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Categoria (Kategorie):
The meaning of being expresses itself in the categorial structure of
logos, which determines both the being of entities and our thinking. We
live in a meaningful or categorically structured world, and are
therefore able to make sense of it. In Being and Time, Heidegger
differentiates carefully between categories and existentials. Categories
are only valid for entities that are not being-there (nature, equipment,
things, objects), and should not be used to understand being-there or
the meaning of being in general. The structure of being-there is not
determined by categories, but by existentials.

Crculo Hermenutico (hermeneutischer Zirkel):

In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses the problem of the hermeneutic
circle. In order to work out the question of being adequately, he must
make the ontological structure of being-there transparent. In order to
uncover the meaning of being, Heidegger must define the being of that
entity whose potential for self-understanding already implies the
possibility of understanding being. The circularity of this
understanding belongs to hermeneutics and is a positive possibility of
knowledge. Only through an implicit understanding of being can we
come to an explicit interpretation of the meaning of being. Every new
interpretation leads to a new understanding, which in turn makes
possible a new interpretation and so on. See also PRE-ONTOLOGICAL

Cuidado/Cura (Sorgen):

In his Summer Semester 1925 lecture course, History of the Concept of

Time. Prolegomena, Heidegger replaces Edmund Husserls conception
of intentionality with the formal indication of care. Care is, in beingtheres relation to its world, concern and, in its relation to others,
solicitude. The formal structure of care is being-theres being-ahead-ofitself in its always already being involved in something. For beingthere, its very being is an issue, or, in other words, being-theres
existence matters to and concerns it. In Being and Time, care becomes
the ontological term for the unity of being-theres structural whole of
relations that consists of facticity or thrownness (past), being-with or
fallenness (present), and existence or can-be (future). Temporality is
the ontological meaning of care and its original condition of
possibility. The basic constitution of care can only be grounded in

Cotidianidade (Alltglichkeit):
Everydayness is the undifferentiated mode in which being-there first
and foremost exists. Heidegger calls this undifferentiated character of
distinguishes the pre-philosophical level of understanding in which
both the possibilities of being theres indifference to, and concern for,
the question of being, reside. See also THEY, THE.

Experincia da vida ftica (faktische Lebenserfahrung):

Factic life experience is Heideggers formal indication of the matter of
hermeneutic phenomenology. It will later be replaced by facticity and,
in Being and Time, by being-there. Life gives itself as experience. As
lived experience, life always expresses itself in structures that it can
understand. Lived experience is factical, because it is the first and last
givenness that can neither be denied nor explained.
Errncia (Irre):

In his lecture, On the Essence of Truth, Heidegger describes errancy as

the essential counter pole of concealment to the original occurrence of
truth as unconcealment. It is the condition of the possibility of error
and falsity. Truth unfolds as dynamic tension between unconcealment
and concealment, uncovering and withholding. The forgottenness of
being is not the fault of being-there, but is due to errancy. Because
being discloses itself as the beingness of entities, being itself remains
concealed. In this way, being-there is led astray by errancy. Errancy
itself as leading astray can be experienced by being-there, because it is
as much disposed toward truth as untruth. This experience makes it
possible for being-there to resist errancy. In releasement, we can
experience the mystery of being: its dynamic of gifting-refusal.

Facticidade (Faktizitt):
Facticity is the formal indication of beingthere that is already charged
with its hermeneutic expression in structures that we can understand.
Facticity includes the distinctive facts of an individuals circumstances.
As a formal indicator, facticity is understanding as the matter itself of
phenomenology. We can understand everything in life except the fact
that life itself is understandable.

Phenomenology (Phnomenologie):
According to Heidegger, phenomenology is not a philosophical
movement, but an outstanding possibility of thinking. During his early
study of Edmund Husserls Logical Investigations and their later
collaboration in Freiburg, he learned the essentials of this method. In
his early lecture courses, from 1919 until the publication of Being and
Time, Heidegger brings phenomenology and hermeneutics together in
hermeneutic phenomenology. Since the primal phenomena are not
readily accessible to intuition in a spontaneous and transparent selfshowing but are concealed, they are in need of the labor of destruction.
Heidegger therefore replaces Husserls perceptual structure of
intentionality as intuitive fulfillment of empty signification with the

most basic structural process of the explication of implicit meaning.

