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PT&T vs.

272 SCRA 596
Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a
reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who’s having a
maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to
immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period.
Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods,
this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The
reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to
join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job
application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that
she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive
reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the
discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said
discrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that
she wasn’t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn’t
deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained
unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed
from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances.
Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s illegal dismissal due
to certain company policy.
Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by
discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where’s a
company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs
afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the
fundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is
that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of
the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s illegal dismissal
and the latter shall claim for damages.

Estrada vs. Escritor
A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote
to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a
man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who
stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and
challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the
proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor
move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the
conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code
against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas
learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with
Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that
they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect
known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who
have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations)
jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the
approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it
does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of
evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show
that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General
utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct
circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in
cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these

distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right
to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil. 252
Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,
defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established
their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one
month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject
the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and
provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating
her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.
The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects
that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.

Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and
1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against
petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share
of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners
denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tagamakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered
judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an
accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio
and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed.




Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given
by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave
the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of
the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate
maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid
even in the absence of marriage certificate.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In
this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private
respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or
destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners
argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,

the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three
children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until
1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents
herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and
Catalina is valid.

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article,
it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at
bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was
not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her
surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez
185 SCRA 425
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her
full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana
was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was
alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner
Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who
had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law
husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents
(Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to
bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases
contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of
pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under
Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being
preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification,
he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and
sisters contend otherwise.
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of
Vitaliana Vargas.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio
Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Falsification of the monthly reports of cases
Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages
even without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were
able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by

the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of

counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s
petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed
to appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court
but this time defendant’s counsel informed the court that chances of
settling case amicably were nil.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent
judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to
pay plaintiff damages.
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because
it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have
already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding
apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages.
The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to
pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual
damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the
defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will
come back and the wedding will push through.

Wassmer vs. Velez
12 SCRA 648
Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiffappellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note to
Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to
opposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. But on
September 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be
returning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appear
nor was he heard from again.
Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the
defendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to
pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955
defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders, judgments and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.” Beatriz moved
to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to
appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.
Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the following day his

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant
contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the
respondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man

separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and
that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for
solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC.
The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a
summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive
death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.
A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the
jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death;
(2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore
there is an irregularity.

Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the
Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which
required the respondent to comment on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the
ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner
and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the
need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure
to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.
He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due
to her own fault and negligence.
Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme
Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner.
Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Arañes vs. Judge Occiano
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the
marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s
death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized.

Vda. De Chua vs. CA
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo
and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died

The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract. Metro Manila. passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia. the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. Thus. Transfer Certificates of Title. but it decided in favor of herein respondents. G. the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio. 1970 in Pasig. absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. . and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City. Castro gave birth.intestate in Davao City. Malvar. their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage. 1970. Cardenas. and even denied her petition. 1971. a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother. Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City. However. of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license. Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married. Thereafter. Residence Certificates. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage. In fact. 1396182 to the contracting parties. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Issue: Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. 103047 September 12. Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. As custodians of public documents. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search. civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty. Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. City Court Judge of Pasay City. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious. the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. There being no marriage license. including the procurement of the marriage license. passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Castro and Edwin F. inter alia. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. This was latter appealed to the appellate court. No. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelina M. Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. 1994 Facts: On June 24. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal. Upon the death of Roberto. including the names of the applicants.R. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage. when Castro discovered she was pregnant. On October 19. it was only in March 1971. CA and Castro Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. that the couple decided to live together. with the consent of Cardenas. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29. this being a violation of the best evidence rule. and a resident of Davao City. which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented. the couple parted ways. A valid. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24.

On October 27. herein petitioner. the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. In 1989. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. they lived separately. Hence. a German national. Together with other evidences submitted. Facts: Article 26. it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status. Therefore. not to its admissibility. Hence. and private respondent Erich Geiling. in Rizal in 1987. adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.Garcia vs. 138322 October 2. marital discord set in. before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce. support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23. may be recognized in the Philippines. Manila. their conjugal assets were divided. Petitioner. On the other hand. respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.R. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26. respondent acquired Australian citizenship. provided it is consistent with their respective laws. private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. and the couple lived together for some time in Malate. The respondent. petitioner Imelda Pilapil. this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. a Filipina. Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. Thereafter. In 1994. No. petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Pilapil vs. the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. The marriage started auspiciously enough. Recio G. the court may under some foreign statutes. while still married to said respondent. Even after the divorce becomes absolute. still restrict remarriage. 1983. they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. 1986.” Since October 1995. In their application for marriage license. 1987. the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic. the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. In 1992. before they were married. In 1998. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action. . petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. a Filipino was married to Editha Samson. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On January 15. which was validly admitted as evidence. In this case. a Filipino citizen. On September 7. he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. followed by a separation de facto between them. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence. filed an action for legal separation. on the other hand. 1979. petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. issued by an Australian family court. the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. he married Grace Garcia. and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated. Rederick Recio. in Cabanatuan City. seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. an Australian citizen. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree. capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that. Although. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. appearance is not sufficient. 2001 Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. After about three and a half years of marriage.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens. Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993. and in 1996 while in Australia. were married in the Federal Republic of Germany.

in any state of the United States. an American. which may be recognized in the Philippines. and 3rd contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U. Thus. the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad.A. petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. 2nd obtained a valid divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code. Ruling: Issue: Issue: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties.. U. being no longer the husband of petitioner. Villanueva were married with two children. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property.In the present case. Upton sued her before RTC. the wife sued for divorce in Nevada. He would have no standing to sue in the case as Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). an American.S. Private respondent. which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or Annulment instead. In 1982. as her husband. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no “community property”. there must have been (1) a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner. had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Republic vs. the Federal Republic of Germany. Romillo Jr. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son and 1st became a naturalized American citizen. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law. in Hongkong in 1972. Van Dorn vs. Hence. a Filipina. is admitted. also to remarry. between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.S. pursuant to his national law. married Richard Upton. he cannot sue petitioner. on the ground of incompatibility. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes. provided they are valid according to their national law. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. For the application of Article 26(2). court. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. In this case. the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen. Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M.S. Ruling: YES. and that (2) a .

