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BY: Mary Grace P. Arevalo
Dayanara A. Rom
Romulo T. Espalmado Jr.
Danica V. Nol
Joemaica P. Combo
Victoria Denise M. Monte
Sharmaine C. Briz
Justine Ria M. Almojuela

Pros. Rosalito Cimanes


G.R. No.: 170236
Date: August 31, 2006
Ponente: J. Callejo Sr.

The appellant, Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape
committed by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously has sexual intercourse with Rowena, his 8 years old deafmute daughter, against her will and consent. His act was then witnessed by his son,
After due consideration, the Regional trial Court of Pasig City Branch 159 rendered
its decision on September 9, 2003 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified rape penalized in Art. 266-A and B. He was
sentenced maximum penalty of death and to indemnify the offended party of other
By reason of the death penalty imposed to the appellant, the case was
automatically elevated to the Supreme Court. But it was however transferred and
referred to the Court of Appeals. Having done so, the CA, after its thorough review
of the case at hand, affirmed the decision of the RTC as regards to the death
sentence executed to the appellant with modification on the amount of other
damages to be indemnified. The case, then finally raised to the Supreme Court. But
even before the appellate court could even decide the case, R.A. 9346 an act that
abolishes death penalty law was enacted.
Whether or Not the appellant is entitled of the benefit under Section 2 of R.A. 9346
Yes, the appellant is entitled of the benefit under Section 2 of R.A. 9346. It imposed
that: a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or b) the penalty of life
imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Also pursuant to the criminal law principle of
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to

the accused are given retroactive effect) and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the retroactivity of penal laws. In the light of the foregoing instances,
however immoral and vicious the crime committed, in the eyes of the law, the
appellant was entitled of the benefit granted in R.A. 9346 Section 2.
G.R. No.: 94953
Date: September 5, 1994
Ponente: J. Quiason

On December 15, 1986, the National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) of the
Western Police District (WPD) conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of
Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant
drug-pushing in that area. However, none was arrested for it is only a surveillance
operation. On January 8, 1987, the WPD held a buy-bust operation of a six-man
team with Pfc. Martin Orolfo Jr. as the poseur-buyer.
At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential
informant, went to Garrido Street. Pfc. Orolfo and confidential informant proceeded
to the house of appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw him
standing outside. Pfc. Orolfo buys Two foils" of marijuana handing at the same
time the marked twenty-peso bill to appellant. After receiving the mark money, the
appellant went inside the house returning with the two foils wrapped in onion paper.
Sensing the presence of the police operatives, the appellant then tried to retrieve
the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so resulting to one foil
being torn. Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit. The
latter was able to subdue appellant. Appellant admitted to the crime and show blue
plastic bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs. He then was escorted to
the WPD headquarters for investigation. On October 2, 1989, the judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sec. 4 Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended as charged in the4 information and sentences
him of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. The appellant then
appealed to the highest court.
Whether or Not there is a lawful arrest and seizure
Yes. There is a lawful arrest in the case following Sec. 5, Rule 113 of 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure dealing with warrantless arrest. The policemen's entry into the

house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught

committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was
valid. On the other hand, there is a lawful seizure on the ground that the plastic bag
containing prohibited drugs seize inside the house was the result of appellant's. As
decided in the case of People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376, A contemporaneous
search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed with the modification following the R.A. No.
7659 amending the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The sentence from life
imprisonment was reduced to prision correctional, as minimum, and prision mayor
as maximum. This is in accordance to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony,. Thus, appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction
of the penalty.


G.R. No.: 100776
Date: October 28, 1993
Ponente: C.J. Narvasa

Petitioner delivered a check on September 1, 1983 to a salvaging firm postdated
November 30, 1983 a sum of 361, 528 Php for an agreement to refloat a sunken
ship. The check being a guarantee was deposited by the firm only to find it
dishonored due to the account being closed.
The firm filed a complaint in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Co petitioned
that the court erred in its decision for at the time of commission, such act is not
punishable yet by the said law as provided in Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice
although reversed later by Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 which was then
used a basis for petitioners conviction.
Whether or Not Circular No. 12 by Ministry of Justice is valid as reference and can be
applied retroactively

No. The decision of the Court of Appeals and lower courts were set aside. Laws shall
be interpreted prospectively especially if such law, if made retroactive, will
aggravate the case of the accused. The act therefore, has been committed in
innocence. Hence, the prosecution against Co was dismissed and the decision of
Court of Appeals reversed.

