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PIPELINEINTEGRITYBASICS

PresentedbyDr.JohnF.Kiefner
June22,2011

Topics

ClassLocations1,2,3,and4
HighConsequenceAreas(HCAs)
PotentialImpactRadius(PIR)
ThreatstoPipelineIntegrity
MeansofMitigatingThreats

ReferenceDocuments
CodeofFederalRegulations,Title49,Part
192,(49CFR192) TransportationofNatural
andOtherGasByPipeline:MinimumFederal
SafetyRegulations
ASMEB31.8 2007GasTransmissionand
DistributionPipingSystems
ASMEB31.8S 2004ManagingSystem
IntegrityofGasPipelines
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CLASSLOCATIONS
Classlocationsareusedtoestablishdesign
factors(safetymargins).Theyarebasedon
populationdensity.Classlocationsare
definedin49CFR192,192.5

CLASSLOCATIONUNIT

Pipeline
220yds
220yds

OneMile

CLASS1
Anoffshorearea.
Classlocationunithas10orfewerbuildings
intendedforhumanoccupancy.
Eachseparatedwellingunitinamultipledwelling
unitbuildingiscountedasaseparatebuilding
intendedforhumanoccupancy.Thus,afour
familyapartmentwouldbeconsideredasfour
buildingsintendedforhumanoccupancy.
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Class2
Classlocationunithasmorethan10butfewer
than46buildingsintendedforhuman
occupancy.

CLASS3
Classlocationunithas46ormorebuildings
intendedforhumanoccupancy;or
Pipelinelieswithin100yardsofeithera
buildingorplaceofpublicassemblythatis
occupiedby20ormorepersonsonatleast5
daysaweekfor10weeksinany12month
period

Class4
Aclasslocationunitwherebuildingswithfour
ormorestoriesabovegroundareprevalent.

DESIGNFACTORS
Thedesignfactorsdeterminethemaximum
allowableoperatingstressinthepipeline.
Class1 72%ofSMYS
Class2 60%ofSMYS
Class3 50%ofSMYS
Class4 40%ofSMYS
whereSMYSstandsforspecifiedminimumyield
strengthofthepipe.
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RELATIONSHIPBETWEENPRESSUREAND
STRESS
Themaximumallowableoperatingpressure
(MAOP)inapipelineisrelatedtothe
maximumallowableoperatingstressbythe
Barlow formula.ForaClass1location:
MAOP=0.72*SMYS*2t/(D)
where:
Distheoutsidediameterofthepipeand
tisthewallthicknessofthepipe
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MAXIMUMALLOWABLEOPERATINGPRESSURE
(MAOP)
Forapipelinecomprisedof30inchoutside
diameter,0.375inchwallthickness,GradeX52
(52,000poundspersquareinchminimumyield
strength)steelpipe,theMAOPforeachclass
locationisasfollows:

Class1
Class2
Class3
Class4

936poundspersquareinch
780poundspersquareinch
650poundspersquareinch
520poundspersquareinch
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MINIMUMREQUIREDWALLTHICKNESS
Fora30inchoutsidediameterpipelinecomprised
ofX52steelpipethatisoperatedatanMAOPof
936poundspersquareinch,thewallthicknessof
thepipeforeachclasslocationwouldhavetobe:

Class1
Class2
Class3
Class4

0.375inch
0.450inch
0.540inch
0.675inch
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EFFECTOFPOPULATIONINCREASES
Inmostcasespopulationgrowththatwouldchange
aclasslocationunitbytwoclasslocationswould
requireinstallingnewpipewithgreaterwall
thicknessorreducingtheMAOPcommensurate
withthecurrentclasslocation.
Thus,ifthenumberofbuildingsinaClass1location
unitincreasesfrom10orlessto46ormore
(Class3location),theexistingpipewouldhaveto
bereplacedwithpipeof44%greaterwall
thicknessorthepressurewouldhavetobe
loweredbyjustover30%.
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HIGHCONSEQUENCEAREA
Theconceptofahighconsequenceareawas
developedjointlybypipelineindustryexperts
andfederalregulatorstodeterminetheparts
ofapipelinesystemwhereperiodicintegrity
assessmentsareneededtoprotectthepublic
andtheenvironment.

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HIGHCONSEQUENCEAREADEFINITION
AClass3orClass4location.
AnareainaClass1orClass2locationwhere
thepotentialimpactradiusisgreaterthan660
feet(220yards)andthepotentialimpact
circlecontains20ormorebuildingsintended
forhumanoccupancyoranidentifiedsite.

