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1. Director of Lands vs. CA G.R. No. 102858 July 28/97
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5]
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned
to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. The land
registration court in its decision dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.”
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land
since 1938.
A petition for land registration was denied because “for want of jurisdiction”. A
jurisdiction is anchored on the compliance of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. The RTC however found that the applicants through their predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the
subject land since 1938. not
The applicant therein failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Thus, the lower court did not acquired
jurisdiction over the land registration case.

Not satisfied private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,
as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. In turn the Petitioner
elevated the case to the Supreme Court with the Solicitor General representing him.

Whether newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in original land
registration case is mandatory or directory.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside because
publication in the Official Gazette is not sufficient enough to confer jurisdiction upon
the lower court. The cited provision therein (Sec. 23 PD 1529) is stated in clear and
categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer

jurisdiction upon the land registration court. The demands of statutory construction
and the due process is very compelling.

ad litem (ad II-tern or -t;}m). [Latin "for the suit"] (I8c)For the purposes of the
suit; pending the suit.See guardian ad litem under GUARDIAN.

in rem [in rém] adjective

directed at property: describes something such as a
law or right made about or directed at property rather than a person. See also in

2. Pascual vs. Pascual Bautista G.R. No. 84240 March 25/92
1903 – Old Civil Code
1950- New Civil Code
1988 – NCC amended with Family Code
Art. 992 was not abolished

ab intestato (ab in-tes-tay-toh), adv. [Latin] By intestacy<succession ab
intestato is often treated as being necessary because of the neglect or misfortune
of the deceased proprietor>. Cf. EX TESTAMENTO.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI
of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband Don Andres Pascual.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Yes because Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. With that request. it is an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal. Mapa y Mapulong G." . their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. Cal. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. No. that he has neither a permit nor license to possess the same. During the hearing. People vs. 22 together with live ammunitions. appellant’s counsel explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm. appellant’s counsel was asked to stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case. 3. L-22301 August 30/67 SUMMARY OF FACTS: Appellant Mario Mapa y Mapulong was convicted by the lower court for having in his possession and under his custody and control one unlicensed home-made revolver (Paltik). are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual contrary to the statement made by the oppositors. A compromise agreement was entered into by the mentioned heirs over the vehement objections of petitioners who subsequently filed the instant petition to the Highest Tribunal. According to the Supreme Court. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a brick wall in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.R.Petitioners was acknowledged twice in various documents by Adela Soldevilla de Pascual where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual.

he is not exempt. Furthermore.R. No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.00 in line with the present policy. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years. 4 months and 1 day. to 20 years of reclusion temporal the penalty should be imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances. is still reclusion perpetua. the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which.R. As such. Gavarra. Masangkay and PP vs. 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is also clear that there is no provision for a secret agent like appellant. 4. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. Sec. Sec.000. PP vs. The Court found that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses. due to the death of the victim. Failing to secure a reversal of the decision. Amigo G. 4. 116719 January 18/96 SUMMARY OF FACTS: Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder. Atencio) for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. Subsequently. People vs. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The lower court’s decision was affirmed. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The appealed decision was AFFIRMED. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30. Estrada vs. No. conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced. After trial. Revised Administrative Code was very explicit. the Judge found the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art. NAA PA DUGANG 5. Sandiganbayan G. the case went to the Supreme Court for automatic review. 148560 November 19/01 SUMMARY OF FACTS: . This is the penalty the Court imposed on all the accused-appellants (in three cases PP vs. an amended Information was filed charging now the crime of murder.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein. Series of 1932. These blunders.A. Province of Ilocos Sur. 2. conduct and conditions required or forbidden. conviction resulted and a fine was imposed.Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was accused of committing the crime of Plunder. No. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will. there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law. 1. and the word “pattern” in Sec. for violating Section 2. No. and the act complained of. defined and penalized under R. 4. While the appeal was pending. lamented the failure of the law to provide for definite meaning of the terms “combination” and “series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. . Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. People vs. 6. of said municipality. however. 5. violative of his fundamental right to due process. or because of the employment of terms without defining them. which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Petitioner. 7659. Municipal Ordinance No. can be gathered from the whole act. as amended by RA 7659. as amended by Sec. par. or at least. the municipal council repealed section 2 in question. (d). From that decision this appeal was brought. Besides. Tamayo 61 Phil 225 SUMMARY OF FACTS: CRISANTO TAMAYO was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal. which repeal was duly approved by the provincial board.A. and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts. is now legal in that municipality. reduced the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and denied him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. instead of being a violation of the municipal ordinances. and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear. hence. and Sec. 7080.[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. according to petitioner. is constitutional. 12 of R.

