Nullify Obamacare Bill Now!

The Constitution of the United States
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
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Amendment 10 - Powers of the States and People

Amendment 10 - Powers of the States and People. Ratified 12/15/1791. Note

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
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Legal Definition of TENTH AMENDMENT The Tenth Amendment provides that " The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. " U.S. Const. amend. X. As a textual matter, therefore, the Tenth Amendment "states

but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). By its terms, the Amendment does not purport to limit the commerce power or any other enumerated power of Congress. In recent years, however, the Tenth Amendment has been interpreted "to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution." South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 (1988). Thus, "the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). There are numbers of ways in which the federal government is permitted to secure the assistance of state authorities in achieving federal legislative goals. First and most directly, the federal government may coerce the states and their employees into complying with federal laws of general applicability. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Second, Congress may condition the grant of federal funds on the States' taking governmental action desired by Congress. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). State judicial and administrative bodies may be required to apply federal law. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1982). The federal government may offer to preempt regulation in a given area, and permit the states to avoid preemption if they regulate in a manner acceptable to Congress. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-91 (1981). The federal government has been permitted effectively to compel the states to issue registered rather than bearer bonds. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988). Finally, the federal government has been permitted to require state utility regulators to consider prescribed federal standards in determining regulatory policies. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 765. In the course of the latter ruling, the Supreme Court referred to and rejected the "19th century view" that "Congress has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." Id. at 761 (quoting Kentucky

v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861)). That view, said the Court, "is not representative of the law today." Id. "The federal government has some power to enlist a branch of state government . . . to further federal ends." Id. at 762. United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), "a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would . . . be beyond the power of Congress." Id. at 176. the Court in New York stated: "whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to bring state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation, no Member of the Court has ever suggested that such a federal interest would enable Congress to command a state government to enact state regulation." Id. at 178. In the same vein was the Court's conclusion after reviewing the debates at the time of the founding of the Constitution: We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. E.g., FERC v. Mississippi. . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 166. Other decisions of the Supreme Court have recognized this proposition that the federal government cannot coerce States into performing the ultimately sovereign acts of legislating or regulating in a manner specified by the federal government. In Virginia Surface Mining, the Court noted that the provision of an alternative of federal regulation rendered federal standards for state regulation permissible; because the State had a constitutional option, "there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added). Similarly, In FERC v. Mississippi, the Court noted that the federal command that the State "consider" federal alternatives was constitutional because "[t]here is nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 765.

"[T]he etiquette of federalism has been violated by a formal command from the National Government directing the State to enact a certain policy, cf. New York." United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993) ("direct commands to the states to regulate according to Congress's instructions" "violate the Tenth Amendment as interpreted by New York"). There are good reasons for focusing Tenth Amemdment concern on federal coercion of a State's enactment of legislation or regulations or creation of an administrative program. These activities are inherently central acts of a sovereign; if an area of state activity is to be protected from direct coercion by an implication drawn from the Tenth Amendment, legislating and regulating are prime candidates. "[T]he power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 761. There is a second reason, also, emphasized in New York itself. Democratic governments must be politically accountable. When the federal government requires the States to enact legislation, the enacted legislation is state legislation. Thus, it will likely "be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." New York, 505 U.S. at 169. When the federal government itself imposes a requirement on a state official, the requirement is more clearly an act of the federal government and thus does not, to the same extent, undermine political accountability. The Tenth Amendment view espoused in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), was that "the Federal Government . . . has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatsoever . . . ." See Brown, 521 F.2d at 841. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the view espoused in Kentucky v. Dennison is no longer representative of the law. FERC, 456 U.S. at 761.
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The 10th Amendment Movement

“If the federal government has the exclusive right to judge the extent of its own powers, warned the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions’ authors (Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, respectively), it will continue to grow – regardless of elections, the separation of powers, and other much-touted limits on government power.”
–Thomas E. Woods

Nullification: When a state ‘nullifies’ a
federal law, it is proclaiming that the law in question is void and inoperative, or ‘non-effective,’ within the boundaries of that

state; or, in other words, not a law as far as that state is concerned The 10th Amendment Movement is an effort to push back against unconstitutional federal laws and regulations on a state level. The principle is known as “nullification,” and was advised by many prominent founders.
Current Nullification Efforts:
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10th Amendment Resolutions 10th Amendment Bills Firearms Freedom Act Medical Marijuana Laws REAL ID Health Care Freedom Act Bring the Guard Home Constitutional Tender Cap and Trade Federal Tax Funds Act Sheriffs First Legislation Federal Gun Laws Regulation of Intrastate Commerce

History of Nullification: While the media generally portrays nullification as being solely aligned with the efforts of the nullifiers of the South and the Civil War, this is certainly false, and reeks of misinformation. Nullification has a long history in the American tradition and has been invoked in support of free speech, in opposition to war and fugitive slave laws, and more. Read more on this history here.

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10th Amendment Resolutions These non-binding resolutions, often called “state sovereignty resolutions” do no carry the force of law. Instead, they are intended to be a statement of the legislature of the state. They play an important role, however. If you owned an apartment building and had a tenant not paying rent, you wouldn’t show up with an empty truck to kick them out without first serving notice. That’s how we view these Resolutions – as serving “notice and demand” to the Federal Government to “cease and desist any and all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated powers.” Follow-up, of course, is a must. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT 10TH AMENDMENT RESOLUTIONS 10th Amendment Bills Unlike the many 10th Amendment Resolutions that have been introduced around the country since 2008, these “10th Amendment” or “State Sovereignty” bills are proposals for binding legislation. They include language to affirm the sovereignty of the people of the state and to create a commission or a committee to review the Constitutionality of acts emanating from the

federal government. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT 10TH AMENDMENT BILLS
Firearms Freedom Act

Originally introduced and passed in Montana, the FFA declares that any firearms made and retained in-state are beyond the authority of Congress under its constitutional power to regulate commerce among the states. The FFA is primarily a Tenth Amendment challenge to the powers of Congress under the “commerce clause,” with firearms as the object. (source, FirearmsFreedomAct.com) CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT LEGISLATION
Medical Marijuana Laws An honest reading of the Constitution with an original understanding of the Founders and Ratifiers makes it quite clear that the federal government has no constitutional authority to override state laws on marijuana. All three branches of the federal government, however, have interpreted (and re-interpreted) the commerce clause of the Constitution to authorize them to engage in this activity, even though there’s supposedly no “legal” commerce in the plant. At best, these arguments are dubious; at worst an intentional attack on the Constitution and your liberty. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT STATE MARIJUANA LAWS

REAL ID Act Led by Maine in early 2007, 25 states over the past 2 years have passed resolutions and binding laws denouncing and refusing the implement the Bushera law which many expressed concerned about privacy, funding and more. While the law is still

on the books in D.C., its implementation has been “delayed” numerous times in response to this massive state resistance, and in practice, is virtually null and void. CLICK HERE FOR ANTI-REAL ID LEGISLATION Health Care Freedom Act The Health Care Freedom Act is considered in states as either a bill or a state constitutional amendment – effectively prohibiting the enactment of any new government-run healthcare programs within the state. While many of the bills have language similar to true nullification legislation, many of them are promoted solely as a vehicle to drive a federal court battle – which is not nullification in its true sense. CLICK HERE FOR HEALTH CARE FREEDOM ACT TRACKING Bring the Guard Home Under the Constitution, the militia (now called the National Guard) may only be called into duty by the federal government in three specific situations. According to Article I, Section 8; Clause 15, the Congress is given the power to pass laws for

“calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” The militia was intended by the Founders and Ratifiers to be defense force and nothing more. Deployments outside the country were not considered, and neither were internal deployments in pursuance of powers that were not delegated to the federal government. Congress has passed numerous laws in the past 100 years giving the federal government additional authority not mentioned in the Constitution. But, without amendment, altering the enumerated powers by legislative fiat is, in and of itself, unconstitutional. Campaigns in states around the country are working to reassert the authority of governors over guard troops. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT BRING THE GUARD HOME LEGISLATION Constitutional Tender The United States Constitution declares, in Article I, Section 10, “No State shall… make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” Constitutional Tender laws seek to nullify federal legal tender laws in the state by authorizing payment in gold and silver or a paper note backed 100% by gold or silver,

CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL TENDER LEGISLATION Cap and Trade Cap and Trade is often claimed to be authorized under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. At best, this is a highly dubious claim. This interstate regulation of “commerce” did not include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, or land use. Nor did it include activities that merely “substantially affected” commerce. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT CAP AND TRADE NULLIFICATION LEGISLATION State Sovereignty and Federal Tax Funds Act Such laws would require that all federal taxes come first to the state’s Department of Revenue. A panel of legislators would assay the Constitutional appropriateness of the Federal Budget, and then forward to the federal government a percentage of the federal tax dollars that are delineated as legal and Constitutionally-justified. The remainder of those dollars would be assigned to budgetary items that are currently funded through federal allocations and grants or returned to the people of the state. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT FEDERAL TAX

FUNDS LEGISLATION

Sheriffs First Legislation
A “Sheriffs First” bill would make it a state crime for any federal agent to make an arrest, search, or seizure within the state without first getting the advanced, written permission of the elected county sheriff of the county in which the event is to take place.

CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT SHERIFFS FIRST LEGISLATION

Federal Gun Laws Nullification As codified in law with the 2nd Amendment, the People did not delegate the power to regulate or control the ownership of firearms to the federal government. And, as the 10th Amendment makes clear, all powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the States or to the People themselves. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT FEDERAL GUN LAWS NULLIFICATION LEGISLATION Nullification of Federal Intrastate Commerce Regulation As understood at the time of the founding, the regulation of commerce was meant to empower Congress to regulate the buying and selling of products made by others (and sometimes land),

associated finance and financial instruments, and navigation and other carriage, across state jurisdictional lines. These bills attempt to reassert this original meaning of the commerce clause over wide areas of policy and effectively nullify federal laws and regulations that violate such limitations by regulating commerce and other activities that are solely intrastate. CLICK HERE FOR CURRENT INTRASTATE COMMERCE REGULATION NULLIFICATION LEGISLATION

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10th Amendment Resolutions
These non-binding resolutions, often called “state sovereignty resolutions” do not carry the force of law. Instead, they are intended to be a statement of the legislature of the state. They play an important role, however. If you owned an apartment building and had a tenant not paying rent, you wouldn’t show up with an empty truck to kick them out without first serving notice. That’s how we view these Resolutions – as serving “notice and demand” to the Federal Government to “cease and desist any and all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated powers.” Follow-up, of course, is a must. CLICK HERE – to view the Tenth Amendment Center’s model

10th Amendment Resolution*

*10th Amendment Resolution The following is a sample 10th Amendment House Concurrent Resolution approved by the Tenth Amendment Center. Activists, we encourage you to send this to your state senators and representatives – and ask them to introduce this resolution in your state.

A RESOLUTION affirming the sovereignty of the People of the State of _________. WHEREAS, in the American system, sovereignty is defined as final authority, and the People, not government, are sovereign; and WHEREAS, the people of the State of __________ are not united with the People of the other forty-nine states that comprise the United States of America on a principle of unlimited submission to their federal government; and WHEREAS, all power not delegated by the people to government is retained; and WHEREAS, the People of the several States comprising the United States of America created the federal government to be their agent for certain enumerated purposes only; and WHEREAS, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads as follows: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”; and

WHEREAS, the Tenth Amendment defines the total scope of federal power as being that which has been delegated by the people to the federal government in the Constitution of the United States, and also that which is necessary and proper to advancing those enumerated powers; with the rest being left to state governments or the people themselves; and WHEREAS, powers, too numerous to list for the purposes of this resolution, have been exercised, past and present, by federal administrations, under the leadership of both Democrats and Republicans, which infringe on the sovereignty of the people of this state, and may further violate the Constitution of the United States; and WHEREAS, when powers are assumed by the federal government which have not been delegated to it by the People, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy; that without this remedy, the People of this State would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whoever might exercise this right of judgment for them. NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE _____ OF THE _______ GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ______, WITH THE SENATE CONCURRING, that we hereby affirm the sovereignty of the People of the State of _______ under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States over all powers not otherwise delegated to the federal

government by the Constitution of the United States; and, be it further RESOLVED, that this Resolution shall serve as a Notice and Demand to the federal government to cease and desist any and all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated powers; and, it be further RESOLVED, that a committee of conference be appointed by this legislature, which shall have as its charge to recommend and propose legislation which would have the effect of nullifying specific federal laws and regulations which are outside the scope of the powers delegated by the People to the federal government in the Constitution; and, be it further RESOLVED, that a committee of correspondence be appointed, which shall have as its charge to communicate the preceding resolutions to the Legislatures of the several States; to assure them that this State continues in the same esteem of their friendship as currently exists; that it considers union, for specified national purposes, and particularly those enumerated in the Constitution of the United States, to be friendly to the peace, happiness and prosperity of all the States; and, be it further RESOLVED, that a certified copy of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the President of the United States Senate, the Speaker and the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, and to each member of this State’s Congressional

delegation with the request that this resolution be officially entered in the Congressional Record as a memorial to the Congress of the United States of America.