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage. petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other." .M. Sanchez A. Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. 1986. tedious. Niñal vs. and infeasible. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. is futile to sever marital ties. Caloocan City. MTJ-00-1329 March 8. (3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. However. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. (2) foreign law. it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. 1985 shot Teodulfa. Araneta Avenue. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts. Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license. After Pepito’s death on February 19. which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage. No. 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. In this case. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void. subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent. having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish. the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact. In lieu thereof. only about 20 months had elapsed. 1974. at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage. Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be in the case of the former. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24. of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting Manzano vs. Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26. long. her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. Four children were born out of that marriage. he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous. but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse. it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. and in the case of the latter.valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to remarry. 2001 Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period. 1997.

. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 Facts: Same. 3. Ruling: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. in their marriage contract. 2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. and 5. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage with the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code is valid. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage.000. Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. it was indicated that both were "separated. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage. Just like separation. it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years. the following requisites must concur: 1. claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2. which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 4. Also. free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. as manifested in their joint affidavit. Issues: 1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code. he would have advised the latter not to marry again. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. Ruling: In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized. Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Clearly. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.Respondent Judge. so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already. had he known that the late Manzano was married. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit. According to him. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment. otherwise. but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code. on the other hand. Article 27-34. 2 months and 7 days old. 2. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin. Cosca vs." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment.

bigamous marriage. Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of their said parents. he begot a daughter named Cresenciana. private respondent. 163. who died on November 8. However. Ruling: Ruling: With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui. Moreover. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision. there being no divorce. it is from the beginning. including the respondents. Domingo vs. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio. petitioner. the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage. Urbana and Ireneo. However. and were known in the community to be such. Upon his death. On his first wife. that a child born in lawful wedlock. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Julian and Paulina. 163 which were owned by their common father. Eusebia Montellano. petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. CA G. . are entitled to equal shares of estate of their father. With his second wife. descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No. deporting themselves as husband and wife. children on first and second marriage. namely Jacinto. Lupo died without a will. unknown to her. he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig. to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents. 1904. And his third wife. have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.Mariategui vs. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo. The laws presume that a man and a woman. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession. and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. Flaviana Montellano. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. CA 226 SCRA 572 Facts: Delia Domingo. filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo. She alleged that they were married at Carmona. one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. No. filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. absolute or from bed and board is legitimate. Under these circumstances. children on third marriage. The petitioners. At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which he acquired when he was still unmarried." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still living. Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights over the said estate. Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. Baldomera. Issue: Issue: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy. Rizal. he begot three children. the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. as a consequence. the children on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect.R. he begot four children. L-57062 January 24. Maria del Rosario. 1992 Facts: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and. provided all requisites for its validity are present. the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. As such. Felipa Velasco.

Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son.Niñal vs. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA. Republic vs. 1985. Ruling: Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void. Issue: Whether or not irreconcilable differences personalities constitute psychological incapacity. Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Same. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 1997 Facts: On April 14. and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. depended on his parents for aid and assistance. it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license. CA and Molina February 13. Article 35 Issue: Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio. and conflicting Ruling: The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. After a year of marriage. . plaintiff Roridel O. resulting in frequent quarrels between them.

a Japanese national. 149498 May 20. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. include their mutual obligations to live together. 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. correlated. Julia finally left for the U. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. or to somehow get in touch with Julia. Quintero-Hamano G. On May 18. Ruling: The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as. the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents. 112019 January 4. On November 16. Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Republic vs.R. 1987. immaturity and like circumstances. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. should be given great respect by our courts. 1986. No. No. for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities.(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified. Leouel averred. Julia called Leouel for the first time. CA G. where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to locate. . or at the very least to communicate with him. Leouel Santos vs. extremely low intelligence. 1988. however. but all his efforts were of no avail. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. Seven months after her departure. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U. Issue: Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the FC. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220. It was bound to happen. observe love. Thus. 2004 Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. on the ground of psychological incapacity.S.R. respect and fidelity and render help and support. psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which. as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code.S. she gave birth to their child. did not last long. because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’ family affairs. (b) alleged in the complaint. The ecstasy. while not controlling or decisive. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home. (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. 1995 Facts: Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. Thereafter. Occasionally. to work as a nurse despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her.. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

two children were born. Issue: Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. CA held that denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence. Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. Sometime in 1991. simply because she filed cases against him. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations. it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological.On January 14. no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. Cavite. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. Unknown to respondent. respondent. false testimony. the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Choa G. Issue: Leni Choa. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Out of this union. 143376 November 26. petitioner. These charges included Complaints for perjury. Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. After sending money to respondent for two months. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. The case went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. On October 27. respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. One month after their marriage. not physical. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor. Hence. concubinage and deportation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. were married on March 15. However. She wrote him several times but he never responded. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. No. Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity. (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. Choa vs. 1993. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. and Alfonso Choa. . which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. illness. The evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.R. but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Toshio stopped giving financial support. an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 1988. Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. However. In proving psychological incapacity. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person. respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 2002 Facts: Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person. Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity. 1981. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.

