You are on page 1of 6

People v.

G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 72
FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the RTC convicting appellant Roel Encinada of
Illegal Transpotation of prohibited drugs from Surigao City to Cebu, under Sec. 4 of
R.A. 6425 as amended by BP 179.
SPO4 Bolonia received a tip from an informant (4:00pm) that the appellant
Encinada would be arriving in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet
Pearl bringing with him marijuana. They were not able to secure warrant of arrest
because the office was already closed. However, they still decided to pursue the
apprehension of the appellant.
Morning of May 21,1992, when M/V Sweet Pearl docked SPO4 Bolonia with
his team followed the appellant carrying two small colored plastic chairs and
boarded a tricycle. The appellant was chased and ordered the driver to stop, they
inspect the plastic chairs and discovered that a package was place between; tearing
the package they were convinced that it is marijuana because of the smell. They
apprehended the appellant brought him to the police station and in the presence of
a member of the local media, they opened the package and saw that indeed it
contains dried leaves of marijuana.
ISSUE: a) WON the evidence sufficiently shows the possession of marijuana by
b) WON the search on the person and belongings of the appellant valid.
HOLDING: SC ruled that proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the
prosecution of Illegal drug case; it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants
The court ruled acquitting the appellant, it reiterates the constitutional
proscription that evidence seized without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in
any proceeding. A guild of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an illegal
search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means.
In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the
policemen. Moreover, the Lawmen did not have personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search
cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence
information is not sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.
People vs Januario
7 February 1997 | Ponente: Panganiban
Overview: Januario and Canape were involved in carnapping. Their involvement
varies from different versions of what happened. They gave verbal confessions to
the crime, which was only later on executed through a written statement and as
assisted by counsel. This was considered inadmissible since it was a fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Topic: Police Investigation; Exclusionary rule/ Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
Statement of the Case:
- This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC in Cavite, which held Rene
Januario and Efren Canape guilty of violation of Sec. 14 last sentence of RA

6539, known as the Anti-Carnapping Law. Santiago Cid, in the same decision,
is acquitted for lack of evidence.
7 November 1988: Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Velasco, Jr. filed against
Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos
for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law
4 September 1987: Januario and Canape, with Sarita and Sarinos, after
stabbing driver Geronimo Malibago and conductor Andrew Patriarca, took one
Isuzu passenger type jeep owned by Doris and Victor Wolf.
7 February 1989: Januario and Canape pleaded not guilty.
30 May 1989: Cid pleaded not guilty.
Sarita and Sarinos remain at large.

Statement of Facts:
- Vicente Pons story:
o March 1988: Cid went to the house of prosecution witness Vicente
Pons, Cid's cousin. He asked Pons if he wanted to buy a jeep. Pons said
he had no money but he could look for a buyer who can pay 50,000.
o So Pons offered to look for a buyer provided that Cid would entrust the
jeep to him.
o He offered it to Myrna Temporas who agreed to buy it for 65,000, which
later became 48,500 only.
- Myrna Temporas story:
o According to her, Pons told her that the jeep belonged to her niece,
Doris Wolf.
o Pons, upon Doris Wolf's instruction, borrowed from Myrna 48,500 and
used the jeep as collateral.
o Pons failed to pay back the 48,500, and also failed to produce a deed
of sale covering the jeep. Myrna filed a complaint. She just found out
during the complaint that the driver and the conductor of the jeep had
been killed by kidnappers.

Upon NBI's investigation, they found that the carnapping of the jeep and the
killing of the driver and the conductor were done by Januario, Canape, Sarita
and Sarinos. The jeep was disposed of through Cid.

From an oral investigation of Januario and Canape, NBI found out that the
driver and the conductor were killed inside a sugar plantation. A lawyer who
was just around, Atty. Carlos Saunar, was asked to assist the two during the

Confession of Januario:
o Januario said that 2 weeks before September, he was in the house of
Canape to procure chicken and kalawit for his business. He also went
there because his new friends, Sarita and Samera, with Canape,
wanted him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He asked for a photo of the
jeep but he was told that he'll have it later that night after they have
drinks at Toto's house.
o At about 5am, the group hailed a jeep. Here, Januario described how
Canape, Sarita and Sarinos tied up the conductor and the driver of the
jeep and took control of the vehicle. The jeep stopped after a while,
and brought the conductor and driver down a sugar plantation.
Januario described how he heard growls, but did not witness what
happened. He also saw the bloodied hand Sarita and Sarinos.
o Upon reaching Libmanan, Januario said they went to Cid with whom
Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. He got
1,000 cash and rice and eggs worh 600.
Januario signed this statement and swore berfore NBI Executive Director
Salvador Ranin. Also signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar as counsel.