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Federal Health Care Nullification Act
The following is Tenth Amendment Center approved legislation to nullify federal overreach into the health care industry. Activists, we encourage you to send this to your state senators and representatives – and ask them to introduce this legislation in your state. click here for additional talking points Health Care
Nullification Talking Points*
*1. Like any legal document, the words of the Constitution mean today the same as they meant the moment it was ratified. 2. The power to regulate commerce among the several states was delegated to the Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution. As understood at the time of the founding, the regulation of commerce was meant to empower Congress to regulate the buying and selling of products made by others (and sometimes land), associated finance and financial instruments, and navigation and other carriage, across state jurisdictional lines. This power to regulate “commerce” does not include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, malum in se crime, or land use. Nor does it include activities that merely “substantially affect” commerce.

3. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution, the “general welfare clause,” is not a blank check that empowers the federal government to do anything it deems good. It is instead a general introduction explaining the exercise of the enumerated powers of Congress that are set forth in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. When James Madison was asked if this clause were a grant of power, he replied with “If not only the means but the objects are unlimited, the parchment [the Constitution] should be thrown into the fire at once.” Thus, this clause is a limitation on the power of the federal government to act in the welfare of all when passing laws in pursuance of the powers delegated to the United States. 4. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution, the “necessary and proper clause,” is not a blank check that empowers the federal government to do anything it deems is necessary or proper. It is instead a limitation of power under the common-law doctrine of “principals and incidents,” which allows the Congress to exercise incidental powers. Two main conditions are required for something to be incidental, and thus, “necessary and proper.” The law or power exercised must be 1) directly applicable to the main, enumerated power (some would say that without it, the enumerated power would be impossible to exercise in current, common understanding), and 2) lesser than the main power. 5. The Commerce Clause, the General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause have not been amended.

CLICK HERE – to download the Tenth Amendment Center’s Nullification Talking Points brochure (.pdf)

An Act to render null and void certain unconstitutional laws enacted by the Congress of the United States, taking control over the health insurance industry and mandating that individuals purchase health insurance under threat of penalty. SECTION 1. The legislature of the State of ____________ finds that:

1. The People of the several states comprising the United States of America created the federal government to be their agent for certain enumerated purposes, and nothing more. 2. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution defines the total scope of federal power as being that which has been delegated by the people of the several states to the federal government, and all power not delegated to the federal government in the Constitution of the United States is reserved to the states respectively, or to the people themselves. 3. The assumption of power that the federal government has made by enacting the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” interferes with the right of the People of the State of _____________ to regulate health care as they see fit, and makes a mockery of James Madison’s assurance in Federalist #45 that the “powers delegated” to the Federal Government are “few and defined”, while those of the States are “numerous and indefinite.” SECTION 2. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the [STATE] Statutes as Section [NUMBER] of Title [NUMBER], unless there is created a duplication in numbering, reads as follows: A. The Legislature of the State of _______________ declares that the federal law known as the “Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act,” signed by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010, is not authorized by the Constitution of the United States and violates its true meaning and intent as given by the Founders and Ratifiers, and is hereby declared to be invalid in this state, shall not be recognized by this state, is specifically rejected by this state, and shall be considered null and void and of no effect in this state. B. It shall be the duty of the legislature of this State to adopt and enact any and all measures as may be necessary to prevent the enforcement of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” within the limits of this State. C. Any official, agent, or employee of the United States government or any employee of a corporation providing services to the United States government that enforces or attempts to enforce an act, order, law, statute, rule or regulation of the government of the United States in violation of this act shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or a term of imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or both. D. Any public officer or employee of the State of ____________ that enforces or attempts to enforce an act, order, law, statute, rule or regulation of the government of the United States in violation of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding two (2)

years or by a fine not exceeding One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or both such fine and imprisonment. E. Any aggrieved party shall also have a private action against any person violating the provisions of subsections (C) or (D). SECTION 3. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.

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The Enumerated Powers of States Robert G. Natelson, Nevada Law Journal, 2003 – Added 10-08-09
View online at: http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/view_online.php?url=http%3A%2F %2Fwww.tenthamendmentcenter.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2Fpublications %2Fthe-enumerated-powers-of-states.pdf

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The Original Meaning of an Omission The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty and

“Expressly” Delegated Power Kurt T. Lash, Notre Dame Law Review, 2008 – Added 07-24-09
View online at: http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/view_online.php?url=http%3A%2F %2Fwww.tenthamendmentcenter.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads %2F2009%2F07%2Foriginal-meaning-of-an-omission.pdf ____________________________________________________________________

The States’ Rights Tradition Nobody Knows
04. Mar, 2009 by Thomas E Woods, LewRockwell.com

In 1798, the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky approved resolutions that affirmed the states’ right to resist federal encroachments on their powers. If the federal government has the exclusive right to judge the extent of its own powers, warned the resolutions’ authors (James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively), it will continue to grow – regardless of elections, the separation of powers, and other muchtouted limits on government power. The Virginia Resolutions spoke of the states’ right to “interpose” between the federal government and the people of the state; the Kentucky Resolutions (in a 1799 follow-up to the original resolutions) used the term “nullification” – the states, they said, could nullify unconstitutional federal laws.

These ideas became known as the “Principles of ’98.” Their subsequent impact on American history, according to the standard narrative, was pretty much confined to South Carolina’s nullification of the tariffs of 1828 and 1832. That is demonstrably false, as I shall show below. But it isn’t just that these ideas are neglected in the usual telling; as I discovered not long ago, these principles are positively despised by neoconservatives like Max Boot and the leftists at the New York Times (or do I repeat myself?). Neither one, in their reviews of The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, so much as mentioned Jefferson’s name in connection with the Principles of ’98. It is hard to view such an omission as anything but deliberate. To mention Jefferson’s name is to lend legitimacy to ideas that nationalists of left and right alike detest, so they simply leave him out of the picture. Jefferson once wrote, “When all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.” To resist this centralizing trend, the sage of Monticello was convinced, the states needed some kind of corporate defense mechanism. Our betters have already told us that the only reason anyone might wish to vindicate the cause of states’ rights is for the purpose of defending slavery or

upholding some lesser form of local oppression. What follows is the tip of the iceberg of the history that, by what I shall assume is an entirely well-meaning and innocent oversight, these great scholars of American history consistently fail to acknowledge. The Embargo of 1807–1809 In retaliation against British and French depredations against American neutral rights on the seas, the federal government under Thomas Jefferson in late 1807 declared an embargo, according to which no American ship could depart for any foreign port anywhere in the world. (The rationale was that trade with the U.S. was a key ingredient in British and French prosperity, and thus that economic pressure might persuade them to change their policies.) The U.S. Navy was granted the power to stop and search any ship within U.S. jurisdiction if its officers had “reason to suspect” the ship was violating the embargo. Likewise, customs officials were “authorized to detain any vessel… whenever in their opinions the intention is to violate or evade any provisions of the acts laying an embargo.” Such standards fell far short of the “probable cause” requirement that generally governed the issuing of warrants for searches. New England was especially hard hit by the embargo because so many of its people were employed either directly in foreign commerce or in proximate fields, and it was there that opposition to the policy was concentrated. In 1808 a federal district court, in the

case of United States v. The William, ruled the embargo constitutional. The Massachusetts legislature begged to differ. Both houses declared the embargo acts to be “in many particulars, unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional.” “While this State maintains its sovereignty and independence, all the citizens can find protection against outrage and injustice in the strong arm of the State government,” they said. The embargo, furthermore, was “not legally binding on the citizens of this State.” In the midst of the crisis, a New York congressman, giving his explicit sanction to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, said, “Why should not Massachusetts take the same stand, when she thinks herself about to be destroyed?” “If any State Legislature had believed the Act to be unconstitutional,” asked a Connecticut congressman, “would it not have been their duty not to comply?” He added that the state legislatures, “whose members are sworn to support the Constitution, may refuse assistance, aid or cooperation” if they regarded an act as unconstitutional, and so could state officials. Connecticut governor Jonathan Trumbull shared these views. “Whenever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed bounds of their constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in great emergencies, devolves the arduous task – it is their right – it becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right and liberty of the people, and the assumed

power of the General Government.” Connecticut’s General Assembly passed a resolution that, among other things, directed all executive officials in the State not to afford “any official aid or co-operation in the execution of the act aforesaid.” The General Assembly furthermore declared: “Resolved, that to preserve the Union, and support the Constitution of the United States, it becomes the duty of the Legislatures of the States, in such a crisis of affairs, vigilantly to watch over, and vigorously to maintain, the powers not delegated to the United States, but reserved to the States respectively, or to the people; and that a due regard to this duty, will not permit this Assembly to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the embargo.” Rhode Island, when the embargo was at its end, declared that her legislature possessed the duty “to interpose for the purpose of protecting [the people of Rhode Island] from the ruinous inflictions of usurped and unconstitutional power.” Interposition – the language of the Principles of ’98. The War of 1812 During the War of 1812, Massachusetts and Connecticut were ordered to call out their respective militias for the purpose of defending the coast. The call derived from the federal government’s authority to call

the state militias into service “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions.” Massachusetts Governor Caleb Strong, however, maintained that the states reserved the power to determine whether any of these three conditions held. At Strong’s request, the Massachusetts Supreme Court offered its opinion. That court agreed with the governor: “As this power is not delegated to the United States by the Federal Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, it is reserved to the states, respectively; and from the nature of the power, it must be exercised by those with whom the states have respectively entrusted the chief command of the militia.” Connecticut followed suit: It must not be forgotten, that the state of Connecticut is a FREE SOVEREIGN and INDEPENDENT state; that the United States are a confederacy of states; that we are a confederated and not a consolidated republic. The governor of this state is under a high and solemn obligation, “to maintain the lawful rights and privileges thereof, as a sovereign, free and independent state,” as he is “to support the constitution of the United States,” and the obligation to support the latter, imposes an additional obligation to support the former. Thus if the militia were called out for any purpose but those listed in the Constitution, it “would be not only the height of injustice to the militia…but a violation of the constitution and laws of this state, and of the United

States.” The president had no authority to call upon the militia of Connecticut “to assist in carrying on an offensive war” (some New Englanders were convinced that the war was aimed primarily at the annexation of Canada). Connecticut would not comply with the federal order until New England should be threatened “by an actual invasion of any portion of our territory.” From a political point of view, the War of 1812 would wind up essentially a draw, and the Treaty of Ghent signed in December 1814 reestablished the status quo ante bellum. From a military point of view, though, it was a British rout. As a result, Congress seriously entertained the prospect of military conscription. Here is where Daniel Webster, so often a villain in American history, emerges as positively heroic. With his usual eloquence he spoke out against military conscription as incompatible with both the Constitution and the principles of a free society. “Where is it written in the Constitution,” he asked, “in what article or section is it contained, that you may take children from their parents, and parents from their children, and compel them to fight the battles of any war in which the folly or the wickedness of government may engage it?” (Predictable quarters can now be expected to call Daniel Webster – than whom there was no greater or more eloquent defender of the federal Union – an unpatriotic, America-hating leftist.) What did Webster think should be done if the conscription bill should pass? In that case, he said, it

would be “the solemn duty of the State Governments to protect their own authority over their own militia, and to interpose between their citizens and arbitrary power.” Interposition – the language, once again, of the great resolutions of ’98. In December 1813 a new and more obnoxious embargo than that of 1807-1809 was instituted. The Massachusetts legislature found itself inundated with petitions and statements of grievances. A special committee, headed by William Lloyd, was established to devise a response to the situation. The Massachusetts General Court approved the committee’s report early the following year. It read, in part: A power to regulate commerce is abused, when employed to destroy it; and a manifest and voluntary abuse of power sanctions the right of resistance, as much as a direct and palpable usurpation. The sovereignty reserved to the states, was reserved to protect the citizens from acts of violence by the United States, as well as for purposes of domestic regulation. We spurn the idea that the free, sovereign and independent State of Massachusetts is reduced to a mere municipal corporation, without power to protect its people, and to defend them from oppression, from whatever quarter it comes. Whenever the national compact is violated, and the citizens of this State are oppressed by cruel and unauthorized laws, this Legislature is bound to interpose its power, and wrest from the oppressor its victim.

