P Training For Resilience

21st Flight Safety Conference
Paris, 23-26 March 2015

Training for Resilience

Presented by Dr. Nicklas Dahlstrom
Captain David Owens
Safety Conference 2014; Monitoring
Page 2
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.
Confidential and proprietary document.
What is resilience?
Culmination of all our;

experience + training + ability
the competencies applied in real life!
Resilience is the ability to recognize, absorb and adapt to
disruptions *
Examples?
Qantas QF 32 or Baghdad!
United 282 Sioux City
Thinking outside the box
Resilience is primary goal of training!
Page 3
*Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006
The pyramid model
Page 4
Not just flight operations!
Page 5
Decision Making
Decision Making and Time

Fuel
Weather
Medical
Hours
Rational
decision
making
All other
decisions
Minutes
Seconds
Natural
decision
making
TCAS
GPWS
Wind shear
Split-second
Conditioned
reaction
Conditioned Reaction
Typical conditions:
Clear trigger(s)
Time is a critical factor
No competing/complex
information available
The aim is for the reaction

to be correct and fast
Lets start with a typical conditioned reaction - RTO
Example; Rejected Take-off, Simon Lowe, Airbus has arranged for you to use it
Used before by Airbus as an example of Monitoring
It is a positive example
What was right?
They stopped on the runway, straight and safe
How did they do that?
They followed their training!!

Page 9
What went right?

How?
How?
How?
4. Training
They detected a problem

Recognised it correctly
Recalled the correct actions
Carried them out correctly
3. Detected the
problem correctly
2. Carried out the

correct actions
1. Stopped on R/W
On the centreline
And safe
Detect.Recognise.Recall.React
They did as they were trained; therefore,
their training was resilient
IT WAS RESILIENT IN THE REAL WORLD!!

Page 10
What about their training?
How to perform a rejected Take-off?.....................

Bang.?
Close the Thrust Levers
Select max reverse
Allow the auto brake to bring the aircraft to a stop
Set park brake
Call, Cabin Crew at Stations
Page 11
If we train it this way ..

Training is not wrong .
Just the way it is delivered MAY not
be usable...
Not good enough!!
It is the method of training we need
to consider!
Detect, Recognise, Recall, React
Detect.Recognise.Recall.React
In many accidents one of these steps was missed
A successful outcome requires the correct steps carried out in the
correct order
This applies to the conditioned reaction discussed here and ALL of

the other decision making stages
What just
happened?
Nic?
Page 12
I remember
this from
the sim!
Decision Making and Time

Fuel
Weather
Medical
Hours
Rational
decision
making
All other
decisions
Minutes
Seconds
Natural
decision
making
TCAS
GPWS
Wind shear
Split-second
Conditioned
reaction
Rational Decision Making

Typical conditions:
Clear and specific goals
Minimal time constraints
Complete and correct info
The aim is an optimal decision
Ok, but if we
go there
Natural Decision Making

Typical conditions:
Unclear goals (+ risk)
Available time is minimal
Incomplete/incorrect info
and changing situation
The aim is for a decision

that is good enough
Natural Decision Making

This looks like
Steps involved:
Situation recognition
(Based on cues from the situation)
This should
work
Serial option evaluation

(Until get to good enough option)
Mental simulation
(To test option and have a plan)
If we do it this
way it will fix
the problem
Most critical operational decisions will be NDM decisions!
Why is this important now?

?
Ok
Great!
Turkey
Well-being
Regular
feeding
Attention
from farmer
Shelter
29th November 2013
26th November 2014
Days
(Taleb, 2007)
Why is this important now?
2014
2012
2013
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2015)
The Changing Situation

for Pilot Experience
EXPOSURE
VARIETY
EXPERIENCE
EXPERTISE
REFLECTION
PRACTICE
Limited exposure Degraded experience

