. In the ahakra
there is tmdhysa. This is the basis for karttvabhokttva. There is karmi pravtti for
phala. Nobody does anything, laukika v vaidika v, without karmaphala. Karmaphala is
for the kart. Therefore one thinks not only kart'ham, he thinks bhokt'ham. This is
typical adhysa, because pthagtm is not kart.


The whole Bhagavad Gt talks about kart being adhysa, because tm is akart.
Karttvam and bhokttvam are both adhysa; 'the tm is neither subject nor object' is
jnam. Bhyakra makes adhysa the very entry into the halls of Vednta. Without
adhysa there is no Vednta, no moka. The sambandha between pthagtm and everything
else, the various qualifications such as rama, become the motivation for doing karma.
The common enmeshed connection to one's son, to other relatives and friends, even to
things and situations is through deha alone, even though, as k says here, the
bhyadharmas, being pratyaka, cannot be aham. There is no way for putradharma to
become my dharma. How can his vaikalya come to me? This unreasonable attachment is
sagadoa, because tadtm is not possible. It is adhysa due to atisneha, an excessive
emotional indulgence. It is described in the essential verses of the Gt. Sneha, caring and
affection, are essential; atisneha is when something another person does disturbs you and
your objectivity goes away. This is bhyadharma tmani adhysa. We determine what is
bhya arbirtrarily, and our emotional dependence is always in terms of our own concept of
what is good for the person or thing we are attached to.
What about dehadharmdhysa? What belongs to the body, what is centered on the
deha, is a time-bound dehadharma. How can this be found nitye tmani? Only by adhysa.
This is avidy; svarpanicaya has not taken place. This is not just what happens for some
special person, this is sarve loka, pavdi aviea. The body's characteristics are
superimposed on pthagtm. The actions of the body are superimposed on pthagtm.
The indriyadharmas, the functions of pra and mana, are superimposed. To make it clear
that this is your own experience, Bhyakra switches to first person, singular. The
variable antakaraadharmas, antakaraa vttytmaka, are taken to be one's own dharmas,
and the identification with the antakaraa is complete. Kma, sakalpa, vicikits - doubt,
and adhyavasya - certitude are superimposed upon oneself. Fear, shyness, shame, grief,
love, and compassion, all emotions, all the dharmas of buddhi are covered here too. The
jva lives his life as he does because of this deha indriya antakaraa adhysa alone.
@vmh<Tyiynmze;Svcarsai]i[ TygaTmNyXySy t< c TygaTmana< svRsai][<
e aNt>kr[aid:vXySyit,
Evamahampratyayinamaeasvapracraskii pratyagtmanyadhyasya ta ca
pratyagtmn sarvaskia tadviparyayentakaradivadhyasyati |

It is the antakaraa that must own up all the activities of the mind. The
antakaraa is the one who becomes sukhiduk kartabhokt. Therefore you cannot say
aham kart. Between the tm and the ahampratyaya is the basic adhysa. The adhysa is the
cause of all karma and oka and moha. It is the ahakra that appears in its many coats
hilarity, grief, murmuring to himself to exhaust his tension. The ahampratyaya can
undergo changes and can remain unmanifest in deep sleep, and it is updhi born,
varasi. Being inherently not understood, there is atasmin tad buddhi. Born of the
adhysa is the ahakra. The ahakra concludes aham baddha and seeks release from the
notional bondage.


The one who is recognized through ahampratyaya, the ever-changing ahakra,

witness of himself and his activities, superimposes on the pthagtm. k uses the word
prtilomya unlike. The pthagtm shines unlike all others, but ahakra shines because
of aham asmi. The idamaa that allows ahakra to shine is pthagtm. But pthagtm is
not a substrata on which a real river of thought is flowing. In every superimposition there
is dhra bhnam apeka. The dhra prasiddhi is associative sasarga adhysa where no
adhysa is possible. Because the superimposed ahakra is there, one is dhra and one is
ropita. dhratvam is itself adhyst labhyate, but dhrasya bhnam apekyate. The
ahakra is there, saying 'aham asmi'. This 'asmi' is sat, there to say 'aha bhmi'. The 'me'
that is there is both asmi and bhmi. It shares both 'I am' and 'I shine'. Every object both is
and shines. To say an object 'asti', is to say bhti not two different things. It is asti
because I see it. Without seeing there is no asti. When I see an object it shines after, after
the eye shines: the eye bhti, the object anubhti. Then, mana bhti, the eye anubhti.
Then, ahakra bhti, mana anubhti.
But ahakra shines only as mind shines. Ahakra undergoes change and anubhti.
The krapratyaya is there in the word. 'Aham' is also there. This aham is the dhra, the
svaya bhti dhra; it is there undergoing no change. This 'svaya bhti' is the aham bhm,
the aham asmi. Sad aham asmi because sad aham bhm. tm is there and undergoes no
change. This is the aham bhm. Unlike all others, in the mind tm shines as myself. It
requires no other prama. Again, there is no association between tm and any other
entity, but tm shines pratyak prtilomyena. Ahakra depends upon the existence of the
tm, while tm is self-existent. The impossible sambandha is accomplished as
dhysikasambandha. The mix-up is done and one is mistaken for the other. If you say you
do not commit the mistake, you understand bdhita adhysa. But ahakra will be there,
enlightened you or not. There is no elimination of ego necessary or possible.
The adhysa is a different kind of adhysa. When you say 'aham asmi', I exist, the
existence and the consciousness that are involved in that very revelation both belong to
pthagtm. The appropriation by ahakra is sasargdhysa. The ahakra is the locus for
superimposition. Antmani tmana adhysa tmani antm adhysa this is the anyonya
adhysa to be understood. Sasra is due to this adhysa alone, a superimposition of
ahakradharma upon the tm. The ahakra is not a separate conscious being, it
appropriates bhnam from the pthagtm. Like the silver that appears on a shell, the
bhnam belongs to tm. And when the shell is known, the silver does not turn into shell,
it merely proves itself to be shell and the silver goes away in a way that leaves no doubt
that it never was there. The aha sasr resolves into aham asasr the aham remains
the same. This is the sasargdhysa.
@vmymnaidrnNtae nEsigRkae=Xyasae imWyaTyyp> kt&TR vaeT vvtRk> svRlaekTy]>,
Evamayamandirananto naisargiko'dhyso mithypratyayarpa
karttvabhokttvapravartaka sarvalokapratyaka |


This adhysa is not adhysa that has a beginning. It does not have a beginning at a
given time. The tmntmdhysa that makes one a pramt is the beginningless adhysa
that makes one a kartabhokt. This vyvahrikajva who does all activities, who is ihaloka
paraloka gm, who awaits the fruit of actions that bring him manuyajanma and the unique
chance of getting rid of sasra, has no beginning. The human has the pururtha adhikra
arra which alone gives the opportunity to earn new karma good enough to keep this
sasracakram going forever. This jvatvam is naisargika, not created by anybody.
With adhysa the hetu, you find yourself a jva inclined to karttvabhokttva. Once
you become a pramt you desire lokajnnam, and karma and bhokt follow. The adhysa
cycle goes on. To be a karmaphalabhokt, antakaradiu there should be a
paramprydhysika sambandha, because really there is no sambandha possible, just as with
clay and pot. In fact the whole thing is mithy; there is no sambandha unless the things are
of the same order of reality. The Nyyaika does not establish reality with his
samavyasambandha, and we do not do that here either with dhysikasambandha
Naisargikatvam is the hetu for anditvam. The kkra's avidykryatvam is not
necessary as cause for anditvam. Avidykryatvam is there for ditvam too. This is
vyavahra, of course it is avidykrya. We are looking for the basic jva. Jva is krydhysa,
and krydhysasya anditvam. Adhyst saskra is karmaphalam. The flow of adhysa is
innate. From this adhysa there is pramttvam, from that, jnnam. From jnna, icch. From
icch, karma. From karma, phalam. From phala, janma. From janma, pururtha adhikra
janma, karma. The in-between janmas are purely for phalabhoga, not for gathering new
karma. Only human birth, or the equivalent because we do not know qualifies for
self-consciousness, for self-judgment, choice and new karma.
Within sasra, there is no means by which you can end it. You cannot exhaust
karmaphalas. Sasra has both no beginning and self-perpetuation. The kart can do karma,
but he cannot destroy the cause of this adhysa. There is no end to sasra, but that does
not mean you cannot relax. You can relax because sasra, this andi ananta naisargika
adhysa, this karttvabhokttvapravartaka, is mithypratyayarpa.
The lakaa of mithy is adhihna ananyatvam, that which does not exist
independent of its adhihna. Mithy is a term to reveal your understanding of reality.
There is no such object called mithy anywhere. Mithy is only your understanding. We
use what people do know to communicate that which is not yet known. There is more to
mithy than the prtibhsikam, the 'false like ropesnake', that people generally know. The
snake is false because bdhayogyatvam is there. In the wake of its own truth, what
disappears, sasritvam, we say is bdhayogya, it is subject to negation. The adhysa
mistake can be corrected by looking again at what is there and by having a vocabulary to
analyze and objectively identify it. Therefore what goes is the notion that I am sasr,
while the adhysa is neither satyam not tuccham it is mithy. It is nothing other than the
adhihna that is there, and what appears to be there is bdhayogya. Adhysa is neither sat
not asat. It is anirvacanya.


Not only the snake, the rope too is mithy. The rope does not have ropeness. What
is this which has ropeness? It cannot be a rope. The substantive is neither rope nor nonrope. All that is there without being separate from what it is, is caitanyam. You are the
adhihna for the potness and for clayness, for the entire jagat. And adhysa is
mithypratyayarpa. The adhysa cannot be dismissed as non-existent nor proved as
existent. It is mithypratyayarpa, jnabdhya.
Mithypratyayarpa adhysa means it has all three - pramt prameya prama. The
kkra wants to include the jagat, but pramt prameya prama will naturally all be
included in the discussion of pthagtm iti Brahman. kkra says mithy means my as
pratyaya. He is not saying anything different than adhysa as the basis for karttvabhokttva
is mithypratyayarpa. He says skipratyakam is the prama for this adhysa. Ahakara
is, then, parampara for tmntmasambandhdhysa. All other pramas we use merely
support skipratyaka. This sarvalokapratyaka is andi, smnya, the same for every jva,
naisargika. All are born with dehtmabuddhi.
e ae> ha[ay AaTmEkTviv*aitpye sveR vedaNta Aar_yNte ,
Asynarthaheto prahya tmaikatvavidypratipattaye sarve vednt rabhyante |

For removal of this adhysa which is not without meaning, for freedom from that
which is the cause for all you do not want, to eliminate the tm ajnam which is the
mukhya hetu, for the removal of atasmin tad buddhi alone, the entire vedntastra is given.
Doesn't that removal happen in deep sleep?
No, vidy is necessary. For that gain of tm ekatvavidy, jvevara aikyavidy, ida
sarvam jagat - yadidam ayamtm tad jnam, ida sarvam Brahma tadbrahma aham asmi iti
jnam, the vedntastra is given. The kkra says that Bhyakra sees both viaya and
prayojana. Thereby, when adhysa is established, everything comes to light. tm becomes
the viaya which does away with karttva bhokttvam and karmaphala and janma. Having
explained adhysa in this way, with this determination, moka becomes sdhya. What is the
adhysaviaya? Adhihna of the adhysa is tm ekatvam. Brahman is the adhihna, and
tm is Brahman. Adhihna of the adhysa is the viaya. Prayojanam is jnam itself.
Jnam is sdhanam,moka is sdhya. tmajnena moka. tm is nityamukta. By
knowledge of tm I am free. Moka icch has become jna icch. The total destruction of
the anarthahetu is moka. This immediate recognition that is all artha, all that is desirable
and meaningful, is gained by ravadi. You get this vidy by prama, by Upaniad. By
study and vicra of Vednta, which has a commitment to unfold this ekatvam, the
abhedaviaya is arrived at. That is the sampradya.
If adhysa is not established as the topic, moka will not be sdhya. You become
permanently a limited being. If limitation is satyam it cannot go away. If limitation is not
satyam it need not go away. Why do you feel limited? Adhysa. Then, Vednta pravtti.
Vednta enters only when adhysa is established. In your introduction of Vednta you have
to talk about adhysa. You have to say moka is siddha. You have to say nanda is siddha.


Then only there is pravtti. Then adhysa is established. Then, straightaway,

Question: The subject matter for the mmsastra is the same as vedntastra.
Yet there are various upsanas presented in the vedntastra. If those upsanas are also the
subject matter of Vednta why don't we see the stravkyas as connected to and
supporting the upsanas?
Siddhnta: We will show in the stra analysis how tm ekatvam is, alone, the
ttparya of the Vednta.
There will be people who will contend whether there is such a thing called
Vednta. Already there is a mms, Prvamms, dharmamms, karmamms
done to the Veda. The Prvammsakas say Vednta is a part of that Veda and is not to be
seen apart from the connection to karma. They say the meaning of Vednta has already
been covered. There is no need to start a new book. They say there is a complete
methodology for the interpretation of karma mantra devat in the Veda.
We say that Vednta is to be studied independently; it has its own special phala
and a different adhikr. A somayga and the stra have pratipdakapratipdyasambandha,
and the somayga being anadhigata, it must be revealed by the Veda. But the sambandha
between somayga and its result is different than that of jnam and moka. Knowledge of
somayga karma can only produce a desire, and, even then, only if you have a desire for
heaven. The sambandha between jnam and moka is direct - if knowledge is there, phalam
is there. Brahmavit brahmaiva bhavati. Therefore subject matter, adhikr, sambandha and
phala are all different. Vednta is agatrtha.
Prvammsakas say that tm ekatva is not the Vednta viaya. They say vara is
the Vednta viaya and for vara you should go to Vaikuha. They have a different moka.
But we say that vedntastra viaya is tm eka, tmana anyat kicit na vidyate, sarva
khalvida Brahma, neha nnsti kicana, tad Brahma tvam asi, tad Brahma ayam tm. We
say this is the vedntaviaya. With this identified as the subject matter, this is the way we
are going to do this vicra. The mms has to be done.
One contender says that the brahmaabda means pradhnam and that pradhnam is
jaajagatkraam. But we say no, Brahman is cetana tm and there is no other Brahman.
Others say tm is Brahman, but you should become Brahman. They say tm was
Brahman and again you have to go back to Brahman. We say no - and every time you say
no, mms is to be undertaken. Others say tm is Brahman, but you must meditate on
tm as Brahman to become Brahman, to convert tm into Brahman. No. Tad Brahma aham
asmi is jnam, and it is not ea to karma. Neither is karma ea to Vednta. All the
contentions are there as reasons for understanding Vednta.
ywa caymwR> sve;
R a< vedaNtana< twa vymSya< zrIrkmIma<saya< dzRiy:yam> ,
Yath cyamartha sarve vedntn tath vayamasy arrakammsy
pradarayiyma |


There is only one tm. Therefore tm ekatva is the thing to be known. tm

ekatva vidy is moka. Adhysa is there, and due to that alone there is sasritvam. Moka is,
alone, the negation of that sasritvam. tm ekatva vidy is you are asasr, the truth of
everything, the truth of tm. This is the arthtm of all the vedntavkyas. Others will
quote those vkyas to support their contentions. One question is enough to stop you
How can you be sarvakraam? How can you be paramnanda? The various vkyas seem to
point out many things. How can jaa come from cetana? The same Vednta is used to
come up with different answers and different meanings.
In this mms we intend to show this tm ekatva meaning. Why
rrakamms? In the fourth and fifth chapters of Pini there are twenty-nine k
pratyaya. This is kan pratyaya, taddhita. arram rraka, kutsite arthe. The arram is
kutsitrthe, it has a sense of being low, less, fragile. Kutsita means it is nindayoga. This
is why it is called arra it is subject to disintegration. In kutsita arra abides this pjya
tm. This rraka is rraka tm, and tm is the viaya.
We are looking into the vedntastrattparya, the vedntaviaya that says this tm
is Brahman and this is you, the one interested in this teaching The upsanas have the same
ttparya, the same end in view. They are useful for cittanaicalya, cittaikgrat. Their
ultimate ttparya is in aikya. Brahmtm being one in the same, there is no virodha. How
tm can be Brahman is the question. 'tm is Brahman' is taught because what you think
is tm is not what is said here. tm is taken as an entity, other than satya
jnnamanantam. tm is Brahman is the viaya. 'Adhysa is there' means tms are many.
Adhysa not there means tm becomes Brahman; there is only one. The viaya is tm
ekatva, and the prayojana is moksa. Viaya and prayojana both being there, this stra is
The introduction to Vednta is the same as that for vedntavicratmakammsastra. The introduction to brahmastras is not anything special. You have to
prove that Vednta has a separate subject matter for it to be a matter for vicra, for it to be
agatrtha. Viaya is there only when there is phala. abdaprama being deliberate, it must
have phalavat arthabodhakatvam. Pratyaka does not have that. There are useless anumnas
as well. But there is no useless abda. abda means it is a prama from vara, words
revealed by vara. All the mantras are ibhi d, and the words of the is should have
usefulness. Whether it is anuvdtmaka abda or it is revealed draamantras, whether it is
said by the is or it is revealed by the is, the abdaprama has phalavat
If your contention is brahmalokaprpti, moka is karmaphala. You say to do upsana
and karma together for moka. With this, there is no viaya for vedntastra and no need
for vedntastravicra. But the introduction we have given proves there is viaya. Moka is
not karmaphala. All phala is perishable. You cannot say nityamoka is perishable. Only if
moka is siddha can it be nitya, and there is nothing to be accomplished, no sdhya.


Question: Moka, then, should be unproduced, always there. And I should have
freedom from all my sorrows and afflictions. Why do I not feel that eternal moka? How
can it be both siddha and sdhya?
Siddhnta: There is no categorical answer. The person who wants a categorical
answer to everything is bound to suffer. Unless the basic problem is categorically
answered, all the way it is not categorical. The whole jagat is not categoric. There is no
categorical answer: moka is sdhya as pururtha, but not as karmaphala, and it is only
meaningful with reference to avidy. Moka is not the absence of jnam, it is jna virodh.
What you see is one thing, what is there is another. This is the adhysa, the mistake. The
problem is atasmin tad buddhi both antmani tmabuddhi and tmani antmabuddhi.
Bhyakra uses 'atasmin tad buddhi' because both are there as anyonyatdtmya.
Tasmin tad buddhi corrects the error; jnam removes ignorance. Knowledge of brahman
not an upsana knowledge that Brahman happens to be tm, does not destroy jna
abhva. The naj on 'avidy' and 'ajna' has to have the sense of virodha, of opposite.
Ajna alone is the anarthahetu, but the problem is due to adhysa. To prove there is such
a thing called moka, moka which even though it is siddha has sdhyatvam due to adhysa,
Bhyakra had to prove that adhysa. Adhysa is what he calls avidy, and it has really
confused some people because ttparya is not clear. Ttparya is to prove there is moka,
not to prove adhysa. This moka is janena; janamtrena the whole stra is done.
Nothing else is necessary, because sasritvam is nothing but adhysa.
The way people commonly think is only in terms of pramrthikam. Their
sasritvam is a reality that cannot be removed. For them, each individual is discrete and
nntvam is real. They are stuck with only pramrthikam and prtibhsikam. There is no
vyvahrikasatt. Duality is pramrthikam, exactly what people think. For them,
prtibhsikam means only rope should be seen as rope, otherwise you will jump. They
simply choose to ignore that adhysa already has them jumping. There is nothing more to
it for most people. As Bhyakra says, everybody innately accepts there is such thing as
error, everyone jumps for the snake which is not there. Bhyakra says the error is there
with reference to tm and therefore sasritvasiddhi. Otherwise there is no moka. If
sasritvam is due to adhysa, there is moka adhysanivtti sasritvanivtti.
Sasritvanivtti is mokaprpti. What is the mokaphalam ? Bhyakra says it is tm
ekatva vidy pratipattaye. And he definitely says moka is a lbha, a gain, a gain in terms of
That tmaikatvalbha means your smallness goes. That is the mokaphalavat
arthabodhakatvam. tm being me and one, there is no second thing at all. To have fear, to
feel small, there must be a second thing. What about the jagat? The jagat is yourself as
sarva Brahma. All this is possible if tm ekatva is understood. Then only, jaganmithy
comes into the picture. This is tm ekatva siddhi. But akara does not give this as an
introduction. He does not give satyam mithy as an introduction. He gives pururtha as
introduction. To enter into the viayavicra, into the stramms, you require only
adhysa as the cause for sasritvam. When the adhysa goes you become everything


mokalbha. Pururtha, 'why adhysa', 'what is the sarva anartha hetu', is the whole

Wherever there is a stra literature there is a tradition along with it. As a
participant in the sampradya one can get what really is the strattparya. This
strattparya is the ttparya of living. Once adhysa is established and tm is known as
everything, you have satyam mithy, bdhita adhysa. Ahakara is understood as due to
adhysa, and tm is free from being small. Establishing adhysa gives you both viaya,
brahtmaikatva, and prayojana, mok. The vedntavicra gives you this too, as well as 'tm
being Brahman'. The strattparya will not come to you if you merely ask 'Who am I?'
And there are many other interpretations and contentions. You must do the inquiry that
makes clear the ttparya.
The word akara itself tells exactly what akara is. a karoti iti akara. a no
mitraa varua | a no bhavatvaryam. Na a bhavatu. Here this am means
magalam; svasti is called am. Svasti is svasmin sthiti - being physically, emotionally,
ultimately happy. The same meaning as am. When all ends well it has ended in am, in
magalam. There are many magala events in one's life, and what is ultimate magalam is
only moka. This is the meaning of am. Because of whose grace, because of whose
knowledge this am is possible is called akara. The Lord is akara. This akara alone
akarcrya. He is Bhyakra. Patajali is Mahbhyakra. Vysa is Strakra, who is
Lord Nryaa himself. When Mahviu as Lord Nryaa assumes a form like Vysa
and writes the stras, who will do the bhya? There must be some arrangement with Lord
iva. You require Lord iva in the form of akara to give the bhya to unlock the stra.
This is our attitude toward akara. We look upon one Paramevara in the form of the two
avatras as Bhagavn.
We trace the parampara of akara with Govindapda as his guru. Govindapda's
guru is Gaudapda. Each guru is a gh, and in between there is so much flow. Padmabhuva
is Brahmji, Nryaa. Afterwards is all Paramevara. The is begin with Vasia. Then
Vysa. Then akti. Then Parara. One more gh is ukha. akara writes the bhya to
Gaudapda's Krik. We have nothing written by Govindapda.
In the sadivasamrambham verses the whole parampara is swallowed completely.
Sadiva is Dakimrti. The jnagaga is always flowing. akarcrya is the one gh. It
stops on him because he captured the entire sampradya in written words still available, all
from palmleaf. Vysa put it in stras, akara gave us the meaning, and without
sampradya he could not have done that. To see Vysa's di you must have a link, and
that link is akara. To be a sampradyavit you have to do mms. This 'vit' must stand
scrutiny. It cannot stand what is unreasonable, what is wrong. It cannot propose a
jaabrahmavastu or a jnadharma that is not svarpa. It must be free of both internal and
external contradiction and must withstand inquiry. That which cannot be negated is
jnam. This kind of jnam is what holds the sampradya and allows us to be open for
discussion. There is one crya who is close to Vysa.


In hdayam we are accommodative, but not in knowledge. When you see what is
there thoroughly, when you analyze it objectively, how can you be accommodative? With
compassion you give the others their places, and this is what akara does. There is no
better way of celebrating akarajayanti than by studying his bhya. He begins with an
introductory sentence to the first stra.
vedaNtmIma<sazaSy VyaicOyaistSyedmaidm< sUm!Vedntammsstrasya vycikhysitasyedamdima stramJijsdhikaraam: First Brahmastra:

Awatae ij}asa .
Athto brahmajijs || (1)

The first Brahmastra athto brahmajijs. Both vedntavicra and dharmavicra

can be said to be pjitavicra. Dharmastra makes you understand the vaidkakarmas and
dharma which give you puya. This makes you a relatively complete human being.
Dharmajijs is a pjitavicra. The vedntastra presents and analyzes the
upaniadvkyni. There is doubt as to whether those have been covered, analyzed and
understood, by Jaimini's Prvamms. We begin to explore this question with the
jijsdhikaraam. Adhikaraam means a topic. Two points of view must be there.
Is the Vednta gatrtha or agatrtha? We will analyze in four sections, one stra
after the other. From the first stra - atha, Brahma, and jijs all will be analyzed. This is
a stra. There is no fooling around. Because there is a doubt, there is analysis. One point
of view is called prvapaka; the second point of view is called siddhnta. The prvapak
will give his view of how it is. The siddhnt, the Vedntin, here the sampradyavit, will
respond and defend. The analytical method is all binary, to avoid confusion.
The prvapak says Vednta is gatrtha. The siddhnt says agatrtha. You have
viaya and viaya. There is a doubt. The prvapak must give a hetu for his position that
Vednta is gatrtha. He says that the vedntavicra, in fact the entire Veda, has been fully
analyzed by Jaimini. He says vedntavicra is not even a valid topic. The siddhnt says
Vednta presents a separate subject matter which is not yet developed and which requires
analysis. This is how the adhikaraa begins. We still must give the
pratipdyapratipdakasagati, the connection between the vedastra in general and the
vedntastra. There are many connections to be looked into.
Siddhnta: Vedntammsstra has its own subject matter, its own phalam, and a
unique sambandha. Sambandha between stra and this brahmtmajnam is, in one way,
not unlike the sambandha between stra and knowledge of a vaidika ritual. Both have
anadhigatatvam; neither Brahman not jyotioma is available for means of knowledge other
than Veda. Both are vedaviaya and both have pratipdyapratipdakasambandha. But there is
a peculiar sambandha between the stra and Brahman. Pratipdya is Brahman, and
pratipdaka is the stra. With regard to brahmtmajnam, the sambandha between the
jnam that is given by the stra and the phalam determines all the other relevant
sambandhas. Whereas there is no sambandha between jyotiomajnam and the phala that is

svarga. Knowledge of the yga will not give you svarga. Both jnam and karma have
sdhanasdhyasambandha with their results. The sdhana for svarga is karma. The sdhana
for moka is jnam. Again, for vedntastra there is bhinna viaya, bhinna sambandha,
bhinna adhikr, bhinna phala. These four, the anubandha catuaya, are entirely different for
vedntastra, and they have not been covered by dharmajijs, by prvamms.
The kkra says the skdviaya for the vicra is Vednta. The viaya for this
vedntavicra is Brahman. What can brahmavicra do for you? To look at yourself you must

have a mirror. And your interest is not in looking at the mirror itself. All the time, the
ttparya is to look at yourself. The vedntavicra is for looking at the vedntaviaya, at
Brahman, but the skdviaya is Vednta alone, Upaniad and Gt vkyas and some
puravkyas. There is doubt about the need to start this study based on the question
gatrtha or agatrtha.
Prvapaka: The Vednta is a part of the Veda, doesn't that make it gatrtha? The
vedntamms is not needed. Veda asks you to do, it gives vidhi. The li lo tavya
pratyayas that indicate vidhi are there. 'This is to be done by you' - the imperative and
potential forms are clearly there for this. The interest of the stra is in your doing action;
you must covert the prayoga into a vidhi, and you need to choose between the options Veda
affords. Even some of the stories are to be connected to vidhis. The ktsnastra is
committed to karma to be done. The Prvamms of Jaimini has recognized this and
analyzed the Vednta within this. Knowing you are saccidnanda is helpful for doing karma.
You will feel better about it and do it better. We already know what Vednta is for. There

is no subject matter there which has not yet been covered; there is nothing left undone.
kkra takes you back to the bhya by saying that the Vednta, the subject matter
of the mmsstra, is pjita because it gives you moka, and the prvamms is
pjitavicra because it gives you dharma in terms of puya and growth and maturity and
antakaraauddhi. There are important stras here. If vidhi alone were vedrtha, Vysa
would not talk about a desire to know Brahman. The first stra presents Brahman as the
object of a desire to know. Brahman is not covered by any other prama or any discipline
of knowledge. Brahman is anavagata, and the inquiry into Vednta, whose viaya is
Brahman, is to be begun. This is what both Strakra and Bhyakra want to convey,
because Brahman is anadhigata, and because it establishes adhysa, and because it is the
viaya, and because it is the prayojana. Athto brahmajijs.
Each of the first four stras is an adhikaraa. And each adhikaraa has four sections.
This format changes after the first four stras. The first four stras are special; they cover
the entire topic of Brahmastras. It is a binary exposition: prvapaka followed by
siddhnta. If there is more than one prvapaka, separate answers are found. Vidyraaya
wrote a separate book called Adhikaraaratnaml. He gives two verses for each
adhikaraa sometimes four. The first verse reveals the doubt and the prvapaka. The
second verse will answer the prvapaka. His verses are very terse. The work is a
masterpiece of concision and precision, another stra. We will look into his verses along
with the brahmastras.


The first adhikaraam is called jijs adhikaraam. Jijs means desire to know,
desire to know Brahman. Brahmajijs is karmai ah, not 'Brahman's desire to know'.
The use of karmai ah means Brahman becomes an object of a desire to know. Is there
any such thing to know? Generally, it is when you know an object that you have a desire
for it. An unknown object cannot be an object of desire. Here there is a desire to know.
The ratnaml states the question. Is Brahman already known or unknown?:
Avicrya vicrya v brahmdhysnirpaam |
asandehphalatvbhy na vicra tadarhati ||
adhyso'hambuddhisiddho'saga Brahma rutritam |
sandehnmuktibhvcca vicrya Brahma vedata ||
Prvapaka: You have a desire to know Brahman. This means already you know
there is Brahman. Why the desire? Is Brahman to be known? Is there any such thing
available? Is Brahman knowable or not? Is Brahman siddham or sdhyam? You say
Brahman is satya jnamanantam and this is tm. Is Brahman really tm? What use is it?
What is the result of knowing it? If already I am Brahman, what phala is there? I have no
doubts about whether or not I exist. I know I am this tm. Does that mean when I am sad
Brahman is sad? There seems to be no result from knowing tm is Brahman. There is no
moka brought by knowing this.
Any adhysa is only with reference to antm, and adhysa has not been established.
I know very well I am. What use is an inquiry into this adhysa? Since I have no doubt
about my existence and because there is no result to this knowledge, Brahman does not
withstand inquiry. If tm is the same always, it should not be variable. My experience of

I is variable through the various states, and I attribute I to a variety of situations and
conditions; how can asaga Brahman be a complex of dehendriya? If I am mukta - nitya
uddham nanda nirvikram - as Brahman, why do I have all the opposites of those
qualities? You say that all my doubts will go away. You say there is sasra nivtti. This
itself is a sdhya. Is moka siddha or sdhya?
Siddhnta: When the jva vara aikya is known I am mukta. Even though Brahman
is siddha it is sdhya. Ajant avidyay sdhya. Moka, the result, being there, vicrya
Brahma. Do vedntavicra, because no other prama is there for Brahman. Therefore
A stra has to fulfill the definition of stram: alpkaram asandigdha sravat
vivatomukham astobhyam anavadya ca stra stravido vidu. This
strtmakammsstram does not and should not start with a separate prayer. The

prayer is all accomplished by a certain implication.

The stra's first two words, 'atha ata', are meaningful in that they make the stra
meaningful. Each word is necessary if the stra is to be complete and is to avoid having
some other meaning. Atha ata brahmaa jijs. Atha has the meaning of nantaryam
thereafter, after which, sometimes indicating a sequence. 'Thereafter' means 'after the
obvious', because what goes before is not stated here. 'After what' becomes obvious
because a desire for Brahman has to take place in a given person. That desire will take

place only when knowing Brahman will be of some use to the person. Knowing Brahman
is of no use in doing karma, and it is in fact against karma. Knowing Brahman is disaster to
vaidika karma. Knowing Brahman is not going to be very useful for vaidika karma, and Veda
is all karma. What is knowing Brahman for?
A desire to know Brahman is not common, but it is not unreasonable. There is
something different about it. Not everyone will have this desire. There can be a person
who in a gurukulam setting has studied and learned to recite his whole Veda and has
become competent in the six associated fields of study. He has also studied Upaniad and
can chant Taittirya with svaras. And for what is all his study and chanting? For doing
abhiekam. The grammar he has and the other disciplines have all filtered into him, and he
has hopes for himself and for his future and for his sons. His icch has grown, but it has
not grown to an icch for Brahman.
Why does the jna icch not take place? Because adhikr abhvt. That which has
to take place inside the person for the desire for Brahman has not taken place. That desire
to know has a different kind of force than kartum icch. The desire to know means all
other desires come down and subserve the predominant desire. This jijs will be there
in the adhikr. You will see it in his or her focus on moka. Brahmajnam may be of no
use for other things, but it has no substitute in terms of moka. Moka has to be understood,
and that there is no moka without jnam has to be understood. That you require a
prama that is not with you now has to be understood. Vedntavidy, not mere vedavidy,
has to be understood, and that comes only with guru. All these must be understood, and
one must have lived a life of dharma and be relatively free of guilt and hurt. One lives a
life of raddh, bhakti, values; then there is jijs. It is that kind of jijs which will not
go away. All this must be there, and all this is implied in this athaabda. This is the
meaning for athaabda that fits here nantaryam. Antara means gap. There should be no
gap in one's understanding or in one's commitment. Anantarasya bhva is nantaryam.
Atha means therafter; thereafter brahmajijs will happen. When viveka vairgya
amadamdiakasampatti mumukutvam are there, he will go after Brahman knowledge.
Viveka vairgya will drive him towards this. Curiosity may lead you to the study, but
avagati is there only when brahmajijs is there. Brahmajijs is adhikritvam. Do not
think there is something more for moka. For the seeker of experience, even Nryaa is
just another holy visit. Is life just a chance to accumulate enough resources so that you
can sneak up on its end with trepidation and meager comfort? What is nitya cannot be
created, and yet what you want is nitya. How can you be wanting nitya? This is why you
are eternally finding yourself wanting. What is lasting? What is not bound by time? This
has to be centered on yourself. It is not an incidental attribute or accumulation. It has to
be yourself alone. It is not in karma or upsana.
Without doubt or need for interpretation, the stra says it clearly: ayam tm
Brahman. How are you going to convert that into a meditation? How are you going to
give another meaning to ekam advaya satya jnamananta Brahman aham asmi as
revealed by the stra? Jnena moka there is no other way. tmavit oka tarati;


brahmavit param apnoti - all these words are your assurance. You have no other way than

looking at yourself, and to look at yourself you must look out. If I am the problem, I am
the solution. Therefore I look at the stra to reveal what I am. When brahmajijs is
there, there is a chance for vedntavicra. Therefore tad vijnrtha gurumeva abhigacchet
rotriya brahmaniham.
Question: Is guru prama or is stra prama?
stra is prama, and you get the stra only through the guru. Until avagati is
there, brahmajijs is kept up. This jnam fills you, fulfills you, you are pra. At once,
without doubt or accumulation, you know 'I am pra'. In Taittirya, Bhgu oscillates
between his seat of meditation and his father until it is over. The desire for Brahman
knowledge is over. Prti takes place when he understands Brahman. And when it is over,
it is over. Any other subject matter you inquire into will leave more to find out. But
brahmajijs can be over because Brahman is pram.
Tapas Brahma vijijsasva | tapo brahmeti connection is there to the jijs in the
stra. You get the mms connection, the sagati to the stra. Avagati paryantam, the
vicra must be there. Brahmajnya vedntavicra kartavya.
akara bhya:
tawzBd AanNtyaRw>R pirg&te naixkarawR> ij}asaya AnixkayRTvat!,
Tatrthaabda nantaryrtha parighyate ndhikrrtha, brahmajijsy
anadhikryatvt |
Bhyalakaam is padrtha anvaya vkyrtha prvapaka siddhnta. In the padrtha

you need to defend the meanings you choose and why you do not choose others which
may be equally valid. A koa is a dictionary, a book of synonyms in the same language.
The Amarakoa gives various meanings for athaabda. One meaning is with reference to
ktsna completeness, total, sarva. Therefore by using athaabda you have magalam, an
auspicious beginning. Other meanings are given: anantaram means thereafter. rambha
means beginning, adhikra. Prana means question. Uta expresses a correlative sense
'whether this or that'. Prvaprakta means something referred to before that is brought up
We are going to ask tm nitya atha anitya? tm is the vieya; nitya is the
viea. It can be the other way too the only nitya is tm. One is substantive, the other
is adjective. Now, if the meaning of atha is prvaprakta, you get a very different reading
than the question we want to ask. In fact it does not make sense to look at the meaning of
athaabda as prvaprakta. If it did, athaabda would not mean thereafter or magalam.
None of the other meanings could be given here either.
Bhyakra says that, in the stra, athaabda has the meaning nantarya. It means
thereafter, but no prvaprakta is there. Atha is the first word. The meaning of atha must
be taken with reference to the entire stra the desire to know Brahman. Atha stands for
this without which the desire for Brahman will not arise. Having certain conditions
fulfilled, thereafter jijs arises in a given person. Pururthaviveka leads to
nitynityrthaviveka, and this makes you a mumuku. Without mumuk there is no

brahmajijs. Dharma artha kma, ritual and progeny and charity, must be left behind.
With mumuk, brahmajna walks in. Without jna there is no moka. Jnya
brahmajijs jtum icch. Brahmavicra vedntavicra kartavya.
This is the net result meaning nantaryrtha athaabda.
The meaning of athaabda is not 'beginning' in this context. The meaning is
anantaram as sdhana catuya sampatti. The different aspects of the sdhana are pointed
out in the stra; it is all sampradya. They are all in accord with adhikritvam, but the
athaabda here does not mean adhikra - beginning, or any of its other meanings.
Athaabda does not mean 'thereafter' in the sense that only after one has found every other
exercise useless does he give this a try. This is not a simplified yoga for the old and stiff.

This desire requires a staying power and a knowing power and an ability to assimilate. A
desire may have a start, but can you start a desire? Even so, this knowledge has the apek
of its own of adhikritvam, and this preparedness has to be pointed out. Therefore
athaabda nantaryrtha. Tatra eva samanvaya athaabdasya.
Because this is stra, there is more to this nantaryam. What are those things after
which brahmavicra? This analysis is always going along with the stra, so who is the
brahmajijsu will be stated. Athaabda stands for all this. It is not that there is a
beginning to the desire to know Brahman. You have this desire and you may start the
vicra into Brahman. It is not the desire you want to analyze. You want to know Brahman,
and you will search for Brahman where Brahman is available. This is not a beginning; the
word kartavya must be brought in from outside the sentence with reference to
brahmavicra. Kartavya will indicate both the undertaking and the beginning, therefore
athaabda as 'beginning' would be redundant and useless. The meaning as nantarya gives
adhikritvasiddhi and is the meaning yukta here. The qualifications are indicated here, and
they are the bulk of Vednta. Without qualifications it does not work. Without
adhikrinicaya you have very little to say as a Vedntin. You have to establish a
bhinndhikr, not just bhinnaphala. To say agatrtha vednta you must state the
qualifications and who is the adhikr. Athaabda must have nantaryrtha in the stra.
The principal argument here is you do not begin a desire. Brahmajijs na
rabhyate. Brahmavicra begins due to brahmajijs. Brahmajijs is the word here.
Before brahmajijs, athaabda cannot have the meaning of beginning. It can only have
some other meaning. That meaning is magalam.
mlSy c vaKyaweR smNvyaavat!,
Magalasya ca vkyrthe samanvaybhvt |

There are three words in the stra. Brahmajijs is a single word. We go word by
word, and even while doing so the vkyrtha comes. As we analyze each word's meaning,
including implied meanings, there must be samanvaya, connection that incorporates all
other words in the stra. The athaabda is used in different ways. It indicates magala as
well as thereafter, beginning, order, question, uta and prvaprakta.


We have taken the meaning nantaryam, thereafter. That is the mukhyrtha. The
nantaryrtha is 'if this is there, the other will be there'. One is hetu and one is phala. One
is the specific, asdhraa, pukala, cause, without which the other is not possible. The
yarn is the asdhraa kraa for the cloth. The loom and spindle et cetera are sdhraa,
secondary, kraas. The hetuphalabhva is indicated by nantaryam, thereafter.
Brahmajijs will be there when vivekavairgya are there. Really, viveka is pukala kraam.
If viveka is there, vairgya will follow. In the stra, atha indicates that which is necessary,
this because of which alone brahmajijs is possible.
Jaimini was a disciple of Vysa, and there is no antagonism between prva and
uttara mms. It is the Prvammsakas who can create problems. Jaimini says athto
dharmajijs. The same word - atha. There we find 'svdhyyo adhyetavya'. When one has
studied Veda and the related disciplines he has to do stravicra. One should know how to
distinguish the primary and secondary vidhis. Analysis should provide how to approach
the Veda. The dharmamms is karmamms, and it is adharmamms as well. The
study of Veda can be asdhraa kraa for both dharmamms and Vednta. But
understand that brahmajijs is possible without that study. Veda adhyayanam, then, is not
necessarily pukalakraam for brahmajijs. One who has studied Veda is not necessarily
adhikr for brahmajijs. The subject matter and results differ. The knowledge of the
various ygas and their performance has no connection to brahmajijs. Brahmajnna is
mokaphala. This is why athaabda must be understood. This is why Bhyakra says
nantaryam means sdhancatuaya, sampatti anantaram. Mokya brahmajijs, therefore
athaabda with regard to vedntavicra should include mumukutvam, your desire for moka.
This is why the other meaning of athaabda, as prvaprakta, does not fit in.
What about magalam? It is said that a vaidika will not read a book which has no
magalam. Magalam means prayer. It also means sampti, ending, conclusion. The prayer
in the beginning is for a successful undertaking, for achieving the end. Another goal is
that the work reach the right hands. When books were palmleaf, each copy tended to be a
different version. The copying was done by brahmacrs who were learning. This
magalam, therefore, is that the book reach the right person in the right form, without
change or verbal entropy or dissipation. A prayer can be a thought or a word, and then
one starts. Athaabda has this magalrtha, but here there is no way to incorporate the
'magalam' meaning into the context of the stra itself. The athaabda invokes
Paramevara's grace and that is enough. By simple declaration you get magala result.
k says magalam is a possible meaning that is negated by Bhyakra because
there is no samanvaya with the words that follow in the stra and with the meaning of the
sentence. The athaabda does not make sense as a referral to a supplicant. There is no way
to make a connection between the stra and a magala kart. Moreover, separate verse
prrthana would not be appropriate in Vysa's stra format. The brahmastra ttparya
niraya and nicaya would not be served by varanamasktya outside the stra form.
Athaabda is used within the first stra itself, and that is Strakt's prayer. Athaabda does
not work as the word 'magalam', it works because it is purposefully heard first. That is


what is magalam, the athaabda ravaam. Separately the athaabda joins the other stra
words like Pini's 'vddhirdaic'. Vddhi is prayer when we think of it this way, and it is
a name for certain letters. Here, by sheer ucchraa of athaabda, there is magala scakam.
Therefore athaabda artha within the stra is only nantaryam, the mukhya meaning already
AwaRNtryu @v wzBd> uTya mlyaejnae vit,
Arthntaraprayukta eva hyathaabda ruty magalaprayojano bhavati |

Indeed there is no other way than by nantarya to make the stra meaningful.
Okra and athaabda give the prayer for successful completion of the purpose for which
the book is written. It is something like our ndasvaram in the South. When you hear
ndasvaram you feel some auspicious event is occurring. The conch too has that magalam
sense, but it is used for funeral processions too. Okra dhvani itself not pratka, not
abda, not abhidhna - is magalam. Before si, Brahmji said O. That is the beginning
of all the work. It is a traditional story that has placed O at all beginnings. Brahmji
completed the job and you will too. Okra and athaabda, by usage, are magalascakam.
The meaning of athaabda is only nantaryam. If you have to try to make
prvaprakta fit the meaning, if you have to take it from the standpoint of what is already
stated, the athaabda will not fit in. If prvaprakta is brahmavicra, then the pukalakraam
has to include sdhancatuaya for brahmajijs, and then from the standpoint of
prvaprakta, nantarya will again walk in.
R ktape]aya )lt AanNtyaRVyitrekat!,
Prvapraktpekyca phalata nantaryvyatirekt |

A possible meaning for athaabda has been given as prvaprakta. If you say tm
nitya atha anitya, if you ask tm uta anitya, you are asking if prvaprakta tm, the
vieya, is anitya. The uta is there as the meaning of the athaabda. By this we
understand the prvaprakta is brought in. kkra asks us to consider the prvaprakta as
meaning 'either satyam or mithy', bringing in prapaca. This is another meaning,
arthntara. What has gone before the brahmajijs, before brahmavicra kartavya, has to
be stated. The prvaprakta should be phalata to yield brahmavicra. As we have seen, that
prvaprakta should not be karma, which does not necessarily have this phala. We saw the
student who learned everything so that he could do abhieka. And prvaprakta is not
jnam, because jnya brahmajijs. The prvaprakta should be that because of which
brahmajijs will take place, and this cannot be nantaryvyatirekt. It cannot be separate
from the meaning of nantarya as thereafter. The prvaprakta will be only sdhana
catuya sampattih. Hetu phalabhva must be there. The hetu is pukalakraa and that is
prvaprakta and that is sdhana catuya sampattih. Therefore nantarya is the only
acceptable meaning for athaabda.
Krama does not work as the meaning here either. When you say one thing is first
and another thing is next, it is a kind of nantarya that is not useful here. Only mukhya


nantarya, that in whose presence brahmajijs will take place, only nantarya with
hetuphalabhvasambandha, is acceptable as the meaning.
sit canNtyaRwTR ve ywa xmRij}asa pUvRv
& < vedaXyyn< inymenape]t @v< ij}asaip yTpUvv
R &<
inymenape]te tVym! SvaXyayanNty tu smanm!,
Sati cnantaryrthatve yath dharmajijs prvavtta veddhyayana
niyamenpekata eva brahmajijspi yatprvavtta niyamenpekate tadvaktavyam
svdhyynantarya tu samnam |
Veda adhyayanam, as a rule, is necessary for entry to dharmajijs, which is really
karmamms. In the same manner, if the nantarya artha is accepted, Veda adhyayana is
expected as a precedent for brahmajijs. To remove the confusion as to what karma is
kartavya, you have to do mms. Therefore, atha. There is also confusion as to whether
tm is Brahman. What is pukalakraa for brahmajijs has to be told. But is there really
a need for Veda adhyayana? Is it a rule as it is for dharmajijs? Without knowing the
pukalakraa, and with adhikritvam not mentioned in the stra, you cannot establish
Vednta as a separate stra.
Brahmajijs implies adhikritvam. Brahman is the subject matter of Vednta, and
tm being Brahman is not available for any other means of knowledge. Certainly
anadhigatatvam does not make the subject matter of Vednta entirely separate from the
subject matter of the Veda. Many aspects of the karma section are also anadhigata.
Moreover, the karmas in the Veda have a variety of different phalas; just because Vednta
has bhinnaphala does not separate it from the Veda. And you cannot call the Vednta
agatrtha because of pratipdakapratipdyasambandha. This will not work. It is adhikr

alone that will work.

The adhikr in the anubandhacatuayam is what separates Vednta from
karmastra. The vedntavicra adhikr has moka icch and no loka icch or vitta icch or
putra icch. He is the mumuku. He is the adhikr for Vednta an entirely different
subject matter and an entirely different phala. That because of whose presence this
brahmajijs will take place is what Strakt has to tell. Then, only, Strakt can start the
stravicra. That adhikribhva has to be there, but not necessarily Veda adhyayanam. Veda
adhyayanam is a common similarity, but it is not pukalakraam.
Karma avabodhanam is useful for antakaraauddhi; we do not say it is not
required. But the fellow might have done all the karmas in a previous janma. Bhyakra
says that - that no one would enter Vednta without having done vaidikakarma. The
necessary puya has to have been gathered by doing vaidika karma. Svdhyaya, Veda
adhyayanam, will be there, but it is not extremely significant with regard to brahmajijs.
There are any number of nyyas in the Prvamms by which you interpret the
vedavkyas. They may talk of one specific result or many results for karma. In
Bhadrayaka we see 'yajena dhnena tapas vividianti' by doing various rituals and
charities and religious disciplines people try to know Brahman. This implies that karma
also becomes a means for brahmavicra. It implies that you should do Veda adhyayanam for

brahmavicra. This is called sayoga pthagtva nyya. It says you will get Brahma
avabodha as a special puya from karma avabodha. It makes brahmajnam a karmaphala.

This raises a question.

niNvh kmaRvbaexanNty ivze;>,
Nanviha karmvabodhnantarya viea |

The prvapaka makes a case for karmas based in Veda adhyayana that lead to karma
avabodhana and then to Brahma avabodha. He says that is what makes Veda adhyayana
common to both prva and uttara mms. In fact, he says, that is what makes
Prvamms prva, you do it before brahmavicra. A certain kind of karma done in a
particular way yields karma avabodhana, and that will lead you to brahmavicra. This, then,
he says, is the nantaryrtha: Veda adhyayana is pukalakraam for dharmajijs which
has karma avabodha as phala. That phala becomes the pukalakraa for brahmavicra.
akara says no. The first viveka is 'what is to be done and what is not to be done'.
Perhaps what is edible and what is not comes even before that. But dharmajijs here is
purely study of the Mmsstra. Brahmajijs is possible only for the one who has
studied vedntastra.
The k says the sayoga pthagtva nyyas are not relevant here. The nyyas are
there to interpret what is to be done and not done with regard to vaidikakarmas. They are
not a direct cause for brahmavicra. They are meant for dharmaniraya. Even karma
bodhana is not pukalakraam for brahmavicra. Karmabodhana gives you knowledge of
means and ends, but it is not a rule that they are a cause for brahmavicra. It may be true
that where there is smoke there is fire, but it is not true that wherever there is
dharmakarmajnam there is brahmajna. There is no vypti. This is not to say that
karmas do not help us as means for antakaraauddhi and for the possibility of a fellow's
viveka. The karmas may have been done in a previous life and created a disposition for
this knowledge. The karmas are not specific vieaas for adhikrtvam for brahmajnam,
though the saskras of dharmajijs can be expected in the one who seeks brahmajnam.
We are talking about rules here.
n xmRij}asaya> agPyxItvedaNtSy ij}asaeppe>,
Na dharmajijsy prgapyadhtavedntasya brahmajijsopapatte |

Even with the meaning 'thereafter', you have to explain what is the avadhi, how
'thereafter' is to be applied. For dharmajijs you will find Veda adhyayanam, and here it is
true too. That there is veddhyayanam is samnam but it is not sdhraam, not
pukalakraam. Veda adhyayanam is not this, the presence of which, you will have
brahmajijs. In fact this kind of vivekdi, this kind of discrimination as to what exactly
connects with what, is the cause. There are many who undergo the study but, at the same
time, do not have brahmajijs. There is no rule that veddhyayana must be there before
brahmajijs. The fellow may have studied, adhta, a book on Vednta and picked up his
inquiry that way. Perhaps he met someone who knew something about this and they


talked on the train and he developed mokajijs. As a result, his knowledge is

ptatajnam, paperback knowledge, general knowledge.
For the pravtti of brahmavicra, for the undertaking of an inquiry into
parambrahman, what is the avadhi when you say nantarya? This is the adhikr vieaam
that is to be told. Though we share the rules and many procedures with the Prvamms,
the knowledge of karma mentioned in the Veda is not the avadhi after which brahmajijs.
Neither is the performance of karma the avadhi. A religious life is one that involves denial
of one's rgadveas, of dharmdharma, and that will give rise to viveka. A vaidika life means
brahmavicra will in time be there, but there is the matter of what you expect to be. The
avadhi is what you are expected to be. You are expected to be a vivek. What is the viveka?
All these karmas put together and performed by the same person will not give me moka.
Question: All right, let nantaryam not be kraakrya, hetuphala. Let there not be a
mukhya nantaryam. Let us say there is no direct cause and effect relationship between
dharmajijs and brahmajijs. What is still pointed out is an order - first one then the
other, like brahmacr to ghastha to vnapraha. In this vaidika life one is never outside of
an rama. There is an order. The Veda wants to convey krama as the meaning. Vysa says
the same thing, and his heart is Veda's heart.
There is one yga in which an animal sacrifice is involved. Within this there is an
order. After the hdaygram, there is an order given for the offering of the prescribed
oblations. The vkya is there. You can make an image of the pau out of sugar and cut this
and offer the pieces in a given order. Bhyakra gives this as an example of krama. The
top part of the heart is offered first, then the tip there is an order. Similarly, the
questioner says there is an order from dharmajijs to brahmajijs.
ywa c dya*vdananamanNtyRinym> mSy ivvi]tTva tweh mae ivvi]t>
Yath ca hdaydyavadnnmnantaryaniyama kramasya vivakitatvnna tatheha
kramo vivakita -

The k tells why order is not the meaning here for athaabda. There is neither
logic nor evidence that stra intends this interpretation. Nothing stra says gives such a
reasoning. And it is unreasonable anyway. No order is meant to be conveyed. If krama
were the meaning, there would be one kart for the krama, for both dharmajijs and
brahmajijs. Instead, the adhikr for brahmajijs need not be involved with
dharmajijs, and he will be differently qualified.
ze;zei;Tve=ixktaixkare va ma[aavat! xmRij}asyae> )lij}aSyeda,
eaeitve'dhiktdhikre v prambhvt dharmabrahmajijsayo
phalajijsyabhedcca |

Wherever there is ekakarttvam, two different types of karma are involved. One
should be e and the other ea. Also there must be prama to tell what the
qualifications are for the person qualified to do the karmas. Bhyakra says both yukti and
ukti should be there. As far as eae, one Jaiminimmsstra says ea parrthatvt.


There is a yga, pryj, a small ritual, a satellite ritual to a main ritual. The main ritual is
called e, ag, and pryj becomes a ea. Why? Parrthatvt because it is meant to
complete the other one. The other is complete only when you perform this ea also. ea
is parrthatvam. You decide which is the e and which the ea. According to vidhi you
analyze the stra and you decide which is the main ritual and which the satellite. Now
when it comes to the performance, one person cannot do one ritual and another person the
other. It has to be samnakart. There is no e without the ea done by the same kart.
Vednta loves to debunk this eiea bhva. Say the body is e, ag, and the
limbs are aga. Now, which body is it you mean? You say the trunk. What is this trunk?
And what ag is not meant for aga? The hands are meant for the body. Which, then, is
ag? It is all arbitrary. Vednta takes apart all ags, until there are only agas. Then all
agas disappear. There is no real relationship between eiea, no bhva.
Main ritual and satellite ritual it is all within vyavahra. It is all arbitrary. But
irrespective of the quality of the relationship, the main ritual cannot be complete without
the satellite ritual and without both rituals being performed by the same yajamna, the
same kart. That is true of the order within the vaidika karmas, but it is not a rule between
dharmajijs and brahmajijs.
Prvapaka: Why isn't brahmajijs the ea? Dharmajijs is the main thing. The
brahmajna you get from brahmavicra is with reference to the tm, the kart. If you
think about the tm as saccidnanda and then perform karma, the karma becomes complete.
Why not? e ea. Or turn it around and make brahmajijs the e. Say that Brahma
meditation is e and karma is ea. Either way, Vednta is not an independent subject
matter. It is all one Veda and all for karma's sake alone.
Bhyakra: There is no prama for your eieabhva. There is such a thing as
adhiktasya adhikra. Adhiktasya adhikratvam means that for the one who is already
properly qualified by accomplishing something there is the adhikra. For example, you
must do vivha to do agnihotra, and if you do agnihotra you can do darapramsa, and if
you do darapramsa you can do somayga. This is adhiktasya adhikra in terms of the
one qualified for doing agnihotra who is thereby qualified to do the further rituals. But
this does not apply to dharmajijs and brahmajijs. In terms of krama, of ekakarttva, of
eiea, there is no way to establish Vednta as anything but an independent subject
matter with its own adhikr and phala. The only connection that is there is if you live a
life of dharma and that prepares you to be a brahmajijsu. Even if you have brahmajijs,
if you do not live a life of dharma there is no question of fulfilling brahmajijs. This is
what is being pointed out in the athaabda. If your life of dharma has resulted in viveka and
vairgya leading to mumuk, that is the avadhi. Ethical life, religious life, leads to spiritual
k refers to a godohanam, a vessel used for milking a cow. In the darapramsa
ritual, this vessel is used to bring water to the yajnala. Only the adhikr interested in
acquiring cattle, wealth in general, will bring the water for the ritual. The one who desires
cattle, the paukma, is adhikta. He alone is qualified for the aga in this karma. Having


performed the darapramsa every full moon day and every new moon day, he is
qualified to perform somayga. Adhikta adhikratvam. The one who does darapramsa
is the one adhikta for somayga. The stra says one person has to do this. The nih is
only for a samnakartk.
Since the karmas cannot be done simultaneously, there is a krama. Adhikta
adhikratvam establishes the sequence of moving from the desire to the fulfillment of the
karma by one qualified person. This krama is not a choice or decision by a person.
Prama, mna alone, decides which is the first and which the second. ruti alone tells
you which are the karmas and which is first and which second. Adhikta adhikratvam is
revealed by the ruti alone. The ruti and the smtis used for interpretation are there with
this knowledge.
Between dharmajijs and brahmajijs there is no adhikta adhikratva and no
eieatva. There are neither direct words nor any other indications, ruti ligdikam, that
there is any such connection. The example of the ramas brahmacr snta gh van
sannys is not an example of an order that can be extended to dharmajijs and
brahmajijs, to veddhyayana and brahmavicra, to karma avabodha and Brahma avabodha.
The vidhis and rules and requirements in the ruti may seem to validate such a conclusion
of adhikta adhikratva, but ruti has to be taken as a whole in terms of ekavkyat. ruti
talks of Brahman in terms of anna and pra and the other koas, but this does not mean
ruti means other than tm being Brahman. And the rules of succession through the
ramas have exceptions and variations. For example, one may have brahmajijs even
before becoming a ghasth and doing all the karmas. Smti talks of one who was free of
rgadvea who gained moka, who became a jvanmukta, and he was in the brahmacr
rama itself.
If there is evidence that the rgas still have a hold, the brahmacr should continue
to follow the rules and become ghasth. One follows the rules and not the exceptions to
become a uddhtm. Straightaway from ghasth pravrajet; he can take to a life of
brahmajijs and pursue brahmavicra seriously even if he does not take sannysa. A van
is one who has taken to a contemplative life. He does less vaidika karma and more upsana
and pursues brahmavicra. If one day he feels he should give up everything then let him
give up. But let it not be due to disenchantment or a sense of decay or disempowerment.
When you are ready to get out, do it. In fact you don't do it it happens. But adhikta
adhikratvam nsti as far as there being a rule that dharmajijs is a necessary step before
brahmajijs. In fact, virodha is there and there is absolute bhinna adhikrtvam.
Prvapaka: Both for karma and for pursuit of knowledge there is one phala, and
that is moka. What if I have no interest in putra, vitta, and pau, but I do karma for the
sake of moka? You told me that mere karma will not give me moka, so I will combine
karma with knowledge, with meditation. Brahman knowledge is necessary for Brahman
meditation. You cannot meditate on a Brahman that is unknown to you. I put jnam and
karma together to form mukti. The phala is one as mukti. The subject matter is one as
vedrtha, the object of the desire to know divided into karma and Brahman. Therefore


ekakarttvam is there because one fellow has to follow both dharmajijs and
brahmajijs. There is an order there.
Siddhnta: No, phalabhedt. Your mukti is not true. Both poha and husk will not
satisfy hunger. If I have to give up karma in order to gain moka, why would I try to
incorporate a kart. If I have to destroy the notion that I am a kart, if kart is tm and
tm is not kart is the truth, then what is this combination you have made as mukti?
Brahmajijsyam is entirely different; karma has its own result. Brahmajna is moka.
Ekakarttvam is not there for dharmajijs and brahmajijs. The adhikrtvam is different,
and athaabda indicates gaining this distinct qualification after which brahmajijs.
The athaabda has the meaning thereafter. Within this, the primary meaning is that
after the avadhi, after the pukalakraam, gaining this disposition, this qualification
viveka vairgya mumukutva amadamdi akasampatti there is adhikrtvam for
Prvapaka: No, athaabda means order. Once the first thing is over the second

thing will come. The same person is involved in doing two different things in succession.
Moreover, there can be doubt about the the phalas being different. There may be
anekakarmas, but phalas are only one. The darapramsa yga involves two sets of karmas
performed on either the full moon or new moon days. But there is only one phala. All the
ygas are for one svarga. Similarly, karma avabodha and Brahma avabodha are both meant
for moka. You see, we are in the same boat.
Siddhnta: You may call your boat's destination moka, but it is not moka. There is
phalabheda. The results are different and the subject matters differ. There are ygas with
many karmas that have but one phala. There are also twelve chapters in the Prvamms.
When you study the chapters in order, the jijsya is for dharma, vedoktakarma. The one
phala comes from a jijsya that is kramavat. But dharmajijs and brahmajijs are not a
krama. They are not alike in the way that two vaidika karmas are alike. The subject matter
of dharmamms is entirely different from that of brahmajna. For them, one after
the other ekakarttva krama is not possible.
A_yudy)l< xmR}an< tanuanape]m! I in>eys)l< tu iv}an< n canuanaNtrape]m! I
Abhyudayaphala dharmajna taccnuhnpekam I nireyasaphala tu
brahmavijna na cnuhnntarpekam I

Knowledge of how to perform a yga does not give you the phalam. No one wants
to go to heaven when he is enjoying life here anyway. The prvapak is doing what
modern Vednta does, and it can be destructive. He makes a distinction that says Vednta
is a theory and practice is necessary to complete it. He says you study Vednta and then
you do sdhana. This whole concept is wrong. The prvapaka says this brahmajnam,
like karmaphalam, is anuhnpeka. But brahmajna phalam is moka gained right now.
There is no anuhnam necessary. There is no putting Brahman into practice. Even if by
talking and listening and chanting and contemplation you seek clarity in your vision of
brahmtm, it is all a matter of understanding, not experience. It is not that Brahman is in


any way objectified by you in order for you to incorporate it into any practice. Brahman
and karma two different types of phalam.
The k is a real vaidika, Prvammsaka. After having talked of the six ygas
with one phala, he brings in the example of three rituals having different phalas. One yga
invokes srya and brings brahmavarcas, brahmatejas. It is said that even if you yourself do
not practice gyatr, if you come from a family with a tradition of gyatr practice, if it
goes two generations back, you will still show clear evidence of that brahmavarcas. It is
the same when you practice the chant of Veda. There is that brilliance, not only outside,
brahmavarcas. A brahmacr, after upanayanam, will perform every day a fire ritual, the
samithdhnam. It is the only fire ritual which does not require a wife. The goals of the
ritual are all manifestations of brahmavarcas.
k explains the three ygas to expand the sense that there is no order in the
mmss and that the dharmajna and brahmajna phalas are different. He says in the
three ygas there is a difference in the phala and there is no krama apeka. You do not
invoke the deities saurya ryam prajpati in order. You choose one or the other.
Samnakart is not there and three different ends are involved and the subject matters
differ. He says that when the jijsya differs there is no succession.
Any accomplishment or attainment causes in you a certain desirable condition, a
desired object experience, a ntavtti, a vtti of resolution. The wanting vtti resolves and
you have sukha anubhava which is the abhyudaya phalam of a viaya. Any object experience
is the nimitta for the sukha experience from local happiness to svarga. The vaidika rituals
bring abhyudaya phalam, though they are very complicted; there are a thousand nyyas.
But dharmakarmajnam does not itself bring that phalam. Anuhnpekam you still
must do the karma. After you gain jnam of the act you have to perform the ritual.
in>eys)l< tu iv}an< n canuanaNtrape]m! I Vy xmaeR ij}aSyae n }ankale=iSt
pu;VyapartTvat!, #h tu Ut< ij}aSy< inTyTva pu;Vyapartm!,
Nireyasaphala tu brahmavijna na cnuhnntarpekam | bhavyaca dharmo
jijsyo na jnakle'sti puruavypratantratvt I iha tu bhta Brahma jijsya
nityatvnna puruavypratantram |
Bhyakra is very thorough in explaining the difference between dharmajnam
and brahmajnam. This is the basis for his whole approach to vedntastram.
Brahmamms phalam is brahmajnam. And brahmajnam is meant for nireyas, nitya
nirapeka reyas, a reyas that is what you at all time want, what everybody always wants.
The security that is behind every one of your efforts to be secure, this sukham, is this
nireyas. This is what you are seeking.The ongoing efforts that never satisfy are the
abhyudaya phalam, dharmajnaphalam. Anitya sukham and nitya sukham are two different
types of result. Each has a different way of achievement: karma avabodha that is
anuhnpekam for anitya, and brahmajnam that requires no other thing for nireyas,
for nitya. One rises and is gone; it is anitya. Dharmajnam does not give you the reyas it
promises, it lacks anuhna. Brahmajnam gives you the nireyas it promises. The


jnam itself is this nireyas. The knower's svarpa being Brahman, this is the phalam.
After brahmajnam there is nothing to practice. This is not a matter of theory and
practice. Brahmajnam is itself an end, anuhna anapekam. Jnam and karma are
opposite. Brahmajnam itself is moka, and it is not a cause.
There is no kryakraasambandha between dharmajijs and brahmajijs.
There is no hetu for any such connection. There is no pukalakraam. Neither is there
krama apeka, prama abhvt. It cannot be said that jna and karma together create
mukti. There would have to be ekakart for there to be krama. Ekakartkatvam is not there
jijsbhedt phalabhedt; the natures of the subject matters and the results are different.
Dharmajna karmajnam has phalam in abhyudayaphalam, anityasukha, puya, certain
limited results. Whereas nireyasaphalambrahmajnam. If the two were in order, there
would be one phalam. The results of karmajnam are not achieved by knowledge itself.
The knowledge of karma must be put properly into practice. The hetu for anityaphalam is
different, anuhna apekam. Brahmajnam eva nireyasaphalam, anuhna anapekam.
Nireyas is the phalam for brahmajna, and opposite to this is phalam that is a result of
In the wake of brahmajnam, itself, phalam is achieved - without being practiceborn, effort-born, or meditation-born, which too, because kart is there, is karma. If
nireyas, moka, were the result of some kind of karma, the phalam would be anityam. An
impermanent moka is unacceptable even to the prvapakas. Nityatvt, moka is not born;
it is the very nature of the tm. From the standpoint of bondage we say tm mukta.
Moka is freedom from the notion that I am bound. The feeling that one is bound is born
out of confusion; therefore nothing but knowledge will remove that confusion. Gaining
brahmajnam is gaining brahmanireyasaphalam also.
Jnam is the nireyas hetu nityatvt. Moka is nitya, it is not created, it is in the
form of the very nature of Brahman. Whereas abhyudayaphalam anuhna apeka, therefore
karmajnam implies karma practice then, only, you get to know the phala. It is
dependent on the effort of the person. Otherwise karmajnam is useless. Finally, the
putting together of karma and brahmajnam is not possible. If the object of the desire to
know is for dharmakarmapuyasvargdisukhaphalam, it will have to happen in the future.
That bhavya dharma is sdhya; it has yet to happen. Bhavya is vieaa to dharma, and
dharma is a better word than karma. Dharma means knowledge of what is to be done and
not done, and it means knowledge of the results as well. The sukha from this
bhavyadharma does not happen at the time of knowledge. Dharma is to be practiced as
karma if it is to produce phala. Whereas brahmajnam is a matter of sarvadharmn
parityajya mm eka araa vraja seek vara. Choosing vara is choosing moka.
Puruavypratantratvt karmadharma is ktisdhya, centered on proper activity, and
the phalam is not immediate from the jnam alone. The jijsya is dharma, and it is
sdhyam. Whereas for uttramms brahmavidy vedntavkyas the subject matter is
Brahman. This jijsyam is siddhabhta Brahman. Both dharma and Brahman are codan,
upadesha, and both anadhigata viaya. But one is sdhyavastuviaya and the other is


siddhavastuviaya. Each has its own vkyas. Even though it is not available for other means
of knowledge, Brahman is already existent. Dharma is anadhigata and sdhya. They are
opposites. There is no samucchaya. Do not say that one will follow the other.
caednav&ieda, ya ih caedna xmRSy l][< sa Sviv;ye injuanEv pu;mvbaexyit, caedna tu
pu;mvbaexyTyev kevl< AvbaexSy caedna=jNyTva pu;ae=vbaexe inyuJyte,
Codanpravttibhedcca | y hi codan dharmasya lakaa s svaviaye nijujnaiva
puruamavabodhayati | brahmacodan tu puruamavabodhayatyeva kevalam, avabodhasya
codan'janyatvnna puruo'vabodhe, niyujyate |
Codan should be taken as 'vkya'. Codan is upadeavkya, vedavednta
upadeavkya, vidhivkya. All the vkyas that reveal an anadhigataviaya are codans. All
pramas operate in only one way. No prama is puruatantra; prama is always
viayatantra vastutantra. Knowledge is always as true as the object; every prama works
in a manner to reveal the object. Ajta jpakam is exactly the prama. Whatever is
ajta will be brought into knowledge. That ajtasya jpakam is the pramapravtti. The
pramapravttiphalam is jnam.
Prvapaka: The Veda is a means of knowledge and it includes the Vednta. The
operation of the vedapramna is going to be uniform for Veda and Vednta. The
pramapravtti should be the same whether it is talking about dharma or Brahman.
Siddhnta: It cannot be the same because the phalam is different. In revealing the
anadhigataviaya, codanpravtti is the same, but the svargdiphalam is not immediate.
When the vkya gives you the karma that has svargdiphalam, it does not give you svarga. It
gives you the knowledge of means and ends. But brahmajnam is an end in itself.
Brahman is nityasiddhaviaya and not dependent on human effort. There is a difference in
your responses to the knowledge of a karma and the knowledge that is Brahman one is
'uh huh', the other is 'ah hah'. Phalabhedt there is no samucchaya.
Dharmvabodhaka vkyas reveal their purpose in terms of clearly defined means
and ends. They also reveal the purua by evoking and sustaining his interest is those ends.

He knows that after doing that he will get this.