Need we point out yet again the language of the Principles of ’98? Fugitive Slave Laws At a time when the federal government was using its police powers to enforce the capture of runaway slaves, it was the state governments, expressly recalling the Principles of ’98, that determined to resist. (See Mark Thornton here [.pdf] on how the federal government socialized the costs of slaveholding.) Although the Constitution did, unfortunately, contain a clause calling for the return of runaways, some Northern states resorted to the argument that that document spelled out no particular enforcement mechanism behind that requirement. In addition, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was especially obnoxious and repugnant. It placed all fugitive slave cases under federal jurisdiction. Fugitives were denied jury trials and the right to testify in their own defense. Special commissioners were empowered to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and according to the terms of the act were to be paid $10 if they found the accused fugitive guilty and only $5 if they found him innocent. Still more obnoxious features included the right to force bystanders to participate in the capture of a fugitive and stiff penalties for sheltering or obstructing the capture of a fugitive. Several Northern states simply refused to comply. Especially interesting is this 1859 statement of the

Wisconsin Supreme Court – taken, in parts word for word, from the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: Resolved, That the government formed by the Constitution of the United States was not the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. Resolved, that the principle and construction contended for by the party which now rules in the councils of the nation, that the general government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism, since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the Constitution, would be the measure of their powers; that the several states which formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infractions; and that a positive defiance of those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done or attempted to be done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy. Many more examples of the ongoing relevance of the Principles of ’98 could be cited. In the midst of a dispute with the federal government over the Second Bank of the United States, the Ohio legislature voted to affirm the Principles of ’98. In 1825, Kentucky’s governor said: “When the general government encroaches upon the rights of the State, is it a safe principle to admit that

a portion of the encroaching power shall have the right to determine finally whether an encroachment has been made or not? In fact, most of the encroachments made by the general government flow through the Supreme Court itself, the very tribunal which claims to be the final arbiter of all such disputes. What chance for justice have the States when the usurpers of their rights are made their judges? Just as much as individuals when judged by their oppressors. It is therefore believed to be the right, as it may hereafter become the duty of the State governments, to protect themselves from encroachments, and their citizens from oppression, by refusing obedience to the unconstitutional mandates of the federal judges.” These are facts. They are facts that constitute a central part of antebellum American history. Yet to say that the standard American history text does not trace the influence of the Principles of ’98 over the course of the ensuing years, as I have done all too briefly here, would be the understatement of the century. The profession at large has essentially ignored the issue; other than Bill Watkins’ excellent study, you’d be hard-pressed to find a single book-length treatment of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 over the past hundred years. Thus when I resurrected these long-neglected ideas in chapter four of The Politically Incorrect Guide to

American History, did this inclusion merit the praise of your average scholar? To the contrary, the general complaint was that I hadn’t spent more time on subjects people already know inside and out. As for the Principles of ’98 themselves, discussing them with leftor right-wing nationalists is like waving garlic before Dracula. Not that raising the issue makes them clam up entirely. To the contrary, they’ll find some silly photos of you (which, I confess, exist in embarrassing abundance), or dredge up something you did or said a dozen years ago, or generally suggest you’re a bad person. (Everyone who’s ever met me knows I’m just a great big meanie.) They may behave this way because they think doing so will make me shut up (no such luck there), but it’s also a lot easier than cracking a book on a subject they don’t seem to know the first thing about.
Thomas E. Woods, Jr. [send him mail] is senior fellow in American history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He is the author of nine books, including the New York Times bestseller The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History and, most recently, Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse. Visit his new website. LewRockwell.com

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From Interposition to Nullification: Peripheries and Center in the Thought of James Madison
Essays in History – Volume Thirty-Six, 1994 Published by the Corcoran Department of History at the University of Virginia. by Kevin R.C. Gutzman

In 1836, the expiring James Madison offered “Advice to My Country”: The advice nearest to my heart and deepest in my convictions, is that the Union of the States be cherished and perpetuated. Let the open enemy to it be regarded as a Pandora with her box opened, and the disguised one as the serpent creeping with deadly wiles into Paradise.1 Madison’s concern for the future of the union had been piqued by the Nullification Controversy and the growing appeal of states’ rights. There is a certain irony in Madison’s worries: the states’ rights strain of Jeffersonianism owed much to the actions and public writings four decades earlier of Madison himself. The story of Madison’s career can be seen as that of a creative politician whose very creativity came, at the end of his life, to threaten his foremost achievement. After his death, his intellectual heirs would rend the union asunder; the doctrine of state sovereignty under the federal constitution, which

Madison had helped formulate in response to a perceived threat to republicanism, would be used to truncate the union, the extended sphere Madison had been instrumental in creating and in which he had long lodged his fondest hopes. James Madison’s thinking about federalism prior to 1800 reflected the relative strengths of the federal and state governments at different times. Consistent theory yielded to political imperative; understanding was altered by perspective and experience. Madison had a consistent vision of the ideal polity, but the events of those years elicited the enunciation of doctrines and the support of constitutional interpretations of which, on sober second thought, he disapproved.2 James Madison was integrally involved in the conception, drafting, and passage of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Yet, he had emerged from the Philadelphia Convention eleven years earlier convinced that the old British imperium in imperio had been recreated, concerned that the federal government had not been given enough power vis-a-vis the states. To rectify the situation, he had proposed a constitutional amendment making certain basic freedoms enforceable by the federal judiciary against the states.3 This apparent inconsistency need not be viewed as a sign of opportunism. The Virginia Plan and the Virginia Resolutions were both devices Madison hoped would preserve the hard-won gains of the Revolution. He did not want mere union, but a certain type of union; he did

not want mere federalism, but federalism which would return control of the republic to those who could be trusted to act continentally. In the context of 1787, this desire led to advocacy of firmer union in the Virginia Plan; in that of 1798, to assertion of states’ rights in the Virginia Resolutions. Thus, Publius could point to the reservation of rights to the states as a positive feature of the proposed federal edifice: while he would have preferred a more centralized union, Madison believed the union in prospect was superior to the Confederation government. As a statesman, improvement was Madison’s goal; as an heir to the thought of St. Augustine, Madison thought that imperfection was to be expected in any human creation; as a practical politician, he adopted popular arguments with which he did not necessarily agree in order to secure his aim. Madison, like his friend Thomas Jefferson, partook of the ambient partisan excess of the 1790s. Because he tended to see the actions of the Federalist administrations in an extremely negative light, his enunciation of Republican values in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and “clarification” in the Report of 1800 were inconsistent with his statements and behavior both before and after the Federalist period. Madison undermined the prospects for long-term durability of his work in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 by acting as he did in 1798-1800.4

It was to the “Principles of ‘98″ that James Madison’s successors in leadership of the Southern interest in federal politics turned until, in the 1960s, the South as an insular political entity was eliminated from American life. Despite what Madison said in his later years, the states’ rights tradition was firmly based on his and Jefferson’s writings in 1798.5 THE VIRGINIA PLAN On the eve of the Philadelphia Convention, Madison composed a document entitled “Vices of the Political system of the U. States.”6 It was a distillation of all the experience and thought of the Confederation period (the preceding seven years). The first vice he listed was the “Failure of the States to Comply with the Constitutional requisitions.” Also included were “Encroachment by the States on the federal authority,” “Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other,” “want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the Government of the Confederacy,” “Want of ratification by the people of the articles of Confederation,” “Multiplicity of laws in the several States,” and “mutability of the laws of the States,” among others. A good plan of union should counter these vices, each of which could best be remedied by delegation of more power to the center. Madison’s Virginia Plan was calculated to remedy each of the shortcomings of the Confederation catalogued in “Vices of the Political system of the U. States.” As to federalism, Madison said of the Plan:

Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for middle ground, which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful.7 These are the words of a nationalist cognizant of the fact that the federal government would be too distant to perform all the functions traditionally filled by the states. The Virginia Plan addressed all these concerns. Although many of his plan’s provisions were adopted, Madison’s experience at the Convention was an unhappy one. The “Father of the Constitution”8 was dissatisfied with the final product because the new Senate was to be an un-republican institution.9 The decision that states would be represented equally, in lieu of apportionment by population, made him wary of delegating new powers to the government: had both houses been apportioned in the “republican” way, according to population, as in the Virginia Plan, Madison would have supported a far more national system than the Convention produced.10 It is difficult to reconcile the public Madison of the Federalist Papers with the author of Madison’s correspondence in 1787. Publius’s arguments stressed the reserved rights of the states and the limited nature of the newly minted federal government; in his

correspondence, Madison not only decried the structure of the Senate, but was especially aggrieved by the omission of a federal veto over state statutes. As he would explain in Federalist 10, Madison hoped that extending the sphere would reduce the possibility that faction could result in harmful statutes; the veto was a device for extending the sphere in all areas of governmental activity, not just those over which Congress had been given legislative authority.11 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 24, 1787, Madison lamented that the veto’s defeat had removed the possibility of putting an end to the pernicious ascendancy of local factions. As it stood, the constitution “involve[d] the evil of imperium in imperio.” This evil had been absent from the old imperial constitution, but it had afflicted several other confederacies, including Revolutionary America. “[T]he impossibility of dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as to be free from different constructions by different interests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impartial, requires some such expedient as I contend for.” He added almost as an afterthought that such a negative also held out the promise of protecting individual rights, especially by rendering state statutes less evanescent. The extension of the sphere made the federal government a more trustworthy guardian of rights than the states, and the veto would have perfected American federalism.12

Madison’s proposal to give the federal legislature a veto over state statutes was the single provision on which he was most insistent in the Convention. When it was watered down, then removed from the Virginia Plan, he brought it up again (he did not press in this way for his preferred manner of apportionment of the federal senate).13 He seems to have regarded this device as a panacea for the ills of the Confederation period. As mentioned above, he believed it would lessen the influence of faction. This ameliorative effect would be felt both on the federal level and in the states, where insidious laws would be negated. One result would be a new flowering of support for republicanism.14 Madison was convinced the omission of this feature from the federal plan insured its failure; the courts’ new role as enforcers of the federal constitution against state executives and legislatures seemed a poor substitute.15 Still, [t]he great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the sovereignty as that it may be sufficiently neutral between different parts of the Society to controul [sic] one part from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled [sic] itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society. All that, he averred, had been achieved,16 so there was merit in the whole.