Lopez. CA G. trust and respect. respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage. the people around her. On the other hand. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. normal and still a virgin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. including parenting. 155800 March 10. state of health. Indeed. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. who stated. a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. Abcede. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.R. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 1988. Issue: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. among others−had been duly established. Ruling: Yes. On the other hand. According to the trial court. educational attainment and other events or things. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love. filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes. The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy. the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths.Antonio vs. there was no sexual contact between them. which according to them. Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Clearly in this case. She also claimed that her husband married her. More disturbingly. that petitioner was essentially a normal. introspective. Chi Ming Tsoi vs.R. income. and that he might consummate their marriage. there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. 119190 January 16. and Dr. her occupation. Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. Hence. Until their separation on March 15. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The wife claimed that her husband was impotent. Reyes G. After trial. a Filipino citizen. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. petitioner. The husband’s . He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother. 1989. and the refusal is senseless and constant. although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations. From the totality of the evidence. If a spouse. respondent. however. In support of his petition. while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent. were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. No. they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction. 2006 Facts: Leonilo Antonio. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. shy and conservative type of person. singing abilities and her income. or at least abide by the truth. petitioner presented Dr. No. based on the tests they conducted. in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself. much less its psychic meaning. a psychiatrist. declared null and void. a clinical psychologist. 1997 Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22. and was a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman.

however. Under the circumstances of the present case. Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. Lapuz-Sy vs. In 1984. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. they maintained constant communication. Morigo vs. stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation . Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. In 1986. Issue: Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the action. the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation. but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. and in its Article 108. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. 1934 and canonically on September 30. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus. The former replied and after an exchange of letters. no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. without more. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Both agreed to get married. the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia.senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. by their reconciliation. 145226 February 6. her husband abandoned her. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to “procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. they became sweethearts. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative. married civilly on September 21. After school year. Go Hiok. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds. Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. In 1943. Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Such act alone. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio. Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City. People of the Philippines G. petitioner died in a vehicular accident. 1943. On August 19. needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. which is now moot and academic. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100. When arraigned in the bigamy case. Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void. Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent. Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith. While in Canada. His motion was granted. 2004 Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City. 1991. In 1990. by providing that the spouses can. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. for a period of four years. with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation. R." In the instant case. The complaint seeks among others. Before the trial could be completed. No.

it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. the couple came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters. After marriage. Gandionco vs. Support pendente lite. L-72984 November 27.R. Ruling: Petition is dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage.already rendered. Bugayong vs. can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge. L-10033 December 28. . before the latter left to report back to duty. Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Being personal in character. Froilan Gandionco. filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Peñaranda G. the couples live with the sisters of the husband. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Ginez G. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage. serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity.R. Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Early in July 1951. No. as a remedy. 1956 Facts: Benjamin Bugayong. while on furlough leave. No. 1987 Facts: Teresita Gandionco. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite. legal wife of the petitioner. And again for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite.

cousin of the plaintiff-husband. Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong. he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering. Issue: Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Macadangdang vs." obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. That other remedy. and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. specifically pray for legal separation. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation. that during her marriage to Pacete. who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint. whether principal or incidental. CA 108 SCRA 314 . On the second day. she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato. the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. nor excuse compliance. with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense. as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete)." that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement. that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato. Ruling: Petition is granted. An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies. accounting and separation of property.Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. that they had a child named Consuelo. In this interim. Issue: Ruling: Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did. In her complaint. the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land. the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code. fishponds and several motor vehicles. that she learned of such marriage only on 1979. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion. in fact. Pacete vs.

139789. they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March. 1967. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of Family Code to have custody of her husband in consortium. For this Court to allow. Ruling: The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses. Macadangdang filed his answer. the lower court dismissed the complaint. her husband being Crispin Anahaw. admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. She also alleges that due to the affair. an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. the legally presumed father. there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano. Potenciano Ilusorio. with the CIF of Davao.R. Respondent. an opportunity to be heard. much less consent to. However. 139808 July 19. Defendant. CA G. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject.Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman. Correspondingly. issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children. opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. then defendant. asserting that he never refused to see her. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities. This would be a severe assault on morality. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only the moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly personal. . filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner. then plaintiff. Therefore. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. now petitioner. No. The lower court in a pre-trial conference. Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit. However. In its decision rendered. the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. her illicit lover and above all her own son. filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago. 2001 Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio. upon agreement of the parties. Potenciano vs. and granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio. Ruling: SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife. they are duty bound to live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69. she and her husband separated in 1967. Issue: Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband.

she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of . Facts: Edgardo Reyes. the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license. may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital obligations of the respondent. However. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife.R. 127406 November 27. who is obliged to support the wife. Ruling: The law provides that defendant. Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses.Goitia vs. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant. private respondent wed Ofelia Ty. RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent. However. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 2000 Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husband outside of the conjugal domicile. Article 68 emphasize mutual love. but for another reason. Out of their union bore two daughters. No. She submitted the marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence. The law provides that defendant. Article 68 Issue: Ty vs. petitioner. may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. who is obliged to support the wife. respect and fidelity among husband and wife. the option given by law is not absolute. in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. he was still married to Anna Maria. In the same breath. 252 Facts: Same. private respondent. CA G. Until private respondent petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time they got married. married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Ruling: There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. However. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present case.

the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. Should they grant her prayer. militates against such incongruity. No. However. alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. 8 in said certificate. Bildner G. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. On the other hand. The children. if not common sense. the spouses had six children. a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 1995. With these. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. anxiety. Logic. filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. Out of their marriage. petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy. Therefore. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. Sylvia and Lin. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 Facts: Article 69. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. frail health. In 1972. Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. To do so. To justify the grant of the petition. Ilusorio vs. and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. also a candidate for the same position. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. private respondent Cirilio Montejo. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. On March 29. filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. On March 23. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious. Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss. they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. 1995. not merely nominal or moral. Romualdez-Marcos vs.their marriage which caused her mental anguish. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age. Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective. 2000 Facts: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years. Issue: . the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. 139789 May 12. would make the application of the law absurd. they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. besmirched reputation.R. poor eyesight and impaired judgment. social humiliation and alienation from her parents.

for the sake of family unity. PBM failed to pay the loan. to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity. spouses Ching. VP. 1998 Facts: Article 73. the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law but never automatically loses her domicile of origin. respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession. Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession. Upon Agapay vs. business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. Issue: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Therefore. CA G. No. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Article 87. application of private respondents.R. This difference could. filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Thus.Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. Thereafter. Ruling: It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. occupation. Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. Private respondents. respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn. business or activity. Out their union was born Herminia Palang. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. 118305 February 12. be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM. recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles of origin. occupation. deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. A few months after the wedding. he left to work in Hawaii. executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments. Ayala Investments vs. not with . While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other.

Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. the donation inter vivos is considered null and void. Francisco asked his niece Leticia. respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. he refused to live with his wife and child. Herminia Palang. No. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. 2001 Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. old. Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos. Francisco registered the lot in his name. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died.his wife or child. Thereafter. 146683 November 22.” Thereafter. in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. to take care of his house and store. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. recovery of possession and damages. Respondents. Thereafter. Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. When he returned for good. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Arcaba vs. Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. No. both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang. 109557 November 29. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years. A few months before Francisco’s death. CA G. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child. the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila. Tabancura Vda. petitioner. Zosima. As evidenced by deed of sale. Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. When Miguel was then 63 yrs. alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba. Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. De Batocael G.R. he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay. Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. After the death of Uy vs. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife. nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement.R. 2000 . who are nieces. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Therefore. On the other hand.

to give them financial support. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. Ernesto Jardeleza. nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership. his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their children. averring that he has never failed. denied that he has abandoned his wife and family. instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City. upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. Therefore. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property. Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. finding that it was convinced that Dr. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez. which the SC affirmed. De La Cruz 130 Phil 324 Facts: Estrella de la Cruz. filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Dr. as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real abandonment. However. petitioner. De La Cruz vs. respondent. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan. He also questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization. the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City. neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.Facts: Teodoro Jardeleza. Because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose. was married to Severino de la Cruz. The defendant started living in Manila. two of whom were studying in Manila. the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. if the husband. at Bacolod City. The defendant. In point of fact.. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on the defendant’s polo shirt and iron safe. prevent him from competently administering his properties. During their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay Cadastre. RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.. The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. They are also engaged in varied business ventures. . petitioner. Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property. assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the property. even for a single month. despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse. Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations. Sr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment". in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal assets. there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.. Gilda Jardeleza. with vehemence. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. defendant. Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. and it is considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife. and not mere separation. Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record. Ruling: The CA. In such case.

Issue: Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be made answerable to the obligation. Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable. The respondent also refuses to give financial support to the petitioner. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt. cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. through the definite findings of the trial court. CA 161 SCRA 608 Facts: Jose Jo. CA 216 SCRA 692 BA Finance Corporation vs. The first woman. The SC. sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. When their motions for reconsideration were denied. for the said property to be held liable. holds that the petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but retain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. Facts: Augusto Yulo. secured a loan from the petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action for support. Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the attached properties were her exclusive property. as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note in behalf of the A & L Industries. respondent. In the case at bar. the same can be made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo. Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim. Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of the spouses.Partosa-Jo vs. petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter. However. the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal property. Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note. respondent. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the special power of attorney procured by Augusto. Ruling: SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. alleging that Augusto had already abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Issue: Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment. About two months prior to the loan. coupled with the refusal by the respondent to give support to the petitioner. The record shows that respondent had already rejected the petitioner. however.. BA Finance Corp. . The physical separation of the parties. The complaint for support was granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property was never entertained. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. Ruling: SC granted the petition.

they issued a writ of execution against the properties of the defendant-wife but the two notices of levy on execution covered also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership. Ruling: SC denied petition based on the respondent Court’s original findings which had already become final and indisputable. who acted as an agent in the sale on the commission of jewels. Roberto Laperal Jr. Spouses Katigbak 90 Phil 77 Facts: The plaintiffs. Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible with his own private funds. Johnson & Johnson. The defendant Evelina moved to dismiss. Hence. as well as the defendant-husband cannot be held liable. petitioner. She issued checks amounting to the payment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Issue: Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her husband against the spouses Laperal. vs. and his wife Purificacion M. and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the total sum P113. and he did not contract for her. RTC granted the complaint and ordered defendant to pay. petitioner filed a motion to fix the value of the levied properties. after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on record that there was no privity of contract between respondent and defendanthusband regarding the obligations incurred by the defendant-wife. defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises. CA 262 SCRA 298 Facts: Delilah Vinluan. The conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant-husband cannot be levied upon. demands for the payment and even offered accommodations to pay the obligation but failed. The defendanthusband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by the defendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products incurred an obligation to the said company. Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. Subsequently. Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. With these. Hence this appeal. Only Spouses Laperal vs. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any.the defendant-wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak. on the ground that the complaint failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against her.500 plus interest and costs. the conjugal partnership. Ramon was not her agent. they held that defendant-husband must not be legally held liable for the said obligation. To reach both kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife . Ruling: The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her". and that both defendants refused to pay the notes. Defendant-husband moved to quash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed the motion. For the repayment of the sums borrowed by him. Issue: Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent. respondent filed a complaint against defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages. However. The first transcribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are not signed by Evelina. Thus. and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. Johnson & Johnson Inc. The plaintiff opposed the motion but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.

Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria.000. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts incurred by the husband. the lot would nonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him “during the marriage by lucrative title”. their surviving children. Canada. was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order. IAC 192 SCRA 21 Facts: Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. signed the agreement as a witness. issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. After the death of Modesto. The plaintiff-appellant. Posadas 56 Phil 215 Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for $10. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila. Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. which was the amount of the insurance policy on the . During the following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and BPI vs. on the other hand. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. Modesto’s will.Evelina Katigbak.” The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been transferred to him. As a result. and she is not a necessary party defendant. his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18. whose main office is in Montreal. entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. the Bank of the Philippine Islands. In the loan agreement executed between the parties. the sum of P20. Villanueva vs. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. Graciano and Nicolasa.150. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. is his exclusive and private property. About a month later. Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. paid Rosario Gelano Vda. his wife Victoria. After they died.000 from Jesus Bernas. Victoria’s will stated that her interests. bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage. which Modesto had inherited from his parents. a relative Raymundo Aranas. Certain it is that the land itself. Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place during his marriage. real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. "Where the husband is alone liable. as a matter of law. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively. The deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano. no action lies against the wife. which is not the case. rights and properties.

if they belong to the assured exclusively. 118305 February 12. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands. constitute community property. and (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds. Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico. however. an action for collection of a sum of money. if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate. No. with money borrowed from an officemate. and then returned the money to said widow. Ruling: SC holds. Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions. Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear. it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution. the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wong’s. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature. the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon. Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. CA G. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson. Katrina was charged with estafa. was dishonored for lack of funds. Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership. (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate. and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife. levy on execution and the auction. Meanwhile in Hongkong. A writ of execution was thereafter issued. and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. Hence. and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside. Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father.R. levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. payable to the latter's estate. 1998 . Ayala Investments vs. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part. During the marriage. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check. as administrator of the deceased's estate. That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary. If he paid it out of his salaries. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. They had been most of the time living separately. After trial. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership. then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate. exclusively. are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter. satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured. Wong of said deceased.

respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Hence. It is immaterial in the. he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof. from petitioner. 146504 April 4. no actual benefit may be proved.000. petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. Since he is not a stockholder.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. however.Facts: Facts: Same. respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. She claimed. L. that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount. 2002 . No. where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business. defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25. Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of the amount he loaned to them. the law presumes and rightly so. seller of the property. Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25. petitioner issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo.00 for the purchase of a house and lot. Ruling: The respondent directly received the money or services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. From the very nature of the contract of loan and services. Simply stated.R. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25. Abelardo G. that contract falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. his business or profession fails or does not succeed. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home. Inc. Carlos vs. The amount was in full payment of the property. who acknowledged receipt thereof. Defendant-husband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own. Thereafter. respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25. Here. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. thus benefiting the family.000. Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989.000. Thus. H. Carlos Construction. Issue: Whether or not the amount of US$25. that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ruling: Early in time. Article 121-122 Issue: Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.000. it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same.000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint.

Emphasis to the RTC’s judgment on liquidation of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o unions of marriage. Ruling: The Supreme Court stated that. Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Ruling: A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name. No. if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent. Article 147. However. both married and with children. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other. and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share. the case may be. in the absence of proof to the contrary. 136803 June 16. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties. the fruits of couple’s separate property are not included in the co-ownership. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. the couple separated. in avoid marriage.R.Mallilin vs. the property regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as. Castillo G. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which. Jr. The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict with Article 147 or 148. Issue: Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the properties. properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money. they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. cohabited after a brief courtship while their respective marriages still subsisted. Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the SEC. with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors. During their union. Issue: Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the parties in the liquidation of their properties. The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on co-ownership. 2000 Facts: Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin. Due to irreconcilable differences. likewise provides that. . Valdez vs. RTC 260 SCRA 211 Facts: Same. but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. but separated from their respective spouses. Elvira Castillo. is presumed to be equal.

Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. she later claimed that the funds were provided by her mother and sister. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23.R. who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. 2005 Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G. She alleged then that she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. . Inc. The evidence on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner and titles over the property were. Ruling: The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The Imus Rural Bank. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. The sale at public auction proceeded. clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to Agapay vs. G. or the value thereof.shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor. it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Francisco were married. Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. The Register of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles. No. SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. issued to the latter as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo. married to Eduardo Francisco. bought 7. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities. At that age. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Same. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage. said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Article 148. Eduardo. Ruling: The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Inc. the levy on execution of the property was null and void. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by cohabitation between her and Miguel. covering two parcels of residential land with a house. MIWCC then submitted an indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance. Francisco vs. Hence. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco. thereafter. 151967 February 16. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland.500 bags of cement from MIWCC but failed to pay for the same. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against Eduardo. Confronted with this reality. MIWCC made a bid for the property.

She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her. 2000 Facts: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos. and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in litis. and Gina Tumlos. Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises. petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship. Issue: Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC) is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendantappellant. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant.000. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of. which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. Ruling: It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code. and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest. Ruling: . Toto Tumlos. both as rental. 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision. Tumlos vs.600. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint.R. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos.Juaniza vs. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Jose 89 SCRA 306 Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23. 137650 April 12. that it was agreed upon that after a few months. Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1. as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Rosalia Arroyo. At the time of the accident. but was denied. there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1. until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. In their complaint. No. for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years. Fernandez G. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife.00 a month. the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent. and physical injuries suffered by. Upon appeal to the RTC.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. Clearly. demanding that he vacate the property. Martinez vs. Sr. 140153 March 28. 162084 June 28. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. had been admitted to probate.R. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons. this fact by itself does not justify her claim. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made and/or exerted by them. there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences. 2001 Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees. for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila. but that the same proved futile. No. Docena vs. likewise. RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez. Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone. namely. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. No. Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife always act together. she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario. Daniel. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. Martinez G. They alleged that they were the owners of the property. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so.R. alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of Demolition.Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father. No amicable settlement was. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. Lapesura G. her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. Sr. In the meantime. Manolo and Daniel. Indeed. In any event. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. Rodolfo. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo. Likewise. . Jr. 2005 Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon. the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.

