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Koha Digest # 135


Date: 5 February 1997




In the center of Belgrade, there is a building called "Palata Albanija", the highest peak of the
town at the beginning of this century. For Albanians that would go to Belgrade, this was an
automatic sign of sympathy, because of the name, but its other meaning was forgotten. For
many years there was the need to remember the marching of the Serbian army through
Albania in WWI, what the Serbs call the "Albanian golgota", meanwhile Albanians
narratively say "When the Shkja got in".

These days, the building is witnessing the protests and is often filmed by the cameras that
wish to capture the opposition leaders. In the same way this building is being ignored by the
journalists (finally, this is not important for the demonstrations), the anti-Milosevic
opposition is not mentioning the Albanian question and Kosova.

In fact, even when it was mentioned, it was referred to in the negative context. Starting from
the demonstrators' calls to the police "Go to Kosova" (the message: don't beat us, there are
others to beat there) and going up to the many variations of one of the leaders, Djindjic, that
Milosevic is capable of selling- out Kosova (message: the opposition will know how to better
defend the idea of Greater Serbia).

Naturally, this mood is contrary to the aura of the students revolt that, with its creativity,
insists to project a new political content, that of building a civic society. But this too is part of
the Serb contradictions: as big is the difference between Milosevic and the opposition, that
big is the difference between the concept of the building of a civic society and the concept of
a large part of the opposition.

The influential part has decided not to declare itself about any important matter at the
beginning of the protests, first of all Kosova, because, they said, the regime would misuse this
is its medial campaign. Nevertheless, as the time passes by, the statements of the opposition
leaders do not encourage those that think that this opposition is against the politics of
Milosevic and not only Milosevic as a person.

Serbia passed through the phase of collective chauvinism in the past decade, but the
opposition is not doing much to prove that its efforts are against the bases of Milosevic's

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
Besides the bases of state economy, oligarchic communist administration, there is also the
basis of Serbia's expansion. Kosova has repeated the opinions that "the opposition is worse
than Milosevic", partially inspired by the opposition's actions. Some of these voices would
say the same thing even if the opposition would have a differentiated posture, simply because
of the inertia or because of misunderstanding, and the lack of understanding of Milosevic's
politics. Maybe with the pluralism of the Serbian society and the Kosovar one we are entering
a phase in which one understands that the problems between Serbia and Kosova are much
more complicated than they seem at first sight. And maybe the sole process of understanding
of both sides could ease the complication.



by REMZI LANI / Tirana

Albania is experiencing the most serious crisis since the fall

of communism six years ago. For over one week, the country has
been captivated by a wave of protests of thousands of citizens
that have lost their savings in the pyramidal schemes. Almost all
main towns of Albania had become rings of clashes between the
police and the people, meanwhile tens of official buildings have
been burned down. The scenes of violence have been especially
dramatic in the towns of Lushnje, Berat and Vlorë, where the
deceived demonstrators have protested several days in a row by
blocking the roads that link the capital with the South and have
burned almost all the buildings of the government and the ruling
Democratic Party. Almost 100 policemen have been injured in the
clashes, but there is no data on the number of the injured on the
side of the demonstrators.

The demonstrators blame Berisha's government for having lost

their money in the pyramidal schemes which expanded in Albania
as in no other former communist country, including Russia and

The calculation is that around 1 billion dollars have been

invested in almost 10 companies, which offered interests that
ranged between 8 and 25 percent per month. The government was
forced to undertake measures to close-down some of these
companies, immediately following the bankruptcy of Tirana's #1
pawnbroker, a romany called Sude, which had a turnover worth 60
million dollars. The bosses of two of the most famous companies,
"Xhaferri" and "Populli" have been arrested, while their existing
capitals in Albanian banks have been blocked. The government
claims that around 300 million dollars have been blocked and will
be paid back to the citizens.

But, the measures taken by the Government have not been able to
stop the people's revolt. Moreover, the arrest of the bosses has
caused the harshest protests in Albania since 1990/91, when
demonstrations against the communist regime took place. Started
with the slogan "We want our money", the protests escalated with
slogans against the government and Berisha proper. A large number
of people have lost their money in the pyramidal schemes, not
only their savings but also their houses. The government is to
blame because it has encouraged the schemes and has not protected
the citizens from the enormous fraud. The chairman of the DP, and
Albania's foreign minister Shehu, who had gone to Lushnje to calm
down the protesters faced the mass of enraged people that beat
him, mistreated him and finally took him hostage several hours.
This only proves the anarchy the country is living and the loss
of credibility of the actual government.

