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Amatan v.

Aujero
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956. September 27, 1995
FACTS:

A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of


murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed. After
preliminary investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an
information charged Umpad with the crime of Homicide.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the
Public Prosecutor and the consent of the offended party, entered into plea
bargaining where it was agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as originally
charged in the information. Respondent judge found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide exactly
in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement.
A letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S.
Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct
wherein he contended that the sentence of respondent judge finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted
Homicide and not Homicide as charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of
Attempted Homicide.
HELD:
Yes. While it is true that Sec. 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to
plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged", the fact of death of the victim for which the
accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and
plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower
offense of attempted homicide.

In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to


injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and
everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes
judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the
intent is to promote right and justice. The fact of the victim's death, a
clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted
the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The
failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts
to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if
not competence, in the performance of his duties.

Salvacion v. Central Bank


G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997
FACTS:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed


and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days
and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day
on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained
at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli a Dollar
Account in China Banking Corp.
The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China
Banking Corporation. China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body, whatsoever.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act can be made applicable to a foreign transient.

HELD:
No. The foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because
such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit
in the bank only for a short time. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizerzmente con damo de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is
one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377) It would be unthinkable, that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. The provisions
of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A.
6426 are inapplicable to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

Demafiles v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28396. December 29, 1967
FACTS:

The petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying
for the mayoralty in the general elections. On November 21 the respondent
Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers
pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as
"obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground
that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered, of whom 188
voted, when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar
only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its
session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the objection of
one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded
with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally
gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was
proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste.
On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting
the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the

subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board


members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit, considering that they
were reelectionists. The COMELEC resolved to annul the canvass and
proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste,
Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of Antique and to
constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to
the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall
canvass anew the results of the election for local offices.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the case is moot because respondent Galido had taken his
oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.
(2) Whether or not the canvassing board may pass upon the validity of the
election return in this case.
(3) Whether or not the canvass and proclamation should be annulled.
HELD:
(1) No. In the courts view, the last portion of the provision "and shall have
qualified" is devoid of any meaning and does not warrant the respondent's
reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste
begins immediately after their proclamation. Here is a clear case of a
failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty
forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying. The
court agreed by the general rule that the term of office of municipal
officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and
so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the
basic issues in this case.
(2) Yes. A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function that of
compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to
it. However, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much
less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the
precinct from whence it came are illegal. But the exclusion of the return in
this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously
manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were

195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local
election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30,
1967.
(3) Yes. The canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the
four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it,
they being candidates for reelection. The statement of respondent Galido
that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under
section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to
prevent them from canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a
municipal board of canvassers, is branded as obiter dictum
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a
provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal
canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the
maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.

People v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. L-32282-83. November 26, 1970

FACTS:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction,
filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside
the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur (respondent herein), denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled
"People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer;
and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.
The Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario
Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit
Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No.

5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the


Department of Justice. The Administrative Orders were issued at the
instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to
either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and
personal safety.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court
below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question
to the Circuit Criminal Court.
(2) Whether or not the cases should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal
Court.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts
nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual
cases to the circuit courts. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226
relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing,
Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District. Respondent Judge Gutierrez,
therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not
mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the
law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
(2) Yes. It is unfortunate that in refusing to consider Department
Administrative Order No. 226 as mandatory, respondent Judge Gutierrez
failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases
should be transferred because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in
view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court
sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered.
There is an imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site
outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into
conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given
a fair chance to present its side of the case.

Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section
14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the
actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice
demand that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should
yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice
"summum jus, summa in juria."