The first set is composed of Alfredo Tano and nine others who were criminally charged for violation of various local ordinances in the Province of Palawan. Office Order No. of course. all of whom. alleged private association of several marine merchants -.R. The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is. formerly denounced. 2. The second set of petitioners merely claims that they being fishermen or marine merchants. Socrates G. 33. 15-92.are natural persons who claim to be fishermen. Tano vs. Ordinance No. the legislative intent as has been shown by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The first set of petitioners does not have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari. and it would be illogical for the Supreme Court to attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists. . dated 19 February 1993 is constitutional. 23. No. dated 22 January 1993 and SP Resolution No. they would be adversely affected by the ordinances. Series of 1993. Series of 1993. and no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts.STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not the action against the accused should be dismissed as a result of the absolute repeal of Section 2 of the Municipal Ordinance. The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77). SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Since the repeal was absolute. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not SP Ordinance No. to temporarily restrain public respondents from proceeding with their criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. is no longer deemed criminal. What they did was a long leap from the municipal courts to the highest court of the land thereby offensively disregarding the hierarchy of courts. 110249 August 21/97 SUMMARY OF FACTS: There are two sets of petitioners in this case. dated 15 December 1992. except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -.

R. CA G. the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. 8. their “exploration. and under Sections 149. pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2." STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is criminally liable for violating R.. good customs and public policy. Article XII of the Constitution. Ramirez vs." contrary to morals. and in case of doubt.[29] In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause). marine resources belong to the State.”[28] Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. 93833 September 25/95 SUMMARY OF FACTS: Petitioner Soccoro D. Garcia using the verbatim transcript of the event alleging among others that private respondent allegedly vexed. In statutory construction. entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication. 4200 is untenable.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that “[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. and other purposes. Ramirez stands accused of violating Republic Act 4200.” The centrepiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned. particularly a violation of R.. which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power. insulted and humiliated petitioner in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. development and utilization .In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine. shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." It was learned that Petitioner electronically and secretly taped the confrontation with private respondent without the latter’s knowledge.A. 447 (a) (1) (vi). legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. the law is . 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi). Early on she filed a civil case against private respondent Ester S. and.A 4200. any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.

explain her side. There being no evidence to show an authorized. 1984. Consequently. 4200. 10. not only to be entitled to reinstatement. she had every right. manager for technical operations. 1984.R. "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R. Subsequently Petitioner notified private respondent in writing that effective November 8. she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings. to full back wages. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Salazar’s eventual separation from employment was valid. NLRC G. Before she was dismissed. but as well.Basbacio vs. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The Supreme Court held that Salazar’s eventual separation from employment was not for cause because her security of tenure was maliciously interrupted by GMRC when it illegally dismissed Salazar for failure to rebut the allegations found in the investigation. 9. Office of the Secretary of the DOJ G. No. Salazar who was illegally dismissed in connection with the alleged missing company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar. 82511 March 3/92 SUMMARY OF FACTS: Petitioner GMRC was the employer of private respondent Imelda L. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to. cause for the dismissal of private respondent. Globe Mackay vs. effective October 9.A. private respondent Salazar was placed under preventive suspension for one (1) month.R 109445 SUMMARY OF FACTS: .applied according to its express terms. much less a legal. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded.