Madison believed that failure to secure ratification would entail the dissolution of the American union, and, to a nationalist Virginian, that meant disaster.17 He remained unreconciled to the federal features on which the small states’ delegates had insisted, but he thought a union of all thirteen states essential. The Convention left Madison in the middle ground: he supported the constitution despite its flaws, yet, if the Antifederalists’ insistence on strict construction would force some Federalists to yield the point even before the Tenth Amendment was added,18 Madison was headed in their direction by the time the Philadelphia Convention adjourned. THE PUBLIUS PROJECT On leaving Philadelphia, Madison undertook the Publius project. Some have said that his contribution displayed the political philosophy that would mark the rest of his career.19 Given the grave misgivings he had about the document, it seems more likely that Madison’s performance was simply what was necessary to secure ratification.20 To that end, Madison, like his co-authors, marshalled the most telling arguments available, often without wholly believing in them himself. Several would later prove useful to him in the crisis he perceived in the administration of John Adams; however, those very arguments were prominent among those of his own utterances whose meaning he disputed, even distorted, in the context of the Nullification Controversy. One must handle the Publius

letters with care, for it is often unclear whether Madison’s contribution was solely instrumental. Perhaps the most formidable objection Publius had to overcome came from Montesquieu. In The Spirit of the Laws, the Baron had argued that if republican government were adopted by a large state, diversity of interests would lead to faction and civil strife; the homogeneous populations of successful (small) republics had homogeneous interests.21 The “esteemed Mr. Montesquieu” was taken as an authoritative source by lettered Americans in the eighteenth century, and this argument was oft-cited.22 Madison adopted David Hume’s argument that a larger republican polity would be less apt to suffer domestic unrest because difficulties of communication and diversity of interests would render the ascendancy of one faction unlikely.This argument was perfectly suited to his need for a response to Montesquieu’s position. In Publius’s thirty-ninth letter, Madison asked whether the new government would be national or federal, answering, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but . . . that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States,

derived from the supreme authority in each State — the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act . . . Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others,25 and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.26 [Madison's emphasis] Madison would contradict this statement of the union’s nature in the Nullification controversy a half-century later.27 In Madison’s Federalist 44, Publius considered the possibility of latitudinarian constructions of the new charter. He held that successful congressional usurpations would require cooperation by the executive and judiciary; if each of them failed to impede the usurpation, in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives.28[emphasis added]

Perhaps the most important Madisonian constitutional precept appears in Federalist 45. There, Madison averred that, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”29 Here we have the crux of the later jurisprudential dispute between Federalists and Republicans. He went on to say, ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the State governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted.30 One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was [sic] produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. [emphasis added]31 The cooperation of Kentucky and Virginia in 1798 bore a striking resemblance to this scenario, but with this important distinction: they were only two states, but each spoke as if it could act unilaterally. CENTRALIZATION IN THE 1790s: VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESPOND

Madison and Jefferson were at the center of the political turmoil of the 1790s. Jefferson, the former Minister to France, had many friends and acquaintances among the French intelligentsia, and this helped to insure that he would receive the French Revolution enthusiastically. Hamilton, Adams, and other Federalists were skeptical of the possibilities for good inherent in the activities of the revolutionaries, especially as events progressed. They therefore tended to tilt toward England in the European wars. Jefferson and Madison, on the other hand, believed through most of the 1790s that France’s cause was America’s: republicanism. For them, it was not a long leap of logic to seeing Americans who were unsympathetic with the French cause, even old colleagues Adams and Hamilton, as monarchists. When conditions in France became unpalatable to the Republicans, they remained distrustful of the “Anglomen.” Jefferson and, particularly, Madison thought they saw a love of aristocracy and centralization at work in the Washington administrations’ economic policies. Thus, while Madison supported some expenditures given constitutional warrant only by the broadest of interpretations of the general welfare or the necessary and proper clause,32 he insisted on strict construction when Congress considered establishment of a national bank33 and when Hamilton submitted his famous “Report on Manufactures”34; he also proposed an impracticable alternative to Hamilton’s plan for repayment of the war debts.35

This disposition on the part of the Republican leaders carried over into military policy, where Madison and Jefferson read the Washington and Adams administrations’ calls for military preparedness as attempts to corrupt the constitution (and American society generally36). They thought the Federalists’ desire to augment the standing military force smacked of Walpole; they called the supporters of the Bank of the United States “Tories” (as early as 1791)37; they marvelled at President Washington’s farewell warning against foreign entanglements (anti-French, therefore anti-republican); they saw Hamilton’s insistence that the union’s credit depended on prompt repayment of the war debts as an excuse for corruption. The evolving hideousness of the French Revolution was of secondary importance to the Republicans, whose prime concern was that European militarism not infect America.38 The retirement of General Washington, whom Madison had long admired, even revered, reinforced Republicans’ worries. The Federalists quickly enacted legislation creating a standing army and navy, buttressing the nation’s coastal defenses, and imposing direct taxes to pay for it all. With the uproar over the XYZ Affair and the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Quasi-War appeared to have arrived on the home front in earnest.39 His first reaction to the draft Alien Act had been that it was a “monster that must for ever [sic] disgrace its parents”;40 when Adams signed the Act, Jefferson and Madison responded with their resolutions.

The potential for division inherent in the doctrines of 1798 was obvious. Still, Madison’s trimming did not serve, and his worst fears about the long-term consequences of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were realized: they provided the ideological underpinnings for several subsequent campaigns against claims of authority by the federal government. As was his custom, Madison seized the most powerful arguments available for bringing the state of the polity closer to his ideal. The Virginia Resolutions were an extreme states’ rights statement. Virginia called on the states to insist on a narrow interpretation of the necessary and proper clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. After nearly a solid decade of political defeats, Madison was casting about for some means of constitutionalizing protection of minority rights against what must have seemed a perpetual Federalist domination. Jefferson’s version, which Madison had seen in draft and which was adopted (in slightly amended form) by the legislature of Kentucky, was substantially too clear for Madison.41 Relying on the Tenth Amendment, Jefferson insisted that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional intrusions on the rights of the states;42 the states were obliged to nullify them within their respective boundaries.43 Madison was hesitant to put the matter that plainly. Whether that was a result of disagreement with Jefferson’s formulation, because of a

wish to avoid driving off moderate sympathizers, or a means of avoiding Federalist accusations of usurpation is unclear. The contemporary evidence suggests the last of the three possibilities is closest to the mark, although the second probably also played a role.44 Despite their reputed moderation, the Virginia Resolutions had a threatening air.45 They opened with a statement of Virginia’s “firm resolution to maintain and defend the constitution . . . against every aggression, either foreign or domestic” and a pledge of support to the United States government when its laws were constitutional.46 Then, after a second resolution reiterating the support for the constitution plighted in the first, came the central resolution: That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact to which the states are parties; as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact; as no farther valid than they are authorised [sic] by the grants enumerated in that compact, and that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the pro[gress] of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them. [emphasis added]

Thus, like Jefferson’s draft Kentucky Resolutions, Madison’s final Virginia Resolves asserted that the state had a “duty” to maintain its “rights and liberties” within its boundaries. To read the Virginia Resolutions, and especially the third one, as a moderate statement of civil libertarianism or a mere campaign platform for 180047 is to read them in the light of Madison’s later gloss. It seems more reasonable to read them, as many Federalists and Republicans alike did, as more ominous. The arch-Federalist Theodore Sedgwick called them “little short of a declaration of war.”48 Pennsylvania’s legislature decried them as part of a move toward disunion,49 and with good reason: John Taylor of Caroline, their sponsor in the Virginia legislature, was privately advocating precisely that.50 Indeed, whatever Jefferson’s and Madison’s intentions, the compact theory of the constitution enunciated in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had this in common with the tree of knowledge: the forbidden fruit (nullification and/or secession) likely would be eaten sometime. The distinction so often drawn between Jefferson’s wording and Madison’s moderate tone seems strained: What is the difference between “null, void, and of no force or effect” and invalidity51? Between “nullifying” a statute and “interpos[ing]” to prevent its enforcement? The following (fourth) resolve lamented the tendency of the federal government to interpret constitutional grants of power too broadly. The result must be a

change from republican to monarchical government. The fifth resolve was dedicated in part to the argument that the Alien and Sedition Acts united executive and judicial functions in one man, thus endangering republicanism. Besides that, it said, the Sedition Act involved the exercise of powers specifically denied to the federal government by one of the amendments to the constitution; it did so in a way calculated to undermine responsibility in government.52 The resolutions closed with an appeal to other states to concur in Virginia’s position.53 The reaction of the public at large must have been a crushing disappointment. Only North Carolina, of the other Southern states, responded in any way, and its senate refused to endorse the resolutions.54 North of the Potomac, the result was even worse: in total, nine states flatly repudiated the Republican manifestos, and a tenth rejected them without responding.55 THE REPORT OF 1800 Madison stood for the legislature in 1799 to defend the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. Intended as a vindication, his Report of 1800 was largely ignored at the time because of the press of the presidential campaign, on which it “probably had little effect.”56 The legislative debate over the Report of 1800 centered on the third resolution of 1798, specifically the sense in which the states were parties to the federal constitution.57 This issue and the related question of state sovereignty, when added to the cataclysmic fallout

of the XYZ Affair, cut into Republican support in the congressional elections intervening between the two documents. By the time Madison submitted his Report, the Federalists had their largest congressional majority ever.58 Irving Brant, Madison’s leading biographer, held that the report of 1800 was merely an elucidation of the Virginia Resolutions of two years earlier,59 but a close reading reveals greater moderation, even a touch of obfuscation, in the Report. Motivations for a change in tone are obvious: Jefferson was in the middle of a presidential campaign, and the public, even in the South, had responded unfavorably to Virginia’s earlier statement. A tactical shift in Madison’s emphasis is perfectly consistent: the Virginia Resolutions had gone farther in asserting states’ rights than had the Federalist, which had itself been less nationalist than Madison’s private views. Advocacy of states’ rights was a tactical move,60 and Jefferson’s election promised to allay Madison’s fears. Thus, the Report opened with a statement that the General Assembly should clarify its meaning and thereby mollify those who had perceived the Resolutions of ‘98 as signs of “a diminution of mutual respect, confidence and affection, among the members of the union.”61 After judging the first two resolutions of ‘98 unobjectionable, the Report launched into a discussion of the central, third, resolution. One of the points made

there was that although the meaning of the statement that the states were parties to the constitutional compact was unclear, all would agree that the people in the states qua state were parties. Virginia (Madison) deduced, even in the wake of the other states’ response in 1798, that it was obviously up to the states to decide when the compact had been violated. However, the Report continued, interposition must not be employed “either in a hasty manner, or on doubtful and inferior occasions . . . [but] can be called for by occasions only, deeply and essentially affecting the vital principles of their political system.”62 This was not a new point, but one made in the text of the Resolutions themselves, which said only cases of a “deliberate, palpable and dangerous nature” [emphasis in the original] justified such extreme measures.63 As to the objection that it was for the federal judiciary, not the states, to decide these questions, Virginia responded that this would mean that the delegation of powers had destroyed a party to the compact, which was an absurdity and implied that a league of the three branches of the federal government could exercise undelegated power.64 This argument, too, assumed the states to be parties to the pact. The perceived Federalist attack on republicanism had come in for criticism in the fifth resolution, and, since it was the gravamen of the Republican complaint, that resolution was the subject of the bulk of the Report. The main point of the explication was that the Alien and

Sedition Acts were exercises of power not granted to Congress by the constitution. RECANTING ‘98 After 1800, the Republicans prosecuted people for seditious libel.65 With friends of republicanism and sound constitutional construction such as they in office, the crisis had passed; the extreme rhetoric Madison had employed in response to the Federalists’ use of the law of seditious libel was no longer indicated.66 Principle depended on circumstance. The closest antebellum parallel to the Republicans’ state of mind in the 1790s was that of the South Carolina Nullifiers in 1831-1833.67 The Nullifiers formally propounded the theory of interposition anonymously drawn up by Vice President John C. Calhoun, which resuscitated the Principles of ‘98, particularly Virginia’s third resolution, to prevent enforcement within South Carolina’s borders of the federal tariff.68 Thus, Madison became the center of the debate over state sovereignty and nullification. Each side requested his support; he explained why his past pronouncements did not mean what they seemed to mean. Left unclear by Madison’s letters during this period is the reason he chose to recant his position of 1798. Seemingly, it would have been easy for him simply to state that he had been concerned in the 1790s with the prospect of the imposition of an unrepublican police

state, so state interposition was appropriate. The tariff, he could have said, might be inequitable, even unconstitutional, but it did not justify “calculat[ing] the value of the union.”69 Instead, after saying that, he went on to lay out a consolidationist view. Instead, Madison’s response was to insist that the Virginia Resolutions and the Report of 1800 had not meant that any state had the right to nullify a federal policy. The Madison of 1830 was much more like the Madison of the Philadelphia Convention than like that of 1798; while Madison the opposition politician had participated in the partisan extremism of the 1790s,70 since 1800 he had become increasingly convinced that federalism, the “extension of the sphere,” held out the promise of secure republicanism to as many as would take advantage of it, rhetorically inquiring, May it not be regarded as among the Providential blessings to these States, that their geographical relations[,] multiplied as they will be by artificial channels of intercourse, give such additional force to the many obligations to cherish that Union which alone secures their peace, their safety, and their prosperity?71 In 1830, Senator Robert Y. Hayne, Carolina’s champion in the famous Webster-Hayne Debate, sent Madison a copy of his speeches. Hayne obviously expected the author of the Virginia Resolutions to endorse the doctrine of nullification. In response, Madison adopted totally different ground.72 He disapproved of the notion that a single state could