More effective training to achieve expertise
So what can we do?
Evidence Based Training
Training
Pilots
Safety
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2013)
Evolution of
Evidence Based Training
ATQP
REGs
EBT
REGs
EBT
EBT
EBT
REGs
Learning from Best Practice
30
300
30
2000
2 000 000
300
(Heinrich, 1931; Hollnagel, 2014)
Deconstruction of Competence
Competence
Dont worry,
just do what I
tell you to do!
I am not seeing
the big picture in
this
Subcompetence
Sub-subcompetence
Sub-subcompetence
Subcompetence
Sub-subcompetence
Reconstruction of Competence
Previously I
flew the 320.
Competence
Subcompetence
Ok, so lets start

with what is the
same on the 350!
Subcompetence
Provide context Allow exploration

Sub-subcompetence
Sub-subcompetence
Sub-subcompetence
Training for Resilience and Expertise

Trainee ownership and motivation
Development of general competencies,
not only actions for specific situations
Focus not only on correct answers,
also on exploring useful methods
Integration of HF/CRM in all training,
more HF/CRM knowledge for trainers
From Safe Actions to Safety Culture

Awareness
Understanding
Changed behaviour
Challenges and Ways Forward

Errors Collect/Communicate Best Practice
Information Exploration in Training
Compliance Aiming for Expertise
Safe Actions Safety Culture
Efficiency and Safety
Efficiency and Safety
Advancing learning methods for pilot training
Daniel Willingham professor of

psychology at the University of Virginia
Learning Pyramid retention rate
Learning pyramid - psychology of

learning
A lot of new research in this area has

shown learning to be very individual
We know that repetition is a factor and

so is the preferred method of learning
and learning by discovery also the
time between learning and test
There are many other factors
Page 31
Why
Dont
Pilots Like
Ground
School?
How do we train this?
We need to understand the psychology of learning

Evidence Based Training, competency and evaluation principles
Realistic scenario but not the immediate recall of the lesson
Train a task,
procedure or
skill
OR
Page 32
How to train? More information!
Surprise we are looking for ideas and are developing

practical methods of generating surprise
We have sent you a monitoring OTT

EBT principle of first look for recurrent training, ICAO 9995
Then train what the student needs as an individual
May require a significant change in trainer style

and methods
Page 33
Conclusion
Most accidents were in aircraft that were flyable
In almost every case, the pilots had been

trained but for some reason, on that day, under
those circumstances, they didnt or couldnt use
that training
We are addressing this by changing the way

we train
We must continue to apply EBT principles

But whatever we do, we must train to achieve
RESILIENCE!
Page 35
Airbus S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of
its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements
made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.
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21st Flight Safety Conference

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

21st Flight Safety Conference

Training for Resilience

21st Flight Safety Conference

Safety Conference 2014; Monitoring

Confidential and proprietary document.

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

21st Flight Safety Conference

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

Culmination of all our;

Confidential and proprietary document.

*Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006

21st Flight Safety Conference

The pyramid model

Confidential and proprietary document.

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

21st Flight Safety Conference

Not just flight operations!

Confidential and proprietary document.

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

Decision Making and Time

Time is a critical factor

The aim is for the reaction

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

Lets start with a typical conditioned reaction - RTO

They followed their training!!

Confidential and proprietary document.

21st Flight Safety Conference

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

What went right?

They detected a problem

2. Carried out the

They did as they were trained; therefore,

their training was resilient

IT WAS RESILIENT IN THE REAL WORLD!!

Confidential and proprietary document.

21st Flight Safety Conference

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

What about their training?

How to perform a rejected Take-off?.....................

Confidential and proprietary document.

If we train it this way ..

21st Flight Safety Conference

Paris, 23-26 March 2015

Detect, Recognise, Recall, React

This applies to the conditioned reaction discussed here and ALL of

Confidential and proprietary document.

Decision Making and Time

Rational Decision Making

Clear and specific goals

Minimal time constraints

Complete and correct info

The aim is an optimal decision

Natural Decision Making

Unclear goals (+ risk)

Available time is minimal

The aim is for a decision

Natural Decision Making

Serial option evaluation

Most critical operational decisions will be NDM decisions!

Why is this important now?

29th November 2013