When a purua looks at the codan, at the aprvavkya vidhivkya which reveals the
sdhyasdhansambandha involved in a vaidikakarma, there is a certain bhvan, a certain
vtti. Because the prama reveals what is paroka, otherwise not know, he understands
what the yga to be done is and what is required of him. He knows the connection of the
yga to the svargdiphalas he is interested in. It is also said that the vidhivkya creates a
certain bhvan because of the expectation and anticipation on the part of the purua for
the gain of the desired phala.
Ayam tm Brahma also puruam avabodhayati, even though tm is nitya aparoka.
This 'nityparokabrahma is tm' is knowledge I do not have. Mokaphalaka Brahma
avabodhayati by the ayam tm brahmeti upadea mahvkya. But the difference is that
brahmai na pravartayati. There is no connection made between the purua and a Brahman


that is other than himself, an object to be aimed for or gained. Why? Bhta brahmaviaya
nityasiddhavtt. Dharma is bhavya dharma, sdhya dharmah. Dharma and Brahman are
different, and there are two types of pramapravtti. There is a small difference
jijsyabhedt. Ekakartkatvam is not possible.
With karma, with dharma, Veda first gives you parokajnam, and in order to make
it aparoka the purua has to do something. The stra, then, is only avabodhakam, not
pravttakam. To get the result you must do something after you have gained the
knowledge. The purua with an interest in gaining that result will, alone, be karmai
pravtti. This certain bhvan which he gets is codan janya. The karma and the result too
are codanjanya, purely pramatantram, because they are nitya paroka.
If by the knowledge ayam tm Brahman moka labhyate, kicit kartavyam?
Abrahman cannot be made into Brahman. The brahmaviayacodan puruam avabodhayati.
That satya jnnanta codan is vedntaviaya, not prvammsviaya. The Brahma
avabodha is not pure codan janyajnam, it is vastutantram because tm nitya aparoka.
R awaRvbaexe tt!,
Yathkrthasannikarerthvabodhe tadvat |
Akrtha means indriyrtha; akni indriyi. Between a sense organ and an object
within its range of perception a sambandha takes place. Wherever sense perception is

possible the contact between the sense and its object is total. For taste and touch the
contact is direct; for the others, the objects should be within range. The sambandha takes
place and there is avabodha without puruam pravartayati. Jnya there is no further
pravtti. Viayvabodhe purua na niyujyate. There is nothing impelling the purua into
some kind of activity for the sake of avabodha. All that is necessary is prama prameya
Vedntastra is prama for 'tm being Brahman'. The abdaprama being
available, the tm being already Brahman, there must be jnam. Moka lbha is there
without any other pravtti. It is final and there is no combination with abhuyudaya dharma.
There is no rule of succession or order making a connection between anitya and nitya.
k says that in the meaning of the tattvamasi mahvkya, in the tvam artha, the ayam tm
is to be known as Brahman without prapacam. Jagatkraabrahma, but Brahma being
satyam and jagan being mithy, satya Brahma is known to be niprapaca. If prapaca is
there, Brahman has undergone change and is subject to time and you are finished. If the
jagat is vieaa to Brahman you are finished there is no moka. Satya Brahma remains
satya Brahma, and this is how reality is. This is how, alone, pthagtm is understood as
Brahman. This is the upadeavkya, codan avabodhayati na pravartayati. It is the prama
that is instrumental for jnam. There is no other meaning. Pravartaka prama na.
Pramam is simply avabodhakam.
Prvapaka: Why dont you take avabodha as a viay jnya pravtti. First you
get parokajnam, intellectual knowledge, and afterwards aparokajnam. If you have


self-knowledge, you must realize that self. This may be modern Vednta, but it has
always been there.
Siddhnta: There is no paroka Brahma available at all. Nitytm being selfevident, that has to be understood as such. Avabodhasya codan janyatvt. The example is
the knowledge gained by the senses of their objects. The knowledge of a sense object and
the knowledge that is Brahman are born when prama and prameya are there. Jnam is
not puruatantram, not an act of will on a person's part. Therefore the meaning of the
athaabda must be revealed. There is no other meaning you can give to the athaabda than
nantarya. Pukalakraa is the avadhi, that in whose presence brahmajijs will take place.
This has to be mentioned. Thereafter, therefore, brahmajijs. The hetu is then there; in
the thereafter there is a hetu. The hetu must be there, and between this and the
brahmajijs there is no other goal. Therefore phala must be there in the very 'thereafter'.
That means viveka is there, vairgya is there, amadamdiakasampatti is there, and moka
icch is there which cannot be fulfilled without dharmajnam. With the qualfication
comes therefore brahmajijs.
tSmaiTkmip vVy< ydnNtr< ij}asaepidZyt #it,
Tasmtkimapi vaktavya yadanantara brahmajijsopadiyata iti |
Brahma is the subject matter of the uttaramms at hand, and dharmamms is
an entirely different subject matter. They are not to be understood as being in any type of
Prvapaka: Vedoktakarma is important, and after vedoktakarma alone Brahma iti.
They go in order; dharmamms and brahmamms are both Veda. They are like
chapter after chapter, like class after class. It is the samucchaya that works. After karma
and jna samucchaya, mukti. Brahmajnam is just for another type of karma. Mnasa
karma meditation, brahmopsana, can be either e or ea, and jnam will be the other.
There is ekakart for both the main and the secondary processes. There is no
pukalakraam, but there is an order there. Adhikta adhikrtvam indicates that order of
karmamms and brahmamms and the one phalam for both. I do not accept your
moka. Veda talks about moka as kartavya, and I will prove that.
Siddhnta: You say that moka is heaven and that it is nitya. stra itself says
heaven is anitya; it begins and ends in time. There is no moka that is anitya. Moka is
centered on the very knowledge of the self, which is Brahman. Athaabda is not
adhikrrtha because there is no way to begin a desire for Brahman. You cannot say
'From now we begin the brahmajijs'. You can say that a prvaprakta is not mentioned,
that no information has been given in the stra that refers to previous information. You
can ask what is the prvaprakta for brahmajijs. You can ask if vivekdi is necessary or
not, if it is adhikritvam for brahmajijs. But the athaabda is there and you cannot say na
apekate. Apekate is there, and it means vivekdi. That is the net result of prvapraktrtha,
and it will end up in the meaning of athaabda as nantaryam. Athaabda means thereafter,
not succession.


Thereafter, again, means 'in the presence of what, this will be there'. This is the
primary meaning of nantaryam, the pukalakraa, the hetuphalabhva. The hetu is the
avadhi if it is there, then thereafter this will be there. When the word thereafter is there,
you have to mention the avadhi. If it were not obvious what is the avadhi, Vysa would
have mentioned it in the stra. The athaabda should refer to what is obvious. It is
stravicra that we are doing; Vysa assumes that you know. This is Brahmastras, not
Tattvabodha. Naturally there is an assumption that you will know that 'therefore vivekdi'
- nitya anitya vastu vivekah, amadamdiakasampatti, mumukutvam. The fourfold
qualifications become the pukalakraam. This is the avadhi atha, thereafter. Thereafter
what will be there? Brahmajijs there is no other way. If all these are there,
brahmajijs will be there. If all these are not there, brahmajnam will not be there. One
may have some spiritual curiosity, or have some serious hope to solve some other
problem, and be drawn to this inquiry. But we are talking about brahmajijs. This is
why the word mumuku is not here. Everybody wants freedom from problems. To get rid
of their pain, people seek some kind of freedom. We are addressing the chronic dukha,
smsrika dukha. It is smsrika dukha nivtti we are seeking, and this has to be discerned
first. In their enthusiasm one may discover the adhikritvam to some extent. That is why
you start to teach carefully, to straighten the whole thing. There has to be a sustaining
power that continues until one knows.
It is pukalakraam, not just one after another. We are talking about the mukhya
nantaryrtha as the athaabdrtha na kramrtha. This is why Bhyakra says tasmt iti. He
does not even mean the magalrtha, even though this is achieved. The meaning in the
stra is 'thereafter'. No other meaning is possible here where strakra talks of
%Cyte - inTyainTyvStuivvek> #hamuawRaegivrag> zmdmaidsaxns<pt! mum]
u Tu v< c,
Ucyate nitynityavastuviveka, ihmutrrthabhogavirga,
amadamdisdhanasampat, mumukutva ca |

The athaabda unfoldment is complete with this. In the Upaniad itself you get
viveka vairgya, ihmutrrthabhogavirga and the other vkyas. They are there in both ruti
and smti. From the gamavkyas, which have prmnikatvam, we gather that these
fourfold vivekdi are the minimum qualifications having achieved which one is adhikr.
Viveka means all my laukikam vaidikam pursuits are not capable of producing what
I really want. Moka can mean many things, any dukhanivtti. Muc dhtu bandhanivrttau.
What is bandha? Anything that you don't want. Therefore pururtha nicaya must be
thorough, and we want that vyavasytmaka buddhi. We require this quality of antakaraa
vtti. That what I seek is the basic freedom from my being small, insignificant, bound by
time, bound by inadequacy; that this freedom cannot be fulfilled by adding something to
myself as a seeker; that by getting rid of a few things I am not going to be any different
I must come to see these things. If I extend the viveka a little bit I may see that analyzing
the complaining person is the only solution, that there really is no real problem. What is


real is 'I must be nitya, tm must be nityapra' all your paperback jnam comes back,
and you remember the words of all those songs.
This is the advantage of being born in a country where this knowledge is the basic
truth and is found in the very cultural forms. These things come alive when this much
viveka is there. All the karmas and a life of dharma lived so far and all the prayers et cetera
pay off in this viveka. One sees through the process of endless change, endless becoming.
That I have a problem is the problem, and I may not be the problem at all. The inadequate
will always be inadequate, and what comes in time will go away in time. I must approach
the problem in a way that will solve it. This is the ptatajnam. It may be that I do
require some anitya results for the time being. I may need that medicine before I address
the bhavaroga. As long as we understand what is what, there is no problem.
Therefore vairgya, iha amutrrthabhogavirga. Artha is viaya. I no longer have
the notion that an experience here and an experience there will solve my problem. In this
dispassion all religions stop, all paradises stop, all dependence on objects and experiences
in this and other janmas and puya stop. Across your countless births there is nowhere
you have not come from or gone to. You think you have been having bhoga, but you have
become bhogya too. Perhaps you have had enough. Because viveka is there you have
vairgya. One is the hetu for the other, and dama will be there to some extent.
Indriym uparama dama - by will you can stop the senses, but mind you cannot
stop. Mnasa uparama ama. It is never said how this is accomplished. It is a problem
in the tradition itself. And I do not think they ever knew how to take care of it. How
should you take care of it? Mnasa uparama does not take place unless you express it in
an appropriate way. You must write it out, talk it out, talk it out with someone who will
not abuse that knowledge. Talk to Bhagavn and be mindful of your behavior pattern and
your thinking pattern. Address the need to interfere and cause problems for others, and
recognize the internal pressure which leads to acting out. Express it to yourself as you
would to a true friend. Be that true friend for yourself, and let Bhagavn in on it. Heal the
injured child inside and help him or her mature within your whole consciousness. This is
how we deal with all emotions.
Uparati can be taken as a sense of ownership, unwarranted in the sense that all is
given by vara. This sakti, the fixation on possession, should fall behind from lack of
nourishment. Uparati is also the taking of sannysa. Karma has its place for
antakaraauddhi, but sannysa is jnrtham. Either way you can do. Between
karmasannysa and karmayoga there is a choice, and there is no other choice, both are
jnrtham. Titik is the cheerful handling of opposites and extremes. This is not the
same as putting up with, it is freedom from complaint. Life is lived in the world of
opposites, and all conditions are different degrees of iam and aniam. It does not bother
the vidvn; he does not even recognize it in terms of iam and aniam. It is not a matter
of reducing aniam to iam. You can even develop a liking for blue cheese or durian.
Being objective and maintaining one's composure is a matter of focus. You can make
everyone's life miserable when your focus on your likes and dislikes. The shift of focus is
not easy to learn. What is is vara, and to be with vara is to be with what is. What you


live in is yourself; live so that you draw apart the curtain between yourself and the truth
of Bhagavn.
Now it is called four: viveka vairgya amadamdi mumukutvam. It is eleven as
well. k tells about samdhnam. There are three tendencies. One is a general sleepiness
whether one sleeps too little or too much. The second is procrastination, a dullness
inside, laziness, a reluctance to do what needs doing. One repeatedly puts off what is
required. The third is indifference, a casual, incautious distraction that often includes a
dismissive attitude. To counteract these three one must use his will. It helps to have an
effective support system, satsaga. By this, one helps the other and all are helped thereby.
Do you get up early for pj? Do you have a routine? External action where a number of
people participate helps you build an inner disposition of cooperation and attentiveness.
You can deal with the indifference and disconcerting reluctance. It is tyga one has to do.
You know Lord Dakimrti's foot is there on Apasmra, who sits there with a drawn
knife waiting to attack you. Bhagavn keeps that fellow at bay with his foot. But the
fellow, the one called the inner enemy, is not dead. Yes, your own disposition can be an
enemy to you. The three are the inimical enemy of your self.
Samdhnam involves a kind of raddh. With regard to puyapp and the results
of some actions, you need raddh in the ruti. But it is not the same where you need to
understand. Here raddh is in yourself, a capacity to trust yourself, so that you can
understand. tmavit oka tarati is a leap of understanding, perhaps too much for the time
being. Subject to so much sorrow, how can you trust the ruti statement? Who is going to
cross sorrow? It calls for maturity, and maturity of vision. A mind absorbed in and
content with the true nature of the self is a unique blessing in accord with the five virtues
we have discussed. Of them, only dama focuses on discipline. All are matters of inner
disposition. But they come together and fructify in samdhnam. They become a unit that
is self-supporting and secure. The gap of faith is crossed over in the experience and
knowledge of harmony and confident spontaneity. There is inner discipline and inner
growth along with viveka and vairgya and growing wisdom that make the person, make
the adhikr.
Mumukutvam is the disposition of the adhikr. That being there, brahmajijs is
there. We are talking about the whole person, not just his desires or interests.
Mumukutvam is not mere moka icch. Mumukutvam alone is converted into jijs.
Otherwise moka is not possible atha ata brahmajijs. Without jnam there is no
moka. His viveka is up to that point it is not merely disenchantment with the world, a
feeling that all these things in the world are useless. It is not a vague sense that one must
realize the self. It is not kriy, diet, neti, discipline, study. No, it is called self-knowledge
because you require stram. Prama is necessary. The desire to know Brahman means
vedntavicra is necessary. You have come to know the limits of the other pramas and
their powerlessness in this. All this being there, atha tasmd. By revealing the avadhi we
have come to the conclusion that this fourfold sampatti are riches one has to have.


Mumuku mumukutvam , adhikr adhikritvam: we are talking about the whole

person. The mumuku may have other roles to play in daily life, and he or she may play
them well. It is mumukutvam that converts him or her into a karmayog.
te;u ih sTsu agip xmRij}asaya ^Xv c zKyte ij}aistu< }atu< c n ivpyRy,
Teu hi satsu prgapi dharmajijsy rdhva ca akyate Brahma jijsitu jtu ca
na viparyaye |

The k tells the adhikr vieaatvam. They say we have a casteless society. The
very ones who say this make sure that the castes are there. After they say this, they ask
your caste. They make sure, I tell you. Yesterday one fellow asked me for a place here. I
asked his mark. Seventy-five. I asked his group. MB most backward. It caught me up
most backward? most backward group, like it was an MBA. I myself looked at myself.
I said immediately, "You are qualified." I was so happy he was qualified, and he was
happy too. He was so happy he was most backward, it gave him confidence that he would
get in. I was very happy he was most backward, because he will get a seat now. From this
we understand that everything is a qualification and everything is a disqualification.
Dont worry that you don't have any hair on your head.
Teu vivekdiu. When these qualifications are always all there, even if you
have already had the privilege of studying Veda and dharmamms, brahmajijs will be
there for you. Dharmajijs is not a disqualification, it is a privilege. If vivekdi are there
because of janmntara or prtakarma, seva, or any other reason, Brahman becomes the
object of a desire to know. It will not be there otherwise, and even if the seeker reads
Upaniad this avagati will not take place. One will study but will not know. It is not a
matter of enthusiasm, only vivekdi, there for whatever reason. Without them, even if he
has time for brahmavicra, brahamajnam will not take place. You have anvayavyatireka
vivekdiu and the jijs. The viveka is the pukalakraam.
When brahamajnam is there, vivekdi must be there. Vivekdi is there,
brahmajijs will definitely be there. Up to brahmajijs the desire for moka is not
enough. Many things taken to be forms of spiritual pursuit are useless nonsense. It is
okay, but it is not enough. People may be serious, but they have judgments, conclusions.
Viveka should lead to brahmajijs. Otherwise confusion is there. The successful seeker
will know there needs to be a pramam, success being in the form of jnam. He or she
will know almost all about Vednta. Vddhavyavahra is a culture's and a people's
knowledge of what it takes to pursue this. The conventions of sannysa, of going to the
guru and to the stra, may be available, but still the thought must come. Ka was
around all the time, but until Arjuna had the thought, he did not become a iya. Ka
would have told him long before; only when reyas came did iya come. Here, one leads
to the other viveka brahmajijs. That is the adhikr vieaatvam. The vyatireka is
tSmadwzBden ywaesaxns<pyanNtyRmp
u idZyte,
Tasmdathaabdena yathoktasdhanasampattynantaryamupadiyate |


In the stra, Strakra has taught that nantaryam is what is meant by the word
atha. 'After sdhanacatuya sampatti prpti' is the meaning of anantaram.
At>zBdae heTvwR>, ySmaed @vaihaeadIna< ey>saxnanaminTy)lta< dzRyit - t*weh kmRictae
laek> ]Iyt @vmevamu pu{yictae laek> ]Iyte #Tyaid>, twa iv}anadip pr< pu;aw dzRyit ivdaaeit pr< #Tyaid>, tSma*waesaxns<pynNtr< ij}asa ktRVya,
Ataabdo hetvartha | yasmdveda evgnihotrdn
reyasdhannmanityaphalat darayati 'tadyatheha karmacito loka kyata
evamevmutra puyacito loka kyate'(Chand. 8.1.6) itydi | tath brahmavijndapi para
pururtha darayati 'brahmavidpnoti param'(Tait. 2.2) itydi |
tasmdyathoktasdhanasampattyanantara brahmajijs kartavy |

When you say 'therefore', a hetu should also be presented. When the reason is
given, you can say therefore. Vivekdi is the pukalakraam, therefore thereafter you can't
but do brahmajijs mokya. Brahmavicra kartavya. Atah therefore. Thereafter,
therefore, brahmajijs. Athaabda brings in many words from the ruti to support this.
The same Veda that talks about heaven which you think to be mokasthnam tells
you to come back and look again. The religions that talk about heaven-going talk only
about heaven-going, a place to go, another trip. That is as far as they go. Whereas here
the very Veda that talks about heaven negates heaven going not the existence of heaven
or its desirability or its being reyas, it negates the possibility of it being moka. It
dismisses heaven as anitya. Veda says that agnihotrdi karmas are the means to things that
are reyas, that are good. Heaven is good, and there are other good things there. From
simple agnihotra done with two oblations every morning and evening to the avamedha
there are limited results attainable which may look like moka but are not. The word reyas
is used for them, but all karmas anityaphalata.
Upaniad does not need to give you logic for what is raddh-born. Going to
heaven, exhausting your puya, returning to a body you will continue it is all raddh.
Upaniad does not need to give a logic, but there is a logic here. The citation is from
Chndogya. It is nitya paroka, but it is logical because the laws are the same paroka v
aparoka v pratyaka v. The same law of karma applies and keeps you in the framework
of time and experience. Just as it is here, it is there. Amutra means there, elsewhere, in the
other world, nitya paroka. This body, this field of experience, it is loka, it is karmacitta, it
comes about by karma, and kiyate, it diminishes over time. It is going to be around as
long as as you have viaya anubhava. Day after day the puya kyate. It is the same there
the problem of sukha. You cannot have your cake and eat it too. Loka anitya. Anything
you enjoy will be limited in terms of time. Your disposition too will play a part in your
ability to enjoy what would otherwise be pleasurable. It is the same in any other world.
Anything earned by your action is going to be finite in quality and quantity.
Bhyakra also cites a positive vkya from Taittirya: brahmavid pnoti param. The
ultimate human end is given as Brahman. The most relevant thing you can quote here:
parkalokn karmacittn nirvedam yd brhmaa. Brhmaa vivek. He has done

svdhyya, studied the Veda, he has been doing karma, he is a vaidika, he is a brhmaa.
Li may that brhmaa gain nirvedam, dispassion, vairgya. Examining, parka, is the
hetu for that. See that all that is put together, all that is born, all that is gained, all that is
experienced, all heavens, sarvn lokn dissipate in time. This vicrya, examining this, this
viveka is the hetu for vairgya. All karmaphala is going to be anitya karmaphalatvt. Watch

the farmer and see the circle of activity and yield, of effort and return, of coming and
If what you seek is not eternal you will be eternally seeking. Seek the eternal, but
not in what is timebound. The eternal is siddha; it does not need to be created. If it is
already there, non separate from the tm, what you have to do is knowledge. Tasmt ata is tasmt. Tasmt what? Tasmt tad vijnrtha gurumeva abhigacchet rotrya
brahmaniha samitpi. This is a thing to be known, therefore brahmajijs.
Sdhanacatuayasampttyanantaram ata brahmajijs.
There are two things here. One is, every karmaphala, whether the karma is laukikam
or vaidikam, is anitya. The second is, the ruti need not quote a logical nyya revealing a
certain vypti. A vypti is a logical postulate 'when it is there, that will be there';
'because this is there, that should be there'. A rutivkya will a have a vypti in its garbha,
in the main body. When 'yath' is there in the vkya, we know dnta is there, a logical
postulate is there which we have to pull out. In the vkya 'tadyatheha karmacito loka kyata
evamevmutra puyacito loka kyate' we must extend the logic to cover nitya paroka, the
amurtra. If there is such as place, it will be the same there as it is here. rutinyya is yat
ktaka tad anitya kryatvt ghaavat - like your arra too, which is another pot,
karmacitta. All karmaphala is anitya.
Daphalam is anitya, we know. Adaphalam is anitya you should also know.
ruti is the prama that tells you that adaphalam astti. It tells you this karmaphala called
puyam is there. Only by ruti do you know this and that this phalam is anitya. If your
arra is taken to be adaphalam, that adakarmacitta deha is going to be anitya. Do not
dream that it is otherwise. There is no anityamoka. You cannot come to terms with moka
by doing karma; you must deal with self-disapproval.
Prvapaka: What about the karmaphala which is considered nitya? What if you do
the two rituals which are said by ruti to have nityaphalam, akayaphalam, suktam puyam?
ruti promises a heaven where you will stay forever. kkra says vivekdi are possible
only when moka is a possibility. But if there is nityaphalam available through karma, why
should I have vairgya toward this? I will have a desire for this limitless heaven, not for
moka, not for avoiding karma. You cannot establish either viveka or vairgya as being
inapplicable to karma. Therefore dharmajijs is enough. We do not need to take up this
Moreover, if you say jnena moka, that means there should be a desire to know
Brahman. Why shouldn't that mean a desire for the jnam from brahmopsana? My
knowing I am a jva is knowledge as true as any other knowledge. What is gained by
knowing jva as something else? You are advocating madness, self-identity confusion.


Jva cannot give up his svarpa and assume some identity other than what he is. This
brahmasvarpamoka does not exist, and a jva cannot dismiss what he is. The jva is there;
he must be there if there is going to be moka. If jva goes away, where is moka? A jva

should approach God and enjoy his presence, experience him, enjoy him.
Even if I accept that jva is already Brahman, what do I gain by that? Siddha
Brahma does not mean anything to my pururtha. If Brahman is something to be
accomplished I can look at it as a pururtha, but if it is already siddha there is nothing I
can do about it. If I am Brahman there is no moka; it is better to look for some good karma
that will give me a permanent stay in heaven. The body and this world are not designed
for enjoying moka while here. The world is a karmabhmi designed for exhausting karma.
Only in heaven will you get away from this. Developing vairgya toward all ordinary
karmas, he went to a brahmaniha who knows that akayakarma. He went to a guru who
knows all the Veda and learned from him the right karma to gain nityaphalam. That is what
the vkya means. The way you interpret vivekavairgya just makes you a loser, a failure.
Siddhnta: Ataabda means therefore. It means there is a causality. After the
sdhanacatuayasamptti, because viveka arises, because a desire for moka arises, because
jvasya brahmatvam asti, because adhysa is established, because sasritva is established,
because sasritvam is due to adhysa, because adhysanivtti is jnam, uttaramms is
begun for brahmajna. This means there is adhikritvam and the adhikr. The ataabda
negates the prvapaka. Mumukutvam is possible. The rutivkya 'tadyatheha karmacito
loka kyata evamevmutra puyacito loka kyate' supports vairgyasiddhi. The positive
rutivkya 'brahmavidpnoti param' supports mumukutvasiddhi.
kkra affirms the meaning of athto as 'thereafter, therefore'. Thereafter gaining
these fourfold qualifications, which are implied, not mentioned, because this is stra,
brahmajijs. Athaabda brings in the avadhi, the pukalakraam, all that is required as
hetu for what come after. There is hetutvam for brahmajijs established which eliminates
the kepa, any objection. The athaabda does this. It makes the vkyas come alive.
There is brahmajijs because brahmavidpnoti param; tmavit oka tarati; para
pururtham pnoti; vijnam nanda Brahma. There is a positive pursuit, desire for
knowing Brahman.
kkra cites other ruti: yadalpa tanmartyam | yatktaka tadanityam. Anything
small is subject to destruction; small itself means it is within time/space. Anything that is
created is limited in time. One must see which rutivkya are backed by nyya. ruti that
talks about akayakarmaphalam means only that phalam lasts a long time, that's all. The
nityatvam there is pekikanityatvam. Agnihotra and cturmsya yaja produce only a
comparative result. The nyyavat ruti negates the nitya meaning. Therefore from the ruti
itself you know that vairgya toward everything else, toward sarvn vaidikalaukikaprptn,
is consistent with seeing them all as being other than the tm. There is no moka in
Mumukutvam, the putting out of the fire of the one who is afflicted by sasra, is
by brahmajna. That is the water here. That is the rutivkya the k cites here. The


prvapaka is correct, the jva cannot become Brahman the jva is Brahman. Why you do
not know is because you do not know Brahman. You need to know Brahman. You need a
buddhi for it. May you do ravaam.
[ae ij}asa ij}asa,
Brahmao jijs brahmajijs |
Bhyakra uses the word kartavy, but there is no way to do something that would
make a difference to brahmajijs. It is brahmavicra that is kartavy. You can take the
compound brahmajijs as ah tatpurua, just let jijs yield to vicra. A desire to know
Brahman gives you vicra as means to that fulfillment. And the brahmavicra will be
maintained until brahmajnam. tm vre rotavya tma vre mantavya tma vre
nididhysitavya all will be covered by brahmajijs. But brahmavicra will not cover
them. Therefore the proper word here is brahmajijs. Nevertheless, kartavy has to be
accounted for.
The word mumuk also translates as jijs. Mumuk, moka icch, brings in the
pururtha. Because there is mumuk there is brahmavicra. Mumuk fulfillment is
brahmavicra. Mokapururtha is achieved only by brahmajnam. Moka icch is
converted into Brahma icch. Therefore brahmajijs will bring in mumuk, the
pururtha. It will maintain the brahmavicra until the completion of brahmajijs. The
brahmavicra stands in for brahmajijs to go with kartavy. There is no kartavy for
brahmajijs; you cannot add to brahmajijs. There is no doing of a desire to know
Brahman. A word has to be brought in which can be used in the sense of an undertaking.
That word is brahmavicra.
kkra says that the stra sentence must be completed. Stra is a sentence, but it
must fit the stra definition. There are not many words there. Certain obvious words are
omitted. The words, like kartavy, must be brought in. But when the sentence is analyzed,
when you do the anvaya, the brought-in words must be yogyat. The words must gel. Does
kartavy gel with a desire to know Brahman? It does when brahmajijs kartavy yields to
brahmavicra kartavya. You get brahamaa vicra when you do the compound
brahmajijs as ah tatpurua. Keeping the ultimate meaning of brahmavicra in view,
Bhyakra introduces brahmajijs.
Look at this compound: dharmajijs dharmya jijs. You should do this
karma to accomplish this result. You need to know this karma if you are to achieve that
end. And the caturth always gives the intention. Often the caturth means tasmai nama.
Salutations are offered to one who will ensure the success of the ritual. You tell for whom
you make the salutation, that altar. That is the tadartha caturth. You have the same here
with dharmya jijs in terms of intent. I want to gain the puya from the karma. Do I
immediately think of the sdhana, the ritual, or do I think of the ia, the result of the
sdhanam, what is desired? Whichever it is, it will gel with the the caturth, with dharmya
in the compound. Either way dharmya will be okay.


In the brahmajijs compound the k says Brahman becomes an object of jijs.

Desire is always for an object; there is no abstract feeling of desire. The compound
brahmajijs is karmai ah. Brahmaa jijs, ah tatpurua, can means Brahman's
desire to know. But karmai ah takes away the ea meaning, possession. The meaning
of the compound as Brahman's knowledge is not possible. Jijs is san pratyaya,
desiderative, a desire to know, jtum icch. It is there in the s pratyaya. There is
reduplication of jndhtu - jijs. The pratyayasya meaning is icch. Desire is the main
word, mukhyrtha a desire to know. The desiderative can also be jnya icch, but not
here. Once you say icch, you expect the object, karma, of that desire. The object is to
know, knowledge. The object also is Brahman, and no other object has been indicated.
Prvapaka: Brahmajijs should be taken as caturth, as brahmae jijs for
Brahman's sake, jijs. You will get the brahmaphalam as with any karma. The meaning as
Brahman icch is that there is a phalam which you will get. For Brahman's sake is the desire
for knowing. You get this brahmaphalam not as a result of jnam but as a result of
upsana. Just as with any ia sdhana, you do the karma to gain the result. First I have to
know Brahman, then, for the sake of Brahman, I must have jijs, brahmajijs.
c vyma[l][< jNma*Sy yt> #it, At @v n zBdSy jaTya*waRNtrmazitVym!,
Brahma ca vakyamalakaa 'janmdyasya yata' (B. S. 1.1.2) iti | ata eva na
brahmaabdasya jtydyarthntaramakitavyam |

The ah can be taken as karmai or ee. ee is smnyasambandha, something

connected. From universal sambandha you get vieasambandha. That the compound is not
caturth has been pointed out. It has been said to be ah. If it were caturth it would have
phala for the sake of. The caturth tadartha also has prakti vikti artha. The prakti will be
in the nominative case; the changeable, the vikti, will be in the caturth. In the yaja they
erect a ypa, an octagonal sacrificial pole. Certain woods are used for the pole yupya
dru. The vikti is in the caturth. Now, if you say 'for the sake of Brahman' jijs, you
have, then, the same problem. You have to state the object of jijs. After you state the
object, you can expect a phala which accompanies the effort involved.
Having stated Brahman to be the mukhya, having said the samsa is ah
tatpurua, what is this Brahman? You cannot just make up some meaning for Brahman.
The meaning is not found in the brhmaa vara context; it is not what only brhmaas
think. It is not that by a brhmaa you will pnoti param. You cannot say Brahma is jva or
Veda or prajpati, even though such suggested meanings are found. In the stra what is the
meaning of Brahma? The meaning is as stated in the ruti, as in Taittirya. It has been
Bhyakra proves the point by citing the lakaam given in the second stra
janmdyasya yata. Yataabda keeps in mind the Taittirya vkya: yato v imni bhtni
jyante | yena jtni jvanti | yatprayantabhisavianti | tadvijijsasva | tad Brahma. You ask
what is Brahman? Ki tad Brahma? From out of which everything has come, by which
everything is sustained, unto which everything goes back, this is Brahman. We understand


Brahman is the cause of everything. This is one lakaam. What is the svarpa of this
Brahman? The same Taittirya will give you 'satya jnam ananta Brahma'. This is the
other lakaa. One yata will bring in both the lakaas.
Janma di asya. di means beginning. What comes along after janma is what
comes with janma - sthiti bhaga. Then janmasthitibhaga again. Bhaga is sahra.
Janmasthitisahra of the jagat comes from sarvakraa Brahma. This is Brahman as
defined in the next stra. Lakaam is used in the sense of definition, but definition is not
really the word meaning here. Lakaam is lakaam; lakya is Brahman and lakaa is
janmdi. 'Definition' is the translation of lakaam, and a definition is generally descriptive.
But there is no description of nirgua Brahma here. Nevertheless we use words for the
lakaam. We have to use words, words that help you understand Brahman. Words such as
satya jnam ananta do this.
That which is the kraam for the manifestation, sustenance and resolution of the
entire jagat is Brahman. For no other reason than that Strakra himself gives the
definition you need have no doubt. kkra points out the arthntara that are dismissed.
He says the meaning is not found in terms of the brhmaa jti. The meaning of the word
'Brahman' is not found in the sense of jva. 'Brahma svayambhu' means the Veda, that
which is not authored by any human being. Brahman does not mean Veda. Brahmaabda
does not mean Prajpati, Brahmji. Though the brahmaabda is found used in the Veda and
in vyavahra in these various ways, none of them holds its meaning.
The Veda has perennial nityatvam, a certain continuity. The Veda is revealed in
every cycle of manifestation. There are three types of nitya. Prav nitya is that which is
perenially eternal, it keeps flowing. But in fact it is anitya. Apekita nitya is relative, longtime nityatvam like the English word eternal. 'Nitya' itself is triklbdhitam, that which
does not undergo any change. It is also called atyantika or kastha nitya. There are no

three eternals the first two are non-eternal.

In the bhya, 'ata eva'; Bhyakra uses the evakara. The meaning is 'because of
this reason only'. The first stra establishes athto brahmajijs: the viaya, the adhikr,
the phalam, the sambandha between ruti and subject matter, the sambandha between the
subject matter and the pururtha. With these established, brahmajijs is tenable. Next,
ki tad Brahma? The brahmaabda is seen only in the first stra because the topic of the
whole is Brahman. The brahmalakaastra will have no connection with an interpretation
that the birth of the jagat is from a brhmaa or from Brahmji. Brahmji himself is sa.
Sisthitisahra, the whole thing will again become avyakta therefore it can only be
parambrahma. The stra reveals the lakaa of Brahman as jagatkraam. The stra has
connection with no other meaning.
There is one more vtti referred to that was present in the time of Bhyakra. The
Bhartprapacavtti takes the brahmajijs compound as ee ah. Both ee ah and
karmai ah are possible. In the saptam, both adhikarae and viaye senses are possible
and commonly used. You can say 'He lives in the city' and 'He is a paita in the shitya'.
Both saptam usages are common. Both ah usages are common. Why not take ee?


[ #it kmRi[ ;I n ze;e ij}aSyape]Tvai}asaya> ij}aSyaNtraindez

R a,
Brahmaa iti karmai ah na ee, jijsypekatvjjijsy,
jijsyntarnirdecca |

A jijs is dependent upon the jijsya. The thing desired to be known is mukhya
apeka. Without that, there is nothing to know. In fact there is a major discussion to come
as to whether Brahman is known or not known. Known, you cannot desire to know it. If it
is not known, you cannot desire to know it. That question will be taken up later. Clearly
in this compound the desire to know has an object. Jdhtu is sakarmaka. Karmai ah is
correct here. Even if a vieabrahman is brought in by the eeah smnya sambandha
usage, Brahman becomes one of the things of ah. Brahman becomes the e. That
would indicate a desire to know all that is connected to Brahman. There is nothing
connected to Brahman, and by spraying bullets like this you end up with nothing being
important. The jijs in the jijsya is what is important. To say that the smnya usage is
more accomodative because it brings in prama and guru et cetera is just deception on the
prvapaki's part, an attempt to add his philosophy. His vedaprama is karma, at least
samucchaya. His attempt here to use eaah is an expression of his poorly hidden
agenda, ghbhisandha. He would make upsana, not Brahman, mukhya. We say Brahman
is not a vidhi, not an aga, not a ea to meditation. Only one thing is pointed out by the
compound brahmajijs.
The karma is the object of desire. The san pratyaya is a substitute for desire. The
pratyaya is optional - jna icch and jijs are the same. There are two objects here 'to
know' is the object of the desire, Brahman is the object of the knowing. The word jijs
takes up the first object in the pratyaya, and Brahman, then, is the only object. For a
transitive verb you must have an object. Without knowledge of that object, it is not
possible to know. The icchya viaya is jnam, and jnya viayam is Brahman. Therefore
the knowing is contingent upon the object Brahman. Karmai eva ah is the proper sense
here, not ea. Brahman is not in a ah relationship with a number of things which are
desirable to know. Only one thing is pointed out here by the stra.
There is no indication here of any other object to be known. The object is here in
the ah as the object of the desire to know. A complex object can also take this form.
Dharmajijs is a complex object; adharma must also be known. They chant the vkya
twice, once with 'dharma', once with 'adharma'. The 'a' will be elided there in the second
case, so the chants sound the same. E padntdati (P.S. 6.1.109) the prvarpa. Dharma
itself is not one topic. There are different types of puyas and phalas. There is one
dharmaabda there for all dharmakarma.
But here, one partlessly whole Brahman is all there is. There is nothing connected
to that. If at all there is anything else involved stra prama et cetera it will all come
with the knowledge that is the gain of moka. One Brahman has to be known; everything
else will come. Brahman has to be pointed out as mukhya because adhysa and adhikra and
moka and all else will become siddhim only when Brahma jijsyam. You cannot use a


general thinking, a eaeisambandha thinking, and make Brahman useful for anything,
including upsana. This is not a group of equally valuable things. Even if Brahman is
taken as primary it is not one among equals. As both e and ea it is a problem.
Kartkarmao kti (P.S. 2.3.65) Pini stra talks about the karma being in ah
therefore brahmaa jijs iti. Why would you give up that mukhya karma and go for
Brahma sambandh?
nnu ze;;Ipirhe=ip [ae ij}asakmRTv< n ivXyte s<bNxsamaNySy ivze;inTvat!, @vmip
Ty]< [> kmRTvmuTs&Jy samaNyare[ prae]< kmRTv< kLpytae VywR> yas> Syat!, n VywR>
aitaze;ivcarit}anawRTvaidit ce
Nanu eaahparigrahe'pi brahmao jijskarmatva na virudhyate,
sambandhasmnyasya vieanihatvt | evamapi pratyaka brahmaa karmatvamutsjya
smnyadvrea paroka karmatva kalpayato vyartha praysa syt | na vyartha
brahmriteavicrapratijnrthatvditi cenna -

The fellow with the ghbhisandha is arguing now: Even if you take
smnyasambandhrtha, Brahman becomes the object of the desire to know. Because the
brahmaabda is there, it does not in any way dismiss Brahman being the object of jijs. It
allows many other things to be jijskarma as well. Brahman is the e and everything
else is ea. Why doesn't the stra say 'vednto jijs' if it means just Brahman? Brahman is
the object of the jijs and the compound is eaah. The ahpratyaya reveals the
sambandhasmnya and the prakti tells the viea. Brahmaa, in the ah, is the object of
Swamiji: As though he does not know what the disputant is aiming at, Bhyakra
asks why, when a direct karma is mentioned, you would add something that is not
mentioned? That it is in the sixth case has nothing to do here with something belonging to
Brahman, it has only to do with the object of knowledge. This is a useless effort to make it
fit another meaning indicating a general relationship.
Disputant: It is not useless. All the viayas connected to Brahman are objects of our
knowledge. The purpose is knowing all that is to be inquired into with regard to Brahman,
all that is to be gained by vicra. eaah lends itself to knowing the things connected to
Brahman. After dharmdhyayanam, brahmdhyayanam. It is a succession. After you know
all these other things you know Brahman. Brahman is another type of karma. The
prvatantras have covered vcikam and kyika karma. The Upaniad covers mnasakarma.
That is the vedntaviaya. Therefore anantakalyaguasampanna brahmadhyeya na tu
jeyam. By propitiating and meditating you will gain special puya which will take you to
loka. That is called moka. This is what you get by eaah prayojanam. The karmai ah
gives you only Brahman.
kra contributes a list of the things that can be associated with Brahman in a
eaah relationship: vedntaprama, brahmalakaam, yukti all varieties of reasoning
to understand Brahman, all jnasdhanni amnitvam adambhitvam itydi, all karmas


agnihotrdi karma, phalam mokaphalam. What is not mentioned are the things the

disputant is hiding. What would he hide? That he wants to teach you how to pray. He
wants to teach you the proper attitudes toward what should be the right God and attitudes
toward all other gods.
xanpirhe tdpei]tanamwaRi]Tvat!,
pradhnaparigrahe tadapekitnmarthkiptatvt |
Siddhnta: If you get everything else that comes along with the the pradhnam,
mukhya, you can miss the pradhnam. Brahman has been established as the object of
knowing; you should focus on that. Whatever is necessary for brahmajnam will be
gained by implication with the taking of the mukhya. If you ask for idli, chutney will

ih }anenauimtmTvaTxanm!,
Brahma hi jnenptumiatamatvtpradhnam |
Pradhna is kartu psitatama karma. psita is iam. An academic wants to know
grammar for his real goal, scholarship, pityam. The desire to know Brahman involves

straightaway the most desirable object.

tiSmNxane ij}asakmRi[ pirg&hIte yEijR}aistEivRna ij}aist< n vit naNywaRi]aNyevie t n
p&wKsUiytVyain, ywa rajasaE gCDtITyue spirvarSy ra}ae gmnmu< vit tt!,
Tasminpradhne jijskarmai parighte yairjijsitairvin Brahma jijsita na
bhavati nnyarthkiptnyeveti na pthakstrayitavyni | yath rjsau gacchattyukte
saparivrasya rjo gamanamukta bhavati tadvat |

When Brahman is taken as the foremost object of the stra, all the other factors,
viayas which must be inquired into and understood if brahmajnam is to be complete,
will be covered by implication. They need not be covered by other stras. In stra you say
the mimimum while you leave nothing ambiguous or uncovered. Where something is
uncovered you have a special stra. In Pini you see the stra process. If there is an
exception, it comes as apavda after the general rule, utsarga. Because the viayas such as
prama and lakaam are objects of jijs, they need not be treated separately as the
meaning of this stra.
There is an example. When you say 'The king goes', you will not see the king
walking along alone with his umbrella. You know that when the king goes he goes along
with his entire retinue. In fact you need not see the king if you see the others. When you
say 'brahmajijs', all connected topics are known to be implied.
uTynugma, ytae va #main Utain jayNte #Tya*a> uty> tiij}asSv t+ #it Ty]mev [ae
ij}asakmRTv< dzRyiNt,
rutyanugamcca | 'yato v imni bhtni jyante' (Tait. 3.1)) itydy rutaya
'tadvijijsasva tadbrahma' iti pratyakameva brahmao jijskarmatva darayanti |


This is in keeping with ruti also. Between the mmsstra, these Brahmastras,
and the ruti there is always connection. This first stra must have a ruti in view. Yato v
imni bhtnitadvijijsasva tadbrahma' is the ruti for the first two stras. Taittirya ruti
for the first stra is 'tadvijijsasva tadbrahma'. The stra cites the taittiryavkya. May you
have the desire to know Brahman. That desire to know Brahman ties the rutivkya to both
of the first two stras. Again, Brahma is the object of jijs. The stra is analysis of the
ruti; it has to keep the ruti in view. ruti and stra have the same purpose that which
is the object of the desire to know, that Brahman.
t kmRi[;Ipirhe sU[
e anugt< vit, tSma[ #it kmRi[;I,
Tacca karmaiahparigrahe strenugata bhavati | tasmbrahmaa iti
karmaiah |
Karmai ah, not eeah, is the way to take the stra, and that meaning is also
clear in the Upaniad. Strakra follows the Taittirya vkya which gives Brahman as an
object of a desire to know as well as giving the lakaam of that Brahman. The ah is
used in the sense of the karma.
}atuimCDa ij}asa,
Jtumicch jijs |

A desire for an object is possible only when the mlajnam of the object is
available. A desire for an object implies some knowledge of the object, or at least one's
contention must be known. Even if it is erroneous knowledge, knowledge of one thing
must be there. You require to know before you have desire for the object. An unknown
object cannot be the object of your desire. This is not to say that you have to know
Brahman and then you have to realize Brahman. That is modern Vednta. If you have
mlajnam of Brahman you know Brahman. How are you going, then, to have a desire to
know Brahman? There are cryas who propose that the desire is to be understood as a
experiential gain of Brahman.
The k says an object not known at all will not generate a desire to know. You
have brahmajijs for brahmajnam; that is the phalam. If you have a desire to know
Brahman, how do you know there is Brahman? If you have knowledge of Brahman, how
can you have desire to know Brahman?
AvgitpyRNt< }an< sNvaCyaya #CDaya> kmR )liv;yTvaidCDaya>, }anen ih ma[enavgNtuim< ,
avgitihR pu;awR> in>ze;s<sarbIjaiv*a*nwRinbhR[at!, tSma ivij}aistVym!,
Avagatiparyanta jna sanvcyy icchy karma phalaviayatvdicchy |
jnena hi pramenvagantumia Brahma | brahmvagatirhi pururtha
nieasasrabjvidydyanarthanibarhat | tasmbrahma vijijsitavyam |

How can you have a desire to know Brahman without knowing Brahman? We are
accepting a particular knowledge, pta knowledge of Brahman. Vddhavyavahra is one
way to get that pta knowledge of Brahman. You see people going to to hear or see


something and you go with them. You read certain books and get paperback knowledge.
A vaidika studies his entire Veda. He does Veda adhyayana, including Upaniad, and he
learns about Brahman there. If he has studied the agas he has heard of parambrahman.
pta jnam is not really knowledge, it is some idea.
Bhyakra says that Brahman has to be understood until no more doubt is there.
This is Brahma avagati. This is the paryantam jnam, the limit, the end, the brahmvagati
icchy phalam. Brahmajijs will be maintained until it is fulfilled. What comes?
ravaa manana nididhysana come. Jijs brings in all the three words. The k defines
avagati as 'until varaa goes', until 'I don't know' goes away. Avagati is a consciousness,
caitanya, which removes the varaa to the limit. It is abhivyaktimat caitanyam, a vtti that
removes the varaam. Know that Brahman is not an object like other objects, it is the
very subject tm. Akhakravttijnam, akhaasktkravttijnam takes place. This
is the object of the jijs. This is the jnam and it is the phala. The object of the desire to
know is Brahman; the phalam of the desire to know is Brahma avagati.
You must have some mlajnam, pta jnam, in order to desire to know
Brahman. The paperback knowledge is not the same as the clear knowledge. There is
difference between the two. There has to be adequate knowledge that makes one go for
Brahman knowledge. A person who commits himself to brahmajnam, who burns all
boats to gain brahmajnam, has to know a lot. He has to know what is at stake. The basic
knowledge and the knowledge you are working for are different and distinct. Therefore
brahmajijs is siddham.
Jijs is a desire to know. The san pratyaya in jijs gives the meaning 'desire',
icchy. The object of that icch is jnam, avagati paryantam jnam. A desire is always
meant for the phala, what you finally want. The realization of Brahman, the
avagantumia, the object of knowing, is the result of the operation of the prama.
There are cryas who say that moka, not Brahma avagati, is the pururtha. They say
knowledge of Brahman will not give you anything. They say you can know a recipe but it
will not appease your hunger. You have to do something with the Brahman you know.
They say this Brahman is to be meditated upon. And there are different ways to meditate
and to gain puya and to gain loka. There are such contentions that meditation and going
to loka are pururtha.
Bhyakra says Brahma avagati is pururtha. Knowing Brahman is the
mokapururtha. How are you going to know Brahman without it being yourself? You are
Brahman and you cannot be more than Brahman. If you are Brahman, what use is a desire
for moka? What will you do after pra Brahma? Brahma avagati destroys all anrthas
beginning with avidy, which is the bja. Avidy is the seed cause for sasra. Brahma
avagati has the capacity to destroy avidy and its products such as janma maraa arra
itydi. Brahma avagati is pururtha. Therefore brahmajijsitavyam.
tTpunR ismis< va Syat! I
Tatpunarbrahma prasiddhamaprasiddha v syt I


There are within the bhya different discussions on major topics brought out by
the stras. In the introduction we had adhysa. Each major topic has subtopics. Each of
the first four stras is a separate adhikaraa. All other adhikaraas have more than one
stra. The subtopics in the jijsdhikaraam are called varakas. We have completed the
first three varakas. The fourth varaka is brahmajijsya na jijsyam. Within that,
Brahma prasiddha v aprasiddham.
Is Brahman known to us or unknown to us. This question has been implied in the
material already discussed. In a way the question has been answered with ptatajnam.
Brahma becomes jijsyam because this general knowledge is there. There is a desire to
know and an object of that desire to know. The question remains: is Brahman already
known or not?
There are vaidika cryas who say that if Brahman is already known it cannot
become jijsyaviayam. They say that the jijs is there only for dhynam's sake. They
say there is no avagatiparyanta jnam jnam is jnam. For them Brahman is always
parokam, sarvasya kraa sarvaja Brahma which can never become aparokam. They
say brahmajnam is simply further information about Brahman which you can come to
know and then meditate upon. Along with the cryas, one Mmsaka also takes Brahma
as dhyeyam. He says upsany karma Brahma. The entire Veda is karmastra. Prvatantra,
Prvamms, covers two kinds of karma, and Uttaramms covers mnasakarma. It is
all meant for your after-death travel to the right place; that is the end called moka. He
says that Veda as prama is only upacra. The cryas have all concluded what is correct
and incorrect, and they take the heart from the vedaprama. They wish only to prove
what they have already concluded. They have no prmyabuddhi. They make use of the
Veda to serve their own purpose. They say if Brahman is already known it cannot become
the object of a desire to know.
We say that in the opening discussion adhysasiddhi was established. Sasrtvam
is nothing but adhysa. Adhysa is bandha. Therefore Brahman, as both self-evident tm
and adhihna, is both jtam ajtam ca. Brahmasvarpam, jagatkraam itydi, is not
known and there is, therefore, sasrtvam. tm is Brahman, and tm is the dhra for
the adhysa. Therefore Brahman is know as the adhysdhra. Adhihnatvam, jagatkraa
Brahma, alone remains to be understood. Even so, brahmajijs is there, viaya is there,
moka is there, sambandha is there, adhikr is there everything is siddha already.
Prvapaka: As usual, you said adhysa. It is your problem. In my view the viaya
has not been established. Is Brahman known or not? Have you really established a
meaningful viaya? Adhysasiddhi does not make 'tm Brahman' anything more than an
idea. You have not proved limitless Brahman is there as tm and therefore available for
my inquiry and my desire to know. But even to become the object of my desire, Brahman
should be known. We have a doubt as to your interpretation of the presence of Brahman.
You take an idea and and say that it is viaya, but there is nothing there. There is no need
for a book on dentistry for crows. There is no viaya there.


If Brahman is not unknown, there is no ajnam there. Since there is no ajnam

there is no need for brahmajnam which removes ajnam. There is no need for nivtti,
no need for that brahmavicraphalam. There is no need because Brahman is known. There
is no need to begin brahmavicra. Further, ajtambrahma cannot be objectified and be an
object of vicra. You cannot even choose to know an unknown Brahman. That which is
not known cannot become an object of your intention or desire. The stra should not
yid is< n ij}aistVym!, Awais< nEv zKy< ij}aistuimit,
Yadi prasiddha na jijsitavyam | athprasiddha naiva akya jijsitumiti |

The first option has been given, but some questions do not deserve an immediate
answer. Some answers will catch you either way.
Prvapaka goes on with his contention. He says if Brahman is prasiddham, known,
it will not be an object of your desire to know it is already known. There is no
jijsitavyam. He uses the athaabda, uta. He says if Brahman is aprasiddham it is not
possible for you to do jijs. If Brahman is not an object of your buddhi, buddhyruham,
how are you going to look into it? You can go back and look at the same place where you
saw a ropesnake, but vicra is not possible here if Brahman is totally unknown. If an
object has parts, you can dissect it and analyze it endlessly, but you are talking about your
nirviea nirgua Brahman. What object is without guas? How could you say such a
thing is prasiddham or aprasiddham? This object never becomes jijsyam. Do not start this
vicrtmaka mms stra and the Vednta if you are talking about something that is not
the object of a vtti.
Between your Brahman and the stra there is no pratipdakapratipdyasambandha.
jyam is butter that has been melted by sunlight. Butter melted by fire heat is called
ghtam. jyam is what is to be used for yaja. It is a rule. stra itself tells what ypa is.
All the words that describe the elements and actions in a yaja are know to me. Because I
know the words I can follow them. If Brahman is totally unknown, even if it is stra that
first mentions it, what can I think? I don't get anything. If it is known to me, there is
revealer-revealed sambandha. But a totally unknown object will not be revealed by a
hundred stras. And known to me it does not require a stra. You say that Brahman is
known to me. This is why I say that satya jnamananta kalyaguasampanna
Brahma is dheyam not jeyam. How will I ever know Brahman which is buddhyruham?
Pratipdakapratipdyasambandha nsti between stra and Brahman. When knowledge is not
possible, brahmvagati phalam and mokam and pururtha are not possible. An unknown
Brahman cannot be an object of desire to further inquiry.
%Cyte - AiSt tav inTyzubumuSvav< svR}< svRzismiNvtm!,
Ucyate - asti tvabrahma nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhva sarvaja
sarvaaktisamanvitam |
Siddhnta: stra says ayam tm Brahma. Then you find
nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhva Brahma asti. I am - aham asmti prasiddha - because


tm is Brahman. The mahvkyas keep bringing you back to Brahman. What is that
Brahman? How can you equate aham to omniscient Brahman? This is the mms
ttparyea. Yena jnena sarva vijta bhavati, by knowledge of which makes you as
well know everything this is Brahman. Sarva khalvida Brahma because sarvakrya
mithy krant ananyat. Here also sarva Brahman. Sarva Brahman if it is so then this
brahmatvam asi. Tattvamasi. Therefore sarvaja Brahma aham asmi. The sentence should

be either dismissed as contradiction or understood reconciling the contradictions. Where

there is equation there will be seeming difference. The seeming difference is to be seen as
seeming difference. That means there is no difference. Abheda is to be understood by you,
and this is exactly what the stra is trying to convey. stra says nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhva because you come with all the opposite meanings superimposed on
yourself. stra negates anything that you think about yourself. This means adhysa asti.
If the adhysa is 'I am limited', I am limitless becomes adhihna. This is perfect. This is
exactly what ruti says. Adhysa siddhi means adhihna siddhi. Sasritva adhysa,
adhysanivtti is adhihnajnam.
Brahman prasiddham aprasiddham ca. Atyanta aprasiddham na, tmatvena
prasiddhatvt. Brahmaa prasiddhatvam tmatvena. ruti prasiddham api. Brahmaabda is a
Sanskrit word with its own root brahmat or bhatvt. Both have the same meaning
more or less. That which seemingly grows into jagat is called Brahman this is brahmat
Brahma. That which is limitlessly big is Brahman bhatvt. This vastu which is
incomparably big is Brahman.
zBdSy ih VyuTpa*manSy inTyzuTvadyae=waR> tIyNte b&htexaRtaerwaRng
u mat!,
Brahmaabdasya hi vyutpdyamnasya nityauddhatvdayo'rth pratyante
bhaterdhtorarthnugamt |
Prvapaka: Whether prasiddha or aprasiddha, Brahma na jijsyam. Already known,
it cannot be a viaya to be known. Unknown, it cannot be an object to be known. Even
brahmaabda does not help because you have no artha. Even if stra uses the word, you
have no meaning, and the word does not have the akti to reveal an object to you. There is
no figuring out brahmaabda. You must already have the meaning of the word. Vk and
vcya, word and meaning - the connection has to be established in your head. Then words
convey meaning. Aprasiddha na jijsyam. Prasiddham na jijsyam. There is no
pratipdakapratipdyasambandha and, therefore, viaya abhvt. There is no adhikrtvam,
and vairgya is useless. Better to fulfill your desires and pick up some happiness. This is

what life on this planet is for.

Siddhnta: The arthas of nityauddhatvdaya are sensed, pratyante, when the
brahmaabda is looked into as being born from its root. The bh dhtu has the sense of
bigness and of growth, vddhi, also. A dhtu is not a word; it is converted into a word by
sup and ti. The prataya which is the conversion to arrive at the word Brahman is 'man'.
Brahman is the word. It is an akrnta word. The vocalic 'r' of the root become the repha.


The 'n' is lopa Brahma, neuter. Brahm is also there. You get the meaning: there is an
object, vastu, which is big.
Big is usually a word relative to some other word which provides a limit, a
measure. A big forest, a big orange, a big seed you have an idea of how big the object is
in terms of the limiting object. Brahma is the vastu for which there is no sakocaka, nothing
that is going to limit the size of the bigness. A niratiaya mahat vastu is pointed out
limitless Brahman. You have no way of denying that Brahman is a word. It is a word with
a meaning derived from its root, and when stra uses that word you already know
something incomparably big is being pointed out.
Brahman is also said to be sarvaja sarvaakti jagatkraam. You can easily
understand that this mahattvam is there because Brahman is the cause of everything, with
this kind of knowledge and this kind of skill and power. This much you know of limitless
Brahman. Being limitless, it cannot be bound by time, it cannot be bound by space, it
cannot be one given object, nothing can stick to it, it cannot undergo any change, it
cannot have puya or pp. Looking into the word itself you can logically arrive at this.
Prvapaka: By what prama is Brahman known? Don't say that because ruti says
'satya jnamanantam' Brahman is prasiddham. This tells you nothing about an object
such as a pot or cloth which can make abhidhnbhidheyasagati. Without such a
connection and without padrtha how will I know the main subject and the meaning of the
sentence? Nothing is conveyed.
Siddhnta: The word Brahman is there in your Amarakoa. It is a Sanskrit word
with an identified root and known pratyaya. It is in the language. By the vyutpatti, the
etymology of the word, brahmaabda is known with its meaning. What is that Brahman?
Something with no sakocaka, limitlessly big and without attributes; it is not going to be
in one place or time. If at all you attribute some gua, it should be limitless gua in
terms of knowledge and akti. You cannot say there is no sagati, this kind of meaning
being there from the verbal root.
That which you know to be naa is that which has been da in the past. And
anything that you see now is not as it was in the previous moment. This is the nature of
all that you experience. You do not see the present at all, you always see the past. The
present tense is just an arbitrary conclusion. When you understand that all else is
danaasvabhvatvam you can know the meaning of tm in the words
nityauddhabuddhamuktasatyasvabhva. This kind of tm asti is in the vyutpatti. That
which is limitless must be limitless in terms of knowledge and power, limitless in terms
of anything you say. Limitless in terms of aivarya vibhti r vairgyam therefore
Bhagavn. Brahma asti. That is the root meaning of brahmaabda.
In the stra, brahmaabda is used. You see the abda used throughout the stra. A
word with no meaning will never be found in any stra. The stra assumes that you
know the brahmaabda in a certain way. Then stra removes any kind of smallness that
you would impute to the meaning neti neti. stra uses known words alone to convey
what is to be known. You look in the dictionary for the meaning of an unknown word, yet
you already have some information, and you have the meanings of the known words used


to define it. This is the vddhavyavahra contextually you pick up the meaning of words
from the way they are used in speech and books. Gradually you pick up more and more
words and their usage.
From the standpoint of grammar, the bh dhtu is listed in Pini's roots bhi
vddhau. In the word 'vddhi' Pini remembers that bhat kraa, the brahmavastu. By one
word he has his prayer accomplished. Bhi vddhau - you cannot go any further. That is
the mahattvam, niravadhika mahattvam iti - without limit, avadhi, pariccheda, sakocaka.
There is nothing to limit the bigness. We understand Brahma from its root standpoint.
How is it used in the stra? Satya jnamananta Brahma. It is known with the meaning
of that anantaabda. Anantaabdena samndhikarayt. Ananta Brahma. What more can
you say? How can you say there is no sagati?
Limitless mahattvam cannot be in a thing which has doas such as klata
antavattvam, deata antavattvam, vastuta antavattvam. It should be both not any one
object and every object. It is both sarvam and free from sarvam. Bhyakra says the whole
thing is very evident. Niratiaya mahattvam is also in terms of jnam and akti. There is
no doa of alpatvam. The abda and the stra give you this. It is because there is abda that
stra uses the word. The stra becomes meaningful when you look at the abda. The
material, the straviaya, is alone apaurueya. The language belongs to the is, therefore
Bhagavn revealed the whole subject matter in Sanskrit. The language that you know is
the medium through which the knowledge is given.
Being free from any limitation of bigness and being the sustaining factor of
everything, nityatvam is there for Brahman. Being free from any limitation in terms of
time or existence, Brahman is limitless. There being no avidydi doa, there is uddhatvam
for limitless Brahman. Your avidy is Bhagavn's glory, because when it goes there is
knowledge and you know you are this Brahman. Being in the form of caitanya, there being
no jyam, there is buddhatvam for Brahman. There being no bandha, even at the time of
bondage, there is muktatvam for Brahman. Doanya nirgua Brahma prasiddha
bhavati in this manner. In the tatpadavcyam of the mahvkya this Brahman is prasiddham.
tmatvena this Brahman is prasiddham.
If we go by the root meaning of the word, we understand there is brahmavastu, and
this vastu is niratiaya mahat vastu. There is no limit to that vastu. There is a sense it is
not final that the word has the meaning of something limitless. The abhidhnbhidheya
connection is called abdasya akti grahaam. abdaakti the word has the power to
convey its meaning. This is what Klidsa says: vgartha vivasampktau vgartha
pratipattaye jagata pitarau vande prvatparamevarau. The vk and artha are inseperable.
You should always go for Klidsa's example. I salute Prvat and Paramevara, the
parents of this entire jagat, the nimittopdnakrae, who are inseparably one from the two
standpoints. Look at the brahmavastu from one standpoint and it becomes the material
cause even though there is no such thing as material. For comprehension, we just give
the idea that there are such things as material and efficient causes without which there is
no intelligent creation. In fact all that is there is nothing but knowledge.


varasya jnam eva is this entire jagat. Si is nothing but the jnasya abhivyakti.
Just as in the dream your manifestation of a jagat is nothing but your knowledge. A
mathematician said all that is here is equations, and it is true. All that is here are the
correspondences. If you look into any one object, it always ends up in knowledge of
something else. All that is here is pure knowledge. Vk and artha alone, nmarptmakam
ida jagat, that is all that is here. An object means nothing more than the word and its
meaning. That is all the jagat is about. 'Ah, the alpa of my mati; ah, the glory of Rma's
family. It will never be possible for me to write the glories of Raghu's family. Therefore I
ask the Lord to give me all the words and their nuances. I need to have all of them at the
tip of my scribe's tool. I salute word and meaning, the inseparable source of the jagat.'
Brahmaabda is a word with its own power to convey. How can it not create a sense for
you? Once that sense is there, ruti will take care of whatever it wants to take care of.
Nityauddha nityabuddha nityamukta, free from any doa, sarvajatvam, sarvaaktiman,
niratiaya mahattvam, tatpadavcyam that is the sense of prasiddha Brahman.
Whatever we understand about Brahma as tatpadavcyam is not total jnam. But
it is enough to become jijsya. Why? ptatvt. ptajnam is not pramam. Prama
means ajna nivartakatva, it has to eliminate my ignorance about tm being Brahman.
The pt, mla, jnam becomes the basis for converting this object of knowledge into an
object of jijsya. I must have the idea of what is Brahman for there to be jijsya. As long
as you do not get stuck with the wrong idea, the paperback book words eternally
immortal consciousness supreme infinite at-once bliss give you a feeling that there is
something which you have to experience. You are on a trip. As long as you keep the
mind open and continue to explore, this capacity is Bhagavat kpa. It forces you to edit and
reshuffle and correct all the ideas you have. Your scales of vision have to undergo change.
There is an attitude of an inductive mind, a mind open to being wrong. I should be able to
laugh at myself at my own cost. This capacity is vara anugraht. With that
brahmajijsya is possible.
k turns to oneself with the same logic. Niratiayamahattvt Brahman cannot be
separate from you. You cannot call Brahman limitless and then look upon Brahman as a
vastu other than yourself. You would be putting limits on Brahman and Brahman would
limit you.
Bhyakra turns the whole prasiddham or aprasiddham discussion on its head. He
makes it a simple logical issue. The questioner has a problem, and it is silly to even
answer the question he asks. Bhyakra points out the sagati between abhidhna and
abhidheya, and then he points out it happens to be you. Being limitless, Brahman cannot be
separate from you. You plus limitless does not exist, and limitless plus you cannot exist.
Neither do you exist as a part of the limitless. Part means everything is limited as part,
but limitless means partless it is limitless. Like Brahman, the manin pratyaya is there in
tm, from pdhtu. The meaning of tm is atti tm, pnoti sarvam, vypnoti sarvam, the
one who experiences everything, the one who pervades everything. tmatvena Brahma
prasiddham eva.


Then, too, stra tells ayam tm Brahma. It does not propose a Brahman other than
tm. Nor is tm presented to be an aa of Brahman. Ayam tm brahmeti this is
smndhikarayam. Yad jagatkraa tad Brahma ayam tm. Ayam tm means nitya
aparoka tm. Idaabda is used for tm. This is why Bhyakra did not begin the book
with ida pratyaya gocarasya asmat pratyaya gocarasya. Idaabda is used for tm with the
nitya aparoka meaning. Self-evident tm is Brahman. This is all you can say unless you
have no pramabuddhi in the prama and you have already concluded what tm should
be. The cryas are where they are because they do not have pramabuddhi in the prama.
You have to look at what the stra says and see if this is what you want to be. Brahman is
in keeping with what I love to be. I love to be free from being small and inadequate, and
that is what I am. It is in keeping with the human aspiration. Nothing else is going to
satisfy, and stra makes it very clear. Brahmaabda does not accommodate any other truth
neha nnsti kicana.
Ya anya san anyat payati sa mrtyo mtyum pnoti. ruti cannot say anything
more directly than this. But those with conclusions do not want to see the truth. They
want to squeeze their conclusions out of ruti.
Brahman being known as tm is there in the tvampadrtha. Therefore
brahmajijsya upapatti.
svRSyaTmTva aiStTvis>,
Sarvasytmatvcca brahmstitvaprasiddha |

Being sarvasya, the tm of sarva, brahamaa stitvaprasiddhi. The existence of

Brahman is known. Why? You say, "I am." That 'am' is the existence of Brahman. I is the
conscious being, sat cit tm. Aham asmi reveals saccid tm.
svaeR aTmaiStTv< Tyeit n nahmSmIit, yid ih naTmaiStTvis> Syat! svaeR laekae nahmSmIit
tIyat!, AaTma c ,
Sarvo hytmstitva pratyeti na nhamasmti | yadi hi ntmstitvaprasiddha syt
sarvo loko nhamasmti pratyt | tm ca Brahma |
Bhyakra is having a dig, nothing else. He is mildly pulling the other fellow's leg.
He tells him 'There cannot be a better idiot than you'. How could limitless Brahman not be
there as tm? If aham asmi then limitless Brahman cannot be other than tm. Moreover,
we have what stra says. How can you deny that 'I am Brahman'? Yes, you can ask the
question 'How can I be Brahman?', but still you are Brahman. I can tell you that in spite of
your denial you happen to be Brahman. 'Nobody says nham asmti' Bhyakra says to
the nyavdin. How could you say that? Even if you say 'nyo'ham' you have to use
asmi. It hangs there. Pratyate, it is recognized.
ruti tells of satyajna Brahma pratyate as saccit tm. Then you add to saccit
tm Brahman the attributes that make only you small. But in fact you are free from all of
them. Brahmaabda and stra make it clear that it cannot be otherwise. This niratiaya
mahattvam is recognized as the self evident cognition, aham asmti. That itself is


brahmaprasiddhi alone. Your identity is not a conglomerate of your memories and ideas
and emotions and likes and dislikes that gives you a feeling that there is a Mdhyamika

self. If you peel away the layers of an onion or a cabbage you may have nothing left but
nya, but tm is something that is not wrapped up in anything.
Being the tm of everyone, Brahman is known. The nyavdins and
Kaikavdins and Mdhyamika and Yogcra contend that tm does not exist. For them
consiousness is a flicker and then goes away. For them tm is a series of flickers of
consciousness, kaikavijna santati, giving you a semblance of a being. The semblance
of a being is due to confusion, and there is no one constant jva, much less a kastha tm.
Another fellow says that all there is is a conglomerate of attributes, inside is nya, and
there is no tm at all.
Bhyakra says that nobody says 'I do not exist'. You have to exist to say such a
thing. And to say there are flickers of consciousness there must be one there who is not
flickering to see that there are flickers. Do not mistake the vtti for tm. Certain things
can be understood without the prama. Only 'vara is jva' cannot be known without
prama. In all these matas there is no vara. varasiddhi is not there. It is not that you are
obliging God or anything by having him part of your philosophy - the reality is that God
is everything. But the fellow who insists on his God does not understand any more than
the fellow with no God. The concept of God has to be proper, it has to be jnam.
Without vara the sarvtmabhva will not be there. It is not just pthagtm, which is
difficult enough for these people, that we are talking about.
The self-evident tm has to be established. Everything becomes evident to the
self through a prama. This self has to be self-evident. Without this, all one can say is I
do not exist at all, I am not there. Again, for whom is this cognition 'I am not there'? This
is not a worthy argument. stra makes it clear that Brahma tmatvena is prasiddha. If
niratiayamahattvam for Brahman is understood by vykaraa, then limitlessness should
include you also. stra makes it clear in many vkyas 'ayam tm Brahma'. tm ca
Brahma. There is only one aparokam tm that is Brahma. There is no paroka Brahma
except in the sense that you do not know. Aham sasr is aparoka as aham asmi, Brahma
is aparoka. Brahman cannot be limited to a locality, it is all-pervasive and should include
yid tihR laeke aTmTven ismiSt ttae }atmevTe yij}aSyTv< punrapm!,
Yadi tarhi loke brahmtmatvena prasiddhamasti tato jtamevetyajijsyatva
punarpannam |
Prvapaka: A Brahman already known cannot become the object of a desire for
knowledge. If in the world of people Brahman is known as tm, Brahman is already
known and na jijsyam. Why is it, if I am Brahman, I don't say that? I say 'I am', and I
include mortal and inadequate and alpa. You see it on the headstone, a horizontal line

between two dates even though he was married three times. All biographies are the
same - born-died, born-died. Is that not how it is? Isn't that the conclusion of a jva? Is
Brahman prasiddham or aprasiddham? Then, only, we can say jijsyam. A known Brahman


cannot be the strapramaviaya. Brahman is adhigata and we do not need a prama.