3 (a). 7309. Act No. By this acquittal he filed for a claim for compensation as contemplated in Sec. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Petitioner's contention has no merit. Rep. Petitioner having failed to clinch a favourable decision resorted to the Supreme Court for a reversal of the Secretary’s decision. Such a reading of sec. Rep. respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. 3 (a). convicted. On appeal. imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." . Petitioner appealed and successfully got a judgment of acquittal. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to the claim of compensation in accordance with Sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused. 7309 at the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice but was denied. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Thereafter they were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled. Act No.Petitioner and his son-in-law were convicted of murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of two others.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The reason for the promulgation of R. 1992. to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. more particularly. 104712 SUMMARY OF FACTS: Petitioner Manuel T. and provide for the necessary implementing details.A. for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. 3 of R. having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. honest.R. it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. He claims that the second proviso of par. and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations. Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large. . . but by district . which requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district.A. 1861 which states in part: This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution Nos. peaceful and credible elections. . NO. He prays. 3. . Sec.MIDTERM CASE DIGESTS 1. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque. Specifically. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free. as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. 1992 elections. 7166. (d) of Sec. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. (c). 3 thereof. Manuel T. 2313. COMELEC G. 2379 and 92-010 are valid. particularly Sec. De Guia vs. He would consequently lean on par. which immediately succeeds par. (c). Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions. orderly. Metro Manila.

WHEREAS. in the case of provinces. public hearings.That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R. (b) and (c) have already . 1991. a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. and consensustaking with the different sectors in the community. pursuant to. to the Congress of the Philippines. c. 7166. which are all single-districts. This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. b. and approved by the President of the Philippines on November 26. compactness. the recommendation of the Commission on Elections aforestated. in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11. 3 of R. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. 8 Thus. 2379. among others. particularly Section 3 thereof. 2313. Thus — WHEREAS. no municipality. apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of population. and under pars.A. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11. the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment are as follows: a. shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts. in the case of cities and municipalities.A. and no barangay. the Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area. synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process. directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit. the Commission on Elections. 1992. contiguity and adjacentness of territory. the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166. WHEREAS. adopting among others. after consultation. WHEREAS. and in implementation of Republic Act 7166. 1992 synchronized elections recommended. the Commission promulgated Resolution No. the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats.

1992. Cebu and Davao. they shall continue to be elected by district. although under par.A. 1992. (2) for provinces with single legislative districts. 3 of R. on the part of respondent. But beginning the regular elections of 1995. finding no abuse of discretion. which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. (c). Then. (d). much less grave. elections. 1992. As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R. (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts. COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area. WHEREFORE. petitioner must fall. No costs.A. e. where he stands. they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11. and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. the single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise singledistricts.A. . They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11. although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.been apportioned into two (2) districts. 7166. it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. the cities of Manila. which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. That is the true import of par. By then.. (c). that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila. consequently. (d). as We view it. elections.g. will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. they will henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11. 7166. the instant petition is DISMISSED. they will all have to be elected by district. 7166. as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. and for lack of merit. they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district. (a). (b).

78687 SUMMARY OF FACTS: The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. CA G. the spouses Elena Salenillas. to place the property in the possession of the private respondent. 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. 1983. the trial court judge on October 12. 1975. Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2. the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. in favor of the spouses.00. extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding was instituted by the Bank and against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27. 1981.R. Daet. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.00. the petitioners again mortgaged the property. attempted on November 17.2. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. Salenillas vs. Petitioners made a formal offer to repurchase the property. this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: . 192765. P-1248. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer. the spouses’ daughter and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900. The Enciso spouses sold the property in favor of the petitioners. issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. Having failed to pay their loan. or on December 4. 1983. Later. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however. The private respondent won the bid and ultimately a “Sheriff’s Final Deed" was issued to him on July 12. 500. Florencia H.

The cases pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act. or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance. present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists. and. and the second. whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed. In both instances. the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale. Consequently. she may therefore validly repurchase. petitioner Elena Salenillas. it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee. or other legal heirs. is a "legal heir" of the latter. 1983. . in speaking of "legal heirs. with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12. Section 119 of the Public Land Act. As such. patentees of the contested property. on August 31. his widow. and even on this score alone.Whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans. when proper. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Yes. his widow. the mortgages were foreclosed. 1981. At the very least. and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27. provides in full: Sec. the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. and not otherwise. the Court ruled that the five-year period to repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser. 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year period. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent. 119. upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness." makes no distinction. shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant. From the foregoing legal provision. on the other hand. has no legal basis. 1983. formally. being a child of the Encisos. as amended. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-inlaw of the Encisos.