Facing an unforseen challenge and the increasing dissatisfaction,

the Government was forced to promise to start paying back the
money on 5 February. Premier Meksi has tried to calm down the
disappointed citizens by saying that a large part of their
savings will be covered.

But, the promises have not been sufficient to calm down the
aggressiveness of the people. The Albanian Parliament, dominated
in its 90% by members of the DP and which has no Socialist
opposition, has adopted, in an extraordinary session, a decision
by which it authorizes President Berisha to use, in extraordinary
circumstances, the military troops to protect the state buildings
and the national highways.

Sources inside the DP claim that, in a four-hour long meeting

with DP's parliamentarian group, Berisha was intensively
pressured by his MPs to proclaim the state of emergency. He
refused to do this and the compromise formula was to apply a
partial measure - the use of the military for the protection of
the buildings and roads. The past events have deteriorated the
political situation in the country. The ruling party and the
opposition are exchanging harsh replies, accusing one-another of
being responsible of the created chaos.

Meksi accused what he called "the red bands" for being the cause
of the wave of violence in the country. On the other hand, DP's
chairman, Tritan Shehu said that the "opposition was using the
people's misfortune to destabilize the country".

The opposition, weakened and divided after the local elections

held in October, has supported the peoples' protest. In the
meeting organized in the capital, the main opposition parties
have officially asked the resignation of the government. They
have suggested the creation of a technical government and

afterwards the celebration of new general elections. The
opposition has criticized the use of the military forces to keep
the calm in the country.

In fact, the opposition that could have gained the support that
it has never had before, has not had a clear posture about the
pyramidal schemes. They had become so massive and popular in
Albania, that talking against them would mean turning people
against oneself. Even, when IMF warned of the risk the expansion
of the schemes meant, the opposition parties chose to be quiet.
But, in the meantime they have accused the ruling party for using
the money of the pyramidal schemes to finance the electoral
campaigns. But, all accusations were denied by the DP.

The proposal for a technical government was replied to by a huge

"no" by the ruling party and has not very many chances to
succeed. Even if it would be accepted, it would represent many
question marks even for the opposition. If Berisha would do that
would the opposition acknowledge a government that would take the
mandate from a parliament it doesn't recognize and that it is
boycotting? Would this mean that the opposition would come back
to the parliament?

The crisis in Albania is economic as much as it is political.

It's difficulty relies on the fact that there is no chance to pay
back the money to all the people, in conditions when the
opposition, more than a partner is a political decoration.
Holding over 90% of the central and local power, the ruling party
must, alone, overcome the blind protests.

Besides many other problems, Berisha's government faces another

big one: how to treat the people's protests. Differing from last
year's images of the police beating the opposition leaders, this
time the police proved to be very tolerant, and it even allowed
the state buildings to be burned. One shouldn't forget the fact
that similar to other citizens of Albania, the policemen
themselves have invested their money in the schemes, and are
reluctant to use their batons.

In fact, right now the streets of Albania are flooded with the
economic opposition - which has been missing in Albania in the
past four years. The fast economic changes, the increase of
living standard compared to the past, the great influx of money
from the emigration, the smuggling and especially the pyramidal
schemes had left the opposition the only chance to complain about
human rights, about Berisha's attitude or Nano's incarceration.
In the past two electoral campaigns, no one spoke of taxes and
money, but only about Berisha and his rival Nano. It is hard to
foresee what will tomorrow look like. Berisha has lost his
psychological fortress, the "Skënderbej" square, where the

opposition managed to protest for the first time after four

The presence of the army on the streets of the country has

stopped the wave of destruction, and maybe the beginning of the
payback on 5 February, as promised, could bring at least a calm
of hopes.




Many people in Tirana believe that IMF is also to blame for the
pawnbroking crisis that has mesmerized Albania now. IMF's office
in Tirana has been silent for four years, meanwhile the cancerous
metastasis of the informal market was catching up all the cells
of the Albanian economy. Moreover, IMF tried to present the post-
communist Albania as the place where the economic reformations
recommended by IMF have been the most efficient compared to all
other Eastern countries. The local press had often referred to
Albania's government as "IMF's government", having in mind its
almost blind trust on all recommendations coming from this

In the meantime, any serious investment is the country of the

eagles had been buried thanks to the pawnbrokers. Rumanian
"Caritas" or the Russian "MMM" didn't manage to spread on the
whole territory or to attract large amounts of money as in
Albania. But, as the epidemics of the schemes caught the state,
IMF was either silent or speaking at very low voice.
Albanian foreign minister Shehu stated in his last press
conference, that IMF had warned the Albanian government about the
schemes only in the last round of negotiations.

