V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.51 Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Currentness Penal Code (Refs & Annos) Title 2.

General Principles of Criminal Responsibility Chapter 9. Justification Excluding Criminal Responsibility Subchapter E. Law Enforcement � 9.51. Arrest and Search

(a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if: (1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and (2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. (b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. (c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or (2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed.

(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or (2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed. (e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection (c) or (d). (f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States. (g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d). CREDIT(S) Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, � 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, � 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 2003 Main Volume Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, � 1.01, throughout the section, following references to specific subsections, deleted "of this section". Prior Laws: Rev.P.C. 1879, arts. 490, 491, 559, 561 to 565. Rev.P.C. 1895, arts. 593, 594, 664, 666 to 670. Rev.P.C. 1911, arts. 1014, 1015, 1094, 1096 to 1100. Vernon's Ann.P.C. (1925) arts. 1142, subd. 5; 1212; 1214 to 1218. Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 15.27. CROSS REFERENCES

"Actor" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07. Arrest, Generally, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. arts. 14.01 et seq., 15.01 et seq. Evading, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.04. Resisting, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.03. "Deadly force" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.01. Escape, Generally, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.06. Defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.01. Implements, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.09. Permitting or facilitating, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.07. Unlawful custody effect, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.08. Justification to resist arrest or search, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.31. "Law" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07. "Peace officer" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07. "Reasonable belief" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07. Reckless injury of innocent third person, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.05. Search and seizure, Generally, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 18.01 et seq. Resisting, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.03. "Serious bodily injury" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07. Suppression of riot, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 8.06. Theft, force justified to prevent consequences, see V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code � 124.001; Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 18.16. Threats, duty of peace officer, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 6.05. LIBRARY REFERENCES 2003 Main Volume Assault and Battery 64.

Homicide 752 to 756. Westlaw Topic Nos. 37, 203. C.J.S. Assault and Battery � 96. RESEARCH REFERENCES 2006 Electronic Pocket Part Update ALR Library 169 ALR 1419, Search Incident to One Offense as Justifying Seizure of Instruments of or Articles Connected With Another Offense. Encyclopedias TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 455, Self-Defense; Justifying and Mitigating Circumstances. TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 1905, Arrest and Search; by Police Officer or Officer's Agent. TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 1906, Arrest and Search; by Police Officer or Officer's Agent -- by Private Citizen. Treatises and Practice Aids Charlton, 6 Tex. Prac. Series � 7.9, Law Enforcement. McCormick, Blackwell & Blackwell, 8 Tex. Prac. Series � 109.1, Model for Dictating Objections to the Court's Charge. McCormick, Blackwell & Blackwell, 8 Tex. Prac. Series � 106.28, Deadly Force by a Peace Officer in Making an Arrest or Search. Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 6.98, Entering to Execute Search Warrant -Entry by Breaking as Limited by Section 9.51 of the Penal Code. Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 8.55, Use of Force to Make Arrest. Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 8.57, Entry of Premises to Make Arrest -Announcement Requirements. Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 9.91, Use of Force to Make Warrantless Arrests. Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 10.57, Use of Force. Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 6.100, Entering to Execute Search Warrant -- Exclusion of Evidence Obtained After Unlawful Entry -- Texas Law Requirements. Dix and Dawson, 43 Tex. Prac. Series � 31.269, Undercover Peace Officer or Person Investigating Crime Not Accomplice Witness.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Searches and seizures, excessive force, fleeing suspect, threat of serious physical harm, reasonable misapprehension standard, qualified immunity, see Brosseau v. Haugen, 2004, 125 S.Ct. 596. NOTES OF DECISIONS In general 2 Admissibility of evidence 12 Arrest with warrant 5, 6 Arrest with warrant - In general 5 Arrest with warrant - Validity of process 6 Arrest without warrant 7 Federal law 11 Force to overcome resistance, force used 4 Force used 3, 4 Force used - Generally 3 Force used - Force to overcome resistance 4 Immunity 10 Informants 9 Instructions 15 Jury questions 14 Private citizens 8 Sufficiency of evidence 13 Validity 1 Validity of process, arrest with warrant 6

