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1. Director of Lands vs. CA G.R. No. 102858 July 28/97

Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5]
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned
to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. The land
registration court in its decision dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land
since 1938.
A petition for land registration was denied because for want of jurisdiction. A
jurisdiction is anchored on the compliance of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. The RTC however found that the applicants through their predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the
subject land since 1938. not
The applicant therein failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Thus, the lower court did not acquired
jurisdiction over the land registration case.

Not satisfied private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,

as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. In turn the Petitioner
elevated the case to the Supreme Court with the Solicitor General representing him.

Whether newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in original land

registration case is mandatory or directory.


The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside because
publication in the Official Gazette is not sufficient enough to confer jurisdiction upon
the lower court. The cited provision therein (Sec. 23 PD 1529) is stated in clear and
categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer

jurisdiction upon the land registration court. The demands of statutory construction
and the due process is very compelling.

ad litem (ad II-tern or -t;}m). [Latin "for the suit"] (I8c)For the purposes of the
suit; pending the suit.See guardian ad litem under GUARDIAN.

in rem [in rm] adjective

directed at property: describes something such as a

law or right made about or directed at property rather than a person. See also in

2. Pascual vs. Pascual Bautista G.R. No. 84240 March 25/92

1903 Old Civil Code
1950- New Civil Code
1988 NCC amended with Family Code
Art. 992 was not abolished

ab intestato (ab in-tes-tay-toh), adv. [Latin] By intestacy<succession ab

intestato is often treated as being necessary because of the neglect or misfortune
of the deceased proprietor>. Cf. EX TESTAMENTO.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI
of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband Don Andres Pascual.

Petitioners was acknowledged twice in various documents by Adela Soldevilla de

Pascual where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are
among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual contrary to the statement made by the
A compromise agreement was entered into by the mentioned heirs over the
vehement objections of petitioners who subsequently filed the instant petition to
the Highest Tribunal.
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Yes because Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a brick wall in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
According to the Supreme Court, it is an elementary rule in statutory construction
that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says.

3. People vs. Mapa y Mapulong G.R. No. L-22301 August 30/67

Appellant Mario Mapa y Mapulong was convicted by the lower court for having in his
possession and under his custody and control one unlicensed home-made revolver
(Paltik), Cal. 22 together with live ammunitions. During the hearing, appellants
counsel was asked to stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit nor license to possess the same.
With that request, appellants counsel explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."


Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to
the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The lower courts decision was affirmed. Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No.
4, Revised Administrative Code was very explicit. Furthermore, Sec. 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code is also clear that there is no provision for a secret
agent like appellant. As such, he is not exempt.

4. People vs. Amigo G.R. No. 116719 January 18/96

Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder. Subsequently, due to
the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime
of murder. After trial, the Judge found the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. Failing to secure a reversal of the decision, the case went to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
Whether or not reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1
day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal the penalty should be imposed for the crime
of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying
The appealed decision was AFFIRMED. The Court found that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses,
the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted
and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty the Court imposed on
all the accused-appellants (in three cases PP vs. Gavarra, PP vs. Masangkay and PP
vs. Atencio) for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with
the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is
affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the
present policy. NAA PA DUGANG
5. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560 November 19/01

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was accused of committing the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659. Petitioner, however, lamented the failure of the law to provide for definite
meaning of the terms combination and series" in the key phrase "a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
pattern in Sec. 4. These blunders, according to petitioner, reduced the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and denied him
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
Whether or not RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is constitutional.
The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2
is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much
less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.

6. People vs. Tamayo 61 Phil 225

CRISANTO TAMAYO was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal,
Province of Ilocos Sur, for violating Section 2, Municipal Ordinance No. 5, Series of
1932, of said municipality. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. From that decision this appeal was
While the appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question,
which repeal was duly approved by the provincial board, and the act complained of,
instead of being a violation of the municipal ordinances, is now legal in that


Whether or not the action against the accused should be dismissed as a result of
the absolute repeal of Section 2 of the Municipal Ordinance.
Since the repeal was absolute, the legislative intent as has been shown by the
action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced, is no
longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for the Supreme Court to attempt
to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.