Although in an agreement reached with IMF, it was foreseen that

the latter would supervise Albania's macrofinances, its office
in Tirana is accused now for being silent and flirting with the

The Government has always accepted all formulas proposed by IMF,

including the close-down of non-rentable enterprises, which
created a huge number of unemployed. On the other hand, the grey
eminence of finances, silently approved of the informal market
of Albania, maybe as a compensation for the obedience of the good
pupil. The offices of pyramidal schemes remained opened close to
the seat of IMF's representation in Tirana.

But, last autumn, it became evident that the flirt had gone just
too far. The pyramids had buried 1,2 billion Lekë, almost four
times the budget of the state. IMF preferred again not to put out
the dirty laundry, but opted to send a letter to Berisha telling
him of the catastrophic consequences of the schemes. IMF hoped
that the country that had been given so much publicity would be
able to recuperate, but it seems that this reaction came post-

Everything that came afterwards rolled-down fast. The fall of one

of the schemes stopped the deposits in the others, and this
caused the bankruptcy chain-reaction. This time, decided to
listen to IMF's suggestion, the government tried to save what it
could by freezing 300 million dollars in Albanian banks, that it
has promised to pay to the people.

Now, IMF's officials in Tirana have come out from their silent
ivory tower and started making statements to the press: "IMF will
do everything it can to help-out the Albanian government in this
crisis", said John King, IMF's representative in Tirana.

But, many think that the government's encouragement and IMF's

silence have led towards the fraud.

Accused of being part of the plot, IMF seems to be determined to

technically assist the government to find less hurting solutions
for a country that is headed to chaos. The elegant portfolio of
IMF's officials is paradoxically being protected by the military,
that are also protecting the state buildings.

And as the storm of protests of thousands of deceived seems to

fade, a new storm threatens: inflation. Several days before 5
February when the Government has promised the payback will start,
the Lek is losing its value.

If the 300 million dollars come back to the people's hands fast,
then the economists evaluate that inflation will rise and thus
cause the increase of the prices. And, while all talk about the
sacred day of payback, no one remembers the back of the moon,
which doesn't seem to be that illuminated.



by YLBER HYSA / Prishtinë

After a relatively short time since the attempt against Papovic,

and a series of killings in Kosova, the Serbian police undertook
a wide campaign of arrests and raids. Only within some days, the
number of the arrested reached 26 (situation on January 29).
The raids started as a well planned campaign and they were done
simultaneously in different towns of Kosova: Prishtinë,
Mitrovicë, Lipjan, Deçan, Gllogovc, etc. According to the
information, the police had registered the houses of the arrested
and acted quite harshly by turning everything upside down. The
raided and the arrested, are political activists of the LDK, the
Social-Democrats, UNIKOMB or human rights activists, members of
the CDHRF, students, season's workers employed abroad, former
political prisoners. A wide spectre of people. Some of them were
previously known as political activists, even from times of
illegality, some of them are related to the mortal victims of the
police. But, nothing has a special meaning a priori, although the
police and the Serbian media hurried to proclaim them
"terrorists" even before any trial. Thus, daily "Jedinstvo",
based on the communique issued by the police claims that one of
the arrested, Avni Klinaku is member of the "terrorist
organization, the `National Liberation Movement of Kosova'", and
that he has been heading the "highest body of this terrorist
organization" since 1991, and that since 1993 he is fugitive. It
is further added that there is grounded suspicion that Klinaku
and his followers had organized terrorist groups aiming at
attacking vital objects and people in Kosova, thus preparing the
armed insurrection. The communique further states that "many arms
and ammunition of different calibre were found during the
searches, as well as many plans to attack buildings and other
means to commit terrorist attacks. The organs of persecution are
still working on the enlightenment of their incriminating
activities", concludes the communique issued by the Informing
Service of the MIA of Serbia.