1. Validity Enactment of this section, which allows officer or his agent to use whatever force is necessary to arrest person when officer or agent has reasonable belief that arrest is lawful and which does not give police discretion to determine legality or illegality of arrest for all purposes but only speaks to use of force to make arrest and allows police to arrest without acting at their peril on matter that

may take court months to decide, constituted valid exercise of police power. Ford v. State (Cr.App. 1976) 538 S.W.2d 633. Arrest 68(2) 2. In general Vernon's Ann.P.C. repealed arts. 1210 to 1212, justifying an officer in killing a party who was attempting the rescue of a prisoner only when the officer's life was endangered thereby or he was threatened with great bodily injury, did not, where the assault was not made with a deadly weapon, authorize the slaying of such person. Williams v. State (Cr.App. 1899) 41 Tex.Crim. 365, 54 S.W. 759. A peace officer has the right to summon assistance to his aid in the discharge of his duty. Owen v. State (Cr.App. 1910) 58 Tex.Crim. 261, 125 S.W. 405. The fact that an officer thinks that a writ entitles him to take property under it will not increase his rights. If the writ is void he is a trespasser. Lassiter v. State (Cr.App. 1914) 73 Tex.Crim. 35, 163 S.W. 710. Sheriffs And Constables 98(5) 3. Force used--generally When aggression of officer in making arrest exceeds what is reasonably necessary to effect arrest, right of self-defense inures to the party assaulted. Stanfield v. State (1931) 118 Tex.Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94; Daughtery v. State (1944) 146 Tex.Crim. 488, 176 S.W.2d 571. Degree of force used by police officer when he and other officers detained arrestee was not excessive, given that arrestee was convicted of aggravated assault of officer, which required proof that arrestee caused serious bodily injury under Texas law, and that officer was thus justified, under Texas law, in using force up to and including deadly force to resist assault and effect arrest. Sappington v. Bartee, C.A.5 (Tex.)1999, 195 F.3d 234. Arrest 68(2) Police officer did not commit assault against arrestee under Texas law by pointing his pistol at arrestee in course of his official duties. Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, Tex., C.A.5 (Tex.)1988, 834 F.2d 1223. Assault And Battery 2 Officer who was forced to shoot motorist in self-defense, because motorist was attempting to run officer down with pickup truck, did not use excessive force, and thus could not be held civilly liable to motorist's estate. Fraire v. City of Arlington, C.A.5 (Tex.)1992, 957 F.2d 1268, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 462, 506 U.S. 973, 121 L.Ed.2d 371. Civil Rights 1088(2) Officers who make a rightful arrest, and subsequently use violence and rob the party arrested, are not exonerated on account of the legality of the alleged arrest. Tones v. State (Cr.App. 1905) 48 Tex.Crim. 363, 88 S.W. 217, 122 Am.St.Rep. 759. Robbery 14 It was city marshal's duty to arrest prostitute if her conduct on street was contrary to law, but he had no authority to assault her when she remarked that she thought "he had it in for her." Hudley v. State (Cr.App. 1917) 81 Tex.Crim. 39, 194 S.W. 160. Arrest 63.2 If an officer, in making an arrest acts in such wanton and menacing manner as to threaten persons being arrested with serious bodily harm, the latter have the

right to defend themselves by means proportionate to the necessities of the occasion, as viewed from their standpoint. Snow v. State (Cr.App. 1921) 91 Tex.Crim. 1, 237 S.W. 563. Homicide 805 Aggression of officer using metal knucks in making arrest can go further than is reasonably necessary to effect arrest. Stanfield v. State (Cr.App. 1931) 118 Tex.Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94. Homicide 805 Where sheriff in arresting accused's son used metal knucks in unlawful manner, right of self-defense was available to accused. Stanfield v. State (Cr.App. 1931) 118 Tex.Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94. Homicide 805 As respects liability on official bond, officer may use no greater force in arresting suspected felon than in arresting suspected misdemeanant. Tabor v. McKenzie (Civ.App. 1932) 49 S.W.2d 874. Sheriffs And Constables 157(4) 4. ---- Force to overcome resistance, force used An officer having lawful authority to make an arrest, may, on resistance, employ such force as may be necessary to overcome he must use no greater force than is necessary for the arrest accused. Giroux v. State (1874) 40 Tex. 97; Beaverts v. State 175; Carter v. State (1892) 30 Tex.Crim. 551, 17 S.W. 1102. meeting with such resistance; but and detention of the (1878) 4 Tex.Crim.