Neither is there an adhikr. Why are you writing the stravicra?
Siddhnta: A seashell is understood as an object of the word 'this'. You see only
the shell but you say 'This is silver'. The 'this' refers only to the shell idantay. That this
is silver is your own special sight - you make 'this' join silver. But in the wake of
knowledge that this is shell the rajatam will go away and 'this' will join the shell. In fact it
does not join the shell, it has always been only shell. It continues to be idam alone the
shell continues to be shell. It was shell before, it is shell after, in between you saw 'This is
silver'. The 'This is silver' resolves in the wake of knowledge. Now tell me, is the shell
known or unknown. An totally unknown shell cannot become a locus for projection, for
adhysa. A known shell cannot become the locus for adhysa. Nevertheless a mistake is
made in ignorance of what is the truth of what is there on the sand.
Here, that which is self-evident is mistaken for something else. Even though
Brahman is there as 'I exist, I am a conscious being, aham asmi', the conclusion is made
that there are many other asis and astis. The truth is that asmi is Brahman and it reveals a
sattvam that is the only sattvam available. It is not known that Brahman is the only
caitanyam available. In reality brahmaa prasiddhi is there tmatvena. Pra Brahma,
nanda Brahma, ekamadvitya Brahma, sarvakraa Brahma these are not known.
Therefore Brahma jijsyam bhavati. stra gives you the brahmaabda and the vykaraa
tells you something asti. Then it tells you sarvakraam and satya jnamanantam is
Brahman and tattvamasi. You get the Brahma jijs from vddhavyavahra, from the
ptatjnam. All these other vdas are possible because one does not know he is pra

Once you see that it is a shell there is no argument. The fact that there is argument
shows that someone does not see the truth of what is there. That is why
brahmammsyam eva. Vipratipatti means viparta pratipatti. This error being there, you
cannot but have jijs for Brahman. The smnyajnam becomes the mlajnam for
vieajnam. Vieata jnam for Brahman is what you go for. Therefore jijsya
Brahma. Pra Brahma sarvakraa Brahma varo'ham iti - that vkya is not understood
by me. Viaya prayojana adhikr pratipdyapratipdakasambandha are there. You cannot
establish any other prama than vedntastra for vara. Once prama is available you
can assimilate with your logic, but mere logic cannot establish because there is no liga.
stra alone is the yoni for this. abda alone is the prama for Brahman as jagatkraam.
n, tize;< it ivitpe>,
Na | tadviea prati vipratipatte |
Brahma asti prasiddha as 'I am'; that amness belongs to Brahman. Astitvam is only
for satya Brahman. Who told you there are other objects? Space, time, bhautikas all
these are only one Brahman. Every astitvam and everybody's astitvam are only one
brahmaa astitvam. Every nma can be reduced to further nmas, and every nma for
which there is some kind of a rpa, all this astitvam, is Brahman. Do not say that nmarpa
is mithy, nmarpa is satya Brahma. What we call mithy is a provisional assumption


that there are nmarpas which draw their being from Brahman. We accept the pot and
then talk about the ghaatvam. The ghaatvam asti means clay alone exists. There is no
ghaatvam asti. Only clay exists, even where the pot exists. The potness is an incidental
attribute. This is all satya jnamananta Brahma. This is the vieapratipatti.
Do not say there is a smnyagua and a vieagua for Brahman like 'all trees
and different types of tree'. Guai viia dravya bhavati Brahman becomes an object.
And every gua becomes gu, and you are always in trouble. Smnyaviea is all only
from the standpoint of avidy. Because vieajnam is not there, Brahman is not known,
even though smnya is there. Smnyaviea is kalpita, vipratipatti being there.
dehma< cEtNyivizmaTmeit kta jna laekayitka itpa>,
Dehamtra caitanyaviiamtmeti prakt jan lokyatikca pratipann |
Brahman is known from the 'limitless' meaning of the word and general jnam,
and from ruti saying ayam tm Brahma. There is ptatajnam that by the knowledge of
Brahman I will get moka. A certain pururthanicaya is there. Interested in knowing
Brahman or not, the fellow is interested in being free from dukha. That he knows this
moka is in the form of knowledge of myself is a major jump from mumukutvam. He
needs that ajnanivartaka vtti, and for that brahmajijsyam. The very fact that there are
contentions makes it clear Brahma is aprasiddham, vieata aprasiddham. They call them
schools of thought but they are schools of error. As a locus for a mistake, Brahma is
prasiddham, and it is a mistake and therefore aprasiddham.
Ordinary people, prkt, and those with no strajnam tend to be followers.
Even a madman will have a following. The caitanya viia deha is taken to be tm by
ordinary people and by Lokyata Crvkas. Lokam is a technical meaning for a prama. It
is a prama other than Veda and other than what is dependent on Veda - smti.
Lokaprama is atiriktaprama perception. When the body is alive and conscious, tm
is there. When everything is gone, tm is gone. The Lokyata thinks caitanya is a viea to
the deha. He misses the main thing. He takes the body as the tm. The sthlavipratipatti is
a huge vipratipatti. Nevertheless it is more solid than the schools that have ghosts floating

around after death.

#iNya{yev cetnaNyaTmeTypre, mn #TyNye, iv}anma< ]i[kimTyek,
indriyyeva cetannytmetyapare | mana ityanye | vijnamtra kaikamityeke |

Other Crvkas hold that the whole body is an indriya, a sense organ centered on
the pervasive sense of touch. For them, this is what is cetana. The body is a conscious
being. When the indriyas function, there is tm. This Crvka is closer to saying that
pra is the tm. But his position does not interfere with yvat jivet sukha jivet. Others
take mind to be tm. When the mind naa, tm naa. In sleep, tm is there as a
potential thinker. The one who thinks this is also a Crvka.
The Vijnamtram is the flicker school of thought. This is the Kaikam, Yogcra.
It is pure vijnam we can say that too: vijnam nanda Brahma. Vijna rpa is tm.


But this Yogcra fellow says it is vijnamtra kaikam. He is avaidika; he does not
accept the vedaprama, does not accept abdaprama. They have their own reasoning
and end up with momentary consciousness. Like time, momentary consciousness obtains
in this moment and is gone. How many moments are there in a second? That is how many
consciousness flickers there are. Really, what they are calling vijnam is vtti. Vtti is
kaika; that is why you can see motion. They can observe kaika, but they think the
observer too is kaika. For them there is no such thing as sk, witness consciousness.
They say the thought that there is any reality to selfhood is not true. It is a delusion. They
say seeing through that delusion is moka, nirva, nibnna. They don't have a repha.
They say that tm itself kaika. Nirva is understanding I am kaika. They say
an intimate realization is enlightenment, but it is not clear how it comes. You sit under a
tree. You watch the mind. There is moha in this. How can they say that kaikavijna
rpo'ham? To say this you must have vijnam. You must have consciousness to say that I
am kaika. The obtaining flicker of consciousness cannot know that it is a flicker. It
flickers away without enlightening the next one. What prama allows you to say you are
a flicker? You say it is intimately realized, but your argument does not stay. Yogcra,
Sautrntik, there are a number of groups. One fellow accepts the external world exists as
kaika. Another, Yogcra, says there is no external world, only your internal thoughts.
One fellow says the wind moves the trees' branches. Another says the branches
move the wind. The enlightened third fellow says only the mind moves. It is all bluff, I
tell you, putting people on a spin. You read these things and feel whaaa.
What is it you have in your right hand?
A lamp, Sir.
Drop it What is it you have in your left hand?
A lamp, Sir.
Drop it What is it you have in your hands?
Nothing, Sir.
Drop it.
Enlightened. It stuns your buddhi, and you like to be stunned. A categorical
buddhi gets bored; while you are either here or there, you find life is somehow always in
between. Is this true or is that true? Do I go here or there? You choose the golden middle.
The truth does not lie in the extremes. But how do you find out what is the middle? You
become a puppet of an effusion of words. You stun the buddhi with the clap of one hand.
How? When you are enlightened. All humbug: I think, therefore the world is there. This
is subjective idealism, and it is not clear thinking. There is no vara, and neither can the
fellow say how he himself got there. There is no way that kaikam consciousness can
know it is kaikam.
nyamityapare |

This is also Bauddha. nyam is what they say is between two flickers of
consciousness. nyam is their grand ground, and what this is, if you say anything, it
ceases to be nya. What is this 'it'?


He says, "This is nya. Yes, this means I am nya."

If they just saw it properly, this does not mean I am nothing, it means nirgua.
This is tm, all-knowing consciousness.
AiSt dehaidVyitir> s<sarI ktaR aeTe ypre I aev
E kevl< n kteTR yek,
e AiSt titir $r>
svR}> svRziirit keict!, AaTma s aei rTypre,
Asti dehdivyatirikta sasr kart bhoktetyapare | bhoktaiva kevala na kartetyeke |
asti tadvyatirikta vara sarvaja sarvaaktiriti kecit | tm sa bhokturityapare |

Even though this Brahman is prasiddham as tm, even though it is pra Brahma
and nirgua satyam, Brahman is the locus for vipratipatti. Incomplete knowledge
becomes erroneous knowledge. tm is a sitting duck, available for committing an easy
mistake. That is why the mistake is universal. tm is adequately known and adequately
unknown. Nobody is a sole proprietor of ignorance. You are not condemned for not
knowing. You start your life with not knowing. Not knowing 'tm being Brahman' being
there, one has to know. Naturally prkt jan make the mistake, and seemingly
thinking people make special mistakes. Mistakes are made without prama, and mistakes
are made looking at the prama. Mistakes outside the prama, outside rutismtipura,
are vedabhy. Loka alone is their prama. These are the Crvkas. The nyavdin and
the Vijnavdin are also vedabhy.
Now we will start the vaidika. These are our anukulaatrus, friendly enemies who
fight like anything. They are not dehtmavdins they accept Veda and puyapp and
karmaka and devats. These are the Prvmmsakas. They say dehdi vyatirikta. They
say the the stlaskmaprdi deha is vyatirikta from ayam jva. The jva is distinct from
the body-mind-sense complex, the kryakraasaghta. Jva is the one born into this body,
who gives up this body, who is a ihalokaparalokagm. He is a sasr. By doing good
karmas he should pile up special puya and earn the longest possible easy stay in heaven.
The longest stay in heaven is called moka. This same view is held and told in the rya
Samaj book by another Swami Dayananda Saraswati. He was no mean scholar, wrote a
bhya on the Veda, but his take on Vednta was not well founded.
These are pravaidikas and they have raddh in the Veda, more in the Karmaka.
They say the jva is sasr, the one who is born again and again and dies again and again.
Sasritvam is real, and the only relief is moka through karmaphala. They say it is
heavenly anityaphala, it has pekika nityatvam, it is amtam, this is moka. The
dehavyatirikta sasr is karmakart and phalabhokt. The karmaphala is heaven going. His
amtatvam is only svarga. They quote Upaniad to defend and support their contention that
doing karma for a hundred years comes before renunciation and sannysa. They do not
believe in avatra and all that, but when it is convenient they will quote from these. These
are the Prvammsakas.
Bhoktaiva kevala na kartetyeke. Now the Skhya purua and prakti. He says
purua is the tm and is many. tm is not a kart, he is only bhokt. Prakti is everything
and is one. Prakti is called pradhnam and it is jaa jagatkraam. It consists of three

qualities, guas sattvarajastamsi. Sattva accounts for intellection, emotion, desire et

cetera. Rajas accounts for all activities and ambitions et cetera. Tamas accounts for the
jatmakajagat and dullness and idleness such as sleep. The prama prameya vyavahra - it
is all done by prakti. The purua is only bhokt and has nothing to do with prakti. The
person who knows he is free as purua is free from karmaphala pyappa. If you are
avivek, you are affected by karmaphala. This is the Skhya, Kapila's Skhya.
The Yogs, yogina, are Sevaraskhyas. According to them tm is not a kart and
puruas are many. They say the jagat cannot be created by mere pradhna. When the three
qualities are in resolution, sambhva, smya avasth, equilibrium, it is called pralaya. That
is the unmanifest condition. Physics talks about a state of equilibrium when the strong
force, the electro-magnetic force, gravity, and the weak force could not do anything
because of the extreme temperature. Then, for some reason the scientists do not know,
the temperature went down and the forces became active and created the elements and the
galaxies and so on. As the activity of the stars increased, the forces again reached an
equilibrium and a temperature which sustains the universe as we enjoy it now.
The Skhya figured out a few things. He accepted the smya avasth and said that
a disturbance starts the creation. The question is who did the disturbing. Svaya
jaapradhna cannot choose to disturb. Purua is asaga. The jaaguas cannot rub each
other. The Yogs, Sevaras, say there had to be an vara. Skhya itself does not accept
vara. Patajali's Agayoga philosophy follows the Sevara to some extent. Bhyakra
addresses the Yogamaha that was there at that time. For them, vara is sarvaja
Others, pare, the vedntina, say vara is bhoktu svarpa, bhoktu tm.
@v< vae ivitpa yuivaKytdaassmaya> sNt>,
Eva brahmavo vipratipann yuktivkyatadbhsasamray santa |

The many contentions, vipratipatti, get that way being dependent upon yukti and
vkya. Theirs is yukti bhs, seeming reasoning. It is a reasoning full of holes. They quote
bhs vkyas, vkyas they can turn to their false interpretations. They take them out of
context, not knowing the real vivak. To cover themselves they use the language of nyya.
Their pot is ghaaabdavcyadravybhvapratiyogi the opposite of the absence of the
object that has the meaning of the word pot. He says this and makes you feel as though he
is a logician. He creates a false logic and bases a whole system on this logic.
taivcayR yiTk<icTitp*manae in>eysaTithNyetanw ceyat!,
Tatrvicrya yatkicitpratipadyamno nireyastpratihanyetnartha ceyt |

If anyone accepts any one of these views without brahmtmaviayavicra he slips

away from nireyas, moka, the absolute good. He slips away from pururtha and will
get what he does not want. Therefore this brahmammsstra is begun.
The k says Nyyaikas will accept vara. The Nyyaikas will establish vara
through a kind of logic: ida jagat sakrtka kryatvt ghaavat; kart asti. He will
establish a kart. He will not say who told him the jagat is a krya. He cannot say why


there are not many karts. His logic is a donkey; he can always put one more bundle on it.
He also accepts that tm is kartbhokt. Prvammsaka has no vara. Koi means a point
of view.
Bhyakra shows us the vipratipattis and shows us how they tend to dismiss each
other. As a result, we need not dismiss them. Each koi is an adversary of the others, and
they knock each other out of the ring. The dehtmavd is dismissed by the indriytmavd.
The mana tm koi dismisses that. Then the kaikavijnam and the nya tm. These
are all avaidikas.
The Mmsaka trkika says kartbhokt, and the Skhya says no kart, only bhokt.
The Yogimaha says there must be an vara to disturb the equilibrium of the guas and
create. If you analyze, you see the progression of kois gradually works its way closer to
Vednta. Vednta says vara bhoktu tm. No dvaitakoi comes close to advaita. Every koi
ends up in dvaita alone. tm is svarpa, called sk from the standpoint of the
antakaraa. The bhoktu svarpa is sk. The sk tm is the svarpa of vara also.
varasya svarpa is bhoktu svarpa. Sk tm is nothing but caitanya, the svarpa of the
jva and of vara. Therefore bhoktu tm is varasya tm. The bhokttvam and the
varatvam are both mithy. They are of the same order. That is why it is all real. That is
why it is advaita.
The k gives us a taste of the false reasoning and the selective use of rutivkyas
by the kois. Because the I sense is in the body, the prkt say tm is the body. tm is
the deha is false reasoning supported by bhsavkyas: sa v ea puruo'nnarasamaya itydi.
The indriyas and mind are not tm. Even though they quote the vkyas they take out of
context. Asad eva idam agra st many Upaniads have vkyas like this. The Yogs and
nyavd have their vkyas picked out too.
The body cannot be the tm because it is a product of the five basic elements.
Neither can tm be born out if the skmabhtas. Being objectified by you, ahakra na
tm. It will be shown that all the rutivkyas quoted by the vipratipattis provide no basis
at all for their contentions. Brahma is not only jijsyam, it is mmsyam. This
Uttaramms is to be begun. That is the 'tasmt' here.
e vedaNtvaKymIma<sa tdivraeixtkaep
R kr[a in>eysyaejna StUyte .
Tasmbrahmajijsopanysamukhena vedntavkyamms tadavirodhitarkopakara
nireyasaprayojan prastyate || (1)
kkra says there are virodha pratipattis and their ideas about various ways to
moka. In which mata he has got raddh, the mumuku will gain that end. It is like a moka
buffet. There is crab, there is salad, and you can graze. Why start brahmavicra?
The problem is we say moka is already you. What choice is there? A gained
moka is not moka. That tm is Brahman is knowledge not found in any of the kois. A

kind man offered a blind man some help. The fellow who offered help happened to be
blind too. This is the help offered by the kois. Knowing the tm to be other than what it
is is like falling into a dark, dry well. If you commit a mistake against the limitless, your


loss is limitless. A thief robs whatever you possess, but this fellow who recognizes
Brahman differently manages to rob himself. What kind of ppa it is to steal all your own
treasure. To determine and know what is the nireyas phala, the vedntavicra is to be
undertaken. This is how it is in the final conclusion, in terms of reality, vastugati. Do not
take my word for it. See what the Upaniad says about tm being already mukta. Do
vicra and analyze what the others say. See the grand canyons in their logic.
There has been a fourfold explanation on the part of the bhya, four varakas, four
sections. Four topics were discussed by Bhyakra for the first stra. The first was the
introduction: bandha adhyasta therefore viaya lbh. Knowledge of the adhihnam
releases one from the bondage superimposed upon the tm. The adhysabhya connects
to 'athto iti'. The second section is viaydi sadbhavt ghartha or aghartha. Has
Prvamms analyzed the entire vedastra? The third section was adhikr lbh. The
one who has antakaraauddhi is the one who is qualfied for the end to be achieved in
terms of knowledge. The final section is ptaprasiddhi Brahman is not known totally.
There is general knowledge gained by looking into the word 'Brahman' itself, an
incomplete knowledge that tm is Brahman. These are the four topics, and brahmajijs
kartavya. The first stra talks about why the mms of the vedntavkyas is to be done.
Prastyate, rabhyate. Tasmt - we have already covered the brahmaviaya
prayojandi. Brahma is anadhigatam because it is anyaprama aviaya. Brahman is not
going to be objectified; it is that because of which anything is objectified. Without
brahmtm there is no knower. Jagatkraa Brahma cannot be arrived at by any prama
you have. Aparokatve sati brahmaa anadhigatam. abdaika vedyatvam asti. Brahmaa
vedntavedyatvam Vednta alone. There is no other way. Brahmavicra kartavya.
This 'no other way to be known' is not understood by people. The spiritual pursuit
is a circular pursuit because after fifty-five years you are at the same place. It is trivial
pursuit. A bullock team pulling a oil expeller all day makes more sense even though it too
comes back to the same place. The resolution of the pursuit requires a prama not within
the ones we have. Pramtu svarpatvt the means of knowledge you have cannot go
there. Pramt prama prameyam are all three brahmarpa. Every object you objectify is
Brahman. The means of objectifying is Brahman. The one who objectifies is Brahman. And
Brahman transcends all the three. While all the three are Brahman, Brahman is free from all
the three. No pramt can understand this through any prama he has. ptaprasiddham
asti brahmaa. It is known in a way because of its root word meaning, because of
vddhavyavahra, because it is tm, and because stra tells you about it.
Upanysa means proposal, statement. Vivaraam means explanation, description,
unfolding. The upanysas that we had in the beginning the adhysa siddhi, whether there
is an adhikr, the possibility of moka, tm is Brahman, jnd moka tell us that the
stra avagama takes place by stravicra, by mms. This stravicra is pjita, blessed.
And from all those words, athto, you get the start of the vedntavkyamms.
Every one of the nyya kois is wrong. If the basic assumptions are wrong, what
kind of view of the reality of the world will you get? Their means of measurement are
defective. There is no blessing when you look at Vednta through such distortion. It is

challenging enough to deal with the universal mistakes made in linguistics and
observation; we do not need to add more mistakes. The stra comes from a structure
based on careful perception and solid inference. This is where to look, not at a strung out
logic and misleading explanations.
Bhyakra says this. Don't create a system which is a virodh to Vednta. False
arguments have to be seen false, and that requires tarka. Reasoning that points out the
fallacies in our own reasoning is what we require in Vednta. Vednta is not established
by reasoning; it is itself a prama and does not require reasoning. You analyze the
vedntavkyas to find out the ttparya of the stra. Those who argue against this ttparya
should be recognized as vedntavirodh. There are many things in grammar and in the
Skhya which help us with the reasoning. Even the nyya fellows may have something
useful for us. We go by the mms which has the support system, upakaraam, of all
forms of reasoning not opposed to Vednta obtaining in all disciplines of knowledge.
Moka has been taken up by all the vipratipattis; Bhyakra uses the word nireyas
so that there is no argument. This is abdhita nireyas that, once proved, cannot be
negated by anybody. Nireyas is the purpose, the prayojanam. Four topics are already
analyzed: adhysa siddhy viaydi sadbhvt; agatrthatvt Brahman is vedntaviaya as
anadhigata; adhikr lbht athaabda vicrea; ptaprasiddhy brahmaa jijsya na
jijsya prasiddha v:. Previously kkra said brahmajijs kartavy, but jijs is not
something one can do. It is only a lakaa. It starts the whole thing and goes away. What
results is vicra.
The strtmakastra, Mmsstra, starts by itself with the first stra. It is
within the stra. It has its origin within the ruti alone. There is connection with
vedastram. ravaavidhi is there. ravaavidhi is in the vkya 'tm vre draavya
rotavya mantavya nididhysitvaya'. The first chapter of the Brahmastras is
vedntavkyavicraravaam. The second chapter is mananam, all saaya nivtti, up
against the vision of the stra. There is connection between ruti and stra.
Vedntavkyavicra ravaavidhi. Prptavicra is undertaken in this first chapter. That is
why it is called samanvaydhyayanam. Where samanvaya? Jvevara aikye samanvayt. The
first two chapters deal with the real viaya. Just as with study of the Veda, you go beyond
the vddhavyavahra understanding. Adhyayanavidhi and ravaavidhi are there. There is
anavadhnam, no doa. It is anavadyam.
Without knowing what is this Brahman, there is no question of vedntvkyavicra.
Therefore Brahmastri. This is the one topic here. Once the brahmalakaam is there we
can do vicra of Brahman. Is this the Brahman you have heard about or is Brahman
something else? The brahmalakaam will be defended in the stra. The second stra is
brahmalakaam. There is a doubt as to whether there can be lakaam of a Brahman that is
beyond words, and there is the expectation of ki tad Brahma. Let us look at the ratnaml
for the second stra.
lakaa brahmao nsti ki vsti nahi vidyate |
janmderanyanihatvtsatydecprasiddhita ||


brahmaniha kraatva syllakya sragbhujagavat |

laukiknva satydnyakhaa lakayanti hi ||

The first Brahmastra is called jijsdhikaraa. The second is janmdyadhikaraam.

The third is strayonitvdhikaraa. The fourth is samanvaydhikaraa. The question here is
brahmaa lakaam. From the first stra, brahmaabda has adhikra all over. The Brahman
is anuvtti. The whole thing has only this one topic, brahmajijs being there.
For this jagat, the creation is out of that Brahman. This is the definition of Brahman.
There is a doubt raised. Is Brahman available for definition?
Prvapaka: Lakaam should be able to distinguish an object from other objects of
the same species and from every other object. If Brahman is a unique object, you have to
point out the special feature by which Brahman can be distinguished. You have already
dismissed all possible guas for Brahman. Lakaa nsti. It is known that smell is the
special quality of the earth; no other mahbhta shares this quality. There is no such
special quality for Brahman. And there is no other Brahman there to provide lakaam.
Sajti and vijti are not there for Brahman. Why don't you say that paramus or pradhnam
or nyam account for everything? Certainly stra talks of kraatvam. If there is creation
and sustenance and destruction from some thing, it cannot be something like Brahman. It
must be one of these causes other than Brahman. Your Brahman is nirguam, and from
nirgua saguam cannot come. A world full of attributes cannot come from that which
has no attributes and does not change. The cause is always found in the effect. We know
this word satyam, but how does this word relate to something avcyam? Whatever this
word 'satyam' means is not known to us - a something unavailable to words. The object of
a word is always finite. What laukika words can reveal your Brahman? Your words,
evening knower and known, are useless for us. There is no knowledge of Brahman
possible. Your Vednta has no meaning at all.
Siddhnta: Even though Brahman is free from change and desire and quality it has
jagata kraatvam. There is no anyam. Whatever else you say is kraa has its cause in
Brahman. How is it possible for sagua to caused by nirgua? Just as a garland, srak, can
be a snake. Just as a dream jagat is there for you in sleep. It is superimposition upon the
vastu alone. The taasthalakaa for Brahman is that which even though other than Brahman
points out the vastu like the treebranch tip that points out the moon just beyond.
Bodhakam is there. Vyvartakatvam is there, and the treebranch can distinguish the object
moon from everything else. Having pointed out the moon, the branch goes away. That is
Samukhya samndhikarayam and bdhy samndhikarayam are the two form
of samndhikaraya. There is a samndhikarayam there in the taastha. When we say
'jagatkraa Brahma from which all have come', the entire ida jagat sarva khalvida
Brahma. If the creation is considered to be mithy, if jagat and Brahma are one and the
same, if you say Brahman is jagatkraam, then the samndhikarayam between the jagat
and Brahman is definitely bdhym samndhikarayam, like a discarded garland that you
take to be a snake.

Ida jagat Brahman. The kraatvam here is vivarta updna kraatvam. If there is
only one lakaam, then that one kraam must be either updna or vivarta. If Brahman is
only the material cause for the jagat, it becomes inert, jaam. And then this inert Brahman
material has to be delivered into the hands of a supreme being who fashions this jagat like
you make a roti. What is the Brahman here? Since no specific Brahman is mentioned in the
second stra, you should think of Brahman as nimittam. If you take 'yato v imni bhtni
jyante' as Bhgu did, you understand nandam Brahma. Is that cetanam or acetanam? The
cetanatvam is included there.
We will show that Brahman is both nimittam and updnakraam. Nirguatve'pi
sati updnatva brahmaa. If a sagua Brahma underwent change to become this world,
there would be no moka. Without change, Brahman has undergone change. Without
changing it changes. Adhithnatvam is there for Brahman. There is no connection
between the snake and the garland, between the ropita and the adhithna. The snake is
the lakaam for the lakya garland, and there is no real connection. This is the taastham.
The snake is not a gua of the garland, but at the same time it becomes the lakaa. The
snake is non-separate from the garland and the adhithna can be pointed out. This is the
same for the krya jagat and kraa Brahma here. This is the whole setup, a satya mithy
connection. Any other kraatvam will not work - the kryakraasambandha will not be
there at all. There will be no advitya Brahma and no sarvtmabhva and no sasrd
moka. With janmdyasya yata you get kryakraaprakriy. You have to present Brahman
only as vara, and then the abheda can be pointed out. The janmdyasya yata stra will
bring in all the lakaa from all the vkyas.
We need not give a reasoning for establishing the satya mithy situation. But we
will give reasons that point out the fallacies in the reasoning of others when they propose
paramus and pradhnam and other kraas. Even though Brahman is not the padavcyam,
the immediate meaning of a word, Brahman can be revealed by words alone. Without
giving up dhtvrtha, words will imply the meaning. With their dhtvrthas, in terms of
pure existence, unconditional knowledge and limitlessness, the words will be useful. This
Brahman is not an existent object like anything else you say exists.
Any object of buddhipratyaya you commonly say is satyam. You say it exists. That
is the satyam for us in general. Here, pratyayaviaya is not satyam. Here, for the viaya and
for the pratyaya and for the one who is the knower, for all three, that which gives
existence to all of them is the satyam we are talking about. The root meaning of existence
is retained, while all possible limitation is knocked off. The satyapada becomes lakaa of
lakya Brahman. When we say Brahman is beyond words, we understand it is beyond the
immediate meaning of those words we use. The vastu is revealed by laukikapadni, but
those words are specially used. We knock off the restricted meaning of words, including
the words anantam and jnam. It is the abstract sense of the dhtvrtha that we keep to
point out consciousness. By lakaa we get past the limitations of the words. These words
are used in a technical manner by a person who knows what he is doing. These words,
words such as uddha buddha nityam, all negate what Brahman is not.


We do not go for alaukika words. Unknown words cannot define. Known words
alone can define, but not from their immediate meanings. That is why you require a
teaching situation. Akhaabrahma, jijsya Brahma, is not separate from you, from the
inquirer. Brahman is the svarpa of the jijsu. We have laukika words that will reveal that.
This jagatkraa Brahma is kraam when you are defining; it is kraam when you
understand it is not the krya or kraam; it is kraam when it is both kryam and kraam,
and when it is both it is neither. That is the taastham.
In the jijsdhikaraa, Brahman jijsitavya mokya. It is a value, not speculation,
not a philosophy. All you have to do is knock off all the notions you have about yourself
and the world and reality. Moka is pururtha. Brahman being jagatkraa becomes vara;
the content here is both spiritual and religious. It is a desirable change that you bring
about in yourself in terms of vision here. Everybody is trying to change anyway, but if
the change is basic, it is spiritual. Brahma vicra kartavya. For that you need the prama,
Brahma aviayatvt. Therefore vkyamms is done here.
ij}aistVyimTyum!, ik<l][< punSteTyt Aah gvaNsUkar>
Brahma jijsitavyamityuktam | kilakaa punastadbrahmetyata ha
bhagavnstrakra Janmdyadhikaraam: Second Brahmastra:

jNma*Sy yt>.
janmdyasya yata ||


What kind of lakaa does Brahman have? Vysa is here addressed as Bhagavn.
The whole stra can be said to be centered on this one stra. The first stra began the
inquiry and established the need for the vicra. The connection is made to what begins
here. The adhikr, the mumuku, the jijsu, is brought in here so that we know what is to
be done for the sake of brahmajnam. The connections are made between the student and
the stra, and between vicra and Brahman. The stra has to be known as it is; ttparya
nicaya must be there. Then, with the kind of reasoning that helps you understand the
stra, you see whether it is true or not.
Between Vednta and Brahman there is pratipdyapratipdakasambandha. Between
brahmajnam and moka there is sdhyasdhanasambandha. Brahma is to be understood by
vkyavicra, pramavicra, because there is no other way of knowing this. The
brahmaprama are the pramavkyas and the yukti. To begin the inquiry, the lakaa is
given. You cannot just ramble on about Brahman. Showing his reverence to Strakra
Vysa with that one word Bhagavn, the lakaastra is introduced by the jijsu.
The third stra says strayonitvt. This is the defense of the lakaa, all the way.
The third stra is properly read as both bahuvrhi and as tatpurua. There is a double
meaning for the strayonitvt. Brahman is the source of the stra, and Brahman is known
only through the stra. Brahman is both jagatkraam and sarvajam. Brahman is
jagatkraa strayonitvt, because Brahman has strayonitvam. And you can say
'sarvaja Brahma' strasypi yonitvt, kraatvt, because stra is the means for that


Brahman knowledge. In the fourth stra, knowing Brahma is sarvajam and jagatkraam,
all the vkyas resolve in tadbrahmhamasmi. Tattu samanvayt. All the upaniadvkyas
resolve in revealing 'This Brahman is what you are' alone. The fifth stra ikate
nabdam says that pradhnam and any other proposed cause is not kraam because they
are acetanam. All the stras that follow the second stra defend janmdyasya yata, the
lakaa stra. The brahmalakaa well defended means you are a jn; it means there is no
longer ptajnam.
The kepa began by saying that vedntastra need not be started because moka is
not possible by knowing Brahman. That objection was negated in the previous adhikaraa.
In this adhikaraa the prvapak says that even though Brahma may be jijsitavya, there is
no way of knowing this Brahman and no use for starting the stra. He says there is no
such thing as brahmajnam.
The vedntavkyas that give the lakaa of Brahman, the words that point out
without vagueness or omission, that unequivocally define Brahman, that reveal Brahman,
are called spaaligavkyas. They clearly point out Brahman. They don't point out a
manifest Brahman. In the samanvaydhikaraa those vkyas talk only about parambrahma
which is you. They have their connection in revealing this Brahma is you.
There is sagati for pada, for samanavaydhyaya, for Upaniad and Mmsstra,
and for adhikaraa. The viaya for the janmdyasya yata stra is the Upaniad vkya 'yato v
imni bhtni jyante'. You know this because the stra reveals it by liga. 'Yata' and
'janmdi' are there. 'Asya' is that 'imni bhtni'.
Three words are there: janmdi asya yata . This is the whole stra here. This is
'idam' of 'idam agre st' and of 'sarva khalvida Brahma' and of 'yadida sarvam ayamtm'
and 'ida ketra arram'. This is 'ea' of 'ea puruo annarasamaya'. This ea includes
everything, this entire jagat. From whom the creation of this jagat has happened is
Prvapaka: Janma et cetera are the dharma of the creation. This dharma cannot be a
lakaa for Brahman. Definitely it cannot be svarpalakaa, and it cannot be taastha
because there is no connection between Brahma and the jagat. You can say the ghaa is a
lakaa for mt, and the snake for the rope, because there is an obvious superimposition.
But creation belongs to the jagat, not to Brahman. How can you say that jagatkraa
Brahma is both nimitta and updna for the creation? You have no example to support this.
You have no anumna that allows you to say that the material is also the maker.
You say that Brahman is to be understood. That is your pratij. If so, you need
anumna to eliminate all doubts. If there is no anumna to help me, or if what is presented
is against anumna, the rutyartha cannot be arrived at. Brahman is not paroka like
agnihotra, it needs to be understood. I need to clearly know what ruti says about
agnihotra, but anumna is not important in that knowledge. I need atyanta understanding
of Brahman, immediate, aparokajnam. I need anumna for that. The meaning of the ruti

has not been established at all.


Do not tell me that Brahman is nimittopdnakraam. If you were to take either

one of them you could find many pertinent examples. We can make a reasonable case for
either cause based on anumna. But the non-duality of Brahman cannot be established. If
it is updna it cannot be nimitta, and vice versa. There are always two causes. By
understanding the kart you do not understand the material.
Siddhnta: Brahman, which is the very nature of the tm, is beyond your
perception and cannot be arrived at by anumna. Brahman is straviaya, why do you
bring in anumna here? Anumna can be used to knock of conclusions based on previous
anumna. Anumna is human inference based on sensory data either witness perception
or sense perception. The subject matter here is atndriya and provides no data on which an
inference can be made.
There is a dnta. The dnta is sukham. Your pleasure is born out of you and
provides the sattvagua change in your antakaraa. The kart is you and the material is
you also. Your dream is an even better example. There you are the updnam and the
nimittam also. With the myopdhi, Brahman is both causes, sarvajam and sarvaaktimat.
The dnta is there and we do use anumna. But at the same time, Brahman is to be
revealed by stra. This is why knowledge stays. What is revealed by ruti cannot be
negated at all. As revealed by nirdoa ruti, both causes are there. It is nirdoa because it is
not born of any puruabuddhi, not born of any speculation. You can say it is revelation,
but this is not a matter of faith. What ruti says cannot be shaken. It is revealed to the is
alone, knowledge that is coming down to us. It can be well established. This is the
introduction to the janmdyasya yata stra itself.
akara bhya:
jNmaeTpiraidrSyeit t[s<iv}anae bIih, jNmiSwitg< smasawR>,
Janmotpattirdirasyeti tadguasavijno bahuvrhi | janmasthitibhaga samsrtha

'Janmdi' is a bahuvrhi. Janma dhi yasya the jagat for which janma sthiti bhaga.
In a tadgua savijna bahuvrhi, the vieaas are with the fellow. In the atadgua
savijna bahuvrhi the vieaas are other than the fellow. Janma sthiti bhaga are
samhra dvandva, and all are with the jagat. If you take it as atadgua, you have 'the jagat
for which janma is the beginning'. The creator would be separate from sustenance and
destruction, a babysitter. Instead, all the three are included in the jagat, and you bring in
the word 'Brahman'. Therefore you have the lakaa: Brahman is the cause for the jagat
throughout its manifestation.
The stra tells us Brahman is the cause. Abhinnanimittopdnakraatvam is not
stated. Brahman is already jijsya, praktam. The vastu to be known is Brahman. Lakaam
is given here. There is a connection between the stra and the mms. Therefore you
have to bring in all the vkyas that describe Brahman as the kraam. Satya
jnnanmanantam is the Taittirya svarpalakaam of Brahman. We see there too the vkya
'tasmdv etasmdtmana kassambhta'. This cetana Brahma is alone the cause for
everything. In the vkya the pacam is used apdne. The apdna use is jai kartu, 'out of


which a creation takes place'. It can be taken as either nimitta or updna kraam. Here,
nimitta is appropiate because updna is not mentioned. Even so, updna is understood
because 'anantam' is there for 'tasmdv etasmdtmana'. We infer the updna kraam.
'Yato v imni bhtni jyante' can be taken as either kraam. When it says 'yena
jtni jvanti', the tty could say that there is a maker in Vaikuha giving orders for the
different beings to be born. By his mandate there would be updna. Rmnuja and
Madhva will give this kind of argument. Then the ruti says 'yasmin prayanti
abhisavianti'. This makes it clear. When the pot is broken it does not go and fall into the
potmaker. Here the 'prayanti abhisavianti' vkya definitely reveals updna kraa. Then
there is completion in 'nando brahmeti vyajnt'; Brahman is nirita for Bhgu. The one
abhinnanimittopdnakraa is prptam.
In the same Taittirya the stra says 'tad aikata' and 'so akmayata'. This Brahman is
equated to tm. tm that is satya jnamananta Brahma, clearly indicated by the
masculine gender, is the creator. He saw; he desired; he created; he entered. He himself
became everything therefore abhinnanimittopdnatvam. The third Brahmastra presents
general kraatvam, nimittopdna are inferred. Later in the first Brahmastra chapter,
stra 1.4.23 specifically presents both nimittopdna. By doing this it avoids contradicting
the pratij and the dnta. The pratij is Chndogya 'yasmin vijte sarva vijta
bhavati'. In order to know that knowing which everything is as well known, that cause
must be both nimitta updnam. The dnta is 'ekena mtpiena sarva mmaya
vijta syt'. If one clay pot is understood properly what it is all about satyam is what
counts, and mithy does not count. There Brahman is said to be nimittopdna kraam.
The lakaam of Brahman, in terms of Brahman being cause for the jagat's creation,
sustenance, and destruction, indicates not merely karttvam but nimittopdna
ubhayarpam. Brahman is both the agent of creation and the material for creation.
Question: How can a Brahman that is nirguam be kraam? What can come from
nirgua? All the guas of the krya should be found in the kraa. How could there be a
tangible jagat? Jijsyam is nirgua Brahma; in sagua Brahma there is no moka. If a
person's defining attribute is alpaakti he will always be separate from pra vara. Only
if Brahman is nirguam do I have a chance. The lakaa does not reveal to me how
nirgua Brahman enjoys the status of kraam.
Siddhnta: The lakaa here is taastha, like ropesnake. There is no snakeness in the
rope. But still the snake is the lakaa, because without the rope the snake does not exist.
The snake you see is the rope. The silver that you see upon the shell is the lakaa for the
shell. But rajatatvam is not there in the ukti. Similarly, kraatvam is not there in the vastu.
Therefore Brahman can be nirguam, because kraatvam is only adhyropita. Mithy is
like that. The kraatvam is kalpita. Even though kraatvam is bhinna, even though
kraatvam is not there for the Brahman; jagat cannot be without Brahman. With reference
to itself, Brahman is free from adhihna kraatva nirguatvt. Vivarta updna
kraatvam itydi we get myay kalpita kraatvam, mithy ityartha. Kalpita
kraatvam, taastha sadeva, brahmaa lakaam iti anavadyam. Nirgua Brahma


jagatkraa bhavati. Mithytvam has to be there for the jagat. There is the place for you to
introduce Mkya's svapna dtnta.
Janmdi asya yata. For what is going to be said jagata, the dipad brings in sthiti
and bhaga. The neuter form of the compound reveals the samhra dvandvam janma
sthiti bhagam. Janma is the viea for the other two. In a bahuvrhi compound, the
meaning of the samsa is only one object which is the vieya. All the padrthas in the
compound are vieas to that one. Another example is given, one where the vieas are
other than the fellow citragordevadattasya - citr gva, different breeds of cows
belonging to Devadatta. If he loses or sells the cows he is no longer citragu. The
compound indicates a person other than what the words in the compound convey. The
napusaka singular dyoti form of janmdi suggests the samhra. An aggregate in this
construction will always use the neuter. Janma sthiti bhaga are treated as one thing; they
are the viea.
The stra form here employs a tadgua savijna bahuvrhi. There are three
members in the samsa acting together as a gua and giving savijnam, understanding,
as to what is there. An example is lambakara, the one with low-hanging earlobes. His
big earlobes are the gua for this fellow and provide the referent for the bahuvrhi. Here,
janmakraa tadbrahma. If you take just janma you omit sthiti bhaga and you do not get
the full meaning of kraam. Brahman as the cause for only creation would mean there has
to be someone else there to take care of that creation. Advayatvam and bhattvam would
not be there for Brahman, and niratiaya Brahman would not be understood. For the
creation, for the sustenance of the creation, and for the destruction of the creation the
cause is Brahman. All three must be there for Brahman to be advayam. Together alone they
make a lakaam for Brahman. The three-fold causal status is there for Brahman. That is
how the compound is to be explained, dyotita.
Question: We understand this jagat as andi, as having no beginning at all. How
can there be a janma for the jagat?
Siddhnta: It is a cycle. The beginninglessness is with reference to its cyclic nature.
It is with reference to a given kalpa we can say this is creation, this destruction.
jNmnaidTv< uitindez
R ape]< vStuv
& ape]< c,
Janmanacditva rutinirdepeka vastuvttpeka ca |

We say creation is the beginning in the krama. You could take the unmanifest
condition as the beginning, because in a cycle there is no real krama. We go by what ruti
says. Based upon rutivkya that says jyante, an object first has to come into being. Then
it is sustained, and after some time it is destroyed. It is all based on the object, such as a
clay pot, having come into being.
R Stavt! ytae va #main Utain jayNte #TyiSmNvaKye jNmiSwitlyana< mdzRnat!,
rutinirdeastvat 'yato v imni bhtni jyante' (Tait 3.1) ityasminvkye
janmasthitipralayn kramadarant |


The statement of the ruti is 'yato v imni bhtni jyante'. The creation of all
beings from that Brahman is mentioned first. Afterwards, 'yena jtni jvanti'. That is the
sustenance by Brahman. Then again, 'yasmin prayanti abhisavianti'. This is the kraa
wherein all the krya goes back. We are told of the kraam for all three. There are two
types of kraa here. Somebody has to decide that this world which has come into being
has to now be withdrawn. That is vara sakalpa, the nimitta kraa. Brahman being the
updnakraa, it goes back to vara alone. The order given there is clear.
& mip jNmna lBxsakSy ximR[> iSwitlys<vat!,
Vastuvttamapi, janman labdhasattkasya dharmia sthitipralayasambhavt |

The nature of all objects is the same. A pot or Devadatta's arra has an existence
by birth, a coming into being. Deho jyate asti vardhate vipariamate apakyate vinayati iti.
For a vastu alone, the dharm who has the dharma of creation, there can be sthiti and
pralaya, longevity and disappearance. The order is clear.
When Strakra is making a stra for giving a lakaa to Brahman, what direction
does he follow? First he looks at the mlaruti and makes sure the connection is there.
The Strakra is not giving rambhavda like Kada does with his paramus and dyads
and triads. Most theologies are rambhavda. There is no real rambha - since rabdham is
mithy, rambha is also mithy. The mlaruti makes a statement with reference to one
sarga, and based on that we say janitva sthitva vilyate. That is one cycle of the andi
cycling. We are not addressing ditvam here, we are trying to define Brahman by
taasthalakaa and point out Brahman as the cause for the beginning et cetera. This has
been the padaccheda of janmdi, padrtha. This is how the stra is explained.
What is the meaning of 'asya', the ah of idaabda? Generally, idaabda has its
meaning in pointing out something right in front of your senses. It conveys the meaning
of the object. Bhyakra asks what is not in front. Anumna is based on pratyaka for the
sk. The conclusion you come to is skipratyakam. Idaabda has the capacity to
convey everything that is witnessed by you.
ASyeit Ty]aids<inxaiptSy ximR[ #dma indez
R >,
Asyeti pratyakdisannidhpitasya dharmia idam nirdea |

In the stra, the asyapada, as a form of idaabda, refers to that which is known by
pratyakdi. It points out the object which is near, present. What is the object here brought
to the pramas? One jagat. This entire jagat is the dharm mentioned by the word 'this',
asya. The entire ketram is idaabda. Whatever is within the framework of mybhmi
time and space is idaabda, nothing but vara everywhere. This idaabda is always
what is opposed to you, to aham. In order to knock off that divisive ahambuddhi, idam also
aham. But you have to look at the aham differently, as being in one vastu alone. That is the
;I jNmaidxmRsb
< NxawaR,
ah janmdidharmasambandhrth |


Idaabda is in ah, sambandhrtha, the sixth case janmdi kasya. Asya - asya
jagata, digocarasya, skivedyasya, sarvasya. The asya is not qualified by a single object.
The asya is general, smnya. Therefore sarvasya jagata. Between the jagat and the
janmdi there is a sambandha. The janma is connected to Brahman, yata.
yt #it kar[indez
R >,
Yata iti kraanirdea |
Yata is pacam alone, because this is lakaa, apdna pacam. The word is yata;
it could also be yasmt. The yata brings in the rutiprdhnyam 'yato v imni bhtni
jyante'. This is the mukhyaruti. This will bring in all relevant ruti - remember samavaya
here. Adhikra is samanvaya. The connection is there between vicrya rutivkya and
vicrtmakastra. The yata abda brings in the rutivkya, and by that you get
taasthalakaam. That gives you the asdhraasambandha, the special as-though
kryakraa connection.
The as-though kryakraasambandha cannot happen anywhere else. The crow
thats sits on the roof and indicates Devadatta's house can sit elsewhere. But even though
the jagat is not a part of Brahman, the jagat cannot sit elsewhere. There is no other way for
the jagat to have existence, because there is only one existent thing; this is satyam. The
jagat being mithy, it has no satt except the satt of Brahman. Therefore wherever jagat is,
there indeed Brahman. Wherever viaynubhavam, there is caitanya Brahma. This is a
special taastha, unlike the the crow who, when he flies away, takes the lakaa with him.
Svarpe jagat nsti, the jagat being mithy ghaavat.
The svarpa of the ghaa is only mt. In the mt there is no ghaatvam. Similarly, in
Brahman, which is the svarpa of jagat, there is only the lakya of the words satya
jnamanantam. There is no jagattvam, no kryatvam, no kraatvam there. There is no
kraatvam or kryatvam of the ghaa in the mt. One is satyam; one is mithy. In the vastu
there is no kryatvam or kraatvam. This is why it is called taastha. But at the same time
the lakaa is there. The crow flies away and sits somewhere else, but the jagat does not

go and sit somewhere else. That is why we switch from ropesnake. We switch the
examples, such as from rope-snake to mt-ghaa, purely for lakartha. The crow is not
there for as long as the house is there. But here it is not like that; as long as this is there,
that is always there.
Yata abda brings in both all the vkyas and the svarpa lakaa. The 'yato v imni
bhtni jyante' vkya does not give you nirita Brahma. Brahmaa svarpa is not yet
nirita. Bhgu has not finished his inquiry, and Vrua keeps teaching until nirdhrita
Brahman. The svarpa is discovered in the truth of nanda. There jijsya Brahma, here
jijsita Brahma. That is why Bhgu did not come back. nanda pram ananta
Brahma is the svarpa; this is that yata. This means cetana Brahma. And being that from
which everything has come and back to which everything goes, satya Brahma. Therefore
satya jnam anantam nanda Brahma.


The jagat consisting of kdi bhtas looks nityam alone. Some say the jagat is not
born at all. But the ah is there in the vkya, and therefore the jagat is born. We can say
it is born for various reasons. ruti is there. The jagat is born, it is put together, it is mithy.
Assuming that the jagat is understood as having a creation in the cycle, the stra moves
on. But later it will be proved that the jagat is not nityam and it is born as a manifestation.
Question: Whether you take jagat or janma as being the product, what is the
connection with Brahman? The jagat is andi and there is no sambandha to Brahman. Even
if janma is there it is only for the jagat and has no connection to Brahman. What kind of
jagat creation can be connected to Brahman? It is not Brahman's creation. There is no
lakaatvam for the jagat. It cannot indicate Brahman in any manner.
Siddhnta: Kraatvam asti brahmaah, and that is the lakaam. This is what the
ruti conveys here. By the word yat, satya jnam anantam nandarpa vastu ityucyate.
Anantam is nandam, but the word nandam is very satisfying to you. Bhyakra cited
nandt, therefore nanda brahmeti vijny. That is how nanda brahmeti is nirita.
Svarpalakaam is there nandam; taasthalakaam is there kraam. If you give only
svarpa, the connection will not be there. Someone will say the jagatkraam is pradhnam.
Here, by the taastha all possible other causes are negated. Svarpa will not tell you what
all is this Brahman. You can say 'H u h u, I am everything, aha lokakt' only when
jagatkraam has been told. You can say that only when you can say 'I am vara', when
you understand the jagat is not separate from the kraa.
The taasthalakaam negates all possible other causes and the connection of
Brahman to the satyam/mithy jagat. Then the svarpalakaam lets you understand
Brahman. That removes all the doubts and whether you are a sasr or not. That is how it
has to be understood. Both lakaas are necessary. Then we have to establish brahmaa
varatva sarvajatva sarvaaktimattva cetanatvam. These four must be there in
Brahman. You have to explain at least two.
ASy jgtae nampa_ya< VyaktSyanekkt&
R aes
< uSy itinytdezkalinimiya)laySy
mnsaPyicNTyrcnapSy jNmiSwit< yt> svR}aTsvRze> kar[avit t+ie t vaKyze;> ,
Asya jagato nmarpbhy vyktasynekakartbhoktsayuktasya
pratiniyatadeaklanimittakriyphalrayasya manaspyacintyaracanrpasya
janmasthitibhaga yata sarvajtsarvaakte kradbhavati tadbrahmeti vkyaea |

You have to bring in 'tad Brahma' to complete the stra 'this is Brahman' from
which the creation et cetera of this jagat take place. This is the strrtha. Brahmaabda is
brought in from the first stra. Brahmdhikra is brought in because yatabda is there.
Brahma iti anuvtti. Then the vkyrtha has to be defended. This is how the bhsya moves.
The jagat is in the form of nmarpa, names and forms. Except the names and
forms, there is no other thing that is here. All that is here is one vastu; nmarpa is the
creation. It has an order because it is varasi. That which is created, differentiated, is
filled with varieties of karts and bhokts. It is a place where there are definite places,
times, and effects for a given karma. For a given mind to understand a given arra is not

easy, to say nothing of the jagat. You know only the tip of the iceberg. The breadth of the
creation is not even imaginable by the mind. It is simply not all available for visualization.
All of creation janma sthiti bhaga - is vieaa for 'asya'. The three are mentioned to
indicate what kind of cause it is. From the nature of the product we can appreciate the
nature of the cause. From the products we will establish brahmaa sarvajatva
sarvaaktimattvam. varatvam and cetanatvam will be included.
The vieaas are not presented as poetry; they are the definite, terse stra
methodolgy. The attributes of the jagat are part of a reasoning, rutyanugrhakayukti,
given here to help us assimilate the vakyas cited from ruti. A pot-maker, the kumbhakra,
first has a desire to make a pot. Then he has to visualize the pot he wants and gather the
appropriate materials before he kneads the clay and places it on the wheel for forming. In
the beginning the pot-maker has the knowledge of the word pot, the name and the
function of his creation. Abhidhnbhidheybheda sambandha being there, he cannot
understand pot without the word. The pot-maker alone knows the pot that is inside his
head, but he makes that name and form available to others outside by his skill. The potmaker is one of the aneka karts and bhokts within the creation who were themselves
created by the mukhyakraa. That mukhyakraa created out of himself, svata, all
nmarptmaka jagat. He himself came into this form, just as the dreamer comes into his
dream world. As he visualized, so it is. In the dream there is a certain law, but here the
mukhyakraa is the law itself and all possiblity, and all that is here is in the form of
nmarpa jagat. The anumna here helps you understand the ruti.
The original creation, the si, dhyakryam, is born of cetana alone kryatvt.
'Being a meaningful krya, intelligently put together' is the meaning for the kryatvt
vypti. The nyavda of the Bauddha is negated. From nyakraam you will get only
nyakrya. The Skhya pradhnajagatkraamata is negated by saying cetanajanyam.
Neither can you take Brahman to be Brahmji, Hirayagarbha, who is a mithy jva within
the sa jagat alone. The jva is not created, not even andi. Only the skmasthlopdhi,
the kryakraasaghta is utpannam. The jva is saccidnandasvarpa and is always nitya.
Unknown or enlightened, the jva is nitya. That is why moka is not possible without
knowledge for this jva fellow.
Bhokts are mentioned here as being created because sometimes a kart is not a
bhokt. There is a small difference there. When a son performs the rddh ritual, the
departed soul is the bhokt. In the vaivnara ritual there are eight potshards used for
offering. There the son is the bhokt of the father's ritual actions. A tvik is kart only; the
karmaphalam goes to the sponsor. A cook is often not phalabhokt. Here, Hirayagarbha is
not the cause because he himself is caused. But do not think that there is a Brahmji who
sets himself up as a Brahmji and is separate from vara. It is through skmopdhidvara or
sthlaskma updhi alone that all jvas come into being within the created jagat.
Otherwise jvas are eternal. No particular jva is the creator. The only ultimate cause is the
one Brahman as creator.
Jagatkraam is one and is sarvaja Brahman. In fact, it is vara we are talking
about now. Tadbrahma with myabalam is sarvajam. Brahma is the order that gives the

results in terms of time and place due to action. The order we are talking about is definite,
firm, unshakable pratiniyata connection of action and result in terms of time and place.
The ada results take time to manifest. The place where they manifest is the jagat where
these things are possible. The sun, meru, is the fulcrum around which all circle. The meru
is also the central bead in a ml. Above all is svarga. Earth and heaven are the place of
karmatva bhokttvam. A person will be born here so that he can have the experience of
childhood and the village, or of a flat in Bombay. It is pratiniyatadea. Heaven is the place
to experience puya.
Pratiniyatakla, the times available are fixed. You cannot just wait for uttaryana
to go to svarga, because uttaryana is a kind of a nimitta. Uttaryana is just an indicator for
a particular gati. After the fall of the body you will go according to your karma. Agnihotra
is also nimitta. In terms of daphala, the one who gives to others knows what service has
been done and who has done it and what it is worth to him. He is the sarvaja of that
action and its results. In terms of the entire creation, the karmaphaladt must be sarvaja.
It is more than a matter of remembering. Who could remember what is involved for all
beings and all actions and all results? Beards, wrinkles, rains, flowers they all come
according to the order. You must be sarvaja to be the law of karmadharma.
To establish aktimattva, kkra gives another attribute to this jagat. Leave out
the creation of your body and just consider the functioning. How does one liver function?
How could this be put together, and how could one soft organ take care of so many
contingencies. It is mind boggling. There is so much knowledge involved, manifest in the
form of this body. There is sarvaaktimattva needed to put to use the sarvajatvam. Then,
after creation, you have to know how to control. For Bhagavn it is no problem. He has
sarvaakti. Tad kraa tad Brahma. The jagat is from that sarvajasarvaaktibrahma
jagatkraa Brahma. This is the kryakraaprakriy.
ANye;amip avivkara[a< i:vevaNtaRv #it jNmiSwitnazanaimh h[m!,
Anyemapi bhvavikr trivevntarbhva iti janmasthitinnmiha grahaam |

Birth and being and destruction can be further divided by vddhi, viparima and
apakay growth, metamorphosis, decline. The six-fold bhvavikra is a valid description.
All six are included in the janmdi. Vddhi and viparima are part of the sthitikla.
Apakay is taken with bhaga.
yaSkpirpiQtana< tu jayte=iSt #TyadIna< h[e te;a< jgt> iSwitkale
s<aVymanTvaNmUlkar[aTpiiSwitnaza jgtae n g&hIta> SyuirTyaz'Kyet tNma zIit yaeTpiR[StEv
iSwit> ly t @v g&Nte,
Yskaparipahitn tu 'jyate'sti' itydn grahae te jagata sthitikle
sambhvyamnatvnmlakradutpattisthitin jagato na ght syurityakyeta, tanm
akti yotpattirbrahmaastatraiva sthiti pralayaca ta eva ghyante |


Question: Yska's nirukta, the original book of synonyms, gives the six
modifications: deho jyate asti vardhate vipariamate apakyate ninayati. Why are all six
not mentioned in the stra?
Siddhnta: Yska's book is an authority on Vedic words, but we are doing mms
of the vedntavkyas. Yska's six modifications are given with respect to a bhautika arra
composed of five elements that have already come into being. A body is born within the
existent jagat and is subject to the six-fold vikra. The arras are the krya of the
pacabhtas. This is not the vivak of the Strakra here. Brahma, not the pacabhtas, is
the object of your desire to know. We are talking about the mlakraa of the mahbhtas.
The lakaa of the mlakraam is what is given. There should be no doubt that janmdi
are from Brahman. Both efficient and material causes are effectively established by the
rutyuktalakaa. The lakaa do their job pointing out Brahman. There should be no other
cause than mlakraa Brahma. The three janma sthiti bhaga are taken to be the
meaning of janmdi. There is no reason to take Yska's book as the basis for analysis.
n ywaeivze;[Sy jgtae ywaeivze;[mIr> muvaNyt> xanadcetnad[u_yae=avaTs<sair[ae va
%Tpyaid s<aviytu< zKym!,
Na yathoktavieaasya jagato yathoktavieaamvara muktvnyata
pradhndacetandaubhyo'bhvtsasrio v utpattydi sambhvayitu akyam |

There were four adjectives used by Bhyakra for Brahman. The world that has
been described as born, existing, and being destroyed would not exist without vara, who
has the four vieaas. Here Bhyakra uses the word 'vara' for jagatkraa Brahma.
There can be no other cause than that Brahman. Bhyakra deals mainly with the Skhya
here. The ikater adhikaraa that follows the first four stras covers the cetanatvam of the
kraa. Pradhnam, being jaam, cannot be mlakraa. Because ruti plays a secondary
role for the Skhya, after reasoning, he will quote the ruti when it is convenient. For that
reason we say it is aruta pradhnam. Pradhnam, being acetanam, has no basis in the
ruti. None of the other causes that are proposed is possible either.
There is no basis in the ruti for jagatkraatvam for the paramus of the Vaieika.
They too are acetana. They themselves, being inert, would have to have been put together
in some way. They cannot put themselves together to become the world. If you say
creation is vara's mandate, you have to explain that vara. And you cannot say the
paramus are cetana, because jvas alone are cetana. The nyavd talks of the jagat as
abhvt, 'out of nya'. But a jagat that is seen by you cannot come from a non-existent
thing. From asat, sat cannot come at all. No one sasr, even a devat, even Indra, even
Hirayagarbha, can be the source for the jagat. All beings with updhis are themselves
created and cannot be the creator.
n c Svavt> ivizdezkalinimanaimhaepadanat!, @tdevanuan< s<sairVyitireraiStTvaidsaxn<
mNyNt $rkari[n>,


Na ca svabhvata viiadeaklanimittnmihopdnt | etadevnubhna

sasrivyatiriktevarstitvdisdhana manyanta varakraina |

Neither does the jagat come of and by itself. If you say 'There is no cause other
than itself' or 'Without a cause' there are any number of problems. How can you say what
is intelligently created has no cause? Do you ever see a rose come from a jasmine plant?
There is a manifestation of knowledge involved, and a knowing kart is involved. An allknowing kraam must be there for the jagat. There is no spontaneous origination because
in this jagat people who are interested in getting things done depend on viia dea and
viia kla and viia nimitta. There is no way to justify thinking that a krya has no
particular cause. A man who wants to harvest grain does not sow his seed in the rocks.
He puts the seed in the right soil and waits for the right time and waits for water to come
or brings it himself. If he wants to harvest rice he does not sow grain. If there was no
connection with a cause, there would be no such pravtti on his part. Negative vypti - no
product is there without an adequate kart. Positive vypti - whatever is a krya, tat
There are those who say vara is jagatkraa. They arrive at their conclusion
purely by questionable anumna. ruti is not the prama for them. The Vaieikas and
Nyyaikas do accept ruti as a prama, but, for them, rutyartha is only anumnena
prptam. ruti subserves anumna. According to them, yat krya tatsakartka ghaavat.
The ghaa is a krya, and it has its kraa in the pot-maker. They say it is the same for the
By pure anumna it is very difficult to establish jagat kryatvam. What example
can there be? One would have to see another created jagat to say there is sakartkam.
Instead the Vaieikas and Nyyaikas just jump to sarvajatva siddhi. The kart has to be allknowing to create a given thing. For that, they have the pot example. One problem they
have is that they cannot prove there is only one kart. There could be more than one kart,
as there is for the construction of a house. The financer, the architect, the contractor, the
carpenter are all karts. Anumna cannot give you one kart, but it is the sdhana, the
prama, for these believers. For them, vara is distinct and separate from the jva, the
In forming a conclusion with anumna, the place you want to arrive is the paka.
Here the paka is the jagat. In the fire on the mountain example the paka is the parvata,
vanimn is the sdhya, and the hetu is dhmatvt. This is how a vypti, an inferential
conclusion, goes. With reference to the jagat, kartra sdhayati; therefore jagat kart asti
kryatvt. Jagat being a krya, a kart must be there and that kart must be sarvaja. He
must be vara and have the necessary material with him. The anumna is made. The
Vaieika does not need ruti to come to this conclusion.
How do you know his conclusion is a bhrnti? Because 'manyante'. There is a yukti
bhs no real yukti at all.
niNvhaip tdevaepNySt< jNmaidsU,
Nanvihpi tadevopanyasta janmdistre |


Vaieika: In the janmdistra, the anumna alone is presented. 'vara is the

jagatkraam' is the correct conclusion from the evidence of the jagat. Yukti is svatantra
Siddhnta: For us, with reference to an object that is not available to all the other
pramas, ruti is the prama; all the pramas subserve the ruti. Pratyaka anumna
arthpatti have no access to those objects. Heaven, janmntara, puyappa,
agnihotrdikarma, ygasdhyasdhana are all known only by ruti. tm being Brahman
which is jagatkraam is also atndriya viaya. Being the svarpa of the da, the pramt
has no access to tm being Brahman. ruti alone is araam. What the vastu is has to be
assimilated by you. The assimilation that vastu is yourself takes place only by reasoning.