8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
G.R. No.: L-32485
Date: October 22, 1970
Ponente: J. Makasiar

A petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a
duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the
laws of the land, and praying for determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
6132 and the declaration of the petitioners rights and duties thereunder. Kay
Villegas Kami Inc. actually impugns only on the first paragraph of R.A. No. 6132 Sec.
8(a) on the grounds that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and
freedom of expression, and that it is an ex post facto law.
Whether or Not Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is unconstitutional and is in the nature
of an ex post facto law
No, Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional and is not in the nature of
an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is a law that: a) makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act; b) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed; c) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed; d) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; e) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful ; and f) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as protection of a former

conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Given such, the constitutional

inhibition pertains only to criminal laws which are given a retroactive effect.
G.R. No.: L-13005
Date: October 10, 1917
Ponente: J. Malcolm

Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang,
a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu after a direct voyage from the
port of Saigon on April 25, 1917. Ah Sing bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon and
brought them on board and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon
to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making a search
found the 8 cans of the prohibited drug. There is no other evidence, direct or
indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to illegally import the opium
in the country.
Whether or Not the crime of illegal importation can be proven against Ah Sing
Yes. As applied to the Opium Law, the Court expressly hold that any person
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel
which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of
the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of
the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was
merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere
pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused
needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation
being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be
brought into the Philippine Islands.
Thus, the Court accordingly found that there was illegal importation of opium
from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible
misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to
foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.


G.R. No.: L-5270
Date: January 15, 1910
Ponente: J. Elliott

The defendant, H.N. Bull, captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from
Chinese and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. He was
accused of willfully, unlawfully and wrongly transport and bringing into the port and
city of Manila, aboard said vessel, 677 cattle and carabaos, without providing
suitable means for securing the animals. While in transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessel, and were cruelly wounded, bruised and killed.
1. Whether or Not the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case
2. Whether or Not the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable
means for securing said animals
1. Yes. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country,
but when it came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, it was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before it came to
anchor. During that part of the voyage the violation of the statue continued, and
as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same
conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense,
assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing
one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within
American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the offense and the person of the offender.
2. Yes. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes
the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio

Grande R.R., "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with
an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally;
that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So
in Wong vs. City of Astoria, it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did
not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the
act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's
counsel, that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning.
To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design, done for a certain
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly'
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his
defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of
carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure
to the life and comfort of the animals."


G.R. No.: L-18924
Date: October 19, 1992
Ponente: J. Romualdez

Defendant accused of violation of the laws of the land by smoking opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa, though English nationality, while anchored at Manila Bay.
The lower court dismissed the case as for the allegation of the lack of jurisdiction in
the demurrer presented by the defendants party.
Whether or Not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over such act even though
committed in a merchant vessel of another nationality
Yes. Provided that act shall compromise the public order of the land in accordance
with the English rule used during the time of commission. Therefore, smoking opium
although on a merchant vessel but anchored in the shores of our country shall be
punishable, as the smoke produced, having disastrous effect, will compromise
public safety.
Hence the order appealed from is revoked.


G.R. No.: 17958
Date: February 27, 1922
Ponente: J. Malcolm

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta for Peta. The first boat had one
individual, a Dutch subject. While the second boat, with eleven men, women, and,
children, who were subjects of Holland, arrived between the islands of Buang and
Bukid in Dutch East Indies. There, the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by
24 armed Moros. The Moros initially asked for food, but once on board, they took all
the cargo, attacked the man and brutally violated the two women. Where ideally it
would submerge, holes were made on the boat and the persons, with the exemption
of the two women, were again placed on it. The Moros, two of which were Lol-lo and
Saraw, arrived at Maruro. It was there were the two women escaped.
Upon returning home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, Lol-lo and
Saraw were arrested and charged in the Courts of First Instance (CFI) of Sulu the
crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by the counsel de officio for the Moros
based on the grounds that the CFI, nor any courts in the Philippine Islands has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged for it did not constitute a public offense under
the Philippine laws, but it was overruled. Trial proceeded and judgment was
1. Whether or Not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case; and
2. Whether or Not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy
are still in force
1. Yes, the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case. Piracy is a robbery
or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done in
animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Moreover, it is
a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does
it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.
Given such, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction

over the case at bar because Lol-lo and Saraw were found within the
jurisdictional territory of the said court.
2. Yes, the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United
States. Correspondingly, the principle in public law that the political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As corollary
to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of the transfer, designed to secure
good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal
character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered
or repealed. Based on the aforementioned principle in public law, it is right to
note that amidst the transfer of the Philippine Islands to the United States, its
laws are not jeopardized and still in force. Thus, the provisions of the Penal Code
dealing with the crime of piracy, particularly Art. 153-154, are hereby applicable.