Legal arrest by an officer being resisted, he may resort to such force as is necessary, but no more, to overcome the resistance and accomplish the arrest. If the officer exceeds such force, he is guilty of an offense. Skidmore v. State (1877) 2 Tex.Crim. 20; Beaverts v. State (1878) 4 Tex.Crim. 175, citing Skidmore v. State (1875) 43 Tex. 93. And see, also, Giroux v. State (1874) 40 Tex. 97; Rasberry v. State (1877) 1 Tex.Crim. 665; Carter v. State (1892) 30 Tex.Crim. 551, 17 S.W. 1102; Owen v. State (1910) 58 Tex.Crim. 261, 125 S.W. 405. While an officer has the right to use necessary force to complete a legal arrest, he may not kill his prisoner to prevent his attempted escape. Caldwell v. State (1874) 41 Tex. 86. And see Tiner v. State (1875) 44 Tex. 128; Miers v. State (1895) 34 Tex.Crim. 161, 29 S.W. 1074. An officer or other person, in executing an order of arrest, is authorized to use such force as is necessary in overcoming resistance to the execution of such order; but he shall not take the life of the person resisting arrest, unless he has just grounds to fear that his own life will be taken, or that he will suffer great bodily injury in the execution of the order. Plasters v. State (1877) 1 Tex.Crim. 673. If the officer acts outside of his authority or exercises it unlawfully, his official character does not prevent accused from setting up the unlawful acts to justify or extenuate acts of resistance. James v. State (1875) 44 Tex. 314. The officer must not use a deadly weapon in making an arrest unless compelled to do so by the conduct of the prisoner. English v. State (Cr.App. 1895) 34 Tex.Crim. 190, 30 S.W. 233. Constable is not warranted in killing person for resisting arrest or fleeing, unless in danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. Grohoske v. State (Cr.App. 1933) 124 Tex.Crim. 338, 61 S.W.2d 847. Homicide 754

5. Arrest with warrant--In general A warrant of arrest issued by a justice of the peace confers no authority to arrest in another county, unless it is indorsed by a judge of the supreme court, court of appeals, or a district or county judge (when it may be executed anywhere in the state), or by a magistrate of the county in which the accused is found, when it may be executed in the latter county, but must be executed by an officer of the county where the accused is found. Ledbetter v. State (1887) 23 Tex.Crim. 247, 5 S.W. 226; Peter v. State (1887) 23 Tex.Crim. 684, 5 S.W. 228. The ordinary jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is circumscribed by the limits of his precinct, but when proceeding as an examining court his authority is coextensive with his county. Hart v. State (1883) 15 Tex.Crim. 202, 49 Am.Rep. 188. Indictment for resisting an officer in his attempt to execute a warrant for the arrest of a party accused of a felony, should, in addition to showing that the warrant was sufficient to charge the felony against the party accused, show that the warrant was legally issued. Pierce v. State (1884) 17 Tex.Crim. 232. 6. ---- Validity of process If a process, fair and legal on its face, is placed in the hands of an officer for execution, he will be protected in executing it, although he may know of facts which render such process in reality void. Tierney v. Frazier (1882) 57 Tex. 437; Rainey v. State (1886) 20 Tex.Crim. 455. In accordance with the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable seizures or searches, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.1879, arts. 233 to 236 (see, now, arts. 15.02 to 15.05) provided that a warrant for arrest, and also the complaint on which it issued, had to specify the accused's name, if known, and if his name was unknown, had to give a reasonably definite description of him. Alford v. State (1880) 8 Tex.Crim. 545. In Texas, civil liability for both false arrest and false imprisonment will attach when: there is willful detention of person; against the consent of the party detained; and detention was without authority of law, and thus no action will lie against officer for false arrest or false imprisonment where detention is executed by virtue of legal sufficient process duly issued by court of competent jurisdiction. McElroy v. U.S., W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. False Imprisonment 2; False Imprisonment 7(3) No person other than an officer can make an arrest, except for a felony committed in his presence or within his view, unless he is specifically appointed by a magistrate to execute a particular writ, or is summoned by an officer on a posse comitatus. Alford v. State (1880) 8 Tex.Crim. 545. Defendant committed the assault in resisting arrest after he was informed by the officer assaulted that he had a warrant for him. A defect in the warrant, in that it only gave his surname, and did not state that his name was unknown, and give a description of him, being at the time unknown to defendant, was no defense. Graham v. State (App. 1890) 13 S.W. 1013. Homicide 739 7. Arrest without warrant