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal


G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution. While petitioner concedes that the Supreme
Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at
the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal". Petitioner avers that the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof,
contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this
Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
HELD:
No. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the
establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,
otherwise. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution should be read with
other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on
the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Supreme Courts constitutional


mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our countrys
highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection
therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the
exercise thereof.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of the courts power to
judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the
rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary. The court reiterate that the
establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the
Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
The court had previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to
which Members of the Court were designated. The PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. The
vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the
discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a
microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not constrict an absolute and
constitutional grant of judicial power.
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for
benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed
qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act,
as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as
the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a
total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits
of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the
same. The NIA and the Civil Service contend that petitioner is excluded from
the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683 because petitioner's employment is coterminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA, and said project was
completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position
became functus officio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners application for ealy retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 6683 should be granted.
HELD:
Yes. The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to
trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon
early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Co-terminous or project
personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as
long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and
as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents
NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under
Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.

COA v. Province of Cebu


G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001;

FACTS:
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the
Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related
benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes
were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were
the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued
Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for
the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the
provincial SEF.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school
teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses
for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund
(SEF) of the local government unit concerned.
HELD:
Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the
compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who
should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective
rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the
corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and
indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged
principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries

and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school


boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of
the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants
are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be
appropriated.
Shioji v. Harvey
G.R. No. L-18940. April 27, 1922

FACTS:
In cause No. 19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein S. Shioji
was plaintiff, and the Toyo Kisen Kaisah and the Pacific Mail Steamship Co.,
were defendants, judgment was rendered on October 31, 1920, by Judge
Concepcion presiding in the second branch of the court, in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants. Thereafter, the defendants duly
perfected an appeal by way of bill of exceptions, to the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands filed on February 16, 1922.
The countermove of the respondents in the injunction proceedings pending
the Court of First Instance was to file a complaint in prohibition in the
Supreme Court, to compel the respondent Judge of First Instance to desist
from interfering with the execution of the judgment in case No. 19471 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and to issue an order revoking the
previously promulgated by him. The preliminary injunction prayed for as an
incident to the complaint in prohibition was immediately issued by the
Supreme Court, and has been complied with by the respondents herein.
Counsel Petitioner herein moves for judgment on the pleadings.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Judge of First Instance may assume the jurisdiction to
interpret and review judgment and order of the Supreme Court, and to
obstruct the enforcement of the decisions of the appellate court.
(2) Whether or not Rule 24 (a) is in conflict with any law of the United States
or of the Philippine Islands.

HELD:
(1) No. The only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a high court
is returned, is the ministerial one, the issuing of the order of execution, and
that lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse
the judgment of the higher court as it would seem to be superfluous. A
judge of a lower court cannot enforce different decrees than those rendered
by the superior court. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Island is
expressly authorized by statute to make rules for regulation of its practice
and the conduct of its business. Section 28 of the Judiciary Act (No. 136),
grants to the members of the Supreme Court the power to "make all
necessary rules for orderly procedure in Supreme Court . . . in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which rules shall be . . .
binding upon the several courts."
(2) No, Rule 24 (a) is not in conflict with any law of the United States or of the
Philippines, but is a necessary rule for orderly procedure and for regulating
the conduct of business in Supreme Court. It is a rule which relates to a
matter of practice and procedure over which the Legislature has not
exercised its power. It is a rule which does not operate to deprive a party of
any statutory right. It is a rule in harmony with judicial practice and
procedure over which the Legislature has not exercised its power. It is a rule
which does not operate to deprive a party of any statutory right. It is a rule
in harmony with judicial practice and procedure and essential to the
existence of the courts. And, finally, it is a rule which must be enforced
according to the discretion of the court. Independent of any statutory
provision, the court asserts that every court has inherent power to do all
things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction.
Luciano v. Provincial Governor
G.R. No. 30306. June 20, 1969
FACTS:

The petition now before us, originally for mandamus filed by Jose C.
Luciano, Councilor of Makati, Rizal, who received the highest number of

votes in the last general elections of 1967, to compel the Provincial


Governor and/or the Provincial Board of Rizal under Section 13 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act to suspend Makati Mayor Maximo Estrella
and others, soon branched out to include quo warranto to have petitioner
declared to be entitled to act as Mayor of Makati, Rizal and, thereafter,
further expanded to add a prayer for injunction against newly named party
respondents, Judges Delfin B. Flores and Herminio C. Mariano, both of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the Court of Appeals, because said
judges and the Court of Appeals have restrained or enjoined the suspension
of Mayor Estrella and others.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise the mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
HELD:
It is true to say that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act grants with specifity upon the Court of First Instance the
power to suspend an official charged with a violation thereof. The plain
import of the last sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, is
that a defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices case "shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him." And so, there is in this legal
provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court, all other acts
connected with the discharge of court functions which here include
suspension should be left to the Court of First Instance. Section 13
requires as a pre-condition of the power to suspend that there be a valid
information.
Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed
from one who should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of
a given statute fairness must have in the mind of the legislators, we brush
aside needless refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the provisions
thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court has the
inescapable duty to suspend the public official indicted there under.

Angara v. Electoral Commission


G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936
FACTS:

Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of


Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being
the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted,
and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified. Petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of
the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period. Petitioner, in seeking for the
issuance of the writ prayed for, contends that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation thereof by the National Assembly.
HELD:
No. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular

power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other
is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp.
138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to
the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents
G.R. 26803, Oct. 14, 1975
FACTS:

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners


challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before
the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing
the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to
hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and
directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings
refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade
name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name
pending at the Patent Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Patents may be compelled to personally hear
the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
HELD:
No. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to
obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or

employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and


instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned,
controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the
consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the
enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also
empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head,"
to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."
It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to
which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations
and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its
purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate
a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by
implication it has been withheld. There is no provision either in Republic Act
No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the
designation of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and
authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited
laws should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the
administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge
of his duties in the administration of said laws. It could hardly be expected,
in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear
personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him
little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same
time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility
imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of
orderly and responsible administration. The remedy is a far wider range of
delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has been
justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at
the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more
important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far
as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important
matters of detail."
People v. Concepcion
G.R. No. 19190. November 29, 1922

FACTS:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri


branch of the Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of
the Philippine National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919,
authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in
the amount of P300,000. "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership.
Venancio Concepcion is a member of the board of directors of this bank and
was charged with a violation of Section 35 of Act No. 2747. Section 35 of Act
No. 2747, provides that "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly,
grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor
to agents of the branch banks."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of a credit to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No.
2747 hence violative of said law.
HELD:
Yes. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar
maxim that no man may serve two masters that where personal interest
clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore,
it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure
of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a
director is a member, falls within the prohibition. A loan, therefore, to a
partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an
indirect loan to such director. The court is of the opinion that the statute
forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to himself directly. The
loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.
Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo
G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994

FACTS:

On January 26, 1980, petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission


on Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987.
Petitioner had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA in an acting
capacity since 1975. On December 31, 1985, petitioner applied for clearance
from all money, property and other accountabilities in preparation for his
retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which covered the period
from 1976 to December 31, 1985. Petitioner sought a second clearance to
cover the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. All the signatures
necessary to complete the second clearance, except that of Chairman
Guingona, were obtained.
In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by
petitioner on December 27, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner
of the approval of his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568,
effective as of March 9, 1986. However, respondent Chairman added that in
view of the audit findings and inventory report adverted, payment of only
one-half () of the money value of the benefits due petitioner by reason of
such retirement will be allowed, subject to the availability of funds and the
usual accounting and auditing rules. Payment of the balance of said
retirement benefits shall be subject to the final results of the audit
concerning petitioners fiscal responsibility and/or accountability as former
Chairman of this Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioners retirement pay is
valid.
HELD:
No. Respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under
the retirement laws. In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the
respondents, we found that the employee had been cleared by the National
Treasurer from all money and property responsibility, and held that the
retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied
to his indebtedness to the government. Well-settled is the rule that

retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the
intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is
no longer capable of earning his livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777
[1992]). The petition is granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent
Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner's retirement benefits in full and his
monthly pensions beginning in March 1991.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. CA
G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996