nullify any statute which was not so oppressive as to absolve that state of all responsibility to the union. He added, “[T]he Constitution of the U.S. . . . must be its own interpreter according to its text and the facts of the case.73 [Madison's emphasis] The charter was that of one people [emphasis added] and could not be negated but by the whole people.”74 This was a modification in doctrine that had been rendered necessary by Calhoun’s strict fidelity to Virginia’s formulation of 1798. Madison feared that one state would act to nullify through a specially chosen convention (as South Carolina eventually did); he felt compelled to deny the legitimacy of such action. It was exactly the opposite of the view he had taken as Publius forty years before and later in the Report of 1800, when he had called ratification a federal act (thus recognizing state sovereignty).75 He next stated that the supremacy clause governed the question; if that failed, impeachment might be tried, then amendment. Madison closed with the incongruous statement that the failure of all these remedies would entitle a state to resort to the law of self-preservation, but that that was a right the government need not respect.76 Referring to the debates over the Virginia Resolutions, Madison told Hayne:

the tenor of them does not disclose any reference to a constitutional right in an individual State to arrest by force the operation of a law of the U.S.77 Interstate cooperation, he said, had been the aim of the General Assembly. If either the understanding of the other political actors of 1798 or the plain meaning of the section of Virginia’s third resolution reproduced above is to be trusted, this statement, with its implication of exclusivity, was simply untrue.78 The phrase “null[,] void & of no power or effect” had been deleted, showing, claimed Madison, that nullification had not been in Virginia’s mind. As for Kentucky, he incorrectly stated,79 “nullification” had never been part of its resolutions. Then followed a passage dealing with the mutual cessions of authority to the federal government by the states, which proved that they were all yet equal, an argument which ignored the question of what would happen if one state or a minority of states were discriminated against via a power not granted to the Congress by the constitution or through employment of a constitutional power in an unintended fashion (the circumstance Hayne claimed to face).80 Madison then arrived at what must have been for him the central problem with nullification: it presaged the end of the union. He referred Hayne to Federalists 39 and 44. In his August 28, 1830 letter to Edward Everett,81 Madison gave a glimpse of the reasons for his change of mind since 1798. The episode of the Alien and Sedition

laws, in his opinion, showed that republicanism itself was an adequate check if the people were properly informed. The Nullifiers’ complaint, he said, was that the people at large disagreed with them; no good republican could grant them that.82 The notion of a preemptory veto by one state, valid until disapproved by three-fourths of the states, was dismissed for the same reason.83 The constitution had been ratified by all, he said, and must be amendable only as provided, adding, “nothing is said [in the Report] that can be understood to look to means of maintaining the rights of the States beyond the regular ones within the forms of the Constn.” [sic] In his March 27, 1831 letter to James Robertson,84 Madison made the point that interposition by individual states had never been contemplated; this was shown by the use of the word “states” throughout the Virginia Resolutions and Report of 1800. That reference to states’ rights, even if the rights of individual states were under consideration, also might be in the plural seems not to have occurred to him.85 The Nullifiers read such language as we would. In still another letter about nullification, Madison said: The essential difference between a free Government and Governments not free, is that the former is founded in compact, the parties to which are mutually and equally bound by it. Neither of them therefore can have a greater right to break off from the bargain, than the other or others have to hold them to it.86

He continued that the use of the word “respective” in Virginia’s third resolution did not connote rights of individual states, an incredible construction. The letter closed with regrets about the Nullification Proclamation, which Madison thought had spurred fears of consolidation,87 but did not suggest a way to offset the trend. The result of Madison’s volte-face was, as he regretted, that he was “denounced as Innovator, heretic & Apostate.”88 He should not have been; the doctrine of secession and nullification was absurd, especially in light of the fact that no foreign government recognized any capacity for international action in any of the states.89 His most extreme anti-Nullifier statement, the March 12, 1833 letter to Virginia’s Senator William Cabell Rives,90 stated that the states had transferred their sovereignty to the federal government and that the transfer was permanent; the federal government was the final arbiter of its own powers. Assuming the inerrancy of Supreme Court (thus of federal) interpretation, he said, “As this is a simple question whether a State, more than an individual, has a right to violate its engagements, it would seem that it might be safely left to answer itself.” Madison went to his grave insisting that Virginia’s third resolution of 1798 had been misrepresented by the Nullifiers: — it must be understood as a mere introduction of the seventh (which called for interstate

cooperation).91 The states, he admitted (in contradiction of his earlier statement in the same letter), were the final arbiters of constitutional meaning, but should exercise that authority only in extreme cases such as that presented in 1798.92 Immediately contradicting himself, he said interposition was extralegal, for it would lead to a multiplicity of federal regimes (a different one in each state).93 1798’s “interposition” had simply meant petitioning, followed by resort to the ballot.94 The most striking thing about Madison’s “Notes on Nullification” of 1836 is that it approved virtually every argument that could be considered against nullification, the most baffling of which was that sovereignty has been divided in the American system, therefore the states must obey the federal government.95 What aspect of sovereignty that leaves the states is not clear; that it leaves the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution is. One last time, Madison stated that the constitution had been ratified by one people acting in thirteen states, thus contradicting again his statements to the opposite effect in Publius’s thirty-ninth letter and in the Report of 1800. The difference was “interesting, but as an historical fact of merely speculative curiosity.”96 Madison’s final pronouncement on nullification closed with a statement of his political faith, a recapitulation of the experience that had left him a firm advocate of union:

Thus far, throughout a period of nearly half a century, the new and compound system has been successful beyond any of the forms of Govt., ancient or modern, with which it may be compared; having as yet discovered no defects which do not admit remedies compatible with its vital principles and characteristic features. It becomes all therefore who are friends of a Govt. based on free principles to reflect, that by denying the possibility of a system partly federal and partly consolidated, and who would convert ours into one either wholly federal or wholly consolidated, in neither of which forms have individual rights, public order, and external safety, been all duly maintained, they aim a deadly blow at the last hope of true liberty on the face of the Earth.97 Madison here ignored the preceding pronouncements in the same document, which comprised a consolidationist statement worthy of Daniel Webster. Political theorists had long insisted that sovereignty must be located in one place. Madison’s fifty-year attempt to prove them mistaken had failed. His failure would have cosmic repercussions. This article is part of Essays in History, volume 36, 1994, published by the Corcoran Department of History at the University of Virginia.
All material copyrighted by the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. NOTES

1. Saul Padover, “Madison as a Political Thinker,” 20 Social Research 32, et seq. (Spring 1953), at 54, citing “an 1853 manuscript in New York Public Library Manuscript Division.” [sic] 2. I disagree with, e.g., Colleen Sheehan, “The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison’s ‘Notes on Government,’” William and Mary Quarterly 49 (1992), 609- 627 in that I do not believe there exists a single (public) writing of James Madison while he was still active in politics in which his political philosophy is revealed clearly. Since all his public writings had tactical purposes, to glean his political philosophy, one must either read his private letters in conjunction with his public writings or consider his postretirement statements. (The latter course obviously may not accurately reflect the beliefs of the earlier, active Madison.) For a similar view, see Padover, “Madison As a Political Thinker,” 33. 3. Papers of James Madison, vol. 12, ed. Robert Rutland, et al. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1962), 201. 4. Madison’s suspicions of the Federalists were even stronger than Jefferson’s. John R. Howe, “Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s,” American Quarterly, vol. XIX (Summer 1967), 147-165, at 149. 5. For contrary views of historians, see Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison & the Republican Legacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 119170; Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties,” William and Mary Quarterly 5 (1948), 147-176. For a hint at the reason why my reading is usually rejected by historians, see Ibid., editors’ note, 145-146. 6. “Vices of the Political system of the U. States,” April 1787, Papers of James Madison, vol. 9, 348-357. 7. Ibid., 187-188. 8. Cf. Ibid., 229. 9. Ibid., 228 details Madison’s objections. 10. The structure of the Senate also led Madison to favor allocating powers to the Executive he had previously favored giving the Senate. Cf. Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison, ed. Adrienne Koch (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1966), 344, where he agreed that the Executive, not the Senate, should appoint judges. 11. Lance Banning was mistaken in saying the proposed federal veto was to be wholly defensive. Lance Banning, “The Practicable Sphere of a Republic,” in Beeman, et al.,

Beyond Confederation, fn. 19, 170-171. Rather, Congress would have been able to employ it even when the federal position was not threatened. 12. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Papers of James Madison, vol. 10, 206-214. 13. Charles Hobson, “The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution and the Crisis of Republican Government,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. XXXVI, no. 2 (April 1979), 235. 14. Ibid., 218, 225. 15. Ibid., 228-230. Madison expected violence if a state statute were ever declared unconstitutional. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, Papers of James Madison, vol. 15, 206-214, 211. 16. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, Papers of James Madison, vol. 10, 206-214. 17. Cf. Lance Banning, “Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good,” Ratifying the Constitution, ed. Michael Gillespie and Michael Lienesch (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 274. As a Virginian, he had a powerful incentive to perpetuate the union: Virginia was militarily vulnerable. 18. Peter Onuf, “Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective,” William and Mary Quarterly XXIII (1989), 341-375. 19. E.g., by Clinton Rossiter, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: Mentor Books, 1961), xv. The view that Madison’s contribution reflected his true beliefs is reflected in a plethora of articles and books, including Lance Banning, “The Hamiltonian Madison: A Reconsideration.” 20. This notion is elaborated in Albert Furtwangler, The Authority of Publius: A Reading of the Federalist Papers (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), passim., especially 17-44, 112-148. Also see Federalists 62 and 63, in which Madison defended the composition of the Senate. 21. Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, tr. Thomas Nugent (New York and London: Hafner Publishing Company, 1966), 120. 22. As Madison and Hamilton conceded, several opponents of the constitution raised this objection to the proposal for establishment of a single government over such a large area. The Federalist, 52-53, 83-89. 23. The consonance between Madison’s essay and Hume’s was first noted by Douglass Adair in “‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,” Huntington Library Quarterly, XX (1957), 343-360.

24. Cf. Peter Onuf, “James Madison’s Extended Republic,” 2380. 25. A position Madison had long held. Cf. “Report on Washington-Carleton Correspondence about Treason,” Papers of James Madison, vol. 5, 42. 26. The Federalist, 243. 27. See the discussion of Madison’s “Notes on Nullification,” infra. 28. The Federalist, 305. Madison put theory into practice in the wake of the Jay Treaty’s ratification, but the Virginia General Assembly refused to cooperate. Papers of James Madison, vol. 16, 95- 104. 29. The Federalist, 313. Madison made this point again in Federalist “55, in which he argued, inter alia, that members of Congress need not be as numerous as if it “possessed the whole power of legislation.” Ibid., 374.. 30. He reiterated this point in “Political Reflections,” February 23, 1799, Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, 237-243, at 242.The Federalist, 320.; see also Federalist 55, Ibid., 376. Madison went on to detail the manpower advantage the state militias must always have over federal forces. Once again, he incautiously laid the groundwork for states’ rights extremism. For Madison’s more candid appraisal of the relative military strengths of the center and the states, see fn. 12, supra. 31. Papers of James Madison, vol. 12, 30 n.2, 91-92; Papers of James Madison, vol. 13, 348. 32. Congressional Debate (Madison’s notes), February 2, 1791, Papers of James Madison, vol. 13, 374; Madison to Edmund Pendleton, February 13, 1791, Ibid.; Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800, 327-333. 33. Ibid., 348-349. Madison’s constitutional inconsistency was a popular target of Federalist attack, most famously in Hamilton’s opinion to President Washington on the constitutionality of the bank. Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 321-322. 34. Paying both the original and the current holders of debt instruments was not feasible, Madison admitted: “A composition, then, is the only expedient that remains; let it be a liberal one, in favor of the present holders; let them have the highest price which has prevailed in the market; and let the residue belong to the original sufferers . . . It will be said, the plan is impracticable; . . . but it does not appear to me in that light . . . having never been a proselyte to the doctrine, that public debts are public benefits.” Papers of James Madison, vol. 13, “Discrimination between Present and Original Holders of the Public Debt,” 34- 38, at 37, 38. 35. Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 312-315, 331; Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New York: W.W. Norton