The rules under which an arrest could be made by a peace officer, without warrant, were defined by Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.1925, arts. 212 to 216 (see, now, art. 14.01 et seq.). These articles prescribed the only circumstances under which an arrest could be made by a peace officer without a warrant, except when the arrest was made in the prevention of an offense. Johnson v. State (1878) 5 Tex.Crim. 43; Lacy v. State (1879) 7 Tex.Crim. 403; Ross v. State (1881) 10 Tex.Crim. 455, 38 Am.Rep. 643; Staples v. State (1883) 14 Tex.Crim. 136; Jacobs v. State (1889) 28 Tex.Crim. 79, 12 S.W. 408; Ex parte Sherwood (1890) 29 Tex.Crim. 334, 15 S.W. 812; Carter v. State (1892) 30 Tex.Crim. 551, 17 S.W. 1102. A person unlawfully carrying arms may be arrested without warrant. Hodges v. State (1879) 6 Tex.Crim. 615; Jacobs v. State (1889) 28 Tex.Crim. 79, 12 S.W. 408. Under Rev.P.C.1879, art. 322, an officer was authorized, on the information of a credible person, to arrest without a warrant any person for unlawfully carrying a pistol. Ex parte Sherwood (App. 1890) 15 S.W. 812. Arrest 63.1 Where a patrolman of railroad yards asked and deceased voluntarily assented, and no and the door left open while they were in v. State (Cr.App. 1923) 95 Tex.Crim. 323, 8. Private citizens Where a person has acted for several months as a deputy sheriff, under a written appointment from the sheriff, and has recorded his oath of office, but not his appointment, he is an officer de facto. Weatherford v. State (Cr.App. 1893) 31 Tex.Crim. 530, 21 S.W. 251, 37 Am.St.Rep. 828. Sheriffs And Constables 20 Where such an officer, who is known in the community as a deputy sheriff, summons a bystander to assist him in the arrest of an offender, the bystander will be justified in so doing, and, if the offender shoots him while making the arrest in an orderly manner, it is murder. Weatherford v. State (Cr.App. 1893) 31 Tex.Crim. 530, 21 S.W. 251, 37 Am.St.Rep. 828. Homicide 552 A private citizen, while engaged in making an unlawful arrest and restraining the person arrested by threats with a pistol, loses the right of perfect self-defense. Rutland v. State (Cr.App. 1920) 88 Tex.Crim. 114, 224 S.W. 1088. Homicide 781 9. Informants Undercover officer's solicitation of informant's armed assistance in making arrest was not so outrageous as to deny defendant due process; officer accepted informant's offer to assist only after primary and secondary bust signals failed to trigger arrest team of other officers, informant was authorized to assist under statute authorizing citizens to use force to assist officer in making arrest, and informant's negotiations to secure cocaine were not carried out with defendant. Ramirez v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1991) 822 S.W.2d 240, petition for discretionary review refused. Arrest 68(1); Constitutional Law 257.5 Penal Code authorizes informant to arm himself to assist undercover narcotics officer with arrests in response to request by officer. Jimenez v. State (App. 1 deceased if he would go to the office, command or restraining word was given, the office, there was no arrest. Rezeau 254 S.W. 574. Arrest 68(3)

Dist. 1992) 838 S.W.2d 661. Arrest 10. Immunity

68(1)

