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Below is the list of supporting documents (SD) which accompany this statement. It is
important that all are to hand, and a copy requested in the case of any missing document. SDs
#1 to #24 relate directly to this matter and those which are relevant but not specifically
referred to are a numbered #25 to #31 in the list and relate to previous concerns raised with
Humberside police on a similar theme.


No #




1 Oct 2015

Defendants representations proof of

payment; summons costs

Defendants Grounds of

6 May 2015

High court Judgment in the matter of an

appeal of Council Tax court summons costs

R (on the application of

Reverend Nicolson) v
Tottenham Magistrates.doc

22 July 2013

Draft case stated for appeal to the high court

Case stated Draft.pdf

16 Oct 2015

NELC (Claimant) - Witness Statement

Alan French - Witness


16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 1 (Defendants 2015/16

Council Tax bill)


16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 2 (Council Tax reminder)


16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 3 (Council Tax second



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 4 (Council Tax final



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 5 (Council Tax summons)



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 6 (Peters v Anderson case law)



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 7 (Devaynes v Noble case law)



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 8 (Cory Brothers & Co - NELC8.pdf

case law)


16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 9 (Defendants email to




16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 10 (Extract from Bailiff

help forum)



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 11 (Extract from Legal

Beagle forum)



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 12 (Contents of letters to

and from Admin Court Office at Leeds)



16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 13 (Leeson v Leeson case law)



29 Oct 2015

Defendants representations appropriation

of payments; evidence of costs appealed

Defendants (Supplementary)
Grounds of Appeal.pdf


Chronology (case bundle draft document high court application)

Case Stated Chronology



Consent order (case bundle draft document high court application)

Case Stated Consent order



Grounds of appeal (case bundle draft

document - high court application)

Case Stated Grounds of

appeal draft.pdf


Skeleton Argument (case bundle draft

document - high court application)

Case Stated Skeleton

Argument draft.pdf


2 Sept 2014

Complaint to Advisory Committee

(Magistrates / Justices Clerks conduct)

Judicial complaint 2 Sept



7 Nov 2015

Complaint to Judicial Conduct Investigations

Office(Judges conduct)

7 Nov 2015 ocj-complaint0913.pdf


2 Aug 2011

Concerns about the automated procedure of

issuing council tax summonses en masse

Fake court Summons 2

August 2011.doc


31 Aug 2011

Concerns about the automated procedure of

issuing council tax summonses en masse

Fake court Summons 31

August 2011.doc


20 March 2012 Concerns about the automated procedure of

issuing council tax summonses en masse

Fake court Summons 20

March 2012.doc


5 Sept 2013

Business Rates (NNDR) summons fraud

Business Rates summons

fraud 05 Sept 2013.pdf


25 Oct 2013

Highlighting effects of benefit reforms on cost

income / inappropriately funding council tax

FOI data 25 October


First document referred to in FOI data 25

October 2013.pdf

Total Cost of CT Admin.pdf

Second document referred to in FOI data 25

October 2013.pdf

FOI costs letters.pdf




The issues raised here will no doubt be considered by the police to be civil rather than
criminal matters because of the association with the recovery of council tax, for which
the recovery of such debt falls under the Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure of the
Magistrates Courts Act 1980. Perjury however is punishable as an offence whether it
occurs in criminal or civil proceedings and the consequences are in this case that a false
statement was made in order to commit an act of fraud.


The seriousness of the matter is compounded by the obvious knowledge by the judge
that a false and corrupt statement had been made but nevertheless proceeded to find in
the councils favour.


Because of a conflict of interest which exists if Humberside police were to deal with this
matter, it is suggested that another police force to does so (see below para 68).


North East Lincolnshire council (NELC) essentially instituted court proceedings to

enforce council tax liability even though payments were made in sufficient amount to
meet the legal obligation to pay the sums set out on the demand notice relating to my
2015/16 Council Tax liability. Ironically, at various times the account was in credit due
to over payment, but at all other times the account was up to date.


A billing authority is able to exploit its council tax processing system which allocates
payments to the earliest debt (if one exists) where payments are unspecified.
Note: A specified payment, for the purpose of NELC's processing system, is a payment
that matches exactly the instalment amount or an arranged payment plan.