Care, interpretation, and understanding replace intentionality,
intuition, and signifying acts as the fundamental concepts of
phenomenology. The central phenomenon of Heideggers hermeneutic
phenomenology is the facticity of life, which in its being is concerned
with its very being. Life is rooted in care and always implicitly
interprets itself in concern, solicitude, and worry. Since life in its
facticity finds itself always in a historical situation, the interpretation
of the temporality of care as the ground of life itself becomes the
fundamental task of phenomenology. In the formulation of the path of
thinking leading from Being and Time, phenomenology is the method
of fundamental ontology. The question of being is worked out in a
twofold way: the existential analysis of being-there and a destruction
of the history of ontology. The task of phenomenology is to let the
being of entities as that which shows itself to be seen from itself in the
very way it shows itself from itself. Since the being of entities shows
itself in beingtheres understanding of being, this understanding must
be interpreted in a phenomenological explication of human existence.
The understanding of being is the temporal-historical circular
movement between being as it shows itself and the specific entity who
raises the question of the meaning of being. Phenomenology takes its
departure from the hermeneutics of being-there, which, as an analysis
of existence, establishes the directive for all philosophical inquiry at
the point where it arises and to which it returns. In his later work,
Heidegger no longer uses the word phenomenology to describe the
task of thinking, viewing it instead as a possibility granted within the
history of being. Phenomenology recedes in favor of the other
beginning of thinking.

In the factic life experience of primal Christianity, kairos refers to the
moment of the Second Coming of Christ. The whole community lives
in the anticipation of the decisive moment in history. Nobody knows
when this moment will occur, although it is certain that it will come.

Heidegger contrasts this nonobjective experience of time with the

scientific conception of time as a series of nows. In his reading of
Aristotle, Heidegger finds both experiences of time. In his Nicomachean
Ethics VI, Aristotle shows that our temporally particular situation
admits of no absolute and once-and-for-all norm. As each situation is
new, we must think anew and act anew. The right middle of passion
and action is hard to find and easy to miss. This is why it is hard to be
good. The end of action varies according to the kairos or the proper
moment. In action we seek the kairos, that is, feeling and acting at the
right time, for the right purpose and in the right manner. In Physics IV,
Aristotle develops another understanding of time as a series of nows.
This objective understanding of time would determine the history of
the concept of time until Edmund Husserl. In Being and Time, the
moment of insight (Augenblick) and decision constitutes a
Kierkegaardian elaboration of the kairos. Heidegger later identifies the
term Augenblick as Sren Kierkegaards most prescient insight.

Carncia (Not):
Heidegger speaks of need in two different ways. In On the Essence of
Truth, he explains that being-there must submit to a double influence:
the oppression of errancy and the prevalence of the mystery. From this
results a tension in being-there in the form of a need, which arises out
of the constraint and reservedness imposed upon it by errancy and
mystery. The full dynamic and enactment of truth, which includes
within itself untruth of errancy and of mystery, retains being-there in
need. Being-there needs to think the truth of being. In his Summer
Semester 1935 lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger
says that being itself needs being-there as the there of its being. The
there as the sphere of openness is the necessity of being. The need
of being is that it needs being-there in order to become manifest.

Temporalidade (Zeitlichkeit):
This distinction enables Heidegger to explain the kairological
temporality of Christianity. The kairos is the moment of the critical

junction at the fullness of time, which decides between owned or

authentic and unowned or inauthentic temporality. Primordial or
original temporality is the source from which allother levels of
temporality derive.

Temporalidade (Temporalitte):
Totalidade dos Entes (das Seiende im Ganzen):
Everything that is, or entities, occur together in an ensemble, rather
than in isolation. The character of this whole entails that a prior
backdrop of the world is required in order for specific entities to
become manifest. The manifestation of beings within the whole is a
corollary of the fact that, as an entity in its own right, the self is
already situated within the context of the world.