You are on page 1of 5

People v.

Duero, 105 SCRA 379

Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his
alleged oralconfession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
counsel and because thereis no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights, his confession isinadmissible in evidence.*
Automatic review of the decision convicting Duero of robbery w/ homicide.
Sunday PM, Oct 24, 1976, Fausta Duero, an octogenarian housekeeper living
alone,was killed in her house located at Barrio Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo.She
sustained 2 gaping wounds on the right cheek, 2 on the neck, another on the right
shoulder and a bruise on the cheek. A piece of wire was tied around her neck. A
scythe was sticking in her neck.The crime was discovered in PM the next day by the
bgy captain. Noticing that the windows of the old woman's house had not been
opened, he asked the grandson of the old woman, to peepthrough the bedroom
window.When Olmos informed bgy Cpt. that the old woman's things were scattered
in the bedroom, herequested Olmos to inform his uncle, Salvador Duero, a son of
the old woman, to come to thehouse. Salvador found that money and pieces of
jewelry were missing. A mallet was found onthe floor near the victim's body.No
eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. The principal evidence of
theprosecution is the testimony of Lt Lujan, chief of police of Cabatuan corroborated
bycircumstantial evidence from witnesses.Lujan declared that Severino voluntarily
confessed to him that he committed the crime butrefused to sign a confession.
Patrolman Alag also heard him confess & that it was he whoinduced the commission
of the crime. Patrolman Tormon declared at the prelim exam, Dueroknew that Fausta
had money bec Fausta's daughter Mauring repaid her P1K.Tormon said that Severino
met Fausta at a store in the morning of Oct 23, 1976. Fausta waswilling to lend
Severino P100.Another witness testified that Severino told him that he would rob
Fausta. Another one said hesaw Severino near the stairs at around 6 pm. Severino
was calling the old woman.*
WON TC erred in convicting Duero on the basis of his oral confession to the
policestation commander.
YES. Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed that he
wasmaltreated by the police.As alibi, Severino testified that he was in his house
when the crime was perpetrated. His wife,neighbor and friends, confirmed his alibi.

SolGen agrees w/ counsel de oficio's contention that Severino's oral confession is

inadmissible inevidence by reason of Art IV
Consti:"SEC 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any p
erson under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and tocounsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained inviolation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence."All the foregoing provisions are new except the first sentence,
regarding the right against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur seipsum accusare),
(1935 Consti), now revised or expanded in sec20.The new provisions in sec 20, Art
IV 1973 Consti were adopted from the ruling in Miranda vs.Arizona w/c specifies the
ff. procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accusedpersons:"Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that anystatement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to thepresence of an atty. (must be clear & unequivocal)"The defendant
may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily knowingly
andintelligently.As restated by Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case:"For those
unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it
the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise."More
important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the
inherentpressures of the interrogation atmosphere . . ."Further, the warning will
show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize hisprivilege
should he choose to exercise it . . ."The warning must be accompanied by the
explanation that anything said can and will be usedagainst the individual in court.
This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but
also of the consequences of forgoing it . . ."An individual need not make a preinterrogation request for a lawyer. Failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a
waiver. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does notmake a
request may be the person who most needs counsel.


,@ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.FACTS:
Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death
of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in a bamboo grove
with 38stab wounds at the back and whose hymen was completely lacerated on the
right side,though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt. The trial court
found appellantguilty as charged and was sentenced to death.Conviction was based
primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza and CelsoManuel, a radio reporter.

SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellant confessed to the killingof Jennifer and
disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was submittedas evidence
for the prosecution. According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but
the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. Onthe other
hand, Manuel declared that appellant, in an interview, admitted the brutalkilling of
Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed
appellantaccompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen were
about 2-3meters from him and that no lawyer assisted appellant during the
interview. Alsopresented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the
NBI, who testifiedthat it was possible that the lacerations on the victim could have
been caused bysomething blunt other than the male organ.
W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel whichappellant
claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible.
The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waivedonly in
writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissionsobtained
in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence.
However, this prohibitiondoes not apply to confessions or admissions
made to private individuals, such asradio reporters.
For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
followingrequirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be inwriting.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police
stationin the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the only
one, inthe brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under
custodialinvestigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12 (1) of the
Constitution applied tohim. . . . But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the
waiver was neither put inwriting nor made in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the waiver is invalid andhis confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's
testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been
excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonetinadmissible in evidence, being, as it
were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor
General that accused-appellant's confessionto the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is
admissible. In People v. Andan, the accused in arape with homicide case confessed
to the crime during interviews with the media. Inholding the confession admissible,
despite the fact that the accused gave his answerswithout the assistance of
counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant's

[oral] confessions tothe newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of theConstitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between aprivate individual and another individual.
It governs the relationship between theindividual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to theState and its agents.


FACTS:In an original application for certiorari , Moncado,charged with the offense of
treason, alleges that on 4April, 1945 he was arrested by members of the CIC ofthe
army of the United States at his residence in SanRafael Street, Manila without a
warrant of arrest andwas taken to the prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal; a weekafter his
wife accompanied several members of CICunder the command of Lieutenant Olves
to theirresidence in San Rafael and found out that several effects several effects
were scattered on the groundamong which were several documents; Lieutenant
Olves informed Moncados wife that he will carry with
them some documents to prove the guilt of herhusband.ISSUE:Are the documents
obtained without warrantadmissible as evidence?RULING:YES. It is a doctrine well
established in Philippines,United States, England and Canada that theadmissibility
of evidence is not affected by the illegalityof the means that the party has used to
obtain it.The Constitution guarantees the inviolability ofindividual rights in the
following terms; 'Will not violatepeople's right to security of their persons,
homes,papers and effects against records and kidnappingarrest, unless probable
cause that will be determined bythe judge after examination under oath or
affirmationof the complainant and the witnesses who introduced,and with detailed
description site that has to registerand the people that have to apprehend or things
thatmust be seized.' (Title III, article 1, 3rd paragraph).These constitutional
limitations, however, does not goso far as competent evidence exclude
documentsobtained illegally. The regulation of courts, Rule 123,determines which
are admissible and relevant and notclassified as incompetent evidence obtained

Escobedo v. Illinois
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked to speak with his
lawyer while in police custody but before being formally charged and was denied.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to speak with an attorney, and
not advising them of their right to remain silent after they have been arrested and

before they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment.
Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect in the murder
of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney
arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner did and was not allowed to
speak to his client as the officers said they had not completed questioning. The
petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain silent before the interrogation.
He was convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He was then
granted certiorari.
Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and interrogated by police
without their request to see an attorney being honored, nor being advised of their
right to remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment?
Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case.
The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of counsel. Here,
because the police investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather than a
less specific investigation, refusing to allow an accused to speak with his attorney is
a denial of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made must
thus not be admitted into evidence.
A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to
abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful investigation.
The result here recognizes this idea.