A billing authority is advantaged by the costs generated for making complaint to the
Magistrates' court for engineering a non-payment scenario, by making a decision not
to re-allocate a payment which a taxpayer obviously intends reducing the indebtedness
of the current year's liability.


NELC exploited its processing system in exactly this way in my case to divert a sum
obviously intended to reduce the indebtedness of the current years liability to a sum
which was outstanding from the 2012/13 tax year and so engineered default. The
criminal implications are clear as in the context of R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2 (the
test of honesty), there is no doubt that even if the council held genuine belief that its
actions were morally justified, it must have realised that ordinary people would consider
them dishonest.
Disputed sum outstanding from previous year


The sum outstanding from 2012/13 related to court costs for a similar matter involving
NELC making complaint for non payment of council tax. That sum was disputed (the
costs) and an application to state a case for an appeal to the High Court was submitted.
That sum was suspended pending the court's decision (yet to be determined) so under no
circumstances was it permissible for NELC to exploit its processing system for
engineering default by allocating payment to that sum. A letter dated 19 July 2013 sent
by NELCs Legal Department in connection with the claim for a mandatory order, to
which will be referred later, contains the following (emphasis added):
Yourself v Grimsby Magistrates Court & NELC
I write further to the legal proceedings issued by yourself at Leeds High Court
against Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court, naming North East
Lincolnshire Council as an interested party. The papers have been passed to me
upon Mrs Conolly's departure from employment with the Local Authority.
The purpose of my writing to you is to inform you that the 60 court costs, which
you dispute, will be suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. At the
completion of those proceedings, dependent on the Court's decision, the fee will

either be withdrawn from your account or will remain outstanding to the Local
A copy of this letter has been sent to the Leeds High Court for their information.
Yours sincerely
for Group Manager Legal & Democratic Services


Even if the costs were not suspended, the sum (court costs) did not form part of any
year's council tax liability for which its system would have a parameter set to accept
specific payment (paras 4752, SD #18). Moreover, if NELC had lifted the
suspension, it could not simply be recovered by diverting payments made on the current
year's council tax because the sum then would be under enforcement. In those
circumstances, a decision about which one of a range of enforcement measures
empowered by the liability order would have had to be made to enforce the sum and
communicated to me. Despite NELC stating in a number of correspondence that I would
be notified if and when it were to resume enforcement, it never at any point conveyed
this to me (paras 7479, SD #18).


An additional concern is why it is that one of the exhibits NELC1 (copy of my current
council tax bill) itemises the sum as a separate balance from the current liability and
describes it as a sum subject to court proceedings. NELC has at the same time as
claiming to have no reason to believe that the costs were being disputed, submitted an
item of evidence to the court that states that they are. This was additional to being
highlighted in my initial representations (para 20, SD #1) which the judge missed or
ignored. The Council Tax bill states as follows:
Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings

Missing papers

On 16 October 2015, NELC served court papers by electronic transfer on myself and the
Magistrates court in respect of the 30 October 2015 court hearing. Fourteen files made
up the complete set of documents but only 9 of those which included a 'Witness
Statement' (SD #5) and exhibits 'NELC1' to 'NELC7' and 'NELC9' were successfully

transferred. Exhibits 'NELC8' and 'NELC10' to 'NELC13' were not transferred. Shortly
after NELC sent an email explaining it was having difficulty serving the court papers
and provided a link and instructions about how to download the files from an
account which NELC had created on its system which required me to log on with details
it provided after which I needed to change the password to one of my choice in order to
access the information.

I was suspicious about why it was, that only certain files could not be served, and not
happy about entering sensitive information that might get into the wrong hands, it had
after all been able to transfer most of the papers by email attachment. I identified the 5
missing files and asked if those could be emailed but made it clear I was not willing to
create an account to access the files in the way suggested.


On 19 October, NELC replied and explained it was having difficulties accessing the
electronic file and wanted to arrange a visit to my home so the paper files instead could
be handed over.


I was suspicious about why a simple task was causing such difficulties and it crossed
my mind that there might be something NELC wanted to propose (off the record) in
view of the compelling evidence against it, or if not that some other ulterior motive to
make contact. In any event, it was pretty obvious from the context of the 'Witness
Statement' that the missing content could be sourced elsewhere, for example where the
content related to case authority. NELC was therefore informed that it was unnecessary
to deliver the case bundle in paper form.