On this occasion, it is not stated whether the blueprints and

other means for committing new attacks were found in the houses
of the raided, in other raids or otherwise. But, a priori, the
arrested are identified as members of "a terrorist organization".
Police sources claim that they confiscated arms from Begzat
Baliu, former political prisoner, who was also arrested in this

The Province of Bolzano has primary powers in most of the
economic, political and cultural sectors. The province has the
power to issue legislative provisions on the following matters:
artisanship, tourism, agriculture, mining, town-planning and
urban development plans, public welfare and benefits, toponyms,
local customs and cultural institutions, nursery schooling,
vocational training.

The secondary powers exercised by the Province of Bolzano cover,

amongst other things; commerce, shops, and businesses, promoting
industrial production, sanitation and health, apprenticeships and
primary and secondary education. Only in matter concerning the
army, the legal system, postal services and telecommunications,
the tax system (at least in part), and foreign policy does the
Province possess solely he power to supplement or to execute
measures issued by the central government. Besides these powers
the Province has equally broad and detailed provisions regarding
the financial basis of its autonomy. With few exceptions, the
province's administrative competencies derive directly from the
legislative powers described above, and they consequently cover
the same broad range of subjects. However, in legal matters the
Province of Bolzano is subordinated to the jurisdiction of the
central state, apart from the institution of an autonomous
section of the regional court of administrative justice. The
Statute also defines the means to resolve possible conflicts
between the two institutions: recourse may be made to the
Constitutional Court in the case of laws issued by the Province
(and also by the Region) as well as by the Republic.

Regarding the cohabitation of Italians and South Tyroleans within

the Province of Bolzano, the regulations seek to give balanced
consideration to both ethnic groups on the basis of a broad set
of rules providing for rotation, parity, proportionality,
differentiation and, not least, ethnic control. For example, with
the exception of the President of the provincial Executive
Council, the rules for ethnic rotation apply to all political
offices within the Province (and the Region); the rules of ethnic
parity apply mainly to the joint use of Italian and German as
official languages (only in the army is Italian used
exclusively); the rules of ethnic proportionality apply inter
alia to civil servants and at the political level, to the
composition of the Provincial Executive Council. These
regulations, which seek to guarantee balanced consideration to
both ethnic groups within their common institutions, are
supplemented by a broad system of institutions differentiated
according to ethnic criteria, mainly cultural in nature. In the
educational system, this parallelism of structures does not
include distinct schools in which teaching is carried out in the
respective languages by mother-tongue teachers (with the
complementary and obligatory teaching of the second language),

but also parallel structures of school administration. In order
to avoid marginalization of the parliamentary minority, which
usually forms along ethnic lines, in legislative, administrative
and budgetary matters, the Statute establishes a supervisory and
guarantee system which operates at various levels:

- differentiated voting according to ethnic group;

- the creation of committees composed in equal parts by the two

ethnic groups convened to resolve controversies;

- application to the above-mentioned Autonomous Section of the

regional court of administrative justice;

- recourse to the Constitutional Court as court of last resort,

at least as far as the national context is concerned.


Controversies in the debate over the redefinition of the autonomy

of Kosova are evolving from the model initiated in the year 1974,
which gave this province broad legislative, administrative and
judicial authorities under the constitutional reforms in
Yugoslavia and Serbia. With a few exceptions, the status of this
autonomous province was equal with the Yugoslav Republics,
including its direct representation in the Federation bypassing
Serbia. Such a status for a province which formally was part of
the Republic of Serbia, created a "constitutional paradox" - the
Province participated in the Republic's legislative process, but
was not obliged to implement the laws passed by it. Such
asymmetry in relations of the Republic with her provinces
("patronage of the provinces over the republic") caused a
political revolt already at the end of the '70s, whilst the '80s
brought about political conflicts and changes in the status of
Kosova. The "constitutional paradox" can only be explained by the
character of the Yugoslav political system at the time, when
constitutional solutions and institutions of the political regime
were mostly facade for the single-party rule and crucial
political decisions were passed by communists who made the
political elite. The solutions from 1974 functioned as long as
the power of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia existed, that
is as long as Josip Broz Tito had the role of indisputable
arbiter. Hardly a year following his death, Albanian mass
demonstrations broke out in Kosova, demanding that this Serbian
province be given the status of a seventh Yugoslav republic and
the right to external self-determination (that is, secession from
the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia as well), as was guaranteed
to the federal republics under the 1974 Constitution in the
spirit of the Leninist doctrine of federalism. The autonomous

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status of 1974 can, therefore, hardly be a basis for seeking a
solution for the future status of Kosova. For the Serbs, it is
threat to Serbia's existence as a State, whereas for the
Albanians it does not fulfil the objective which the national
movement in the Province has set itself, i.e., national self-
determination and secession. In other words, the current dilemma
is the (still) infrequent deliberations concerning the
redefinition of autonomy for Kosova, between "1974 minus" (that
is, autonomy without the facets of statehood), and "1974 plus"
(namely, autonomy with greater features of the state), is
misleading because the Leninist model of federalism belongs to
the past not only in Yugoslavia, but in all the Eastern European
countries as well.