Chua vs. we ought not to distinguish. . No. From or by necessity of law. 88979 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Civil Service Commission G. A case omitted is to be held as (intentionally) omitted. Lydia O. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. ex necessitate legis.3. Where the law does not distinguish.R. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Ubi lex non distinguit. nee nos distinguere debemus.

casual and emergency employees. Those qualified to avail of its benefits are the appointive officials and employees of the National Government. as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. and oppressive. we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Lydia Chua is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. unjustified. Petitioner Lydia Chua filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. regardless of age. denied the same. In the interest of substantial justice. 6683 is unreasonable. that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. however. her application must be . and so holds. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Republic Act No. Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. temporary. While the application was filed after expiration of her term. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The Court believes. Believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. instead.SUMMARY OF FACTS: Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy. as well as the personnel of all local government units. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 6683.

to the discussion of the evidence in the record. denied. There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for reconsideration. he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. is. Pinuila. Yet. confining himself as he does. the petition is GRANTED. the motion for reconsideration filed in this case. contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.R. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. L-11374. after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy. L-14129 SUMMARY OF FACTS: STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not the remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits have placed accused twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. supra). appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy. as it is hereby. G. when defendantappellee filed his brief. 1961 and People vs. be deemed to have waived his constitutional right thereunder.R. In his appeal brief.granted. No. defendant Manantan could have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. February 16. When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal.(People vs. L-15309. therefore. 1958. however. No. He must. Manantan G. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that defense may be waived. and. The Court. 4. May 30. Rosalina Casiano. PP vs. Pinuila. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS. . This is in accord with this Court's ruling in the cases of People vs. WHEREFORE. Then again. does not believe that they were well taken. on neither occasion did he do so. No.R. G.

Inc.R. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. vs. 72005 SUMMARY OF FACTS: . It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again. consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack. Mananang G. supra). Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious. No costs. Philippine British Assurance Co. the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. SO ORDERED.5. vs. Inc. 33140 SUMMARY OF FACTS: STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether OCT No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. Intermediate Appellate Court G.M Tuazon & Co.R. Navarro. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. vs. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: No." (Varsity Hills. J. No. 6.

. During the pendency of the suit. 3 The latter in turn posted a counter bond in the sum of P1.. 400. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on September 25. shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. Inc. and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment under his counterbond. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Yes. so the attached properties were released. 110898 SUMMARY OF FACTS: . 7. filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Inc. is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. No. PP vs. WHEREFORE. Under Section 17..00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co. 000. The rule therefore. (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner. of the Rules of Court. in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on the counterbond.R.Sycwin Coating & Wires. Rule 57. Judge Evangelista G.

Valdehueza on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted private respondent’s application for probation in its order of April 23. 1990 had taken effect. [private respondent] is. 1993. The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court. The ruling of the RTC that “[h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision. After the case was repromulgated private respondent applied for probation but was recommended for denial by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. therefore. when he could have then applied for probation. Hence this petition by the prosecution. 1992.Private respondent Grildo S. Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28. After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its minimum period. private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. it is covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. since under the law an application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same . On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent’s conviction but reduced his sentence by imposing on him an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor.D. 1990” is an obvious misreading of the law. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide. as minimum. private respondent waived the right to make his application. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: The Court holds that it did. after P. as maximum. No. to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. not covered by [the amendment in] P.D.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati. 1987. Cecilio S. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23. De Villa vs. Metro Manila and therefore. After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination. the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. SO ORDERED. Court of Appeals. Tugonon is SET ASIDE. WHEREFORE. 8.R. in Llamado v. Sunga. 87416 SUMMARY OF FACTS: On October 5.10 it was held that the petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for probation. Undaunted petitioner ran for succour in the High Court. and after having failed to clinch a favourable decision. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.” Accordingly.“after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant. No. petitioner moved to dismiss the Information. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: Yes. de Villa was charged before the court with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 wherein the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank . petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA and again met the same fate. CA G. . 162 SCRA 191 [1988]). 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private respondent Grildo S. petitioner Cecilio S.