Exhibit 'NELC12' was identified in paragraph 69 of the Witness Statement to be a letter

on which NELC relied to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were
being disputed [because I had withdrawn my] application for the Judicial review of the
costs'. As it was indicated to be the letter sent to the Administrative Court Office dated
20th November 2013 my email records verified that NELC had been sent a copy and
acknowledged by way of a 'read receipt' sent 22 November 2013.


I was satisfied that not having exhibit 'NELC12' would cause no disadvantage. The
letter, however (Annex C [C-6], SD #18) does not give any cause to lead NELC to
believe that the High Court appeal (case stated) challenging the summons costs had
been withdrawn. The letter was in response to the Administrative Court's
recommendation (Annex C [C-5], SD #18) to withdraw the judicial review claim as the

process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case (SD #3) and deemed there
no longer a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was
underway. The judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application
to state a case for an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the
Magistrates' court to conform. The judicial review claim therefore was for a mandatory
order, not a 'review of the costs' and so the case stated appeal challenging the summons
costs has never been withdrawn.

It is clear from the context of that letter alone that it was only the judicial review claim
for a mandatory order that was withdrawn and that the High Court appeal challenging
the summons costs was still being pursued (draft bundle, SD #19 to #22). It is
inconceivable that the judge would have had difficulty understanding this, therefore the
reason he refused to, reinforces the assertion that he was biased in the favour of NELC.


The bias toward NELC was made plain from the way the judge turned the matter from
being a question of whether the appeal had been withdrawn to whether evidence could
be produced to support the appeal was still live. The appropriation of monies was
supported by NELC on the basis that it believed the appeal had been withdrawn, and on
that basis alone. Upon realising that NELC had made a false and corrupt 'Witness
Statement', the judge offered assistance (as a way of justifying granting a liability order)
by introducing a defence for those actions, on which NELC had not sought to rely,
thereby seeking to pervert the course of justice. The question of whether the case was
live was not a factor in NELC's decision making to engineer court proceedings; the
decision upon which NELC misappropriated payment was based on its false claim that
it believed the appeal was withdrawn.


When asked if I could provide evidence that the appeal was still live (as opposed to not
being withdrawn) the judge prevented me raising the matter that NELC had
acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read receipts' returned on
15 January, 14 February and 23 April 2014 in respect of letters dated 10 January, 13
February and 22 April 2014. Those letters, which were copies of correspondence sent to
the Justices' Clerk contained hard evidence that the high court appeal was still
being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for mandatory order was
withdrawn (Annex C [C-8], [C-9] and [C11], SD #18).


Acknowledgement of letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the failure
to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 10 January (Annex C [C-8]):

From: Mike (Gov Connect)

To: xxxx
Sent: 15 January 2014 11:50
Subject: Read: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Your message
To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)
Subject: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Sent: 10 January 2014 15:09:48
was read on 15 January 2014 11:50:32.


Acknowledgement of second letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the
failure to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 13 February (Annex C [C-9]):
From: Mike (Gov Connect)
To: xxxx
Sent: 14 February 2014 11:29 AM
Subject: Read: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Your message
To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)
Subject: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 13 February 2014 16:18:48 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London
was read on 14 February 2014 11:29:00.


Acknowledgement of letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, requesting certificate
stating that the application has been refused sent on 13 February (Annex C [C-11]):
From: Mike (Gov Connect)
To: xxxx
Sent: 23 April 2014 15:44
Subject: Read: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North
East Lincolnshire Council)
Your message
To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)
Subject: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North East
Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 22 April 2014 14:48:32 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London
was read on 23 April 2014 16:44:20.


The judge's argument in favour of NELC was apparently based on the length of time
elapsing since the Justices' Clerk gave an undertaking to set out in writing the position

regarding the appeal and advising on the next steps which were never acted on (Annex
C [C10], SD #18).