and Co., 1980), passim. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 14, 1794, Papers of James Madison, vol. 15, 284; “Political Observations,” April 20, 1795, 511-533, fn. at 511-512. 36. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 1, 1791, cited in Franklyn Bonn, Jr., The Idea of Political Party in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota (1964), 160. 37. For Madison’s reaction over time, see Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787- 1800, 371-388. For his lack of moral outrage, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 12, 1793, Papers of James Madison, vol. 15, 6-8, at 7 (approving of the regicide). For outright approval of the French Revolution, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 13, 1793, Ibid., vol. 15, 28-30, at 30. The pro-Revolution resolutions drawn up by Madison c. August 27, 1793 for the endorsement of Virginia county governments (any criticism of France = love of England = monarchism, a recurrent Madisonian theme of the 1790s) are at Ibid., 79- 80.Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, xx. 38. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 20, 1798, Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, 132. 39. Jefferson’s draft of the Kentucky Resolutions is at The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill Peterson (New York: Viking Press, 1975), 281-289. 40. Thus also of the people, who have the right to be governed only by a government of their own device; when the federal government ignores the Tenth Amendment, it deprives the people of government by consent. 41. The editors of Madison’s papers aver that Madison’s version was therefore “more carefully crafted.” Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, 186. It is unclear why simple reliance on the Tenth Amendment signifies craftsmanship less careful than Madison’s, even though Madison’s version was “purposely vague about the recourse left open to a state in protesting such acts.” Ibid., 187. Perhaps the editors mean that Madison’s version was more politic than Jefferson’s. 42. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, December 29,1798, Id., 191-192 contains the famous question, “Have you ever considered thoroughly the distinction between the power of the State, & that of the Legislature, on questions relating to the federal pact.” [sic] This is usually read as implying some special Madisonian insight into the nature of the union. However, the following two sentences say: On the supposition that the former is clearly the ultimate judge of infractions, it does not follow that the latter is the legitimate organ[,] especially as a Convention was the organ by which the Compact was made. This was a reason of great weight for using general expressions that would leave to other States a choice of all the modes possible of concurring in the substance, and would shield the Genl. Assembly agst. the charge of Usurpation in the very act of protesting agst [sic] the usurpations of Congress. 43. Cf. Neal Riemer, “James Madison’s Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of Republican Government,” Ethics, vol. LXV (October 1954), 40 (text at fn. 24). For a

statement of their moderate nature, see “Virginia Resolutions: Editorial Note,” Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, 188. 44. The Virginia Resolutions of 1798 are at Ibid., 188-190. 45. E.g., Drew McCoy, Last of the Fathers; Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties;” Adrienne Koch, Madison’s “Advice to My Country” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800. If, as Koch and Ammon said, Madison did not “believe that the state was the ultimate judge of both the violation and the mode of redress,” he certainly did not make that clear in either the resolutions themselves or the Publius letters. Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties.” 46. John Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1951), 171. 47. Ibid., 172. 48. Ibid., 172-173. 49. “Null: . . . 1: having no legal or binding force: INVALID.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1979). 50. While this is usually read as a matter-of- fact statement, it was probably a misrepresentation of the law of press freedom at the time. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), viii and passim. The uncertainty results from the impossibility of saying whether the doctrine of desuetude had changed the law by 1787. 51. At the end of the eighteenth century, Americans could be expected to be familiar with the long English tradition of enforcing law agreed to be “legal,” though not “constitutional.” John Reid, In Defiance of the Law: The Standing-Army Controversy, the Two Constitutions, and the Coming of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981). Thus, Virginia’s statement that theses laws were unconstitutional did not necessarily imply that they were “of no force or effect;” that implication came from the “interposition” proposal in the third resolution. 52. North Carolina’s legislature had been Jefferson’s first choice for the role of junior partner eventually filled by Kentucky’s in adopting his resolutions. Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties,” 167; Richard Buel, Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789-1815 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), 223- 224.

53. Ibid., 223. 54. Richard Buel, Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789-1815, 224; Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787- 1800, 470; “The Report of 1800: Editorial Note,” Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, 306. 55. Ibid., 305; Madison to Thomas Jefferson, January 4, 1800, Ibid., 302. 56. John Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts, 179. 57. Irving Brant, The Fourth President: A Life of James Madison (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs- Merrill, 1970), 299. 58. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology, fn. 29, 284. 59. Report of 1800, Papers of James Madison, vol. 17, 307. 60. If interposition consists merely of replacing representatives and instructing senators, why not resort to it on the slightest provocation? 61. Ibid., 310. The analogy of a simple treaty between states was used, implying that each state stood on its own; Madison never raised this analogy in the Nullification Crisis context. 62. Ibid., 311-312. 63. Ibid., 303. 64. John R. Howe, “Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s.” 65. The foremost account is William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). The collapse of the (Madisonian) middle position between state sovereignty and consolidation is the topic of Richard Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Also useful is John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1953). 66. Madison insisted that the federal tariff, the purported aim of which was to encourage domestic manufactures, was constitutional. Madison to Joseph C. Cabell, September 18, 1828, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1910), 316, et seq. His protestation that the distinction between regulatory and revenue tariffs drawn in the Revolutionary crisis did not apply would convince except that it

overlooks his doctrine that the states are the parties to the compact (and thus the final arbiters of its meaning). Ibid., 326. 67. William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 130. This point was tacitly made in Madison to Alexander Rives, January 1833, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX, 495. 68. John R. Howe, “Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s.” 69. Madison to Joseph Cabell, September 18, 1828, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX, 339-340. 70. Madison to Robert Y. Hayne, Ibid., fn. 2, 383. 71. A point he repeated in Madison to Edward Everett, August 28, 1830, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX, 384. 72. This point was reiterated in Madison to Alexander Rives, January 1833, Ibid., 495. 73. See the discussion of Publius’ thirty-ninth letter, supra. 74. This point was repeated in Madison to Everett, September 10, 1830, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX, 395 (note), and in “Notes on Nullification,” Ibid., 573, 539, fn. 1., where he interpreted Thomas Jefferson’s reference to nullification as an appeal to natural rights. The notion that governments may of right ignore natural rights seems only to have been applied by Madison in the context of state opposition to federal action. It may appear to be drawn from John Locke’s argument that each is on his own when those who have been authorized to make laws see their right to do so usurped. John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), 179. However, Locke was speaking of a unified, not a federal, polity. In the American case, as Madison said, the constitution of the general government was a federal act; the Lockean conclusion is that federal usurpation would leave the states on their own (as is implicit in Virginia’s third resolution). In that light, nullification becomes a moderate remedy. Also see Ibid., 184-190, where a discussion of the proper remedies to governmental overreaching puts the people in the right and the government in the wrong (thus contradicting Madison’s statement). In neither situation did Locke (or the Carolinians) say that each constituent was free to dissolve the compact: only the government in question (in 1798 and 1830, the federal government) could do that. However, only the constituents could decide when that had occurred, for who else was there? (Madison himself agreed in his Report of 1800.) The central attribute of Locke’s compact theory of government is that delegation is always contingent: the constituents’ rights always remain paramount to those of their creature, the government. The alternative is unlimited government.The foremost practitioner of the Websterite theory of an organic union antedating the federal constitution, President Abraham Lincoln, said the people’s existence preceded the constitution and made it possible. If not, “The United States [would] be not a government proper, but an association of States in the nature of a

contract [or pact] merely.” Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 130, citing Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, vol. 2, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Library of America, 1989), 217. Madison, by saying that the ratification of the constitution was a “federal” act undertaken by “independent” states, said that the states were once distinct. In fact, the United States were referred to in the plural for nearly nine decades, which shows that the people at large understood the situation thus (as does their adoption of the word “federal” to denominate the general government). 75. This point, like the letter generally, was repeated in Madison to Edward Everett, August 28, 1830, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX, 383, 402. 76. A threat of force was also implicit in Virginia’s and Kentucky’s manifestos. Neal Riemer, “James Madison’s Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of Republican Government,” Ethics, vol. LXV (October 1954), fn. 24, 40. 77. The Portable Jefferson, ed. Merrill Peterson, 281-289, at 286. 78. Madison insisted that the United States’ government was neither national nor federal, but a blend of both, and refused to recognize that one or the other must have the final word on constitutional construction. Cf. Madison to Edward Everett, August 28, 1830, Writings of James Madison, vol. IX, 384. 79. Ibid., 383. 80. See also Madison to Alexander Rives, January 1833, Ibid., 495, 496. Implicit in this notion is the idea that a congressional majority may legislate as it will, regardless of the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of some powers to the states. 81. This argument was repeated in Madison to C.E. Haynes, August 27, 1832, Ibid., 482, et seq. 82. Ibid., 444, et seq. 83. He repeated this argument in Madison to C.E. Haynes, August 27, 1832, Ibid., 482, 483; in Madison to N.P. Trist, December 23, 1832, Ibid., 489, 490; in “Notes on Nullification,” 1835-1836, Ibid., 573, 575-576, 580-581, and elsewhere. Using Madison’s logic, assertions of “the free speech rights of men” would raise only claims to such rights when exercised corporately, for only the plural is there used. 84. The standard understanding of performance contracts is that absent a fixed term, they can be terminated by any party with reasonable notice. 85. Ibid. 86. Madison to William C. Rives, March 12, 1833, Ibid., 511.

87. If sovereigns agree to act federally in, e.g., foreign affairs, do they cease to be sovereigns, or are they simply sovereigns acting federally in foreign affairs? Whether conventions of the people in each state or the legislatures were the bodies authorized to speak in sovereign capacity, Madison had held in The Federalist that thirteen sovereigns had made the constitution – - that ratification was a federal act, not the act of one people. 88. Ibid., 511, et seq. 89. Ibid., 574. 90. Ibid., 575. 91. Ibid., 575, 577. 92. Ibid., 595-597. 93. Ibid., 599. 94. Ibid., 603. 95. Ibid., 606.

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“The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified.” — United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931).
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The Tenth Amendment

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
The Tenth Amendment **************************************

The United States Constitution ________________________________
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Contents
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Preamble Article 1 - The Legislative Branch o Section 1 - The Legislature o Section 2 - The House o Section 3 - The Senate o Section 4 - Elections, Meetings o Section 5 - Membership, Rules, Journals, Adjournment o Section 6 - Compensation o Section 7 - Revenue Bills, Legislative Process, Presidential Veto o Section 8 - Powers of Congress o Section 9 - Limits on Congress o Section 10 - Powers Prohibited of States Article 2 - The Executive Branch o Section 1 - The President o Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments o Section 3 - State of the Union, Convening Congress o Section 4 - Disqualification Article 3 - The Judicial Branch o Section 1 - Judicial Powers o Section 2 - Trial by Jury, Original Jurisdiction, Jury Trials o Section 3 - Treason Article 4 - The States o Section 1 - Each State to Honor All Others

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Section 2 - State Citizens, Extradition Section 3 - New States Section 4 - Republican Government Article 5 - Amendment Article 6 - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths Article 7 - Ratification Signatories Amendments o Amendment 1 - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression o Amendment 2 - Right to Bear Arms o Amendment 3 - Quartering of Soldiers o Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure o Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings o Amendment 6 - Right to Speedy Trial, Confrontation of Witnesses o Amendment 7 - Trial by Jury in Civil Cases o Amendment 8 - Cruel and Unusual Punishment o Amendment 9 - Construction of Constitution o Amendment 10 - Powers of the States and People o Amendment 11 - Judicial Limits o Amendment 12 - Choosing the President, Vice President o Amendment 13 - Slavery Abolished o Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights o Amendment 15 - Race No Bar to Vote o Amendment 16 - Status of Income Tax Clarified o Amendment 17 - Senators Elected by Popular Vote o Amendment 18 - Liquor Abolished o Amendment 19 - Women's Suffrage o Amendment 20 - Presidential, Congressional Terms o Amendment 21 - Amendment 18 Repealed o Amendment 22 - Presidential Term Limits o Amendment 23 - Presidential Vote for District of Columbia o Amendment 24 - Poll Taxes Barred o Amendment 25 - Presidential Disability and Succession o Amendment 26 - Voting Age Set to 18 Years o Amendment 27 - Limiting Congressional Pay Increases
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The Constitution of the United States
Preamble Note
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the

general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. ____________________________________________________________________

Article I - The Legislative Branch Note
Section 1 - The Legislature All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Section 2 - The House The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. (Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.) (The previous sentence in parentheses was modified by the 14th Amendment, section 2.) The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Section 3 - The Senate