RTC G. however an exception to it. Thus. through counsel. and his eleven children. Romeo Manalo. Hontiveros vs. Pilar S. Under this provision. who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros. private respondent Ayson. and petitioner Maria Hontiveros. whether full or half-blood. 1992. who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros. that is. that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages. pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages against them. Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. Hence. The court dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal. CA G. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. Manalo. 129242 January 16. Ruling: Ruling: The petition was granted. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. parents and children. 125465 June 29. the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.Issue: Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made. As pointed out by the Code Commission. No. the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife. but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. Manalo vs. Capiz. this petition for review on certiorari. Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to filing thereof. Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents’ answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion.R. but their motion was denied. as administrator thereof. Petition was granted. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners’ claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after trial. a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature. He was survived by his wife. who are all of legal age. culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother. filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan. are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family. Consequently. No.R. . At the time of his death. ascendants and descendants. 151 of the Family Code. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. and brothers and sisters. However. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 2001 Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14. the allegations must still be proved. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners. 1999 Facts: The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros.

respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar. Jose Modequillo. Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. No. Ruling: To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they Modequillo vs. during the marriage. et al. as the case may be. Davao del Sur. of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. 1988. signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. 1022-MJ May 7. a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Davao del Sur. . His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as a notary. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench. a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas. whether at law or in equity. Gapusan A.” The said judgment having become final and executory. Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family Albano vs. 1976 Facts: Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag.Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made.M. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. vs. Breva 185 SCRA 766 Facts: On January 29. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage. Section 2. the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership". petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1. then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. et al.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution. and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of Family Code. Private respondent opposed the motion. Manacop vs. However. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile. Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof. filing an answer. Art. These chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables. Issue: Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code. the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. Thus. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased residential lot with a bungalow. a family home as contemplated by law. Ruling: The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. filed a complaint against petitioner and F. before the RTC of Pasig. Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. In the present case.F. the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. Private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. pursuant to the Civil Code. CA 277 SCRA 941 Facts: Petitioner Florante F. it is. Macaraig 89 Phil 165 . The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. Inc. Eventually. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC. execution of the judgment was delayed. If the family actually resides in the premises. Ruling: Under the Family Code. Manacop Construction Co. Instead of Andal vs. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company.. petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs. therefore. Inc. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the FC. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home.

Maria Dueñas. he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. on the ground that Articles 164. Rather. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. . assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Vicente’s sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate. On the other hand. Petitioner Marissa. Felix. and Emiliano was not impotent.R. In RTC. upon their death the fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question. (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together. Ruling: Ruling: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. or at least had access one to the other. Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. Issue: Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of the spouses and has the right to be the sole heir. his wife. Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. 166. The older sister of Vicente also declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses. Marisa BenitezBadua opposed the petition. On the other hand. 1994 Facts: Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. 105625 January 24. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate. respondents proved by testimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetriciangynecologist which prevented her to give birth. who was given the name of Mariano Andal. and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a certain couple. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy. as she was there at the time the spouses were having this problem. No. brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses by submitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously treated her as legitimate child. and the child was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. 170. The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological or adopted child of deceased was denied. and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. who were unable to procreate. CA G. His sickness became worse. both parties submit their pieces of evidence. And here there is no such proof. as guardian ad litem. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved. eloped with Felix. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse.Facts: Mariano Andal. Benitez-Badua vs. went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. his brother. who did not even attend his funeral. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. Sometime thereafter. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife. these articles govern a situation where the husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife. Live of Birth Certificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate.

They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. Gerardo opposed the motion and insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the father’s surname to the child. (Billy). Liyao vs. She argued that a putative father cannot have visitation rights over the illegitimate child and the child’s surname be changed to the mother’s maiden name. . who are the legitimate or illegitimate children. on the other hand. Yulo for more than 10 years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. which they begot a child named Jose Gerardo. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao. During her three day stay at the hospital. No. Respondents.Concepcion vs. No. Liyao G. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.R. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. Hence. A child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby. Custody was then given to Theresa. introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. 2002 Facts: Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M.R. 2005 Facts: Ma. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 138961 March 7. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the spouses had lived together. competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity. The law and only the law determine. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. Issue: Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. William. painted a different picture of the story. Ruling: Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. CA G. Jr. SC finds no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. 123450 August 31. Jr. In any event. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. Corazon gave birth to William Liyao. All the medical and hospital expenses. for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. he filed for annulment on the ground of bigamy. RTC ruled that Theresa’s marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriage with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate. Ruling: SC denied the petition. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was only a sham and she never lived with him at all. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his wife was still married to Mario Gopiao. there is no clear.

an illegitimate daughter. among which is the disputed property. No. which resulted to Amelita’s pregnancy. By this act alone. While dining. she said she remembered during cross-examination. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa. She wrote to Ivan asking for support around February stating that she was four months pregnant. Vda. He was conceived approximately sometime in the 2nd week of November. Amelita pleas for help and support to Ivan but failed. Ruling: SC dismissed the petition. This is relevant because the child Michael is a FULL TERM baby. she became Rosalina’s co-heir and coowner of the property. At first. She wrote to Ivan’s wife where she revealed her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. 157037 May 20. was never put in issue. Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Ivan confessed that he is a married man. they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in Manila. they begot a son. She was inconsistent in her response whether they did or didn’t have any sex in Manila in the 1st and 2nd week of November.Eceta vs. In 1977. both parties have already agreed and admitted. Thus at the time of his death. The couple acquired several properties. On that first meeting. In her answer. Maria Theresa. During the subsistence of their marriage. she thinks she conceived the child on October. Ivan rebutted by the petition of the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order. Mendez 209 SCRA 18 Facts: Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta. However. Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he stayed. however. and illegitimate child. 2004 Facts: Petitioner Rosalina P. met Ivan Mendez. Ivan professed his love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then they have had a sexual intercourse. he sired Maria Theresa. During his lifetime. However. In 1991. she said she doesn’t remember. CA favored the respondent and dismissed the complaint of petitioner.R. Vicente died. Constantino vs. Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. Notwithstanding. Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of Ivan to her son Michael to warrant support. that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter. what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. Later in her response. Amelita Constantino. respondent. . De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. RTC ruled in favor of Amelita. In fact. his compulsory heirs were his mother. But after the sexual contact. Rosalina. Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death. petitioner and waitress at Tony’s Restaurant. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. Eceta G. This means. respondent petition the complaint CA that RTC erred in its ruling. She then filed for the recognition of the unborn child and payment for damages. Ruling: Issue: Issue: Notably. Vicente. The filiation.