Officers were not guilty of false arrest and false imprisonment under Texas law, and thus plaintiffs could not recover on that theory under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), where officers detained plaintiffs to make execution of valid search warrant and probable cause existed to detain them until officers could verify that they had no involvement in drug trafficking activity of another person occupying the same building and posed no threat to the officers' safety. McElroy v. U.S., W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. United States 78(5.1) Under Texas law, officers were protected by qualified immunity from claims of assault, false imprisonment, or false arrest, thus the United States was not liable for their conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) when officers, upon breaking into apartment and believing that suspects were involved in international drug operation, tackled and handcuffed them, inflicting minor injuries, and pointed guns at them until they could be placed in handcuffs, where, after determining that suspects, who turned out to be innocent persons in different dwelling unit from crime suspect, posed no threat to their safety, officers did nothing further to physically harm them. McElroy v. U.S., W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. United States 78(9); United States 78(10) 11. Federal law In determining whether conduct of law enforcement officers constituted assault, false imprisonment, or false arrest under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), United States could invoke any defenses available to individual law enforcement officers under state law. McElroy v. U.S., W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. United States 78(5.1); United States 78(9); United States 78(14) 12. Admissibility of evidence In prosecution of police officer for murder, in which the state claimed that defendant entered upon deceased's premises armed for purpose of killing deceased, and the defendant claimed that his purpose was to arrest deceased for shooting that had taken place on premises, and in which there was testimony as to a quarrel between defendant and deceased during which deceased had accused defendant of insulting his wife, but which defendant claimed was a mere protest to the wife as to shooting on deceased's premises, evidence that there had been shooting on deceased's premises, and that complaints had been made to defendant thereof, was admissible. Waggoner v. State (Cr.App. 1923) 96 Tex.Crim. 96, 256 S.W. 266. Homicide 1047 13. Sufficiency of evidence Defendant, a deputy sheriff, while taking a drunken prisoner to jail, upon his resisting, threw him down, and had hold of him when deceased came up and struck him,--some of the evidence showing with a stick, and some with a brick; and in the course of the altercation defendant said that if deceased struck him again he

would shoot him. Thereupon deceased did so, and defendant shot him. This was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty of manslaughter. Williams v. State (Cr.App. 1899) 41 Tex.Crim. 365, 54 S.W. 759. Homicide 706 City was not entitled to an issue on justification in suit in which damages were sought for injuries sustained by plaintiff when she was shot in the hand by a city police officer, in that, in view of the containment order, it could not be said that officer discharged firearm in an effort to make or assist in the making of an arrest or search and there was no evidence which furnished a basis for a finding that officer had reason to believe that any person in plaintiff's apartment was attempting to escape or attempting to prevent his search of apartment from which shots were fired. City of San Antonio v. Higle (App. 4 Dist. 1984) 685 S.W.2d 682, ref. n.r.e.. Trial 350.3(5) 14. Jury questions Where constable, who was being sued by accused for illegal arrest and had made threats against accused, obtained warrants for accused's arrest on another charge, found accused sitting in automobile, informed accused as to warrants, drew pistol, but replaced it in scabbard, took out black jack and handcuffs, and was attempting to handcuff accused when accused shot him, right of self-defense was not established as a matter of law but was for jury. Daugherty v. State (Cr.App. 1943) 146 Tex.Crim. 488, 176 S.W.2d 571. Homicide 1346 15. Instructions The charge with reference to the right of an officer to use a deadly weapon upon an arrested party in his custody, only when in the necessary defense of his own person from serious bodily injury then about to be inflicted upon him by such prisoner, is not obnoxious to the objection that it based the right of selfdefense upon the actual existence of danger, and not upon its reasonable appearance. Giebel v. State (App. 1889) 12 S.W. 591. Homicide 1486 In place of a general charge, a charge, stating under what circumstances, applicable to the facts of the case, defendant, in homicide, as an officer, would have a right to arrest deceased should be given. Kilpatrick v. State (Cr.App. 1916) 80 Tex.Crim. 391, 189 S.W. 267. Homicide 1470 In murder prosecution arising after defendant shot victim while attempting to arrest him, in which defendant's defense was that he was justified in using a certain amount of force to effect the arrest, but that he shot victim in selfdefense, and in which applicable paragraphs of jury charge reflected only those two theories, inclusion of definition of when "deadly force" could be used by a person attempting arrest was harmless. Werner v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1984) 680 S.W.2d 858, petition for discretionary review granted, affirmed 711 S.W.2d 639. Criminal Law 1172.1(3) V. T. C. A., Penal Code � 9.51, TX PENAL � 9.51 Current through the end of the 2006 3rd Called Session of the 79th Legislature. � 2006 Thomson/West END OF DOCUMENT

(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.