The judge ironically exploited the Magistrates Court's failure to comply with the
relevant procedure rules, thus preventing/delaying the case coming before the high
court, in order to justify granting an order for which NELC fraudulently applied. In a
twist of fate, had the appeal proceeded, it is completely rational the high court would
have made similar judgment as in a case raising the same issue (see Nicolson v
Tottenham Magistrates, SD #2) and found the Magistrates Court's granting of the costs
unlawful. Crucially, had the Magistrates' court not sought to pervert the course of justice
in that appeal (SD #23), the disputed costs would never have been incorporated into my
council tax account (suspended or otherwise) to enable NELC to fraudulently allocate
payment to, in order to engineer a further recovery cycle (and costs) for recovering the


It was conveyed to the judge that the matter in need of addressing surrounded the issues
raised in the argument he had made in support of NELC, which was the misconduct of
the Justices' Clerk that has led to wasting three years of my time. The efforts set out in
the representations (paras 715, SD #18) to ensure that the case advanced leaves no
doubt that the delay or prevention of the appeal coming before the court was in any way
my responsibility.



The missing court papers were requested again on 2 November 2015 (after the court
hearing). I was considering the options to take the matter further and wanted the files in
preparation for providing as evidence for whichever route was decided upon. NELC was
able to transfer them on this occasion and on viewing them it was obvious (especially
with regard to exhibit NELC12), that contrary to my initial view, I was disadvantaged
by not having all the papers.


Exhibit NELC12, which contained my letter withdrawing the claim for a mandatory
order and another from the Administrative Court acknowledging that instruction,
provided additional evidence that NELC had wilfully made a statement material in the
proceeding, which was known not to be true. The letters were not copies of the original;
it can be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the contents of that submission were
obtained from the same source that recorded publicly everything relevant to the matter

(Annex B, SD #18). The source was a public help forum dealing with council tax issues,
the same forum which NELC had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits

The letters contained in exhibit NELC12 had been redacted and matched the entries
that were posted on the public forum (Annex B, SD #24). The forum is the only place
from which those letters could be sourced in that redacted form. The characteristics of
the letters which NELC submitted to the court were identical to the forum posts.


Clearly NELC had not sought the original letters and had presumably as a short cut
referred to the website where all correspondence connected with the matter (albeit
redacted) where conveniently in one place. It is likely that if NELC had made use of the
forum to produce its submission, it would have been informed from the regular updates
posted that the case stated appeal was still very much being pursued.


Whether NELC did refer generally to the forum is not the deciding factor that would
determine that it knowingly made a false statement; it would however reinforce the
allegations. The crux of the matter is that the post from which the content was sourced
(NELC12) was accompanied with some commentary (see below) which reinforced the
matter in itself:
Back almost to square one.
Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.
The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates' Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.


Contents of exhibits NELC10 and NELC 11 where also sourced from public forums
but were produced from screen shots and included information such as the date to
indicate when the websites were accessed. The content in exhibit NELC12 was not
obviously produced from screen shots, but although possible it is much more likely that
the text would simply have been copied and pasted, retaining the same formatting.


These exhibits where referred to in paragraphs 66 and 67 of NELCs Witness Statement

to make the point known to the court that I was aware about the need to make an
election of payment and that I had knowledge about how the Northgate system works.


It is with disbelief that NELC could make the assumption that I intended to allocate
monies to the oldest sum (and the judge agree) when it is self evident from those
exhibits that my disputes, past and present, surround my objection to monies being
allocated that way. Clearly NELC has incriminated itself by submitting material which
fully supports it knowingly misallocating monies to a sum against my express wishes.


The remaining missing court papers all provided the case authority on which NELC
sought to rely in its Witness Statement. Though it was anticipated sourcing these cases
would not cause undue difficulty, the complete judgments were not found, only
references in other cases, which though time consuming, provided an outline of the
issues and enough to piece together a response (paras 4873, SD #18).


Exhibit NELC8 which is referred to in paras 60 and 61 of NELCs Witness Statement

relies on the case; Cory Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Turkish Steamship
"Mecca" 1897 AC 286. In para 61 (Witness Statement) the partial sentence on which
NELC sought to rely was this: When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor
and makes no appropriation to particular items, the creditor has the right of
appropriation and may exercise the right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise.


However, on viewing the exhibit after obtaining it post court hearing, there are several
references to the case which it relied on in exhibit NELC7: Devaynes V Noble 1816
merivale 529 (the Clayton case). NELC relied on that case to defend that its Council
Tax processing system allocates payments correctly if no election is made, i.e., the
earliest debts are paid first (paras 58-59, SD #5).