Under the present circumstances, a model for Kosova's future

autonomy should be sought among existing European models of
internal self-determination of ethnic communities, among which
the South Tyrolean model could in many ways be an interesting
point of departure for a Serbian-Albanian dialogue on the
redefinition of autonomy for Serbia's southern province. In this
respect, one should point out the following aspects:

First of all, the Tyrolean problem has a history of violence on

both sides and it is only after World War II and after Italy
begun its democratic development, that political conditions were
created for a compromise solution to the problem. There is
widespread opinion in Serbia that the solution to the ethnic
dispute in Kosova is precondition for the democratization of
Serbia, and also that a lasting settlement of Serb-Albanian
relations is only possible in a democratic Serbia. As long as
Kosova continues to be a latent threat to the country's security,
the presence of strong military forces and police detachments
will be called for, and shall constitute the basis of
authoritarian political ideas, movements and undemocratic
practices in the country. The main test of the democratic
commitments of both Serbian and Albanian post-communist political
parties and movements, will be their readiness to establish
dialogue and begin searching for compromises that would prevent
further escalation of the problem and open the way to its
solution. Simply, the democratization of society as a whole is -
both in the case of Tyrol and of Kosova - a conditio sine qua
non for the solution of ethnic problems, whilst the protection
of individual human rights is the basis of every policy for the
protection of the collective rights of ethnic communities.
Considering the significantly greater segment of ethnic Albanians
in Yugoslavia's population (16,5%), than the German speaking
Tyroleans constitute in the population of Italy (0,5%), there is
a need to ensure a much stronger Albanian representation in the
political systems of Serbia and Yugoslavia, where Kosova is
concerned. If demographic trends are taken into account, the

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question arises whether, by the middle of the next century,
Serbia may not become a bi-national state like Belgium, Canada,

Secondly, economic motives were also behind both these ethnic

conflicts. The South Tyrolean problem could be solved, among
other things, because of the province's economic development in
the last few decades. In such circumstances, provisions under the
Statute of Autonomy relating to tax revenues of the Province of
Bolzano have economic substance, as the province is capable of
generating taxable income to finance its own autonomy. Kosova
differs a great deal from South Tyrol: Although former Yugoslavia
had invested considerable resources into the province (over US$
5 million daily during the '80s), it still remains, even today,
the least economically developed region in the country. Among the
most important reasons for the failure of those investments was
the misguided development policy which aimed at promoting capital
intensive industries in a backward region, rich in labor
resources and natural wealth, but extremely poor in capital.
Economic backwardness, traditional mobility and entrepreneurship
of the Albanians, and the liberal migration policy of Yugoslavia
had in the '60s and '70s, were the reasons for the emigration of
several hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians to Western
European countries (mostly Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland,
and so on), and to the United States where they have formed a
compact and economically strong diaspora. Thus, were Yugoslavia
to become a market oriented, open country, this would greatly
benefit Kosova where 85% of private capital is already in the
hands of the Albanians, and the tension in the relationships
between the two ethnic communities would be appeased.

The international setting is likewise of great importance for

resolving both these problems. In the case of Italy,
internationalization of the problem in 1969, was the main thing
that contributed to approval of "package" (pachetto) and its 137
measures ruling on the autonomy of South Tyrol, as recommended
in a resolution of the United Nations. However, the dispute was
not really resolved until 1992 when Italy's interests as a member
of the European Union and Austria, as a candidate-country for
membership in the EU, came to the point where both countries saw
the necessity of totally removing this problem which was spoiling
their mutual relations. Italy's and Austria's membership in the
Union substantially altered the status of ethnic communities in
South Tyrol, without any need for the formal rectification of the
border: Implementation of the Schengen Agreement will eventually
do away with all obstacles to the circulation of people across
the Italian-Austrian frontier, while the Union's regional policy
will make up for the creation of a Euroregion embracing both
North and South Tyrol. The combination of internal self-
determination which the autonomous status of South Tyrol