Confession of Canape:

Sarita and Sarinos told him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He looked for
a buyer with Januario. They saw Cid as an interested buyer.
o They told Sarita and Sarinos about it. They drank, then at 5am, hailed
a jeep, wrote it and was asked by Sarita and Sarinos to take out a knife
and point at the driver and conductor of the jeep.
o They stopped at a certain point. Januario, Sarita and Sarinos brought
the driver and the conductor down the jeep at a sugar plantation, with
Sarita later saying that everything was already fixed "Ayos na".
o After this, they went to Cid and gave the jeep to him for 25,000.
o He also said that Cid and Pons knew that the jeep was just going to be
stolen. He also admitted that he himself knew that when they were
looking for a buyer, the jeep they will be selling will also be just stolen.
Canape signed, subscribed and swore to this statement.

12 September 1989: Prosecution offered evidence, which the court admitted.

Defense manifested its intention to file a demurrer to evidence.
21 November 1989: Since defense has not presented Cid yet, the court
ordered the cancellation of his bail bond and gave his surety 30 days within
which to show cause why judgement against the bond should not be
22 December 1989: Court issued an order stating that the demurrer to
evidence may not be allowed anymore for failure to appear at the scheduled
26 December 1989: Defense mailed a demurrer to evidence or motion to
dismiss on insufficiency of evidence.
10 January 1990: Trial Court dismissed the motion, since the demurrer failed
to contain a compelling reason to recall the previous order.
6 February 1990: The court issued an order considering the cases terminated
against Januario and Canape, but granted a reservation to present evidence
as regards Cid.
9 March 1990: Defense presented Cid as witness. He said that a certain Raul
Repe, Toto Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him about the sale of a jeep.
He referred them to Vicente Pons who he thought would buy the jeep.
27 March 1990: The court denied defense counsels motion to cancel the
hearing that day. Since Atty. Saunar was present, the trial court ordered that
his testimony be heard that day. Here, Saunar said that Atty. Vela, an NBI
agent, approached him. Vela, along with Atty. Toribio told him that Januario,
Canape and Sid verbally confessed to participation in a crime, and they were
about the execute their sworn statements, so they needed his assistance.
Saunar agreed and explained to the three the consequences of their
confession. He told them their constitutional rights, the Miranda rights,
specifically. Prosecution reminded the court that Saunar cant be presented as
witness, so they consider him only as additional evidence for the prosecution
and/or rebuttal testimony.
11 May 1990: Defense manifested that it was closing its case.

1. Was the admission of the testimony of Atty. Carlos Saunar proper?
2. Were the extra judicial confessions of Januario and Canape admissible as



- Rule 119 of the Rules of Court shows the order of trial. The order is
followed, but strict observance of the rules depends upon the
circumstances of the case, at the discretion of the trial judge.
Therefore, the court may allow the prosecutor to still present
involuntarily omitted evidence. Saunar's testimony was considered as a
rebuttal witness with respect to Cid, so it was considered.
- Atty. Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial
investigation counsel.
- Even if he can be considered as a competent counsel, he is not

independent because at that time, he was applying for a

position in the NBI, so his loyalty would not be to the accused
but to NBI.
Section 12(1) of Article II of the Constitution states that admission of
facts related to a crime must be obtained with assistance of counsel,
otherwise it would be inadmissible. An admission, under Section 26 of
Rule 130 is "an act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact". This is different from a confession, which is defined in Section 33
as a "declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt of the offense.
Januario and Canape made verbal admissions of complicity in
the crime. But such verbal admissions must be made with
assistance of counsel. They were not made with assistance of
counsel when they made it in Naga City.
People vs Alicando: There is a "libertarian exclusionary rule
known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, where once the
primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully
attained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit)
derived from it is also inadmissible.

People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)

posted in CONLAW2 cases by katcobing
Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was
to take care of Isips house which was under construction adjacent to the latters
residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her
mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was
found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed
that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims
mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip
identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away
from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants
and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein
he narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court
convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
1. WON the appellants extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in
accordance with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and
2. WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who
assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed preinterrogatory and custodial rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt.
However, the Court ruled otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of
direct proof does not absolve the appellant because conviction may be had with the
concurrence of the following requisites as stated in the Rules of Court:
there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335,
that facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial courts decision in giving credence to several
circumstantial evidence, which is more than enough to prove appellants guilt
beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that
provided the rights of suspects under custodial investigation in detail.
A person under custodial investigation should be informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and
he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be
used as evidence against him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his
behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international nongovernment organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that
this is accomplished;
7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver
and chooses to speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he
does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication,
the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;

10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of
his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of
any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.