And that reasoning is in terms of the conclusions you have about being separate from
vara and separate from jagat. Only reasoning can silence your arguments. But what the
vastu is, is understood only by the ruti. Sadvastu is not a nitya paroka vastu like heaven,
not a vastu where anumna cannot help you gain knowledge. When ruti talks about the
non-verifiable things, you must use liga and vkya and pada et cetera to arrive at the
ttparya of the ruti.
When it comes to tmajnam, because there is immediacy in this self-knowledge,
because it is bdajnam, Brahma avagati, because the self happens to be self-evident,
because everything that is here happens to be self-evident Brahman, you have no other
thing but the vkya to point it out. Then the assimilation takes place by eliminating the
arguments which stand against the vision of the ruti. This is what is called mananam. It
promotes what the ruti says. It helps with what is said by the ruti. But yukti is not
svatantra prama.
The Vaieika vyaptijnam is yat krya tat sakartka kryatvt ghaavat. Janmdi
is the lakaa for kraa Brahma, and anumna supports that saying there must be a
creator. This is the astitvasiddhibuddhi which says that kart is sarvaja, being the kraa
for the jagat.
The k discusses the yukti bhs. He takes an akura as an example. The plant
sprout is a krya that is not the creation of any jva. Even what a plant geneticist or
biologist comes up with is not outside what is already there. If jva is not the kart, then
the kart is other than the jva. But what is other than jva is acetana, dyam, jaam. And a
kart must be cetana. So you cannot establish another kart. By reasoning you cannot say
vara is the cause for the jagat. This is the bhs. The vyptijnam is not there so there is
nowhere to go with anumna. You cannot establish the sdhya. varatvam can be
established only by ruti. The question as to whether Brahman is saarram or aarram is
dealt with the same way. There is no way to establish a real arra for Brahman. Jnam,
sarvajatvam, is there myay. ruti alone is the means for knowledge for that which is
atndriya. Inference is simply a means to make the rutyartha tenable. Anumna is not
n, vedaNtvaKyksm
u wnawRTvaTsUa[am!, vedaNtvaKyain ih sU
E daTy ivcayRNte,


Na | vedntavkyakusumagrathanrthatvtstrm | vedntavkyni hi
strairudhtya vicryante |

The vedntavkyas can be looked upon as flowers. The stras have the purpose of
stringing together these flowers. The whole stra has its basis in the Vednta. The stras
clearly cite the vkyas that are their connection to ruti. By analyzing the vkyas the stra
comes to life. The vkyas have to be understood in a way that yields their meaning.
R a ih avgitnaRnm
u anaidma[aNtrinv&
R a,
Vkyrthavicradhyavasnanirvtt hi
brahmvagatirnnumndipramntaranirvtt |

What does a mumumku, a jijsu, want here? Brahmvagati. The mumumku

must have all nicaya pururtha and moka. He must be clear what is nsti akta ktena.
Brahmajijs must be there. Then we can call him mumumku. The connection between
mumumku and brahmvagati is brahmajnam that is sdhana for moka. And there is no
difference between the two brahmajnam is moka. stra is for the purpose of
brahmvagati alone. The whole introduction of the stra is for this alone. It is not for
intellectual stimulation. Brahmvagati is not a process of anumna. straviaya must be
aprva and not available for other pramas.
The knowledge of Brahman is born of the analysis of the vkyrtha alone. First you
analyze in terms of the aligas. You gain the ttparya. Then you do vicra for vkyrtha
ttparyanicaya. cryas arrive at different ttparyas. Your adhyavasnam, the final
conclusion, should be without any doubt at all. The prameya of the vkyas is 'this jva is
identical with vara svarpea'. In the jvevara aikyam alone is the rute ttparya.
'How can I be vara?' This is the prameye ak, prameya asambhvan. First was
prama asambhvan nivtti ttparyanicaya. Then prameya asambhvan. The
untenability of the self being vara jagatkraam is dealt with. This is where manana,
anumna, comes in. The two-fold nicaya is adhyavasya. ruti says jagatkraa Brahma
ahamasmi. Then I have a doubt that I resolve. Then there is no 'then what'. This is
brahmvagati. There is nothing else involved here. You do not go outside the stra at all.
It is not just a book, it is prama. Nih is not sitting around somewhere. Jnnanih is
absence of bdha, that which cannot be negated at all. No error, no vagueness.
sTsu tu vedaNtvaKye;u jgtae jNmaidkar[vaid;u tdwRh[daF(aRyanumanmip vedaNtvaKyaivraeix ma[<
v invawRte uTyEv c shayTven tkRSya_yupt
e Tvat!,
Satsu tu vedntavkyeu jagato janmdikraavdiu
tadarthagrahaadrhyynumnamapi vedntavkyvirodhi prama bhavanna nivryate
rutyaiva ca sahyatvena tarkasybhyupetatvt |

Whereas the vedntavkyas are there talking about the creation of the jagat et cetera,
the grasp of their meaning is in terms of firmness. No error, no vagueness, no doubt
jnadrhyam. Anumna that is not opposed to the vedntavkyas will help you assimilate


what the vkyas say. This anumna is neither negated nor avoided. The vimatam, the topic
under discussion by two vds, is abhinnanimittopdnakam. The jagat has its cause in the
cetanam. A conscious being alone can be the cause. The spider and its web can be brought
in as the ruti example here for the two causes in one. Svapna and sukha too can be used
as supporting anumna. ruti herself says that yukti is accepted as an aid. 'rotavyo
mantavya' says this in Bhadrayaka. tm daranam is the goal. For that, ruti alone is
the prama. After ttparyanicaya, the jnam should be made abdhita. Mantavya by
reasoning, tarka, drhyam in the vision of the ruti has to be established.
You know the story in Chndogya. There the yukti is pointed out by the fellow
who knows how to get back home when he is shown the mrga by the wise man who
removes his blindness. It is the one who has a teacher who knows.
twaih - aetVyae mNtVy> #it uit> pi{ftae mexavI gNxaranevaeps<p*etEvmevh
e acayRvaNpu;ae ved #it
c pu;buisahaYymaTmnae dzRyit I
Tathhi 'rotavyo mantavya'(Brhad. 2.4.5) iti ruti 'paito medhv
gandhrnevopasampadyetaivamevehcryavnpuruo Veda' (Chnd. 6.14.2) iti ca
puruabuddhishyyamtmano darayati |
Brahmavastu being the nitya aparoka svarpa of oneself, the understanding is
going to be aparokajnam. tm ajnam and sasritvam are also aparoka, skivedya.
The sukhitvadukhitva are already in the experience of the person, but they are not
attributes of the tmavastu. Their negation is by ruti, giving rise to the aparokajnam
that the vastu is satya jnanmananta Brahma. There is no compromise in this.
Everything else is raddh. There is no parokajnam of tm being Brahman. Everything
else is purely raddh. The vastu is aparoka.
We saw in Naikarmyasiddhi that every prama is svatantra. There is no necessity
for corroboration by another prama. Here also, svatantrapramanam avagate.
Nevertheless, as it is required, we can take recourse to anumna and anything else that
gives help, shyyam, in seeing. The whole pursuit has to resolve in the immediate
knowledge of the tm being Brahman. Anything that stands against this knowledge we

have to eliminate. It is only your conclusions that can stand against knowledge. Those
conclusions come from some intellect or some argument. They are arrived at on some
basis, and one may not be able to negate them by himself. One may even be able to
convince others without himself being free from doubt. One's own mind needs to be
convincing with regard to its conclusions and to its reaction to what ruti says. That
necessary process is mananam.
We saw the citation from Bhadrayaka as to tmarotavyamantavya. In Chndogya
is the illustration of how reasoning can help in your buddhi. The words paita and
medhv are there. The one who knows the subject matter and who can think properly will
be capable of the vicra. You need the tools that give you pityam, and you need a
teacher. The dnta tells of a fellow from Gandhra who was found by a teacher. The
fellow had been robbed and handcuffed and blindfolded and kidnapped by scoundrel


thieves who dropped him somewhere in the forest. Panicking, the fellow ran blindly
about in the forest yelling and screaming about his sorry condition. By some grace of
vara, another purua heard the commotion and came to find out the problem. He
removed the bonds and the blindfold from the captured's eyes, and, being a pait,
knowing his way in the forest and able to teach others, he showed the fellow the mrga to
take back to Gandhra. Now when you learn something like a route you may not
remember all the instructions, and there may be some needed adjustments along the way.
Therefore you have to be able to do and use some reasoning to find your own way to your
happy home. The Gandhra fellow used his head and made his way back to his home and
Here in sasra the thieves are avidy kma karma. The notion 'I am inadequate',
the desire to become somehow more complete, and the effort to manipulate yourself and
the world into longer periods of happiness take you away into the dense forest of sasra.
There you wander and scramble about to get to somewhere you do not quite know. You
want to go home to svarpnanda. Your jnacaku is blinded and you are convinced you
are a sasr. Then a teacher who is overpowered by compassion tells the seemingly lost
fellow that he is not a sasr and tells him where he was. In the example, he told him he
was in Gandhra dea, exactly where he wanted to be. He told him he was under a kind of
spell, like that bhag-taking fellow sitting in his own room who asks you over and over to
take him to his room. What will you do?
You are not a sasr. Tattvamasi. You are that gndhradea itself; svarpnanda is
not separate from you. Being one who is taught by the teacher 'You are tatsvarpam', and
being capable of reasoning, one can remove his own doubt. The tarka is in the form of
one's own buddhi. Everything is explained. tmana here means rute. ruti, of itself,
gives you the aid and the instruction for vastu seeing. Then it is up to you to remove all
your doubts by using your own buddhi.
Objection: You said tmasvarpa is not available for other pramas. Like dharma,
then, like sdhana for puya, Brahman is purely vedrthatvt. This means there is no need
for anumna. If you understand what ruti says, you do not need any manana. ruti herself
provides the necessary ligas you should take recourse to.
n xmRij}asayaimv uTyady @v ma[< ij}asayam!,
Na dharmajijsymiva rutydaya eva prama brahmajijsym |
Siddhnta: To understand dharma you have to go to the ruti alone. If there is a
vikalpa, you cannot opt for anything other than what ruti says. Only if ruti gives the
choice can you vary the ritual. But this is not true with regard to brahmajijs. ruti is the
only araam for brahmajijs, all right, but in understanding 'You are that
satyajnnanda jagatkraa Brahma' you may have a doubt. If you have a doubt, or if
you do not understand, you may need a prvapak, a sparring partner, someone who
dodges and punches back and helps you to drhya. The manana apkea asti. It is not there
for dharma, but it is there for brahmtmajnam.


ik<tu uTyadyae=nuvady ywas<vimh ma[< AnuvavsanTvatvStuiv;yTva }anSy,

Kintu rutydayo'nubhavdayaca yathsambhavamiha pramam
anubhavvasnatvdbhtavastuviayatvcca brahmajnasya |
rutydaya is ravaa manana nididhysanam. It is your anubhava as the
knowledge is assimilated and freed of doubt. Anything indriyavedyam or skivedyam is
anubhava. They are all prama in brahmajijs as far as they go. Knowledge of Brahman
is not parokam, it is anubhavam avasnam. When do you say that you have brahmajnam?
When it results in the anubhava. tm is prasiddha, tmatvena prasiddha, therefore
anubhtisvarpa is tm. tm is in the form of caitanya, always present. The anubhava of
this is only recognition. This recognition is aparokajnam, called anubhava avasnam.
Brahmajnam has its end only in immediate knowledge. The immediacy is the end. And
the knowledge of a siddhavastuviaya can be only anubhava avasnam, in the form of
immediate knowledge. Siddhavastuviayajnam is either aparokam or it is ajtam.
Ajtam means unknown or erroneously known.
Dharma and Brahman are different, even though both vedrtha. Dharma is nitya
paroka and does not have anubhava avasnatvam. The connections between dharmasdhya
and dharmasdhana are not seen at all, they are ada. Dharma does not have a viaya that
is siddha. Moreover, dharma is puruatantra. Dharma and Brahman have jijsya bheda.
Anumna apeka asti for brahmajijs.
Bhyakra said rutydaya anubhavdayaca. Of course there is no brahmnubhava
as a prama. His reference there is to yukti for the gain of avagati. We know this by
anvayavyatireka. Yukti is important to establish the vastuviaya. rutydaya means ruti
liga vkya sthna samkhy. These are the various useful factors which are used in
mms to interpret sentences and arrive at their meaning.
The k talks of the brahmasktkrkhya vidvat anubhava. People use this vidvat
anubhava, the experience of the great sages, but it is a very weak argument. It means you

do not have the knowledge someone else has. Who decides who is a great sage? It is all
charismatic decision who is a great sage, and no serious prvapak will accept that. You
can quote an pta on his anubhava, but it is not a valid prama. Our anubhavdaya
jgrat svapna suupti; in this there is an invariable variable and thereby anubhava and
anvayavyatireka. By the logic of anvayavyatireka, citing the anubhava, we come to arrive at
sampadrtha - what is the tvampadrtha iti. Anubhavdaya are necessary for understanding
the rutyrtha 'sk cet kevalo nirguaca'. The rutydaya anubhavdayaca are useful
pramas for us. Unless you have tvampadalakya you cannot resolve the equation in the
mahvkya. For this you require anubhavdaya.
For moka you require knowledge of Brahman. This brahmajnam is bdam, born
of words. The tattvamasi mahvkya janyajnam is bdam. When you say tad Brahma
aham asmi, this is the sktkra. This is the final, avasna, knowledge that is necessary.
The final knowledge is possible and moka is possible because this Brahman is
pratyagbhta, siddhavastu as the viaya. The brahmajnam, the sktkra, is the


siddhavastuviaya. This means it is in the form of pthagtm, the inner self. Inner self
means it is self-evident. There is no possibilty of asambhava. You cannot question it. You
cannot say it can't happen. Because it is siddhavastuviaya and vedrtha you cannot make
the argument that manandi are not required.
Dharma and puya are nitya paroka. You cannot see dharma, you can see only a
dharm. Dharma here is puya, and it is always indirect. Puya is sdhya and brahmajnam
is siddha. Brahmajnam is aparokajnam, puya is nitya paroka and there is no sktkra
apek or even possible. ruti has to tell you which is the karma you have to do which will
give you this puya. The whole thing is paroka. The karma and how it is to be done, the
agas, the ag, the vidhis all have to be determined from ruti. Vkya liga sthna
sambandha are technical tools used within ruti alone.
But you cannot expect to get a result from doing mananam on agnihotra and
somayga. You cannot get puya, only a headache. You could do somayga mentally and
get some daphalam, some mediatation phalam. When you do mnasapj there is a little
adaphalam. But manandi are useless with regard to karma.
ruti is ruti, but here we are talking about technical ruti. ruti, not depending
upon any other prama, reveals a certain viaya by its words. This is ruti. It has its own
arthabodhakatvam. If ruti does not give all the words necessary to reveal a certain topic, it
will give enough arguments and clues, ligas, to complete the topic. When ruti says ka
is everything as in Taittirya, 'yadea ka nanda na syt' the meaning is determined
ligt. ka goes along with nanda. This ka is not bhtka, it is caitanya tm.
samantt kate prakate. kate is prakate, and that is indeed ka. ka iti ligt.

Enough indication is there.

kk yogyat sannidhimath padn samha vkyam. A vkya is a series of
put-together words. Vkya should have kk. The krakas create kk. All verbs
create kk. There will be kart and karaa and karma with the verb. You can ask these
things from the verb. That is why tianta padam. The supantas join the ti in the form of
krakas. One pada depends on the other, which must be yogya. Only then is it a vkya.
Even though a sentence may be grammatically sound, it must have yogyat. It
should make sense. This is part of the kk. When you say brahmajijs kartavya,
brahmajijs is not something that can be done. Jijs yields in the sentence to vicra.
Then the kartavya works there. Sannidhi is syntax, the syntactical connection. The

individual words that relate to each other should be found together. It is the same in
music, there is melody only when the notes come one after the other. There is no gap
between related notes. Small gaps in the melody are no problem for our imagination and
for the connection that is distinctive in Carnatic music. The sitar fills in all the gaps; it is
not good for Indian music at all. Connection is our melody. All melodies are all
connected notes, but we can imagine the connection. We can imagine because a note
lingers, and therefore you can connect. It does not matter that the instrument does not
sound every note. There is something left unsaid that remains predominant. Just think of
all these instruments saxophone and mandolin et cetera that are used for Carnatic
music. They are music slayers. kk yogyat sannidhimath padn samha vkyam.


In the somayga the prakaraa is the combination of pradhnavkya and agavkyas.

In the yga, there is brhmaabhga which is karmabhga and there is mantrabhga. There is
a connection between the two that is called krama, sthnam iti. In English they say
'respectively'. The same thing is krama, here sthnam. Therefore these mantras are to be
used with these karmas. Both mantra and karma will have krama, but mantra and karma are
themselves entirely different and found in different places. The first mantra will go with
the first ritual, the second with the second and so on.
k gives an example of krama. There are ten small ii rituals taught in the
karmaka. Each ii devat has its own mantra. haniyam means 'construed' rather than
inferred. Some mantras are chanted by the Adhvaryu, the priest in charge of Yajurveda.
The gved is Brahma, the Hot. The Smaved is called Udgta. The Brahma is the
pradhna. There is a smya in the ritual: the mantras and the karmas have the same name.
The krama occurs in the Brhmaa, and the mantra with the same name occurs in the
mantrabhga, Sahit. The connection is very important. The krama is to be followed
carefully to complete the rituals. Viniyoga means use, appropriation.
Brahmajnam is not dependent upon manana and the ligas. Whereas to interpret
karmadharma you require ruti liga vkya et cetera. Dharma here is puya. As far as
possible, experience and ruti are the basis for brahmajnam avagati. They have
prmyam. Bhyakra says that both Brahma and dharma are vedrtha, both jijsyam, but
there is a difference in the conditions. Being vedrtha, dharma is karma sdhyam.
Whereas Brahma is siddham. The logical conditions for dharma are not applicable to
Brahman. Brahman is anubhava yogya. Anubhava means sktkra, nitya aparoka. Dharma
is anubhava ayogya, nityaparoka. The logical conditions, updhi, are necessary for dharma.
Dharmasya anubhava ayogyatvam and anapekitatvam. It is the opposite for Brahman,
upadhivyatirekt. Remember, Brahman is always anubhava. We are not saying there is no
anubhava. Every experience is Brahman. That is sktkra. If you know this, it is jnam.
The svarpa of every experience is Brahman. Whereas dharma is vedrtha with no
necessity for and no dependency on direct experience.
Dharmajna bdam. Brahmajna bdam. bdam means Vedic words.
Dharmajna nitya parokam. Brahman nitya aparokam. Manandi are not necessary for
dharmajnam. Manandi are speka for brahmajnam. They are opposite in this even
though they are smnya in vedrthatvam. Dharma is vikalpa and vidhiniedha. Tattvamasi is
not a vidhi. It is a statement of fact. Where there is vidhi there will be niedha. Where there
is rule, utsarga, there will be exception, apavda. These are there in the karmaka. Are
they in the jnaka? What is the exception to tm is Brahman?
ktRVye ih iv;ye nanuvape]aStIit uTyadInamev ama{y< SyaTpu;axInaTmlaTva ktRVySy,
Kartavye hi viaye nnubhavpekstti rutydnmeva prmya
sytpurudhntmalbhatvcca kartavyasya |

The difference between vedavedya Brahma and vedavedya dharma is that one is
siddhavastu the other is sdhyavastu. Sdhyatvt karmpeka is there for dharma. And all the


characteristics of karma also come into the picture for dharma. There are two types of
jnam, svapraka and parapraka, svayambhti and anubhti. Between jnam and karma
there is this other difference.
Dharma, puya, is to be accomplished. For this you do appropriate karma. As we
have been seen, it does not require anubhava. You are told to do something and you do it.
For dharma, only vedavkya is to be followed. Dharmajijs means the vedavkyas
involved are all analyzed properly with ruti liga vkydi. If the upasarga is here and the
verb is there, this needs to be recognized. kk yogyat sannidhi are recognized in the
words. With that, the purua's will is involved in achieving the result of any karma; the
phalasiddhi is tmalbh. The karma is puruatantram.
Brahma is vastutantram. Brahman is satya jnamanantam. Brahma is sarvaja
sarvaakti. Brahma therefore jagatkraam. And Brahma happens to be tm. Brahman
includes you. This is how Brahman is. If you dont like it, that is a different issue. That is
how you are. Brahman is vastutantram. This is not my thinking or your thinking. It is not
even that ruti decides what Brahman should be. ruti tells what is the siddhavastuviaya.
Even the connection between means and ends, sdhya sdhana, is, in that sense, already
established, siddhaviaya. That siddhatvam is vara. Provisionally the connection is siddha,
but karma has to be done. Karma apeka is there for karmaphala. It is different for Brahman.
For Brahman, the phala, moka, is siddha as the knowledge. For mokaphala, nothing
else is apeka. Whereas dharmasya phalya karma apeka, brahmaphalya jnam apeka.
Jnya prama apeka.
R ktum
R Nywa va ktu zKy< laEikk< vEidk< c kmR ywaen gCDit p(amNywa va n va gCDtIit,
twa Aitrae ;aefizn< g&ait naitrae ;aefizn< g&ait %idte juhaeTynuidte juhaeit #it ivixit;exaaawRvNt>
Syu> ivkLpaeTsgaRpvada,
Kartumakartumanyath v kartu akya laukika vaidika ca karma yathvena
gacchati padbhymanyath v na v gacchatti | tath atirtre oaina ghti ntirtre
oaina ghti udite juhotyanudite juhoti iti vidhipratiedhctrrthavanta syu
vikalpotsargpavdca |
Karma, laukikam or vaidikam, is done by a person who has free will. Karma is
puruatantra. A person can choose to do it or not to do it. This is true of a karma that is

said to take you to heaven. Doing one's duty, fighting the battle, it is said there are many
ways to reach the same end. Examples of laukika karma are going on a horse, walking,
going by some other means and not going at all. It is all vikalpa. An example of vaidika
karma is the atirtra ritual for one who desires a valuable animal. There is a vessel for
somarasa called o. The o is used just before sunrise or just after sunrise
depending on the vedakh followed. The vidhiniedha and adhikra and other general
rules and qualifications apply to rituals. But what qualification is there for a person who
wants to know Brahman jnam? Those things are not involved here. Maturity may be


mentioned, but the other qualifications are not. Jnam does not require qualification, it
requires prama. A buddhi must be available for the prama to work. This is all we want.
We see 'his na kuryt', but there are places his is advocated by the
dharmastra. A surgeon has to cut in order to help. That changes the whole stra.The
dharma is to be interpreted. Time and place and intention all have to be considered. In a
pit tarpaa ritual they use kua grass. Some put down two blades, others put down more.
It differs according to the kh. Karma means vikalpa. Vikalpa utsarga apavda all become
meaningful when applied to decisions involved in karmas.
n tu vSTvev< nEvmiSt naStIit va ivkLPyte,
Na tu vastveva naivamasti nstti v vikalpyate |

But jnam is vastutantra. If I hold up a mango and say come and take it, you can
come up, you can refuse, you can come up and take it after class. But if I say 'What is
this?' there is no vikalpa. You cannot say there is nothing there. You cannot say it is a rose.
Why? Because it is vastutantram. This is how knowledge is. This is how Brahman is. It is
satya Brahma jna Brahma ananta Brahma nirvikrya Brahma uddha Brahma, and
you cannot modify it either.
The k says that a karma to be done is subject to vidhiniedha. Having established
dharma as centered on the person, a karma has to be sdhya. It must be properly done to
gain the result. It has to be accomplished, earned, and it is not like siddha Brahma. You
cannot say that because they are both vedrtha all that is applicable to dharma is applicable
to Brahman. Vidhiniedha means do and do not do. What can you do to do Brahman?
Brahman is not vikrya saskryam utpadyam or pyam. It is not reached - it is you. If it
were reached it would go away. The reacher and any reached are Brahman. We do not
create or modify or clean Brahman. There is no dusting or scrubbing or polishing which
brings out a neglected Brahman like an old copper pot. There is no cleanser which will
affect Brahman nityauddhatvt.
Alternatives are an important vikalpa. If you do not have rice to offer you can offer
barley. In America, at one dollar a flower, the lakrcana would cost one hundred
thousand dollars. We offer petals of flowers rather than whole ones. And we say, "Please,
Bhagavn, take these flowers we offer in place of vastram." You can offer what is
available. You can add o if you desire; it is aicchika, optional, and centered on your
desire and your means. A vyavasthita vikalpa is an option where there is no choice. The
kh one belongs or one's status in the ritual determines the choice. In a pauyga the
general rule regarding his is given an exception. But as to Brahman there is no vikalpa,
no discrimination as to Brahman being of this kind or not of this kind.
ivkLpnaStu pu;bu(pe]a, n vStuyawaTMy}an< pu;bu(pe]m!, ik< tihR vStutmev tt!,
Vikalpanstu puruabuddhyapek | na vastuythtmyajna puruabuddhyapekam |
ki tarhi vastutantrameva tat |

Brahman cannot be viewed differently, according to one's wish or whim. Beliefs

differ, but Brahman does not differ. There are no vikalpas in Brahman as revealed in the

ruti. An old pot may look like tin or copper. Which is it? This is an example of
prakravikalpa. Another vikalpa is whether an object is there or not. tm is subject to your
vikalpa as to whether it is of this gua or not of this gua. There are these kind of doubts.
And there are doubts as to the existence of tm. The nyvda says there is no tm. The
Crvka says dehavyatirikta tm nsti. There is stinstti sattvasvarpa vikalpa for the some
of the schools of thought. But most of the kois accept that there can be no vikalpa in
jnam. tm is satyam whatever they conclude. tm kart the Mmsaka view - and
kartabhokt are both true as far as they go. The Skhya 'bhokt but asaga' is true. These
contentions accept that vastujnam is not subject to vikalpa. The k has described here
the vikalpas for tm.
Bhyakra says that all these vikalpanas about tm are all puruabuddhi.
Puruabuddhi here is more about will or error. Bhyakra says puruabuddhi cannot be
there for tm, for the vastu. Vastujnam should be as true as the vastu. You do not
decide about the vastu; your will is not invoved. In dharma, puruabuddhi is appropriate.
Where there is aicchikavikalpa you can decide. Here, Brahman and tm cannot be taken as
this way or that way. The cryas who say that there are many tms, that tm is a
vieaa to Bhagavn, that all this is because this is kliyuga, are using puruabuddhi. But
don't think the cryas aren't telling exactly what they know. They think tm is different
than vara and they say it. tm is that sitting duck for their vikalpa. The cryas'

approach to truth is not truth, it has some other emotional needs. There is no need to
prove which one is right and which is not; you need to know what is the truth.
That the vastu is available for kois is itself puruabuddhi. In India one's day of
birth is determined by where the moon is in relation to a nakatra. You go by pacgam,
not just a calendar. It tells you where the moon is in relation to the star. The moon has to
come around to the same star for you to reckon one year of your life has passed. It may
come one month later, one month earlier. A birthday is different by the English calendar.
This is why we do not have birthday celebrations every year on the same calendar date.
The rddh anniversary for the dead ones depends on the month, the waxing or waning
moon, paka, and the tithi, the lunar day. The tithi will differ year to year for nakatra. You
go by tithi. But a person who cannot perform the rddh on tithi has options provided by
the dharmastra. You can do the same paka tithi the next month. You can ask another
person to do it as your proxy. Not everyone can enter a consecrated temple you get your
pj done through the priest. These are all sanctioned options in karma. Dharmastra is
full of options. But there is no option here. The vastu has to be known as it is. There is
puruabuddhi to the extent that it is your jnam, but your will is not involved. The
puruabuddhidoa goes to your knowledge and the knowledge becomes defective. The
vikalpas of doubt and error must be seen to be mind-spinning alone. The ideas of the kois
have no more substance than cotton candy. The vastu is not available for koidvayam.
Brahman is Brahman. We understand whether it is nirgua v sagua v. You
cannot prove the word saguam for Brahman. No guas belong to Brahman. How would it
have become sagua? Who had the guas before Brahman got them? The errors and
speculation are all manaspandita mtra, puruabuddhi. Karma can be pursued as it is known

to you. Within the scope of the options available for karma, what you have learned is right
for you. Pj et cetera is all puruabuddhi, and the well-founded variations by solid vaidikas
are valid. The smrtakarmas, with their many substitutions, are as valid as the vedastras
as long as they are done with raddh and bhakti. The Gt confirms this when it says that
whatever you offer reaches the Lord as long as you do not cross your akti. The options
are there in dharma. But what is applicable to dharma is not applicable to Brahman.
Question: Anna brahmeti, pram brahmeti, mano brahmeti, vijna brahmeti,
nanda brahmeti, ka brahmeti doesn't stra give these options for Brahma? Aren't
they all right because stra gives them? Why wouldn't all the vikalpas given in the Veda
be pram? When you say Om at the start dont you say Om to the options also?
Siddhnta: No, vastu ythtmyajnam is knowledge that is in keeping with the
nature, the svarpa, of the object. This jnam is not puruabuddhyapekam, it is
vastutantram. Puruabuddhidoa comes from one's prior notions and prejudices. All these
have to be suspended and the prama allowed to work. What is there must be allowed to
be revealed without puruabuddhi's distortion. Vikalpas that apply to karmas that are to be
done by you, ones that involve your will, are appropriate for sdhyavastus. But knowledge
of a siddhavastu is not puruatantram. Vastujnam is born of an alignment of the vastu
and the prama. Only one cognition is pram. Only that one is ythtmyam.
nih Swa[avekiSmNSwa[uvaR pu;ae=Nyae veit tv}an< vit, t pu;ae=Nyae veit imWya}anm!,
e ie t tv}an< vStutTvat!, @v< UtvStuiv;ya[a< ama{y< vStutm!,
Nahi sthvekasminsthurv puruo'nyo veti tattvajna bhavati | tatra
puruo'nyo veti mithyjnam | sthureveti tattvajna, vastutantratvt | eva
bhtavastuviay prmya vastutantram |

Real mithy is false. Seeing a treestump as other than a treestump is false

knowledge. Padmapda takes mithyjnam as 'mithy ca ajna ca mithyjna
tannimitta'. akara might have smiled and accepted that, but akara meant false
knowledge by mithyjnam. Lokavyavahra is mithyjna; not-knowing the tm,
vyavahra is all false knowledge. Aha sasr, aha kart bhokt, is mithyjna
nimitta. Tattvajnam, tasya bhva tattvam, vastujnam. The sthu alone, known as it
is, has that. This knowledge is vastutantra. It is a not a point of view you have arrived at
or superimposed.
It is entirely different if, for instance, you deliberately superimpose jaganntha on
a treestump. Lord Ka, Subhadra, is there in Puri, and they use three pieces of wood as
the altar. One person has done the ritual collection of three pieces of a certain wood. He
has taken on some preparatory dream or trance condition for the collecting. Out of the
wood they make a properly consecrated altar. All of them, even the pjri, know the altar
they focus on is merely wood. But they are not worshipping wood, they are worshipping
jaganntha, jagadvara, kvatra, with his myakti. You can say whatever you want
for what the three are, but this is the altar. You create the bhvana and therefore the
consecration. That is a deliberate, not false, superimposition. A alagrma is a stone fossil


upon which Lord Viu is superimposed. The pj is not for the stone, it is for Viu. This
is not the situation we are talking about here where in the twilight a treestump is
incompletely seen. There is a doubt as to whether it is a stump, and there is fear that it is a
dangerous man. That it is a man is not tattvajnam. We are talking about tattvajnam.
The validity of knowledge of a bhtavastu is vastutantra: there is no vikalpa, no
puruabuddhyapekam, no apavda, and viparyaya is not allowed. Even vagueness will
leave you short.
k says that no vikalpa becomes knowledge. I read something this morning that
said that knowledge is twofold, vastutantram and puruatantram. It is true in one way. The
article said one is called pram, the other is called bhram, ayatrthajnam. Can a mistake
be taken to be knowledge? Just because it is in Sanskrit doesn't mean you have to believe
it. How can vastutantra jna be tat yathrthajnam? I tell you even the other mithy
also is siddha in this. If I show you a pot, is it vastujnam? It is, only in one sense. You
see, this mithyjnam is included also. This is why Padmapda is right. For the pot,
'vastutantram is clay' is jnam. And even clay is not vastutantram. Only Brahma is
vastutantram. This alone jnam. But akara talks about vastutantra in terms of pot is pot
and flower is flower, and in that sense you can accept knowledge is twofold.
In the sthu, everything other than the sthu is not yathrthajnam. This is
extended to all other things. The vikalpanas are invalid and have no prmayam. The
bhtavastu, whatever is, must be known as it is, vastutantram not puruatantram.
tEv< sit }anmip vStutmev UtvStuiv;yTvat!,
Tatraiva sati brahmajnamapi vastutantrameva, bhtavastuviayatvt |

This being so, jnam being what it is, knowledge of Brahman also is vastutantram.
Brahman is to be known as it is. If it is jagatkraam it should be known as jagatkraam. If
it is satyajnnata svarpata it should be understood that way. Any other thing is
ayatrthajnam. Nityauddhabuddhamuktasatyasvabhva Brahma we will accept that
totally. This is what Brahman is. The vkya has more words and these cover more
confusions. These words are not adjectives to Brahman, they are all lakaams to Brahman.
The words are needed for the many angles of confusion that there are. Subject to change
no; subject to puyappa no; subject to ignorance no; subject to mistake no,
subject to bondage no; old no. This is the process of negation that leaves Brahman
alone. Leave him alone. The vastu must be known as it is, vastutantram not puruatantram.
If you go a little farther, dharmajnam is also vastutantram. This 'only if you
follow this you will get this' is also jnam, siddhavastuviaya, means and ends. You have
something more to do only because the end is not yet bhta. Sdhya and siddha is the only
difference. Otherwise it is jnam. Bhyakra will cover this later in the fourth adhikaraa.
We are just doing what is general, vyavahara. We will do what is prauha.
k says that pramajanya knowledge that is valid is as good as the vastu. It is
not open to puruabuddhi. Brahmajnam api vastujanyam. The flower generates flower
knowledge. Bhtrthaviayatvt is the vypti. 'Artha' here means vastu. What is to be
accomplished, what has to be generated, being not there at all, is what has options. In

siddhaviaya what options do you have? You are already Brahman, you are already
liberated, you are already pure. What options do you have? It is siddhaviaya, and you
need to know. This knowledge has no vikalpa.
Question: Is paramapururtha moka open to options? There is reyas, moka, and
there is preyas, dharmrthakma. Doesn't that mean it is open to options? If the dhra, the
vivek, goes for moka, isn't he making a choice?
Siddhnta: Ask yourself. Do you want to be a vivek, a buddhimn, or not? There is
no choice in that. Would a vivek choose to be avivek ? Neither jnam nor moka nor
vastu is open to option. Even dharma is not open to option what is appropriate is
appropriate. Only in aviveka and in some sdhyas is there choice. Between siddhyartha and
sdhyrtha there is vailakayam. Brahman is not equal to dharma. Manandi apeka siddha iti
bhva where we started. Brahman is siddhavastuviaya. Don't say that vedrthatvt, like
dharma, Brahman is not meant for mananam. Manana is meant for Brahma because Brahma
is bhtavastuviaya. Vedrthatve'pi it is siddhaviaya, and therefore it has manandi apeka.
Whatever is appropriate can be found useful to assimilate the jnam. Anumna,

reasoning - not simple reflection, conclusions - not just inferences, proving all other
conclusions are wrong and what the stra says is right, is also apeka.
nnu UtvStuTve [> ma[aNtriv;yTvmevie t vedaNtvaKyivcar[aniwRkv
E aa, n,
#iNyaiv;yTven s<bNxah[at!,
Nanu bhtavastutve brahmaa pramntaraviayatvameveti
vedntavkyavicranarthikaiva prpta | na | indriyviayatvena sambandhgrahat |
Prvapaka: If Brahma is not like dharma and it is not pure vedrtha, not vedavedya,
then it is available to pratyaka and anumna. Brahman, then, is known by other than
vedavednta. You yourself say it is vailakaya. Brahman is pratyakdi viayam. It is like a
pot, an object of experience. That means we do not need vedntamms. Brahman has
the status of being an object of pramas other than the Veda, other than Vednta.
Dharma, karma which produces puya and does not produce ppa, is vedrtha. To
understand both dharma and Brahma, both being vedrtha, we use ruti vkya liga sthna et
cetera. But you say dharma vilakaa Brahma. This means Brahman is not vedrtha. This
means Brahman is not aprvam, not anadhigata. Brahman is an object of pratyaka
ghadivat. As jagatkraam, Brahman is inferred. The janmdistras do not analyze
vedntavkyas, they ananlyze the anumna that has brought Brahman into light. Nitya
paroka is a different thing; it is for vedrtha. Here Brahman is siddhrtha ghaavat. For
Brahma there is the status of being a bhtavastu, siddhavastu. For a siddha object, pratyaka
and anumna are the pramas, na ruti. What is the need for mmsstras unless they
analyze these pramas?
The prvapak goes on. Brahma is pramntaraviayam. Fire is bhtavastu, but you
see only smoke. Smoke too is bhtavastu. Fire is bhtavastu even though it is not seen,
known only by anumna from the smoke that is seen. The dipad anumna has come.
dipad, what do you say? anumnam, arthpatti also. A series of steps are taken in


order to arrive at anumna. Your stomach is bloated. You can see it. You tap on it and it
sounds like the other side of the tabla. You know you have some bacteria causing the
problem. You need treatment. It is arthpatti, even the sound the tapping makes, all
bhtavastu. Bhtavastu creates anumna by arthpatti. You don't see all the evidence, but it
is all bhtavastu. Every bhtavastu is pratyakdi pramaviaya. Therefore your Brahman,
dharma vilakaam, is not vedrtha. If Brahman is self-evident, why do you drag in the Veda.
You will dismiss my whole Karmaka and hold on to one and half page Kenopaniad.
Vedntavicravkya na rthika.
Siddhnta: Brahman has bhtavastutvam but it is not pramntaraviayam tmatvt,
pramtu svarpatvt, atindriyatvt, aabdam aspraam arpam itydi, nirguatvt, adyatvt,
aviayatvt. Chndogya yat caku na payati yat rotve kopi tad Brahma. That which
cannot be objectified by the mind, by the senses, that is Brahman.
How are you going to do anumna? For vyptijnam there must be one thing
present. You cannot say yatra yatra jagat tatra tatra Brahman. Do you see Brahman? Brahma
is not indriyagrhya. Brahman is not an object of senses. Which of the senses reveals
Brahman? Whatever is objectifed is abdaspararparasagandha. If you say this is all
Brahman, how do you know? This is the question How do you know? What is the
connection between the senses and Brahman? If you show that the world that you see is a
krya, you can infer a kraa. But is that kraa pradhna or paramnu or what? How have
you established Brahman as kraam? There is no sambandha between what you see and
Brahman that would establish a vypti, an invariable concomitance.
Svavtae iv;yiv;ya[IiNyai[ n iv;yai[, sit hIiNyiv;yTve [> #d< [a s<b<
kayRimit g&t
e ,
Svabhvato viayaviayndriyai, na brahmaviayi | sati hndriyaviayatve
brahmaa, ida brahma sambaddha kryamiti ghyeta |

By its very setup, by the way the creation is created, the indriyas are externalized.
With rutijnam you know that all things are Brahman, but svabhvata means taking the
creation as it is. The indriyas always see outside and see objects, not Brahman. The abddi
viayas are the objects for the senses. stra says Brahma is aabdam aspraam arpam
arasam agandha. If Brahma had the status of being the object of any indriya we could make
a sambandha. It is not possible to determine whether this krya is connected to Brahman,
because all you see is krya.
If Brahman has idriyai grhyam there can be vyptijnam. But that is not there.
Without stra you have no knowledge of Brahman. You can only have viayajnam.
There is no sambandha between Brahman and indriyaviaya, the krya. When there is no
vyptijnam, you cannot say krya brahmajam. You can say it in a general sense, but
you do not have that jnam. Your inference that there is Brahman is not based on valid
evidence. You cannot prove by anumna that this jagat is born of Brahman.


kayRmamev tu g&ma[a< ik< [a s<b< ikmNyen kenica s<bimit n zKy< inetm

u ,
tSmaNmaidsU< nanumanaepNyasaw
Kryamtrameva tu ghyam ki brahma sambaddha kimanyena kenacidv
sambaddhamiti na akya nicetum | tasmjjanmdistra nnumnopanysrtha -

The second vikalpa given was yat krya tat sakraam: being a krya, it has a
cause. But you have no way to extend this to Brahman. The jagat alone you see. Whether
it is connected to Brahman or any other you do not know. You require a prama. The
janmdi stra is not meant to explain and analyze an anumna arriving at Brahman as
jagatkraam. There is no sambandhaktam between Brahma and what is there for the
senses. Your grasp of the kryam, of what is here, may allow you to say that it is
sakraam, but it does not say what is that kraam. That the kraam is Brahman will not
be known except by rutiprama. This is the job of the janmdi stra. The stra does not
analyze anumna for jagatkraam as Brahman. Brahman is praktam as the jagata kraam
in the first stra. The entire Mmsstra is not going to repeat the word Brahman one
more time.
The word Brahman has to be brought into every adhikaraa. It is always anuvtti;
that is the adhikra. Like pratyayasya: after the aga comes pratyaya para. Pratyaya comes
next to the aga. Pratyaya paraca these two stras (P.S. 3.1.1 and P.S. 3.1.2) - the
anuvtti goes on and on; you have to add the word, otherwise the stra wont make any
sense. This is the problem in Laghu Siddhntakaumud and other works. They bring in
stras from all over and they end up meaning nothing without bringing in the anuvtti.
But this does not mean you should not study these texts. You need to identify the anuvtti.
Here you have to bring in the brahmaabda from athto brahmajijs. There is no
other object jijsyam. Brahmaa lakaa kim? Janmdyasya yata asya jagata janma
sthiti pralaya from what? Yasmt krat? Tad Brahma. The stra should make it obvious
what the corrseponding vkya is here. Strakra has made it obvious; you cannot quote
any other vkya. Yata iti comes after 'jijs' as jijsya Brahma. Understand, these are
all indications. Not simply vicrya Brahma, jijsya Brahma. The word yata must be
there, and the janmdi too should be there in the rutivkya. The vkya should give
brahmaa kraatvam. Both the updna and nimitta lakaas should be there. Both
taastha and svarpa lakaas should be there.
ik< tihR vedaNtvaKydzRnawRm,
! ik< punStedaNtvaKy< yTsU[
e h
e ill]iyi;tm!, &gv
u ER vai[>, v[<
iptrmupsar, AxIih gvae eit #TyupMyah - ytae va #main Utain jayNte , yen jatain jIviNt ,
yTyNTyis<ivziNt tiij}asSv, t+ie t tSy c in[RyvaKym! - AanNdaXyev oiLvmain Utain jayNte,
AanNden jatain jIviNt, AanNd< yNTyis<ivzNtIit, ANyaNyPyevj
< atIykain vaKyain
inTyzubumuSvavsvR}Svpkar[iv;ya{yudahtRVyain .


ki tarhi vedntavkyapradaranrtham | ki punastadvedntavkya yatstreeha

lilakayiitam | 'bhgurvai vrui | varua pitaramupasasra I adhhi bhagavo brahmeti'
ityupatramyha 'yato v imni bhtni jyante | yena jtni jvanti |
yatprayantyabhisavianti tadvijijsasva | tadbrahmeti'(Tait. 3.1)) tasya ca nirayavkyam
'nanddhyeva khalvimni bhtni jyante | nandena jtni jvanti | nanda
prayantyabhisaviantti' (Tait. 3.6)) | anynyapyevajtyakni vkyni
nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhvasarvajasvarpakraaviayyudhartavyni || (2)

What vkya shows you that jagata kraam? What is desired to be given as a
lakaa jijsya Brahma? What is this vedntavkyam?
Bhyakra quotes: Bhgurvai vrui. He cites the vkya along with its beginning.
Bhgu is the son of Varua. He approached his father one day and asked him to teach
what is Brahman. Why is this here? For vivak. It is an interaction of father and son
which implies a sense of truthfulness. Because it is his son, everything will be told
without spin. Varua is a vaidika, and he will not say anything that is not good for his son.
That is the introduction. Then Taittirya says tadvijijsasva | tadbrahmeti.
Varua tells his son to seek that from which all beings have come. Tad vijijsasva
see that. Brahma jijs. Seek that from which jagata janmdi, seek that by which all
live, seek that which means there is no destruction. Nobody can destroy anything. Who
are you to destroy what is all Bhagavn? From nmarpa to nmarpa it all goes back, it is
all withdrawn. This is the taasthalakaam. Yvat lakyaklam anavasthitatve'pi vyvartakam.
This jagat is not going to be there as long as Brahman this jagat will get resolved. This is
not a real svarpa of Brahman. What is the svarpa of Brahman? What completes Varua's
answer to his son?
The same stra determines that for you. nandt hi eva khalvimni bhtni jyante.
nandam is Brahman. Bhgu has understood. This nanda is what you are. This is the
discovery. When Bhgu does not come back it is because he is satisfied; he understands
that he himself is that satisfaction. nanda is Brahman. nanda cannot exist independent
of tm, because 'nanda' means it is you. Sukham means it is you. And I must tell you,
dukham also is only you. Dukha is you and nanda is you. nanda is caitanya,
saccidnandam, limitless. Therefore nandam is saccidnandam alone. tm Brahman
nanda sarvakraam asti therefore sat. And it is nanda therefore cit. nanda cannot be
without being tm. Therefore cit is prpta already. And sat is already prptam as
brahmajagatkraam which is nandasvarpa uddhacaitanyam.
All other vkyas of the same nature, in all the other khs, from all four Vedas,
have to be cited here. These vkyas talk of the sarvaja cause of this entire jagat which is
always enlightened, always pure, always liberated, knowing which one is liberated. How
is one liberated? Because one knows I was always liberated. By dropping your not
knowing Brahma you gain mukti. That is the phalam.
If you understand that anumna cannot be used to establish Brahman, ruti can
make use of anumna to help you understand the updnakraam and the krya are one
and the same. For example the pot and clay. ruti herself says this: yekena mdena


mnmaya vijta syt. If you know one clay then the entire mnmaya md vikra is as
well understood because mnvikra is only nmadheya. There is no real pot; it is pure
nmamtram. The aikyam is pointed out. The sambandha between mt updna and the
ghaakrya is only a sambandha between nmarpa and adhihna. In fact the situation is
satya mithy. A product is not separate from the cause. This is used by the ruti for

pointing out that only one thing being known everything else is as well known. There is
no 'everything else'. By knowing clay, everything made of clay is known.
We are dealing with reality here. Sadeva satyam. That one alone is satyam
brahmajagatkraam. The ruti is quoted and analyzed in the janmdi stra. But anumna is
not a prama to knowledge that Brahman is jagatkraam. Anumna is not analyzed here
independently. Without anumna we can establish updna and nimitta kraam. We see
updna in the mt example. Svapna is the best example through which we understand
updnanimittakraatva brahmaa. From the mt example we understand the kryaghaa
requires an efficient cause, a maker who handles the material. The jagatkrya also requires
a jagat maker and material. ruti talks about both those by only one word yena.
ruti talks about only one cause. When a pot is made you also need a wheel and a
stick and water. It is not just pot and maker. The singular yena makes it very clear. The
two causes are pointed out as Brahman; without the ruti this can never be understood.
The jagat is non-separate from Brahman. Citing an anumna here is not to prove Brahman,
it is only to make you understand what the ruti wants to communicate. What ruti says is
not against any prama.
Janmdi stra is for understanding vkyas: 'satya jnamananta Brahma'
'tasmdv etasmdtmana kassambhtah' 'yato v imni bhtni jyante tadbrahma
tadvijijsasva'. The anumna is used for understanding the straviaya vedntavkya which
has the lakaam of Brahman. k: In the first stra, sdhanacatuayasampatti anantaram iti
nantryrtha for the athaabda was told for the viia adhikr. Having introduced the
brahmavicra for moka, the stra gave the person who is interested in Brahman the second
stra with the lakaa. I follow Ratnaprabh because in most places he is very thorough.
Sometimes I may differ; but that is my privilege.
Bhgu wants to know Brahman. For whatever reason, his father had not yet taught
this. For whatever reasons in his life, Bhgu is ready to ask. He asks his father to teach
him. He asks him to remember all that had been told to him by his teachers. A story is
always meant to convey something. This story has no historical commitment, it has
commitment only to eka Brahman tattvamasi. The brahmajijsu gains this knowedge.
This time, when Bhgu asked, Varua taught. As his father guided him, oscillating from
the seat of contemplation to his father's words, Bhgu understood the ruti. Through the
taasthalakaam he came to the svarpa. Yato v imni is enough. Yena means there is only
one kraam that is Brahman. Therefore you are not separate from Brahman. It is
The stra follows the same method as Taittirya. k is defending Bhyakra by
quoting 'adhhi bhagavo brahmeti'. Bhyakra quotes only the minimum, 'yato v imni


bhtni jyante'. k quotes the introduction to make clear the mode: the setting of a
serious vaidika life of study and learning, the brahmajijs of Bhgu, and the giving of the
lakaa. Bhyakra does not quote everything, he expects you to know. This is the style of
bhya. It is called gmbhryam; you say exactly that much alone. It is precise and

'Yena' means the updna and nimitta kraas are one. You cannot arrive at that
one kraa by anumna. You can infer yat krya tat sakraam. Jagat is a krya because
you can see every day it is happening. The more you understand the jagat the more you
understand the necessity for a creator, an all-knowing, skilled being. Being or beings. Up
to there you can have anumna. ruti alone tells you there is only one there; this is
Brahman. This one is not separate from the inquirer of Brahman because what is there is
only one thing. There is only one Brahman, which is the svarpa of the inquirer. Yena is
not a collective singular. Only one tad Brahma is pointed out. Any sense that there are
many creators, many devats, is a mistake. The jagatkraam is ekam. That one single nondual cause is one Brahman. Yad eka kraa tad Brahma mahvkya. Between kraa
and Brahman there is abheda. There is akhartha. And we can extend that with tattvamasi.
Therefore mahvkyattparya is akhartha bodhakatvam. Only one thing is pointed out.
Brahman has to be brought in; beyond that you cannot go. Once Brahman has come, it is
you. Ekam cannot be other than you.
What is the svarpalakaa? For a medhv, one taasthalakaa will lead to
svarpalakaa. A few steps are needed. You have the vkyas necessary. You get abhinna
nimitta updnatvam. Tad aham asmi you will also get. You have to press the vkya. That is
exactly what Bhgu was told. And Bhgu's response to his father giving the same response
each time points out raddh. Bhgu's raddh is all the way until he discovers the
svarpalakaa. Bhgu's tapas takes him from annam to pra to mana to vijnam to
nandavikra. Then nanda Brahma nanda tm. nanda tm means caitanya nanda tm
sarvakraa satya saccidnandabrahman svarpam. Satya jnamanantam told earlier is
retold through an khyyik, dynamically by a teacher to his son.
Bhyakra says that the other vkyas of this same nature which point out both
svarpa as well as taastha are to be cited here. Vkyas from Muaka and Bhadrayaka
and other Upaniads will become the basis for this stra. It is like a noodle; one you take,
so many come. What do you have now? Adhysa siddhi, adhikra siddhi, pururtha siddhi,
mokasdhana siddhi, vedntavicra siddhi, brahmalakaa siddhi; all established by athto
brahmajijs | janmdyasya yata. All the discussions are locked up there in the stra. The
teachings come down as the sampradya. Other lines of thinking that develop are found in
the k. This is okay as long as it does not transgress the vision, as long as it adds
something. But if it goes against the tradition it is decension not recension. It will not
bless. Blessing alone is sampradya. Then we have another stra.


strayonitvdhikaraa: Third Brahmastra:

zayaeinTvat! II
strayonitvt ||


There are two ways of reading the stra. Anuvtti for the entire stra is Brahman.
Brahman is the bhinnanimittopdnajagatkraa, sarvajam, therefore the cause, yoni, of the
stra. And the stra is the valid means of knowing Brahman.
Prvapaka: Why do you say that stra is included with sarvakraa Brahma?
There is a vedavkya that says that Veda is nitya. The devat virpam is 'nityay vc stuti
kuru'. By the eternal words of the Veda may you do praise. The Veda, then, does not need
to be created. Therefore there are now two eternals satyambrahman and Veda. Is Veda
created by Brahman or is Veda eternal? How can there be brahmaa
One varanam, assertion, is that there is sarvaja brahmaa because he is the
yoni, the source of knowledge, for the stra. This kraatvam is there for Brahman.
Sarvaja brahmaa siddham. When you take words from the next stra to support a
position it is called apakara. Adhyhra is taking words from outside. We did that with
'kartavya' in 'brahmavicra kartavya'. Those brought in words need to be obvious,
suggested by the stra and within the stralakaam itself.
The other varanam is that jagata kraa Brahman is understood only by the
stra. Brahman is not anumna. There is phalasagati with what was said in the last stra.
stra yoniprama yasya brahmaa. Brahmaa shastrayonitvam asti. stram is the
only pramam. The stra wants to accomplish two things, to give both varanas. Now let
us look at the adhikaraa ratnaml.
Adhikaraa ratnaml:
na kart Brahma vedasya ki v kart na kart tat |
virpanityay vcetyeva nityatvakrtant ||
karti nivasitdyukternityatva prvasmyata |
sarvvabhsi vedasya karttvtsarvavidbhavet ||

This is the whole ak. Did Brahma create Veda or not? Who did create it? There
is a vkya that says that the four Vedas came from Paramevara as effortlessly as your
breath rising and falling all day long. There is also the vkya that says that the Veda is
nitya. Therefore there is a doubt and a third varana. To make a determination here is
called mms. According to Prvammsaka, Brahman is not the kart of the Veda. He
says Veda is nitya, as is told in the vkya with 'virpa'. Prvammsaka goes along with
that nityatvam. He says Veda is andi and has no particular kraam. There is also
Manusmti that says that Veda is nitya. Veda is not karttantra puruatantra pramatvt. If
Veda is born out of someone's head it is human anumna. But what is anumnaprpta is
not the prama. Veda is independent prama and nityam only.


The other varanam says Brahma vedasya kart. Brahma is the source of Veda along
with everything else. The four Vedas are from the mahat bhta, Brahman, Paramevara.
From this limitless being, sarvajt alone, all this came. The Veda is not nitya. Like all of
si, it is vyakta from avyakta. There is a certain perennial manifestation; the stra was
manifest to the is as it was before. The Veda is created as it was and enjoys this
perennial nityatvam, pravha nityatvam. Again and again it comes perennially the same
way. The knowledge continues. Nityatvam with this qualified meaning is okay. Veda is
created by Brahman, and therefore brahmasarvaj sarvaakti. Like inhaling, nivsa,
effortlessly the Veda comes. Consider, then, what sarvajm means. Brahman is vedasya
kart therefore sarvajam. The prva adhikaraa viaya and its phala are established here.
This phala is not a product of anumna. There is ekaphalasagati for this and the previous
stra. Brahmaa sarvaj bhavet. This is one way of interpreting strayonitvt.
ASTyNymeytaPySy ik< va vedEkmeyta, "qviTsvStuTva+aNyenaip mIyte.
pilaidraihTyaaSy maNtryaeGyta, t< TvaEpin;deTyadaE aea vedk
E meyta.
astyanyameyatpyasya ki v vedaikameyat |
ghaavatsiddhavastutvdbrahmnyenpi myate ||
rpaligdirhitynnsya mntarayogyat |
ta tvaupaniadetydau prokt vedaikameyat ||

He makes it so tight, because he has to give everything: viaya, doubt, prvapaka

and siddhnta.
Prvapaka: For praktabrahman, is there anya meyatvam, anya prameyatvam? Veda
talks about Brahman, but other pramas should be able to reveal this Brahman. We can
infer about Brahman; the doubt has already been raised in the bhya. This is the Nyyaikas
question. He says there is anumnameyatvam; Brahman is siddhavastu ghaavat. The jagat
krya sakartka ghaavat. He says you have to accept aktimattvam and vettvam for that
kriyvn, jagatkart. We can call him Brahma, the word Veda gives. The jagat is here, that
kart must be here. You can make an anumna says the Nyyaika.
Siddhnta: That which is free of the guas for the senses, which is not a sense
object, which is not all the senses together, which is free of ligas which would afford a
connection between krya and brahmakraam all you can see being prapaca, there
being no vypti to arrive at - is Brahman. There is no pramntara, only Veda. Moreover,
the Upaniad says the purua it reveals is not known through any other means than Veda.
In the second verse of the ratnaml, k includes his salute to the vedavedyam.
Then r Rma introduces himself as sarvaj sarvakraa. He is vedakart, who gives all
means and ends, all pururtha, the cause for all four Vedas. In one verse the k covers
two varanas. And the third one, vedanitya, Veda is not created, is over too effortlessly
Veda comes back. The cause for the Vedas is also the knower of all the Vedas. This is k's
dhynam to his iadeva.


Therefore all three varanas have been covered here: Brahman is the source of
both jagat and stra; stra is the only source for knowledge that is Brahman; the stra is
eternal, not created.
akara bhya:
e svR}< eTyupi]< tdev fyah
Jagatkraatvapradaranena sarvaja brahmetyupakipta tadeva drahayannha -

In the previous stra, Brahman was presented as sarvajm. The brahmaa

jagatkraatvam is artht prptam, skt. For this jagat, by that kraa, sarvaj Brahma,
janmdi takes place. The capacity to manifest the jagat is, artht, a extenuation of
brahmaa sarvajtvam. Now Strakra says that Brahman is the yoni of the stra.
Bhyakra adds that being the yoni for the jagat shows that Brahman is also the cause for
the stra. Being kraa for both, sarvaj Brahma.
Prvapaka asks why, if Brahman is already an existent thing that is yourself, you
require a prama other than those you have. Why spend time looking into Veda for a few
vkyas when Brahman is available looking into yourself. Brahma sarvaj siddham
already jagatkraatvt. The janmdi stra and the Taittirya vkya give only updnakraa.
You can bring in other vkyas, but that still does not prove nimittakraam is one with
updna. 'Yena jtni jvanti ' establishes updna, but nimittakraam is not bdena
prptam. Nimittakraatva brahmaa has to be established.
k says that the first two stras give you the connection, and that connection can
be clearly seen in the sentence that introduces the third stra. Brahma sarvajm was
already presented when stra showed Brahman to be jagatkraam. Jagatkraatvt
sarvajm is artht prptam. This is the ekaviayatvasagati. Only when a thing to be
created is known is that creation possible. Therefore creation is by a cetana being,
someone with a buddhi, someone with prior knowledge. If this is so, Brahma sarvajm.
From being the cause for all, for what is both jtam and ajtam, this Brahman is
sarvajm. A vypti is given: the one who is the maker of a given krya is the one with the
knowledge of the krya, just like a potmaker. Can you extend this to sarvajtvam and
sarvakarttvam? You can if you have a stra like strayonitvt. Then nimittakraam is
established as sarvaj Brahma. After that, we can use whatever available is useful for us,
including yukti. 'Yato v imni' has already been cited. Because Brahma is the kart of the
Veda, brahmaa sarvajatvam arthtaprptam. To confirm that, the Strakra says
Two reasons are given to establish brahmasarvajm. One is, it is the cause of the
entire world. The other is, it is also the cause of the Vedas. Both reasons serve only one
purpose brahmasarvajm. Because Brahman is the source of everything, including the
stra, and because the stra is the only valid means for knowing Brahman, for both
reasons, Brahman is sarvajm.
Prvapaka: Veda is nitya. Brahmaa sarvahetutva nsti. Brahman created a jagat,
but the Veda always is nitya. Veda need not be created by Brahman. Anything created will

suffer from limitations, just as vykaraa suffers from puruabuddhidoa. Any mlapramna
such as pratyaka will suffer from limitations. Anumna is always ripe for distortion and
mistake. You cannot say Veda was created by anybody. Vedakarttvam would depend on
mlapramna, and that means all those problems would be there. Vedakartu sarvajatva
na sdhyati.
Siddhnta: Sdhyati karttvt because vedanityatvam is pravhanityatvam. The
jnam revealed in the Veda is nitya, and it is with vara. This jnam is what is nitya.
And this jnam is what is revealed in every cycle. It comes with vara again and again.
Prvapaka: If you say the Veda is created, authored, it becomes defective.
deficient. It cannot enjoy prmyam. If it is authored by a person, a person who depends
on his prmas, it will reflect those limitations. The subject matter of the Veda - svarga
puya ppa is aprva and cannot be authored. Veda has apaurueyatvam. Because
authorship is not there for Veda, Brahman cannot be sarvajm or the whole thing is a bluff.
That which is not created has nothing to do with sarvajm. Veda is bhya and Brahman
does not contribute to the knowledge and Brahman is not sarvaj.
Siddhnta: strayonitvam is a sdhana for sarvajtvam. Being the sarvajagata
kraa the updna is established. What's more, with strayonitvam you establish
nimittakraa, and Brahma has got to be sarvajm. Bhyakra firmly says strayonitvam
is there. strayonitvam, whether strajnam is from a paperback book or gveddi
grantha, can come only from a cetana. From being the kart of everything, Brahma has
sarvajtvam which includes stra. The strayonitvt stra serves the purpose of
establishing pravha nityatvam and apaurueyatvam for stra, and vedaika prameyat
brahmaa, and nimittakraatvam.
In the tradition they repeat the stra twice. I repeat it four times to cover all the
k arguments also. The arguments may not be necessary but they are all there.
Bhyakra gives only two varanas.
The vedntavkya from Bhadrayaka that is the basis for the third stra asya
mahato bhtasya nivsastam etad yad gveda - is spaabrahmaligavkya. In a sense it
establishes the Brahma as sarvajm. It makes the connections between the stra and the
Veda and between the stras. It connects with the same type of vkyas in the first pda
yato v imni; tma vre rotavya; pariks lokn et cetera. They too are
spaabrahmaligavkyas. Not that spaa is an adjective to Brahman. Spaa is adjective to
liga. These vkyas talk clearly about Brahman and make the ttparya clear. When the

vision is clear we can move on.

mht! \Gvedade> zaSyanekiv*aSwanaepb&i< htSy dIpvTsvaRwaRv*aeitn> svR}kLpSy yaein> kar[<,
Mahat gvedde strasynekavidysthnopabhitasya
pradpavatsarvrthvadyotina sarvajakalpasya yoni kraa Brahma |
Brahma is sarvajm and sarvakraam, strpi hetudvayam.
Abhinnanimittopdnakraa Brahma. This third stra will establish the nimittakraa by
strayonitvam. Keeping in mind all the vkyas, including Taittirya 'sacca


tyaccbhavatsatya cnta ca satyamabhavat', with that Brahma prakta, nimittakraa

Brahma strasya yonitvt. The argument is that if you accept sarvajm and sarvakraam
from the last stra, nimittakraam is already established and Brahman is strayoni. If you
do not accept that, you ask what tells us that something other than Brahman is not
nimittakraa and Brahman is only updnakraam? If nimittakraam is to be established,
all you have to say is 'brahmastrayoni'. Once you say Brahma is strakraam you have
established cetanabrahma, sarvaj Brahma; they are all artht prptam.
In the cited gveddi vkya your attention is drawn to the tm which is taken for
granted. The stra cannot make you do anything. There is no real sanam forcing you to

act. If you do not do these things you are liable to do things that will bring trouble. But
there is no real command or rule. What command can there be for jnam? What stra
directs you toward this meaning? tm vre dratavya.
If you take the six vedgas and add pura mms dharmastra nyya you get
the ten vidysthnas. These secondary disciplines of Manu support the Veda. Phonetics for
accuracy, the know-how of rituals, the meaning derived from verbal roots, the
appreciation of the formality of meter, determining the correct day and time for karma,
atonement, sikrama, dharmdharma, vara's glory, Vednta, raddh and bhakti in the
oral traditions, how to look technically at the stra, how to think logically and negate
what is improper, what is anumna and what is rauta all this goes into understanding
Veda and shows the respect one has for Veda.
Like a great lamp, like the sun, all object are lighted up by that Veda which lights
up pururtha. k says there is total absence of not saying what is good for you. With
great compassion and with no partiality Veda talks, all the way to moka, about what
people are seeking. It lights up everything, both what is hitam and ahitam, puya and ppa
alike. ruti says ynyasmka sucritni | tni tvayopsyni | no itari. The opposite
possibilites for all attainments are all told. As if it were all-knowing it talks. How could it
talk about all these things with authority, how could it engender the respect of the great
minds if it were not the almost omniscient? Veda is Bhagavn, but Bhagavn is everything.
Veda has the akti to light up with words what we know and do not know. Is Veda
acetana as just words? I do not think so; a word is not acetana. By the time you receive a
word, written or spoken, it comes from a cetana. It comes from cetana, it travels as print or
as sound, but everything is cetana only. Coming from cetana and received by cetana, never
is abda acetana. Even if you misunderstand, it is cetana. But what Bhyakra says is good
nhIzSy zaSyGved
R aidl][Sy svR}gu[aiNvtSy svR}adNyt> s<vae=iSt
Nahdasya strasyargveddilakaasya sarvajagunvitasya sarvajdanyata
sambhavo'sti -

The stra including gveda that is endowed with the guas of a sarvaja is not
going to be born from less than an sarvaja. You hear the Veda chanted differently in the
North and in Kerala - do not doubt that it is the same Veda. There are different traditional


forms of the Yajur and Sma Vedas, do not doubt that they are Veda. Therefore nimitta
kraabrahma and sarvajabrahma and sarvaaktibrahma.
Because the Veda has almost complete sarvajatvam, it must come from sarvaja.
There are those such as Pini who approach a level of perfection in their fields, but the
Veda holds the vast wealth of all knowledge effortlessly revealed. This is not a necessary
y*iStraw za< ySmaTpu;ivze;aTs<vit ywa Vyakr[aid pai[Nyade}y
eR k
E dezawRmip s
ttae=Pyixktriv}an #it is< laek,
Yadyadvistarrtha stra yasmtpuruavietsambhavati, yath vykaradi
pinyderjeyaikaderthamapi sa tato'pyadhikataravijna iti prasiddha loke |
Prvammsaka: Veda is sarvaja, why do you want to prove that yoni is sarvaja?
Why the pressure to prove the author of Veda is sarvaja? 'Veda itself is nitya' is enough.
Siddhnta: What has not come out in Veda is also there. All the jagat is not in the
Veda. Veda has only anadhigata, therefore sarvajatva is kalpam. The one who authors a

book unfolding a subject matter knows much more than what he writes. If someone has
authored this Veda he must be sarvaja alone. Bhyakra gives Pini as an example.
Pini must have had knowledge of all the disciplines and all the stra to create a device
such as his meta-language. The capacity he had is astounding. Even so, Pini's
knowledge was even more than what he wrote. An author has more to contribute than
what he has achieved. Sarvakraa Brahma, as author of the stra, is sarvaja
Another general anumna, a general connection, is mentioned here. An author
with a grasp of his subject can expand his topic, one of the Vedic disciplines, with words.
His knowledge will be carried in the new additions. As you expand, there is more and
more clarity. Pini added abdavistra with lasya (P.S. 3.4.77). La is the upadea. La is not
always only an it letter. He gave all ten tenses under la; he expanded his grammar beyond
the krakas. Therefore, an author can share more of his topic and increase the knowledge
of his readers because he always has more knowledge of his subject than is found in his
writing. Another example is given, this time a highly descriptive mahvkyam in contrast
to the vykaraam. Like Pini, no doubt Vlmki knew much more than he said in
Here, what is out and available is Veda. It hardly needs to be said that a work with
the ability to throw light on everything came from a mahbhta, Brahman, who knew
much more than this. This is not an attempt to establish Brahman by anumna, it merely
supports the vkya 'sarvaja sarvaakti Brahma'. The Mkya and Muaka Upaniads
tell of the Brahma. After this we give drtnta; we have to establish brahmasarvajam:
What to say that all of the grammar found in Pini or anywhere comes from Veda.
Vykaraa only talks about the words of the Veda. This is the ekadea, the subject matter.
Veda talks about means and ends, conditions and rules and laws, karma and phala, how to
perform the rituals, the dealings of humans, how to treat animals, deva and rama - what


is not there? As effortlessly as you breathe, vara gave out the gveda itydi and it came
to the inspired is. 'Brahman is sarvajam and sarvaakti' is the conclusion here, but the
argument is not well-founded. The vypti given does not hold well.
ikmu vVymnekzaaediSy devityR'm
nu:yv[aRmaidivaghetae\GR veda*aOySy
E lIlaNyayen pu;in>asv*SmaNmhtae Uta*aen>e s<v> ASy mhtae UtSy
in>istmet*Gved> #Tyaidut>e , tSy mhtae UtSy inritzy< svR}T! v< svRzimv< ceit,
Kimu vaktavyamanekastrbhedabhinnasya
sarvajnkarasyprayatnenaiva llnyyena puruanivsavadyasmnmahato bhtdyone
sambhava, 'asya mahato bhtasya nivasitametadyadgveda' (Brhad. 2.4.10)) itydirute |
tasya mahato bhtasya niratiaya sarvajtva sarvaaktimattva ceti |

'What to talk of' You see, once you have no connection between what you have
said and what you are going to say you drop the vypti like a hot potato. You thought you
could establish Brahman being sarvaja with this inferential postulate, and you find it does
not establish anything. What it does is make your opponents wonder. When the
vyptijnam is inadequate, to extend to full appreciation of the drtnta, you use this
'kimu vaktavyam' nyya. What is there to talk about, that Brahman being sarvaja
sarvaakti the vypti has already been dropped now. Bhyakra drops it because all the
others are waiting there for a mistake. They will jump at the chance to bring up
anumnaprptam for sarvajatva brahmaa. Bhyakra avoids providing the opportunity
for their rote objections.
The Veda which is the source of all categories and all divisions of all the things in
the jagat, which reveals the connections between means and ends, which is the ocean of
all knowledge, which is given the names g Veda et cetera, is given, as Bhadrayaka
says, effortlessly as the breath of that great being. It need not be said that the puruaviea
from which Veda is born, sambhavati, as in the two examples given here, is sarvajatva
An author knows more than he writes is the assumption here. But where words
cannot express your anubhava you go beyond any vypti. In fact all the things in life you
cannot express. Really. The only thing you can express is Brahman. How can you say
what is the difference between the sweetness in one sweet dessert and another? All
important things you cannot express - what is the fragrance of a flower? What is the
difference between the fragrance of a rose and a jasmine? The only one thing you can
communicate is Brahman. Because it is satyam, it is self-evident, it is attribute free.
Tomato-potato, broccoli-brain you speak and the other fellow understands, but all
important things remain locked behind the words. Bhmatikra says this. Bhyakra says
the vypti makes just one point: the author who knows his subject matter knows more
than he says.
Language puts limitations on what words communicate. Regional languages will
differ. You will not know the abdasdhutvam. In Tamil, pramdam means wonderful. In


Sankrit and Telegu it means useless; indifference. Anything you take, even in Veda, has
limitations in meaning and interpretation that come from problems with communication
and regional differences. The original itself is less than the author knows. When you give
up completely trying to say what is there you get 'kimu vaktavyam'. Nevertheless, it
matters a lot who is speaking. If it is Bhagavn speaking you should be ready to make an
effort to understand. When he says 'me matam', he is not saying it is his opinion. From
Ka it means his nicayam, what is very clear to him. When ruti says that the Veda
comes as the simple breathing of the mahat bhta, there is no doa as is found with
human authors and human communication.
You are creating an anumna here: Pini and the others know much more than
what they have produced in their fields. If you extend that to vara by further inference
the Nyyaika will get up. You need to support your conclusion by what is said in the
Muakopaniad stra: itirutyukta sarvajatva drhyam. But by anumna you do not
support and make the stra firm. Anumna is for assimilation, for our own understanding.
Drhyata here is 'making our mind very clear'. Anumna establishes only that there is
more knowledge than what Veda can give us. Veda covers what is anadhigata. The
vedasarvaja is kalpa, and vara, who effortlessly gave this, must have more knowledge.
This stra helps you assimilate varasya sarvajatvam.
All these efforts are not necessary if you can go with saying brahmaa
strayonitvam is meant for establishing the brahmanimittakraa. How do you know
strayonitvam? 'Mahata bhtasya nivstam etad gveda yajurveda' you know from all
the vedasamha. This is the vkya. You establish the nimittakraam and walk into the next
vraka, that Veda is a pramna for which there is no other way of knowing Brahman. Do
not fall into the trap of arguing over sarvaja because Brahman created the jagat.
Veda is not produced if arthajna is all that is accomplished. Arthajna means
going to a guru and gaining arthajnam from different sources and then producing a
book. This arthajnahetutvam is not there for Veda. We know because of 'nivsitam',
effortlessly, aprayatana, like breathing. The teaching at the beginning of the new cycle is
different than teaching geometry. vara, Paramevara, does not have to practice or gather
material or study. His jnam not inhibited by varaa, with the power of creativity,
unavoidably revealing the meaning by words, making it appear in the vessels of the is,
Veda is given. From this yonikraam all this sarvam. What more can be said? That jagata
kraam is niratiaya sarvaja sarvaakti Brahman.
The Skhya takes Brahman to be pradhnam. This is why Bhyakra established
nimittakraa by citing the vkyaea from Taittirya. You have to establish cetana
karttvam. The janmdistra establishes only updna. 'Yasmin pravianti' in Taittirya
prevents us from including nimittakraa. The fallen loaves of bread do not go and take it
out on the baker. We are restricted to updna because kraa pravianti. 'Yato v imni
bhtni jyante' also reveals only updnakraam.
strayonitva brahmaa gives you cetananimittakraam. There is this Taittirya
vkya: so'kmayata bahusy prajyeyeti. Both this and the stra make the final nail in


the coffin of the prvapaka. The abdtmakastram can only come from a puruacetana.
After that you can use all your anumna. strayonitvt nimittakraa Brahma. stra is
the yoni, the kraam, the prama, for Brahman. Brahma is strayoni. Why?
Anadhigatatvt. Brahman is not available to any other means of knowledge. It is not
available to the senses. It is not available to anumna. It is known through Upaniad.
strayonitvt Brahman strea vicryam, with the help of the vedntavkya alone.
Ekaphalasagati. Vedntavkya vicra kartavya. strayonitvt.
Awva ywaem&Gvedaidza< yaein> kar[< ma[mSy [ae ywavTSvpaixgme,
Athava yathoktamgveddistra yoni kraa pramamasya brahmao
yathvatsvarpdhigame |
Brahmastrapramam anindriyatvt anadhigatatvt svargdivat. Our svarga is
different, it is not a heaven, you won't come back. In the other svarga, God is waiting. For
both, anadhigatatva samnam. Therefore you can give examples. The difference is our
svarga is nitya aparokm. Theirs is nitya parokm. That is the bheda. Being unavailable for
any other pramna, Brahman is nitya aparokm. Anadhigatatvt svargavat is the anumna.
strayonitvt is the stra. Therefore for us Brahma is strayoni, kraam, reduced to
strapramam. The stra becomes kraa for your knowledge. Brahmajnakraam is
stra. Kraam does not mean that Brahman is produced by stra.
Athav - Bhyakra gives the second meaning for the third stra. Brahmalakaam
was given in the previous stra. Was the brahmalakaa arrived at by anumna or by stra?
That is the doubt. We say it is by stra, the vkya is aupaniada puruam,
k introduces the second assertion: stra is the only source for knowledge that
is Brahman. Looking at the stra this other way is not optional; it is at least as important
as the first. With the other, once brahmajagatkraam is proved, we can get nimittakraa
and sarvaja with the vkyaea. The vkyas found elsewhere in the four Vedas nando
brahmeti, satya jnamanantam, sarvaja Brahma et cetera - can be taken into account.
Therefore the strayoni stra is not necessary to prove nimittakraam. Brahman was said
to be known as the source of the jagat by the Taittirya vkya 'yato v imni bhtni jyante'.
But what is the pramna for this brahmajijs, for brahmajnam, needs to be proved. The
prvapaka, Nyyaika, is 'anumnam is pramnam'. He says ruti is anuvda, it helps you,
but anumnam is pramnam.