FACTS:
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI) filed this action for
prohibition, Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent
Minister of Natural Resources from enforcing its Order of Execution against
it, for liability arising from an alleged encroachment of the petitioner over
the timber concession of respondent DAVENCOR located in Mati, Davao
Oriental. The Court of Appeals in its decision found MIWPI as an alter ego of
Milagros Matuguina and/or Matuguina Logging Enterprises (MLE), to be liable
to DAVENCOR for illegal encroachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a transferee of a forest concession is liable for obligations
arising from the transferors illegal encroachment into another forest
concessionaire committed prior to the transfer.
HELD:
No. Section 61 of P.D. 705 provides that Unless authorized by the
Department Head, no licensee, lessee, or permittee may transfer, exchange,
sell, or convey his license agreement, license, lease or permit, or any of his
rights or interest therein, or any of his assets used in connection therewith.
The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his
license agreement, license, lease, or permit only if he has not violated any
forestry law, rule or regulation; has been faithfully complying with the terms
and conditions of the license agreement, license, lease or permit; the
transferee has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to hold

a license agreement, license, lease or permit; there is no evidence that such


transfer or conveyance is being made for purposes of speculation; and the
transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor.
In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their
ordinary meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when
they are commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be
avoided. The term obligations as used in the final clause of the second
paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations
incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be
construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred by the transferor
as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of
the transferor, and could not have been included in the term obligations
absent any modifying provision to that effect.

Ernesto v. CA
GR 52178, Sep 28, 1982

FACTS:
Petitioner for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP-08166-R, Demetrio Ernesto, et. al. vs. San Carlos Milling Co., et al.,
which affirmed the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III,
City of San Carlos dismissing the complaint of petitioners seeking the
payment of their 60% share of the alleged contractual increase in the share
of the planters in the proceeds of sugarcane milled in respondent's sugar
mill during the crop years 1958-59 to 1967-68 and all subsequent crop years
to which they maintain they are entitled under the Sugar Act of 1952 (R.A.
809).
Petitioners insist that in the San Carlos Milling district, there was no such majority during all the
times materials hereto, which contention is denied by respondents. And the issue revolves solely
around the point of whether or not so-called emergency, non-quota and non-district or
accommodation planters should be counted in determining the majority contemplated in the law.
The determination of the issue is decisive because the record indicates that if the emergency, or
non-quota, non-district and "accommodation" planters are to be considered in ascertaining how
many "planters" with written milling contracts with the sugar mill", the result would be that the

planters in the San Carlos Milling district with such written contracts would be in the minority, in
which case Section 9 of Republic Act 809 would be applicable, not in relation to any contractual
increase in the share of the planters.

ISSUE:
Whether or not so-called emergency, non-quota and non-district or
accommodation planters should be counted in determining the majority of
planters contemplated in the law.
HELD:
Yes. The court believes that there is no valid reason why the statutory
definition of planters under Act 4166 and Executive Orders 900 and 901
should still be adhered to after the factual situation to which they were
addressed had already changed. The limitation to sugar quotas, whether
export, domestic or reserve among all the mills continued only until 1955.
From that year, emergency, non-quota, non-district or accommodation
planters came into being with the blessings of the Sugar Quota
Administration. With such a change in situation, it would not be logical to
continue adhering to the previous definitions that had already lost their
legal effect. Consequently, the court is of the considered opinion that after
the quota system ceased, the definition of planters within the district for
the purposes of Section 1 of the Sugar Act should be all planters who
delivered their sugarcane to the respondent Central who milled the same.
Hence, as such, they should all be counted in determining the total number
of planters in the sugar district in ascertaining whether or not a majority of
them have written milling contracts with the respondent Central.

Amadora v. CA
G.R. No. L-47745 Apr. 15, 1988
FACTS:

While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as
the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of

the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped. On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved. The respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not
a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 2180 of the Civil Code applies to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic.
HELD:

Yes. The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the
word "apprentices."