Returning to exhibit NELC8, it is revealed in the paragraph from which NELC quoted
in part, that the rule in Clayton's case does not apply to a case where there is no
account current between the parties:
When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor and makes no appropriation
to particular items, the creditor has the right of appropriation and may exercise the
right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise, the application of the money is
governed, not by any rigid rule of law, but by the intention of the creditor,
expressed implied or presumed. The rule in Clayton's case, (1816) 1 Mer. 585
does not apply to a case where there is no account current between the parties, nor

where from an account rendered or other circumstances, it appears that the creditor
intended, not to make any appropriation, but to reserve the right.

The judgment in exhibit NELC8 further clarifies the kind of account which the rule in
the Clayton case does not apply to in a reference to Sir W. Grant Master of the Rolls
judgment in Clayton where he distinguished one debt and account type from another:
They were all cases of distinct insulated debts, between which a plain line of
separation could be drawn. But this is the case of a banking account, where all the
sums paid in form one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any
distinct existence.


The case authority, on which NELCs software supplier bases its allocation rules with
regard to allocating unspecified payments to the oldest debt, cannot apply in a system
whereby the accounts relate, as they do in council tax, to distinct insulated debts,
between which a plain line of separation could be drawn.


Exhibit NELC13 which is referred to in para 72 of NELCs Witness Statement relies

on the case; Leeson v. Leeson (1936) 2 K.B. 156. The context of that case is not clear
from what is detailed in its statement which is limited to the following: an
appropriation of a payment cannot be inferred from an intention in the mind of the
debtor un-communicated to the creditor. It can only be inferred from circumstances
known to both parties.


Again, after obtaining the exhibit and viewing the judgment, it is clear that the authority
on which NELC sought to rely should not have been any assistance as it is obvious from
the circumstances, to which sum payment was intended. Despite not having the exhibit
NELC13, some relevant information was sourced (paras 5361, SD #18).


Not withstanding his reliance on a statement which he knew to be false, the judge acted
outside his powers by granting the order. The regulations governing council tax liability
do not give the court authority to make an order when the defendant has proved that
there is no outstanding debt. No discretion in such cases is given to impose a penalty
(especially not for ones own perverse gratification) which is what the judge did in this
case by allowing the application and granting costs, based on his own opinion differing
from mine about how, and in what manner bills are paid.


He made this obvious by raising irrelevant matters which were no ones business but my
own concerning the number of transactions, in what sum those payments were made and

the method used for paying council tax instalments. He implied that using the
enforcement process as punishment was legitimate for not paying the way NELC
preferred by the concern, which drove him to the point of enquiring if I held a bank
account and why payments werent made by standing order like everyone else.
Evidently, it was for my objection to Direct Debit as a means of paying bills that the
judge viewed it warranted for NELC to exploit its dysfunctional council tax processing
system as a means of defrauding me.

The bias could not have been more obvious when the judge referred to previous
maladministration (Annex J, SD #1), similarly in respect of misallocated payments, for
which 27 days was taken by NELC to respond and resolve the matter, by which time
reminders and a summons were wrongly issued. The facts were distorted out of all
recognition and portrayed in the courtroom to be my fault for NELCs gross error. The
judge was again noticeably irked to the point that he was motivated to make a spurious
statement which was that NELC, as a consequence, had a right to remove the statutory
instalment entitlement for subsequent years liability and demand the full sum up front.


The order was not made because there was a legal obligation, but for what appeared to
be the assistance that imposing a financial penalty might provide in coercing me into
conceding and making payments in line with the NELC's preferred method.



The Magistrates court has no discretion in the amount of costs it orders in respect of a
complaint made to the justices in the matter of council tax liability. The regulations
restrict the level so that no more than the expenditure incurred by the applicant in
respect of instituting the complaint is rechargeable to the defendant. The breakdown
(Annex F, SD #1) contained indisputable evidence that the vast majority of the costs
claimed were not incurred by NELC in respect of instituting the complaint in my case.


It was explained to him (the judge) that the costs itemised referred largely to council
resources dealing with enquiries, rescheduling and monitoring payment plans etc. and
subsidising bad debt for which none could be attributable to the issue of my summons.
A detailed analysis in this regard had in any event been submitted in the written
evidence (paras 67 and 27117, SD #1) to support that the summons costs as applied

on making complaint could not have been incurred by NELC, as set out in its
breakdown (Annex F, SD #1), therefore fraudulent.