Now you have to forget the first argument. Forget what has been said about
strayonitvam and look at the stra from the previous adhikaraa, as though we are just
now entering into strayonitvt kraam. We are giving a new meaning, and giving new
connections between the stras. Jijsya Brahma, the Brahma we have desired to know,
has been given lakaa by janmdyasya yata. Now we have a desire to know the pramna
for that lakaa. This is the varakntaram, the second discussion.
Bhya: As was said in the gveda and other stra, strayoni kraam for
brahmasvarpa. Otherwise you cannot arrive at that one sarvaja sarvaaktivastu. Nyya


has no access to this viaya. stra is the brahmapramam. Anadhigatatvt is the hetu; this
must be given.
Question: rutyaika vedyatvam cannot be a hetu because the sdhya and the hetu are
one and the same. 'By ruti alone it has to be known because it is known through the ruti
alone' this does not prove strapramna brahmaa. There is no connection. The
mountain has fire because it has got fire this one does not work either, either way.
Bhya: You have to establish the anadhigatatvam and thereby ekabrahma. The
stra says aabdam asparamitydi. Once Brahman is not available for objectification there
is no basis available for any inference arriving at the cause of the world. You see only
kryaliga, the jagat. You can say that kryam must be sakraam. This is why Bhyakra
quietly says 'yathvat svarpdhigame'. Through anumna you cannot arrive at whether
Brahma kraa v some other thing kraa v, or whether there are many kraas.
The sagati between the previous adhikaraa and this adhikaraa is ekaphalatvam
brahmavicrya vedntavkyai. Brahmavicra is vkyamms. rutivkyamms
becomes the result for this stra. It and the previous stra, both lakaam and pramnam,
have only this one phala brahmavicryam. What is the Brahman? For this you look at
stra. You need a means of knowledge to know what is the brahmalakaa. k says that
for niraya that the svarpa of Brahman is jagatkraam and satya jnamanantam, stra
is the pramna. It is only through the stra you get lakaam and pramna by which you
know what is this Brahman. These two stras have this one result. That which is known
by the Upaniad, here Bhadrayaka is cited, is aupaniada Brahma.
Prvapaka: How do we know Veda is the only pramna for Brahman? If Brahman is
siddhavastuviaya it should be available to other means of knowledge. There is no rule that
only Veda should talk about it.
Siddhnta: Siddhatvam need not be pramntaraprptam, in fact, it is also vin
pramna prptam. You need to see that there is one more option svata siddham. Then,
you might ask, if Brahman is siddha, why would you desire to know Brahman? The
adhysasiddhi is important to answer this. Svatasiddhatve'pi jeyatva brahmaah. Through
the rutivkyaprama this Brahman is to be known as it is. In other words, it is not like the
You cannot start a new stra without a doubt being there. Is Brahman known
through stra alone? stravedya brahmaah na v is the viaya. Na iti prvapaka; astti
siddhnta. This is that binary movement. We saw the many arguments in the first varaka.
This is over. Now another binary process answers how we know stra is the only
pramna for Brahman. There is a new varaka.
Prvapaka: This anektmaka jagat establishes, kryatvt, there is a kraam. What
is that kraam? You need this vieajnam. Smnyajnam is there from the anumna.
You bring in some viea also. The prvapaka says you have to establish one or many
kraas if you are going to say sarvajam for that cause. Since you cannot establish that
one kartkam, you cannot say Brahman is sarvaja.


Siddhnta: Prvapaka is giving you the clue to prove the anumna is wrong. You
cannot prove ekakart by anumna. In fact all kraatvam are aneka. There is no ekakraa
at all. You decide to lift your hand and it goes up are you the kraam? Many things had
to happen for that lift. You may decide, but it may not lift. Where is ekakraam? You
cannot prove it; sakartkam alone you can arrive at by anumna. Even that is a problem.
You cannot prove the jagat is a kryam unless you have seen another jagat. But ruti is
there for our use, and it is useful. Vedapramakatvt brahmaah there is no
pramntarvedyatvam. strayonitvt. This is the sagati between the two adhikaraas.
For the prvapaka there is anumnavicryam, not stra - you have to look into
inference alone. He says Vysa would do that. But if Vysa were sitting there he would
say, "I am not doing any vicra," and he would get up and go. Bhyakra has his own
style: vedntn vicryat because Brahman is known only through Vednta;
brahmajnena moka; therefore brahmajijs; mokya brahmajnam; therefore
brahmajna icch ki tad Brahma; janmdyasya yata; straprama. Bhyakra does not
give the balavat mukhya meaning for the stra first. You must know that, for him, what
comes later is more balavat. This is how he covers the many angles of the stra. What
comes first negates in light of the rule that comes later. It is progressive. What he gives
later in his bhya is his vision.
zaadev ma[agtae jNmaidkar[< aixgMyt #Tyiay>,
strdeva pramjjagato janmdikraa brahmdhigamyata ityabhiprya |

Every vkya here has prasannagmbhryam. Bhyakra gives all hetus. Only
through the straprama do you arrive at the kraa for the jagat and all within it. He is
bringing in the previous stra. There is no other prama. He has dismissed anumna as
being without liga. stra alone being the means to know Brahman is siddham. The vkyas
have been given: yato v imni bhtni jyante itydi.
zamudat< pUvRs
U e - ytae va #main Utain jayNte #Tyaid, ikmw thIRd< sU< yavta pUvs
< atIyk< zamudahrta zayaeinTv< [ae dizRtm!, %Cyte - t pUvs
U a]re[ Sp<
zaSyanupadanaNmaid kevlmnumanmupNyStimTyazKyet tamaza< invtRiytuimd< sU< vv&e
zayaeinTvaidit .
stramudhta prvastre 'yato v imni bhtni jyante' (Tait. 3.1) itydi I
kimartha tarhda stra yvat prvastra evaivajtyaka stramudharat
strayonitva brahmao daritam | ucyate - tatra prvastrkarea spaa
strasynupdnjjanmdi kevalamanumnamupanyastamityakyeta tmak
nivartayitumida stra pravavtte, strayonitvditi || (3)

He writes this line to create a prvapaka to present the siddhnta. This is how it
gets expanded. That one understands Brahma from the stra is good enough. But the


question comes up, if the vkya 'yato v imni bhtni jyante ' has been cited and Brahman
has been shown to be the cause why is there another stra?
k says that the previous stra did not make a clear presentation of stra as the
yoni. The 'ucyate' refers to the whole section dealing with the second stra. Only
brahmalakaam was given and the one vkya cited. That vkya could be a restatement of
what is arrived at by anumna. By that, anumna becomes pradhnam and stra secondary.
There can be a doubt because janmdi kraam could be said to have been established in
the previous stra by anumna, liga being there. Our analysis of the Vednta is not
necessary if we can know Brahman through inference. Therefore the third stra was
repeated twice to address both varakas. The dvitya varaka alone is mukhyam. We will
look at the ratnamla for the fourth stra.
Adhikaraa ratnamla:
vednt kartdevdipar brahmapar uta |
anuhnopayogitvtkartrdipratipdak ||
bhinnaprakaralligaakcca brahmabodhak |
sati prayojane'narthahne'nuhnato'tra kim ||
pratipatti vidhitsanti brahmayavasit uta |
stratvtte vidhtro manandeca krtant ||
nkart tantre'sti vidhi stratva sasandapi |
manande purbodhbrahmayavasitstata ||

The third stra establishes that Brahman is known only by the Veda. This is
questioned. We say vednt brahmapar. There is an objection to that conclusion that
Brahman is known only by stra. The vedntavkyas found at the end of each of the four
vedas have brahmai eva ttparya, brahmayavasit. They resolve in Brahman alone. Do
not think the word 'resolve' means dissolve. There is no resolving, nothing happens. I just
use the word in context. What the vedntavkyas have to say is tm is Brahman. This is
avasnaprpta. Having unfolded the Brahman they have finished the job, and your job is
finished too. Jaimini left you work to do, but here your job is over. The job of the
vedntavkyas is to reveal Brahman; your job is to understand Brahman.
Or are these vkyas and Brahman to be made use of? This is the modern Vednta
interpretation. It says this brahmajnam itself will not bless you; brahmajnam is meant
for pratipatti. 'Pratipatti' also means knowledge, but here it means upsanam. 'Vidy' is
used in the same way. This other interpretation says the vkyas give you Brahman as the
locus for meditation. They enjoin meditation. Do that upsana on tmabrahman. How it is
to be meditated upon has to be told. There is a mantra of sixteen syllables called o.
o is also the bowl for keeping the somarasa during the somayga. When we have a
doubt such as 'What does o mean in a particular vkya?', or what shape the ypa used
in the ritual should take, stra should be analyzed to find the appropriate meaning.
Prvapaka: To gather the necessary puya to propel you to brahmaloka you must
do both agnihotra and brahmopsana. The meditation on tm as Brahman will give you the

rocket power needed to propel you. There are a number of contenders here. The
Bhamata, the followers of Bhaa, says you need puya of both karma and upsana,
samucchaya. According to the Mmsakas, a sentence is centered on the verb, and that
action is accomplished by the krakas. The fulcrum, the axis, the soul of the sentence is
action. All of the vedastra is based on action, and vkyas that appear otherwise are
without meaning. Li lo tavya address you, and stra is telling you there is something
hita to be accomplished by you. stra is not bhtavastuviayavkya. Vkyas that talk about
anything that is already existent have to be interpreted in terms of how they can help you
achieve the end. You have to add a few things to vkyas such as 'ayamtm Brahma'. The
tmabrahmdhysopsana is to be done.
What is this Brahman? Satya jnnamananta Brahma. Of course. Rmnuja and
other cryas tell us that this is what brahmajnam is for. For them, brahmavit param
pnoti means Vaikuha prpnoti. Brahmavit is a meditator upon Brahman, not a knower of
Brahman. They add one Sankrit word and twist the whole stra. Jnam becomes
dhynam. Viu nryaa dhyyet. For the Prvamms, the vedntavkyas are not
siddhavastuviayapar, they are sdhyavastuviayapar. They give you the special puya
you require. Brahmajnam is vidhieam. Can you say the tavyapratyaya in 'tm v are
draavya' is not a vidhi? Without knowing what is this Brahman, Brahman cannot be
meditated upon. For this there is ravaam. After that, do manana nididhysana as the
meditation on this Brahman. The vidhi is there.
Siddhnta: tm is already siddha. Vidhi is karttantram; jnam vastutantram,
pramatantram. Brahman is tm. The vkya 'ayamtm Brahma' is there. There is no rule,
no vidhi, there. There is no rule that stra gives you nothing but mandate. And there is no
mandate that people will do it. Does this mean that stra has failed? Do you put the value
of stra on thousands of years of failure? stra only reveals what is good for you and
leaves it for you. stra is not karttantram it is stratantram. It does not stand on your
will. stra gives you jnam, it does not make you do anything. Whatever Ka, it only
gives you jnam. Do not think the entire stra is interested in making you do things. It
gives you means and ends, and finally it tells the one who is ready to listen 'You are
Brahman, what you want to be'. 'tm v are draavya' is not karttantram, it is purely
pramatantram, tm-being-Brahman jnam. It is not a matter of your decision to
become Brahman. Less than being Brahman, your problem is not solved. You cannot
become Brahman; it is not karttantram.
There is no vidhi to be Brahman. A vidhi is useless in this; go ahead and try to see
tm. Try to visualize tm that visualizes everything. You cannot. What are you going to
do? The strattparya and the liga convey only that you are Brahman. There is no logic
in becoming Brahman or in anything else. You ask why manana and nididhysana are there
if you only need ravaa? Because this is all before knowledge. Before knowledge you
can do many things. For clarity, for viparta removal, for saaya nivtti, do those things.
Bodht prk do them. Tasmt brahmai avasit. The vedntabrahmavkyas resolve in
unfolding Brahman being yourself. Tattu samanvayt. That is Strakra's answer.


kw< punR[> zama[kTvmuCyte yavta AaaySy iyawRTvadanwRKymtdwaRnam! #it iyaprTv<

zaSy dizRtm!, Atae vedaNtanamanwRKy< AiyawRTvat!,
Katha punarbrahmaa strapramakatvamucyate, yvat 'mnyasya
kriyrthatvdnarthakyamatadarthnm'(Jai. S. 1.2.1) iti kriyparatva strasya pradaritam
| ato vedntnmnarthakyam, akriyrthatvt |

Here is an objection, from the third stra's second vraka. Bhyakra also picks
up the argument here. Again, it is Bhyakra's last presentation that is final. Consistently
his final presentation is what he thinks is the right thinking. We see this again later, in the
nandamaya dhikaraam. There nandamaya is parambrahma. There is a doubt whether
nandamaya is svarpa or is like all the other mayas, annamaydi, the koas. Bhyakra
begins his presentation, and there a number of stras. He makes a number of arguments
and you think it is all over. It is then that he really starts. He says all these mayas are not
true. He says that nandamaya is like any other maya, mayat vikre. Even if you take
prcurya there is dukhalea. nandamaya is only nandamaya and not para Brahma.
Para Brahma is what is said by the word Brahman. Brahma puccha pratih that is
Brahman. All other mayas are pervaded by this Brahman. This Brahman is nanda tm.
This is the adhihna for everything else. This is the being of everything.
Starting with satya jnamananta Brahma, Bhyakra goes to kdi. Then sa
tm. This brahmtm became pthiv, the oadaya. Annam is brahmtm. No, satya
jnamananta Brahma. Bhyakra goes through all the anyontara tm. At nandamaya
the priyamodapramoda- vikras, that kind of a relative nanda, is pointed out as the maya.
Where that nanda comes from is the Brahman. The one who does not know this Brahman
is as good as non existent. Bhyakra makes his point at the end.
Here, strasya yoni is Brahma; therefore sarvaja brahmana is siddham. That was
the first vraka. Then we had the second vraka; stra yoni prama brahmana.
This stra begs the question 'How do you know stra is the prama?'
Objection: This is the Prvammsaka kepa. He say he does not accept that
vedrtha is the prama for Brahman. If Brahman is siddhavastu then it is not a viaya for
Vednta, it is not vedrtha. Brahma is siddhavastu and has pramntara viayatvam; it cannot
be vedaviaya. Veda is meant for making you do things to accomplish things. The li lo
tavya pratyayas are there. If it is Veda, there is kriy and karma, dharma, and something to
be done. This is what is vedaprama is for. Aprvasdhya is the viaya of the entire Veda.
The meaning of Veda is in karma, and vkyas that do not support action are basically
useless. The Veda does not talk about bhtavastus. If it does, those vkyas have to be
hooked up to some kriy or another. Vedavkyas such as 'Agni cried' and 'Vyu is the
swiftest' are useless until they are interpreted in connection with the karmas. The vkyas
which talk about bhtas have to be taken to the vidhis asking you to do this or that.
mnyasya vedasya kriyparatvt. All sections of the Veda are meant only to make a
qualified person do various karmas.


Further, if Veda says 'tm is Brahman', it is talking about some praise. And there
are other possible interpretations. If it talks about tmabrahma as satya jnamanantam it
means it is upsyam, an object of meditation. The Prvammsaka speaks for all the
cryas in that he gives them the key for how to read the Veda. Prvammsaka is part of
our sampradya and is never directly criticized. The other kois lean on the
Prvammsaka and we confront their conclusions.
k goes over the options. How is it again said that stra has pramakatvam for
Brahman? Are the Vedntas committed to unfolding an already existent Brahman? If
Brahman is siddha, there is no sdhya and no result. And if Brahman is siddham it must be
available for other means of knowledge. Moreover, if Vednta is Veda it must talk about
some kind of kriy? Because of these doubts, Brahman does not deserve to be the subject
matter of vednta.
This identification of the two doubts continues the binary process of the
Brahmastras. The first koi was 'brahmasarvaja v na'. The second was 'brahmastrayoni
or not'. To avoid confusion, only two points of view are taken and discussed. If there is a
third or more vrakas, you take and discuss them separately. The next stra is connected
to strayonitvt stra by the second vraka, taken up here. The connection is made by
the Prvammsaka objection. Viaya saaya prvapaka siddhanta sagati these are the
The k will address the whole subject matter. He gives rutisagati, the vkyas
which clearly point out Brahma sarvtmatva. Sad eva saumya idam agra st ekam eva
advitya Brahma; tattvamasi vetaketo; yena vijnena sarva vijta bhavati. There are
similar vkyas in every Upaniad, and they provide subject matter for the whole chapter
here. The rutisagati is here for the adhikaraa. Pdasagati is the spaaligavkyni:
tattvamasi; ayam atma Brahma; prajna Brahma; satya jnamananta Brahma. There is
adhyayasagati, pdasagati, and here, between the previous adhikaraa and this one,
ksepasagati. ruti and vedntamms have sagati in Brahman.
Prvapaka: The pursuit of Vednta on the part of a mumuku is useless. I make
this objection because strapramnakatva brahmaa nsti. Brahma is a siddhavastu
according to you. All the Vedas deal only with kriy, therefore seeing any part of Veda as
having any other meaning is niphala. Arthavattvam for any vedavkya is only by
connecting it to vidhi.
Adhyayana kraa bhvan. Adhyayana is the sdhana. By study of the Veda you get
the vedavkyas that direct you to actions. By the meanings of the verbs, kriypadas, in
those vkyas, bhvan is created. The meaning is bhvan; the object of that meaning is
what is desired, bhvy. This is the object that is phalavat. Dharma is bhvy, puya. So, by
the prama you get bhvan. Prama is the stracodan and what you get out of it is
bhvan, and the viaya of this bhvan is bhvy. The phala is, finally, the bhvy, puya.
mnyasya phalavat arthabodhakatvam. Whatever is within the Veda has kryaparatvam.
mnyasya kriyparatvt.


The prvapaka says the vkyas in the Veda talking about bhtas are basically
meaningless because no sdhya is there. They are not valid, they have no prama, there is
nothing to be accomplished. But that disrupts the vypti that wherever there is vedavkya
there should be kriyparatvam. You cannot say half the Veda is prama and the other half
of the vkyas are useless. Half the egg cannot be for hatching and the other half for
cooking. We cannot just remove or ignore what seem like useless vkyas. The Veda must
be taken as it is. The Prvammsaka can find and quote vkyas that say the consensus of
Veda is maintained by the vidhivkyas. With the help of the vidhivkya, any arthavdavkya
can be read as sharing his one topic. Devat stuti, kriy stuti, phala stuti stuti does not
mean praise alone some stuti is there. Stuti means there is a way to find the meaning.
Every vkya has something to convey. The Prvammsaka says you look for the vidhi
and vedn pramyam asti.
R evtaidkaznawRTven va iyaivixze;Tv< %pasnaidiyaNtrivxanawRTv< va,
Kartdevatdiprakanrthatvena v kriyvidhieatvam,
upsandikriyntaravidhnrthatva v |

The prvapaka continues. By promoting in a person raddh for the devat, or by

inspiring him to do karma because the phala will be there, the seemingly unrelated
vedavkyas have meaning. This is also true for vedntavkyas which talk about
bhtavastuviayas. Even though they talk about tmabrahma et cetera, the vedntavkyas are
meant for the kart. If they talk directly about Brahman they are for upsana. We cannot
question what the stra says, and there is no part that can be left out. Always there is the
promise of completion through kriy. ruti is the pramam for the actions and the deities
required, and what is said is what is to be done. The kart has to think about himself as
parambrahma and then perform the karmaviea. By connecting the kriy with the vidhi
there is ekavkyat prpta.
Second prvapaka: This second prvapaka brings up another of the three types of
karma. He talks of kyika karma which deals with all the rituals. Vcika karma
vedaparyaa stuti, smagaa et cetera - also is part of kriy. Vaidika pratith is nothing
but mantra. In some gama temples where it is tantrapratih, such as some iva temples
in Tamil Nadu and temples in Kerala, they use nothing but sign language for the mantras,
you will not hear anything. But do not take it lightly; the tantra is as efficacious as any
other pj. The kart must have bhvan; Bhagavn knows what is going on. Thirdly you
have mnasa karma. That too is karma; it is karttantram. There is dhyta and dhynam
and dhyeya, the altar of meditation. This is called upsana, part of mnasa karma.
There are two schools of thought in the Prvamms. Prabhkara founded one
school. Kumrila Bhaa is the source of the other, Bhamatam. Bhyakra knew both of
them. He engaged Mandaramira from the Prbhmatam in a discussion, and afterwards
this fellow became akara's disciple we know as Surevara. Surevara was Bhadranyaka
varttikakra. We use his work on Naikarmyasiddhi and Taittirya Upaniad as well. The


Prvammsakas are two: Gurumata and Bhamata. Gurumata is Prbhkramata.

akara also engaged Kumrila Bhaa, a great champion of vaidika dharma.
Kumrila Bhaa found that bauddhadharma was sweeping through all the rjs and

everything was changing. To find out more about what was happening he joined a
Bauddha monastery and became a bhiku. Then he came out and condemned the whole
Bauddha movement. Therefore he had a guilt that he had cheated the Bauddhas. To atone
for his ppa he wanted to die in a fire. akara asked to talk to him in Ki. As Bhaa was
going around the fire before entering, he told akara to go and talk to Mandaramira.
That was how Mandaramira came to know. That is the story.
The Bhamata is pratipatti vidit santi vednt. He says the Vedntas enjoin
meditation. Satya jnamanantam should be taken as anantakalyna guasampanna
Brahman Brahman with all these limitless qualities like jagatkraam. Just meditate on
'tm as Brahman with these guas'. He says Vednta talks about upsana vidhi alone. He
says innocent people say that by meditation you gain knowledge of tm. But, really
speaking, meditation is karttantram. Whereas jnam is pramatantram, vastutantram.
That simple difference is not known. Proper understanding of bdajnam, that it is for
mnaskriy, is the way to self-realization. He says the whole Vednta is for the purpose of
enjoining you to meditate upon Brahman. The result is moka, brahmaloka prptam.
Jnam is nothing but dhynam. By karma and jna together you produce the aprva result.
Whatever you get there is moka.
The k says the vidhi that everyone should study one's Veda means that
pramatvam is there for Veda. The Bha argument here is that Brahma being siddha, there
is niphalatvam for vkyas that talk about bhtaviayas. Brahman is available for other
pramas anyway. What use is there for a Brahman that is everything? What can you do
with that? If siddhavastu can be used for achieving some aprva it is okay, but which
karma can you use Brahman?
The Bhas say that what looks like a useless vkya still has meaning as praise.
Every vkya implies a kart and karma and viaya and devats and means and phala, all of
which can be meaningful in terms of praise. This is true even in the mahvkya.
Tatpadavcya vkyas are all devatparavkyas unto whom you offer is told there in each
mantra. Tvampadavkyas are kartpraas in that the kart has to think of himself as
nityauddho'ham et cetera. Doing this, the kart becomes eligible for performing karma.
Doing the karmas gives the brahmalokaprptiphalam.
Question. Look at the sthna. We have already gone through the fire of karma and
come to this Vednta. How is the vedntavkyaviaya going to be connected to the karmas?
To which karma will it get connected?
Nyyaika will say the whole Veda is sup, prathamnt. He has all his categories
dravya gua samavya sayoga. Bha will stay with the tiartha. For him the whole Veda
is ti, kriy, dhtvartha, bhvan. He says the prakti only qualifies ti, the action. This is
all that is there. Mnasa karma viditsanti ved. He says the Vedas point out the upsanas.


nih pirinitvStuitpadn< s<vit Ty]aidiv;yTvaTpirinitvStun>, tTitpadne c heyaepdeyrihte

Nahi parinihitavastupratipdana sambhavati
pratyakdiviayatvtparinihitavastuna | tatpratipdane ca heyopadeyarahite
pururthbhvt |
Siddhavastu bhtavastu parinihitavastu are three paryyas, synonyms, for an

existent object.
Bha: Sentences in the Veda which talk about an accomplished fact or something
that happened in the past are siddhavastuviayavkyas. Both vidhi and niedhavkyas are
also siddhavastuviayavkyas. They enjoin or caution you to gain or avoid something that
is already there. All these vkyas must subserve the main vkyas. As the first prvapak
said, the kriyeatvam of the vedntavkyas means they too are vidhivkyas. Aha
brahmsmi is upsita for the one who desires moka. So, just as with a stone lagrma and
Lord Viu, the meditator superimposes Brahman on what is not Brahman. It is done
carefully; there is no question of taking it lightly. tm is not Brahman, but the ropa is
done. All the vkyas, even brahmalakaa, give you only upsyaviea. This kind of sampat
upsana is itself karmavidhi. The kriyparatvam for Veda stays. This is what the Bha says.
Siddhnta: I say that it is already very clear that this ruta Brahma is ayam tm.
This ttparya is rutam, and it is not casually said somewhere. You know you can find
some advaita in almost every book. It is there in Shakespearian plays. Every poet has
some kind of a sense of advaita. Rumi, Wordsworths, Shelley, Keats everywhere there
is experience of advaita. But not, you say, in stra? You agree with what the prvapaka is
saying? Any sensitive person will have the experience of advaita, because it is a fact. Our
advaita is 'What anybody experiences any time is Brahman.' It is pure cognition. When
you say 'sarva khalvida Brahma', there is no question of there being provisions or
conditions. Eclipsing Brahman is impossible. There is no rhu for Brahman. It is pure
cognition, nothing but jnam.
Brahman is not anything that people talk about, but what they talk about does have
content. A man who has a profound spiritual experience knows it goes away. It has to go
away, otherwise you cannot live in the world. Oh, the harmony the roti on your plate
and you are one and the same. So you can't eat because you are roti. The spiritual
experience is mostly a problem. The advaita is not an occasional statement in the Upaniad.
There is upakrama and upasahra and a methodical unfoldment of what is. ruta
Brahma cannot be given up. Nowhere is it said that Brahma is something to be done. Veda
makes known what is not otherwise known. Ajtasya jpaka vedasya. The unknown is
the subject matter of the Veda; it is not going to talk about ghaa and paa. Veda talks about
unknown means like putrakmei for known ends like the birth of a son, known means
like charity for unknown ends like svarga, and about unknown means like jyotioma for
unknown ends like svarga. You yourself say the subject matter of the Veda is anadhigata.
The Veda does not reveal an existent vastu. Veda is only going to talk about the


anadhigataviaya. Veda will not reveal what other means of knowledge can. Veda is
prama because it does not talk about what others know. If, when you teach, you stay

within this, and do so for clarity, not safety, no one can break through this.
k says that a Veda sentence that talks about a viaya that is there and that does
not contradict other pramas is called anuvda. If Veda says that you should sit by the fire
when it is cold, it is restatement and not the subject matter of the Veda. When Veda says
ditya, the sun, is a pole, ypa, it contradicts our prama and must be seen as a
figurative expression. The pole shines like the sun is the correct interpretation. If Veda
says something that is against our prama you will dismiss it if you have no raddh. If
you have raddh you will look into it again and come up with the right meaning.
A whole life is gain of sukha and avoidance of dukha. Updeya is that which is
acceptable and desireable, pravtti viaya. Heya is that which is to be avoided, nivtti
viaya. Veda talks about ada by which I can gain something or avoid something. Veda
has that same commitment to dealing with the desirable and the undesirable that you do;
it has not only anadhigatabodhakatvam but phalavatarthabodhakatvam.
Phalavatarthabodhakatvam implies either heya nivtti or updeya pravtti. Without this there
is no pururtha and no puyam. Without this there is no subject matter for the Veda. Veda
gives you the jnam with which you can direct efforts at pravtti and nivtti. What result
could there be for existent jnam with regard to vedaviaya?
At @v sae=raedIt! #TyevmadInamanwRKy< maUidit ivixna TvekvKyTvaTStuTywen
R ivxIna< Syu> #it
Ata eva 'so'rodt' ityevamdnmnarthakya mbhditi 'vidhin
tvekavakyatvtstutyarthena vidhn syu' (Jai. S. 1.2.7) iti stvakatvenrthavattvamuktam |
Prvapaka: The whole Veda has kriyvidhnam, it enjoins karma. It is kriypara. It
asks you either to do or not to do. 'To do' and 'not to do' are both vidhi. By knowledge of a
siddhavastuviaya, a fact like agni rodt, what do you get out of it? There is no prama. It
does not ask you to do or not to do. It is some kind of arthavda and has no use of itself.
k: But apramyam is unacceptable. To make the Veda a valid means of
knowledge you must accommodate vedavkyas like this which talk about siddhavastuviaya.
When agni cries his teardrops are silver. That is the story. And silver is something that
should not be offered in the ritual because symbolically you would be shedding tears.
Then, it is said, within one year you will have even more reason to shed tears. Do not
offer rajatam.
Prvapaka: Correct. Jaimini writes a stra that says that all the arthavdas should
be prmyam. They should be seen as praising one thing or the other. Or they should
point out something relevant like here, rajata na deyam where the stutyartha,
meaningfulness, connects to the ekadea in the vidhivkya. This is called pda ekavkyatvam.
A direct connection of the arthavda to the ritual is ekavkyat.
When one cuts darbha grass he chants the mantra 'ie tv'. He should know the
meaning of the chant when he cuts, and then he uses the grass for the yaja. The darbha is


a part of the ritual and is ekavkyat in a different way than 'rajata na deyam' is. It has the
weight of incurring ppa. The cutter asks for pardon for doing this, and then he cuts the
grass. It is mantra ekavky. Both forms of ekavkyat are connected to vidhi - praising or
revealing or telling something that is connected to a vidhivkya. When you invoke Vyu in
a ritual and you praise him as swiftest of the devats, the connection is made to the Vedic
ritual by your speedy receipt of the phalam for which you invoke the god. Jaimini has told
ma[a< c #;e Tva #TyadIna< iyatTsaxnaixaiyTven kmRsmvaiyTvmum!,
Mantr ca 'ie tv' itydn kriytatsdhanbhidhyitvena
karmasamavyitvamuktam |
Prvapaka goes on. The upayukta mantras chanted without smaraam, without
their meanings being known, are not what produce the corresponding result. Chanting
itself, such as when you are learning a chant, will give phalam, but chanting with the
meaning held is a different result. At least the priest should know the meaning. All
mantras and the Vednta are connected to vidhi. Their meanings should be known when
they are chanted if they are to give the promised results. Remembering the meaning,
sdhanasmaraam, gives them kriy agatvam. At the time of chanting, the artha, the object,
is to be remembered by the mantra. You should be focused on the artha. For pda
ekavkyat the artha is what is important and the mantra is upayukta, helpful the pda
ekavkyat has ada for its goal. For mantra ekavkyat, such as ie tv, where you want
daphala, the mantra should specifically recall the artha. Either way mantra or
arthavda karmgatvam is there in all of them, and they are to be connected to vidhis to
become meaningful.
Siddhnta: What are you going to do with ayam tm Brahma? What is the phalam
for this? Which vidhi does it connect to? If mantras are capable of revealing facts about
kriy or sdhana, what about ayam tm? The vedntavkyas are entirely different than the
Karmaka where the vkyas are all connected. Where jnam is involved there is no such
connection. Why should we not accept that there can be prmyam in a siddhavastuviaya?
n Kvicdip vedvaKyana< ivixs<SpzRmNtre[awRva aeppa,
Na kvacidapi vedavkyn vidhisasparamantarerthavatt dopapann |

It is important to add ata here. It has been omitted by the scribe.

Prvapaka: Any vedntavkya you see will have no meaning unless it is connected
to vidhi. Neither would it be tenable because it would have no phala, no pururtha. It
would not indicate anything to either go for or to avoid. That the vedntavkyas have a
bhinna context has not been established. I say Veda includes Vednta. Any book includes
the index and the table of contents. Can you imagine Pini Atdhyy without Gaapha
and Dhtupha in addition to stra? Those include upadea and applicable rules. They are
all one book, one scheme, one teaching. Similarly, Veda is one book. If at all Vednta is
going to be meaningful, it must be connected to vidhi. Otherwise vedntavkyas are


without phala. The whole Veda is either vidhivkya or vidhieavkya. Let this be seen in the
Vednta too.
For the prvapaka, being without heya updeya is uselessness. For us, it is our
blessing. It means nityatvam, tma nitya, brahmaa nityatvam, tmasvarpatvam.
Brahmaa tmasvarpatvam is because there is no heya no updeya. It is hetu for us. If
Brahman is to be achieved by a gain in some way, it is not the svarpa of tm. If it is
achieved by avoiding something it is not the svarpa of tm.
Prvapaka: The first part of the Veda is not different from the Vednta. The
context is the same. Here is how. Vednta is connected to another type of vidhi svrthe,
in itself there is a vidhi. This is upsanavidhi, Bhamata. Of itself, Brahman is talked about
for achieving moka. This is the vidhi. Brahma is the object of meditation for the gain of
ada, not the gain of Brahman. Therefore the phala is aprva, the final combination of
upsana and karma which makes the jva achieve brahmaloka. The vkyas about Brahman
only point out the object of his meditation. Brahmavit, Brahma upsak, Brahman eva
bhavati. The promised ada result will take him to brahmaloka.
n c pirinite vStuSvpe ivix> s<vit iyaiv;yTvaixe>,
tSmaTkmaRpie ]tkt&SR vpdevtaidkaznen iyaivixze;Tv< vedaNtanam!,
Na ca parinihite vastusvarpe vidhi sambhavati, kriyviayatvdvidhe |
tasmtkarmpekitakartsvarpadevatdiprakanena kriyvidhieatva vedntnm |

The prvapaka continues. We do not need Veda to tell us what yogurt is. Yogurt
is siddhaviaya. But that this yogurt is to be offered in a particular ritual is information that
is unknown, and Veda alone is the prama. Similarly, ayam tm Brahma is not the
prama - it is upsita and that is the prama. Ayam tm Brahma means what? If tm
already is Brahman it is no prama. If tm is not Brahman then it cannot be prama.
Therefore, to be a prama, tm should be meditated upon as Brahman. Kriyeatvam,
then, is what is going on. Either brahmadevat is being revealed, or some kind of
kartviea is revealed. For Vednta, there is only this kriyvieatvam, vidhieatvam.
In the ritual, the milk is kriysdhana. It is one of the smagr , the ingredients
connected to the kriy and the vidhi. How is your nikriya Brahman going to be
connected to any kriy? But lets us assume that there is bhinnaprakaraa for Vednta.
Aw kr[aNtryaEtd_yupgMyte twaip SvvaKygtaepasnaidkmRprTvm!, tSma [>
zayaeinTvimit ae %Cyte Atha prakarantarabhaynnaitadabhyupagamyate tathpi
svavkyagatopsandikarmaparatvam | tasmnna brahmaa strayonitvamiti prpte ucyate -

It is true that nowhere in the Karmaka is moka mentioned as phalam. That could
mean it is bhinnaprakaraa. Perhaps there is a different subject matter. But still, even if
one subject matter cannot be accepted, within the brahmaprakaraa all those brahmavkyas


indicate brahmtmani tmabrahmeti upsita. That upsana is mnasa karma. Kriyparatvam

is still there for the Veda. Brahmaa strayonitva nsti. There is no strayonitvam.
The previous kepa was sarvaja Brahma jagatkraa strayonitvt. Then you
said Brahman is both updna and nimittakraa strakraatvt. Then you said that the
yato v imnyadi vkya was given for that, and the vkyaea is nanda Brahma et cetera.
Then you said that pra Brahma is jnena moka. But none of this is valid because
Brahman is not a prama, it is an object of meditation. Brahman cannot be said to be the
source of the stra.
The answer to this is given in the next stra:
Samanvaydhikaraa: Fourth Brahmastra: tu smNvyat! .
tattu samanvayt || (4)
akara bhya:
tuzBd> pUvRp]Vyav&ywR>, t+ svR}< svRzi jgTpiiSWtlykar[< vedaNtzaadevavgMyte,
kwm! smNvyat!,
Tuabda prvapakavyvttyartha | tadbrahma sarvaja sarvaakti
jagadutpattisthtilayakraa vedntastrdevvagamyate | katham, samanvayt |

What is the meaning of tuabda in Strakras answer to the kepa? In English tu

would mean 'whereas'. But in sasktam you have to tell what is the whereas. The tuabda
stands there to negate the prvapaka. Tu - What you say, prvapaka, is one thing, the
truth is entirely different. What is the basis for our argument? Tat samanvayt.
Siddhnta: Tat is tadbrahma, sarvakraam, sarvajam, sarvaakti, all-knowing cause
of the entire jagat, cause of creation and sustenance and resolution, cause of that which is
born here, of that which is known through stra: all this is to be brought in from the first
three stras. Since the phala is the same for all the stras kepa sagati there is samyak
anvaya for the vedntastra. The entire bhya to come is to establish the samanvaya. The
entire adhyya and the entire brahmastrammsstra is only to prove there is tasmin
brahmai eva sarve vedntn samyag anvaya. That anvaya? tad Brahma tvam asi.
R u ih vedaNte;u vaKyain taTpye[
R t
E SyawRSy itpadkTven smnugtain, sdev saeMyedm AasIt!,
@kmevaitIym! AaTma va #dmek @va AasIt! tdet+apUvm
R nprmnNtrmbam! AymaTma svRn
u U
e mm&t< purStat! #TyadIin,
Sarveu hi vednteu vkyni ttparyeaitasyrthasya pratipdakatvena samanugatni |
'sadeva somyedamagra st | ekamevdvityam' (Chnd. 6.2.1)) 'tm v idameka evgra st'
'tadetadbrahmprvamanaparamanantaramabhyam' 'ayamtm Brahma sarvanubh' (Bhad.
2.5.19) 'brahmaivedamamta purastt' (Mua. 2.2.11) itydni |
Vedntavkyas are cited here. Vednta here is Upaniad. In all the vkyas of the
Upaniads found in all the Vedas, and that includes the vsya Upaniad in the sahit


portion of the ukla Yajur Veda, there is a commitment to one ttparya. That the jva, the
pthagtm, the one who experiences everything, is indeed this Brahman is the ttparya.
Brahman and tm are one and the same. This is the vision unfolded by all the
vedntavkyas. With commitment they all unfold this vision alone.
In the Smaveda, Chndogya talks of that one sat vastu whose name is om.
Ekamevdvityam. The Sikhs too have this 'ek om kar sat nam' in a stra-like mantra. The
whole explanation is the stra in the Guru Granth Sahib.That which is indicated by the
omkra, both okra vcya and lakya, is that sadvastu. Chndogya Upaniad says that, before
coming into being, the jagat was sat alone, non-separate from sat. After manifestation, too,
it was not separate from sat. Otherwise, if it had become separated, by knowing one thing
you could not know everything. This is the mahpratij. Tattvamasi vetaketu. The sadeva
satyam was also told. There is nothing other than that satkraavastu that is ekam advityam.
This one kraam alone, tat satya sa tm. Tattvamasi vetaketu. This is tm, therefore
you are Brahman.
In the g Veda, Aitareya Upaniad says 'tm v idameka evgra st'. The same thing
the jagat yoni Brahma. tm is sat. 'Tadetadbrahmprvamanaparamanantaramabhyam'
and 'ayam tm Brahma sarvanubh' are in Bhadranyaka Upaniad, ukla Yajur Veda.
Praktam aparoka Brahma is aprvam; it is not krya and it does not have a cause. Only a
Bhaspati asks what is the cause of Brahman. In Theni the Dakimrti temple faces
Bhaspati temple. Think of that, Dakimrti teaching Bhaspati. Brahma is anaparam, not
a krya. Brahma is anantaram, neither outside nor within the range of an individual's
thinking. It is not outside in some heaven. It is sarvnubh, the svarpa of the pramt,
the content of the experiencer. Ka Yajur Veda is already quoted with 'yato v imni'.
Atharva Veda, Muakopaniad, says 'brahmaivedamamta purastt'. Whatever is there,
purastt, whatever is experienced by you is indeed Brahma.
k says Brahma has Vednta as its prama. The meaning of strayoni is
vedntapramakam. Both vedntapramakam and strayoni are bahuvrhi samsa. One
explains the other. strayonitvam has already been presented. Where? By all the
lakaavkyas attending, anvitni, Brahman. Anvaya means ttparyaviayatvam, the object
of commitment. When you say something, your intention has an object. Vaktum icch is
there as viaya. Ttparya viayatvam is anvaya. This is the hetu. This is anvaya.
What is samanvaya? In stra you cannot just add 'sam' whenever you want. Sam
has meaning. Once you say 'sarvaja Brahma, nimittakraa Brahma, kryam is mithy'
all the vkyas will very easily bring in mithytvam of the jagat. Therefore tm becomes
Brahman, satya jnamananta Brahma. All the vkyas bring nanda Brahma which is
tmabrahma. This means tm is the satyam of my jnasvarpa. This nanda is limitless.
Therefore akhartha bodhakatvam is there for the samyakpada. Samyaktvam akhartha
viayakatvam. This Brahma is indeed tm. The akharthakatvam is there in the stra as
samyaktvam. The 'sam' is added to indicate samyak anvayt. It is included in the pratij
and connects with satya jnamananta sarvakraa sarvajam.


Akhaa Brahma, limitless Brahman, means brahmtm. What is born of Vednta?

Pram, jnam. Akhaa Brahma is the object of that jnam. Brahmtm is the vedntaja
pramviaya. That limitess Brahman does not exclude you. This is the vypti: akhaa
Brahma vedntapramviaya. This is the vedntattparyaviaya jeya Brahma not dheya
Brahma. It is ttparya because samyak anvayt, akhaa Brahma anvayt. The vkyas
resolve into akhaa Brahman. Unfolding akhaa Brahma they disappear. Having
fulfilled the job they disappear, like any other word. When you say ghaa or paa the

object stays as an object of your preception. Here, in your head, the words disappear
because Brahman is tmasvarpatvt, ahamasmti. Ajna disappears.
There is a vivak involved in every sentence. When a teacher tells his parents,
"Your boy is a real lion," what is the vivak? The boy has no mane, only two legs, does
not live in the jungle, does not eat raw goat. You cannot take the sentence literally. The
meaning has to be arrived at. Where dharma is involved it is the same. Here, with
akhaa Brahma it is the same. Every sentence has its own subject matter and vivak
must be found.
strayonitvam is there for Brahman because samanvayt. This Brahma is not
karmaea. It is to be known through the stra. Jeya Brahma. Others say Brahman has
dheyatvam. They say Brahman is upsyam, meant for meditation, not just to be known.
Known means vastu, tm must be Brahman, and these others cannot accept that.
Prvapaka cannot accept what Vednta accepts. He has to prove that tm is not Brahman.
He says that since the stra does talk about Brahman being tm, he will make the
connection between tm and Brahman. He says you must superimpose Brahman on tm,
dhyayet. You meditate on tm to be Brahman even though it is not Brahman. It is a
process of invocation. You see the pressure the prvapaka is under. The Mmsstra is
based on this. Every adhikaraa has prvapaka and siddhnta. tm is Brahman and moka
is the phalam: this is the whole stra.
The stra wants to unfold Brahman. This is its commitment, not a passing
reference. There is abhysa for Brahman. There would not be abhysa for anything that is
to be meditated upon. Anything that you are told to do does not include abhysa. You do
not need repeated instructions for an action. There is abhysa for Brahman. Abhysa is a
ttparyaliga for Brahman. We will look at those six ligas. Brahman is not kryaparam, not
karmaea. Neither is it pratipattividhi, meditation vidhi, upsya. These are the two
Akhaa Brahma lakyate vedntavkyai. The k explains himself by going over
akhaatvam. What is this akhaa Brahma? In terms of the brahmavkyas, akhaatvam is
aspatvam. A sasarga vkya is one in which the words are syntactically connected with
the appropriate krakas. To get a unitive sense of what the meaning of a sentence is you
must have this sasarga. A typical vkya would be daena gm naya Take a stick and
bring the cow. There is an implied subject, an object, and a means all in their proper
forms. They are mutually connected. But in a sentence which is akhartha, where there
is no clear artha, there is no such sasarga. In akharthavkya all the words resolve in


one object like so'ya devadatta. There is only one person there. All the words, having
helped you recognize the person, disappear. In the akhartha the words reveal one
object alone padn smndhikarayam. The vibhakti of the words will be the same,
but each word will have its own meaning which it is to convey. A given padrtha is
conveyed by a given word. Adhikaraa here means object. Bhinnapravtti nimittakraa
padnnm ekasmin vastuni, samna adhikarae, ttparyam. That is smndhikarayam. This
is akhartha.
In 'tattvamasi', tvam has bhinnapravtti. How can 'that' be you? The same vibhakti is
there, but where is the same adhikaraa? This is mahvkya. How can vara and jva be
one and the same? The mahvkya reveals it to you. This is the akhartha bodhakatvam.
When there is an obvious difference in an equation, you need to apply lakaa. This is the
only way it will work. The ttparya is there waiting for you. The akharthabodhakatvam
is there for the vkyas. Most sentences bring knowledge because of the krakasasarga.
They are connected to the kriypada to give the unity that brings meaning. But there can
be akharthabodhakatvam for vkyas without sasarga? With however many words there
may be, as long as they all have samna adhikaraa, they can bring knowledge. There are
many bright object in the night sky, but that shining one, the most bright and big in the
night is the moon. All the words are there, but there is only one object. It is the same here
with mahvkya. That which reveals the oneness with however many words is
akharthabodhakavkya. It has pram hetutvam by lakaa. It can give rise to jnam.
The words in the akharthabodhakavkya have lakaa. They do the job and go
away, but they leave something behind. Jnam is bhvasdhana. The dhtvrtha points out
what is to be known, what exists. Here, for the words satya jnamanantam, each one
retains its dhtu meaning and all other things that we know about the word are given up.
Satyam means exisiting in time. That 'in time' is an addition you do not need. 'That which
exists' is enough. Bhvasdhana it reveals existence. Jnam, from its dhtvrtha, means
knowing, pure knowledge, knowledge as such. Jnam means consciousness with or
without an object in awareness. Jnam means neither knower or known or a particular
cognition but the dhtvrtha meaning as consciousness which is present in all of them.
Ananta is very clear that which does not have a limitation. Each of the three words has
its lakya in Brahman, one Brahman. It is mahvkya. The three words satya jnam
anantam can go away leaving behind the lakya. There the moon was to be recognized.
Here that lakya is self-evident and to be recognized. Akhaa Brahma lakyate
vedntavkyai. This is how Brahman is to be understood through the vedntavkyrtha.
Brahma is vedntavedyam.
Upakramopasahrau abhyso'prvatphalam |
arthavdopapatti ca liga ttparye niraye ||
Brahma is the paka. Hetu is tasmin eva samanvayt. To gain ttparya nicayrtha of
the stra we have six ligas. One liga is aprvatam, anadhigatam Brahman is not
available for any other prama. There should be upakrama, a good beginning such as in
the vkya 'brahmavit param apnoti'. There is upasahra, an end or conclusion, in 'yato vco


nivartante aprpya manas saha'. There is beginning and end, and everything in between is
Brahman. What is never thought of is thought of as well; anything that is not known is
known as well. Did you ask for that knowedge? This is another beginning. Sad eva saumya
idam agra sd ekam advitya Brahma. This is another beginning. In that Brahman alone is
everything, knowing which everything is known. You see the upakrama and
Abhysa is repetition. Nine times the mahvkya was repeated for vetaketu. This is
phalam. Here moka is the result, final result. Arthavda and praas and upapatti are
reasoning. All of these ligas are found used in all the Upaniads. You may get all of them
in one chapter, as in Chndogya chapter six. You may have to search through many

Bhyakra quoted vkyas from different rutis. He covered all four Vedas. They
convey the meaning of samanvaya. Taking a cue from this, the k establishes ttparya.
That is done by following certain methods the aligas. Those are the factors that are
necessary to arrive at what exactly is the subject matter of the prakaraa. The beginning

and end should be the same. They determine the subject matter, and there should be no
interruption that would throw it off track. Abhysa is inevitable because the subject matter
is to be understood, and that is how we learn. Aprvat and phalam, something to be
gained by the jva who reads it, will be there. Arthavda are statements meant to highlight
a point. They can be outside the scope of the teaching but still be a part of the teaching in
the sense that they highlight. We will look at them. Upapatti is reasoning.
The k takes the sixth chapter of Chndogya Upaniad to show the ligas.
Upakrama is sad eva saumya idam agra sd ekam advitya Brahma. The evakra is for
emphasis. The advityatvam is that for which there is no comparison, this kind of
advityam. Sajtya vijtya svagatabheda rahitya is advitya. The three types of bheda are
negated in Brahman. Other than Brahman is not there vijti; another Brahman is not there
sajti negated; of itself there are no parts svagatabheda. k makes use of the three
words because ekam is in the original. None of the three is there, therefore ekam. But I
think 'advayam' is enough. Advitya can itself negate comparison. It is only in the
sampradya that the three words are tied to advitya. The word itself does not say that. And
the 'ekam' is there to do the job. But it is not a mistake for the k to use the padatraya.
Aitad tmyam ida sarvam. All that is here has its being in this tm alone. This is
why the Upaniad says 'knowing which everything is known', which is the real upakrama.
That aitad tmyam ida sarvam is possible only when there is one sadvastu. Aitad tmyam
ida sarvam is the upasahra, at the end of the chapter. That takes care of one liga.
What is a liga? These orange clothes one wears are a liga for a sannys. A
kamaalu is a liga. You cannot wear a Raymond suit and carry kamaalu even though
it would be very interesting. It would be inappropriate. It doesn't go well, though anyone
might carry a kamaalu. Ttparya niraye upakramopasahrau ligam. The beginning and
end determine the ttparya. The other ligas will also be there.


In Chndogya chapter six, having introduced the entire jagat as one sadvastu that is
one advitya Brahma, the Upaniad says that Brahma aikata and sarvam asjata. Then three
elements agni pa pthiv are talked about as becoming the entire jagat. That is the
abhinnanimittopdnakraam. Now this Brahman has as though become this entire jagat,
just as the clay becomes the pot without becoming anything. The clay continues to be
clay. At the same time, there is si. Pot is clay, but the si is there; it is all in between.
That advitya kraa sadvastu alone is satyam. The nmarpas are vikra,
vcrambhaa nmadheyam, nmamtram. The nmarpas are non-separate from the
sadvastu. Therefore sadkhyavastu Brahman is satyam. The jagat does not depend upon
Brahman like a father-in-law, there are not two things it is like pot and clay. The
sadvastu is satyam, sa tm. tm means you. Tat satya sa tm; tattvamasi vetaketo. Tat
prakta sat. This ekaivdvityam, this ida sarvam, this jagatkraam, tat Brahman tvam asi.
This is the vkya that was told by Uddlaka to his son vetaketu. The boy asked to
be taught again. Again and again he is upadia. Nine times he is told. Between each
telling of the mahvkya the father decides where there can be vagueness in learning this.
With an appreciation of his son's capacity and from a number of different standpoints
Uddlaka comes up with a variety methods for teaching parambrahma. The mahvkya is
not a stray statement. You have heard the stray statement 'The kingdom of heaven is
within you.' If it is true, why do we have all the theology teachings different from what
we are teaching? You learn God is in heaven, but that kingdom is within your powers.
You have to believe, get baptized, change your name, wait for death, and get buried
officially; then you will turn up there. This is the interpretation of this stray statement.
Chndogya abhysa makes the mahvkya pakka. The boy makes the connection, solves the
equation. Abhysa is another liga.
The pramas that you have, such as pratyaka, are not going to be able to grasp
that which is the cause of the entire jagat and which is tm. stra alone can give this.
That which is without form, which cannot be objectified by any of the senses, which
cannot be inferred because there is no data to provide a basis, is advitya aprvata
There can be a question why I do not see Brahman. Uddlaka has his son bring a
vessel of water. He has the boy put salt into the water and to leave it for some time. At
the end of the day Uddlaka asks if the boy sees the salt in the water. The boy says no.
The boy tasted the water and knew that the salt was there. The boy did not need to see the
salt to know it was there. The salt was everywhere in the water. This example is, of
course, based on an experience. But the idea is every experience is Brahman. The whole
water is salty. The salt is all-pervasive. Similarly, all that is here is Brahman. Brahman is
sitting in your own heart as tm. You do not see it but it is present, starting with your
own body-mind-sense complex. Brahman is all pervasive like the salt; the whole thing is
Brahman. This goes along with 'pramntara'. You need another means of knowledge.
For the salt it was taste. Similarly, pramntaravedyatvam is there brahmaa.
This physical body is called videhamukti, jvanmukti, both. It is limited and
subject to all kinds of problems. You could say it is a suffering mukta. Then the body


dies. There is no more coming back. That 'not coming back' tells you the phalam all the
way. The jvanmukti is only for the one who knows. The videhamukti also means there is
no coming back. Praphalam is pointed out. For the vidvn, the viduah, for the one who
knows the upadea, for the one who knows ayam tm Brahma, the meaning of the
mahvkya, for him or her is this phalam. He is vara and there is no return.
As long as this body has not been dropped, the viduah is jvanmukta and some
suffering can be there. Hunger and thirst and the rest this is jvanmukta. After death,
the viduah is Brahman. Do not confuse this with going to Kaivalya or any other experiece.
He becomes Brahman any verb you use you are going to need upacra. The kkra
says anubhavati, which is not a very appropriate word. It may be Sanskrit but it is the
wrong word. You see, the person is Brahman and he has come to know that. You cannot
say he has become or experienced anything more than he would have anyway. You might
say that he had the status of one who enjoyed Kaivalya while alive and continued to after
death. That is somewhere between playing with words and 'the kingdom of heaven'. The
knower of Brahman is even now Brahman, and after the body is gone he is Brahman. What
experience is there? There is only vara.
Arthavda liga. This sadkhya Brahman in the form of tm enters into all this
created jagat. 'Entered into the created jagat' means experienced in the mind - into the
heart, into the buddhi, into pthagtm. This is purely arthavda because all-pervasive
Brahman, non-dual Brahman, cannot enter anywhere. Can space enter into a pot? In the
anupravea ruti is arthavda. Entering is not possible. If what is not possible is told, it is
arthavda. Why it is told is to make you understand that this which is said to have entered
has not undergone any change. It is still available in the buddhi as pthagtm, to be
recognized. This is what is said here in arthavda form. It is all upacra for understanding.
It is pointing out the upalabdhisthnam where Brahman is to be recognized as such.
Advitya jnrtha arthavda iti.
When vetaketu was asked if he had asked for this knowledge by which
everything is known he said he did not know there was such knowledge. He said he did
not think his original teacher knew there was such knowledge. To explain, Uddlaka gave
the mt example. From mt this entire mnmaya jagat is created, The various mt vikras
like pot and lamp are created, but all of them are mt alone. Therefore mttiketyeva satyam.
If clay, one lump of clay, is understood properly, you understand as well that anything
made of clay is clay. There is this one knowing which everything is known. This kind of
knowledge is here. The example is given; upapatti is here. Kraa ananyatva kryasya.
Prakti atirekea vikra nsti iti upapatti. By the mddi dntas there is upapatti to make
vetaketu understand that kryajnam is kraajnam. Therefore the sweeping statement
'brahmajnam is sarvajam'. From the mahpratij, a second upakrama, the real upakrama,
vetaketu asked for that knowledge.
These were the six ligas as presented in Chndogya chapter six. They are all seen
in every Vednta. Vednta is a positional word; it does not mean the final knowledge or
ultimate wisdom. In every Upaniad, at the end of each Veda and elsewhere, the ligas are


found. Having seen Smaveda, let us look at Aitareya Upaniad in g Veda. Only the
upakrama is pointed out. The Aitareya vkya is just as the Chndogya vkya. Sad eva idam
agra st. Sat is tm. A second thing was not there. The tm is Brahman. The Yajur Veda
Bhadranyaka Madhuka says the sat tm is free from attributes. Even kraatvam, the
status of being cause, is only incidental. Brahman with my alone gains bahurpa. With
the three guas Brahman has become many. The bahubhavanam is pointed out. Then
nirvieatvam, vivarta updnam. Therefore Brahman did not become many; Brahman
remains the same and appears to have become many. Becoming many is mithy, and
satyam continues to be satyam. That satya Brahman is aparoktm, aprvam,
kraarahitam. Kraatvam is mithy. Therefore there are many Vedntas, but the subject
matter is one and the same. Vedntattparya Brahman, and that Brahman you are.
The next vkya is also Bhadranyaka : ayamtm Brahma sarvanubh. The
nirvieam advitya Brahma is aparoktm. This 'sarvanubh' is another problem. Sarvam
anubhavati iti sarvanubh. Cinmtra ityartha. It is anubhti svarpa; it is experience. It is
always experienced. There is no way of experiencing anything without experiencing tm.
Anubhti is cinmtram. Consciousness is anubhti. This is what it is. Do not go off with it
being something separately experienced which implies a kart who undergoes an
objectifiable experience. Do not put any division there. Cinmtra ityartha.
The k explains how each of the examples connects to one or the other Veda.
Bhyakra just assumes the reader knows the connection. The k explains the
sampradya. Any explanation is called k; there is no rule that it has to be in Sanskrit.
And sometimes you need a k for a k; there can be k mistakes to explain.
Atharvaveda Muakopaniad says brahmaivedamamta purastt. For the avidvn, for the
one who does not know, only objects are there. You do not see any Brahman. Purastt is
that which is right in front of you. Everything is Brahman if you know. All these things
you see are amta Brahma for the vidua. Bhyakra cites these vkyas and includes all
other Upaniad with 'di'; then he cites satya jnamananta Brahma. The aligas are
there in every Upaniad. Thereby the subject matter is already ascertained. The subject
matter is ayamtm Brahma.
n c ttana< pdana< Svpiv;ye inite smNvye=vgMymane=waRNtrkLpna yua
Na ca tadgatn padn brahmasvarpaviaye nicite
samanvaye'vagamyamne'rthntarakalpan yukt, rutahnyarutakalpanprasagt |
Prvapaka: All right, let's say we accept that the vedntattparyaviaya is Brahman.
Even then, the Brahma which is vedntapramaprpta can be a karmga. You need not be
allergic to karma. Why should it not be construed that Brahman is meant for some
kryaea? The kart does some reflection on himself as Brahman and then does the karma.
The kart should be connected to some Brahman knowledge that he can relate to himself


or to some devatviea given as Brahman. You have to find out how Brahman can be
useful, but kryaparatvam should be accepted.
Siddhnta: That is not possible, sir. When all the vedntavkyas have a commitment
to convey the tm being Brahman, when the aligas are there that indicate that ttparya,
the words in those vkyas have samanvaya and talk in one voice of the
brahmasvarpaviaya alone. When that is understood, it is not proper to imagine some
other artha. Brahman does not have any viea even though kraatve sati brahmaa.
Nirvieatvam is there at the same time jagatkraatvam is there. This is what Vednta talks
about. These vkyas are not kryaea. The kart does not have to think Brahman, he is
Brahman. Ayam tm sarvntara sk cet kevalo nirguaca. This is sarvanubh. You
cannot take all these brahmasvarpa words to mean they have any other subject matter.
You cannot destroy what has been said, and what is not said you cannot imagine and
impose. Kryaparatvam is not yuktam.
The meaning of a word is in the ttparya of the object referred to by the word.
You cannot attach your own meaning to a known word. It is true of sentences too. The
abdattparya is to be found out. Yat para abda sa eva abdrtha. The meaning of the
word ttparyam is tat parasya bhvam; this is what yat para. It is the basis of
Prvapaka; Why don't we say the vedntavkyas are arthavda and are connected
to vidhivkyas as praise and a way to invigorate the kart and make the phala fruitful?
nc te;a< kt&SR vpitpadnprtavsIyte tTken k< pZyet! #Tyaid iyakark)linrakr[ut>e ,
Naca te kartsvarpapratipdanaparatvasyate' tatkena ka payet' (Bhad. 2.4.14)
itydi kriykrakaphalanirkaraarute |
Siddhnta: The ruti herself has negated such possibilities. The vedntavkyas,
which have ttparya in revealing brahmasvarpa being akhaa tm, are not about the kart
and his special qualities. When all the kartrdi krakas in Brahman are negated by ruti,
where is the question of karteatvam for Brahman? You cannot establish any of the
vedntavkyas as arthavda, as praise of kart or karaa or karma or any other kraka. The
vakyas unfold nirviea ayamtm Brahma in order to point out this Brahman is free from
karttva karmatva karaatvam. This negates all the other krakas: all the other krakas
are negated. Either way they are gone, like your roti, active or passive. Whether Brahma is
known or not, who is the kart? Brahma is not kart. Jnam makes it go.
Bhyakra cites a ruti: tatkena ka payet. What should one see and by what? The
kraka niedha takes place in Brahman. Not only niedha, it is na. Where is the kart in
Brahman? Brahman is not any kraka, how can it be karmaea? Nirkaraaruti completely
dismisses kriy and kraka. Yes, phalam is another kraka. But this is not my phalam; there
is no mine in Brahman. Mine is only sasra mines. Bhadranyaka has so many rutis like

this. There is another argument.

Prvapaka: Why not connect the vedntavkyas to kriy?


Siddhnta: Vednta has its own arthavda which is meant only to reveal the
advayavastu. It is bhinnaprakaraa arthavda connected to the main vkya that reveals, not
connected to vidhi. There is only the one ttparya in the Vednta. There is no way to make
a connection to kriy.
Prvapaka: Siddhaviaya is pramntaravedya ghaavat. Brahman is siddha

already. Therefore it is already known and cannot be the object of a desire to know. The
knowledge that Brahman gives is theory and should be made use of. Brahman is to be
known not by abda but by pratyakdi.
n c pirinitvStuSvpTve=ip Ty]aidiv;yTv< [> tvmis #it aTmavSy
Na ca parinihitavastusvarpatve'pi pratyakdiviayatva brahmaa 'tattvamasi'
(Chnd. 6.8.7) iti brahmtmabhvasya stramantarenavagamyamnatvt |
Siddhnta: Brahman is siddhavastu. Even so, it does not have pratyakdi vedyatvam.
'Vastu' does not have to mean object. With vastu you avoid getting trapped by the word
object. Vastuta it is a reality, but it can mean anything. Use vastu. This is all logic here.
Brahman has no indriyagocaratvam. It is not the object of the senses or of any inference,
liga abhvt. For inference you require some kind of gathered sense data. Does that mean
Brahman is nya? No. Brahman is tm. Zero cannot say 'I am'. Not only that, 'zero is' is a
conclusion. Whereas 'is' is sat. This is Brahman. Being unavailable for other pramas,
Brahman has vedntavedyatvam. You say that is a belief. But I say it is a prama that talks
not about a paroka but about you. When you say 'I am', this 'I am' is Brahman. Where is

the belief in that?

You say it is not a prama. You say that it is a belief. All right, let it be a belief
for the time being. The proof is when you use it as a prama. Until you operate the
vedntaprama it is a belief. Once you have used the abda as a prama you can decide.
Let it prove itself. Brahman is not an object of knowledge by pratyakdi. That does not
mean parinihitavastu Brahman does not exist. Brahman tattvamasi. We are not talking
about pthagtm, rather brahmtmabhvasya. Brahmtmabhva is a cognitive appreciation,
an understanding, of I being Brahman jagatkraam. This is the equation to be understood.
Tattvamasi iti vkyajanya brahmtmabhvasya. Or we can say, brahmtmabhvasya stram
antarea. Within what stram? Tattvamasi. Without that there is no other way of knowing.
Therefore strayonitva brahmaa.
The problem was in your conclusion about a siddhavastu being an object of
pratyakdi. Brahman is a siddhavastu, but it is not an object for those pramas. Ghaavat
does not cover the range of siddhavastutvam. It is a question of updhi. Your dnta has
sdhyatvam and pratyakdi pramaviayatvam. Dnte sdhyavypakatve'pi pake sdhana
avypakatvam. Siddha Brahma is paka. Pratyakdiviayatvam is not there for Brahman.
You cannot make a vypti. Even though Brahman is siddhavastu it has sdhyatvam because


it has jeyatvam, therefore vedntavedyatvam. Therefore to know the self - Who am I? what should you do? Gurum eva abhigacchet and look into vedntastram.
The 'Who am I' people are serious but very innocent. Sincerity should keep the
mind open and viveka should continue. It does not stop when you come up to the 'Who am
I?' question. They have a funny feeling that they are reaching somewhere. A little bit of
Vednta is there in that, even though they do not know. They ask Who am I?, but they
also say tm is pra. They have this much Vednta, and it keeps them going thinking
they must be pra. When you inquire aham aham, the first one goes away and another
one comes which is pra. They talk about it like that, and there is some understanding.
There is a little Vednta. Why settle for a little?
yu heyaepadeyrihtTvapdezanwRKyimit nE; dae;> heyaepadeyzUNyaTmtavgmadev
e ha[aTpu;aRwiR se>
Yattu heyopdeyarahitatvdupadenarthakyamiti, naia doa,
heyopdeyanyabrahmtmatvagamdeva sarvakleaprahtpurrthasiddhe Prvapaka: An object of the Veda should be either pravtti yogya or nivtti yogya.
There should be something you either do or refrain from doing. Dharma and adharma,
puyappa, are vedrtha because they deal with what is to be pursued or avoided. You say
that Brahman is the svarpa of tm and has no heya or updeya. If this Brahman is you, you
cannot go for it or stay away from it. That means Brahman cannot be the subject matter of
the Veda siddhatvt.
To make the prvapak realize his mistake as to what is the ttparya of the Veda
there is a rather tenuous argument here. If you say siddhabrahma cannot be vedrtha
because there is no pursuit or avoidance involved I say sdhya is not vedrtha. Cooking is
the example given. And if you say that even though dharma, puyappa, all karma is
sdhya, it is vedrtha pratyakdi aviayatvt, I will say even though it is siddha, Brahma is
vedrtha pratyakdi avedyatvt.
Swamiji: Brahma aabdam asparam arpam arasam agandham and Brahma
jagatkraam. This jagatkraatvam is not nirta because you cannot arrive at Brahma
being the jagatkraam by anumna. Therefore ruti eva araam. Therefore brahmaa
pramntara avedyatvam asti. Brahma svaya nikalam and svaya jagatkraa because it is
not available for the senses and because it is tm. Being the tmasvarpa it has jeyatvam.
But it is not pramtviaya. How did you miss it? That is the question I should ask.
Somehow you missed it, and that is called avidy. It is not a matter for blame because you
did not do anything to have avidy. It is the original problem.
Siddhnta: You argue that, Brahman being the tm, you cannot go after or get
away from Brahman and therefore it is useless for the Veda to even teach about Brahman.
But I say that it is because Brahman is heyopadeya free that that teaching is useful. Indeed
that is its great blessing because only then is it nityaphala. There is no escape from the
heya and upadeya game. You may avoid one heya, but how can you avoid all the other


things? yumn bhava Brahma heya upadeya nyam. And this Brahman is the svarpa of
myself. By this knowledge, and without needing anything else, moka. By this knowledge
sarvaklea ttparya, all afflictions, are all gone - because avidygranthi is gone. Sacitdi
and punarjanma and kartbhokttvdi are not here or there. All kleas which constitute
sasra are destroyed. This parambrahma apnoti is pururthasiddhi. Moka, the
paramapururtha, is accomplished by sarvaklea na. What about nanda?
nanda brahmao vidvn. Ananta Brahma is nanda Brahma. Niratiaya nanda
is only for the rotriya. But he is defined by a negation; he is akmahata. He is the one who
is unafflicted by kma et cetera. Pururtha security, nanda, freedom from karma and
janma all accomplished.
Wherever Upaniad gives upsana, that can be done, but that does not mean the
whole Vednta is upsanaparam. 'Upsita' will be there to indicate upsana. Where upsana
is the correct reading of the Upaniad, do not try to read Vednta there.
devtaiditpadnSy tu SvvaKygtaepasnawRTve=ip n kiiraex>,
devatdipratipdanasya tu svavkyagatopsanrthatve'pi na kacidvirodha |

In Taittirya there is 'mano brahmeti' sampad upsana, and phalam is given too. In
terms of upsana, Brahman means vara. For meditation, on a lesser object, nika, one
with its own limitations, you superimpose something big, utka. In an ahagraha upsana
where you say 'This devat aham asmti', the ahakra is made to subserve the upsya devat.
We don't disagree that such upsanas are there. We have no problem with the ttparya of
such vkyas. By the same token, we do not try to find Vednta in the Karmaka. Where
upsana is indicated we point it out. We accept what is there; this is called pramabuddhi,
raddh. Wherever there is devatdi viaya and the upsanrtham asti we have no virodha.
Vedntavijnam has phalpek just as karmayoga has dharmpek for a mumuku. Upsana
is necessary. It is also called bhakti. You can certainly support this kind of approach in the
vkyas. It is just a matter of finding which vkya is talking about what.
Meditation has phalam, the instructions include that. But do not take brahmajnam
to be kriyea, useful for mental activity, useful for meditation upon tm being Brahma.
stra gives you a certain jnam, but it is not vkyaea, not connected to the vidhi asking
you to do Brahma meditation. Whatever knowledge one has of Brahman, meditation can
be done. If you have understood the wrong guas you will not understand anything
anyway. Meditation while one is still learning of Brahman can only clarify or confuse
what knowledge one already has.
ntu twa [ %pasnaivixze;Tv< s<vit @kTve heyaepadeyzUNytya
R pe>,
Natu tath brahmaa upsanvidhieatva sambhavati, ekatve heyopdeyanyatay
kriykrakdidvaitavijnopamardopapatte |


Sarve vedntnm upsanaparatvam is not possible. Still, we have no opposition

to the upsanas. Where there are devatdi viea in the vkyas there is connection to
upsanaparatvam. Whereas the vkyas that have ttparya in revealing what is Brahman,
what is tm, do not lend themselves to upsanaparatvam. When it is clearly known there
is oneness, ekatve, no separation between tm and Brahman that is non-dual satya
jnamanantam, there is, for Brahman, none of the heya and updeya you pointed out.
When 'sarva khalvidam', 'this is all the krakas', 'ekam advityam', 'this is free of dvaita',
'free from subject-object bheda',' limitless', are understood, there is, for Brahman, none of
the heya and updeya you pointed out. Updhividhieatva brahmaa nsti.
Mnasa karma implies kraka. For meditation you must retain the kart after
brahmajnam. I am the doer, and I do mental activity. The kart does upsana on a
Brahman that he knows eliminates all sense of kart, eliminates all the krakas. What kind
of understanding is this? You wanted to know Brahman in order to do meditation. In the
process what happened? What was considered the upsanavidhiea Brahma is this
knowing which the upsaka himself is gone. All bheda is gone. Upsana is possible when
there is dvaitajnam, and it is done for phalam. All the krakajnam must be there; the
krakas must all be true for the upsaka. But brahmajnam means dvaitam is not true. For
the one who knows, dvaitajnam becomes bdha, sublated, ayatrthajnam. The
upsanaphala is negated as well. That knower says pro'ham. Where is upsana if
pro'ham is true? Bhyakra actually patiently makes upsanaparatvam silly.
There is no phala for upsana; every phala is within the pra alone. The basis for
the upsana is kraadvaitajnam, upsyopsakadvaitajnam. What is the kraa? Adhikr
anena sdhanena ida phalaprpyate. These are all the required krakas. When the oneness
of knowledge takes place these krakas are destroyed. Upsya and upsaka are negated.
Brahmajnam cannot be a ea connected to upsanajnam.
Prvapaka: At the time of reading or hearing of the oneness of Brahman and tm
the dvaitajnam goes away. It also goes away when you are sleeping and when you have
a moment of happiness or nirguam meditation. The absence of the krakadvaita is there
for that time. What then? Even though one has the knowledge, there is old saskrabala
from one's dvaitajnam and one comes back. What you have to do, when you come back
from ekatvavijnam because of the saskrabala, is go back to vidhnam and again do
upsana. At that point it is not karmavidhnam it is nididhysanavidhnam. This is the
brahmajngam. This is the vidhieatvam.
nekTviv}anenaeNmiwtSy itiv}anSy pun> s<vit=iSt, yenaepasnaivixze;Tv< [> itp*et,
Nahyekatvavijnenonmathitasya dvativijnasya puna sambhavati'sti |
yenopsanvidhieatva brahmaa pratipadyeta |

The nakra is most often at the start of the vkya; do not forget to take it to the
verb at the end here nsti.
Siddhnta: When the dvaitajna is destroyed in the wake of jnam of oneness,
there is no coming back, no sambhava. It cannot come back because dvaitajnam is


ajnam. Ayatrthajnam cannot come back. I saw the snake, I turned on my flashlight

and saw it was a rope, I went away, I came back and again saw the same snake no way.
Only if it is a new snake. There, dvaitajnam is possible because the pramt continues.
When you are the pramt anything is possible. Here, brahmajnam; the pramt himself
is gone and cannot come back; where is the possibility of committing the mistake?
What do you do if it comes back and there is again a question of vidhnam? Vicra.
There is no vidhnam. Meditation is not what gave brahmajnam in the first place. If you
do vicra where do you end up? Brahmajnam eva. With more enthusiasm and better
equipped you reapply the appropriate means of knowledge that yield brahmajnam. It is
not that the dvaitajnam has bala or drhyam, it is the brahmajnam that needs to be
dha. It is not possible for brahmajnam to be a ea to upsanajnam. Dvaitajnam is
to be seen as not true, as a false conclusion. When you have certain projections, when
you feel certain things are true, you imagine they have some strength. It is only a lack of
proper inquiry. When you see through them clearly you see they have no strength. They
are bdhita. A false conclusion is not the cause for a vidhi. Updhividhieatva brahmaa
y*PyNy vedvaKyana< ivixs<SpzRmNtre[ ma[Tv< n < twaPyaTmiv}anSy )lpyRNtTva
ti;ySy zaSy ama{y< zKy< TyaOyatu,
Yadyapyanyatra vedavkyn vidhisasparamantarea pramatva na da,
tathpytmavijnasya phalaparyantatvnna tadviayasya strasya prmya akya
pratykhytum |

Even though vedavkyas are not seen anywhere else to be valid unless they are
connected to karmavidhi, tmavijnam is its own phalam. When the vedntavkya 'satya
jnamanantam' is understood for the knowledge it has to give, the pursuit of the pramna
comes to an end. In the wake of the knowledge of the stra the phala is gained then itself.
You cannot negate the validity of the stra that has viaya in tmavijna, which is part of
the Veda itself, whose gain is the gain of moka.
Prvapaka: Veda is kriypara, it asks you to do or not to do. It is committed to
make you do things or avoid things. Wherever there is Veda there is dharma, and every
vkya is connected to vidhi. Jaimini wrote a stra to say that even a vkya such as 'agni
arodt' has prama either directly or indirectly in terms of vidhi. Unless there is prama
for every vedavkya the Veda becomes meaningless. This does not change even if I accept
that stra is the prama with reference to Brahman. The vkya becomes a vkyaea and is
connected to vidhi.
Siddhnta: Even though every vedavkya in the karmaka is connected to vidhi,
connected to either what is to be done or what is not to be done, we are talking about
Vednta. If it were not a separate prakaraa, why would it be called Vednta? Even
vsya Upaniad in the sahit portion is bhinnaprakaraa. In a section of the Veda where
there is vidhi, the connections between karmas are to be made. The prakaraa there is
different than for vedntavkyas. tmavijnam is complete only with the phala 'sarvaklea


nivtti'. In the process of gaining this jnam, the validity of the stra whose subject
matter is brahmtm and whose phala is sarvaklea nivtti is clear. Vednta has the status
of being a prama to brahmtm. You cannot reject or negate this. There is no
kriyparatvam here. There is no vidhi.
The k says that what is correct in terms of arthavda and siddhavastu and
karmaea et cetera in the Karmaka does not apply to the vedntavkyas. Vedasya
kriyparatvam is not a vypti. Neither can the prvapaka say that it is true loke. It is not
true that no sentence has life without a verb. The kk in a sentence is not based on the
verb yielding the krakas. Not only is Veda not all kriypara, all communication is not
based on kriy. In fact, communication is based on ti, on all the verbal suffixes. The
krakas ask what is the meaning of the verb. It is not true that doing is the only thing that

makes you happy.