. On March 14. No.It will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank. which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof. Inc. . pursuant to Republic Act No. 1988: Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B. Jimenez G. it used to import from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. . Blg. Hon. foreign checks. Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General. 22)." The auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.R. transportation and other charges incident thereto. L-14787 SUMMARY OF FACTS: The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines. maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor. . sodium benzoate. . For every importation made of these materials. sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate. 1956. 9. In the course of their daily business activities. Colgate-Palmolive vs. transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5. . are within the coverage of said law. the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. as amended.P. stabilizer and flavors . 601. provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid basing on section 2 of Republic Act 601.

Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream. Act No. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: It is exempted. Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in . the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig. Migrino G. Hon.958. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law. 10.13. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them. Private respondent moved to dismiss. 89433 SUMMARY OF FACTS: The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Act No. Metro Manila. RP vs. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret. does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. as amended.R. The Board opposed.preparation or manufacture of food or food products.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof. 3019. WHEREFORE. as amended. the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for review. we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. and Rep. 1379. (Republic Act No. According to petitioners. Not satisfied. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction. No.

1 and related executive orders. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: NO. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.O.O. but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. dummy. without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so.Executive Orders 1. that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. relative. similar to the immediate family member. Nos. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. not connected with his being a crony. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres.O. . business associate. business associate. and close associate in E.O. TRO was made permanent. that is – [w]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things. such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent. etc. No. agent. 2. Marcos and/or his wife. The term “subordinate” as used in E. by words of a particular and specific meaning. 2. 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him. No. 1 and the close relative. or nominee in E. No. are acts of his own alone. Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent.

safety and peace and order. whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force. or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner". STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether Presidential Decree No. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: No.R. 772. 48886-88 . which penalizes squatting and similar acts. applies to agricultural lands. PP vs. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.R. intimidation or threat. Commissioner of Customs vs. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. 12. No. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. Court of Tax Appeal G. L-47757-61 SUMMARY OF FACTS: On October 25. No. 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. Hon. Before the accused could be arraigned. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy". Eschaves G. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health.11. Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9.

33-73 dated March 29. Petitioner has not cited or brought to our attention. prompting private respondent to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs who. said memorandum circular indicates the specific law (Public Act. Commonwealth Act. Moreover. 1973. 1978 in favour of private respondent STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade. affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs. and we have found none. is liable to the payment of the berthing charge under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code. any law creating Kiwalan Port as a national port or converting it to one. a private corporation. does not accord the status of national port to the port of Kiwalan. as amended by Presidential Decree No. . thereafter rendered a decision on July 28. SUPREME COURT’S RULING: No because the Bureau of Customs itself in its Customs Memorandum Circular No. however. the tax court. Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of Customs for refund of the berthing fees paid under protest. 34.SUMMARY OF FACTS: The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of Iligan Express Corporation. Republic Act or Executive Order) creating a particular national port. which. It is where several ocean-going vessels of private respondent docked every now and then and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which were paid by private respondent under protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan denied the protest. Consolidating the protests. Private respondent then resorted to the Court of Tax Appeals. nor does the list of national ports appended thereto include the port of Kiwalan. which berths at a privately owned wharf or pier.

operator or master of the vessel is liable for this charge. wharf. however. river or canal under the jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines: Provided. 2901. DE VILLA G. The owner. — Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel for mooring or berthing at a pier. or for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed. GEN. the charge shall be fifty (50%) per cent of rates provided for in cases of piers without cargo shed in the succeeding sections. 1991 SUMMARY OF FACTS: STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: SUPREME COURT’S RULING: . channel. agent. 13.R.Definition. B/GEN. bulk-head-wharf. or for coming or mooring within any slip. COURT OF APPEALS SUMMARY OF FACTS: STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE: SUPREME COURT’S RULING: 14.Sec. No. river or channel marginal wharf at any national port in the Philippines. CESAR URSUA VS. RENATO S. 93177 August 2. That in the last instance. basin. JOSE COMENDADOR vs.