in behalf of her son. 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary. Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel. Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944. considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation. filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. No. At the end of 1945. Alejo G. Carolina Alejo. and since childhood. as his illegitimate child. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife. implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. however. such that she obtained a Master's degree. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. Issue: Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family. and did not know of her whereabouts since then. 140500 January 21. became a CPA and eventually. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Carolina.” Jison vs. Bernabe vs. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. As a result. Further.R.Moreover. expressly or impliedly.R. 1998 Facts: Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. As affirmative and special defenses. he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead. and this. who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter. Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to RTC’s ruling based on Article 175. laches and/or prescription. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education. No. Thus. 124853 February 24. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. he never recognized Monina. FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza Amolar. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. CA G. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her. had enjoyed the continuous. she confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend resulting to her leaving work. . the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim. leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Monina was born in Iloilo. a Central Bank examiner.

Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and their legitimate children all surnamed Terenal-Marquino. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Ruling: in the Marquino vs. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya. No. 1994 Facts: Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation. All told. strongly denied her allegations. on the other hand. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. Conde vs. or while insane. Monina's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws". the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime. as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde. she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. Thus. or after action had already been instituted. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya. She always received financial assistance from them. he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. Also impleaded as defendants. The Marquinos. Annulment of Partition. she died.R. Abaya 13 Phil 249 Facts: Casiano Abaya. Roman Abaya brother of Casiano. to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority. and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. unmarried. it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. and in three cases only. IAC G. Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the matter. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. Support. Paula Conde. The trial court dismissed the case. The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Moreover. During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence. whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act. As exception. An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. Eutiquio was still single.Ruling: SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate daughter of Francisco. However. 72078 June 27. At that time. . The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino.

and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera. In the case at bench. Abadilla vs. not during the lifetime of the parents. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate". She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. Respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan. when in truth and in fact. Ana del Val Chan. respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct. Issue: Ruling: The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime. Issue: Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. since then. respondent ought to know that.Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence. and even after the death of the parents. claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. excusable negligence or oversight. Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla. Ruling: SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and orders his dismissal from the service. declared that his Teotico vs. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility. there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife. cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home and. she died before she could present her proof of recognition. filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the . these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born. a deceased brother of the same testatrix. in his comment. In other words. Sadly. Vicente B. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 Facts: Rene Teotico. it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. a deceased sister of the testatrix. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447 Facts: Complainant Abadilla. Teotico. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. Respondent. Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct in legitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterous relationship. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. As a lawyer and a judge.

petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. Jason Condat. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old. no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles. because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. to all intents and purposes.oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine. with copies thereof seasonably served. CA and Bobiles 205 SCRA 356 Facts: Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat. the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Ruling: The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. Republic vs. Hence. or administrator. and be. then a minor of 10 years of age. Issue: Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding. Adelberto Bundoc. finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance. After the parties had presented their evidence. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will. legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. Accordingly. Ruling: Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir. and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. Rene Teotico. order was duly published. executor. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles. the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. SC holds that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The court a quo. Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo. issued an order setting the petition for hearing. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. The Tamargo vs. As a consequence. be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child. . The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo. The probate court.

the relationship of the spouses become strained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce against Salud Arca at Alabama. Jr. Respondent spouses Bundoc. trade or vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article support was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr. Adelberto's natural parents. or the completion thereof. With the events transpired. At the time of their marriage. Prior to the incident. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Alfredo Javier. Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252. Support also includes the education of the person to be supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession. respondent chose to live with defendant’s parents but left due to frictions having occurred between them. Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy. That is good reason for immediate execution. Through these she prayed that the complaint be dismissed. And that since his departure to US Navy. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint. Lucero 94 Phil 634 Facts: Goitia vs. respondent averred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of Naic. 262 . notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal. Javier vs. after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption. were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. defendant had their marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. In the instant case. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents. they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr. Because of defendant’s departure. parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. however. Salud Arca. but rather the adopting parents. namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura. Ruling: Unquestionably. Issue: Whether or not petitioners. claimed that not they. ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. may still file the instant petition. Cavite. Ruling: SC granted the petition. She also professed that the cause of their separation was not of desertion on her part but of the defendant. She then stayed to her native place in Tanza. would be unduly delayed. Cavite. This petition for adoption was granted that is. for he was an enlisted man in the US Navy.Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc. Issue: Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support his son even if he reaches the age of majority. Having received the complaint. he had always supported his spouse and his son through allotments by US Navy Department of US Government. the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. USA. and if financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal his education. is the son of petitioner Alfredo Javier. respondent and Alfredo Javier.