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, (chosen by the Legislature thereof,) (The preceding words in parentheses superseded by 17th Amendment, section 1.) for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; (and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.) (The preceding words in parentheses were superseded by the 17th Amendment, section 2.) No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Section 4 - Elections, Meetings The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing Senators. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall (be on the first Monday in December,) (The preceding words in parentheses were superseded by the 20th Amendment, section 2.) unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day. Section 5 - Membership, Rules, Journals, Adjournment

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide. Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal. Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. Section 6 - Compensation (The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.) (The preceding words in parentheses were modified by the 27th Amendment.) They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. Section 7 - Revenue Bills, Legislative Process, Presidential Veto All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it

shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. Section 8 - Powers of Congress The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States; To establish Post Offices and Post Roads; To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. Section 9 - Limits on Congress The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. (No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.) (Section in parentheses clarified by the 16th Amendment.) No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State. Section 10 - Powers prohibited of States No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. ____________________________________________________________________

Article II - The Executive Branch Note
Section 1 - The President Note1 Note2 The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

(The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not lie an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the VicePresident.) (This clause in parentheses was superseded by the 12th Amendment.) The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States. No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. (In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.) (This clause in parentheses has been modified by the 20th and 25th Amendments.) The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them. Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. Section 3 - State of the Union, Convening Congress He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States. Section 4 - Disqualification The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. ____________________________________________________________________

Article III - The Judicial Branch Note

Section 1 - Judicial powers The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Section 2 - Trial by Jury, Original Jurisdiction, Jury Trials (The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.) (This section in parentheses is modified by the 11th Amendment.) In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Section 3 - Treason Note Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. ____________________________________________________________________

Article IV - The States

Section 1 - Each State to Honor all others Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. Section 2 - State citizens, Extradition The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. (No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.) (This clause in parentheses is superseded by the 13th Amendment.) Section 3 - New States New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State. Section 4 - Republican government The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence. ____________________________________________________________________

Article V - Amendment Note1 - Note2 - Note3

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. ____________________________________________________________________

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States. ____________________________________________________________________

Article VII - Ratification Documents
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same. ____________________________________________________________________ Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names. Note Go Washington - President and deputy from Virginia

New Hampshire - John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman Massachusetts - Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King Connecticut - Wm Saml Johnson, Roger Sherman New York - Alexander Hamilton New Jersey - Wil Livingston, David Brearley, Wm Paterson, Jona. Dayton Pensylvania - B Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, Robt Morris, Geo. Clymer, Thos FitzSimons, Jared Ingersoll, James Wilson, Gouv Morris Delaware - Geo. Read, Gunning Bedford jun, John Dickinson, Richard Bassett, Jaco. Broom Maryland - James McHenry, Dan of St Tho Jenifer, Danl Carroll Virginia - John Blair, James Madison Jr. North Carolina - Wm Blount, Richd Dobbs Spaight, Hu Williamson South Carolina - J. Rutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler Georgia - William Few, Abr Baldwin Attest: William Jackson, Secretary ____________________________________________________________________

The Amendments Note
The following are the Amendments to the Constitution. The first ten Amendments collectively are commonly known as the Bill of Rights. History ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 1 - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression. Ratified 12/15/1791. Note Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. ____________________________________________________________________

Amendment 2 - Right to Bear Arms. Ratified 12/15/1791. Note A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 3 - Quartering of Soldiers. Ratified 12/15/1791. Note No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure. Ratified 12/15/1791. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 6 - Right to Speedy Trial, Confrontation of Witnesses. Ratified 12/15/1791. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 7 - Trial by Jury in Civil Cases. Ratified 12/15/1791. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 8 - Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Ratified 12/15/1791. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 9 - Construction of Constitution. Ratified 12/15/1791. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 10 - Powers of the States and People. Ratified 12/15/1791. Note The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 11 - Judicial Limits. Ratified 2/7/1795. Note History The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 12 - Choosing the President, Vice-President. Ratified 6/15/1804. Note History The Electoral College The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in

distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; The person having the greatest Number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the VicePresident, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 13 - Slavery Abolished. Ratified 12/6/1865. History 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. Note History 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 15 - Race No Bar to Vote. Ratified 2/3/1870. History 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 16 - Status of Income Tax Clarified. Ratified 2/3/1913. Note History

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 17 - Senators Elected by Popular Vote. Ratified 4/8/1913. History The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 18 - Liquor Abolished. Ratified 1/16/1919. Repealed by Amendment 21, 12/5/1933. History 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 19 - Women's Suffrage. Ratified 8/18/1920. History The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 20 - Presidential, Congressional Terms. Ratified 1/23/1933. History 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 21 - Amendment 18 Repealed. Ratified 12/5/1933. History 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

3. The article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 22 - Presidential Term Limits. Ratified 2/27/1951. History 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President, when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 23 - Presidential Vote for District of Columbia. Ratified 3/29/1961. History 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 24 - Poll Tax Barred. Ratified 1/23/1964. History 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 25 - Presidential Disability and Succession. Ratified 2/10/1967. Note History 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 26 - Voting Age Set to 18 Years. Ratified 7/1/1971. History

1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ____________________________________________________________________ Amendment 27 - Limiting Congressional Pay Increases. Ratified 5/7/1992. History No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html#Am10

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TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER
State Groups

TAC State Groups
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Rachel Maddow’s Blog Targets Tenthers, Cuccinelli, Tertium Quids Josh Eboch Health Care Nullification for California Has Arrived Bryce Shonka Why Texas must call a special session… Brian Roberts Meet Marc Delphine Timothy Reeves DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND: THE HEALTHCARE BILL Andrew Nappi Hold the Line and Push Back Andrew Nappi Healthcare Intervention: The Bigger Picture Andrew Nappi RJ Harris: Nullification is a States Way to Remedy a Contract Breach. Wayne Hill Dates That Destroyed America Andrew Nappi Responding to the Health Care Mandate Bryce Shonka

State Sovereignty Resolutions The 10th Amendment Movement Palin Signs Alaska Sovereignty Resolution Obama's Imperial Decree: Target Oklahoma They Can't Push Us Around Forever

Essential Reading
 NULLIFICATION: Current Efforts  model 10th amendment resolution  tenth amendment talking points
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Napolitano: Tenth Amendment Town Hall Video: The Constitution and Freedom Video: The Role of Congress Under the Constitution Video: Presidential Power and the Constitution History Repeating Itself?

. Early Pennsylvania, Nullifying the Way to Freedom . Pennsylvania to Consider Nullifying Some Federal Gun Laws . Tennessee Governor Signs Sovereignty Resolution . A Rebellion Brewing in Oklahoma
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Real ID on its way Out

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We Refuse! Tenth Amendment Center | April 20, 2010 By Michael Boldin The following is based off a speech given at the Palm Desert Tax Day Tea Party on April 15, 2010 There are a few core beliefs that guide me in everything I do as the founder of the Tenth Amendment Center
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Rights are not “granted” to us by the government – they are ours by our very nature, by our birthright. ALL just political authority is derived from the people – and government exists solely with our consent! We the people of the several states created the federal government – not the other way around! The Tenth Amendment defines the total scope of federal power as being that which has been delegated by the people to the federal government in the Constitution – and nothing more.

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The People of each State have the sole and exclusive right and power to govern themselves in all areas not delegated to their government. A Government without limits is a tyranny! When Congress enacts laws and regulations that are not made in Pursuance of the powers enumerated in the Constitution, the People are not bound to obey them.

These seven items are about sovereignty, which is something we hear about quite a bit lately – but few really understand. Sovereignty is defined as “final authority.” All through history, this final authority was in the hands of just one or two people – a king, a queen, or even just a small cabal of elites at the top of the food chain. But the founders and ratifiers gave us something unique in history – a first, really. They created a system where the average people – you and I – held final authority. We the people are sovereign. We the people hold final authority. We the people are in charge. And, they the government work for us! The Tenth Amendment codifies in law this principle of popular sovereignty – that “We the People” of the several states created the federal government to be our agent for certain, enumerated purposes – and nothing more. But unfortunately, that’s not how things have been working, and very little that the government does is actually authorized by the constitution. And, this is a problem that didn’t just start in January 2009 – it’s been going on a long, long time. Question – What do we do about it?
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Do we call and email our representatives in Congress and ask them to limit their own power? Do we march on D.C. and demand that the government limit its own power?

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Do we sue them in their own courts and ask their judges to limit their power? Do we vote the bums out in 2010, or 2012 – and ask new politicians to limit their own power?

Thomas Jefferson and James Madison both warned us that if the federal government ever became the sole and exclusive arbiter of the extent of its own powers – that power would endlessly grow… regardless of elections, separation of powers, courts, or other vaunted parts of our system. Guess what – they were right. For a hundred years, we the people have been suing, and marching, and lobbying, and voting the bums out – but yet…year in and year out, government continues to grow and your liberty continues to diminish – and it doesn’t matter who is the president, or what political party controls congress – the growth of power in the federal government never stops. The problem we face today is not about personalities or political parties – it’s about power. Until we address the absolute fact that the federal government has too much power, things will never change. Question – What do we do about it? Jefferson and Madison gave us the answer. In response to the unconstitutional attacks on liberty that were the Alien and Sedition Acts, they secretly authored the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798. Here are a few excerpts that really define exactly how things are supposed to work when two or more branches of the federal government conspire against the constitution and your liberty. the several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their General Government

whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force. where powers are assumed [by the federal government] which have not been delegated [by the Constitution], a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy So while it might be important to call, petition, demand, march, sue and vote bums out, because they’re all bums, there’s much more we’re supposed to do. When the federal government violates your rights, you’re not supposed to wait four years for new politicians in the hope that they’ll fix it. You’re not supposed to wait two, or four, or more years for some black-robed judge to pronounce that they’ve violated your rights. You are supposed to resist those violations of your liberty as they happen – and it is your state’s solemn duty to do the same. NEW MOVEMENT While such a task might seem daunting, it’s something that’s already happening today, and has been growing in recent years too. In 2007, one state rep in Maine introduced a non-binding resolution opposing the REAL ID Act. In 2008, one state rep in Oklahoma introduced a simple nonbinding resolution reaffirming the Constitution as defined by the 10th amendment,. In 2009, one state rep in Montana introduced a bill to nullify some federal gun laws and regulations. In 2009, one state rep in Arizona introduced a state constitutional amendment to effectively ban a national health care plan in that state.

These simple, single acts by courageous people have grown into a state-level resistance to unconstitutional federal acts the likes this country has possibly never seen.

Already a dozen states have passed 10th amendment resolutions reaffirming the Constitution as the founders and ratifiers gave us. 25 states have passed laws and resolutions nullifying the Real ID act – stopping it dead in its tracks in most of the country. 7 states have passed Firearms Freedom Acts – nullifying some federal gun laws and regulations in their states. 14 states have now passed laws nullifying unconstitutional federal laws on marijuana 3 states have already passed Health Care Freedom Acts to ban federal health care mandates in their states. Other states are considering nullification laws on cap and trade, the misuse of

state national guard troops, monetary policy and much more.
Here at the Tenth Amendment Center we have released model legislation for you to give to your state reps to demand that they stand with you and refuse to comply with unconstitutional acts from Washington D.C. Our latest? The Federal Health Care Nullification Act. This Act is not over 1000 pages. It’s not 500 pages. It’s not a dozen, or even two. It’s one single page to nullify now. Here’s a majority of what it says: The Legislature of the State of _______________ declares that the federal law known as the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” signed by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010, is not authorized by the Constitution of the United States and violates its true meaning and intent as given by the Founders and Ratifiers, and is hereby declared to be invalid in this state, shall not be recognized by this state, is specifically rejected by this state, and shall be considered null and void and of no effect in this state. And it adds some much-needed ‘teeth’ too: Any official, agent, or employee of the United States government or any employee of a corporation providing services to the United States government that enforces or attempts to enforce an act, order, law, statute, rule or regulation of the government of the United States in violation of this act shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or a term of imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or both.