The judge approved the level from a brief glance of the breakdown. There was nothing
in that calculation that could remotely satisfy the court that the expenditure attributed to
its standard costs was referable to the court application at the prescribed time, neither in
my individual case nor as an average of those against whom complaint was made.
However, the spreadsheet is indicative of a breakdown of NELCs expenditure for
council tax enforcement and recovery (paras 6772, SD #1) which would incorporate
impermissible costs. The application, for which NELC may claim costs, simply involves
a process to obtain the courts permission to enforce payment and nothing more. There
is no vehicle through which NELC may lawfully recharge expenditure it incurs to the
defendant beyond that process.


The law further restricts costs with the provision for incrementally applying them, first
in a sum for making complaint and the further amount (if required) on making the
application. Singly applying standard costs in respect of making complaint would be
lawful only if the authority were to forfeit the element of expenditure it incurs
subsequently in respect of the court application.


It is noted that the judge allowed NELC to succeed in pulling the wool by convincing
him that the costs had been incurred and therefore permissible but with no justification
that the expenditure was referable to the relevant legislation. It is without doubt that the
ignorance displayed by the judge was a show put on as a means to impress on the court
that the fraudulent claim was legitimate. It is alleged that the charade was to avoid being
the judge responsible for the inevitable uncovering of the massive scale fraud committed
nationally by local authorities and enabled by Her Majestys Court Service.


His acquiescence was expressed first by the way the figures, though irrelevant, appeared
to him to be comprehensively set out. It is obvious however that the elaborate
presentation was for duping anyone having to scrutinise and endorse the figures. NELC
had even prided itself on the accounts having authenticity in regard their lawfulness by
attaching auditor approval when in fact the figures were not subject to audit and
NELCs external audit contractor (KPMG) was not willing to have a reference to
District Audit on the Councils website. However, it is clear that had the figures been
subject to audit (and it is not seen why they are not) the evidence was such that NELC's
claims were not reasonable in the context of the relevant law which governs costs. It

would therefore have been appropriate that KPMG apply to the court for a declaration
that an item of account is contrary to law under section 17(1) of the Audit Commission
Act 1998.

In another demonstration of over willingness to accept the figure, the judge attributed
justifying the costs on the basis of the materially irrelevant fact that the cost per
summons which on the breakdown presented to him had been rounded down from
63.05 to 60.00. He had, it appears, purposely allowed this to divert attention from the
relevant matter which was that the majority of the costs were impermissible under the
regulations. The judge did not, or it appears he did not read or account for the
representations that showed without any doubt that the vast majority of costs were
unlawful (paras 73115, SD #1).
Inflating the standard costs to factor in bad debt element


NELCs breakdown provided the required data to determine the amount of bad debt
arising from waived or unrecoverable costs that was added to the standard sum. At least
42% of taxpayers against whom complaint was made were summonsed without costs
applied which had the effect of inflating the standard summons costs by around 25 for
those who did have them applied (paras 7982, SD #1).


The breakdown also provided information to inform the person scrutinising it that the
gross recoverable costs under the Council Tax budget was attributable to resources
taken up dealing with queries relating to the recovery. The amount was taken (budget
figure around 0.8m) as a ratio of calls arising from summonses to calls arising from
reminders that do not result in a summons. Based on the Councils computing method,
this adds 18 to the cost per summons. None of this was lawfully incurred by NELC in
respect of my summons simply because the calculation was founded on assumptions
that each person against whom complaint was made had taken up resources by engaging
with staff in some way in matters connected with the summons (paras 8386, SD #1).