in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor. The manifestation sent by private respondent amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject minor. the right to claim support from his putative parent. Issue: Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretion after the first complaint was dismissed and adjudged. Furthermore. the agreement entered into between the petitioner and private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature of a compromise.Facts: Same. she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. Subsequently. it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from him. It violated the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. By virtue of the said manifestation. the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. Hence. CA dismissed the same. herein private respondent. may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy. The motion was granted by the trial court. represented by her legal guardian. Facts: Private respondent. Ruling: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Glen Camil Andres de Asis. Issue: Whether or not the wife can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The mother’s child sent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicial declarations. this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis. ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor. notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having the right to the same. which then dismissed the case with prejudice. which cannot be countenanced. without fault on her part. future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. the petitioner. De Asis vs. . De Asis 303 SCRA 176 Ruling: It has been held that the wife. Emphasis on the options of support. brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City. Article 204. another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against petitioner. Furthermore. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband. despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and that he cannot be required to provide support for him. and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. personality conflicts. meanwhile. their second child. together with Daffon and two other students. ending all his expectations and his life as well. and upon their return to the United States. Espiritu vs. On appeal to the respondent court. filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. Amadora vs. Additionally. Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Teresita. and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children. the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. Reynaldo and Teresita got married. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines.The children are now both over seven years old. fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo. decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. Teresita left for Los Angeles. CA 160 SCRA 274 Facts: Like any prospective graduate. their daughter. a son. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances. This is the general rule. 2180) should apply to all schools. this time. and given the name Reginald Vince. As it turned out. the dean of boys. While they were in the auditorium of their school. responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. Ruling: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. On 1986. though. fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. Reason: Old academic schools. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo. CA 242 SCRA 362 Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. was born. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli. Ruling: SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. however. Pablito Damon. He had to leave his children with his sister. After trial. as the victim's parents. a classmate. was born on 1988. but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed. the herein petitioners. Reynaldo was sent by his employer. the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. Guillerma Layug and her family. the National Steel Corporation. Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. Rosalind Therese. From all indications. the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students. academic as well as nonacademic. Reynaldo is a fit person. thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. to Pittsburgh. Issue: Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. its rector the high school principal. Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. through their respective parents. where the school is academic. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior. The complaint against the students was later dropped. California to work as a nurse. and the physics teacher.

The remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day. playfully jumped into the pit. along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did.R. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. As a student of St. Aquino 163 SCRA 697 Facts: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. James Daniel Sr. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Alonso. As part of work education. Alcantara and Ylarde. Classes had already ceased. Vivencio Villanueva and St. St. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. Sherwin. on the fateful day. the concrete block caught him. Dapitan City. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents. Were it not for his gross negligence. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block. filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. Accordingly. he died. pinning him to the wall in a standing position. private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of World War II. Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years. Ylarde vs. Whether or not the petitioner St." After private respondent Aquino left. Therefore. Ylarde's parents. Allegedly. 143363 February 6. the heads are not liable. Carpitanos G. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices. Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. Also. Ruling: Ruling: . a public educational institution located in Pangasinan. it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the of thirty-five. Mary’s Academy vs. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard. Issue: Issue: Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for the death of Ylarde. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school. Mary’s Academy. a grown. the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today. the vehicle owner. petitioners in this case. Ylarde sustained injuries. No. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. or condoned their non-observance. a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. three days later. the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.Where the school is for arts and trades. Moreover. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. Before leaving. 2002 Facts: Defendant-appellant St. and Guada Daniel.

IAC 214 SCRA 16 and Facts: Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption. is obliged to pay for the damage done. it is not the school. But. when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. The father and. In order to avoid the guy. The simple reason is that the child was still under their care and custody at the time of the incident. the girl hold steadfast to her decision. insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child. there being no fault or negligence. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Same. but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Articles 220-233. with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The parents of the girl instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages. for acts committed by the latter. must have causal connection to the accident. Tamargo vs. 2176: Quasi-delict – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS: Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong.GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. Such fault or negligence. There is no showing of such. the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. 18 years old. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. Art. is called a quasi-delict. Issue: Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for the death of Julie Ann Gotiong. were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. Hence. in case of his death or incapacity. Ruling: . Emphasis suspension/termination of parental authority. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Art. Ruling: GRANTED. On the day of the incident. on effects Libi vs. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. and deceased Wendell Libi. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible. Parental liability is a consequence of PARENTAL AUTHORITY. between 18 to 19 years old. the girl lived with her best friend. 2180: Imputed Negligence – The obligation imposed by Art. the mother. the two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver.

The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. Republic G. that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. Teresita was raised in . one Atanacia Llaneta.R. Santamaria' Mr. that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court. Santamaria. (Art. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years. 3. The guy knew of it. they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able to know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. entitled 'Enrique R. The father and the mother each had a key. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests. 1974 Facts: Teresita's mother. instead of her maiden name. Santamaria. such as the bag of his mother. Agrava G. hence. Santamaria vs. Enrique R. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name. Laperal vs. these were not the causes upon which the petition was based. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died. Art. Santamaria. and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. No. Victoria vda. In the first place. Llaneta vs. in our opinion. L-18008 October 30. 2. This finding is however without basis. to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. L-32504 May 15. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercising due diligence. she has also ceased to live with him for many years now. 2180). Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her. obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is. The key must have been negligently left lying around or he had free access to it. That during her marriage to Enrique R. that of Elisea L. was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. Elisea L. she naturally used. it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name. No. not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL. diligentissimi patris familias. The said gun was missing. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl. de Ferrer. 2180 of the Civil Code.DENIED. The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a gun. Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law. Moreover. The damages is based on Art. that the said partial decision is now final. 101 of RPC doesn’t apply since the guy is or above 18 years old already. Shortly after Teresita's birth. Santamaria. Enrique R. 1962 Facts: Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads: 1. the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. 4.R. she married Mr. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition.

. When she was about twenty years old.the household of the Ferrer's. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta. as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based on her alleged facts. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. Ruling: The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. Teresita petitioned the court for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. would cause untold difficulties and confusion. she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon. where she was born.