Brahma is a bhtavastu revealed by the stra, and there is no action required to
yield a related phala after this knowledge. Just ask your parents when they wonder about
what you are studying here. You tell them it is self-knowledge. They begin to question
themselves and doubt their own omissions and commissions. They wonder where they
went wrong. They wonder what you can get out of knowing Brahman. Obviously,
brahmajnam is not meant for kriy.
Prvapaka: You can say that where there is smoke there is fire. There is a logical
vypti based on the the examples you have from your experience. But if you say where
there is fire there must be smoke, be careful not to pick up a hot iron. We say yatra yatra
kriyrthatva tatra tatra prmyam; yatra yatra akriyrthatva tatra tatra na prmyam.
Wherever vedavkya is not clearly meant for kriyrtha, such as the vkya 'so'rodt', there is
no svata prmyam. The vkya has to join vidhi to have value. 'So'rodt' becomes a ea to
a karmavidhi, but of itself has no prmyam akriyrthatvt. The vkya 'so'rodt' has no
phalavat arthabodhakatvam; in order to become meaningful it has to connect itself to
vidhivkya. Now, in the Vednta there is no sdhya. You say that tmabrahma is already an
existent fact. That means svrthe there is no prmyam for the vedntavkyas
akriyrthatvt. You yourself are saying this for the siddhavastu. Therefore to become
prmyam the vedntavkya should become vidhiea to become useful. Otherwise it has
no result. Niphalatve sati aprmyam.
Siddhnta: Ayamtm Brahma is siddhaviaya. Even so, it has phalavattvam in
sarvaklea hni. Therefore there is no aprmyam for the vedntavkyas. We see in the
Karmaka that the arthavdavkyas such as 'so'rodt' have no meaning unless they are
connected with a vkya enjoining you to do karma. But the vedntavkyas do have phalam.
Your thinking that they need some connection is wrong.
Prvapaka: In its own meaning, 'so'rodt' has no prmyam, no validity as a
means of knowledge akriyrthatvt. It is not meant for any action, and there is nothing to
Siddhnta: Akriyrthatvt is not the hetu. Even though vedntavkyas are not meant
for kriy they are svrthe prmyam. Only if vedntavkyas were niphalata could you say


they are aprmyam. If they were without phala you could say the vedntavkya svata na
prmyam. Pramam is anadhigata abdhita phalavat arthabodhakatvam. straprama
means the object should be anadhigata. If the object is available for anumna pratyakdi,
Vednta is not the prama for it. What you can infer, what you can see these are not the
subject matter for Vednta. straprama also means the viaya should be useful, phalavat.
And it should not contradict other pramas. stra fits the definition.
For the stra, which is the tmavijnaprama, prmyam cannot be denied.
Why? Phalavatvt. Jnasya phalaparyantatvt. tmajnam is phalaparyantam, it has
phalam. Until complete avidynivtti we do not say it is tmavijnam. Once you have the
tmajnam this is the phalam. A cookbook gives you knowledge, but this knowledge is
not phalaparyanta because you have to do the cooking. tmavijnam need not be cooked
further. tmajnam is itself the phalam. There is no theory/practice problem.
Phalaparyanta means the tmavijnam is phalavat and nothing more is to be done for
moka's sake. stra is the tmavijnasdhana; it has its viaya in the tm. stra is the
prama for tmajnam. No one can reject the prmya of the stra with reference to
brahmtm phalavatvt.
Prvapaka: To arrive at the necessary kriyrthatvam, you need the stra to be
corroborated by anumna. The abdpramasya prmyam, talking about puya and ppa,
cannot be directly verified. The only way to verify is by seeing by anumna if either
kriyeatva or kriyrpa is there in the vkyas; if it is, stra has prmyam. By anumna
we can determine that for Brahman.
Siddhnta: Why do you bring up anumna? Svrthe pramatvam is there for stra.
Every prama is valid within its own realm and needs no verification from any another
prama. The abda is its own prama; brahmaa strayonitvam asti because no other
prama has access. Here is the thing: even though being the tmasvarpa, brahmaa
jeyatvam asti, abdapramavedyatvam asti. Being the very self, no pramt can objectify
this. You ask why, if it is siddhrtha, it is not known? Not-knowing does not require a hetu.
One is born with this not-knowing.
n canumangMy< zaama{y< yenaNy < indzRnmpe]t
e ,
Na cnumnagamya straprmya, yennyatra da nidaranamapeketa |

The prvapaka said he had never seen any vedavkya which was without
kriyparatvam. We have answered that. The stra does not require any type of anumna to
corroborate its prmyam. What example could be cited that would show that stra has
prmyam anyway? The independent status of being a means of knowledge does not
need to be vaildated by another prama. Vedntaviaya being what it is, you should use it
yourself and check up whether prmyam is a belief or not. Check out whether you are
Brahman or not.
tSmaiTs< [> zama[kTvm!,
Tasmtsiddha brahmaa strapramakatvam |


straika vedyatva siddham answering the kepa sagati brahmaa stra

yonitvt. The vedntavkyas require to be analyzed. Therefore this vedntavkyamms,
vicra. Tattu samanvayt. In these brahmavkyas there is samanvaya. By analysis you get
the knowledge of Brahman; knowing Brahman is moka. Brahmastrapramaka siddham.
Suppose you have a doubt whether Vednta or any other vkya has prmyam or
not. You don't look at whether the vkya is kriyrtha or not. What you look at is whether

or not it has a result, a result that is otherwise not known. And there should be no
contradiction within stra itself or with other pramas. Vednta fulfills the definition:
phalavat ajta abdhita arthaparatva ttparya.
This is the conclusion of the first vivaraka of the stra. Samanvayt is the subject
matter. Siddha brahmaa strayonikatva vedntavkyn samanvayt. This is the
upasahra. Vidhivkyas in the Veda have prmyam as well, but because of phalavat
arthabodhakatvam not because of kriyrthatvam.
Aapre TyvitNte - y*ip zama[k< twaip itpiivixiv;ytyEv zae[ smPyRt,
ywa yUpahvnIyadINylaEikkaNyip ivixze;tya zae[ smPyRNte tt!,
Atrpare pratyavatihante - yadyapi strapramaka Brahma tathpi
pratipattividhiviayatayaiva strea Brahma samarpyate | yath
yphavanydnyalaukiknyapi vidhieatay strea samarpyante tadvat |

The next vivaraka is Vednta, called vttikramatam. The Vttikras and others
voice their opposition here, and the Bhas can be included. 'Pratipatti' here should be
taken to mean upsana. The Vttikra takes Brahman as the vastu, and it is pthagtm. But
he says you have to do dhynam, pthagtmani brahmatva dhynam by which you get a
special puya. You get certain after-death loka from which you will not come back. The
stra that tells him to which loka he goes also tells him he will not come back. He says no
logic and no anumna is needed because it is stra. He says it is like our svrthe stra
pramam. He says there is nityatvam for moka because of aprvam, puya. His is called
In the previous varaka the prvapaka did not accept siddhavastuviayavkya. He
said it all had to be taken to karma. Here the Vttikras and Bhas accept
siddhavastuviayavkya. Bha has a definition of siddha as that which does not have kti
sdhyatvam. Kti sdhya means it can be created by an action. What is not to be created by
karma is called kti asdhya. Already it is siddha; it is kti asdhya. There are two types of
kti asdhya. One is utpatti anantaram. A ghaa is already created and is therefore utpatti
anantara kti asdhya, siddha. There is one more kti asdhya. That is the brahmasiddha.
The Bhas say there are siddhavastuviayavkyas in the stra, but they are
connected to kriy. A ypa is already there, you see an octagonal pole, it is a siddhavastu.
All such siddhavastus are connected to the rituals, to vidhi. These prvapakas say that
similarly they accept Brahman as a siddhaviaya. For them, Brahma is siddhaviaya. tm is
also siddhaviaya. They say that whatever is said by the stra with regard to this Brahma is


to be meditated upon. And even though tm is a separate viaya, tm is to be meditated

upon as having that same brahmatvam. Pratipatti is the kriy. We saw the two options
previously: kriyvidhieatva vedntnm or pratipattividhiviayatvam. The second is
under discussion now.
There is a contention. Some people say that all sentences, loka and vaidika, are
krynvitni they are connected to something to be done. They say that only then does
the vkya have akti. Vddhavyavahra means people can quickly pick up what new words
mean. Usually older people ask for things using li and lo, and young people learn what
words like 'bring' mean. 'Bring the cow', 'bring a cup of tea' the object that is brought is
connected to the kriy. 'Bring' is the common word, and what is uncommon is the object
to be brought. The object differs. 'Bring', 'want', 'don't want' these words are heard
again and again. Which word will a child pick up first? You see that the krynvitatvam is
very easily understood by the child. All the padas in even the laukika vkya are krynvitni.
That is how the language gets into your head, and with the same head you look into the
stra. stravkyni are also krynvitni. Even what is siddha is connected to kriy. This
is the contention.
Bha: Brahman is revealed by the stra, but it is asadbrahma. Brahman is
presented as pratipattividhiviaya, mnasakriyvidhi, upsanavidhi, object of meditation.
Because it is pratipattividhi we can say it is jnavidhi like tm vre draavya. You
have to do dhynam, and tm is to be meditated as Brahman. Other examples of
siddhaviayas connected to karma are found in the stra. The ypa is a siddhavastu
mentioned by the stra. Until stra tells you about it, you do not really know what the
ypa is. After you are informed about it, it is kti sdhya, but only after it is kta does it
become siddha. Then it has to be connected to a karmavidhi. stra tells us exactly what is
the havanya fire. By that, it is kti sdhya, and once the fire is made it is pratyaka,
siddhavastu like the ypa. Then it is connected to a vidhivkya.
Similarly, Brahman is a word, its lakaa is given by the stra, and the brahmavastu
is meant for meditation. The brahmavastu, as tm, should be meditated upon. That
meditation will produce aprv, puya. That aprv plus karma aprv form what we call
phala aprv. The meditation puya and karma puya join to give one phala aprv. This is
the karmajnasamuccaya which will take you to the loka from which there is no coming
back. We know this because stra says it is so. stra is the prama for it. You do not
come back, therefore moka. This is the Bhamata.
The pratipattividhimata contends that all vkyas are krynvitrthe and are
connected only to kriy, to meditation vidhi, mnasakarma. By vidhieatvam, pthagbrahma
is known through the Vednta. They say that Brahman is not known svtantrya.
Phalaparyantm is not there without kti. You need mnasakarma.
On the other hand, the Brahma nstikamata says that there is vkyaeatva
brahmaa; therefore there is no Brahma asti, it is only karmaea. It is only after utpatti
that Brahman is siddha. Only thereafter is it kti sdhya. This means everything has to be
siddha through kti. No such thing as Brahman exists without it being kti. Everything is


sdhya, therefore Brahma nsti kti asdhyatvt. This negates the Bha argument by saying
Brahman is not available for any other means of knowledge before kti and because
svrthe saphalatvt. This negates strayonitva brahmaa of the Bhas and sets up the
other side of the doubt for this vivaraka.
The k has made a vikalpa: does Vednta talk about Brahman being known by
upsanavidhiea or does Vednta talk about Brahman as svtantrya? Does Vednta talk
about Brahman just to make you understand and thereby you get mokaphalam, or does the
stra make you understand Brahma so that you can meditate upon it? Svtantryea
Brahman is known, or vidhieatvena? Do the vkyas have the meaning of siddhaviaya or
sdhyaviaya. Bhvbhvbhya saaye. The tattu samanvayt stra will address this doubt.
Vttikra: You can say Brahman is vedntavedyam. It is like ypa and havanya.
The vkyas give you knowledge of the object, and then you have to make use of it.
Similarly, if the vkyas talk about satya jnanmananta Brahma you have to make use
of it. Knowing you are limitless infinite Brahma will not bring you anything. Brahman is
upsanya karma, something to be meditated upon as tm. By this upsana you get mukti.
By this upsana you get mukti because of aprva. The dhyna aprva and karma aprva are
both born and give strabalt moka.
Swamiji: I say you should not miss that this is a dangerous meditation. Whatever
this meditation gives as aprva can only be anitya. Even mnasakarma is a karma because
kart is there. The upsaka is saying 'I am kart'. And what is it he is contemplating if it is
vedntavkya? He is contemplaing 'I am akart'. The Vednta is saying something entirely
different that what karmavidhi says. The kart does 'I am akart' meditation. The akart is
ropa on the kart. This is beginning with confusion and then further confusing. You are
trying to prove what you are not. Using the ahagrahopsana, what you are not you are

saying you are.

Siddhnta: The words of the vedntavkyas give you knowledge of a siddhaviaya.
The vkyas are a prama depending on the nature of the vastu. Here, tm is Brahman, and
this phalam is there immediately. Tattvajnt moka. The tattvamasi mahvkyajnt
moka. Vidhi means niyoga. By the stra, Brahma is presented as satya jnamanantam.
Why do you say brahmtm is vidhiea?
Vttikra: No, how can you meditate without knowing what stra says about
Brahma being satya jnamanantam? The vidhi here is meditation-vidhi for which you
should know the viaya. You cannot just meditate on 'aha sasr'. Everyone knows that
anyway. You need what stra says and the kriy. By the vkyas, stra tells you what is
Brahman for dhynrtham. Both Vednta and Brahman are pratipattividhi for the gain of
moka. This is the special phalam for the brahmopsana. Here, vidhi is for upsana, because
vidhi can also be for karma. For this phalam, stra gives you the meaning of the
pratipattiviaya and tells you to do meditation. In the same way, stra tells you what is
ypa and what is havanya and what they are used for. These are things you do not

otherwise know. How else would you know what Indra has in his hand when the offering
is made in the havanya? All the vkyas are connected to the vidhi. Everything is to be


taken as Brahman to be meditated upon. Then you are told to do the karma in order to gain
the aprva. Gather the meaning from the Upanisad and then meditate upon it.
There are two matas, two contentions. One, the Bhamata, is
jnakarmasamuccayena moka. Jnam there means upsana. In that mata, Brahman is asat;
the certain qualities that are given for Brahman are only for meditation's sake. tm is not
Brahman, but for upsanrtha Brahma becomes tmatvena upsya. By the meditation and
the karma you create total aprva which accounts for moka in some loka after death.
The other contention, Vttikra, the Vedntin's contention, here represented by the
Vttikra, says pratyagtm is Brahman. stra gives you brahmopsanavidhi. The meaning
of the li lo tavya in the niyoga is with reference to tmabrahma upsana. tmajnt
moka, where jnam means upsana. By this upsana, done until one dies, you get aprva.
Therefore this contention, too, is videhamukti. The only thing different is that here you
can take sannysa. There, for Bhamata, you have to both meditate and do karma for
jnakarmasamuccaya, and sannysa is not an option - the upsana itself will not give you
Vttikra is here the prvapaka, and Bhyakra presents the prvapaka
respectfully and very thoroughly. You should know before we proceed that uttaram and
pranam, answer and question, will be there. In some cases we ask the questions and the
prvapaka gives the answer. In that case you assume the prvapak is the siddhnt, kind
of a Vedntin. We become the prvapak to him. The prvapak establishes his siddhnta
here. He kind of goes off the track. Other cryas will follow this fellow, and Bhyakra
knows these kind of people are there.
Siddhnta (Vttikra): In the previous varaka, vedntastra delivered Brahman as
vidhiea. Here it is jnavidhi. Jnam here is dhynam. You have to meditate, but this is
sadbrahma not asadbrahma. Just by stra you will not discover that you are Brahman. You
have to meditate and gain aprva which will give you brahmalokaphala. The vidhi is: tm
vre dratavya. The 'dratavya' is Brahma visualization by upsana. The upsana has the
form of vtti, and there is action, mnsakriy, implied in the prakti in the word 'upsita'. It
indicates the vtti abhysa. This is the vttirpa. There is an upsanakart.
Prvapaka (Vedntin): How can you say vedntastra gives Brahman as vidhiea
like ypa and havanya? stra also says satya jnamananta Brahma. The
ttparyaligas prove Brahma to be siddhavastu, the svarpa of tm.
Siddhnta (Vttikra): In brahmeti upsana, vidhi is the main vkya; Brahma is
vkyaea, not separate from the vidhi. Brahmajijsyam is, then, vidhi, but a subservient
vidhi to 'tm vre dratavya'. Then all the vkyas that talk of Brahman are connected to the
one topic which is the vidhiea. Just because the havanya fire is not otherwise seen or
inferred anywhere does not mean it is not vidhiea; anadhigatatvam does not make it
completely svrthe prmyam. In itself it is not useful without vidhi. This is the
vidhieatvam. Similarly, Brahman is mnntara avedya; stra being the yoni for Brahman,
vidhieatvam is there brahmaa. All the vedntastras repeatedly tell you satya


jnamanantam et cetera for the meditation that is enjoined. Chndogya does it nine times.
Those vkyas do not present a different topic, they are all vidhiea.
In the Karmaka you need to carefully determine the prakaraa, the various
articles and actions that belong to a particular ritual. You have to do vkyabheda, and these
things will be found all over. But in the vedntavkyas, Brahma meditation is the topic; it is
all connected to the vidhi alone.
Prvapaka(Vedntin): How do you say Brahman is connected to meditation vidhi?
The aligas that indicate the ttparya are there, and there is svrtha phalavattvam
brahmaa. Brahman is not vidhiea. When a vegetarian mother and her child went to a
country where few crops were grown, she looked at the restaurant menu carefully. The
restaurant offered dead crab, and on the side it said you could get beans or some kind of
greens. She asked just for the sides, and the waiter had a difficult time trying to figure out
what to charge her. Even so, the vegetables are not crabea. When the main thing is
Brahman, how can you say that it is vidhiea?
kt @tt!, v&iinv&iyaejnTvaCDaSy, twaih zataTpyRivd Aa> - ae ih tSyawR>
kmaRvbaexnm! #it, caedneit iyaya> vtRk< vcnm!, tSy }anmupdez> - ttana< iyawen
R smaay>
AaaySy iyawRTvadanwRKymtdwaRnam! #itc,
Kuta etat | pravttinivttiprayojanatvcchstrasya | tathhi strattparyavida hu '
do hi tasyrtha karmvabodhanam' iti | 'codaneti kriyy pravartaka vacanam' | 'tasya
jnamupadea ' (Jai. S. 1.1.5) 'tadbhtn kriyrthena sammnya' (Jai. S. 1.1.25)
'mnyasya kriyrthatvdnarthakyamatadarthnm-' (Jai. S. 1.2.1) itica |
Siddhnta (Vttikra): The prayojana, purpose, for stra is pravttinivtti. This is
how any vkya is understood from the standpoint of vddhavyavahra, and this is how
stra is understood. stra is pravttinivttytmakam, and what meaning a person takes is
based on what he got from vddhavyavahra. stra is either asking you to do something or
to not do something. Therefore krynvitnyeva vkyni. As it is for loke, so it is for stra.
Without the kryajna of what to do and what not to do there is no pravtti and no
nivtti. stra is meant for giving you that jnam which is only kryaphalatvam. Therefore
kryaeatva brahmaa, and everything about Brahman is connected to that vidhi. A
vddha is either an elderly person or a highly mature person, a jnavddha, such as
Vysa's disciple Jaimini, dharmastrakra, or abhara. abharasvm was the bhyakra for
Jaimini's Prvamms. They know the strattparya properly. Karmaparatvam is
ttparyam, tat paratvam. What is to be done and what not done is the vedastra ttparya.
Swamiji: Kriy, kry, niyoga, vidhi, dharma, aprvam these do not have
different meanings; they are synonyms. One fellow asked me who wrote akarabhya.
Here, by the words of the vddhas, we see how nicaya is done. abharasvm says that
kryaparat is strasya avabodhanam. He says that what is to be done and what is not to be
done are seen revealed everywhere. There is a Jaimini stra which starts with 'codana'.
abharasvm bhya comments on what is this 'codana'. He says that if ligrthavkya is


there, such as 'yajet', both prakti and pratyaya are there. He says the pratyaya is the codan.
That is the niyogrtha, vidhi. Either it is li or lo or tavya pratyaya. These reveal the codan.
From this you get pravartaka nivartaka stram. stra is a world of do's and don'ts.
Jaimini says that by giving you knowledege of the action, stra, jnadvara, makes
you do a particular karma. More than just yajet, stra tells you what and how and with
what it is to be done and who are the devats involved. 'Tattvamasi' is not upadea,
dharmasya jnam is what is upadea, apaurueyavidhivkyam. You learn what is involved
in the karma in the same way you learn things loke. All these things are connected to the
one vidhivkya with the li lo tavya. That is the mukhyavidhi, and all else is vidhiea. The
words that are there talking about siddhrtha, bhtas, such as jya ghee, are definitely
connected to the vidhivkyas. With what is directly connected and what is indirectly
connected, stra is over. The entire Veda is meant for kriyrtha and nothing else.
Swamiji: I do not know exactly why people want to come to hear this Brahmastra.
They have their own ideas it is okay. Brahmastra is mostly about grammar. Simple
Bhandarkar and Antoine are not enough. Lo means what? Ti you understand one thing,
two things, so, nothing. Simple Saskta is not enough; Pini pariccheda must be there.
You do not need these things to understand the vastu. Taught properly, dgdyaviveka is
enough. Mmsstra means grammar. Understand the difficulties of studying this for
someone without any of the traditional background. It is very difficult. It is difficult for
the one who sits there and listens, and it is difficult for the one up and talking.
k: Unless you have the padrthajnam, you cannot have vakyrtha which will
give you the buddhi to do the kriy. Therefore any bhtrtha and anything else that is there
is connected to the main vidhi. Dharmajijs adharmajijs is the whole thing.
At> pu;< Kvici;yivze;e vtRyTktii;yivze;aivtRyawRvCDam!, tCDe;tya caNypyum!,
tTsamaNyaedaNtanamip twEvawRvv< Syat!,
Ata purua kvacidviayaviee pravartayatkutacidviayaviennivartayaccrthavacchstram | taccheatay cnyadupayuktam | tatsmnydvedntnmapi tathaivrthavattva
syt |
Siddhnta (Vttikra): Those who know the stra ttparya have told us that what is
in all those vkyas is hitrtht pravartayati and ahitrtht nivartayiti. In terms of pururtha,
then, the stra is meaningful because it makes a person do or avoid certain activities. All
the vkyas have this same intent, all of them being connected in one way or the other to
the upsyavidhi. And all the Veda, both Kas, have smnya in this. Upadea is only for
knowing how to complete the kriy.
Bhya: You say stra is vidhiniedhavkya. You say the arthavdavkyas and
bhtavastuvkyas and devats and phala are all vidhiniedha. You say the vedntastra is
meant for krya. But when one looks into Vednta there is no vidhi and no kryam. All that

is there is telling me what I should know. How is this to be interpreted? What is it I have
to do? It is not clear as it is in Karmaka.


sit c ivixprTve ywa SvgaRidkamSyaihaeaidsaxn< ivxIyte @vmm&tTvkamSy }an< ivxIyte

#it yum!,
Sati ca vidhiparatve yath svargdikmasygnihotrdisdhana vidhyate
evamamtatvakmasya brahmajna vidhyate iti yuktam |
Siddhnta (Vttikra): When there is kryavidhiparatvam there is the question of
what the sdhanam will be there. That kk will be there. The one who desires svarga or
the one who wants the birth of a son will see the different agnihotrdi karmas enjoined in
the stra. It is the same for those who desire amta, moka. Yajavalkya divided his
possessions equally between his wives. Maitrey asked, if Yajavalkya went for amtatvam,
would she get amtatvam? Was that included in the wealth he was giving? Yajavalkya
told the truth: Having all possible wealth would not assure one of moka. He said tm v
are draavya iti. That means tm dhynam. tm to be known is tmajnam this is
tmadhynam. Fine words butter no parsnips. You need to meditate.
Prvapaka (Vedntin): If the entire stra is kryaparam, why are there two
mmss, stradvayam? The subject matter of the two Kas is entirely different. How
can you say the entire stra is kryaparam. Why would Vysa ask for an entirely different
Mmsstra if there is only kriypara. If there are two Mmsstras there must be
two different phalas dharmajijsya and brahmajisya. Mokaphala that is both
dharmaphala and svargaphala is karmaphala; it is aviet. Mokaphala that is jnaphala is
entirely different. Vysa makes clear the difference in the two jijss, and there would be
no jijsyabheda if moka were karmaphala.
Definitely moka should be different from karmaphala. Only then can it be nitya. If
it is karmaphala it is done for some time for some limited result. Then you start all over
again. This is called sasra. Moka cannot be in the same category if it is nitya. If moka
is not generated by karma then it is already there. If it is already there you should know.
Moka is centered on tm, because it is for me, the jva. And the jva is tm here. And if
this fellow is to get moka and it is not by karmaphala, it is by svarpa. If it is my svarpa I
should know. Where is dhynavidhi if nityauddhmukto'ham? Do you know you are mukta
or do you not know? When you are doing dhynam do you know that you do not know? If
you do not know, how can you do dhynam. If you know, why should you do dhynam?
niNvh ij}aSyvEl]{ymum! Nanviha jijsyavailakayamuktam Prvapaka (Vedntin) goes on. Between Brahma as an object of a desire to know
and dharma as a subject for analysis there is vailakayam, difference. Dharma, the
Karmaka, is sdhya, utpdya, something that has to be produced. Whereas here,
Brahman is nityanivtta, already siddha. It is bhtam and is an object of a desire to know.
Brahmajnaphala is what you get after brahmavicra. Karmaphala is also jijsya, but the
phala is bhavyam, not siddham. Dharmajnaphala is only possible, and karma is always


vikalpa. It depends on practice; you have to perform it. Brahmajnaphalam should be

something different, without need for practice.

kmRka{fe Vyae xmaeR ij}aSy #h tu Ut< inTyinv&< ij}aSyimit, t
xmR}an)ladnuanape]ail][< }an)l< ivtumhRit, nahRTyev< ivtum,
! kayRivixTyuSyEv [>
karmake bhavyo dharmo jijsya iha tu bhta nityanivtta Brahma jijsyamiti |
tatra dharmajnaphaldanuhnpekdvilakaa brahmajnaphala bhavitumarhati |
nrhatyeva bhavitum | kryavidhipratyuktasyaiva brahmaa pratipdyamnatvt |
Question: There are two strakras, one for each: dharmajijsyam and
brahmajisyam. The brahmajisyam strakra says that stra deals with two different
subject matters. Dharma is sdhya, bhavya; Brahma is siddha. If the stra were committed
to just karma, there would be no jijsyabheda. This is not the case, and there are two
subject matters and two mmsas. There is a difference in what is being inquired into,
and there should be a difference in the results from brahmajnam and karma.
Siddhnta (Vttikra): Both dharma and Brahman are karmaphalam. The jijsyatvam
of Karmaka and Vednta is the same, and no bheda has been established. The subject

matter may differ, but there is no difference in that for both there is something to be done
which gives moka as a result. The only difference is brahmaa mnasakriy is what is
involved. It is just a different kind of kriy. Brahman is subject matter for stra as
something connected to brahmtm upsana vidhi. Without there being something that
needs to be done you are not talking about stra. We have no problem with bheda or
abheda. There is no difference in the phala, and you can say the jijsya is the same or
different. Karmaphalatvam is common for both. Just because there is a separate stra that
deals with brahmajijs is not a negation of there being no bheda. We can say this
because Strakra, going along with the stra, gives Brahman as upsanavidhiea. stra
connects Brahman to vidhi alone, and Strakra presents Brahman as something understood
thoroughly. This means understood by upsana.
AaTma va Are Vy> #it, y AaTma=phtpaPma - sae=NveVy> s ivij}aistVy>, AaTmeTyevaepasIt
AaTmanmev laekmupasIt, ved ev vit, #Tyaidivxane;u sTsu kae=savaTma ik< t+ #Tyaka']aya<
e sveR vedaNta %pyua> - inTy> svR}> svRgtae inTyt&ae inTyzubumuSvavae iv}anmanNd<
#Tyevmady>, tpasna zaae=ae mae]> )l< iv:ytIit,
'Atm v are draavya'(Bhad. 2.4.5) iti | 'ya tm'pahatappm - so'nveavya sa
vijijsitavya' (Chnd. 8.7.1) | 'tmetyevopsta'(Bhad. 1.4.7) 'tmnameva
lokamupsta'(Bhad. 1.4.15) |'Brahma Veda brahmeva bhavati' (Mua. 3.2.9) |
itydividhneu satsu ko'svtm ki tadbrahma itykky tatsvarpasamarpaena sarve
vednt upayukt - nitya sarvaja sarvagato nityatpto nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhvo


vijnamnanda Brahma ityevamdaya | tadupsancca strado'do moka phala

bhaviyatti |

The Vttikra goes on: How do you say that Brahman is not presented by the stra
as a kryavidhiea? I will cite vkyas that make it clear that brahmajnam is upsanavidhi.
Yajavalkya tells Maitrey that tm upsana is necessary for moka. tm is to be
meditated upon as Brahman. 'Daraam' here is meditation. Draavya is dhytavya.
Visualization is what we call meditation, and the tavya is there. In the second citation,
tm is said to be free of all ppa and all puya. Then the 'anveavya' indicates this is
upsana. The vijijsitavya is a sub-vidhi that is to be done afterwords. First the jnavidhi,
then vijijsitavya tells how. Vidhi, and the jijs is vidhiea. This means tm should be
meditated upon as Brahman - the Brahman you get by jijs. When you know what stra
says about Brahman you know Brahman is the dhyeya, upsya as tm. This is what all the
Vedntas talk about.
Chndogya is Sma Veda. Bhadrayaka is Yajur Veda. Bhadrayaka says
'tmetyevopsta'. It says 'upsta' in a number of places. Muaka in the Atharva Veda says
'Brahman Veda brahmaiva bhavati'. The one who meditates upon Brahman becomes
Brahman. The vision of the stra is not that Brahman is already free and therefore you
become mukta. stra gives you ada by which you get moka. The vttikra cites Gt
here, but he does not say exactly what it is in regard to. One other citation is very obscure,
and there is a Bhadrayaka quote. These, including 'nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhvo'
and 'vijnamnanda Brahma', are Vedntas that subserve the vidhi. They tell you that by
this meditation you will get moka because of special aprva, karmaphala.
All these vidhis being there, there is an expectation that one should be able to
know how to meditate upon brahmasvarpa. Thus all the Vedntas subserve the vidhis by
telling what is this Brahman. They present what is this Brahman. This includes supporting
vkyas in the Gt and all the vedntavkyas that talk of nanda and nitya.
Meditating upon tm as Brahman told in these vkyas and in other vedntavkyas,
the upsanaphalam will be there. That phalam is mokarpa, the adta, puya. The puya
will be converted to moka after death. You have no strabuddhi if you have to ask how
one will become Brahman, just do the karma and gather the puya. stra has the bala.
Moka is strada, that means it is adta. By your upsana abhysa phala bhavishyati.
Upsana on Brahma that is pthagtm, on 'I am Brahman', on 'the inner self is
Brahman', on these vedntavkyas, will bring param. The meditator gains after death that
alaukika phalam, that special aprva. If you don't accept this and you say moka should be
nitya if it is tmasvarpa, if you do this kind of pressing, if you say I should be the very
nature of tm, something does happen. The brahmaa upsanakartavya vidhieatvam is
there. The vidhi is li lo. We saw two vidhis in the Chndogya citation: so'nveavya and
sa vijijsitavya. To fulfill one vidhi the meditator has to fulfill another vidhi and thereby
establish brahmajisyam. If you do not accept this here is what happens.


ktRVyivXynnuveze vStumakwne hanaepadanas<vat! sIpa vsumtI rajasaE

gCDtITyaidvaKyveNdaNtvaKyanamanwRKymev Syat!,
Kartavyavidhyananupravee vastumtrakathane hnopdnsambhavt, saptadvp
vasumat rjsau gacchattydivkyavadvendntavkynmnarthakyameva syt |

When you read satya jnamananta Brahma and all these other vkyas without
the kartavyavidhi, people will ask 'I know satya jnamananta Brahma, how do I
become Brahman?' You did not give them the kartavya, and they will be wondering what
is going on. You have told them a simple story about some vastu, just a twisting of
Vednta. You have said nothing that tells of what to pursue and what to avoid. If already
you are Brahman there is nothing to be done. The vedntavkya will all be meaningless.
When the royal retinue is passing do you have to say 'The king is going'? You are talking
about the obvious, and the sentence is meaningless. If you say the earth has seven
continents what are you saying? It really has no meaning or use. What if there are eight?
You are just parroting something you heard. You are just giving the Prvammsaka
ammunition to attack you.
You should speak of karmaeatvam and not give the Prvammsaka a chance to
get up and disturb your sannysa, your life of meditation. Teach the vidhi to do upsana. I
am giving you a chance to preserve your sannysa. Then when you die you will get moka.
That is the strarahasyam.
nnu vStumakwne=ip ruiry< nay< spR #TyadaE aiNtjintIitinvtRnn
e awRvv< <
twehaPys<sayaRTmvStukwnen s<sairTvaiNtinvtRnn
e awRvv< Syat!,
Nanu vastumtrakathane'pi rajjuriya nya sarpa itydau
bhrntijanitabhtinivartanenrthavattva da tathehpyasasrytmavastukathanena
sasritvabhrntinivartanenrthavattva syt |
Prvapaka (Vedntin): According to you there is no phalam for sentences like this.

What if someone is sailing across the sea? He may need to know that there are seven
continents. For him it is useful information because he is navigating. Every sentence can
be connected to a karma, karmapara; kriyvidhieatvam is there. There is usefulness, but
with 'tm Brahma' you dont get anything. There is no result from mere jnam.
Nevertheless, when you just describe a vastu tm is satya jnamananta Brahma
there is arthavattvam. It is meaningful because there is phala. The fellow who sees a snake
on the rope is sweating; he is stuck inside the room with the snake. Another fellow comes
with a light and says 'Hey, this is a rope, this is not a snake.' There is only one object
there. The snake of this place and time is indeed the rope of this same place and time.
In the upaniadvkyas, how do you know there is not a similar mistake? The first
object perception was a mistake. Go near and see. Check up. Abdhitatve it is jnam;
bdhitatve it is useless information. The vkya 'rajjuriyam nya sarpa' and vkyas equal
to that - brings about bhrntijna nivtti. Wrong-perception born fear and sweat are
removed, and there is purposefulness in these vkyas. By pointing out you are asasr,


that the bhrntijnam 'I am sasr' is incorrect, there is arthavattvam, phalam, there for 'I
am mukta'.
Swamiji: When there is an error, an erroneous perception that causes a problem,
the correction is not only meaningful, it is necessary. The fellow who thinks there is a
snake has to get out of the room. The correction removes his fear and the sweating. It
works the same for 'aham asasr', because if it is true you are sasr how are you going
to get moka? If sasritvam is the svarpa of tm, how are you going to get rid of it?
When you meditate that 'I am Brahman', is it because tm is Brahman, or is tm not
Brahman and then you meditate? If tm is not Brahman, you will have only meditation
anityaphalam. Brahmeti meditation, iti meditation, is useless because it will not make you
Brahman. Vastumtrakathane'pi there is arthavattva da vkyasya. stra, by telling the
vastumtrakathana 'tm is svarpa', removes the sasritva bhrnti, and arthavavttvam syt.
There is phalavattvam, svrthe prmyam.
Siddhnta(Vttikra): You cannot just quote a dnta and say you have proved
something. What is true for ropesnake does not apply where sasrtvam is real.
Sasrtvam does not go away because it is real, unlike the snake. Tell anybody 'You are
Brahman' and he either protests or gives you a blank stare. Either way sasritvam does
not go away. A valid dnta is okay, but not yours.
Syadetdev< yid ruSvpv[ #v spRaiNt> s<sairTvaiNtRSvpv[mae[ invtet
R , n tu
invtRte ut[ae=ip ywapUv suo>oaids<sairxmRdzRnat!,
Sydetadeva, yadi rajjusvarparavaa iva sarpabhrnti,
sasritvabhrntirbrahmasvarparavaamtrea nivarteta | na tu nivartate, rutabrahmao'pi
yathprva sukhadukhdisasridharmadarant |

Hearing the snake is a rope, the bhrnti goes away. But the sasr does not give
up his sasrtvam. The dnta has no sdhya. You can quote all the
vastumtravedntavkyas and nothing will happen. Even though the fellow is ruta
Brahma, his sasritvam continues as it was before. The sasridharma is sukhitva
dukhitvam, and that continues to be.
aetVyae mNtVyae inidXyaistVy> #it c v[aerkalyaemn
R ninidXyasnyaeivRixdzRnat!,
tSmaTTpiivixiv;ytyEv zama[k< a_yupgNtVyimit,
'rotavyo mantavyo nididhysitavya' (Bhad. 2.4.5) iti ca
ravaottaraklayormanananididhysanayorvidhidarant | tasmtpratpattividhiviayatayaiva
strapramaka brahmbhyupagantavyamiti |
Siddhnta(Vttikra) continues: I am taking these vkyas from your own Vednta,
not Karmaka. tm v are dratavya. I say it is upsana and you say it is jnam. How
can we arrive at the meaning of this sentence. What is the tm I have to know? You say
it is Brahman. I have a problem with that. The tavyapratyaya is right there. Why isnt
'tm is Brahman' there? The tavya indicates there is something I have to do. The stra is


pravttinivttytmaka alone. Kryaparatvt I need to meditate upon tm. For this I should
know what to meditate upon. For this there is vidhiea provided by stra: rotavya itydi.
With this I can fulfill the vidhi. The vidhieas tell me the vicra I have to do; therefore
jijsya Brahma. One vidhi is fulfilled by the the other.
If the vkya were purely jnam, after gaining knowledge I should gain moka. The
sasrtvabhrnti should go away. 'I am sasr' should go after ravaam. If the stra
thought that by 'aha sasr' the sasrtvam would go away, it would never say
mantavya nididhysitavya. Actually, ravaam gives you upsanavidhiea Brahma. With
that useful brahmajnam you can fulfill the dratavya vidhi and do meditation that gives
you phala. As one who has done the upsana you can teach others what you have seen.
Moka is achieved only by doing.
Manananididhysana are to be pursued after ravaam. The vidhi is there in the
stra. As vidhiea, the other tavyas confirm the first vidhi. With the knowledge gained by
listening and assessment and adjustment, you can know what is the Brahman for
meditation. Brahman is to be abhyupagantavya, accepted, by you totally as something that
is connected to pratipattividhi, upsanavidhi. Brahma is strapramakam. stra is the
prama for Brahman. stra alone tells you what is Brahman for meditation.
The words in a sentence are connected to the activity, krya, such as 'a cow to be
brought', and that is main part of the sentence. It is the power of the words to convey that.
Everything in the stra pravttinivtti phala sdhanam itydi has stratvam because
kryn vitatvt, because the abdas are committed to krya alone. The siddhaviaya does not
have phala. Your satya jnamanantam will not have any result. Clearly, vedntavkyas
are committed to doing alone. Your own favorite quotation tm v are draavya
rotavya mantavya itydi - tells you that. Thus the vttikra gives his upasahrati.
Prvapaka (Vedntin): There is no vidhiparatam for Vednta. There is nothing to
be done. Svrthe phalavattve sati, whatever Vednta has to say, itself has phala. This jnam
itself is phalam. Knowing a karma I gain no phala unless I do the enjoined action.
Niyojanam is the karma, here dhynam. But that is not what is in Vednta. Here there is
nothing to be done. There is nothing you can do with Brahman. Knowing I am Brahman it
is complete in itself. That is the tattu samanvayt.
Ayamtm Brahma negates the sasritvam, just like the knowledge of the rope
does to the snake error. Vcya, there is no oneness, no limitlessness. The only possibility
is lakya -the negation is there. tmani sasritvam is to be negated. Negating, alone, the
vkya becomes meaningful. This is the Vednta. Svrthe phalavattvam, and there is nothing
more to be done. There is no krypek, mokdiphalam is jndeva. This is what is said
in these vkyas.
AaixIyte - n kmRiv*a)lyaevERl]{yat!, zarIr< vaick< mans< c kmR uitSm&itis< xmaROy<
yi;ya ij}asa Awatae xmRij}asa #it sUita Axmae=
R ip ih<said> it;excaednal][Tvai]aSy> pirharay,


R aRxmRyae> )le Ty]e suo>oe zrIrva'mnaeirevaepuJymane iv;yeiNys<yaegjNye
aid;u SwavraNte;u ise,
Atrbhidhyate na karmabrahmavidyphalayorvailakayt | rra vcika
mnasa ca karma rutismtisiddha dharmkhya yadviay jijs 'athto
dharmajijs'(Jai. S. 1.1.1) iti strit adharmo'pi hisdi
pratiedhacodanlakaatvjjijsya parihrya |
tayocodanlakanayorarthnarthayordharmdharmayo phale pratyake sukhadukhe
arravmanobhirevopabhujyamne viayendriyasayogajanye brahmdiu sthvarnteu
prasiddhe |
Bhyakra: The vailakayam for the phalas of brahmavidy and karma is total.
They are opposite. The nature of karma proposed in the stra supports this. 'arra
karma' is a term that implies all three types of karma. It is upalakaa for all the materials
involved also, and the altar and the fire. Any dhynam is also implied. ruti smti pura
are included. This is dharmkhya karma. Dharma means puya, vaidikam karma. For this
dharma there is jijs. Jaimini Prvammsstra says athto dharmajijs. The
'thereafter' is different than in the brahmastra vkya. When they repeat the stra, they are

confirming that there is more than one meaning.

After veddhyayanam, after studying the Veda, one does Prvamms. Exactly
what is one's desired phala karma has to be understood by looking into the mms. The
which and what and where and how have to be understood. Therefore dharmavicra is to
be done to properly analyze the Veda. You should know what is to be done and what is
not to be done. Karmas for atonement, for pratiedha/codan/pravartaka, for lakaa/prama,
and for niedha are all jijsya.
Dharmdharma phala is first puyappa and, finally, lokaprasiddha sukhadukha
anubhava. ruti talks about the various beings in the various lokas having sukha in
different degrees. The codan lakaas tell what is to be done and what not to be done for
which sukhadukhaphala. Since it is your experience, you might not need a big prama
for that. If indriyaviaya is ia you have sukha, ania you have dukha. The anubhava is
born of the contact of the senses with their objects. Mental satisfaction can be gained by
reading et cetera, by esthetic enjoyment. Because you are born with this body, in this
situation, with these factors and people and circumstances you have these different
experiences and enjoy these comparative results. Some get more and some get less. This
is the nature of karmaphala.
But moknanda is not involved with any of these comparative results. Moka is all
nanda, but it is tmasvarpa. It is not anubhava through the arra. It does not come and go.
tmasvarpa is that in which all experiences including dukha take place. The
vailakayam between karmaphala and brahmajnaphalam is pointed out here. Karmaphala
is not moka, despite what the opponent says. Moka has nothing to do with senses and is
free from sorrow. It is not born of contact with sense objects. All the living jvas, from
trees to brahmji, enjoy different degrees of sukhadukha depending on their loka and


karmaphala, but moknanda is aprasiddha. The rotriya who is akmahata has the sukha of

all of them, and what he has they do not have.

mnu:yTvadar_y aNte;u dehvTsu suotartMymnuy
U te,
Manuyatvdrabhya brahmnteu dehavatsu sukhatratamyamanuryate |

Keeping your own desires in view, ruti imagined one young fellow who had all
the qualfications and all available sukha. He followed dharma, and the entire wealth of
pthiv was with him. There is no such fellow. ruti recognizes that you think that if you
fulfill all your desires you will have sukha and gives this analogy. From that sukha of an
ideal manuya to the sukha of the beings in all the lokas up to brahm, all of them with
arras, their sukhadukha all karmaphalam, there are different gradations of sukhnubhava.
It is all puyakarmaphalam. This is not moka.
tt tetaexm
R SR y tartMy< gMyte, xmRtartMyadixkairtartMym!, is<
Tataca taddhetordharmasya tratamya gamyate dharmatratamydadhikritratamyam | prasiddha crthitvasmarthdiktamadhikritratamyam |

The reason for the bhoga tratamya is puyasya tratamyam. Why is there puyasya
tratamyam? Because there is adhikritratamyam. The jva must be an adhikr for dharma
and its phala. raddh, effort, sons, support, money all these are required. A certain
drive, ambition, must be there. And these are all there in degrees. The capacity for all
these things is found in varying degrees. But there is no difference or degree in
mokaphalam. Mokaphalam is not the phalam of anything; it is niratiaya svarpatvt. That
niratiaya moka is the same for all. The sdhanam for puya is different than ekarpa
jnam. Who is the brahmavidy adhikr? The one with vivekavairgya. But there is no
vivekavairgya tratamya, no adhikr tratamya. There is no difference in giving up. It too
is ekarpa. There is no adhikr bheda, every one has to have viveka amadamdi.
twa c yaga*nuaiynamev iv*asmaixivze;are[ pwa gmn<
R saxnExm
UR aidme[ di][en pwa gmn< taip suotartMy< tTsaxntartMy< c zaat!
yavTs<patmui;Tva #TySmaMyte, twa mnu:yaid;u narkSwavraNte;u suolvaednal][xmRsaXy @veit gMyte
tartMyen vtRman>,
Tath ca ygdyanuhyinmeva vidysamdhivieduttarea path gamana,
kevalairiprtadattasdhanairdhmdikramea dakiena path gamana, tatrpi
sukhatratamya tatsdhanatratamya ca strt 'yvatsamptamuitv' (Chnd. 5.10.5)
ityasmdgamyate |tath manuydiu nrakasthvarnteu
sukhalavacodanlakaadharmasdhya eveti gamyate tratamyena vartamna |

We all can see and know the various laukika capacities of the people in our world.
Everyone has different resources and insufficiencies and abilities. We are skilled at


judging these things, for without that knowledge how are you going to develop a desire
for something? It is said that a departed soul follows a mrga to reach a loka. He may take
either sryamrga or candramrga. Going to brahmaloka is presented by the stra as a
particular mrga. But brahmavidyphalam moka is nitya pta na mrga prpyam

Those that follow the ygdi, somayga and other such karmas, and combine those
karmas with upsana, take the northern route after death according to the quality of their
efforts. Upsana accompanied by cittasthairya will take one to brahmaloka. That is as far as
one can go with karmopsanasamuccayaphalam. Those that do either ia prta or datta
karmas go by the cloudy mrga to a particular loka. Ia is agnihotra and vivedeva karmas,
tapas performed at the proper time, exercising all the values, speaking truth, protection of
the Veda by learning and teaching, and taking care of guests. Prta is water reclamation,
building ponds and hostels and hospitals and temples, providing food and livelihood,
endowments for ytris, orphanages and support for the elderly, giving refuge to aging
animals. Datta is support of pilgrimage centers, protection of the weak or disenfranchised
and ahis. The people who have this culture will not go to a pilgrimage point without
giving to those who are there to get what they need to live. They are there because they
know they can find thoughtfulness at such places. The culture is in the folks who give
and in those who receive, not necessarily the highly educated. Giving this way is a part of
the culture, not learned in school, but followed even today.
Bhyakra quotes Chndogya stra, which gives the details of the sukhatratamya
and sdhanatratamyam of the candramrga: yvatsamptamuitv. For as long as the results
of their karmas that produced this sukha last they remain there. There are different levels
of experience of sukha and different levels of experience of dukha also. As you go up
through the lokas told in the Taittirya calculus, the sukha goes up. The absence of sukha is
in varying degrees from human beings, to those who dwell in Nraka, to trees. In Nraka
the pain is pervasive, but some punishments are less than others and some sukhalbha is
there. Whether or not the beings know by the codan and lakaa in stra, the loss of
sukha experienced in the various life forms is due to the quality of one's actions and the
puyappa that results. The specifics of puyappa are known only through the stra.
twaeXvRgte:vxaegte;u c dehvTsu >otartMydzRnaetaerxmRSy it;excaednal][Sy tdnuaiyna< c
tartMy< gMyte, @vmiv*aiddae;vta< xmaRxmRtartMyinim< zrIraepadanpUvk
R < suo>otartMyminTy< s<sarp<
uitSm&itNyayism!, twa c uit> - n h vE szrIrSy st> iyaiyyaerpitriSt #it ywavi[Rt<
Tathordhvagatevadhogateu ca dehavatsu
dukhatratamyadaranttaddhetoradharmasya pratiedhacodanlakaasya tadanuhyin ca
tratamya gamyate | evamavidydidoavat dharmdharmatratamyanimitta
arropdnaprvaka sukhadukhatratamyamanitya sasrarpa
rutismtinyyaprasiddham | tath ca ruti 'na ha vai saarrasya sata
priypriyayorapahtirasti' iti yathvarita sasrarupamanuvadati |


We understand the relative gradations of sukha and dukha. Whether one goes to lokas
above or lokas below, whether one has sthla updhi or skma updhi, the
dukhatratamyam will be there. The kraa for it is adharma, pointed out by the pratiedha
pramavkyas in ruti. His na kuryt. Those who follow adharma do different
questionable deeds and suffer differing results in terms of dukha. There is tratamyam in
both the doers of those actions and in the actions.
Puyappa and sukhadukha are the two types of phalam. In order to help us
understand the difference between brahmavidyphalam moka and karmaphalam moka
pointed out earlier, there is now a sahrati, a summing up. The form that sasra takes is
told here. ruti and smti and our own reasoning tell us that anything created is going to
be anitya kryatvt ghaavat. Anityphalaka karma, vcika kyika mnasa karma, is not
sdhanam for moka. For jvas, those with tm avidy, with the doa of kmakarma, the
various graded actions result in the puyappa that creates their various graded arras.
Sukhadukha tratamyam is due to different types of arra. Different types of arra are due
to puyappa tratamyam.
Bhyakra cites the pacaklea here: avidy ahakra kma krodha bhaya. It is just
another way of looking at the whole thing. Avidy is no vivekajnam. Born of that is
ahakra, asmit. Desire, anger and fear complete the five kleas made famous by Patajali.
When you have more fuel there are more flames. More relevant logic: yat kta tad
What is the ruti that points out the logic here? 'Na ha vai saarrasya sata
priypriyayorapahtirasti'. From Chndogya. Priya is sukha. For the tm that has a arra,
for the jva, the kart, the one with dehtmabuddhi, for the one who says 'I am the arra'
but is aarra, for that asaga purua, there is no way of finding a way around sukha and
dukha. The eighteenth chapter of Gt too says karma cannot be totally given up. Yet
tm is totally free from karma, that being its very nature. Only dehtmabuddhi, as long as
it is there, keeps you from naikarmyasiddhi. ruti, and smti, restate what our reasoning
knows about the connection between actions and their results. This is how sasra has
been described.
AzrIr< vav sNt< n iyaiye Sp&zt> #it iyaiySpzRnit;exaaednal][xmRkayRTv<
mae]aOySyazrIrTvSy iti;Xyt #it gMyte,
'Aarra vva santa na priypriye spata' (Chnd. 8.12.1) iti
priypriyasparanapratiedhccodanlakaadharmakryatva mokkhyasyarratvasya
pratiidhyata iti gamyate |
Sukha and dukha do not touch the aspattm. tm, being aarra in reality, is not
touched by the conditions which characterize sasra. Any contact is negated by ruti.
Moka being krya is negated. Codanlakaavkyas that enjoin action on your part are the
prama for dharma, karma; the ruti cited here negates the possibility of their being the
cause for moka. Moka aarra Brahman these are synonyms here. Moka is the


knowledge that tm, even though the arra is nothing but this tm, is aarra. A saarra
cannot but be touched by priya and apriya. Sukhadukhanivtti means all that is born out of
karma, all karmaphalatvam, pratiidhyate.
xmRkayRTve ih iyaiySpzRnit;exae naepp*te,
Dharmakryatve hi priypriyasparanapratiedho nopapadyate |

That mokasya dharmakryatve is negated is understood. Dharma is karma:

sarvadharmn parityajya. There, sarvkarmi parityajya. This is what it is all about. This is
what it is. If moka is puyaphala, karmaphala, the pratiedha of tm being subject to
sukhadukha is not tenable. The tratamyas were pointed out by Bhyakra. This was done
for negation moka is not karmaphalam. He gives the hetus. First was karmaphala
vailakayt. Then he gave the description of sasra. The hetu given here:
karmaphalaviruddhatvt. The karmaphalaviruddha vieaas are atndriyatva viokatva
arrdyabhogatva adharmavattvt. Being svarpa, moka is not samyogajanya sukha, not
sukha born from association between the senses and their objects. Any samyoga is only
until viyoga, dissociation. Partnership is always subject to breaking. In this life it almost
never works too liable to skimming. There are a few in South India, very solid
companies started by the Maravatis, the same now as when they started.
Tratamya means sukhalea or dukhalea. There is no viokatva possible for
karmaphala. Whereas moka is vioka, oka abhva. In fact nandasvarpa is the opposite
of oka. A arra must be there for you to enjoy. Bhoga yatana is sthlaarra; bhoga
sdhana is skmaarra. They allow you to experience karmaphala. Even in svarga one will
be saarra. But moka is not karmaphala and is free of experience and need for a arra.
Aarratvam is moka.
Question: Why don't you take it to say that moka is upsanarpa dharmaphalam?
Why not say moka is dharmaphalam, born of puya and not connected to viaya? Moka is
puyam alone. Karma does amazing things, producing a vast variety of variegated phalas.
Why can't aarratvam be dharmakryam.
AzrIrTvmev xmRkayRimitce tSy SvaaivkTvat!, AzrIr< zrIre:vnvSwe:vviSwtm!, mhaNt<
ivumaTman< mTva xIrae n zaecit,
Aarratvameva dharmakryamiticenna tasya svbhvikatvt | 'aarra
arrevanavasthevavasthitam | mahnta vibhumtmna matv dhro na ocati'
(Kah. 1.2.22) |
Bhyakra: If that were so, niedha would not be possible. The negation by the
ruti is complete. The sukha born of sensory experience, object experience, means dukha
will also be there. When you eat peanuts, be ready for the bad one. This sukhadukha is
negated by the ruti for the aarra, specifically in the Chndogya vkya just above. If
aarratvam were the result of a special puya, born of brahmopsanaphala, and you were
then not touched by sukhadukha, if you had matured as a result of the upsana and had
grown out of attachment to sukhaphala, then that would be perfect. But no, aarratvam is


not something that you assume. It is not something you can say you attained. You can get
only arra. Svbhvikatvt, aarra is not created.
Here Bhyakra cites Kahopaniad. The dhra, the one who is no more ignorant of
the tm, does not come to grief anymore. Sukhadukha do not touch him. The sasra
experience is destroyed by the knowledge that tm is aarram. tm that obtains in the
ever-changing arras is not enclosed by a body. This tm is one, and not subject to time.
It is limitless and not subject to change. It is all-pervasiveness that is not relative.
Because of this knowledge, he is dhra and does not again come to the grief which is the
signature of sasra. Do not doubt that when Bhyakra talks here of arra he means
both sthla and skma.
Aa[ae mna> zu> Asae y< pu;> #Tyaiduit_y>,
'Apro hyaman ubhra '(Mua. 2.1.2) 'asago hyaya purua' (Bhad. 4.3.15)
itydirutibhya |
Muaka and Bhadrayaka are cited. The one who knows is free from pra,
free from manas, free from karmendriya and jnendriya, which are Paramevara's creation.
All these things are skmaarra, and they are negated for this one. He is uddhtm; this
is mokasvarpa, tmasvarpa. He is uninvolved with anything; his nature is asaga.
At @vanuy
e kmR)livl][< mae]aOymzrIrTv< inTyimit ism!,
Ata evnuheyakarmaphalavilakaa mokkhyamaarratva nityamiti siddham |

After gaining this knowledge there is no necessity to do upsana. Aarratvam is

not a karmaphala born of something that is to be done. Brahmajnam is not connected to
mnasakarma. Moka is not karmaphala, not upsanaphalam. Moka is nityam aarratvam,
unproduced, ever-existent. This is siddha.
t ik<icTpir[aiminTy< yiSmiNviyma[e=ip tdevedimit buinR ivhNyte,
Tatra kicitpariminitya yasminvikriyame'pi tadevedamiti buddhirna vihanyate |
Question: Moka is to be accomplished, it is sdhya. You cannot say it is already
there. Moka is dharmakrya sdhyatvt. Your argument that kryamcet anityam is not
necessarily true. There is also krya nityam. Parm pravha pekik are all relative
for a long time nityatvam. But you say you are talking about kastha nityatvam. Parm
nityam means that even though there is change, the buddhi does not go away. It is
conversion of puya into a state of being. This parm nityatvam is true for moka.
ywa p&iwVyaidjgiTyTvvaidnam!, ywa c sa<Oyana< gu[a>, #d< tu parmaiwRk< kqSwinTy<
VyaemvTsvRVyaip svRiviyariht< inTyt&< inrvyv< Svy<Jyaeit>Svavm!,
Yath pthivydijagannityatvavdinm | yath ca skhyn gu | ida tu
pramrthika, kasthanitya, vyomavatsarvavypi, sarvavikriyrahita, nityatpta,
niravayava, svayajyotisvabhvam |


Bhyakra: The earth is not always the same. Even the mountains come and go.
Yet planet earth is still planet earth. Where is that Sarasvati River we pray to? There are
things that we know as the same though they undergo change. The guas undergo change
to become the jagat, yet they are always the same. But tm nitya kastha mokasvarpa.
Kastha nityam is not karmasdhya, and all the relative measures of timelessness are not
what is aparicchinna kastha nitya. This is what we are saying for moka.
This pramrthika kastha nityam is ultimate and not subject to modification.
Like even space it is all-pervasive, even though space does not pervade tm. Kastha
nityam is always present, not accomplished or gained, free from any parts, self-revealing,
self-evident consciousness. The phrase parma nityatvam translated into English
indicates continuity, but this parma nityatvam you have set up is purely your delusion,
mithy eva. Kastha nityatvam is not subject to time or any other thing. You cannot
destroy it because it has no vieaas. It does not undergo any kind of movement. It is not
the product of anything, and it is not known by anything. It has nothing to do with either
karma or karmaphala.
y xmaRxmaER sh kaye[
R kaly< c naepavtet
R ,
e tdetdzrIrTv< mae]aOym!, ANy
xmaRdNyaxmaRdNyaSmaTktaktat!, ANy Uta Vya #Tyaiduit_y>,
Yatra dharmdharmau saha kryea klatraya ca nopvartete | tadetadaarratva
mokkhyam | 'anyatra dharmdanyatrdharmdanyatrsmtktktt | anyatra bhtcca
bhavycca'(ka) itydirutibhya |
Kastha nityatva moka is that with which dharmdharma, karma, the two types of
kriy which produce puya and ppa, have no sambandha. Kla too is not connected to this
moka, and this appreciation is supported by the Kahopaniad quoted. Naciketas asked
Lord Yama to teach him of that which is beyond dharmdharma, beyond karmaphala,
beyond time. Naciketas had already given the answer. Lord Yama knew the boy knew,

because he did not question the boy's question.

We do have to change the verb in the bhya to keep the meaning change na
upvartete to na upvartate. Therefore neither do the three periods of time nor
dharmdharma have sambandha with that kastha nityatva moka. Kastha nityatva moka
has nothing to do with dharmdharma.
Right now we will take time to congratulate the staff of the Aim for Seva Hospital
for one year of great work. Today is the one year anniversary of the opening of the
operation. The end of the first year is important for a child. We celebrate at the end of the
first year, and every child has the traditional ear-piercing, karavedanam. The next
celebration is on the sixty-first birthday, and then the eighty-first/eighty-second. The
success of the Aim for Seva project here will help us accomplish similar projects
elsewhere in the same manner or in bigger or smaller way. Out next step is to look for
corporate help. There is a new awareness; all corporations must have social awareness
and responsibility. This is happening all over the world, and the wind blows here in India.
All the corporations feel this. They need to do something meaningful in the country


where they make their money. We hope to get our act together and get their help. We
have achieved a great deal in this project thanks to our cryas and our staff.
AtSt+ ySyey< ij}asa Stuta
Atastadbrahma yasyeya jijs prastut k glosses Kaivalyam as moka. He says it is mokasvarpa non-separate from
Brahman. It is the distinct phala that is brahmajnam. Jnam eva mokam. This is why
brahmavit brahmaiva bhavati. There is no other way of knowing than 'I am Brahman'. The
knower, the known, and the knowledge are all one and the same. There is karmaphala
vilakaatvam for Brahman. This is not possible if Brahman is not tmasvarpa. Kaivalya is
paryya for moka. Moka being Brahman, therefore there is jijs. That is what is prastut,

going on right now.