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incorporates, Italy and Austria's membership in the EU and
Union's regional policy, is the framework within which the "Tyrol
Model" became possible and represents a success story. In the
case of Kosova, none of these conditions are present: Current
policy doesn't give the Albanians either external or internal
self-determination; neither is Yugoslavia nor is Albania a member
of the EU (for that matter, both of these countries are at the
bottom of the list of candidates for membership), whilst
relations between the two countries are cold and still burdened
by innumerable limitations that are quite obsolete.

The solution of the Kosova problem, shall, therefore depend on

the change of such a situation and the creation of a surrogate
for the membership in the EU, such as, for instance, is being
proposed with the "regional approach" to the EU, and United
States' SECI: "A substantial solution to the Kosova problem, to
be reached peacefully and in line with Albanian demands for self-
determination, can be envisaged only within the framework of a
political and territorial reshuffling of the entire region that
would involve all the interested states and would result in a
common accord. The prospect of a Balkan Federation, to be
established for such a purpose (or, actually, extension of the
Confederation of Western states to incorporate the Balkan
region), has its own legitimacy as a long term ideal, but any
realistic assessment of it as this stage cannot be but a most
hypothetical scenario to be considered in relation to future


Of the three possible solutions to the problem of Kosova -

prolongation of the current status quo, internal and external
self-determination - redefinition of the region's autonomous
status is the most likely at this time. Although there are still
many among Serbia's political elite and public opinion who favor
the status quo, growing awareness that its political and economic
unacceptably high and that, in the long run, could jeopardize the
future of both Serbia and Yugoslavia, indicates the need for
finding other options directed at recognizing either external
self-determination for the Albanians. On the other hand, although
the political parties and public opinion of the Kosovar Albanians
continue to stand firmly on their maximalistic positions - their
demand for external self-determination - they are aware that they
do not have the backing of the international community and that
any attempt at realizing their aim would lead to armed
conflict/war with Serbia which would have tragic consequences for
the people of both nations. The end of war in Croatia and B&H,
the Dayton Accords and normalization of the situation in the area
of former Yugoslavia, shows that the Kosovar Albanians would be

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politically marginalized even more were they to persist with
their maximalistic aims, and would deprive them of the
possibility to reach a compromise now when Serbia is, itself,
going through deep political transformations. The political feuds
which are taking place now among the Albanian leaders -
especially between Adem Demaçi and Ibrahim Rugova - are probably
an expression of this political dilemma, in the same way that all
the more numerous terrorist acts against Serbs, or Albanians
loyal to the Serbian authorities, in Kosova, show the nervousness
of the champions of radical solutions.

In these circumstances, the point of consensus could be the

application of the Europe's current principle of internal self-
determination, and the "Tyrolean Model" certainly has its values
in this respect, as a possible basis for dialogue between the
Serbs and Albanians. A lengthy and laborious process undertaken
by democratically elected, legitimate representatives of the
Serbs and the Albanians, will be required to reach a suitable
model for future autonomy of the Kosova region. This is the only
way to avoid being trapped in the way the creators of the '74
communist constitution had done, by imposing such autonomy as
neither the Serbs nor the Albanians had ever accepted. A new
autonomous status for Kosova, should, therefore, contain
provisions not only with regard to the relations between the
Albanians and the Serbs of the region (with all the norms
required to protect the non-Albanian population), but the
relationships between the province, the Republic of Serbia and
the Federation (avoiding the "Constitutional paradox" of 1974).
recognition of the right of internal self-determination of the
Kosovar Albanians would mean that they would express their
loyalty to the state whose citizens they are and in which they
live, and assume their share of responsibility for its economic,
cultural and political development. No matter how distant this
appear to be at this moment, it could be a possibility that might
manifest itself within the broader settlement in South Eastern
Europe, as well as the common desire of the people of the entire
region - Serbs and Albanians included - for the "European option"
(the recent agreements Hungary concluded in connection with
minority issues with Slovakia and Rumania, indicate that such
options are not unrealistic in the given conditions). To what
extent will such an option be open for solution of the Kosova
problem, shall depend in a great measure upon the readiness of
the European Union and the United States to support them with
practical economic and political commitments.

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