Carandang v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of


the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No.
21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al.,
suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case

No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas
Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide
committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas
Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case
is now pending.
Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission
itself states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the
action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American
law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to
designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code.
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime
of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a
wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein
Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not
physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction
of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages
arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.
HELD:

Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and
"physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense
because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using
these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms
defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any
technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term
"physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article some in their
general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime

of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general
terms.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh


G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945
FACTS:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent
judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case
No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the socalled Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General


Douglas MacArthur, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and
processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," affects the proceedings
in civil cases pending in court under the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation.
HELD:
No. The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative,
as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or
other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been,

the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase processes


of any other government in said proclamation, to refer to judicial
processes, in violation of principles of international law. The court ruled
that the term processes does not refer to judicial processes but to
executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee,
ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines and the constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are
of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word
processes is associated.

Escribano v. Avila
G.R. No. L-30375, Sep. 12, 1978

FACTS:
On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governorelect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that
province a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong,
Cotabato. In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a
speech, which was broadcasted on a radio station, that "Mr. Pendatun is the
worst animal that ever live in this province. Escribano questioned Judge
Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense.
Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the
power to conduct the preliminary investigation. On April 1, 1969 Escribano
filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge
Avila be set aside. On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to
annul Judge Avila's order of March 29, 1969. In that order he found that
Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause to believe that" libel
by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably committed the
same". The city fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano.
Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which do not empower the
Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written
defamations.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with


authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel
committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is
lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
HELD:
Yes. The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never
intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance
to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely
sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a
preliminary investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of
First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it
cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of
another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of
something else not mentioned.)
However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in
this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance
is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a
preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do
with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing
a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and
mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it
should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win best
effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it. The silence of article
360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct an
investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a
judge of that court from holding such investigation.

People v. Tamani
G.R. No. 22160, Jan 21, 1974
FACTS:

After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was fortyseven days late. The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was
promulgated on February 14, 1963. He filed his notice of appeal only on
September 10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 15-day period within which to appeal a judgment of conviction in a criminal
action is counted from the date of promulgation of judgment.
HELD:
Yes. Section 22, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of judgment or order appealed from. The court
held that the 15-day period should be counted from the promulgation and not from receipt of
copy of judgment. The word "promulgation" in Section 6 should be construed as referring to
"judgment" under Section 6 of Rule 120, while the word "notice" should be construed as
referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by
registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to file
his notice of appeal and not eleven days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September
10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late.

People v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978
FACTS:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the
Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed
by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD No. 9.
HELD:

No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two
elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the
elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within
the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or,
whereas" clauses.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.

Quibuyen v. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. L-16854, Dec 26, 1963
FACTS:

In this case, the defendants filed three motions but they were denied. On
August 15, 1958, judgment was rendered. On September 29, 1958, they filed
a pleading entitled "Petition for Relief from Judgment", which was denied by
the trial judge on January 5, 1959. On January 10 and 29, 1959 they filed
their notice of appeal and appeal bond, respectively; but the record on

appeal was not registered until February 4, 1959. On February 12, 1959, the
plaintiff filed their opposition to the approval of the defendants' appeal, on
the ground that the order of January 5,1958 and the judgment on the merits
of August 15, 1958 are not appealable the latter having already become final
and executory. On April 27, 1959, the Judge issued an Order denying the
defendants' appeal, for the reasons stated in plaintiffs' opposition dated
February 12, 1959 and granted the issuance a writ of execution.
Petitioners, in contending that their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was
sufficient invokes Rule 67 which provides that petition is issued only if the petition is sufficient
in form and substance to justify such process. But the Court of Appeals found that the petition
was fatally defective, in the sense that the necessary supporting papers were not attached with the
petition, and most important, the precise order dated January 5, 1959, which petitioners sought to
annul through said petition. Petitioners contended that the order of January 5, 1959, the order of
the trial judge denying the petition for relief mentioned or designated in the prayer of the
petition, was not the order which was being assailed, but the order of April 27, 1959, which was
attached as Annex A, to the petition for certiorari and this was the one refusing to give due
course to the appeal from the order denying the petition for relief filed by the petitioners.
Petitioners submit that Annex A, order of the trial court under date of April 27, 1959, having
been actually attached to the petition, it was no longer necessary for petitioners to attach the
other supporting papers, such as the petition for relief, the opposition thereto, the order denying
the said petition for relief and so forth.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals is sufficient in form
and substance, such that a dismissal by said Court of said petition on the ground that is "fatally
defective is invalid.