7. Tano vs. Socrates G.R. No. 110249 August 21/97

There are two sets of petitioners in this case. The first set is composed of Alfredo
Tano and nine others who were criminally charged for violation of various local
ordinances in the Province of Palawan.
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering
seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
-- an alleged private association of several marine merchants -- are natural persons
who claim to be fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to temporarily
restrain public respondents from proceeding with their criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have
been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claims that they being
fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the
Whether or not SP Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, Office Order No.
23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993 and SP Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No.
2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993 is constitutional.
The first set of petitioners does not have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no
special and important reason or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been
adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. What they did was a long leap
from the municipal courts to the highest court of the land thereby offensively
disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State,
and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
The centrepiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as expressly mandated
by the Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly
provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.
Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted
in favor of the local government unit concerned,[28] Devolution refers to the act by
which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.[29]
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the
LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the
General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi)
and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the
validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

8. Ramirez vs. CA G.R. 93833 September 25/95

Petitioner Soccoro D. Ramirez stands accused of violating Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." It was learned that Petitioner
electronically and secretly taped the confrontation with private respondent without
the latters knowledge. Early on she filed a civil case against private respondent
Ester S. Garcia using the verbatim transcript of the event alleging among others
that private respondent allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated petitioner in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
Whether or not Petitioner is criminally liable for violating R.A 4200.
Petitioners Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200 is untenable. In
statutory construction, legislative intent is determined principally from the language
of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is

applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to
an injustice. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.

9. Globe Mackay vs. NLRC G.R. No. 82511 March 3/92

Petitioner GMRC was the employer of private respondent Imelda L. Salazar who was
illegally dismissed in connection with the alleged missing company equipment and
spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar, manager for
technical operations. Before she was dismissed, private respondent Salazar was
placed under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984,
thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. Subsequently
Petitioner notified private respondent in writing that effective November 8, 1984,
she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
Whether or not Imelda Salazars eventual separation from employment was valid.
The Supreme Court held that Salazars eventual separation from employment was
not for cause because her security of tenure was maliciously interrupted by GMRC
when it illegally dismissed Salazar for failure to rebut the allegations found in the
investigation. There being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be
entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full back wages.

10.Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary of the DOJ G.R 109445


Petitioner and his son-in-law were convicted of murder and of two counts of
frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of two others.
Thereafter they were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained
after their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner appealed and successfully got a
judgment of acquittal. By this acquittal he filed for a claim for compensation as
contemplated in Sec. 3 (a), Rep. Act No. 7309 at the Board of Claims of the
Department of Justice but was denied. On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice
affirmed the Board's ruling. Petitioner having failed to clinch a favourable decision
resorted to the Supreme Court for a reversal of the Secretarys decision.
Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to the claim of compensation in accordance
with Sec. 3 (a), Rep. Act No. 7309.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute
is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in
question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read:
"The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person
who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."


1. Manuel T. De Guia vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 104712
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January
1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of
respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par.
(c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into districts of said
municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will
be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which
immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of
these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in
the May 11, 1992 elections.
We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some
framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3
thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the
sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress.


Whether or not Resolution Nos. 2313, 2379 and 92-010 are valid.


The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of
Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:

This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and
provide for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and
measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted
for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .

That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is

reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No.
2379. Thus

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of

candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections
recommended, among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the
districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan seats;

WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and
approved by the President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting
among others, the recommendation of the Commission on Elections

WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166,

particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No.
2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars
concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensustaking with the different sectors in the community, the Project of District
Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the

district apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and
adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the 1990
census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no
barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or
apportioned into different districts.

This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also

manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of
the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the
sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11,
1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process.
Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already

been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the
members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in
the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities
and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise singledistricts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But
beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district.
By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion the single-district
cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.

As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government

units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for
provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they
shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative
districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under
par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two
(2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall
also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the
thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been
apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they
shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.

Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities
and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which
remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992,
elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full
implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par.
(d). consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of

respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

2. Salenillas vs. CA
G.R. 78687
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor
of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The Enciso spouses sold
the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas, the spouses
daughter and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Later, or on
December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor
of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan
of P2, 500.00.

Having failed to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding was instituted
by the Bank and against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction
held on February 27, 1981.
The private respondent won the bid and ultimately a Sheriffs Final Deed" was
issued to him on July 12, 1983.
When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17,
1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the
petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead
offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Petitioners made a
formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition
and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of
possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.


Whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question
is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.


Yes. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their
right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119.
Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow,
or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons
are bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other
legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those
classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance
but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-inlaw of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner
Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such,
and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so
because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The cases pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other
hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases
involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or
free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and,
upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were
foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to repurchase
a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the
day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale
is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged
property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981,
with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the
petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally,
on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year period.

3. Lydia O. Chua vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 88979
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus.

Where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A case omitted

is to be held as (intentionally) omitted.

ex necessitate legis. From

or by necessity of law.


Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act
No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization.

Those qualified to avail of its benefits are the appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, Petitioner
Lydia Chua filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation
benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission
yielded negative results.


Whether or not Petitioner Lydia Chua is entitled to the benefits granted under
Republic Act No. 6683.