Similarly the element attributed to the standard sum from the recoverable costs under
the Debt Recovery budget adds a sum (31) which has been determined unlawfully.
Assumptions are made that each person against whom complaint is made gives cause
for recovery staff to carry out their various functions. In my case no resources were
called upon to negotiate or re-schedule any payment plan and the whole element of costs
relevant to the Debt Recovery budget can not be lawfully justified (paras 87102, SD

#1). The same goes for the Control & Monitoring budget which accounts for around
10 of the standard costs. As a consequence of having no re-scheduled payment plan, it
is fraudulent to claim costs for monitoring one (paras 103111, SD #1).
Costs to be no more than that incurred by the authority in any individual case

The amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case must be no more than that
reasonably incurred by the billing authority (para 51, SD #1). Therefore, if NELC
wanted to take advantage of streamlining the administration process by applying a
standard sum in all cases (paras 4751, SD #1), in order for it to be done lawfully, it
would need to forfeit each element of expenditure it incurs that is not common to every
application (the majority of costs which are accounted for in its breakdown).


In other words, a standard sum could not exceed that incurred by the authority in a case
where the least expenditure is attributed, which would in practice relate to a taxpayer
settling his outstanding debt on receipt of a summons without contacting the council on
any issue. Deriving a figure therefore from the Gross Recoverable costs which is split
between an estimated number of summons, can not be lawful; even less so if the number
of summons is reduced to factor in an estimate for those withdrawn, waived and those in
respect of unrecoverable costs. The least cost case is the only basis on which to
determine a standard sum if the aim is to eliminate the administrative burden of
calculating the costs in each case, whilst at the same time complying with the
regulations which require that the costs be no more than that incurred by the authority in
any individual case.
If the Regulations were applied lawfully, the consequences would be that the majority of
Council Tax (191,730), Debt Recovery (327,480) and the Control & Monitoring
costs (109,380) would not be permissible in respect of re-charging expenditure for
instituting the complaint. What is set-out above should have been enough to alert the
judge that NELC's claims were not reasonable in the context of the relevant law and
should therefore have, as legally required, sought to award lower costs accordingly. The
number of taxpayers summonsed in relation to the monthly council tax liability hearing
held on 2 October 2015 totalled 942. If the standard 60 costs were applied in each case
there would have been raised in excess of 56k which would account for approximately
10 times an amount had they been properly referable to the law governing them.

Unquestionable Bias

Representations submitted to the court argued a case in the context of the relevant
enforcement power which was ignored in its entirety by the judge who made his
decision in favour of NELC from briefly viewing a copy of irrelevant accounts relating
to its council tax enforcement and recovery budget.


The ease with which the judge was swayed in favour of NELC was demonstrated with
the statement that implied that the costs must be reasonable from a reference made to
other authorities standard costs, and that the ruling in Nicolson v Tottenham
Magistrates (SD #2) had not determined that the level was unlawful. From that it is
clear that he had not read/understood (or pretended not to have) the judgment provided
as a supporting document, which at paragraph 57 said; looking to see whether the costs
were broadly in line with costs being charged by other local authorities was all well and
good, but it was not enough to discharge the courts obligations (paras 4751, SD #1).
And in the judgment the distinction was clear at para 52 that establishing that the costs
were reasonably incurred is not the same thing as establishing that the costs were
reasonable in amount.


It is obvious from the comment referring to the Nicolson case that the point had been
missed as the issue did not exclusively revolve around the level. What was provided in
that judgment regarding the relevant regulations was some general guidance as to their
interpretation and scope (para 36, SD #2). The degree to which that guidance and
interpretation extended is evident in the judgment from paragraph 33 onwards. There
was nothing in that breakdown which would suggest anything other than that it being an
account of its expenditure incurred in connection with council tax enforcement and
Costs set at levels for improper purposes


It was summarised (paras 118130, SD #1) how NELC historically manipulated costs
unlawfully in order to generate income to meet a number of different objectives. The
apparent blind eye the judge turned to this can not give the public confidence in the
justice system. It is one thing having local authorities operating fraudulently but quite
another when the Magistrates court blatantly endorses it.


In 2001/02 court costs had been set with the admitted intention of encouraging prompt
payment (as well as generating additional income) that came with the threat of a more

severe financial penalty. It is well established that costs should be awarded as

compensation, not as punishment. In R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou [1954] 1
ALL ER 406 it was held that costs should not exceed the proper costs incurred and
should not be a penalty.