There is kasthanityatvam for only that one thing. In fact, whatever you do or
think, there is only one thing. Pururthanicaya is the one thing. Kastha nityatvam is the
svarpa of tm. The svarpa of Brahma is the svarpa of moka.
Being a separate jijsyam, a siddha vastu separate from karma, being outside the
dharmdharma inquiry, to be accomplished in terms of knowledge, Brahma is free from
any contact with karma. If Brahman had any kind of contact with any vidhi, there would be
no anadhigata subject matter and no separate stra for Brahma. Dharmajijs would cover
the whole ktsnaveda and no separate mms would be necessary. Prvamms would
have a different name. As it is, there is kartbheda and adhikrbheda, and jvevara aikyam,
brahmtmaikyam, is the subject matter of the Vednta. You cannot get aikyam by
vidhiparaeam, only by jnam. Where brahmtmaikyam is the subject matter, vidhi will
not be there. Where brahmtmaikyam is not there, you cannot say vidhi is not there. Anvaya
That is why ropa is vidhi, upsana. You put everything in one thing. On a tiny
piece of cloth the entire will of millions of people is superimposed a flag. On the
lagrma you superimpose Lord Viu. But it is superimposition, it is not aikyam. It is not
aikyam like brahmtmaikyam. The instruction for upsana is dhyyet, iti dhyyet. What
cannot be that thing is taken to be that thing. We are talking about tm is Brahma; there is
no iti. Brahmtmaikyam cannot have anything to do with vidhi, tm being Brahman.
Being not accomplished by niyoga, by karma, being not karmaphala, that Brahman
jeya mokya samanvayt. Being the object of our desire to inquire, having svrthe
phalavattvam, svatantra, being the object of Vednta which is a prama, brahmajnam
itself being moka, Brahman is being revealed by the Vednta vkyas which have their
ttparya in that teaching that is Brahman.
t*id ktRVyze;TvenaepidZyet ten c ktRVyen saXyeNmae]ae=_yupgMyet AinTy @v Syat!, tEv< sit
ywaekmR)le:vev tartMyaviSwte:vinTye;u kiditzyae mae] #it sJyet,


tadyadi kartavyaeatvenopadiyeta, tena ca kartavyena

sdhyacenmoko'bhyupagamyeta, anitya eva syt | tatraiva sati yathoktakarmaphaleveva
tratamyvasthitevanityeu kacidatiayo moka iti prasajyeta |
Moka cannot be temporary. It should be eternal. All who understand it say it is
nitya. It has been said that brahmajnam is given by vedntastra as vidhiea, as an
object to be meditated on. If that were true, moka would be sdhya and, therefore, anitya.
If that were true, if Brahman were there among the various tratamya karmaphalas, it would
be a special anubhava but just another brahmajnam.
inTy mae]> svEm
R ae]
R vaidir_yupgMyte Atae n ktRVyze;Tven aepdezae yu>,
Nityaca moka sarvairmokavdibhirabhyupagamyate ato na kartavyaeatvena
brahmopadeo yukta |
Moka being not bound by time, none of the schools of thought accepts temporary
moka. Therefore it makes no sense to connect brahmopadea to karmavidhi.
Aipc ved Ev vit ]IyNte caSy kmaRi[ tiSmNe pravre, AanNd< [ae ivan!, n ibeit
ktn Ay< vE jnk aae=is, tdaTmanmevavedh< aSmIit tSmaTsvRmvt! t kae maeh> k> zaek
@kTvmnupZyt>, #Tyevma*a> utyae iv*anNtr< mae]< dzRyNTyae mXye kayaRNtr< varyiNt,
Apica' Brahma Veda brahmaiva bhavati' (Mua. 3.2.19) 'kyante csya karmi
tasminde parvare' (Mua. 2.2.8) | 'nanda brahmao vidvn | na bibheti kutacana' (Tait.
2.9) 'abhaya vai janaka prpto'si' (Bhad. 4.2.4)| 'tadtmnamevvedaha brahmsmti
tasmttatsarvamabhavat' (vajasaneyibrahmanop) 'tatra ko moha ka oka ekatvamanupayata
(. 7) | ityevamdy rutayo brahmavidynantara moka darayantyo madhye
kryntara vrayanti |

You can see the advantage of studying the Upaniads before taking up
Brahmastras. k is always more difficult than bhya. The smaller the print, the more
trouble the text will cause you. k says that since moka is not a sdhya, there is no
niyoga enjoining one to do karma. There is no kart, no niyojya, enjoined to do any karma
for moka. How could brahmopadea possibly be kartavyaeatva?
The knower of Brahman is Brahman not 'becomes Brahman'. For that vkya: just
as in the light of a lamp the darkness disappears, brahmajnt ajna nivtti. Nivtti alone
is moka. tm is Brahman. Ajna not being there as to tm being Brahman, you say 'I am
Brahman'. Can you say 'I am Brahman sasr' after saying that? It is a silly
smndhikarayam. You do need aprva for moka. To get a proper teacher, to keep one's
mind in place, for preparedness I need aprva. But not for moka. Only brahmajnam.
Jnena moka. Ajna nivtti moka. Ajna not being there, he is Brahman. It is jeyam
not dhyeyam.
The rutis negate the need for anything to be done to complete the gain of jnt
moka. There is nothing to be done with the Brahman you have come to know as tm in


order for there to be moka. Brahmavidyprpti and mokaprpti are identical. Brahma Veda
brahmaiva bhavati. He is Brahman, he does not become Brahman. Knowledge of the
limitless means you are limitless, for the limitless cannot be without you. The only moka
is from your avidy; there is no other moka. You are Brahman, and there is no getting
away from it. There is no action that needs to be done in addition to knowledge. The
Muaka also says that when the Brahman that is everything is known, all krakas standing
in the jva's name disappear. There is no more birth and rebirth, which is called sasra,
because there is no longer puyappa for that jva. k says that all anarabdhakarmi go
away; only prrabdha continues. You will exahust those that remain. And there is no
coming back.
Brahmadaranam is not a subject/object event. It is hdayagranthi vedanam. Avidy
going away is brahmadaranam. That is the lakaa of brahmadaranam. Taittirya says
nanda brahmao vidvn | na bibheti kutacaneti. The brahmavit lakaam is nandam. For
that brahmavit there is no hetu for fear. The fear of sasra is gone; that is the phala. k
says that fear is gone because no second thing is there. Bhadrayaka says abhaya vai
janaka prpto'si. Hey, Janaka, self-ignorance is gone, thereby you have gained freedom
from fear. The first chapters of Bhadrayaka are all Vednta.
This Brahman that never became jva, because of the guru's teaching, is known to
be pram, the whole. That pram is moka. Becoming pra is not a result; it is purely
bhrnti removal. The confusion I am paricchinna is removed. Brahmaa ekatvam is
due to the removal of all apparent differences. If they were real they could not be
removed. If they were unreal they need not be removed. The truth is not known, and
bhrnti is there. The bhrnti is dispelled in the wake of knowledge. Brahmtm was and is
unchanged. vsya asks what is moha? What is ignorance and confusion in Brahman?
Where is this for the knower of Brahman? That anything is to be done after brahmajnam
and before gaining moka is negated by the rutivkyas. Brahmavidyprpti mokaprpti. If
you had to meditate in between, how long would you have to meditate? If moka is only
after death, it becomes svargdivat. And any moka that has a beginning will also have an
end. If moka is karmaphala, none of these rutis has any meaning. You cannot say they do
not have meaning.
twa tEtTpZy&i;vaRmdev> itped=
e hm! mnurv< sUy
R #it dzRnsvaRTmavyaemXR ye
! ywa itNgaytIit ititgayTyaemXR ye tTkt&k
R < kayaRNtr< naStIit gMyte,
Tath 'taddhaitatpayannirvmadeva pratipede'ham manurabhava sryaca'
(Bhad. 1.4.10) iti brahmadaranasarvtmabhvayormadhye kartavyntaravrayodhryam |
yath tihangyatti tihatigyatyormadhye tatkartka kryntara nstti gamyate |

This Bhadrayaka vkya is cited to further the negation of there being any
possibility of anything required between brahmavidyprpti and mokaprpti. i Vmadeva,
seeing the mahvkya's fact about oneself, seeing tm is Brahman, staying within that
jnam, gained at the same time the knowledege of the mantra 'I was Manu and I was the
sun.' He gained sarvtmabhva, the knowledge that not only am I all now, anything that


existed before, I was. Anything that will come to exist, I am. Vmadeva, seeing the
tmatattvam, saw everything and saw himself to be everything. Between brahmadaranam
and sarvtmabhva there is no kartavya. This ruti negates any thing or action being in
Payan pratipede the present continuous form can point out either hetu or lakaa.
Here it is lakaa. You could also take it as hetu 'seeing this achieved'. Payan
pratipede is lakaa, as is the vkya 'tihan gyati', 'standing he sings'. Standing is not the
cause for singing. The kart is the same for the two actions. Samnakartkayo prvakle
(P.S. 3.4.21) The lakaa characterize the kart. 'Studying regularly, he came out well in
his exams.' There, 'studying' is an example of use as hetu.
Brahmadaranam and brahmapratipatti kriys are also here, in the present tense,
samnakartkam. They can also indicate either lakaa or hetu. Brahmadaranam is
'brahmaiva bhavati'. That 'brahmaiva bhavati' is sarvtma. Payan the whole of the 'I am
Manu, I am the sun' mantra, he gained sarvtmabhva. As lakaa, there can be no
kryntaram, no time between the payan and the pratipede. Were brahmajnam meant for
meditation there would be no resulting ajnnanivtti. Meditation is a karma and cannot
destroy ajnam. If Brahman is an object of meditation it is a kriy, a vidheya, this indicates
'I am not Brahman '. If you meditate on that, ajnnanivtti will not take place.
Tv< ih n> ipta yae=Smakmiv*aya> pr< par< taryis ut< me gvz_e yStrit zaekmaTmividit
sae=h< gv> zaecaim t< ma gvaDaekSy par< tarytu tSmE m&idtk;ayay tms> par< dzRyit gvaNsnTkmar>
#it cEvma*a> utyae mae]itbNxinv&imamevaTm}anSy )l< dzRyiNt,
'Tva hi na pit yo'smkamavidyy para pra trayasi' (Pra. 6.8) 'ruta
Brahma me bhagavaddebhyastarati okamtmaviditi so'ha bhagava ocmi ta m
bhagavchokasya pra trayatu' (Chnd. 7.1.3) 'tasmai mditakayya tamasa pra
darayati bhagavnsanatkumra' (Chnd. 7.24 2) iti caivamdy rutayo
mokapratibandhanivttimtramevtmajnasya phala darayanti |

A parent is the one who delivers his or her child into sasra. Pranopaniad says
that six students, including Bharadvja, all of whom became is, said to their guru
Pippalda, "You indeed are our father who gives rebirth to us outside sasra. You take us
to the entirely other side, to the far shore. You are as pjya as our birth mothers and
fathers." Brahman is the other side. The ocean is moha, which can only be crossed by the
boat of knowledge. Avidynivartakam ida jnam. It is not meant for mnasa karma,
which cannot remove avidy.
Chndogya's seventh chapter says that Nrada, being one whose kayas were
effectivly dealt with, went to Sanatkumra and said, "People like you say that the knower
of the tm crosses sorrow. I have heard this said, but I have not really come to know
what is that tm, and I experience sorrow. Therefore I have come to you. Please,
bhagavn, take me across this ocean of sorrow." Sanatkumra taught the
sadvastubrahmajnam which is the other side of darkness, of moha. Clearly that

svarpajnam is not meant for dhynam. Moka is pratibandhanivtti alone; it is not the
product of any activity. The pratibandha is purely ajna, the mistake. Dhynam will not
correct that. Brahmajnam is not vidhieam, it is avidynivartakam. See the difference.
tm being Brahman is shown by the straprama. Tena jnena moka. Avidynivtti is
moka. This is the resolution of sasra.
Bhyakra puts two Chndogya sentences into one. Traditionally you never see the
chapter and verse citations in the original bhya. When this bhya was written you were
supposed to know the Upaniads thoroughly. It was assumed one knew where the quote
was to be found. They had a different mindset. One knew the mantra by heart before
reading the bhya. We struggle with one Rudram.
twa cacayR[It< Nyayaepb&i< ht< sUm! - >ojNmv&idae;imWya}ananamuraerapaye
tdnNtrapayadpvgR> #it,
Tath ccryaprata nyyopabhita stram 'dukhajanmapravttidoamithyjnnmuttarottarpye tadanantarpydapavarga' (Ny. S.
1.1.2) iti |
Gautamamuni, nyyastrakra, author of the Vaieika Stras, says in his first stra
that by the tattvaja of tm there is the nireyas prpti. According to Gautama, tm is all
mixed up with other things, and you have to know what is tm deha vyatirikta.
tmajnt moka. The Skhya too has some kind of tmajnt moka. The question is,
tm is what? The second nyyastra says apavarga, moka, is possible because the early
causes dukha and janma and dharmdharmapravtti and rgadveamohadoa and
mithyjnam - are destroyed. They go away in the reverse order. Dehtmajnam,
tmntm avivekajnam, is mithyjnam and has to go. That gone, doas are gone. That
gone, karmapravtti goes. There is, then, no deha prpti, no janmntara. With no body there
is no dukha. This is moka for the jva. Dukhtmakasasra mithyjnanimitta.
This being said, kkra asks: if Gautama says in the first stra that tmatattvajna
is nireyalbha, why then does his school of thought propose paramnu and dravya and
gua and samavya as real categories. How do you get moka if these things are real? Why
don't these things disappear in the order given? How can moka be a sdhya? The
nyyavkya says that tm is other than everything else, and this is what you have come to
know. The result is not exactly tm confusion, yet tm is other than everything else.
How can you get moka from this dvaitajnam?
imWya}anapay aTmEkTviv}anavit,
Mithyjnpyaca brahmtmaikatvavijndbhavati |
Bhyakra stands up to Gautama: I said mithyjna is nimitta, and that is all. If
you say tm is different than everything else, mithyjna is still there. Up to this point,
what the crya says is okay.
Swamiji: This is Bhyakra doing ju-jitsu. Gautama's problem is 'What is
mithyjna?' The removal of erroneous knowledge is brahmtm ekatva vijna, jva


vara, so'ham iti. The knowledge of the oneness between the jagatkraam and the jva is
the only way to remove erroneous knowledge. Bhyakra has kept this trump card up his
sleeve until now. He makes clear this tattvajna must be brahmtmaikatvavijnam to be
n ced< aTmEkTviv}an< s<ppm!, ywa AnNt< vE mnae=nNta ivedeva AnNtmev s ten laek< jyit
#it, n caXyaspm!, ywa mnae eTyupasIt AaidTyae eTyadez> #it c mn AaidTyaid;u (Xyas>,
naip iviziyayaeginim< vayuvaRv s<vgR> a[ae vav s<vgR> #itvt!,
Na ceda brahmtmaikatvavijna sampadrpam | yath 'ananta vai mano'nant
vivedev anantameva sa tena loka jayati' (Bhad. 3.1.9) iti | na cdhysarpam | yath 'mano
brahmetyupsta' (Chnd. 3.18.1) 'dityo brahmetydea' (Chnd. 3.19.1) iti ca mana
ditydiu brahmadyadhysa | npi viiakriyyoganimitta 'vyurvva savarga'
'pro vva savarga' (Chnd. 4.3.1-4 ) itivat |
Prvapaka: Why dont you take this vkya as some kind of meditation? Your
brahmtmaikatvavijnam is not pram, it is meant only for meditation. Both you and I
know jva is not Brahman. Jva is not jagatkraam, not kraam of anything. Jva Brahma
ekatvam does not exist, it is bhrnti, it is merely an object for meditation, adhysa, atasmin
tad buddhi. Apavargalbha is dhyeyaprpta. Do not follow this dangerous nyya fellow.
Being a mmsaka you should go by the stra which gives you varieties of upsana.
Bhyakra: The brahmtmaikatvavijnam is not sampad rpam. It is not an upsana.
In sampat upsana you have a superimposition nikavastuni utkavastu ropya dhynam.
This is meditation of something on something else as advised by the stra. In one sampat
upsana, the lambana, the adhihna, is mana. The mind and its thoughts are the alpa.
The mind's vttis are countless, one every kaa. Devas too are countless. The meditation
looks upon mind as vivedevas, a certain kind of devas. The upsana is 'every vtti is a
devat'. Sampat upsana is visualization. ropapradhna sampat upsana.
Another form of upsana is called dhysikopsana. There is adhysa in sampat
upsana as well. Adhysopsana is adhihnapradhna. The ropa is less important. All
upsanas imply one thing: one object is looked upon as something else. If an object is
looked upon as it is, or oneself is seen objectively, it is jnam, not upsana. If an object is
deliberately taken as other than what it is, it becomes upsana.
The sampat upsana here would be jvtmabrahmeti upsita. According to the
upsana, with reference to kryakraasaghta, the jva grows - vddhi is there in the jva,
in the buddhi vddhi. Kryavddhi is also there brahma Brahma Brahman has
undergone change and become the jagat. Then the upsana: jvtm is Brahman. You get
brahmatvam. There is some dtaphalam, and there is adtaphala as told by stra. The
meditator gains ananta loka. Anantam can be taken as anantaviaynubhava or anantakla,

a long period of time.

But what I say is cetanabrahma being cetanajva is a statement of fact and not a
matter of sampat upsana. This brahmtmaikatvavijnam is ttparyanicita by the aligas


of the stra and therefore cannot be converted into meditation. A statement of fact should
not be converted into vidhi. You cannot just imagine stra saying whatever you want.
Where omkra is lambanapradhna you have upsana. There, omkrapratka is the
upsana, and this is seen as Brahman. That is dhysikopsana. If you meditate on 'Mind is
Brahman', there will be no discovery of vijna Brahma, nanda Brahma. You have to
continue both your knowledge and your meditations to those meanings, all the way to
nanda Brahma, to make it complete. Meditating on 'I am Brahma' is just saying 'I am' is
what is important. You are not looking at Brahman, you are looking at 'I am.' It is a
difficult upsana.
Chndogya's third chapter instructs you to do 'mano brahmeti upsita'. Whenever
upsana is enjoined, 'iti' will be there. The mind is looked upon as Brahman. Some of the
qualities of Brahma are attributed to mana. Chndogya also gives 'ditya is Brahman'. The
sun sustains everything, therefore the sun is Brahman iti upsita. Both these upsanas say
brahmadi kuryt. This is adhysa. But the brahmtmaikatvajnam is not any kind of
meditation. As we saw, it is not sampad. It is not adhysa, where the idea of Brahman is
superimposed on tm or on anything else. Neither is brahmtmaikatvajnam a meditation
with reference to some special kriy such as 'everything goes into Vyu'.
At the time of destruction, all the elementals retreat into Vyu, and he is the
survivor. Then he becomes unmanifest. This is why Vyu is called savarga, a name for
agni. Vyu takes agni to itself. This withdrawal at pralaya kla is the special kriy here.
Everything goes into the cause. If kriy were the nimitta for jnam, why, when you go to
sleep, when all the externals withdraw, when only breathing continues, when all have
become one with Vyu, with pra, when pra alone survives and is mukhya, do you not
know jva is Brahman as a result? It is because this jnam is not a product of this or any
other dhynam.
Npyjyvekadikarmavatkarmgasaskrarpam |

The patn has to look at the ghee used in the Yajurveda yga. By that it undergoes
change and is yogya for oblation. Similarly, before doing karma, the kart is aga for the
kriy. Kart becomes eligible for oblation. There the kart is enjoined to think of himself
as 'aha Brahma'. It is by ruti alone that you know to do this saskrarpa before you do
karma. But brahmtmaikatvajnam is not an aga to any kart, not a dhynam that one does
to make himself eligible for doing karma. Sampadadhysa viiakriy karmgatva are all
negated by one of Bhyakra's hetus.
s<pdaidpe ih aTmEkTviv}ane=_yupgMymane tvmis Ah< aiSm AymaTma #TyevmadIna<
vaKyana< aTmEkTvvStuitpadnpr> pdsmNvy> pIf(et,
Sampaddirpe hi brahmtmaikatvavijne'bhyupagamyamne 'tattvamasi' (Chnd.
6.8.7) 'aha brahmsmi' (Bhad. 1.4.10) 'ayamtm Brahma' (Bhad. 2.5. 19) ityevamdn
vkyn brahmtmaikatvavastupratipdanapara padasamanvaya pyeta |


All these vedntavkyas have samanvaya in ekatvavijna. All the words resolve in
this; therefore ekatvapratipdanapara. When you say 'ayam tm Brahma' there is no
contradiction, external or internal. A lagrma cannot be all-pervasive Viu - there is a
contradiction and ropa. But here in this vastu which is one as sarvakraa Brahma and
the pthagtm, there is no contradiction because vedntastra is the prama for it. If
ekatvajnam were accepted as sampad upsana it would afflict the strattparya.
k says the aligas are there, and there is ttparyanicaya in that ekavastu.
Therefore the vkyas have samndhikarana and only one dhikarana is there and that is
ayam aparoka satya jnamanantam tm. Why would you give up the proven meaning
that self-evident tm is Brahman and go for something else? Why would you strangle the
i*te dyiNwiZD*Nte svRs<zy> #it cEvmadINyiv*ainv&i)lv[aNyupXyern!,
Bhidyate hdayagranthichidyante sarvasaaya' (Mua. 2.2.8) iti
caivamdnyavidynivttiphalaravanyuparudhyeran |

The vkyas which talk about the result of brahmajnam being avidynivtti
become meaningless, they are negated completely, if they are taken as meditation. The
heart of an ajn is the hdayagranthi. The hdayagranthi is cidtm mana tdtmyarpa
ahakra thinking 'I am my mind; I am this much alone'. The ahakra is born of avidy
alone. It gets further knotted in a life of karma. If you do not resolve that knot, other knots
come. Only if knowledge is there will the basic knot loosen, and not if you say the jnam
is meant for dhynam. No kind of vidhiea will remove doubt, only pram will remove
ved Ev vit #it cEvmadIin tavapivcnain s<pdaidp]e n samSyenaepp*ern!,
'Brahma Veda brahmaiva bhavati' (Mu. 3.2.9) iti caivamdni tadbhvpattivacanni
sampaddipake na smajasyenopapadyeran |
There is no tenability for taking any of the four opposed pakas as the vivak of
the vedntavkyas. The one who knows Brahman is Brahman. If you are meditating on
Brahman to be tm which it is not, you will never become Brahman. Abrahman is thinking
he is Brahman. It is crazy. It would be better to think that you were a king. If aham and
Brahman are different, the vkyas cannot give you meaning. By sampat meditation how
could there be that bhva, brahmabhva? You can get some puya, but you could never
say 'I am Brahman' as the result of upsana. If the jva gives up jvatvam, what assurance
does he have that he will become Brahman? He just lost his jvatvam, that's all. After a
hundred years of dhynam, jva is jva and Brahman remains Brahman. For some minutes a
day he is in his meditative fantasy, but then he has to get up. Jva did not become Brahman.
tSma sMpdaidp< aTmEkTviv}anm!,
Tasmnna sampaddirpa brahmtmaikatvavijnam |


Ekatvavijna is not sampaddirpa, it is not upsanaviaya. It is not just a matter

of thinking 'I am this.' Upsana is always superimposition, but this is not really
abhedajnam. If it were, all these vkyas would become meaningless.
Atae n pu;ivyaparta iv*a,
Ato na puruaviypratantr brahmavidy |

Your will has no role with regard to jnam. I tell you all the cryas in the Sabh
will say that Brahman is meant for meditation. Only this bhya says what the reality is.
Brahmavidy is not puruatantra not strtantra either. It is not centered on will. If it is
krya, it is will-based. If it is jna it is vastu-based, pramna-based. The jnam is as true
as the vastu. Keep in mind always that a pramna may be defective. You are always safe
with 'vastutantram'. Your eyes may tell you that it is a snake; then you have to prove the
pramna is pramna. Knowledge is as true as the vastu. Abhditajnajanaka pramnam.
The jnam should not be subject to negation.
Knowledge of Brahman is not connected to any kriy, not karmaeam.
Brahmajnam is not kriysdhanam. Moka is not kriysdhya. All the arguments given by
all the prvapaks are negated.
ik< tihR Ty]aidma[iv;yvStu}anvStuta,
Ki tarhi pratyakdipramaviayavastujnavadvastutantr |

There are pratyakdi pramnaviayni, and anumna and arthpatti are based on
proper sensory data. If the steps are followed and the means are in order, the conclusion
will be always the same. Pramaprpta is vastutantram. Everyone will see the same
flower. The viayas of the senses are the vastus. The vastujnam is as true as the vastu.
Similarly, brahmavidy is vastuviaya, as true as the vastu. It is not a matter of whether or
not you want to have anything to do with Brahman. Brahman is what is, is. Every time you
enjoy, it is Brahman. You become that brahmalea. The enjoyed and the enjoyed become
one and the same. In that there is nanda. nandasvarpa Brahma.
U Sy [StJ}anSy c n kyaic*uya zKy> kayaRn
u vez> kLpiytum,
Evambhtasya brahmaastajjnasya ca na kaycidyukty akya krynupravea
kalpayitum |
It is not possible for you to imagine a way to put karma in touch with Brahman, not
with any kind of karma or by any type of yukti. This means Brahman cannot be an object
of your karma. Brahman is not connected in any way to karma.
n c ividiyakmRTven kayaRn
u vezae [> ANydev tiidtadwae Aividtadix #it
ividiyakmRTvit;exat! yend
e < sv iv}anait t< ken ivjanIyat! #it c,
Na ca vidikriykarmatvena krynupraveo brahmaa 'anyadeva tadviditdatho
aviditdadhi' (Kena. I. 4) iti vidikriykarmatvapratiedht 'yeneda sarva vijnti ta kena
vijnyt' (Bhad. 2.4.14) iti ca |


Question: If I am nitya Brahman, why do I need some means through which it is

Bhyakra: Brahman is pramasdhya, vastutantra. From all the arguments
advanced so far, siddhabrahmarpamokasya. Knowing ayam tm brahmeti is moka. And
siddhasya sdhya nsti. Even Bhagavn cannot give you the head that is already on your
neck. But jeyatvam siddhabrahmaa asti. Why? Avidyay Brahma becomes jijsyam. This
is why there is stra.
Brahman is not the aga of any krya. It is not any kraka. If you want to know
Brahman, it becomes an object of this desire and this knowledge. But it is not an object
you do anything with. Though an object, it is not an object of vidhikriy. It is not this kind
of object. It is other than krya and kraa; it is both known and unknown. It is neither
known nor unknown. Brahman is an object of knowledge that is not an object. Even if you
know Brahman as an object of knowedge, there is nothing you can add to it or connect to
it. It is yourself, the very nature of tm, not available for objectification. Even if it is that

by which everything is objectifed it is not beyond. Being self-evident it need not be

objectified. It is this one without a second. Know it as yourself.
ywaepiStiyakmRTvit;exae=ip vit - yacan_yuidt< yen vag_yu*te #Tyiv;yTv< [ %pNySy
tdev Tv< ivi ned< yiddmupaste #it,
Yathopastikriykarmatvapratiedho'pi bhavati 'yadvcnabhyudita yena
vgabhyudyate' ityaviayatva brahmaa upanyasya 'tadeva Brahma tva viddhi neda
yadidamupsate' (Kena. 1.5) iti |
Brahman is that which cannot be objectified by words or mind. It is that by which
a word and its meaning are known to you. Kenopaniad says it is that by which everything
is known and is not an object of meditation. Upsana is fine, but it is not the
brahmasvarpam we are talking about. Even though it is known through words of the
stra, Brahman is not the object of any word.
Aiv;yTve [> zayaeinTvanuppiiritcet,
! n, Aiv*akiLptedinv&iprTvaCDaSy,
Aviayatve brahmaa strayonitvnupapattiriticet | na |
avidykalpitabhedanivttiparatvcchstrasya |
stra is not pointing out this or that to be Brahman. Because Brahman is selfevident tm, the stra only negates all your notions. Avidynivttiparatva strasya.
There is no viayaparatvam to point out this is Brahman. Idantay na nirdiyate. Only
tmatvena nirdiyate. We will see that difference.
Objection: You cited a vkya that says Brahman is not available as on object. The
original pratij of the stra strayonitvt - indicates Brahman is known through the
vedastram. The mms of the stra is, then, undertaken to know Brahman, and the
knowledge of Brahman is said to be moka. What connection can there be between stra
and this unknowable moka? Why do you study words? If Brahman is not bdam then
strayonitvam is not acceptable.


Bhyakra: stra has its commitment, or you can take it as its phala, in
bhedanivtti. The notion that everything is different than me, the separation of
jtjnajneya, dgdya, is negated here. Brahman is not an object for words here; abda
removes the bheda. stra does not have to identify Brahman as the object of any word, it
need only remove the ignorance that sets up dvaitabheda. The phala is avidynivtti
because bheda is avidykalpita. All division is mithybhtavikalpita. If Brahman is selfevident, the avidy goes by removing the avidy. That's all. Avidynivtti is possible
without Brahman being vttiviaya.
Generally, for avidy to go, a vttiviaya is objectified by you and you have
vttivypti of the object, such as a clay pot. Brahman does not lend itself to be objectified,
but stra gives you vttivypti. This does not mean Brahma is available for knowledge as
a sense object. Brahman is not an object, but it is to be recognized. We will see the many
vkyas 'For whom Brahman is known, he does not know at all' et cetera which hold the
intriguing meaning. stra has a definite style of saying this tm is self-evident, not
available for objectification. There is vttivypti but there is no phalavypti. The
vttivyptyapeka being there, strayonitvam is there. This is called avidynivtti.
tmaa brahmatvam is the viaya. Avidy with reference to this means vtti is
necessary. The avidy has to go. The only prama for that is stra. Mahvkyajanyavtti is
born of the vedntavkya. This is the akhakravtti. Ayam tm Brahma understood, this
vtti makes avidy go away. Avidynivtti is the phalam. strasya
avidykalpitabhedanivttiparatvam. The vedntajanyavtti is capable of this phala
bhedanivtti avidynivtti. strasya pramakatvam. stra yonitvam. Without stra there is
no avidynivtti.
Knowledge takes place in two different ways. In ghaa ajnam the ghakra vtti
is necessary. What was aviaya before has become the vttiviaya. The remoteness of the
ghaa is gone once it is objectifed. It is inside the mind in the form of the vtti. The sight
prama gives you the pot vtti. Then, the pramt looking at the vtti with its viaya
recognizes 'this is ghaa'. That pramtu recognition is called the pramaphalam. This

does not take any time; there are two operations at the same time. The first step is in the
vtti the ghaa is abhivyakta - it is revealed. The second step is the ghaa sphuraam takes
place for the seer of the pot. The second operation is a must for anything that can be
objectified. In fact every thing, including avidy, has to be objectified. But not tm; tm
is self-evident. What is not objectified and still recognized because of the
vedntavkyajanyavtti is tm being Brahman.
Brahmavttiviayatve'pi svaprakabrahman is self-evident as tm. There is no
Brahman other than pthagtm. There is only one. Therefore there is no sphuraaviayatva
brahmaa. It is your self, that which is shining right now. There is no experience of a
separate Brahman. There is no experience that is not Brahman. tm being Brahman, only
all the notions have to go. The problem is only because of the mistake, not because it is
difficult to get hold of Brahman. Aha samsritvam is the mistake. For that to go, the vastu
has to be understood. The brahmavastu being understood, that is gone. All these vkyas are


pointing out sasritvabhrntinivtti by the knowledge of this Brahman unavailable for

The commitment of the stravkyas is to unfold this Brahman by removing the
difference between jt jna jneya. How does it go? Jt is Brahman, jna is Brahman,
jneya is Brahman the bhedanivtti takes place by knowledge and not by any special
nih zaimd<tya iv;yUt< itippadiy;it, ik< tihR TygaTmTvenaiv;ytya
Tpadydiv*akiLpt< ve*veidt&vd
e naidedmpnyit,
Nahi stramidantay viayabhta Brahma pratipipdayiati | ki tarhi
pratyagtmatvenviayatay pratpdayadavidykalpita vedyaveditvedandibhedamapanayati |

The stra has no intention to reveal Brahman as this or that object called Brahman.
To see it any other way is confusion or deception. stra reveals Brahman as having the
status of being pthagtm. Brahman is not not-separate from pthagtm, it is only
pthagtm. There is no outer self and inner self. Pthagtm is not a pearl deep in the
heart of Brahman's oyster. Where would you need look to find the source of I that is selfrevealing? The new-wave words all sound good, and you can put people on a spin for
years, and it is very inviting. You can tell them that you have dived deep and seen the
sights along the way. You can quote your sources and go on about the things to pursue
and the things to avoid as you search. There is a lot of masala. It is all nonsense, tm
with costume, updhi. Brahman is not an object of consciousness because it is
The division of jtjnajneya is avidyay kalpitam, mithybhtam. Knower,
known and knowledge; doer, done and doing; bhokt bhogya bhoga stra negates all
avidykalpita bheda pthagtmatvena brahmaa.
twac zam! - ySyamt< tSy mt< mt< ySy n ved s>, Aiv}at< ivjant< iv}atmivjantam! n
eR ar< pZye> n iv}ateivR}atar< ivjanIya> #it cEvmaid,
Tathca stram 'yasymata tasya mata mata yasya na Veda sa | avijta
vijnata vijtamavijnatm' (Kena. 2.3) 'na derdrara paye' 'na vijtervijtra
vijny' (Bhad. 3.4.2) iti caivamdi |
Bhyakra quotes stra to point out that brahmtm is not the object of cit. The
object of consciousness is 'idam'. Anidantay means aviayatay. Mati is vtti. Amatam
means Brahman is not a vttiviayam. The one who said he saw Brahman does not know
anything. There is a kind of a punning in this Kenopaniad vkya. Generally, those who

know something know. Here there is a twist of words to give you a shock. 'For whom it is
known it is not known, for whom it is not known it is known.' Zing! The mystics all love
this zany statement. Brahman is never an object of consciousness; you have to know how
it is known. For those who know Brahman, it is not an object. For whom Brahma is adya
it is known; for whom it is dya it is not known.


'Na paye' is a vidhi li madhyamapurua expression. With reference to visual

perception there is mental vtti. You will never see the witness, sk, of the manovtti
which itself is seen. Neither will you ever be able to know by buddhivtti the one who is
the sk of the buddhivtti. Tamil is very good for these tongue-and-mind twisting
statements. All of them are nothing but avidynivtti.
e inTymuaTmSvpsmpR[a mae]SyainTyTvdae;>,
Ato'vidykalpitasasritvanivartanena nityamukttmasvarpasamarpanna
mokasynityatvadoa |
Avidynivttiy strayonitvam. strapramaka Brahma.
Question: Does this nivtti take place at a given time or not? The departure of
avidy must be an event in time. What is born is born in time. If moka is born, how can it
be nitya? Light came and darkness went; avidy went and moka came.
Bhyakra: Avidynivtti is not gantuk, not an event, not an advent of moka. The
negation of the sasritvam superimposed on the tm reveals mukttmasvarpa. You
discover tm already is mukta. Nothing was released; tm is eternally released, never
bound, never sasritva. You thought you were a sasr and therefore the word 'moka'
became viable to you. What has happened is your kalpitasasritvam is gone. That's all.
Moka is already there, unborn, nityamuktasvarpasamrpant. The problem of anitya for
moka does not exist. If you say moka is born, is aprva, it is your problem.
For you, sir, your moka is anitya, it is to be created. For you it is karmaphalam.
Utpdya vikryam pya saskryam these are the four types of results, karmaphala.
But moka is svarpa, non-separate from Brahman. Brahmasvarpa is mokasvarpa.
Therefore moka is not any of the products of karma, not utpdya. Creation, modification,
gain, and purification are there for the Vedic rituals and for the karma of laukika life. But
moka is not the product of karma, not the product of upsana, and not any of these four

possible results.
ySy tUTpa*ae mae]StSy mans< vaick< kaiyk< va kayRmpe]t #it yum!, twa ivkayRTve c tyae>
R Sy uvminTyTvm!,
Yasya ttpdyo mokastasya mnasa, vcika, kyika v kryamapekata iti yuktam
| tath vikryatve ca tayo pakayormokasya dhruvamanityatvam |

For one for whom moka is to be created in time there are three types of karma.
Kyika mnasa vcikam at least one of them must be employed to create a result. For
one for whom tm is to be modified into Brahman, the same three types of karma apply.
Being the result of any karma, being sdhya, that result will be anitya. There is no doing
eternal karma. For both utpdya and vikryapaka definitely there is anityatvam. pyatvam
brahmaa is not possible because you are not away from Brahman. What is already there
cannot be gained or reached.
nih dXyaid ivkay %Tpa*< va "qaid inTy< < laek,


Nahi dadhydi vikryam, utpdya v ghadi, nitya da loke |

A pot is created by an action, and there is no eternal pot. By adding buttermilk,

milk changes to curds. By the kriy you modify. Then you churn the curds. These are all
vikra. But there is no eternal product of modification. stra does not go against your
own prama and say that a created effect is eternal. Moka is not created.
n caPyTvenaip kayaRp]
e a SvaTmpTve sTynaPyTvat!,
Na cpyatvenpi krypek, svtmarpatve satyanpyatvt |
Moka is not born of an action that is said to have as its purpose gaining or
reaching moka. Moka being Brahma, Brahma being one's own tmasvarpa, na pyatvam.
You cannot reach yourself. tmalbh mokalbh is only because you thought you had
lost it. Any such gain is upacra from a given standpoint.
SvpVyitirTve=ip [ae naPyTv< svRgtTven inTyaSvpTvaTsve[
R [> AakazSyev,
Svarpavyatiriktatve'pi brahmao npyatva, sarvagatatvena
nityptasvarpatvtsarvea brahmaa, kasyeva |

Here Bhyakra does the vikalpa. If Brahman is pya, is Brahman other than the jva
or is Brahman jva? If Brahman is the jvasvarpa, it is myself and there is no pyatvam. If
Brahman is other than me, if Brahman is sarvagatam as revealed by the stra, there is no
way you can go and reach that all-pervasive Brahman. And you cannot produce nitya
Brahma. Either way pyam is useless. Either way Brahman is not to be reached, na
I used to use this argument from the standpoint of pra Brahma when there was
little time. Brahman is all-pervasive. All-pervasive Brahman should include me. If it does
not include me it is not all-pervasive. If I am out, it is not all-pervasive. All-pervasive
wholeness should include me - but not as a part. If everyone is a part, what is left out for
all-pervasive Brahman? If the partless whole includes me then I am the whole. I am the
whole, pro'ham. I would argue this and then go away. Nobody would understand what I
have said, but at least I said what I had to say.
Like space, you cannot visit Brahman. Even if it were other than tmasvarpa,
Brahma would not be pya because, like space, it is sarvagata. This is an argument based
on ruti, because sarvagatatvam is rutiprpta.
naip s<SkayaeR mae]> yen Vyaparmpe]t
e , s<Skarae ih nam s<SkayRSy gu[axanen va Syaae;apnynen va,
n tav[axanen s<vit AnaxeyaitzySvpTvaNmae]Sy,
Npi saskryo moka, yena vypramapeketa | saskro hi nma saskryasya
gudhnena v syddopanayanena v | na tvahudhnena sambhavati,
andheytiayabrahmasvarpatvnmokasya |

The ghee is made sasktam, eligible for use as oblation, by being seen by patn.
Prokaam, consecration by sprinkling water, too is saskra. Acyutya acyutanama is
saskra. With niuddhi pryma and mantra you make yourself ready to do karma.

They do kartkrakasaskra, karmakrakasaskra and karaakrakasakra. Even the

ladle by which you offer is saskta. Adhikraasaskra also. All are made eligible for
the karma.
Question: If already I am nityauddha, I may have to bring that out, help it emerge
- like wiping clean brings out clearly the reflection in a mirror. Saskrya moka. Moka
is saskrakriyphalam. Like an old pot that requires a lot of scrubbing and polishing, I
need to act in order to clean off moka.
Bhyakra: No, there is no kriypek mokasya. Moka is not an object which has
to undergo saskra. When you do saskra you either add a gua or remove a doa.
When you launder clothes you remove the dirt and grime doa apanayanam. After you
clean the room, you spray gua dhnam. Then you sneeze. Can you add anything to
moka? Moka is the very svarpa of Brahman, and Brahman cannot take any gua
nirguatvt. All the guas that you can add are already Brahma's guas, guas Brahman is
free of.
naip dae;apnynen inTyzuSvpTvaNmae]Sy, SvaTmxmR @v s<iStraet
U ae mae]>, iyyaTmin
s<iSyma[e=iVyJyte ywadzeR inx;R[iyya s<iSyma[e aSvrTv< xmR #it ce iyayTvanupperaTmn>,
Npi dopanayanena, nityauddhabrahmasvarpatvnmokasya | svtmadharma eva
sastirobhto moka | kriyaytmani saskriyame'bhivyajyate yathdare nidharaakriyay
saskriyame bhsvaratva dharma iti cenna, kriyrayatvnupapattertmana |

What mala can you take from moka? Nityauddha Brahma never was sullied,
never was sasr. There is nothing to take from Brahman to make it uddha.
Question: What if we say that moka is tmadharma, and by doing dhynakriy tm
becomes saskta and moka becomes manifest like the reflection in a cleaned mirror.
Bhyakra: Kriyryatvam is not there for the tm. It is not an object available
for cleaning or any other action. tm is not at the other end of any kriy.
Question: Moka, the svtmadharma, is covered by avidy. By upsana it can be
made manifest and cleared of impurities.
Bhyakra: Is the mala in the moka satyam or mithy? If it is satyamala how are
you going to remove it? If it is kalpitamala how are you going to remove it? Kalpitamala
goes away by knowledge, not by kriy. Kalpitamala means there is no mala there anyway.
Even if we accept it is satyamala, as the Jains say, it is kalpita and no connection to tm is
possible. Neither is tm an object which is available for connection. Neither is tm
available for connection to a change brought about by kriy.
ydaya iya tmivkvt
R I nEvaTman< lte, y*aTma iyya iviyetainTyTvmaTmn> sJyet,
R ymuCyte #it cEvmadIin vaKyain baXyern!, tainm!,
Yadray kriy tamavikurvat naivtmna labhate | yadytm kriyay
vikriyetnityatvamtmana prasajyeta | 'avikryo'yamucyate' iti caivamdni vkyni
bdhyeran | taccniam |


tm never comes into being, and it is not the locus for any kind of action. Kriy
never acts on an object without that object undergoing change, and no connection allows
such a change to take place in tm. tm is without change, therefore there is no kriy. If
tm were subject to change you could remove the mala and the mala could come again.
There can be no absolute cleaning. This is not moka. If tm undergoes a change by kriy
it becomes anitya. tm being subject to change would negate vkyas such as the gtvakya
that says 'tm is avikrya'. That would be unacceptable for both of us as mmsakas.
tSma Svaya iyaTmn> s<vit, ANyayayaStu iyaya Aiv;yTva tyaTma s<iSyte,
Tasmnna svray kriytmana sambhavati | anyrayystu kriyy aviayatvnna
taytm saskriyate |
Vikalpa: Is tm svraya or anyraya?
tm is not an raya for kriy. And kriy on any object, on what is other than tm,
will not purify tm, which is not an object and not connected to any object which

purifies. If you clean your floor, it will not clean your clothes. You can use brick powder
and put it with water and clean bricks. One thing cleaning another depends on the
connections involved.
nnu dehayya anacmny}aepvItaidkya iyya dehI s<iSyma[ae >, n,
dehaids<htSyEvaiv*ag&hItSyaTmn> s<iSyma[Tvat!, Ty]< ih anacmnadedh
eR smvaiyTvm!,
Nanu dehrayay snncamanayajopavtdikay kriyay deh saskriyamo da |
na | dehdisahatasyaivvidyghtasytmana saskriyamatvt | pratyaka hi
snncamanderdehasamavyitvam |

Now we see the set up Bhyakra has done with the seemingly meaningless
question of tm becoming moka as a result of cleaning something else.
Question: Is not the body an raya for a number of kriys, and by those actions
isn't tm purified? Bathing and rinsing the mouth and wearing the yajopavtam make
you, the deh, not the body, feel good. The kriys are connected to tm.
Bhyakra: No, the problem is the deh is falsely connected to the
kryakranasaghta. By avidy the tm is taken to be as good as the mind and senses and
body. In fact the saskra is for the deh only. Snnam camanam yajopavta are meant for
the deh, though they are directly perceived as associated with the body. The body is
cleaned too, but it is the deh that has the 'I am clean' buddhi.
tya dehayya tTs<ht @v kidiv*yaTmTven pirg&hIt> s<iSyt #it yum!,
Tay dehrayay tatsahata eva kacidavidyaytmatvena parighta saskriyata iti
yuktam |

These kriys are for the body, how can you feel good as a result? Because you are
connected to the body; tmatvam is there. Some abhimna is there, and for that abhimn
alone is the saskra. The purua with dehdiviia, who is endowed with the body, who


due to avidy takes tm to be the body, naturally feels he is purified by the sanctioned
ywa dehayicikTsainimen xatusaMyen tTs<htSy tdimainn AaraeGy)l< Ahmraeg #it y
buiTp*te, @v< anacmny}aepvItaidna Ah< zu> s<Skt #it y buiTp*te s s<iSyte, s c dehn
s<ht @v,
Yath dehrayacikitsnimittena dhtusmyena tatsahatasya tadabhimnina
rogyaphalam, ahamaroga iti yatra buddhirutpadyate | eva snncamanayajopavtdin aha
uddha saskta iti yatra buddhirutpadyate sa saskriyate | sa ca dehena sahata eva |

Whoever feels he is saskta alone saskriyate kriyay. Suppose a fellow is ill.

He gets treatment that cures him. He gets the phalam. His kapha pitta vyu are balanced;
his saptadhtus are aligned. His body is restored to harmony and health. He thinks 'I am
cured'. The health, arogya, belongs to the body. But the phalam this 'I am cured' buddhi is for the one with abhimn. Yasmin tmani, in the ahakra, that buddhi is born. The
saskrya and the buddhi are for him, not for saccidnanda tm. The ahakra alone has
this feeling 'I am cured'. This alone is undergoing saskra. What we are addressing now
is you do not require any saskra; you are nityashuddha. Keep clean that which needs to
be kept clean, that is okay. But the tm is not purified by purifiying something else. For
this fellow who was ill the dehtmabuddhi persists, and the abhimn remains connected to
the body due to avidy.
Question: The saskras are for the dehbhimn, dehavyatirikta tm. When there is
saskra, the kart performs the jyotiomakarma and then goes to svarga. The saskra
vidhi tells us this. When you talk about who is qualified for karma it is all saskra. It is
the sasktapurua alone who goes to paraloka. But if what you say is true, in spite of all
his saskras and karmas he is not qualified - he cannot be the one who enjoys that
promised loka. The promised loka would not be available for the phalabhokt because he is
separate from the body and has not actually been purified by the karmas.
E h<kaRh
< Tyyiv;ye[ Tyiyna svaR> iya invRTyRNte, tT)l< c s @vaait tyaerNy> ipPpl<
SvaynNyae AicakzIit #it mvanaRt,
! AaTmeiNymanaeyum! aeTe yamRnIi;[> #it c,
Tenaiva hyahakartrhampratyayaviayea pratyayin sarv kriy nirvartyante |
tatphala ca sa evnti, 'tayoranya pippala svdvattyananannanyo abhickati'(Mua.
3.1.1) iti mantravrnt | 'tmendriyamnoyuktam bhoktetyhurmania' (Kah. 1.3.4) iti ca |
Swamiji: The one with all kryakranasaghta, the one with abhimn, the one with
aha kart buddhi, the one with all the kmdipratyayas, this ahakra that accomplishes all
the karmas, as a bhokt, enjoys the karmaphala. All these actions are accomplished only by
the ahakra, the kart, and he alone enjoys the phala. The k refers to pratibimbattm,
cidbhsa tm, but we avoid that sense of a reflected tm. Even though all the kriys are
accomplished by the kryakranasaghta, the karttvam belongs to the ahakra alone. The


fellow with the asmatpratyayaviaya, the ahakra with all the pratyayas, the pratyay who is
himself nothing but a pratyaya, becomes kart.
This all humbug, really. This is mithy. But there is no other way things can be
achieved. We will continue with k's explanation. All cognitions belong to this ahakra
ahakart fellow. By this fellow alone the kriys are accomplished and all the phala
experienced. Bhokttvam is for the pratyay, not for the sk tm who, k agrees, is the
real tm. There are two tms as it were. One is cidbhsa and one is cidtm. As though
there are two, the kalpita and the real. Don't go away with two.
With the pramt and the sk, there is the sattvagua which accounts for buddhi.
The antakaraa even though elsewhere said to be covered by tamas is sattvagua for
everybody. Because of the association with sattva, karttvam and bhokttvam are kalpita on
the pramt. If you know, it is mithybhtakarttvam and mithybhtabhokttvam that bring
about kartabhokt there, but bdhita. If you know, they are bdhita. Otherwise they are real.
Bhyakra cites Muaka here: the kalpitakarttvdimn, the pramt, enjoys the
phalam. The pramt is the bhokt. The same bhokt, once analyzed and understood
through the stra, after the vicra, becomes anya, sk. There are not two things really
speaking. The sk does not really get involved in bhoga et cetera. Bhyakra cites
Kahopaniad which says the ones who know the stra say that the one who is the bhokt
is not the saccid tm. The one endowed with deha and indriyas and mana, the complex
alone, is the bhokt. That means there is no bhokt; the components are mithy - like a car;
when you analyze it into parts, there is no car. Note that here in the Kahopaniad text the
word tm is used for deha. The pramt, the one with dehendriya updhis, alone is the
bhokt. Free from any updhi, the cidtm is untouched by any saskra.
twa c @kae dev> svRt
U ;
e u gUF> svRVyapI svRt
U aNtraTma, kmaRXy]> svRt
U aixvas> sa]I ceta
kevlae ingu[
R #it, s pyRgaCDumkaym[maivr< zumpapivm! #it c, @taE mavnaxeyaitzyta<
inTyzuta< c [ae dzRyt> av mae]>,
Tath ca 'eko deva sarvabhteu gha sarvavyp sarvabhtntartm |
karmdhyaka sarvabhtdhivsa sk cet kevalo nirguaca' (vet. 6.11) iti | 'sa
paryagcchukramakyamavraamasnvira uddhamappaviddham' (Ish. 8) iti ca | etau
mantrvandheytiayat nityauddhat ca brahmao darayata brahmabhvaca moka |
Bhyakra cites vetvatara Upaniad here. In all beings there is only one deva,
one vastu, one effulgent being. In fact there is no second being at all. Because this one
praksahavat jyotin is as though gha, some say there are many tms. Only from
updhita standpoint can you count many, like you count the clay pots. There is only one.
Unless you know, until then it is gha. In the pots you can see mt, but here, tm
gha. This one is all-pervasive and advaya, unconnected to jva. If you do not know, this
one is varaa and you cannot see. And you cannot see only because you cannot see. This
is the only reason. This one is the pthagtm of every jva, mistaken to be the kart.
Pthagtm is unconnected krakask, witness consciousness.


'Witness' is a problematic word because once there is a witness there is a second

something witnessed. But this sk is the adhihna of all beings; it is all that there is, and
the second thing is kalpita. The entire dvaita skyam is kalpitam mithy on the sk. Cet is
cet kevala, the one who is consciousness, cid dhtvrtha, cetanasvarpa, this caitanya.
Cettvam means knowingness, and you may think this means karttvam and bhokttvam are
there. But the sk is not a kart kevala nirgua. tm is nirdoa, free of every
attribute, free of saskrdhnam and apanayana.
vsya says, using masculine gender, this brahmtm is all-pervasive, white, all
one effulgent consciousness, free from skmaarra, free from sthlaarra, not subject to
hurt or injury, free from arteries and veins and the nerve system, not subject to aging and
time. The two mantras cited state that tm is free from rgadvea, untouched by
puyappa, nityauddha. Everything is clearly said, but still people take it differently.
That is what amazes me.
tSma s<Skayae=
R ip mae]>, Atae=NyNmae]< it iyanuvezar< n zKy< keniczRiytum,
tSmaJ}anmek< muva iyaya gNxmaSyaPynuvez #h naepp*te,
Tasmnna saskryo'pi moka | ato'nyanmoka prati kriynupraveadvra na
akya kenaciddarayitum | tasmjjnameka muktv kriyy gandhamtrasypyanupravea
iha nopapadyate |
Kriysdhyatvam for tm has been discussed and dismissed. There is no
saskryam for tm. No one can show there is any other kriy that can give access to
moka. Not even a whiff of kriy enters moka. For everything else, kriy. Jnt eva moka.
There is no fifth kriy. Jnam is the only one way. There is no other dvara for moka.
nnu }an< nam mansI iya, n, vEl]{yat!,
Nanu jna nma mnas kriy | na | vailakayt |
Question: You assume jna is not kriy. Then you say except jnam there is no
moka. But jnam itself is mnasakriy. Jdhtu is kriy. All the krakas are involved in
the word itself. You are making a vyghta. Jnam is sakarmaka.
Bhyakra: No. Jna and kriy are poles apart. There is no connection between
the two. Jnam and dhynam both mnasam. But only dhynam is kriy. Jnam has to
take place in the mind. Mnasam api dhynavat, but jnam na kriy.
Kriy is vidhiyogya, vidhiviaya. Kriy is also because of your will, puruatantra.
Jnam is entirely different, vastutantram, entirely centered on the vastu.
iya ih nam sa y vStuSvpinrpe]v
E cae*te pu;icVyaparaxIna c, ywa ySyE devtayE hivg&h
R It<
Syaa< mnsa Xyaye;qkir:yn! #it, s<Xya< mnsa Xyayet! #it cEvmaid;u, Xyan< icNtn< y*ip mans< twaip
pu;e[ ktum
R ktum
R Nywa va ktu zKy< pu;tTvat!,
Kriy hi nma s yatra vastusvarpanirapekaiva codyate, puruacittavyprdhn ca |
yath 'yasyai devatyai havirghta sytt manas dhyyedvaakariyan' iti | 'sandhy


manas dhyyet' (Ait. Br. 11.8.1) iti caivamdiu | dhyna cintana yadyapi mnasa tathpi
puruea kartumakartumanyath v kartu akya, puruatantratvt |
Mnasakriy is karma. Kriy is where there is vidhi, niyoga, codan, and where
vastusvarpa is not the topic, where there is no intention of revealing the vastusvarpa.
Kriy also involves mental activity, cittavypra, of the human mind, and that means it is
puruatantra. For example, there is a vidhi that when the Hot is about to chant the mantra
he will mention the devat to be invoked. To do that he has to think of that devat. Vaa is
a ruti word like svh, used to offer into fire. When the Adhvaryu is about to take up the
offering, the devat is brought to mind by the gved. The vidhi is there to do dhynam. It
is a codanvkya, and it is puruatantram, an expression of the will of the priest who wants
to complete the karma. The stra itself will give options with regard to aspects of the
karma. This shows the kriy is puruatantra. Whereas jnam is not in any way based on
will and is different in that way from kriy.
You cannot say jnam kriy mnasatvt dhynavat. That is not a valid logic. You
cannot say knowledge is action because it takes place in the mind as does dhynam. You
see and hear this though because people want devotees who will swallow this. Kti
sdhyatve kriy. Dhynam is kriy. Jnam mnasam api kti asdhyatvt na kriy. That is the
jna updhi, the conditioning factor.
}an< tu ma[jNym!, ma[< c ywaUtvStuiv;ym!, Atae }an< ktum
R ktum
R Nywa va ktum
R zKy< kevl<
vStutmev tt!, n caednatm!, naip pu;tm!, tSmaNmansTve=ip }anSy mhEl]{ym!,
Jna tu pramajanyam | prama ca yathbhtavastuviayam | ato jna
kartumakartumanyath v kartumaakya kevala vastutantrameva tat | na codantantram |
npi puruatantram | tasmnmnasatve'pi jnasya mahadvailakayam |

All that has been taught comes like daylight here. Knowledge is born of prama.
Prama means the particular vtti because of which jnam takes place. Jnam is
entirely dependent on, and based on, the object of that vtti. If it is a flower, this is the
viaya for the prama. You have no choice as to what it is; it is what it is. You can make
a mistake, but the vastu still is what it is. You can single out objects by directing your
attention and your sense organs, but the senses, when you are awake, are always on and
make contact with their objects whether you are directed at them or not. When the eyes
and their object are brought into alignment, and there is no inadequacy of light and no
defect in the sense organ, sight takes place. With regard to knowledge you have no choice
to do or not do or to do otherwise.
A vidhi, codan, only tells you 'Please do it'. The vidhi cannot make you do it. The
operation, the doing of the vidhi, is puruatantra, not codantantram. You have to do it.
You can see how different the two things are. When knowledge takes place only pramt
is there. If will comes into play, the knowledge is vitiated wishful thinking, coloration,
subjectivity. Only objectivity keeps all our anxieties from coloring everything.


ywa c pu;ae vav gaEtmai> yae;a vav gaEtmai> #Ty yaei;Tpu;yaeribuimaRnsI vit,
kevlcaednajNyTvaiTyEv sa pu;ta c, ya tu ise=avibuinR sa caednata, naip pu;ta, ik<
tihR Ty]iv;yvStutEvie t }anmevt
E iya, @v< svRma[iv;yvStu;u veidtVym!,
Yath ca 'puruo vva gautamgni' 'yo vva gautamgni' (Chnd. 5.7.1) ityatra
yoitpuruayoragnibuddhirmnas bhavati | kevalacodanjanyatvtkriyaiva s puruatantr ca |
y tu prasiddhe'gnvagnibuddhirna s codantantr | npi puruatantr | ki tarhi
pratyakaviayavastutantraiveti jnamevaitanna kriy | eva sarvapramaviayavastuu
veditavyam |

Where upsana is mentioned in Upaniad it should be recognized as such.

Chndogya says: Hey, Gautama, take the purua as one of the five agnis, take str as
another agni.' A man is not a fire, you cannot boil water on his head. But, for meditation,
you can do this superimposition. A vidhi is here. You are asked to look upon a person as
fire. Is it pram or kriy? It is purely mental dhynam, born of codan. It is not really a
command, just a statement of the steps to follow for the kriy. It is centered on your will.
Between the person and the agni the difference is ignored and the pacgni vidhi dhynam
can be done. But this is not a matter of knowledge.
You do not need a vidhi to tell you fire is fire. Neither was it you that decided fire
is fire. The knowledge of what is fire is purely a product of your pratyakaprama. The
cognition has its object in the vastu that is born of the pratyaka. It is vastutantra,
pramatantram, na kriytantram: only then it is jnam. You have no choice with regard
to the agnibuddhim, neither is it vidhi.
Codant jnam, abdt jnam, such as this meditation on a man as a fire, is
entirely different; there is no vastutantra involved. You do not directly see the fire as the
purua. Pratyakapramna is not involved here. The dhynam you do is kriy na jnam.
The fact about pramajanyajnam has to be extended to all pramas, even bdabodham
is like that. It is vastutantra. There is no vidhikriy, no kriysdhyatvam, in what is
tEv< sit ywaUtaTmiv;ymip }anm! n caednatm!,
Tatraiva sati yathbhtabrahmtmaviayamapi jnam na codantantram |
Tattvamasi is not a vidhi- better 'You are Brahman' than 'You better be Brahman'.
What is pramajanya has no kriysdhyatvam. It is not the result of a kriy.
Pramapravtti is not really kriy. Sometimes pramt is kart, but that is grammatical
kart. In this, all the krakas can be involved. In knowledge, kartkarmakaraam is there as
it is in kriy. In kriy it is puruatantra. Whereas in prama there is only vastutantra.
Though the krakas pramt prameya prama - are there in knowing, that does not mean
puruatantratvam is there.
Brahmtm is a valid object for jnam. There is no mandate or codan here. Even
though brahmtmajnam, vaidikabdajnam, is born of the vedntastrayoni it does not


have kriysdhyatvam. It is not true that anything said in the stra is to be connected to
kriy. There are vkyas that ask you to know; that knowledge is phalam, but it is not
connected to anything. stra has knowledge as its phalam. That is the first argument. The
second argument is that stra has no intention of asking you to do. Veda is dependent on
you, and is bodhakam, ajpajpakam, and has no capacity for pravartakam. In fact, Veda is
very successful in revealing tmabrahman, but it is not successful in making you get up
early in the morning.
This fellow fell over a precipice and caught a root on the way down. He was
hanging there and he yelled for help. From two hundred feet below he heard, "Hey, this is
God speaking. Come on down. Don't worry. I am down here below. Please come down."
The fellow said, "Is there anyone else up above who can help?" Puruatantra. God was
speaking, but vkya na pravartakam. There is no way of making anybody do anything.
Bhyakra will say later that prama is bodhaka only. For now, we accept that there are
vidhivkyas with pravartakam as well as vastuviayavkyas.
Question: We see li lo tavya pratyaya, why don't these indicate a subject matter
asking you to do? The imperative and potential mood forms are there.
ti;ye il'ady> Uymana APyinyaeJyiv;yTvaTk{QIvNTyuplaid;u yu]urtE{yaidvt!
Tadviaye lidaya ryamn apyaniyojyaviayatvtkuhbhavantyupaldiu
prayuktakurataikydivat, aheynupdeyavastuviayatvt |
Bhyakra: With reference to the gain of brahmtmajnam there are lidaya
pratyayas. Yet there is no niyoga and no niyojy, no one person enjoined by a specific kriy.
You cannot do tmabrahma anyway despite the current offerings for classes in the daily

practice of Vedanta. Would you try to promote shampoo sales at a shaven-head-Buddhist

monastery? Would you sharpen a razor so that you could use it to strike a stone? Even
should there be a vidhi, that vidhi is useless in regard to a vastu which is neither heya nor
updeya. Neither can you get next to Brahman, nor can you move close to Brahman. There
is no way to make someone do anything towards tmabrahma. Asdhyatvt na vidheyatvam.
With no pravtti and no nivtti, even if you hear and read these imperative statements
about Brahman, they do not indicate a need to do anything. Neither is indifference
reasonable. What pravtti do you imagine for Brahman anyway?
ikmwaRin tihR AaTma va Are Vy> aetVy> #TyadIin ivixCDayain vcnain,
Svaaivkv&iiv;yivmuoIkr[awaRnIit Um>,
Kimarthni tarhi 'tm v are draavya rotavya' itydni vidhicchyni vacanni |
svbhvikapravttiviayavimukhkararthnti brma |

When you see li lo tavya vidhya in the stra, such as tm v are dratavya
maitrey, they can be taken as a kind of shadow vidhi. You can say they are to turn a
person toward something or turn someone away from some pursuit. It is natural for a
person to go after security and pleasures integral to the life of a human being endowed


with a body-mind-sense complex. But behind this there is the paramapururtha which
itself is not visible. The stravkyas are there to turn a person toward brahmtm.
Otherwise the person has no way of directing the question of his dissatisfaction or desire
or disappoinment toward a reasonable and effective answer. He is a seeker with no sense
of what is sought. Even if he seeks the highest goals he has no idea what they may be.
Already unhappy, how can he suspect that he is the solution to his problem? Nobody can
think like that unless the paramapururtha is pointed out.
The svbhvikapravtti toward arthakma, and what happens as a result, is
addressed by these shadow vidhis. The use of the li lo tavya pratyayas present
tmajnam as paramapururthasdhanam, mokasdhanam. People want tyantika sukha
which once gained lasts forever, but that sukha does not strike often. Nobody is interested
in anityasukha. For how long and to what degree is enough sukha for you? The
tyantikasukha is not in any artha or kma and not in any puya or loka. If this is the truth,
one's commitment to viayas that will not yield what one wants is a mistake, even if those
objects are svbhvika. His pravtti becomes a pratibandhaka to ravadi. The phalam of
the shadow vidhis is the nivtti of the pratibandhaka, of the pravtti, of the bhrnti.
Question: How do the li lo tavya vkyas do that?
Bhyakra: The various rutivkyas that carry pratyayas revealing commands
asking you to do something have no kryn pravea. Yet they clearly do go beyond
description and straightforward instruction. Svbhvika pravtti toward arthakma is meant
for the one who identifies with the kryakraasaghta. He wants to know how to get the
things he desires and how to avoid the things he does not. Ia, the things he finds
desirable and the desire itself and the action toward those objects indicate what he wants
is only nanda, nandam tm. He knows only that he wants to be comfortable, evercomfortable. To be comfortable with oneself, the person one is, is what one wants. That
is the antikapururtha. The fellow does not know that an external pursuit will not satisfy
his desire. He requires some kind of a turning point, and the ruti makes an effort to turn
him toward the tm.
tm is taken for granted. What's more, tm is judged as inadequate, incomplete
and lacking in everything. And that is not true. In order to make this person question his
own understanding of tm and understand what is svarpa the shadow vidhis are given.
yae ih bihmuo
R > vtRte pu;> #< me Uyadin< ma Uidit n c taTyiNtk< pu;aw lte
tmaTyiNtkpu;awRvaiDn< SvaaivkkayRkr[s<"tv&igaecraimuoIkTy TygaTmaetStya vtRyiNt
AaTma va Are Vy> #TyadIin,
Yo hi bahirmukha pravartate purua ia me bhydania m bhditi, na ca
tatrtyantika pururtha labhate, tamtyantikapururthavchina
svbhvikakryakaraasaghatapravttigocardvimukhktya pratyagtmasnotastay
pravartayanti 'tm v are draavya' itydni |
tm v are draavya itydi. These vkyas make you pursue. They do two things.

First they turn you away from something. Then they turn you to something. What you are


doing is wrong, and here is what you have to do. For what? - for what one is after.
Pururthanicaya itself is to be done. The one whose senses are out following the same
norms and pastimes as other people is the bahirmukha. There is no exception, everyone
lives as bahirmukha. You have to; otherwise you will get hit by a truck in the road. But
the one who thinks that all I need is outside me, that all my pururtha are outside me, is
the bahirmukha. What makes him pleased he wants to happen, what displeases him he
does not want. Ia me bhyt ania m bht. Yet whatever the fellow goes after and
gains leaves him only with an additional pravartate. If he gets the job he wants, he should
be happy. Is he? No, he wants promotion, or a different position, or his own business.
The tyantika ia na labhate. All there is is always seeking. There is something wrong in
the whole struggle. But everybody else is doing the same thing.
His only deeper satisfaction is that he sees that everyone else is struggling just as
hard as he is. It is a sadistic satisfaction of mutual struggle. Ia na labhate punar api
pravartate. Always, again and again, going to an iam that is not gained. Something or
somebody has to stop him, pat him on the back and ask him what it is he is after. ruti
does it.
In the general pravtti 'ia me bhyt ' the tyantikapururtha lies buried. ruti
asks him to look back and see the tyantika he is seeking will not be found where he is
seeking. The tyantika iapururtha is not where you are seeking. Not only is it not
where you are seeking, not only is it not in yourself, it is yourself. Accept yourself; you
are the pleased person. Bhyakra quotes 'tm v are draavya'. The svbhvika pravtti,
the non-thinking pravtti, of the jva is very natural. Even as the child is pushed into the
nursery school he or she is encouraged to be competitive. From the first class onwards he
is pushed, particularly if he does well or does not do well. The worst for the child is to be
average, for then he is not given the attention he craves. The worst thing in a person's life
is to have study be a process of competition. That locks him or her into the struggle. That
is where the breaking down starts. The push push push through childhood to youth and
early adulthood does this. And it is everyone's arthakma svbhvikapravtti.
The vidhili in the shadow vkyas turns the person from the
svbhvikapravttiviaya and turns him to the pthagtm. That itavastu is yourself. tm
has the priyatamatvam, the most beloved you are seeking. The pleased self is yourself. Go
for it if you will. The whole cittavtti should flow into yourself alone, into the meaning of
tm v are draavya. ravadiu pravartayanti daranrtham. Perhaps you did not hear
Veda, you just read a paperback for you that paperback is ruti. The person who told
you may not know ruti, he just heard it from someone else the rutivkya alone comes
to you. In some way it comes to you. Each of you here has his own unique and moving, if
not strange, story to tell. It is not a story that begins at any time; it goes down to
unconscious, to childhood, to babyhood, to parenting, to karma, and that means to andi.
The connections are not ordinary.
The rutivkyas that have shadow vidhi are meant only to send you to yourself.
Can ruti make you go after pthagtm? It takes some luck. It is not just one 'Who am I?'
question. This mystic approach is very big. And tm is what you have to know, the


pthagtmviaya. Pthagtmasvarpajnya ravadi pravartayanti. Means are necessary

for the sake of knowledge, and this is where there is some luck involved.
tSyaTmaNve;[ay v&Syaheymnupadey< caTmtvmupidZyte, #d< sv ydymaTma y TvSy
svRmaTmEvaUTken k< pZyet! ken k< ivjanIyat! iv}atarmre ken ivjanIyat! AymaTma #Tyaidi>,
ydPyktRVyxanmaTm}an< hanayaepadanay va n vtIit twEvTe y_yupgyte,
Tasytmnveaya pravttasyheyamanupdeya ctmatattvamupadiyate |' ida
sarva yadayamtm' (Bhad. 2.4.6) 'yatra tvasya sarvamtmaivbhttatkena ka payet kena
ka vijnyt vijtramare kena vijnyt' (Bhad. 4.5.15) 'ayamtm Brahma' (Bhad. 2.5.19)
itydibhi | yadapyakartavyapradhnamtmajna hnyopdnya v na bhavatti,
tattathaivetyabhyupagayate |

The beauty here is Bhyakra's choice of quotations. It is impeccable. He keeps

everything inside, and you have to pick it up. For the one who is now in
tmajnnveaam tmatattvam upadiyate. What is the svarpa of tm is being taught.
How can that be done if words do not go there? Bhyakra starts with aheyam anupdeyam.
There is no pravtti no nivtti it is yourself. You can as though go towards it, you cannot
get away from it. It is tmajnapravtti alone. For tm there is nothing to be given up,
nothing to be added.
What is tm? Ida sarva yadayamtm. All that is here, anything that is
objectified, this entire jagat, ayam tm. He did not say that ida sarva is my. Iya
sarvam is tm. When you say it that way, ida sarvam becomes mithy, tm becomes
satyam. When you say pot is clay, the pot does not disappear. Pot becomes mithy, clay
becomes satyam. That is what we do. The difference becomes mithy. All the differences
that are there in dk and dya - the bheda becomes mithy. And the vastu is ayam tm.
This is bdhy smndhikaraya. Clay/pot is a better example than sthupurua for
bdhy smndhikaraya. In the sthupurua example the fellow sees a person where
there is a sthu. The stump of a tree is the truth of the person he sees. That means, upon
knowledge, the person disappears and the stump remains.
When you say ida jagat ayam tm it is smndhikaraya. According to the
sthupurua example the jagat should disappear. It does not disapper; at the same time it
is ayam tm. The pot is there at the same time clay is there, sublated, and mt is satyam.
This is the Upaniad example. All other examples in the sampradya are only to point out
that your perception may not be right. We have to accept vyvahrika. Dgdya will be
there always. The bheda is what is gone. Ida sarva yadayamtm. tm is taught by
making ntm, nmarpa, mithy. ntm, once taken for the vastu, even after
tattvajnam, does not disappear. Avastu is mithy. Iti upadea.
Yatra tvasya sarvamtmaivbhttatkena ka payet kena ka vijnyt vijtramare
kena vijnyt. For a vidvn, tm eva abht. Nothing other than that. Everything became
tm. Again ntm is negated. tm becomes satyam because of upadea. The knower of
tm knows he is everything. Kena kraena ka payet how can sarvam be taken as


something other than myself, as something tmaa bhinnam? The whole thing is one
subject that is tm, How would one objectify this tm that is the satyam of everything.
When the bheda is negated and the vastu is only one, where is kryn anupravea? After
the knowledge what could dhynam see? Bhyakra quotes this verse to negate all
possible contingent actions after jnam, after tmopadea.
Ayamtm Brahma. A simple statement of fact. Everything that is here is Brahman;
this is tm. Again, there is no possibility for entry by kriy. When the advitya tm is
known by the vkya, when krakas are all sublated, your vidhi, the emaciated tapasv who
lives in the forest of kartkrakadvaita, has no meaning. There is no kriyphalavattvam here.
Jnamokaphala is here. There is nothing to be done. You ask how this jnam can be
useful without being an object of pravtti nivtti, without hna updna. It is no defect to
be free of these. This is but an embellishment for us; this is why moka is nitya.
Alarae ymSmak< y+aTmavgtaE sTya< svRktRVytahain> ktkTyta ceit, twa c uit> AaTman< ceijanIyadymSmIit pu;>, ikimCDNkSy kamay zrIrmnusJ
< vret! #it, @tXva
buimaNSyaTktkTy art, #it Sm&it>,
Alakro hyayamasmka yadbrahmtmvagatau saty sarvakartavyathni
ktaktyat ceti | tath ca ruti ' tmna cedvijnydayamasmti purua | kimicchankasya
kmya arramanusajvaret' (Bhad. 4.4.12) iti | 'etadbudhv buddhimnsytktaktyaca
bhrata'(Bh. G. 15.20) | iti smti |

When the ayamtm brahmeti jnam is there, kartavya is not useless. It is in fact
for us alakra. Everything to be done is done, there is nothing to be done that is
fulfillment. tmna cedvijnydayamasmti purua. Suppose, prvapak, the purua is
no more ignorant of tm. If he knows this 'I am satya jnamananta Brahma', then
kimicchankasya kmya arramanusajvaret? Desiring what phalam and for satisfying which
bhokt there being no bhokt here with or without jnam would that knower again
take on the tpa of the arra? k says 'ced' is there because knowledge is not easily
available. 'To be done' is gone, and all that is to be gained is already gained as this one
nanda. Knowing this, buddhimnsyt. Do you really think that, after this, he needs to do
Bhyakra concludes the negation of the vttikramata:
tSma itpiivixiv;ytya [> smpR[m!,
Tasmnna pratipattividhiviayatay brahmaa samarpaam |
stra does not present brahmajnam as a factor for dhynam. That moka is
attainment by dhynam of aprva followed by reaching some desirable loka is not
acceptable. The stropadea is not to give you knowledge for upsana. There are upsanas
in the Upaniads, and they should receive your attention. But it is not true that the whole
Upaniad talks about upsana. stre siddhavastuvkyni are the phalavat jnakatva


Now we will hear from the Prbhkramatam, where everything is kryn

vitavkyni. A Nyyaika would say that words have a certain intrinsic power in terms of
kk yogyat sannidhi which together give you the meaning of a sentence. The
krakasambandha form of the pada tells you exactly where it has to go. The
padasmnyaakti with the other words in the sentence will give you vkyrtha the
padaakti itself. We too accept this. The padas give you knowledge, but knowledge
depends on the vkya itself. You yourself cannot decide what knowledge the vkya should
give; the vkya itself should tell you. Whether it talks about siddhavastu or something to
be done, the vkya should tell.
The Mmsaka says that the vkyas tell only about krya. The Prbhkramata says
that the siddhavsayavastupadas in the vkyas do not have any meaning themselves. Only
when the padas join the kriypadam do they gain certain meaning. Prbhkramata says the
ti is mukhya for giving sentence meaning. Ti is the verb. Kryn vitatvt padnm, the
vkya talks about things to be done. All sup has no meaning and is subservient to ti. The
whole thing is pravtti and nivtti. The ti gives this, and the prakti gives what kind of ti
gacchati patati karoti. Ti is invariable; prakti is variable. The ti with prakti creates
kk and you can ask ki karoti ka karoti. kk with yogyat and sannidhi give the
vkya meaning, always kriy.
akti and kryn vit are the two matas. The Prbhkr holds on to the position that
the Veda is always talking about pravtti nivtti. He says a siddhavastuviayavkya such as
'ayamtm Brahman', a simple statement of fact, must be connected to vidhi to be useful. It
has to be converted to lirtha, to vidhi.
You must know the khytis, the different schools, convert every la into li and we
convert every li into la. In the Gt vkya 'naiva kicit karomti yukto manyeta tattvavit', the
manyeta has no meaning. How can you tell a tattvavit what to think? You think you can
give a jn a vidhi? We convert it to la, unless it really is vidhi.
ydip keicda> - v&iinv&iivixtCDe;Vyitrek[
e kevlvStuvadI vedagae naiSt #it t
AaEpin;dSy pu;SyanNyze;Tvat!,
Yadapi kecidhu 'pravttinivttividhitaccheavyatirekea kevalavastuvd vedabhgo
nsti' iti tanna aupaniadasya puruasynanyaeatvt |
Prbhkramata followers say there is no portion of Veda, including Vednta, that
talks about what is the vastusavrpa alone. Instead, the vkyas are all asking you to do
something or avoid something. The entire Veda is accommodated by this vidhieiea rule.
tm is not the subject matter of Vednta. tm is already known to us, siddhaloka as kart.
There is no brahmaa prama in Vednta says Prbhkra.
We say no. The purua revealed by the Upaniad as ida sarvam is pra. That
purua, complete in itself, is to be known through the Upaniad. You cannot say there is
no prama, and you cannot say there is no phala for that jnam. You cannot connect it to
kriypara, to any kind of karma.