The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give
allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the
assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be

granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the
minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

4. PP vs. Manantan
G.R. No. L-14129


Whether or not the remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits
have placed accused twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense.
Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused
cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. When the government appealed
to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised that
issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendantappellee filed his brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of double
jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to
have waived his constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's
ruling in the cases of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16,
1961 and People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958.
In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double
jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the
record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that
defense may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded
as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy.(People vs. Pinuila, supra).

There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for
reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well taken.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it
is hereby, denied.

5. J.M Tuazon & Co. vs. Mananang

G.R. No. 33140
Whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late
hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova.

No. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that
respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943
without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and
no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated
again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other
litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro,

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is
directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

6. Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. 72005

Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of
the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas
bond. 3 The latter in turn posted a counter bond in the sum of P1, 400, 000.00 thru
petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were


The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a
judgment maybe enforced on the said bond.
Yes. Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the
surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued
against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary
hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment under his

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers
not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment
pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining
order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against

7. PP vs. Judge Evangelista

G.R. No. 110898

Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide. After
trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its
minimum period. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondents conviction but
reduced his sentence by imposing on him an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as
After the case was repromulgated private respondent applied for probation but was
recommended for denial by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B.
Valdehueza on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he
could have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right to make
his application.
The RTC set aside the Probation Officers recommendation and granted private
respondents application for probation in its order of April 23, 1993. Hence this
petition by the prosecution.


Whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private
respondents application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from
the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.
The Court holds that it did. Since private respondent filed his application for
probation on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect, it is covered
by the prohibition that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction and that
the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for
probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private
respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
The ruling of the RTC that [h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of
Appeals decision, [private respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the
amendment in] P.D. 1990 is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the
appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of conviction
by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an
application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same

after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. Accordingly, in
Llamado v. Court of Appeals,10 it was held that the petitioner who had appealed his
sentence could not subsequently apply for probation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private
respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.

8. Cecilio S. De Villa vs. CA
G.R. No. 87416
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the court with
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 wherein the questioned check was drawn
against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank .
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination,
petitioner moved to dismiss the Information, and after having failed to clinch a
favourable decision, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA and again met
the same fate. Undaunted petitioner ran for succour in the High Court.


Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in


Yes. The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was
committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the
filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action
(Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

It will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case.
As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law.

9. Colgate-Palmolive vs. Hon. Jimenez

G.R. No. L-14787
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet
preparations and household remedies.
In the course of their daily business activities, it used to import from abroad various
materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate
precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and
flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures.

For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central
Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange
Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid basing on section 2 of Republic Act
601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines
of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules
and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
The auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the
reduced amount fixed on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not
exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors"
mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the

preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner

brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for review.


Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to
refund under section 2 thereof.


It is exempted. Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors"
used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or
dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the
words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with
them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely
as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in
connection with other rules of construction.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby
ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were approved by the
Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of

10. RP vs. Hon. Migrino

G.R. No. 89433
The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio
Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The
Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to
petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent because he is a subordinate of former President Marcos.
Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in

Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him,
that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a
crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so.
Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.


Whether or not private respondent acted as a subordinate under E.O. No.1 and
related executive orders.


NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is
[w]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The term subordinate as used in
E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member,
relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,
dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of
private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.

11. PP vs. Hon. Eschaves

G.R. No. L-47757-61
On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 772.

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an
omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the
grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth
and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use
of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not
apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.


Whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,
applies to agricultural lands.
No. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting
in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas
made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands
in rural areas.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions
on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A
which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety
and peace and order.

12. Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeal

G.R. No. 48886-88

The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed
and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of
Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.

It is where several ocean-going vessels of private respondent docked every now and
then and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which were paid
by private respondent under protest.

Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of Customs for refund of the
berthing fees paid under protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan
denied the protest, prompting private respondent to appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs who, however, affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs.

Private respondent then resorted to the Court of Tax Appeals. Consolidating the
protests, the tax court, thereafter rendered a decision on July 28, 1978 in favour of
private respondent


Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately owned wharf
or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge under Section 2901 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34.
No because the Bureau of Customs itself in its Customs Memorandum Circular No.
33-73 dated March 29, 1973, does not accord the status of national port to the port
of Kiwalan, nor does the list of national ports appended thereto include the port of
Kiwalan. Moreover, said memorandum circular indicates the specific law (Public Act,
Commonwealth Act, Republic Act or Executive Order) creating a particular national
port. Petitioner has not cited or brought to our attention, and we have found none,
any law creating Kiwalan Port as a national port or converting it to one.

Sec. 2901.Definition. Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulk-head-wharf, river or channel marginal
wharf at any national port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a
vessel so berthed, or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or
canal under the jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines: Provided,
however, That in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty (50%) per cent of rates
provided for in cases of piers without cargo shed in the succeeding sections. The
owner, agent, operator or master of the vessel is liable for this charge.






G.R. No. 93177

August 2, 1991