Another summary set out that in 2002/03 summons costs were increased by 50% in
order to raise additional revenue to meet funding to pay for additional staff to ensure a
backlog of work that had arisen due to changes in the IT system were addressed. In
Attfield v the London Borough of Barnet [2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin), it was held that a
local authority must not attempt to raise revenue where there is no clear statutory power
to do so. In the present case, the statutory power expressly limits costs that may be
claimed to the expenditure incurred by the Council in connection with instituting the
complaint. The decision to increase summons costs did not arise because of an increase
in the cost of instituting the complaint, rather for the clear intention of funding
additional resources to overcome the backlog of work that had arisen in the
administration of Council Tax etc., due to delays in implementing a new IT system.


Another summarised how NELC manipulated court costs to provide additional income
as an alternative to charging for non-statutory services. The summons costs were
increased in preference to an alternative proposal of introducing a charge for garden
waste collections. Summons costs were therefore increased disproportionately, with no
statutory power to do so, in order to plug a gap in its finances for the purposes of
offsetting expenditure for waste services.


Finally the existence of a budgeted income stream for court costs was highlighted which
was evident from published reports showing outturn variances for this income. A report
relating to the 2004/05 financial year indicated that the costs were set at a level such that
a significant surplus was achievable, which in that year amounted to 0.125 million. The
Council had therefore raised revenue for an improper purpose, namely to prop up other
budgets. Apart from being fundamentally unlawful, the whole approach suggests that
the system is clearly open to abuse with income targets unquestionably creating a
perverse incentive to summons.


What has been allowed to happen, with the court as an accomplice can only be
described as daylight robbery committed with arrogant impunity by NELC. There is no

doubt that the judge had acted with intent to pervert the course of justice as he had
before him indisputable evidence that a false and corrupt statement had been made.
Granting an order therefore made him complicit in NELC's criminal actions that sought
to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes of defrauding me with an attached
claim of costs.

The criminally obtained court order was not the only issue, as the costs awarded were
fraudulent in amount. The only logical reason for the judge denying existence of the
representations contesting them is because had they been considered, its not seen how
they could have been feasibly challenged. The judges responsibility entailed overseeing
the full transfer of 56,000 from defendants to NELC in respect of that one hearing no
matter how fraudulent the claim. A proper consideration of the evidence therefore
would have made that job impossible and why it was ignored. The crucial role played by
Grimsby Magistrates court in ensuring the income generated for NELC continues at
current levels would explain why in respect of the High Court application appealing
these costs the court has prevented proceedings for three years through means of lies
and deception.


There are a number of correspondence itemised in the list of supporting documents

relating to previous concerns raised with Humberside police on a similar theme which
were never properly investigated then (SD #2531). The same can be said for concerns
relating to bailiff fraud (not included). Humberside polices Economic crime unit has,
over a number of years, concentrated its effort into challenging the evidence gathered to
avoid dealing with the allegations thus protecting the accused and enabling them
without consequence to continue their criminal activity. It would therefore be reasonable
to suspect that Humberside police, along with Grimsby Magistrates court and NELC is
complicit in the fraudulent raising of revenue through unscrupulous means. In light of
that, it would seem a conflict of interest if Humberside police were to deal with these
allegations and so it would seem a reasonable suggestion for another police force to do
so. This is especially the case with it being my intention to pursue action against all
those officers who have been party to the misconduct, cover-ups, negligence and lies
etc. There is in any event, no reason to have confidence that the matter would be
properly dealt with by Humberside polices Economic crime officers as Ive found to
my cost from several years being fobbed off by them.


The allegations which point to a criminal conspiracy between NELC and the court are
summarised below:
NELC for committing;
a. Perjury by making a statement (material in the proceedings) that was
known to be false with the intention misleading the court to justify
misallocating payment to a disputed sum
b. Fraud by engineering default for the current year enabling a further court
application for the purposes of attaching a claim of costs and potential
bailiff charges which have been threatened already in a letter dated 8
November 2015
c. Fraud by claiming a level of costs both in my individual case and in
general which are not provided for under the Council Tax (Administration
and Enforcement) Regulations 1992

District Judge Daniel Curtis for;

a. Perverting the course of justice knowing that before him was evidence
that a false and corrupt statement had been made
b. Complicity in NELCs fraudulent application for liability order by,
i) granting the order knowing that a false statement had been made
ii) ignoring evidence contesting payment allocation laws were breached
ii) ignoring evidence contesting costs (level) breaching the Council Tax
(Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated this 2nd day of December 2015