LANSANG VS.

GARCIA [42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a
public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled
for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons
were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending
privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to
forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been
arrested
without
a
warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in
flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc.
889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted
the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was
suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was
amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a)
that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August
Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said
plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak
to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in
order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive
decision
reached
by
majority.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and
upon
all
other
persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in
Proclamation
No.
889-A.
Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid
exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called
out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the
least
harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3
chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970.
CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major
student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
TORRES v. GONZALES

PARTIES:
Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG

Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not
violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In
1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that
the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against
him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be
charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a generous
exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or
prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions
of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been
entrusted.

Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales

152 SCRA 272 Political Law Constitutional Law Pardon Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition
that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence,
the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the
Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by
the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.