G.R. No.: L-5887
Date: December 16, 1910
Ponente: C.J. Arellano

An inspection by Messrs. Jack and Milliron on the steamship Erroll found among its
cargos, Exhibit A which contains 49 cans of opium and Exhibit B containing also
cans of the same substance. The defendant admitted that said cargos belong to him
as it will be brought to Mexico or Vera Cruz. Upon further search too, another four
cans of opium were found where the firemen of said court usually stays. The opium
was kept by the first officer of the ship which shall be returned as soon as the ship
leaves to avoid use of the substance outside the steamship. It has been noted too
as provided by a witness that defendant sold cans of opium upon arrival on the 15th
in Cebu.
Defendant alleged that said possession and act is not covered by the Philippines
laws. Still the court sentenced him the maximum penalty for the reason that the act
committed is under the Philippine jurisdiction.
Whether or Not the Philippine court have jurisdiction over the case

Yes. The court has jurisdiction over the vessel but only in instances when the act is
violating the law of the Philippines Islands as provided by the English rule prevailing
at the time of commission. Mere possession of the drug in the ship was not
punishable but due to the fact that cans of opium were taken from the ship to the
Philippine soil, the court shall apply the law of the land.
Hence, such circumstance mitigated the sentence to 1000 Php and six months of
imprisonment by the Court of appeals.


G.R. No.: L-4969
Date: December 31, 1902
Ponente: J. Torres

August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles
worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel Lawton. The counsel for defendants
alleged to the Court of First Instance that they were without jurisdiction over the
crime charged. Since it happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in
the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case
be dismissed.
However, the prosecuting attorney contended that the court has original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a
fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and
the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board
vessel flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of
August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission.
Whether or Not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed on
the high seas on board of transport not registered in the Philippines


No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on
high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The
transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our court is without jurisdiction
to take a cognizance of a crime committed on board the same. If any doubt could
arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400
effectively dissipates such doubt. This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by
which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, reads as follows:
"Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of
any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on
board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define
the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed
on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands.


G.R. No.: 80762
Date: March 19, 1990
Ponente: J. Sarmiento

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had
just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of
not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the
killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peacerrada, the victim's
widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. He stated
that he clearly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and
hacking the victim Lloyd Peacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform as the
place was then awash in moonlight. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales,
Sr. (the herein appellant) Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida,
was filed. Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peacerrada in defense of her
honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation
in the crime.

In the decision dated October 31, 1984 on the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo found all
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The case then
was brought to the Supreme Court.
Whether or Not the evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime of
murder beyond reasonable doubt
No, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take
turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peacerrada. According to him, he recognized
the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the
moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the
six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used
by each of them. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not
whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know
what specific act was performed by the appellant.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, under appropriate circumstances, like
in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it
may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at
the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may
be sufficient to acquit the accused.
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.


G.R. No.: L-5272
Date: March 19, 1910
Ponente: J. Carson

The defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were
employed in the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after
the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the

door, and called out twice. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a
kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his
Whether or Not Ah Chong should be acquitted because of mistake of fact
Under such circumstances, yes, Ah Chong should be acquitted. It is noted that
theres no criminal liability on his part, provided that the ignorance or mistake of
fact was not due to his negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or
mistake of facts is sufficient to negate a particular intent which, under the law, is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent
and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where,
under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing
an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he
intended to commit. The circumstances proved that in Ah Chongs mind, he was
being attacked, regardless of the circumstances outside him. Would the facts been
as he though them to be, there would have been no crime. Mistake of fact indicates
good faith. Good faith negates intent. Without intent, there is no crime.


G.R. No.: L-3008
Date: March 19, 1951
Ponente: J. Jugo

Federico Soriano, the petitioner, was granted power-of-attorney by Emilia Saenz, the
creditor, as substitute administrator of rents and lease of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.,
The Company was later on indebted to the creditor because of the rents due on
account of lease during the disturbance of war. In this instance, the disputed
properties of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in the building were lost, and that the
lantern slide projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator have been found in the
house and in the possession of the appellant after having repeatedly denied any
knowledge of the equipment and accessories of the Cine and declined any
responsibility for their loss saying that it has been taken by the Japanese.

Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of theft. After trial
he was convicted beyond reasonable doubt. Soriano then filed a petition of
certiorari to the highest court.
Whether or Not the petitioner is liable of theft
Yes, because under art. 308 Theft is committed by any person who, with intent of
gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent. It is clear that
when the petitioner carried away, concealed, and repeatedly lies from the owner
and the police authorities the possession of the alleged lost properties, he acted
with intent of gain. Thus, the petition on certiorari was denied.


G.R. No.: 124360
Date: November 5, 1997
Ponente: J. Villamor

In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in tuba wine shop in the barrio
market of Calunod, Municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis,
started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas and his wife.
Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas wife from which he
threatened to injure if she didnt accept. This resulted to interchange of words
between Bindoy and Pacas wife. Pacas, in defense of his wife, attempted to take
away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The commotion attracted the attention of
Emigdio Omamdam to cease the fight. In the course of Pacas and Bindoy struggling
for the bolo, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the
bolo from the hand towards the left behind the accused from which the point of the
bolo reached Omamdams chest who was then behind Bindoy.
Whether or Not the defendant is legally responsible for the crime of homicide

No, the defendant is not legally responsible for his offense because theres no
evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a
crime. In US vs. Carlos to wit: In many criminal cases, one of the most important
aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which he tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act. Thus, the appellant shall be entitled to
acquittal according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Penal Code.


G.R. No.: 75256
Date: January 26, 1989
Ponente: J. Paras

Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend
Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29
October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.
In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which
caused his unfortunate death. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the
examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate
occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for
Homicide through reckless Imprudence on the ground that the petitioner acted with
discernment. On 26 July 1986, Mr. Guevarra present petition for certiorari implying
that discernment connotes intent.
1. Whether or Not an eleven year old boy could be charged with the Crime of
homicide thru reckless imprudence
2. Whether or Not the court had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact
that it did not pass thru the barangay Lupon

1. Yes, discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between

right and wrong. Intent on the other hand is a determination to do a certain

things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential
to such intent; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts. It
could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent'
for they refer to two different concepts. In evaluating felonies committed by
means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies.
However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary
that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with
intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense.
Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a
means of committing an offense.
2. Yes, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional. it is contended by the petitioner that the case
against him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). The petitioner, in his
arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been
corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470.
Thus the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No.: L-6486
Date: March 2, 1911
Ponente: J. Moreland

The accused, as justice at the peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, decided
sixteen separate civil cases in favour of the plaintiff. The dependants for said cases
appealed from the decision and deposited 16 as required by the law and 50 as
bond. On October 12, 1909, the plaintiff alleged that the bonds were insolvent. The
accused then ordered the cancellation of the bonds and required the appellants to
file another bond within 15 days. None of the appellants were able to file within the
specified time, the plaintiff applied that the judgment be declared final and the
sums deposited by the defendants be deliver to him. The accused acceded to the
petition of the plaintiff.
Whether or Not the defendant-appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds

No, the case lacks many essential elements required by the law to be present in the
crime as he did not convert the money to his own use or use of any other person
nor did he allow anyone to do the same. Furthermore, to constitute a crime, the act,
except in certain crime made by such statute, should be accompanied by criminal
intent or negligence or indifference to duty or consequences that may be equivalent
to criminal intent, as is stated in the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea.
Everything the accused did was in good faith as he believed that he was acting his
position judicially and correctly.


G.R. No.: L-27031
Date: March 31, 1974
Ponente: J. Muoz Palma

It was on August 29, 1966 when accused, Loreto Renegado stabbed Mamerto De
Lira with a double blade weapon, and caused his death days thereafter. Accused
was held guilty of murder upon a person in authority and was to suffer the penalty
of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
The accused and the victim worked at the Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational
School as clerk and a teacher respectively. One of the duties of the accused is to
help type test questions of teachers every periodical tests. With the upcoming
examination for September, De Lira asked the accused to have his examination be
encoded. However, the latter answered that he had so many other things to do. The
teacher reminded of the instructions of the principal that he could be asked by the
teachers for such type the test questions especially when the teacher concerned
has no knowledge on typing and finished a remark You can finish your work if only
you will sit down and work. Thinking that he was being bullied and humiliated, the
accused got angry and stepped out of the canteen. Several manifestation of his
intent to kill De Lira was confirmed by the school guards, some teachers and even
the unusual observation of the wife of the accused. Few days later, at the school
canteen, accused stabbed the victim from the back and caused death thereafter.
For his defense, accused prayed for an acquittal through his written brief because
during the precise moment, accused lost his senses and he simply did not know
what he was doing. He also raised the biased, partial and highly questionable
testimonies of the prosecution from the teachers of the school and guards.