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IDENTIFIEDSITES
Outsideareasoccupiedby20ormorepeople
onatleast50daysinany12monthperiod.
Buildingsoccupiedby20ormorepeopleon
atleast5daysaweekfor10weeksinany12
monthperiod.
Afacilitysuchasahospitalwereevacuation
wouldbedifficult.

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POTENTIALIMPACTRADIUS(PIR)

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POTENTIALIMPACTRADIUS(PIR)
PIRisthedistancebeyondwhichaperson
standingoutsideinthevicinityofapipeline
ruptureandfirewouldhavea99%chanceof
surviving.
ThePIRincreasesasthediameterofthe
pipelineincreasesandasthepressureinthe
pipelineincreases.

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EXAMPLESOFPIRs
Diameter,
inches
16
30
36

Pressure,
psig
1440
1000
1000

PIR,
Feet
419
654
786

PIR,
Yards
140
218
262

PIR=0.69*(diameter)*(pressure)0.5

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Whatisapipelineintegritythreat?
Aconditionorsetofcircumstances
that,ifnotmitigated,couldcausea
pipelinetofail.

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THEFIRSTLINEOFDEFENCEAGAINST
INTEGRITYTHREATS

DesignbyASMEStandards
Selectgoodlinepipematerials
Providecompetentsupervisionandinspection
Coatandcathodicallyprotectthepipeline
Conductanappropriatepreservicehydrostatic
test
Maintainandinspectthepipelineinservice
Protectthepipelinefromoutsideforces
Operatethepipelinesafely
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TIMEDEPENDENTTHREATS
Threat

External
Corrosion
Internal
Corrosion
StressCorrosion
Cracking

PercentageofSignificant
PipelineIncidentsbetween
1991and2010
9.9%
12.9%
1.0%
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TIMESTABLETHREATS
Threat

Manufacturing
Defects
Construction
andFabrication
Defects

PercentageofSignificant
PipelineIncidentsbetween
1991and2010
3.4%
3.3%

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RANDOMTHREATS

Threat

Mechanical
Damage
Equipment
Failure
Incorrect
Operations

PercentageofSignificant
PipelineIncidentsbetween
1991and2010
23.4%
13.3%
1.8%
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RANDOMTHREATS(continued)

Threat

Forcesof
Nature
Miscellaneous
&Unknown

PercentageofSignificant
PipelineIncidentsbetween
1991and2010
11.8%
18.9%

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MITIGATIONOFTIMEDEPENDENTTHREATS
Indentifyapplicablethreats
Prioritizesegmentsbyperceivedseverity
Conducttheappropriateassessmentsto
determinetheconditionsofthesegments
Repairinjuriousdefects
Calculatetimestofailureforanomaliesthatwere
notsevereenoughtorequirerepair
Reassesswellbeforethetimestofailureare
reached,repairinjuriousdefects,andrecalculate
thetimestofailure
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ASSESSMENTMETHODS

ILI
HT
ECDA
ICDA
SCCDA

NDE

inlineinspectionwithsmart pig
hydrostatictest
externalcorrosiondirectassessment
internalcorrosiondirectassessment
stresscorrosioncrackingdirect
assessment
nondestructiveexaminationofan
exposedorabovegroundcomponent
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LIMITATIONSONASSESSMENTMETHODS
Pipelinemustbepiggable touseILI
ILItechnologynotyetreliableforalltypesof
anomalies
Somesegmentscannotbetakenoutof
serviceforHT
ECDA,ICDA,andSCCDAeachonlyapplyto
onesinglethreatalthoughECDAcanbe
effectiveforfindingpriorexcavationdamage
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ASSESSMENTMETHODSFORTIMEDEPENDENT
THREATS
Threat
External
Corrosion
Internal
Corrosion
Environmental
Cracking

AssessmentMethods
ILI,ECDA,HT
ILI,ICDA,HT
ILI,SCCDA,HT

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ASSESSMENTMETHODSFORTIMESTABLE
THREATS
Threat
Manufacturing
Defects
Construction
andFabrication
Defects

AssessmentMethods
HT,ILI
HT,NDE

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MITIGATIONOFTIMESTABLETHREATS
Goodpreservicehydrostatictest
Nondestructiveinspectionofweldsduring
constructionandfabrication

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MITIGATIONOFRANDOMTHREATS

Threat
Mechanical
Damage
Equipment
Failure
Incorrect
Operations

MitigationMethods
Onecallsystem,markers,
publicawareness,patrolling
Periodicinspectionand
maintenance
Operatortrainingand
qualification

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MITIGATIONOFRANDOMTHREATS(continued)

Threat
Forcesof
Nature
Miscellaneous
&Unknown

MitigationMethods
Patrollingandmonitoring
Mitigationcannotbedefined
unlessthethreatisknown

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QUESTIONS?

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