They want to fine us or put us in jail for not buying insurance from some corporation. What’s next – fining us for not buying a Chevy? Well, it’s time that we turn this thing around – and in the federal health care nullification act – we fine THEM for violating our rights! While this may seem difficult to accomplish – or even insurmountable – if we do nothing, or if we even do the same things we’ve been doing, we’re doomed to failure. But if we do what’s right, we will succeed! Samuel Adams put it best: “It does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people’s minds.” Question: What do we do about it? Step one is to sign on in support the Federal Health Care Nullification Act. WeRefuse.com is a new website (and the only one that I’m aware of) dedicated solely to nullifying national health care on a state level. Join us in our first goal of 100,000 to stop national health care “laws” today! Let’s make this work and then we can use it as a model for every other constitutional violation coming out of D.C.
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WeRefuse.com Tell your state legislators and governor's that you refuse to recognize the Unconstitutional national health care law. Tell them that you will not be forced by the federal government to buy a good or service from a company. You are not a slave to the government or to any other American. Tell them that you will not be strong-armed by the Federal Government and that your State must nullify the forced national health care mandate. Sign the petition to your state legislators now. Tell everyone you know to join us as We REFUSE!
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100,000 needed to nullify National Health Care!

PLEASE HELP TO STOP THIS MASSIVE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUR HARD WORKING MONEY THROUGH TAXATION TO SUBSDIZE MILLIONS OF ILLEGAL ALIENS AND WELFARE CASES.
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WHY STATES RIGHTS ARE THE ANSWER
The purpose of the Constitution of the United States is the preservation of Liberty. Having just taken on and winning their freedom from the most powerful empire in the world at that time the founders wanted to secure the right of self rule and safe guard against the corrupting influence of power by establishing a contract which set clear and limited powers for a centralized government. In the Preamble to the Constitution that most of us memorized in school at least long enough to pass a test, the founders tell us exactly why they are writing this constitution, and they want it to accomplish.

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Of course even in the beginning we had Hamilton arguing for what would become the general welfare clause in Article I, Section 8, that expanded the power of congress to include anything that could be said to promote the welfare of the nation. The clause was later used to uphold much of the New Deal legislation in the 1930’s by the Supreme Court, and to justify pretty much anything the congress has wanted to do since then. This contradicts what James Madison wrote in Federalist #45 that argued against such an idea or the fact that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments further define a limit on the power and scope of the federal government. My purpose here is not to debate the general welfare clause. If those in power today were citing this for the authority needed to do the things they feel need to be done, it would be a welcome change to the blatant disregard those in Washington have towards our history and the document they have each sworn an oath to uphold. It is clear that many of our so called leaders view this as a quaint little tradition that bears no meaning in today’s world. Here we have a recording of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi being asked where the constitutional authority for mandating individuals buy Health care under penalty of law. Her response is telling. Our founding fathers tried to warned us of this.

“Do not separate text from historical background. If you do, you will have perverted and subverted the Constitution, which can only end in a distorted, bastardized form of illegitimate government.” James Madison We could talk, debate, point fingers about how we got from 1776 to today, but the fact is each of us is responsible, and unless we own the blame, we cannot own the solution. First you need to ask, “Does the constitution matter to you?” If you answered yes, you may ask, “but what can I do?” Here is an idea for you. Nullification. The idea originally came from Hamilton in the Federalist #28 “It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.” Later, in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, written by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison stated the Federal Government only had the powers listed in Article One Section Eight, and that the states were not bound to enforce any federal law that exercised a power not delegated to it. For a more complete treatise on these I would direct you to read this by Thomas E. Woods, jr., Ph.d. Fast forward to modern times. Did you know in 1994 that Charles Duke, then a representative here in the Colorado State legislature, introduced the “10th Amendment / State Sovereignty Resolution – 1994″? It was first passed in Colorado but swept to many states across the country. Check out this link for an update from the author.

Resolutions are fine, but they have no teeth right? Remember the Real ID Act? The one that said if we didn’t have a “real ID” we would not be able to enter a federal building or board an airplane. You do not have one today and can still do everything you could before, why not? Because the States said no. Check this out from http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/

And today? Well Montana has passed a Firearms Freedom Act, and now other states have followed suit, more on this can be found here. Here is an excellent article by Washington State Rep. Matthew Shea. that outlines a plan to restore our Constitutional rights through the states. Of everything I have read the last three years, this to me is our best chance to win.

Being frustrated and angry is one thing, but to recognise that you have the power and ability to fix it yourself is another. It will not be easy, but consider what our Founding Fathers went through and risked to grant us, their progeny, the freedoms we still enjoy today, and it no longer seems that daunting. This quote lays it out there for you. “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” Edmund Burke It is time for good men and women to come off of the sidelines and get involved. Doing nothing is simply granting consent of the very actions that frustrate you.
Geoff Broughton is the State Chapter Coordinator for the Colorado Tenth Amendment Center. If you enjoyed this post: Click Here to Get the Free Tenth Amendment Center Newsletter, http://colorado.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2009/12/why-states-rights-are-the-answertoday/ ============================================================ =====================================For

Your Reference Below

Already a dozen states have passed 10th amendment resolutions reaffirming the Constitution as the founders and gratifiers gave us.

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============== 25 states have passed laws and resolutions nullifying the Real ID act – stopping it dead in its tracks in most of the country.

Alabama HJR13: Opposition to implementation of the Real ID Act Alaska SB202: Prohibits State Spending on Real ID Effective Date of Law – 08/26/08 Arizona HB 2677, Real ID Act prohibition. (Passed House of Representatives 51-8 on 3/19/08) (Passed Senate 21-7 on 5/6/08) (Signed by Governor Napolitano 6/17/08) Arkansas SCR 16 requests that the Arkansas Congressional Delegation support the repeal of the Real ID Act. (Enacted 3/28/07) Colorado HJR 07-1047 a resolution in opposition to the Real ID Act. (Enacted 5/4/07) Georgia SB 5 Authorizing the governor of Georgia to delay compliance with the Real ID Act (Enacted 5/11/07). Hawaii SCR 31 Opposing the creation of a national identity card and the implementation of the Real ID Act of 2005. (Adopted 4/25/07) Idaho HB 606 Real ID Act, do not implement. (Enacted 4/9/08) Illinois HJR 27 Opposes any portion of the Real ID Act that violates the rights and liberties guaranteed under the Illinois and US Constitutions and urges Congress to repeal Real ID (Adopted 5/22/07). Iowa Kentucky HCR 122 Urges Congress to repeal the creation of a national ID card and the Real ID Act of 2005. (Passed out of committee 2/20/07). SCR 111 A concurrent resolution urging Congress to repeal the creati… Louisiana HB 715 Directs the Office of Public Safety and Corrections not to implement the Real ID Act. (Passed House 5/14/08; Signed by Gonvernor 7/16/08) Maine SP 113 Maine’s resolution against the Real ID Act of 2005 (Enacted 1/25/07). LD 1138 An act to prohibit Maine from participating in a national identification system. (Passed by the Legislature 6/5/07) Maryland SB 576 Prohibiting implementation of the Real ID Act. Massachusetts SB 2138 Memorializing the Congress on the Real ID Act. Minnesota SF 0988 Noncompliance with Real ID Act. (Enacted 5/15/09) Missouri HB 361 Prohibits the violation of a person’s privacy rights in order to obtain a driver’s license. (Enacted 7/13/09)

Montana HB 287 Opposing implementation of Real ID in Montana (Enacted 4/17/07). Nebraska LR 28 Opposes the enactment of the Real ID Act in Nebraska and urges Congress to repeal. (Adopted 5/30/07) Nevada AJR 6 Urges Congress to repeal the Real ID Act of 2005. (Adopted 5/14/07) SJR 5 Nevada Senate version of AJR 6, urging Congress to repeal the Real ID Act of 2005. New Hampshire HB 685 Prohibits the state from participating in a national identification system. (Enacted 6/27/07) North Dakota SCR4040 Urges the United States Congress to repeal the Real ID Act of 2005. (Adopted 4/20/07) Oklahoma SB 464 Opposing the implementation of Real ID in Oklahoma. (Enacted 5/23/07).HCR 1019 Memorializing Congress to repeal the Real ID Act of 2005. (Passed House 3/13/07) Oregon SB 536 Prohibits the state from funding Real ID implementation until privacy guidelines are met and sufficient federal funding is secured. (Enacted 5/23/09) Pennsylvania HR 767 Urging the United States Congress to repeal the Real ID Act of 2005. (Passed the House 194-3.) HB 2537 Prohibiting the Commonwealth from obtaining certification onder the Federal Real ID Act of… Rhode Island H 5474 A Joint Resolution opposing the implementation of Real ID. S 865 Opposing implementation of Real ID. South Carolina S 449 Provides that the state will not participate in the Real ID program. (Enacted 6/13/07) H 3989 Memorializing Congress to repeal or decline implementation of the Real ID Act. (Adopted 5/31/07) South Dakota SCR 7 Petitioning the United States Congress to repeal the Real ID Act. (Adopted 2/22/08) Tennessee HJR 285 Urges a two year extension of Real ID Act deadlines or a repeal of the Act in its entirety (Enacted 6/11/09) Texas HCR 148 Refusing to implement the federal Real ID Act of 2005. SCR 40 Opposing the federal REAL ID Act of 2005 as an unfunded mandate. Utah HR 4 Opposes the Real ID Act of 2005 and the implementation of a national ID card. (Enacted 3/2/09) Virginia

SB 1431 Prohibits compliance with Real ID provisions that compromise the privacy of residents. (Enacted 3/31/09) Washington SB 5087 (PDF) Opposing the implementation of the Real ID Act of 2005 in Washington State. (Enacted 4/18/07) SJM 8005 (PDF) Calling for the federal government to repeal the Real ID Act of 2005. Check t… Wisconsin AB 475 Relating to the issuance of motor vehicle operator’s licenses. Wyoming HJ 5 A joint resolution calling on Congress to repeal the law…

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7 states have passed Firearms Freedom Acts – nullifying some federal gun laws and regulations in their states.

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14 states have now passed laws nullifying unconstitutional federal laws on marijuana

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3 states have already passed Health Care Freedom Acts to ban federal health care mandates in their states.
Health Care Freedom Act
A reading of the Constitution through the original understanding of the Founders and Ratifiers makes it quite clear that any national health care plan, or national public option, is not something that was delegated by the People to the Federal Government in the Constitution. However, the courts, politicians and many commentators have interpreted (and re-interpreted) the Commerce Clause, the general Welfare Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause in ways not intended by the Founders so as to

justify such programs under the Constitution. They are most certainly wrong. The Health Care Freedom Act is considered in states as either a bill or a state constitutional amendment – effectively prohibiting the enactment of any new government-run healthcare programs within the state. While many of the bills have language similar to true nullification legislation, many of them are promoted solely as a vehicle to drive a federal court battle – which is not nullification in its true sense. CLICK HERE – for information on the “Federal Health Care Nullification Act” which directly nullifies the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” signed into law by Barack Obama on 03-23-10.

Bill Passed as Law: Utah, Idaho, Virginia Bill Introduced in state hoses: New Mexico, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, Maryland, Rhode Island, Florida, Oregon, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New Jersey, Delaware, Indiana Wisconsin, Iowa, Washington Bill passed in 1 or more of the state houses: Missouri, Arizona, Texas, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia Bill passed in both state houses: Nebraska, South Carolina, Idaho, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Alabama, Missouri, Tennessee, Louisiana, Kansas, Bill did not pass: Colorado, Minnesota, Kansas, New Hampshire, Mississippi, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Arkansas

*Bill has not been introduced yet: California, Vermont, North Carolina, Maine, Connecticut, Hawaii, Alaska, and Massachusetts

Citizens from the states that haven’t introduced the bill to nullify Obamacare, please contact your state legislators and implore them to take action to empower the state’s sovereignty rights immediately.
Citizens of states that did not pass the bill please contact your legislators to implore them to reconsider the bill to ascertain your state’ sovereignty rights.

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Other states are considering nullification laws on cap and trade, the misuse of state national guard troops, monetary policy and much more.
Cap and Trade Nullification Legislation
Cap and Trade is often claimed to be authorized under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. At best, this is a highly dubious claim. The power to regulate interstate commerce was delegated to the federal government in the Constitution. As understood at the time of the founding, the regulation of commerce was meant to empower Congress to regulate the buying and selling of products made by others (and sometimes land),

associated finance and financial instruments, and navigation and other carriage, across state jurisdictional lines. This interstate regulation of “commerce” did not include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, malum in se crime, or land use. Nor did it include activities that merely “substantially affected” commerce.

Bill introduced: Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Washington, Arizona

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Americans: Thank You for caring about your Homeland.

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