How can you say the entire Veda is committed to karma? Do you say it because
you think there is no Brahman? Do you say it because you think Brahman is not presented
in the Vednta? How can you say Brahman is taught in the Vednta but only as kryaea?
Do you think Brahman exists, but only as lokaprasiddha tm, and therefore Brahman is not
vedaviaya? Do you say anadhigatatvam is not there for Brahman, there is no aprvatvam?
Do you say the brahmavit remains a sasr because you still see him needing to eat and
drink ? Do you say Brahman does not exist because the citations we make do not help you
see Brahman anywhere? How can you say you do not see an asaga Brahma, you see
only saga? You are bringing up only contradictions. Do you say that the sasrijva can
be a brahmavit at the same time?
yae=savupin;TSvevaixgt> pu;ae=s<sarI %Tpa*aidctuivRxVyivl][> Svkr[Swae=nNyze;>
nasaE naiSt naixgMyt #it va zKy< vidtum! s @; neit neTyaTma #TyaTmzBdat! AaTmn
Yo'svupaniatsvevdhigata puruo'sasr Brahma,
utpdydicaturvidhadravyavilakaa svaprakaraastho'nanyaea, nsau nsti ndhigamyata
iti v akya vaditum 'sa ea neti netytm' (Bhad. 3.9.26) itytmaabdt tmanaca
pratykhytumaakyatvt, Bhasyakara's ability to keep all the other contentions in view as he writes is
prasanna gmbhryam. Each of his vieaas knocks off one of these fellows. His intellect

never sags and his enthusiasm never wanes. He continues to deal with these fellows.
The purua is understood through the Upaniads. The anadhigatatvam is the hetu;
vedntavedyatvam is mntara anadhigatatvam. Ma is prama. He uses anadhigata first.
Everyone may know 'I am', but that is known as 'aham asasri'. Nobody knows aham
asasri. Asasri Brahma is not told anywhere else but Upaniad. That is what the
Upaniad alone reveals. This takes all the cryas down.
Nor can it be said that the Upaniads do not reveal a Brahman which is distinct
from all karma. That finishes kryaeatvam. Kryaeatvam is only when there is some
kind of result due to one of the four types of action. Upaniadbrahmasvarpa is moka. That
moka is not the result of any utpdydi. Therefore Brahma asasri. Phalam is there.
Sasrt moka. It is not karmaphala. You cannot say Brahma nsti.
The vedntaprakaraa is not hooked onto any other prakaraa. It is there at the end
of each Veda for a reason. This prapurua is svaprakaraa. You cannot say it is not there.
You cannot say Brahma nsti. You cannot say that Vednta does not reveal this. Here
Bhyakra quotes Bhadrayaka: sa ea neti netytm. The vkya says 'Anything that you
know as tm is negated'. He goes after the Nyyaika. who says tm is kartabhokt, and
after cryas who say tm is of this or that manner. All kart concepts are negated. All
unwarranted attributions are negated. Anything idantay ghita tm, anything skivedya
is not tm. Sk cet kevalo nirguaca is the tm. You cannot say this tm nsti. It is


self-evident and you cannot say it is not known; it is not known because anything you
know it as is negated by the stra.
y @v inraktaR tSyEvaTmTvat!,
ya eva nirkart tasyaivtmatvt |

One cannot negate oneself. Whatever is left out after the one who does the
negation has done all the negation is the tm. The negator cannot negate himself. That
negator is tm. That tm is Brahman. Why he does not know is his question. That is
what the stra is for.
nNvaTmah<Tyyiv;yTvapin;TSvev iv}ayt #Tynuppm!, n, tTsai]Tven TyuTvat!,
Nanvtmhampratyayaviayatvdupaniatsveva vijyata ityanupapannam | na |
tatskitvena pratyuktatvt |
Prvapaka: The fourth contention in the current analysis is 'loka prasiddhatvt'.
tm is not a matter for inquiry, nor is it to be known through the stra. tm is known
as asmatpratyayaviaya, as kartabhokt. Pramntaravedyatvt tm is not known through
Veda. The tm has already been said to be sk of the ahakra. tm, then, is nitya
aparoka as sk and not vedya. I do not need Vednta to tell me who I am.
The prvapaka puts Bhyakra in a tight spot because skytm is presented as
cet kevalo nirguaca and sarvabhtasthabrahma. Therefore what is known through the
Vednta is not what is loka prasiddha. Bhyakra will answer with a variety of vieaas.
nh<Tyyiv;ykt&VR yitrek[
e tTsa]I svRt
U Sw> sm @k> kqSwinTy> pu;ae ivixka{fe tkRsmye va
kenicdixgt> svRSyaTma At> s n kenicTTyaOyatu< zKyae ivixze;Tv< va netm
u ,
Nahyahampratyayaviayakartvyatirekea tatsk sarvabhtastha sama eka
kasthanitya puruo vidhike tarkasamaye v kenacidadhigata sarvasytm ata sa na
kenacitpratykhytu akyo vidhieatva v netum |
Bhyakra: This tm is not known; it is anadhigata. It is pramntara anadhigata.
Vedastraprmyam tmaa. Vedntavedyatvam tmaa prptam anadhigatatvt. Even
the cryas, trthakaras, are confused about lokaprasiddhatvam of the tm. What more do
we need to say about tmaa alaukikatvam?
The Mmsaka is dismissed by tm not being kart. tm is sk. tm is
sarvabhtastha. It is one abiding in the many bhtas. You cannot prove tm is many. It is
kryakraasaghta alone that is variable in all beings. One tm alone is there. The
Nyyaikas and Skhyas and Vaieikas have nothing to stand on with their many tms.
The Jains says that tm is the same as the deha, that it is has dimension. But tm is one
without tratamya. There is no way to know tm as many and as being of various sizes.
The Kikavijnavd talks of momentary consciousness. Crvka says tm is nothing
more than kryakraasaghta. Only Vednta says tm is one, unchanging, kasthanitya,
all-pervasive, timeless consciousness. The nyavd and Parimavd are gone too. The


sarvasya jagata tm, satyam adhithnam, is not known by any prama but vedntastra.
Others may quote stra to serve their imaginations and speculations, but none of them
knows tmatattva.
Whether they base their school of thought on Karmaka, on logic in the
Vidhika notwithstanding the exception for teaching in the vsya Upaniad whether they accept the Veda as prama or not, Bhyakra has covered every one of them
with 'kenacit'. Sarvasya jagata tm is not known.
Being not available for any other prama, mnntaravirodha is not possible. stra
does not present anything that is against any other prama. Self-evident brahmtm
unfolded by the Upaniad can be denied by no one. Vidhieatvam does not in anyway
apply to Brahman; what can any karma do to Brahman?
AaTmTvadev c sve;
R a< n heyae naPyupadey>, sv ih ivnZyikarjat< pu;aNt< ivnZyit,
tmatvdeva ca sarve na heyo npyupdeya | sarva hi vinayadvikrajta
purunta vinayati |

There can be neither pravtti for brahmtm not nivtti from brahmtm. You
cannot get rid of it. The many cryas write thick books and establish schools and
powerful establishments, but they cannot understand what is tm. All you can say is
there is some durita. tm is skirpatvt and one's own tmatvt.
If this skytm is Brahman, what others talk about is only antm, subject to time.
Everything is subject to modification, from paramus on, all of the various lokas, this
entire sryamaala, the brahma, all vikrajtam, all klvacchinnam, even ignorance
otherwise there is no fun in teaching - all of them go, up to purua. Purua remains. The
pthagtm is pra.
pu;ae ivnazheTvavadivnazI iviyaheTvava kqSwinTy> At @v inTyzubumuSvav>,
Puruo vinahetvabhvdavin vikriyhetvabhvcca kasthanitya, ata eva
nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhva |

We do not say purua is avin, because avin becomes vin. Vina and
amtatvam and other words are often used in a general, relative sense. But we are not
talking here in a relative sense. We are saying that there is nothing that could affect
purua, vina hetu abhvt. Just so, Brahma abhaya bhayahetu abhvt. Taittirya tells us in
two places - na bibheti kadcaneti and, later, na bibheti kutacaneti. Kadcana indicates
relative absence of fear, courage et cetera. Whereas kutacana means bhayahetu abhva.
Bhayahetu is dvaitam, the second thing. That second thing is not there, because one satya
Brahma. And there is nothing else. What is there to cause fear? Here, what is the vina
hetu? Time, svyavattvam, saguatvam. When the guas are gone the gu is gone. When
there is any kind of rpa, anything that is called dravya, it will die.
Kasthanityatve it does not undergo any change whatsoever. There is no rpa, no
avyava. Heya updeya are not possible. It is nityauddhabuddhamuktasvabhva; none of
these words here holds a meaning which can be heya or updeya. This is svabhva; there is


nothing that can be added or subtracted. There is nothing to change, and all your schools
of thought are useless. tm is not karmga cetanatvt. Kart itself is gone, where is
karmaeatvam? You know akart is tm and then you do karma? That is beyond
contradiction. When all is negated, all that is left is sk. You cannot add anything to it or
negate it. You want to get rid of the changing, of dukha, you want sukha prpti, but there
is no such thing. Because tm is nitya. Up to purua everything changes; purua does
not undergo any change.
tSmat! pu;a pr< ik<icTsa kaa sa pra git> t< TvaEpin;d< pu;< p&CDaim #it caEpin;dTvivze;[<
pu;Syaepin;Tsu axaNyen kaZymanTv %pp*te,
Tasmt 'purunna para kicits kh s par gati' (Kah. 1.3.11) 'ta
tvaupaniada purua pcchmi' (Bhad. 3.9.26) iti caupaniadatvavieaa
puruasyopaniatsu prdhnyena prakyamnatva upapadyate |

'Tasmt purut' is tmaa sakt. The rutivkyas say there is nothing superior to
the purua. The gender changes in the next part of the vkya because the videha, the thing
predicated, kh, is in the feminine. Purua is kh, the limit beyond which one cannot
go. In sasra the limit is brahmaloka. What is outside sasra? You. Only you are outside
sasra. That is purua, which being yourself is not even an object of attraction. There is
no further gati available. This is the ultimate end. One has to know jva's ultimate end is
jvasvarpa. This is how the ruti talks about the tm. Sdhyasya updeyatvam asti na tu
tmana tm nityasiddhatvt.
In order to gain this ultimate end you do not need to give up yourself, for you are
that end. Being neither an aspect of anything else nor available for negation nor found
anywhere but in the Veda, being clearly unfolded as the ttparya of the stra, being
known only through the Upaniads, the Bhadrayaka states 'Hey, kalya, I ask you of
that purua which is known only through Upaniad.' The use of 'aupaniada' as an adjective
to purua is proper only when purua has prdhnya as the subject matter revealed by
Atae UtvStuprae vedagae naStIit vcn< sahsmam!,
Ato bhtavastuparo vedabhgo nstti vacana shasamtram |

What is suggested by the Prbhkras, that a siddhavastuviaya is not only useless

but not even actually talked about by Veda, is not true. Their position lacks truth if not
enthusiasm, and nothing is accomplished. Phalavat bhodhakatvam aprvat anadhigatatvam
for Brahman is there in Veda and nowhere else. With all the rutivkyas and the other
reasons we have offered, tmavastuparatvam for Vednta is well-established. The ttparya
nicayt, tattu samanvayt. The tmvastu is not lokaprasiddha, it is not against any other
prama, it is not nsti, it is not not in the Vednta. You cannot say it has no phalam. You
cannot say it has vidhieatvam. The type of tm that you are talking about is not the tm
Vednta talks about. For all these reasons and because rutivkyas are there,
tmavastuparatvam is nicitam. Now there is a restatement.


ydip zataTpyRivdamnum[m! - :tae ih tSyawR> kmaRvbaexnm! #Tyevmaid

tmRij}asaiv;yTvaiixit;exzaaiay< :tVym!,
yadapi strattparyavidmanukramaam 'dto hi tasyrtha karmvabodhanam'
ityevamdi, taddharmajijsviayatvdvidhipratiedhastrbhiprya dratavyam |

There are statements by abarasvm and others citing the vkya that says the stra
is committed to bringing knowledge about karma, about vidhipratiedha, telling what is to
be done and what not to be done. That vkya deals only with dharmajijs. abarasvm is
not speaking of the whole Veda, and he is not really negating Brahman. The knowledge of
karma he refers to is anadhigata, and the phalavat bodhakatvam he refers to does not covers
the whole stra. He is restricting himself to talking about the karmastra, and his
statement does not refer to what Upaniad has to say. That is Bhyakra's abhiprya. He
shows a lot of respect for the strabhsyakra abarasvm.
k says the prvammsbhya of abarasvm does not have a real purpose. It
is more like a collection of folk-hymns, not even mrg. Dance that is mrg follows the
formally laid out mrga classical. De means whatever you feel you do - folk. You do
not follow anything. You are free, laid back. Not everybody knows how to dance, but
everybody wants to dance. The g Veda and Yajur Veda are basically collected hymns.
Around that things are written. abarasvm is just making it clear that dharmvabodhanam
includes karmvabodhanam. He does not negate brahmaparatvam. Anything that is phalavat
but not known is what is talked about in the Veda. That applies to Brahman as it does to
The contention is that the entire stra is kriyparatvam and that it does not talk
about any existent thing. This does not make sense in light of the fact that ghee and the
ladle and soma et cetera are frequently referred to in the Veda. Bhtavastus are named, and
the objects are here in the world. ruti's words are useful and phalavattvam is there.
Bhtavastu is upadia.
Aip c AaaySy iyawRTvadanwRKymtdwaRnam! #TyetdekaNtena_yupgCDta< UtaepdezanwRKys>,
e Ut< ceStUpidzit VyawRTven kqSwinTy< Ut< naepidztIit kae het>u ,
Api ca' mnyasya kriyrthatvdnarthakyamatadarthnm'
ityetadekntenbhyupagacchat bhtopadenarthakyaprasaga |
pravttinivttividhitaccheavyatirekea bhta cedvastpadiati bhavyrthatvena,
kasthanitya bhta nopadiatti ko hetu |

The vkyas that do not talk about kriy are useful. The Jaimini Stras say they are
useful as kriyea. If stra is kriy and kriyea alone, the siddhavastu upadea is
meaningless. That is not true. If any vkyas are useless they all are useless. They had such
a problem with the first ten verses in the Koran. They had to say that those were sneaked
in by Satan. In a stra you cannot have some sentences meaningful and some not. The
entire ktsnaveda is prama. The siddhavastu vkyas are meaningful. Distinct from the


vidhis and niedhavidhis, there are vkyas that talk of ea, the bhtavastus such as soma that
are part of the karmas. Since these items are mentioned and are obviously purposeful,
what reason is there to deny that the kasthabrahmavastu is also mentioned?
The vkyas that do not talk about vidhi have meaning because they refer to
meaningful objects. They also have phala. We are driving the fellow into a corner. We
have to prove phalam asti. Now we are focusing on 'kasthabrahmavastu is not kriyea'. It
is not true that an object referred to in a vidhi becomes an action. Kastha is not
connected to any kriy.
Objection: When a vidhi says 'May he offer', it creates kk, and that is
answered by 'with the soma'. Soma may not itself be a vidhi, but it is a bhtavastu
connected to the vidhi, it is a means for the vidhi. It does have bhtakriysdhanam because
the juhoti kriy is there. Bhtavastu is krakasdhya.
nih UtmupidZyman< iya vit, AiyaTve=ip UtSy iyasaxnTvaiTyawR @v Utaepdez #it cet,
nE; dae;>, iyawRTve=ip iyainvRtn
R zimStUpidmev, iyawRTv< tu yaejn< tSy, n cEtavta vSTvnupid<
Nahi bhtamupadiyamna kriy bhavati | akriytve'pi bhtasya
kriysdhanatvtkriyrtha eva bhtopadea iti cet | naia doa | kriyrthatve'pi
kriynirvartanaaktimadvastpadiameva | kriyrthatva tu prayojana tasya | na caitvat
vastvanupadia bhavati |
Bhyakra: What you say about a bhtavastu is not a defect for us. It does not
mean the kasthabrahmavastu kriy bhavati. There is a difference there. The bhtavastu
such as soma is neither kriy nor kriyphala nor aprva. But it is upadia by stra. The
words in the juhoti vidhi have the power to indicate a kriy. The participants in the karma
understand 'juhoti ' and soma. abdrtha is there, upadia. You cannot talk about kriy
without abdrtha. The bhtavastus have meaning; they are upadia. Their usefulness in a
particular karma, their prayojanam, is for the kriy. They are aktimat for this. The vidhi, in
giving instruction for the karma, mentions the bhtavastus. But in being part of the kriy is
a prayojanam for those objects. Prayojanam is, of course, also kriyrthatvam. But 'being
objects for the kriy is their only usefulness' is not the same as saying bhtavastus have
usefulness in the kriy as well as being upadia, which is what we say. Then, only, when
they are also upadia, they have phalavattvam - when the bhtavastus are both useful in
the kriy and upadia. It is not right that everything is connected only to kriy. Do not say
that a bhtavastuviaya does not produce result. Just saying that an object is connected to
vidhi does not mean the object is not upadia by stra.
Objection: Kriyrtha kryaeapara. Kasthasya tu na kryaeatvt na upadea
bhva. Your kastha is not a kryaea and therefore not kryaeatvena upadea. A
bhtavastu is connected to a kriy for two reasons: for abdrtha - for getting some
meaning - or for phala. But your kastha is not included in this.


k: abdanih of a bhtavastu does not connect it to a verb or an action. We

know many objects in the world without them being connected to action. Their prayojana
is not in a specific kriy. Kriyeatva nsti brahmaa.
yid namaepid< ik< tv ten Syaidit, %Cyte - AnvgtaTmvStUpdez twEv ivtumhRit,
Yadi nmopadia ki tava tena syditi | ucyate - anavagattmavastpadeaca
tathaiva bhavitumarhati |
Objection: If brahmtm is not connected to anything, of what use can it be? What
is accomplished? Your example makes sense for soma, but not for kastha Brahma.
Bhyakra: Bhtavastu is upadia and has prayojanam, prayojanam for vidhi. Here,
too, brahmaa upadia and prayojanam. There abdanih abdrtha, here, too, abdanih
abdrtha. The only difference is that there kriyeatvam is prayojanam. Here, brahma is
without kriyeatva prayojanam. Were there kriyeatvam for Brahman, moka na syt.
There is brahmaa phalavattvam but no kriyeatvam. It is magalam, not doa, for us.
That phalavattvam is mokastram.
To be upadea, bhtavastu should be anadhigata and phalavat. There is sphalyam
for objects connected to vidhi in the stra. But there is no rule that for a bhtavastu to
become meaningful kriy is the only dvara. Suppose you understand the rope alone is the
truth. By that adhihnajna there is sphalyam. The bhtavastu upadea for soma has
phalavattvam, and this is true here too for brahmtm. Anavagata tm upadea is bhtavastu
upadea. tm is anavagata, but still jeyatvam is there because mithyjnam is there.
Brahmtmajnnam removes that ignorance, the sasritvam. Therefore tm is bhtavastu.
Bhrntijnanivtti is necessary, therefore sphalyam syt. You cannot say this knowledge
is of less use than knowledge of something connected to kriy.
tdvgTya imWya=}anSy s<sarhetaeinRvi& > yaejn< iyt #TyivizmwRvv< iyasaxnvStUpdezn
e ,
Tadavagaty mithy'jnasya sasrahetornivtti prayojana kriyata
ityaviiamarthavattva kriysdhanavastpadeena |
tmavastu is already known, and that is the problem. It is wrongly known; svarpa
anavagatam. If tm were totally unknown there would be no mithy ajna. Being known
and unknown, there is mithy ajna. Nobody can say tmavastu is totally unknown; to
say that, tm would have to be known. The ajnam is pratyaka; mithy ajnam is the
problem. tm kartabhokt is the mithy ajna. Anavagata tmavastu, and tmavastu ajta,
mithy ajna will be there. Ayatrthajnam will be there. tmavastu becomes the locus
for committing the mistake just like the rope does for the snake. Anavagatam is the hetu
for mithy ajna, erroneous knowledge, the sasra hetu.
Avagaty prayojana kriyate. Prayojanam is achieved by avagata. There is
phalavattvam. In the kriysdhanabhtavastu upadea there is no difference whatsoever.
Here it is the same as in the dnta. There, in the karma, you will gain a few cows and
buffalo; I will gain moka from the desire for cows. I will get pramokatvam. Both soma


and kastha tm have arthavattvam, sphalyam. The phala for knowledge that is kastha
tm is mithy nivtti. tm is not phala. Sasranivtti is the mahatphalam you require.
For Veda, the fruitfulness for butter and buttermilk and soma is through kriy.
Brahmaah svata, not kriydvara. Both soma and Brahma are bhtartha upadea, both have
sphalyam. The whole Veda has anandhigatatvam; it talks about things we cannot otherwise
know. What is anandhigata in Veda must have prmyam and sphalyam. Karma and
devats are anadhigatam and saphalam. Ghee and buttermilk and soma we know and are not
svrthe phalavat. But they are connected to anadhigata kryaea and are important. Unike
soma, kastha Brahma is itself anadhigata. Unlike soma, kastha Brahma is svrthe
phalavat. But soma and buttermilk are valid example for phalavattvam.
Kasthabrahmajnena sasranivtti ayam viea. Phalavattvam.
Bhashyakara finishes off the fellow with what is called naa bhya. Vedntn
niedhavkyavat siddhrthaparatvam iti ha.
Take the vkya 'brhmao na hantavya'. Is it siddhaviaya or sdhyaviaya? Clearly,
Bhyakra is going in for the kill here. 'A brhmaa should never be killed'. This is a
fairly specific statement, but there will be mitigating factors. Droa was a brhmaa, but
he did everything a brhmaa should not do. The 'brhmao na hantavya' vkya is niedha,
not vidhi. Every niedhavkya has siddhrthaviaya. 'Not killing a brhmaa' is already an
accomplished fact. The brhmaa has not been killed, but the result of the vkya can be a
pravtti that is not acted upon. The niedhavkya is siddhavastuviaya, and like soma, it is
meaningful and useful even when it, as it does here, indicates withdrawal from action.
Aip c a[ae n hNtVy> #Tyevma*a inv&ipidZyte, n c sa iya, naip iyasaxnm!,
Api ca 'brhmao na hantavya' ityevamdy nivttirpadiyate | na ca s kriy | npi
kriysdhanam |

A brhmaa cannot be killed does that mean all others can be killed? The more
general rule is his na kuryt. The upadea is there. Refraining from doing is nivtti. It
is not really a kriy. Neither is the absence of hananakriy kriysdhanam. The
niedhavkya is bhtavastu upadea, and it has prmyam. The han dhtu is there with tavya
pratyaya. The prakti meaning is killing. Hantavya to be killed. What is with this tavya?
The pratyayrtha, tavyrtha, is iasya sdhanatvam, the means for a desirable thing.The
na, the negative particle, is there. The naa joins the prakti, not the tavyapratyaya. With
the naartha and the prakti you get hanana abhva.
There is an injunction, but the vkya is also talking about narakadukha, ppa
experienced later. Avoiding that ppa is also i. Therefore hanana abhva will produce a
result. That result is dukha abhva. Not-killing is the hetu for dukha abhva. Therefore
hananam is a dukhasdhanam. Dukham is aniam, and a thinking person will not do
hananam. Being abhva, absence of killing is not a kriy. Neither is abhva kriysdhanam.
Abhva cannot produce abhva. Abhva cannot create anything. What does not exist cannot
connect to anything. Therefore the entire niedha stra siddhrthe prmyam. The


bhtavastu is there in the niedhavkya. Siddhrthe prmya siddhaviaye prmyam iti.

The entire vedastra is analyzed in this 'brhmao na hantavya'.
AiyawaRnamupdezae=nwRket! a[ae n hNtVy> #Tyaidinv&yupdezanamanwRKy< am!, tainm!,
Akriyrthnmupadeo'narthakacet 'brhmao na hantavya'
itydinivttyupadenmnarthakya prptam | taccniam |

It is not acceptable to say that the entire Veda upadea with regard to niedha is
meaningless because those vkyas are siddhavastuviaya and not connected to kriy.
n c SvavahNTywaRnru age[ n|> zKymaiyawRTv< kLpiytu< hnniyainv&yaEdasINyVyitrek[
e ,
Na ca svabhvaprptahantyarthnurgea naa akyamaprptakriyrthatva
kalpayitu, hananakriynivttyaudsnyavyatirekea |

If one has a svbhvika tendency to hurt a brhmaa, that has to be neutralized. One
curbs that tendency. It is siddhavastuvkya alone; there is no sakalpakriy. There is
audsnya pravtti; one has no truk with the thoughts. This is how we live our lives. The
pravtti is possible and you are asked to avoid it. But this avoidance is not a kriy.
The na has svabhva, it has a natural meaning as abhva, absence. When that
meaning is not applicable you get different meanings sde anye virodhe alpe. Sde: for
example, non-sugar, Equal, a sugar substitute not non-sweet. It is equal, sdam.
Anyatvam: for example, 'abrahmaa' - other than, exclusion. Tad alpat: for example, 'I
have no money' - ayogya, anadhikr. These other meanings for the naa come in when
abhva is not applicable.
The prpta nurga is possible for causing harm to a brhmaa. Someone may have
this obtaining passion, itasdhana. For whatever reason, one feels willing to do
hananakriy. The na in the niedhavkya connects to the possibility of hananakriy by
asking you not to cause injury to a brhmaa. The na connects to the verb and the
itasdhana becomes anitasdhana. There is no other reasonable meaning for the na than
non-killing. The svabhva of the na, its primary meaning, akya, is to convey absence of
the action to which it is connected. This sense of absence of action is related to a human's
natural disposition of indifference. But only when the delusion that propels you to do
anitasdhana has gone from you can you maintain the indifference. Pratiplanam means
maintenance or practice. Really, a person cannot even imagine a mnasakarma that is
capable of keeping your mind from going back to your original pravtti to cause harm.
The niedhavkya asks you to withdraw from your inclination. This nivtti, withdrawal, is
not an action, it is just indifference. In the vkya, nivtti is really the naartha. You are not
doing anything. Na hantavya is not a kriy. Not-doing is not an action.
Indifference is puruanihsvabhva. But the na curtails the pravtti toward any
particular karma, any rga. The tavya always connects to an itasdhana, something one
wants to do. The na joins the verb na kartavya and makes the action anitasdhanam.
Whether by following the niedha or by maintaining indifference the action is not done


and you get the same result. The na means abhva, not virodhi or any of its other
n|E; Svavae yTSvs<biNxnae=av< baexytIit,
Naacaia svabhvo yatsvasambandhino'bhva bodhayatti |

It is well known that abhva is the prasiddha meaning of na when it joins a word.
Many words have many disparate meanings. When the primary meaning is untenable you
must find out the meaning. Abrahmaa means 'other than a brahmaa' katriya et cetera.
Adharma means 'not dharma', the virodhi, unless it means ppa. But you cannot go to the
other meanings unless you have considered the basic meaning. Here the meaning of the
na joins the verb hantavya, handhtu. The negation, prohibition of the inclination,
prasakta pratiedha, of the hananam is the main purpose, and there really is nothing to do
with tavya.
AavbuiaEdasINykar[m!, sa c dGxeNxnaivTSvymevaepzaMyit,
Abhvabuddhicaudsnyakraam | s ca dagdhendhangnivatsvayamevopamyati |

The tendency for the inclination to cause harm can be dealt with and indifference
can be maintained. When the iasdhanabhrnti is negated, prohibited, by one's
investment in the vkya, by the hanana abhva vtti, the audsnyam will be maintained.
There will be nothing to feed the hananakriypravttcch and cause it to flourish and make
you act. The na has done the job. The natural tendency to indifference takes over,
supported by pravttyabhvabuddhi; there is no icch. Like a fire which has consumed all
its fuel, further ignition becomes impossible. The hananakriy iasdhanabhrnti, this
wrong-thinking rga, is the pressure, the fuel that has to go. This is when the na brings
the abhvabuddhi and the pravtti goes. Both the kriy and the rga are no longer there if
the na works.
If you just try to throw some counter-thinking, some mnasakriy, against the
hananapravtti it will not take care of the error. You would be using vidhi where it has no
application. You would be doing virodha and not negation. The niedha did not work for
you and you convert it into vidhi. How long do you think you can maintain this
mnasakriy? It is like using alcohol to stop your thinking.
tSmaTsiyainv&yaEdasINymev a[ae n hNtVy> #Tyaid;u it;exaw mNyamhe ANy
Tasmtprasaktakriynivttyaudsnyameva 'brhmao na hantavya, itydiu
pratiedhrtha manymahe, anyatra prajpativratdibhya |

The nivtti maintains the audsnyam. The possibility of hananakriy is negated by

'na hantavya'. The niedhavkya is a clean prohibition, and there is no other meaning
viable. A brhmaa prays for the well-being of all of those in society, for even those who
do not pray. The brhmaa prays daily that all minds be clear and come to proper
decisions. He prays for himself and for others, and a person who prays for you should not


be disturbed. He is doing priestly duty. He is the one doing reality checkup. He is the
model; one can live a life of dharma. He shows one can live with minimum requirements
and live a happy life. He is the lakaa for all that. He should not be disturbed; he should
be protected. This is the comport of the vkya. It refers to a very real ppa. The injunction
is extended to the cow. Gohatya is also considered to be great ppa. Na hantavya means
nivtti from the pravtti.
A brahmacr, one who has taken upanayanam and is initiated into gyatr mantra,
also takes the vow of Prajpati. This is a further commitment that says he should not see
the rising sun a brahmacr vows to get up before sunrise. This is a real vidhi that
includes the na. On the strength of the sakalpa made at the beginning of the vow, one
maintains what he has committed to. It is a sakalpakriy from the naartha at the
beginning 'na iketodyantamdityam'. It is an aprptasakalpakriy, aprptavidhi. 'Don't see'
is prpta. The sakalpa is 'This I will not see.' There can be no other meaning than
Wherever abhvrtha is not tenable for the na you can look for the better meaning.
Pratiedhrtham means abhvrtham. The meaning of na is abhva. All of niedhastra is
siddhavastuviayam. It is a valid prama. It is neither kriy nor kriyea. Niedha abhva.
What is abhva is not a kriy. Hananbhva is not a kriy. Absence of the act of killing is
not a kriy. Not drinking is not a kriy. Abhva cannot be a ea, cannot be connected to
any kriy. Nor is it itself a kriy. At the same time, nivttistrapramam is there.
Earlier we saw pratiedhavkya has phalavattvam. You cannot say bhtavastuviaya
is not prama; phalavattvam is there for the bhtavastu. Vkyasya phalavattvam is there,
therefore pramam. What was phalavat? Dukha abhva. Absence of dukha is phalavat;
otherwise aniam will be there. Maintenance of dukha abhva avoids aniam. The
bhtavastuviayavkya is phalavatvkya. That which has dukha abhva as the result, which
is the meaning of the na particle, is siddha. Therefore, when the na is there, it is a
niedhastra which has pramatvam.
Sasranivtti is the phala, as has already been pointed out. How pratiedhastra is
useful, so too vedntastra is definitely useful as pramam. Niedhastra has prmyam.
The naartha is siddha, dukha abhva is siddha as the phalavattvam, and the niedha is
pramam. Brahmajnam has pramatvam too, being siddhaviaya but anandhigata, and
being phalavat. What phalam do you get? Dukha abhva. What kind of dukha abhva? Not
just hananadukhbhva. Here, sasradukha abhva, dukhanivtti.
u yaeGyupaOyanaidUtawRvadiv;ymanwRKyaixan< Vym!,
draavyam |
Objection: The Jaimini Stras state that the stra has no purpose but to enjoin kriy.
They says that the words in stra not connected to kriy are useless. The mention of the
word anartha in the dharmastrastra relates to stories that have no use in pururtha. The
Veda is full of stories that are the inspiration for the Puras. This is the viaya for the use


of the word anartha. Those stories are arthavda; they are basically praise and of no use to
humans. But they can be of use when they are connected to kriy. The kriy itself is
praised or the kriyrtha is praised or the kart is praised or the devat is praised. The
stories have no svrthe phalakatvam. They have kriyrthaeatvam.
ydPyum! - ktRVyivXynuvezmNtre[ vStumamuCymanmnwRk< Syat! sIpa vsumtITyaidvidit
tTpirtm!, ruiry< nay< spR #it vStumakwne=ip yaejnSy Tvat!,
Yadapyuktam - kartavyavidhyanupraveamantarea
vastumtramucyamnamanarthaka syt, saptadvp vasumattydivaditi, tatparihtam |
rajjuriya nya sarpa iti vastumtrakathane'pi prayojanasya datvt |
Bhyakra goes from one to the next. He does not omit one of the prvapaka

arguments that he set up.

Bhyakra: You say that without there being introduction, entry, of a vidhi, such
as kartavya, the mention by stra of vastumtrakam is anarthakam. You say that when
stra tells you 'This is how vastu is', such as when it says that the earth has seven
continents, there is no meaning. You say that if there is not something to be done, the
rutivkya is useless. But this argument has already been refuted when the example of the
rope snake was examined. Whenever an error causes a problem you will see this example.
When the vastu is known to be rope, the purpose of the vkya is clear. The snake that was
never there goes. Here aya sasri nivtti vastumtrakathane. It is not an ordinary
phalam. Mahat vinai nihatvt.
nnu ut[ae=ip twapUv s<sairTvdzRna ruSvpkwnvdwRvvimTyum!, AaeCyte navgtaTmavSy ywapUv s<sairTv< zKy< dzRiytu< vedma[jintaTmavivraexat!,
Nanu rutabrahmao'pi tathprva sasritvadarannna
rajjusvarpakathanavadarthavattvamityuktam | atrocyate - nvagatabrahmtmabhvasya
yathprva sasritva akya darayitu, vedapramajanitabrahmtmabhvavirodht |
Objection: Even though a person hears of Brahman, his sasritvam does not go
away. Sukhitvam dukhitvam continue as well. The statement about the rope may have
removed the snake bhrnti, but 'You are Brahman' is just another story. One hears he is
Brahman and remains with his sasritvasvarpa. He is just a rutabrahmasasr. The
mahvkya does not work like the ropesnake example.
Bhyakra : No. You are talking about a person who is rutabrahma, not an
avagatabrahma. I do not say they are the same. This pursuit should be there until one gains
jnam. Every avagatabrahma is rutabrahma, but not the other way around. Do ravaam
until brahmvagata bhavati.
The prvapak is making a complete pratiedha, just saying that whatever
Bhyakra says is wrong. Bhyakra says you cannot show that there is sasritvam for
the person who is avagata Brahma. You may see him eating and doing other things that
indicate his connection to his body, but this does not indicate sasritvam. Your


understanding of asasritvam is wrong. Nothing such a person does would show

asasritvam. This is not mysticism we are talking about here. This is not an experience
that come and goes. This is vedapramajanyajnam. It is as valid as your sight because
pramajanya. Brahmtmabhva is aham ayamtm brahmeti bhva. This bhva coexisting
with sasritvam is not possible. Therefore virodht. In the place where valid
brahmtmajnam is born of valid prama, asasritvam cannot be daritam.
nih zrIra*aTmaimainnae >oyaidmv< imit tSyEv vedma[jintaTmavgme tdimaninv&aE
tdev imWya}aninim< >oyaidmv< vtIit zKy< kLpiytum,
Nahi arrdytmbhimnino dukhabhaydimattva damiti tasyaiva
vedapramajanitabrahmtmvagame tadabhimnanivttau tadeva mithyjnanimitta
dukhabhaydimattva bhavatti akya kalpayitum |
Brahmtmabhva is not some kind of a belief. Neither is it an attitude. It is
abdhitajnam. There is no way you can say that a person with this knowledge is subject
to dukha and bhaya. Dukhabhaydimattvam, sasritvam which is mithyjnanimittam,
erroneous knowledge about oneself, tm ajnam, goes away when mithy ajna goes

Generally there is mambhimna within and without one's body. Ghdiu
putrapautrdiu abhimna is there outside; here, abhimna with the body. 'This is mine, this
is me' is abhimna. Abhimna is not really identification. The body is taken as myself and I
am taken to be as good as the body. Everything is superimposed on the tm and tm is
superimposed on the deha. This is all experience-based. The one with abhimna
experiences his sasritvadukhabhaydimattvam as a series of desires, short-lived
fulfillments, and disappointments.
For the same person, in the wake of brahmtmabhva knowledge, is the fact of
knowing avagama. tm is Brahman vastutantrajnabhva is vedapramajanya. And you
cannot say anything better than that. It is not something that takes place as an event or an
experience. It is not pratyakapramajanita. It is vedntapramajanitbdhitajnam that
no prama can remove. Brahmtma avagama is tmaarrbhimnanivttau. The
asmatpratyayaviaya is Brahman, and I is no more lost in your weight and so on.
That old sasritvam that you knew so well, the old sasritvam that had you in its
spell will be there again until dehbhimnanivtti. You cannot make a judgment about
another person with reference to brahmajnam. That is childish. The charismatic
approach is to say he is a jn and that whatever he says is true. How do you know?
Because someone else said so? The whole approach is wrong. What is the pressure to
prove someone a jn? We cannot afford to have that approach. If he is a vidvn he does
not require your support. If he is not a vidvn your support will not make him one. The
vidvat anubhava is not a prama. Not just those with beards should have the benefit of
doubt. The one who knows will be rid of the abhimnam, that's all.


nih xinnae g&hSwSy xnaimainnae xnapharinim< >o< imit tSyEv ijtSy xnaimanrihtSy
tdev xnapharinim< >o< vit,
Nahi dhanino ghasthasya dhanbhimnino dhanpahranimitta dukha damiti
tasyaiva pravrajitasya dhanbhimnarahitasya tadeva dhanpahranimitta dukha bhavati |
Bhyakra gives an example. A ghastha who is a dhan, a wealthy person, tends to
have a sense of his wealth and a class complex as a result. He has that abhimna. Most
often, if this one loses his wealth and cannot maintain his class, his upper class complex
will still be there. I have an example. Here in India, the government nationalized all the
railroads. As a result, one rich fellow was stuck with his ownership debts. It was not an
ordinary dukha. But wait, the day before the nationalization the fellow had signed away
all his possessions to a charitable trust and taken sannysa. He woke up the next day and
saw the news. Dukham so what? The fellow had been studying Vednta and he took
sannysa. Inside he has no abhimna toward anything he had. He cannot become poorer,
but now he does not want money. He is not a poor fellow. It is not possible for you to
impute dukham to that same person who might otherwise or at another time been
grieving for his loss. He had abhimna before, but he had been preparing himself. He is a
sannys; nothing can be done to him. You cannot say he has dukham because of what he
used to be. Whether one is a dhan or not, abhimna is the reason for dukha.
nc k{filn> k{filTvaimaninim< suo< imit tSyEv k{flivyuSy k{filTvaimanrihtSy
tdev k{filTvaimaninim< suo< vit,
Naca kualina kualitvbhimnanimitta sukha damiti tasyaiva
kualaviyuktasya kualitvbhimnarahitasya tadeva kualitvbhimnanimitta sukha
bhavati |

What about sukha?

It is the same thing. In the old days, rich people wore big earrings. Bhyakra
knew these kind of fellows. You could tell a person's class from his kuala. This earring
wearer stands before the mirror and happily admires his ornament. Happily he comes out.
He has kualam and kualyabhimnanimitta. He has some sukham from his status
symbol. He is like the fellow who drives a new Cadillac and has a bumper sticker that
says 'This is my second car'. Then, if the fellow with the earring gives up either the
earring or the abhimna in the earring, you cannot expect to see in him that same sukham
that the earring gave him before.
t< uTya - AzrIr< vav sNt< n iyaiye Sp&zt> #it, zrIre pitte=zrIrTv< Syat! n jIvt #it
ce szrIrTvSy imWya}aninimTvat!, n aTmn> zrIraTmaimanl][< imWya}an< muvaNyt> szrIrTv<
zKy< kLpiytum,
! inTymzrIrTvmkmRinimTvaidTyvaecam,
Tadukta ruty 'aarra vva santa na priypriye spata' (Chnd. 8.12.1) iti |
arre patite'arratva syt, na jvata iti cenna saarratvasya mithyjnanimittatvt | na


hytmana arrtmbhimnalakaa mithyjna muktvnyata saarratva akya

kalpayitum | nityamaarratvamakarmanimittatvdityavocma |

The Chndogya says that the one who is alive but is no longer attached by
abhimna to this arra is not touched by priypriye. arra abhimnarahitam. This is the one
with brahmtmabhva, the jnavn. The Gt (2.56-57) tells us about this knower:
dukevanudvignaman sukheu vigataspha |
vtargabhayakrodha sthitadhrmunirucyate ||
ya sarvatrnabhisnehastattatprpya ubhubham |
nbhinandati na dveitasya praj pratihit ||
Mithyjnanimittasasra. Mithy ajna is false knowledge about the tm.
Sukhadukhdibhokttvam tmana is mithyjna nimittam. Then the ruti is cited that
says tm, being aarra, is not touched by sukhadukha. Antakaraaviittm alone can
have that touch. That connection between tm and antakaraa is itself mithy. Avidyay
alone a person thinks aha saarra.
Question: While living, aarra is not possible. arraviyoga is called death. As long
as you are alive you have arra.
Swamiji: Alive or dead there will be arra for a jva, a kart. Saarratvam does not
imply death. Saarratvam is only 'tm must have sambandha to arra'. The sambandha has

to be established. The inquiry is here.

Bhyakra: The notion aha saarra is due to mithyjna. When the arra dies,
then alone aarratvam for a jva - not while living. Mithyjnanimittatvt saarratvam
tmana. tm having a arra is due to mithyjna. This cause has to be proved.
It is not possible to establish saarratvam for the tm. Without erroneous
knowledge you cannot think of such a connection. Mithyjnam is the tmadehbhimna,
dehe tmabuddhi, lakaam. We have already established nitya aarratvam for the tm. It
is not that after moka tm becomes aarra. Even now tm is asaga, uninvolved with
arra or anything else. tm is aarra, uddhacaitanya. Otherwise, with a arra hanging
on to consciousness, there could be no moka knowledge. Aarratvam for the tm is
nityam, not kalpitam. Why? Akarmanimittatvt. Aarratvam is not karmaphalam. Were
moka a karmaphla it would not be nitya. Nityatvam is svarpatvam.
tTktxmaRxmRinim< szrIrTvimit ce zrIrs<bNxSyaisTvamaRxmRyaeraTmktTvaise>,
Tatktadharmdharmanimitta saarratvamiti cenna
arrasambandhasysiddhatvddharmdharmayortmaktatvsiddhe |
Tat means tm. Dharmdharma is puyappa.
Question: You talk about moka. That means tmasambandha is there. Moka is real
and dehtmasambandha is real. One cannot be satyam and the other not. The tm, the deh,
the jva, goes about doing karma, gathering puyappa, and that gives arratvam. Having a
body is born out of karma. Dharmdharma is the nimitta for saarratvam. The arratvam is
satyam, and you cannot say mithyjnanimittam. Saarratvam is not ropesnake.


Bhyakra: No. You have not established the sambandha between tm and arra.
You are talking about dharmdharma. The question of any sambandha with
asagasaccidtm comes first. You cannot prove dharmdharma is gathered or anything
else by tm without establishing sambandha.
zrIrs<bNxSy xmaRxmRyaeStTktTvSy cetretrayTvsadNxprMprE;anaidTvkLpna,
arrasambandhasya dharmdharmayostatktatvasya
cetaretarrayatvaprasagdandhaparamparainditvakalpan |

To have sambandha you must have a kart who gathers dharmdharma. But to have
a kart you must have puyappa. The sambandha establishes a kart who is due to
puyappa, yet the puyappa cannot be established without a kart. This is a circular
argument based on anyonraya, mutual dependence, that is not tenable here. It is like the
seed and the tree. It looks like both are andi. Both are without beginning. Which is first
you cannot know. But we do not accept anditvam of a real jva.
If there is karttm you can have accrual of dharmdharma and saarratvam.
Anyonraya is possible only when this fellow with tmadehasambandha has gathered
puyappa. This sambandha would be a result of prvajanma-prvajanma andi, like tree
and seed. But begininglessness for sambandha is just an imagination, a blind succession,
not like tree and seed, which is a fact. All we know is you have a body-mind-sense
complex. The other side is blind. Searching for old puyappa will not establish
sambandha. We say there was previous mithyjnam, and that was andi.
Mithyjnanimitta for sambandha is anditvam. Nobody is saying there was no prvajanma.
Karttvam is after the mithyjnam alone. tmntmasambandha is mithyjnam. Up to
knowledge alone that mithyjna can exist.
iyasmvayaavaaTmn> kt&TR vanuppe>,
Kriysamavybhvcctmana karttvnupapatte |
Samavya is not there with the kriy. Bhyakra uses the Nyyaika word samavya
for sambandha. With no sambandha between tm and antm there is no kriysambandha.
With no kriysambandha there is no kartkrakasambandha and no karttva tmana. tm
remains akart.
s<inxanmae[ raj&tIna< < kt&TR vimit ce xndana*upaijRt&Tys<biNxTvae;a< kt&TR vaeppe>,
Sannidhnamtrea rjaprabhtn da karttvamiti cenna
dhanadndyuprjitabhtyasambandhitvtte karttvopapatte |
Objection: I accept that tm is sk, but tm can be like a king, quietly sitting

there while all activities take place around and through him. By his presence alone there
is krayittvam for the rj. That is his karttvam. The others around him do his bidding
and receive his benefits and are connected to him. They are employed by royal mandate,
a sambandha that gives the king krayittvam, thus karttvam.


n TvaTmnae xndanaidvCDrIraidi> SvSvaims<bNxinim< ik<icCDKy< kLpiytum,

! imWyaimanStu
Ty]> s<bNxhet>u ,
Na tvtmano dhanadndivaccharrdibhi svasvmisambandhanimitta kicicchakya
kalpayitum | mithybhimnastu pratyaka sambandhahetu |
Bhyakra: No. The krayittvam of the king is a result of a relationship with his

court established by the payment of wages and the giving of wealth and the delegation of
power. Where is such a connection between the mind and the senses and body with tm?
The rja gives orders and passes judgment, does saccidtm give orders or distribute
anything? There is no connection between satyam and mithy. When we use the word
sannidhi it is not with the sense of association such as that between a king and his
servants. For us, sannidhi is expressed in the vkyas such as rotasya rotra manaso mana.
If we refer to tm as rja it is only in a provisional sense. Your example is weak.
You have to show a cause for saarratvam. You would have to be able to have
direct experience of any sambandha made to the arra. This is not there. Mithyjnam is
the cause, and it is not pratyaka. You cannot establish a connection with saccidsvarptm.
You have no argument against a self-evident tm. If you think there is a connection, this
is what we call mithyjnam. That I am saarra is itself abhimna, mithyjna. This is
what is pratyaka.
@ten yjmanTvmaTmnae VyaOyatm!,
Etena yajamnatvamtmano vykhytam |

Do you argue that the whole vedatra is based upon tm being yajamna for all
karma? If you say that Veda would not give all these karmas if it did not think tm was a
kart, we say it is you who looks at tm as kart, not Veda. With your perspective and
your sense of yourself in mind, Veda addresses you and asks you to do puyakarma. When
Veda talks about tm it does so as asaga. Yajamnatva karttvam tmana is only by
mithyjnam. Yajamnatvam is there until the knowledge of Brahman alone.
Aa> - dehaidVyitirSyaTmn AaTmIye dehadavvimanae gaE[ae n imWyeit ce isvStud
e Sy
gaE[TvmuOyTvise>,ySy ih isae vStud
e > ywa kesraidmanakitivze;ae=NvyVyitreka_ya<
u yae=Ny> is> ttaNy> pu;> aiykE> aEyz
R aEyaRidi> is<hgu[>E s<p> is> tSy pu;e
is<hzBdTyyaE gaE[aE vit naisvStud
e Sy,
Atrhu - dehdivyatiriktasytmana tmye dehdvavabhimno gauo na mithyeti
cenna, prasiddhavastubhedasya gauatvamukhyatvaprasiddhe |yasya hi prasiddho vastubheda,
yath kesardimnktivieo'nvayavyatirekbhy sihaabdapratyayabhmukhyo'nya
prasiddha tatacnya purua pryikai krauryaaurydibhi sihaguai sampanna
siddha, tasya purue sihaabdapratyayau gauau bhavati nprasiddhavastubhedasya |
Prbhkra: We accept dehavyatirikttm. We say tm, a kartabhokt, survives the
body as jva. It is subject to puyappa and takes on new incarnations and can go to


different spheres of experience. We say the jva has a certain gaua abhimna which is not
mithy, it is meta-connection that is not false. In the same way, if you say that a person is
a lion, you are making a connection in a secondary sense; you are talking about a
guasmyam. If a person says that this body is myself, he only means it in a figurative
way. Knowing this body as myself is not literal, but it is not erroneous.
Bhyakra: Only when the primary meaning is known can you say it is gaua, a
figurative usage. When you say a person is a lion, you know what a lion is and you know
what a man is. Only then does gaua prayoga have a meaning. If you take a lion as a
person or a person as a lion it is a mistake. Only when bheda is known to you can there be
gaua. Here, tm asaga saccidnanda. You have not see dehavyatirikttm. It is not
pratyaka. How can you know it is different from anything? There is no gaua when the
difference between two objects is not known.
The four-legged beast with a mane that lives in the jungle has a particular form
that makes him the locus of the word 'lion' and its meaning. This animal is the object of
the cognition of the meaning of the word 'siha'. There is no other object used for this
word. Your understanding is clear. If you know a person with courage and cruelty, you
may say that his qualities are lion-like. But he is obviously a purua. The two ktis are
different, though the person may have those qualities. The person for whom the forms of
the person and the lion and the qualities of the person and the lion are very clear can
make the gaua connection. He also must know clearly the words 'lion' and 'person'.
Mukhya and gaua are clear to him. The fellow for whom the bheda is not prasiddha cannot
use the figurative sense. If the person does not know what a lion is, the gaua is lost on
him. The context must be known. It is the same with an allegory.
tSy SvNyaNyzBdTyyaE aiNtinimavev vtae n gaE[aE,
Tasya svanyatrnyaabdapratyayau bhrntinimittveva bhavato na gauau |

The one who does not know the difference and who uses a word where it cannot
be a part of a figurative meaning will not achieve gaua. Instead, it is mithy pratyaya
alone. It is ignorance.
ywa mNdaNxkre Swa[uryimTyg&m
a[ivze;e pu;zBdTyyaE Swa[uiv;yaE ywa va
zuikayamkSmajtimit initaE zBdTyyaE tehaids<"ate=himit
inpcare[ zBdTyyavaTmanaTmaivvekn
e aeTp*manaE kw< gaE[aE zKyaE vidtum,
Yath mandndhakare sthurayamityaghymaviee puruaabdapratyayau
sthuviayau, yath v uktikymakasmdrajatamiti nicitau abdapratyayau,
tadvaddehdisaghte'hamiti nirupacrea abdapratyayvtmntmvivekenotpadyamnau
katha gauau akyau vaditum |

This is the dtnta. In total darkness there is no problem. When there is a little
light available the sthu that is there can be mistaken for a purua. The stump is not
perceived and what is understood to be there is only purua. The word and meaning
'purua' is applied to the stump of a tree. This is done with no particular reasoning on the


part of the one who looks toward the stump. Two things are then found where there is
only one object. We saw this with the seashell and the word silver and its meaning.
When what is tm is not clear and what is antm is not clear, when there is an
aviveka, how can you say it is gaua? Only when tm and deha are known can you say it
is gaua. You do not know saccidnanda asaga tm. Neither have you ever see
dehavyatirikttm. That fellow who survives death is nityaparoka, not pratyaka. How can
there be a connection between I and the body-mind complex? How can this be part of a
figurative expression?
AaTmanaTmivveiknamip pi{ftanamjaivpalanaimvaivivaE zBdTyyaE vt>,
tSmaehaidVyitiraTmaiStTvvaidna< dehadavh<Tyyae imWyEv n gaE[>,
tSmaiNmWyaTyyinimTvaTszrIrTvSy is< jIvtae=ip iv;ae=zrIrTvm!,
tmntmavivekinmapi paitnmajviplnmivviviktau abdapratyayau bhavata
| tasmddehdivyatirikttmstitvavdin dehdvahampratyayo mithyaiva na gaua |
tasmnmithypratyayanimittatvtsaarratvasya, siddha jvato'pi viduo'arratvam |
Paitas, who seem to know tmntm, and simple cowherds alike can show a
lack of discrimination with regard to what is self and what is not. Whether they say tm
is distinct from or the same as the body, they do not know. The stikas who say the tm is
distinct from the body and is a kartabhokt and a paralokagm with janmntara do not
know what is tm. Any religious believer who says tm is like this has not seen such an
tm. Therefore he cannot see clearly the difference that would make his gaua
reasonable. The difference is only mithy.
tmana saarratvam, any connection between tm and antm, is purely mithy
pratyaya, mithyjnam. Therefore the vidvn, the one without mithy pratyaya, lives here
knowing he is aarra. He is untouched by priypriye.
twac ivi;ya uit> - t*wa=ihinLvRynI vLmIke m&ta TySta zyItEvmevd
e < zrIr< zet,
AwaymzrIrae=m&t> a[ae Ev tej @v #it, sc]urc]uirv sk[ae=
R k[R #v svagvaigv smna Amna #v
sa[ae=a[ #v #it c, Sm&itrip c - iSwt}Sy ka a;a #Yta*a iSwt}l][aNyac]a[a iv;>
svRv&ys<bNx< dzRyit, tSmaavgtaTmavSy ywapUv s<sairTvm!,
Tathca brahmavidviay ruti ' tadyath'hinirlvayan valmke mt pratyast
aytaivameveda arra ete | athyamaarro'mta pro brahmaiva teja eva' (Bhad. 4.4.7)
iti | 'sacakuracakuriva sakaro'kara iva savgavgiva saman aman iva sapro'pra iva'
iti ca | smtirapi ca 'sthitaprajasya k bh; (Bh. G. 2. 54) iytdy
sthitaprajalakanycak vidua sarvapravttyasambandha darayati |
tasmnnvagatabrahmtmabhvasya yathprva sasritvam | yasya tu yathprva
sasritva nsvavagatabrahmtmabhva ityanavadyam |
Bhadrayaka is cited: When the snake is ready to slough its dead skin, it catches

it on a thorn or stick and leaves it lying on an anthill. What was once itself part of the
body is no longer taken with dehtmabuddhi. It is similar for the vidvn and his body. The

objectified body remains here but he knows he is aarra, not subject to time, completely
free while living. He is jvanmukta, jvan api brahmaiva.
Also cited is Bhagavad Git. You have to put the 'iva' in the quote right after
'sacaku'. He already has eyes. stra makes you think a bit. Though he has eyes he is
without eyes. Though he has ears he is without ears et cetera. Akart kart iva is the idea.
The vidvn sees and hears and thinks well enough, but he has no question of karttvam.
Karttvam is mithy; akarttvam is satyam. By knowledge, tmani karttvam is bdhita.
Aham akart.
ySy tu ywapUv s<sairTv< nasavvgtaTmav #Tynv*m!,
Yasya tu yathprva sasritva nsvavagatabrahmtmabhva ityanavadyam |

A person who has heard of this Brahman can still think he is subject to
sukhadukha. He may say there is no such thing as jnd moka, no sasrimoka. But all
this points out is that he is ruta Brahma not avagata brahmtm. We are talking about the
one who knows he is free from sasra. The other fellow is on the way. The Bhagavad
Git addresses these two fellows: the mature and the maturing. Your argument for
sambandha has no basis.
yTpun< v[aTpracInyaemn
R ninidXyasnyaedz
R n
R aiixze;Tv< [ae n SvppyRvsaiyTvimit, n,
Yasya tu yathprva sasritva nsvavagatabrahmtmabhva ityanavadyam |
yatpunarukta ravatparcnayormanananididhysanayordarandvidhieatva brahmao
na svarpaparyavasyitvamiti | na | avagatyarthatvnmanananididhysanayo |

Moreover, what you say with regard to mananam and nididhysanam after
ravaam is not correct. You say that whatever is learned as brahmajnam is to be made
an object of meditation and connected to vidhi. You say some mnasakarma is involved.
You say Brahman becomes useful as vidhiea for upsana after ravaam. We say there is
no resolution in the brahmasvarpa through meditation. Where one gains immediate moka
there is no grand finale. If it is vidhi, there will be more vidhis. If it is ea, there will be
more ea. ravaa manana nididhysana are meant for brahmajnam alone. Brahman is not
part of any vidhi.
Previously we established that the vidvn gains brahmtmajnam through the
vedntaprama and therefore knows he is mukta. Brahmtmvagatabhva,
mithyjnanivtti, mokalbha, is established for this person because vedntastra
reveals what is moka. The anadhigataviaya is there and straprmyam is there. This is
the anavadyam; there is no fault. strayonitvam is there tattu samanvayt,
Brahmajnalbh is what is meant in tm v are dratavya. tm is to be
understood as Brahman by ravadi and amnitvam itydi and antakaraauddhi. Even
Karmaka is there for that understanding. Brahmajnam is the purpose for tavya in the
vkya. The jnam is aparokajnam. If you don't get it, do further ravaam. There is no
parokjnam in this. There is no vidhieatvam here brahmajnaprdnyt. ravaa manana

nididhysana are all meant for brahmajnam. You expose yourself to the jnaprama by
ravaa. ravaam is mukhyasdhana. Mms is part of ravaa; this is for prama ak.
Mananam is for prameya ak. Nididhysana is for viparitabhvan.
yid vgt< aNy ivinyuJyet! veda ivixze;Tvm!, ntu tdiSt, mnninidXyasnyaerip
Yadi hyavagata brahmnyatra viniyujyet bhavettad vidhieatvam | natu tadasti |
manananididhysanayorapi ravaavadavagatyarthatvt |

For the sake of knowledge we require all these other things. But brahmajnam is
not a matter of making use of knowledge. There is no vidhieatvam; there is phalavattvam.
There is no other place or teaching where Brahman is taken and used as an action of
meditation along with vidhi. ravaa manana nididhysana are all meant for brahmajna.
Bhmati's contention that manana and nididhysana are ag and are required for moka is at
least a little off the track. Manana and nididhysana do not themselves produce moka.
There is nothing to this problem of how to make use of brahmajnam.
tSma itpiivixiv;ytya zama[kTv< [> s<vtITyt> Svtmev zama[k<
vedaNtvaKysmNvyaidit ism!,
Tasmnna pratipattividhiviayatay strapramakatva brahmaa sambhavattyata
svatantrameva Brahma strapramaka vedntavkyasamanvayditi siddham |

There is no connection with upsana vidhiea, Brahman being understanding only

through the stra. Svatantram eva brahmastrapramakam. Brahmajna mokaphalam.
strapramaka Brahma tattusamanvayt. Saphalatvt svatantra strapramaka
Brahma, na pratipattivieatay na karmavieatay. Vedntavkyn tasminneva brahmai
samyaganvayt. Vedntavkyasamanvayt iti siddham.
@v< c sit Awatae ij}asa #it ti;y> p&wKzaarM %pp*te,
Eva ca sati 'athto brahmajijs' iti tadviaya pthakstrrambha upapadyate |

This being so, svatantrya Brahma sati, Brahman distinct from dharma being
understood, the stra with Brahman as subject matter is taken up with the stra 'athto
itpiivixprTve ih Awatae xmRij}asa #TyevarBxTva p&wKzamr_yet, Aar_yma[< cEvmar_yet Awat> pirizxmRij}aseit Awat> TvwRp
u ;awRyaeijR}asa #itvt!, aTmEKyavgitSTvit}ateit tdwaeR
yu> zaarM> - Awatae ij}asa #it,
Pratipattividhiparatve hi 'athto dharmajijs' ityevrabdhatvnna
pthakstramarabhyeta | rabhyama caivamrabhyeta - athta pariiadharmajijseti
'athta kratvarthapururthayorjijs' (Jai. S. 4.1.1) itivat |
brahmtmaikyvagatistvapratijteti tadartho yukta strrambha 'athto brahmajijs'


Objection: The vcikam and kyika karmas are already covered in the dharmajijs.
Now a pratipattiviayajijs should start. There should be a separate stra with inquiry
into upsana, mnasakriy.
Bhyakra: There is no need for this, for it too is vidhi. It is not a separate subject
matter. Everything will come under one examination of vidhi. If Brahman were presented
as part of a vidhi about upsana it would have been covered in the stra that begins 'athto
dharmajijs', and there would be no need of a separate stra. There might have been a
separate chapter in Jaimini's work, but not a separate stra. The chapter would have been
something like 'Athto all the things that have been left out dharmajijs'. It would, then,
be like Jaimini's stra 4.1.1 that again uses the jijspada, there with regard to which
karma is ea.
But there is no introduction or examination of brahmtmaikyajnam in Jaimini's
work that starts 'athto dharmajijs'. Therefore the separate stra that begins 'athto
brahmajijs' is proper. There are two parts to the Veda, so there is no conflict in there
being two jijss. It is not that only the Kenopaniad and the relatively few pages at the
end of each Veda are all we hold to.
tSmadh< aSmITyetdvsana @v sveR ivxy> svaRi[ cetra[I ma[ain, nheyanupadeyaEtaTmavgtaE
inivR;ya{ymat&kai[ c ma[ain ivtumhRNtIit,
Tasmdaha brahmsmtyetadavasn eva sarve vidhaya sarvi cetar pramni |
nahyaheynupdeydvaittmvagatau nirviayyapramtki ca pramni
bhavitumarhantti |

All the pramas and all the vidhis have their end only in the aha brahmsmti
avasnam. Bhyakra also ends here. All pramas, including vedntaprama, are valid up
to that only. Advaitajna negates krakadvaita. All vyavahra, being bdhitavyavahra, goes
in the wake of brahmvagata. Brahma na kryaea. Neither heya nor updeya can be a
prama in that advaittmvagati because there are no longer binding objects and no
Aipca> - gaE[imWyaTmnae=sve pudehaidbaxnat!, s+aTmahimTyev< baexe kay kw< vet.
ANveVyaTmiv}anaTaKmat&TvmaTmn>, AiNv> SyaTmatEv paPmdae;aidvijRt>.
Apichu 'gauamithytmano'sattve putradehdibdhant |
sadbrahmtmhamityeva bodhe krya katha bhavet ||
anveavytmavijntprkpramttvamtmana | anvia sytpramtaiva
ppmadodivarjita ||

A father knows his son is different from him, but in one's own son one finds
himself. It is common that the son's problems becomes the father's problems. The other
way around is found too. There is mineness and confusion called gautm. There is
mithytmapratyaya, kartham iti pratyaya. Both of these get sublated in the wake of the
tatsadbrahmhamsmti knowledge. When mithytm is not there, where is gautm? Only


a bdhita continuity will be there. The pressure to do and not do, to ask karma to intervene
where it cannot, to try to manipulate things that are better accepted, will not be there.
The status of being a knower is there for the tm until the knowledge is in place.
Pramt is tm. Pramtu svarpa, saccidnanddvaya Brahma, all krakadvaitavarjita
Brahma, is anvia, the sought after. Being found, that knower knows he is free from all
gathered ppa. After the knowledge, the pramt that comes back is bdhitapramt alone.
Chndogya, after the seventh chapter, where Sanatkumra talks to Nrada, says there is no
complaint of aging or death for the knower of brahmtm; he is free from sorrow. He is
free from suffering from hunger or thirst. His sakalpa comes true. Every desire becomes
fulfilled. The tm, sa tm anvetavya, the opposite tm, this second tm, tm that is
vara, the tm to be known, is known. Paramevara, vara, has to be understood by you
as saccidnanda tm. This is why the words 'satyasakalpa' have come. Therefore
paddvayalakya, the tattvamasiiti.
To take tm to be pramt is due to ajnam. Pramt is tm, but tm is not
pramt. When pramt itself is kalpita, where is the validity of pramt? All pramas are
okay until, prama having done the job, everything resolves in that one vastu. The last
verse is here.
dehaTmTyyae yTma[Tven kiLpt>, laEikk< tdevd
e < ma[< Tva==Tminyat! #it .4.
Dehtmapratyayo yadvatpramatvena kalpita | laukika tadvadeveda prama
tv''tmanicayt' iti || (4)

' tmanicayt' a savaradrgha. Dehtmapratyaya is kalpita; we have seen

mithyjnanimitta. The pramas, because there is difference between abda and spara,
seem to establish dvaita. You were given five senses for knowing and doing which seem
to establish dvaitam. Until you know the vastu, the senses establish only dvaitam. Once
you know the vastu, all of them become kalpita. Honestly, they do not create any dvaitam.
They do not reveal dvaitam. The ears reveal abda and skin reveals spara and eyes reveal
rpa; none of them reveals dvaitam. The objects of the senses are objectified, but dvaitam
is not objectified by anybody. You cannot prove dvaitam. Dvaitam from what? But they
seem to, until you analyze it.
All the dk and dya all the time one whole, subject/object one whole. It looks as
though dvaitam is established by the pramas, and you count the five: pratyaka anumna
itydi, and abda as a sixth. And the prameyas are there. It looks as though dvaita bhavati
until you know what is what. When the vastu is known, all this becomes mithy. And
what is known as prama is also bdhita otherwise there cannot be teaching. The
laukikapramas are accepted for the time being as valid in there own spheres for dealing
with vyavahra.
But the vedntaprama has a prameya which is klatraya abdhitavastu. This is the
difference from the other pramas. When this vastu is known, all pramtpramaprameyatvam becomes mithy. In the bhyavkya after 'tu', is maryd, a limit here,
'until'. All pramas are pramas only tmanicayt, until tm is nicaya.


The pramt is centered on aham. The pramtaviaya is aham tm. This saccid tm
is never bdhita. Pramttvam is tmani kalpita. Its saccidtmaviaya is never sublated, never
negated. Therefore, kalpitapramttvam being there, there is vyvahrikaprmyam. For
pramttvam there is vyvahrikaprmyam. Therefore, because of the pramttvam kalpita
on the tm, all the other vyvahrikaprmas will be there. The vedastra too has
vyvahrikaprmyam, just like bandhamoka.
I told you moka is satyam. Why isn't bandha satyam? If bandha is mithy, how can
there be mokasatyam? Hey, moka need not be satyam. What we want is bandhanivtti
alone. You don't need moka. You require only mithybandhanivtti. And
mithybandhanivtti is ajnanivtti, mithypratyaya nivtti. This is what we say is
brahmajnam, tmajnam. This is why moka is nitya, svarpa of the tm.
ramnai pre xai kTaaysmNvy>, kayRtaTpyRbaxen saixt> zubuye.
rmanmni pare dhmni ktsnmnyasamanvaya |
kryattparyabdhena sdhita uddhabuddhaye ||
Ratnaprabh's iadevat is Rma: To the one who is known as Rma, the one who
is paramadhma, this Brahman that is the samanvaya of all the sacred tradition and texts,
janmdyasya yata, by whom all krya, including prama and jagat, are all negated as
dvaitam, who by the ttparya nicaya of what is samanvaya leaves nothing to be done.
When brahmajnam is known, all the kryas are bdhita. Up to this, vidhi and krya are
sdhita. It is for antakaraauddhi that I have done this work. This is his prayer. I place it
at the feet of my guru.

Om Tat Sat