Whether or not the accused was guilty of murder with assault upon a person in
Yes. Considering that the victim as a teacher called the attention of the accused
clerk for a reminder of his duty to type such test questions as per instructed by
principal constitute the victim as a person in authority. The Court ruled that victims
remark not to be insulting and slanderous but rather a sort of reminder to the
accused. Thus, with the violent character of the accused led him to conceive a plan
to attack the victim. In the end, the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for
murder with assault on a person on authority and to suffer reclusion perpetua plus
to pay indemnity to heirs of the victim.


G.R. No.: L-47722
Date: July 27, 1943
Ponente: J. Moran

The defendant-appellants, Corporal Galanta and Chief of Police Oanis were
instructed to capture the escaped notorious convict Alsimo Balagtas who was a
bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to capture him, dead or alive. The group
of the defendant-appellants took the route leading to the suspected house. The
defendants then went to a room where they found her with a man sleeping, whose
back was towards the door. They fired at him with their revolvers simultaneously or
successively, which led to the mans death. After reporting the occurrence to the
Provincial Inspector, it turned out that the man was an innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson. The defendants have appealed that in the honest performance of
their duties, they acted in innocent mistake of the fact.
Whether or Not the defendant-appellant is guilty
Yes, under the New Rules of Courts Rule109, section 2, paragraph 2, No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subjected to any greater restraints than is necessary
for his detention. Their action of shooting the supposed Balagtas and eventually

killing him is not justifiable as the latter had offered no resistance, or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as he was asleep.


G.R. No.: L-24978
Date: March 27, 1926
Ponente: J. Villa-Real

The accused, Fernando de Fernando, a policeman, was informed that three convicts
had escaped. When passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, he was
called by the latter's daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished
to see him. While they were talking, in the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs
of a house, carrying a bolo and calling for someone inside. Pacencia, who did not
recognized the voice of the person at that time, was with the accused who then
fired a shot in the air. As the unknown person continued to ascend the stairs and
believing that he was one of the escaped convicts, the accused fired directly at the
man who turned out to be the nephew of the owner of the house.
Whether or Not the appellant is guilty of the crime murder
No. He cannot be guilty of murder for there was no malicious intent on his part.
However, firing a shot without exercising due diligence in asking or confirming who
the person provided by the fact that the victim called out a name which would
indicate that the owner of the house might be know the person to be a relative or
intimate friend. Thus, failure to act with ordinary precaution rendered him guilty of
homicide through reckless negligence and was sentenced with prision correcional
and lowered the indemnity to be paid from Php 1,00 to P500.


G.R. No.: L-42288
Date: February 16, 1935
Ponente: J. Vickers

The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, contends
that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the
purpose of delivering to Mayor Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken
that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license for aid firearm. He also
contended that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked his
motor car and that he was sixty-three meters from the Electoral College when the
revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio, representative of the Secretary of
the Interior.
The evidence shows, however, that the defendant was only ten or twelve meters
from the polling place when he was found standing near his automobile with a
revolver on his belt, and that the municipal building could not be seen from the
polling place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a
senator for that district, and that he had been sent to Pontavedra, a municipality
adjoining Pilar. The defendant did not arrest Tomas de Martin, nor does it appear
that he caused him to be prosecuted. Tomas de Martin was not called as a witness
to this case. Furthermore, Mayor Agdamag, to whom the defendant claims he
intended to deliver the revolver, was not the provincial commander of Capiz, but an
officer sent from Cebu, for the purpose of supervising the elections in that province.
Whether or Not appellants intent should be taken into consideration in the instant
No, appeal is denied. The court does not believe that appellant did not know the
location of the polling place in question.
The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent which
he violated is immaterial. Intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise
with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. The rule is that an
acts mala in se there is must be a criminal intent, but those in mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the act was intentionally done, care must be exercised in distinguishing
the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to penetrate
the act