(2) Whether or not it is necessary petitioners to attach still "other supporting


papers" since a copy of the order sought be annulled was actually attached
to the certiorari petition, as Annex A.

HELD:
(1) No. The court is satisfied that it is a case of lapsus calami. The mistake consists in mentioning in
the prayer of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that the writ be issued "annulling
the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge of January 5, 1959, and directing the respondent

Judge to give due course to the appeal interposed by the herein petitioners", without a attaching a
copy of said order, but accompanying the said petition, as Annex A, with a copy of the order of
the court dated April 27, 1959. The order of January 5, 1959 was one denying the petition for
relief "for lack of merit" while order of April 27, 1959 was an order denying the defendants'
appeal and granting the issuance of a writ of execution. The petition mentioned the order of
January 5, 1959 as the order assailed, instead of designating that April 27, 1959, as the order
appealed from. It is seen, therefore, that the designation of the order by date, in the petition was a
mistake.

(2) No. The query invites a negative answer, because it being a special action
of certiorari, Rule 67 governs, at least, in matter of form of petition. All
that the Rules require is that the petition be verified, the facts be alleged
with certainty and it must pray for the annulment of the judgment order
complained of (sec. 1, Rule 67). These requisites were met by the petitioner
with the respondent Court. Granting for the sake of argument, that section
2, Rule 49 is applicable, the same was also substantially complied with. The
copy of the order of April 27, 1959 was filed as (Annex A with the petition,
on the date the petition was presented, and the other pleadings such as the
Petition for Relief from Judgment Annex B), opposition to petition for relief
(Annex C) order of the respondent court denying petition for relief (Annex
D), Notice of Appeal (Annex E), Opposition to Defendants' appeal, and
Motion for Execution (Annex F), with the motion for reconsideration, dated
March 14, 1960, of the order of dismissal of the petition, which served to
cure the alleged defect, in form and substance, of the petition in question.
If at all, petitioners were guilty of a technical violation of procedural
requirements, a technicality which does not seem to be of much moment
presently, since the reason for its existence had been satisfied.

Ferrer v. Pecson
G.R. No. L-5221. October 27, 1952
FACTS:

On March 1, 1949, the petitioner Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez was accused


before the municipal court of Manila of serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the said court. After trial, the Municipal Court of

Manila found him guilty and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto
mayor. Defendant appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Petitioner through counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the
offense and, consequently, the Court of First Instance had no appellate
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipal Court of Manila had jurisdiction over the
offense.
HELD:
No. The jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined
by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Sec. 67 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law and not under the Revised Penal Code. The criminal
jurisdiction of a justice of the peace or a municipal court as defined in the
Judiciary Act of 1948 is confined to offenses in which the penalty is not
more than six (6) months. From this it is clear that the Municipal Court of
Manila had no jurisdiction over this case where a maximum penalty of six (6)
years may be imposed; and if it had no original jurisdiction, the Court of
First Instance presided over by Judge Pecson had likewise no appellate
jurisdiction.
It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law was amended by
section 16 of Republic Act No. 587, in the sense that acts of negligence or
reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious bodily
injury upon any person shall be prosecuted and punished under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. But this act may not be given
retroactive effect so as to confer on the municipal court jurisdiction which
it did not have when it tried and decided the case against petitioner. It may
be true that the provisions of the penal code are more favorable to the
petitioner in this case as regards the penalty, but when the very accused,
herein petitioner, far from invoking the benefits of said Republic Act No.
587, disregards it and instead, invokes the Revised Motor Vehicle Law which
was in force at the time that the acts imputed to him were committed, at
least for that reason alone the question of retroactivity cannot and will not
be considered.