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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER
National
Drug Threat
Assessment
2010
Questions and comments may be directed to
National Drug Threat Assessment Unit, National Threat Analysis Branch
National Drug Intelligence Center
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030310
Cover Photo © PhotoDisc
Product No. 2010Q0317001 February 2010
National
Drug Threat
Assessment
2010
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Table of Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Impact of Drugs on Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Demand for Illicit Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Consequences of Illicit Drug Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Impact on Health and Health Care Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Impact on Crime and Criminal Justice Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Impact on Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Impact on the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
!"#$%&"'()*+,-$%."$'-,/'0,1-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
!"#$%&"'()*+,-$%34%5",6,-'7%8'-$2% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Southwest Border Smuggling and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Drug Movement Into and Within the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Overland Smuggling Into the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Maritime Smuggling Directly Into the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Air Smuggling Into the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Flow of Drugs Within the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Drug Availability in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Cocaine Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Heroin Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Methamphetamine Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Marijuana Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
MDMA Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Controlled Prescription Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Illicit Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
.#0711+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix A: Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix B: Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix C: Scope and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
iii
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
iv
U.S. Department of Justice
National Drug Intelligence Center
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Product No. 2010Q317001
Mexican DTOs continue to represent the prepared for transport to the U.S.–Mexico
4<'3&#)3"#%-#4-)2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)-."#%-)-*)-.#) border and then smuggled into Mexico.
United States. Mexican DTOs, already the G According to the Bureau of Alcohol,
predominant wholesale suppliers of illicit drugs Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF),
in the United States, are gaining even greater Mexican DTO members or associates
strength in eastern drug markets where Colom acquire thousands of weapons each year in
bian DTO strength is diminishing. The extent Arizona, California, and Texas and smug
*+)N#=<(%')KLM)<'H,#'(#)*$#")2*0#4-<()2",3) gle them across the border to Mexico.
-"%+/(D<'3)?%4)#$<2#'(#2)<')4#$#"%&)?%;4)<')
2009. For example: The threat posed by the diversion and abuse
of CPDs, primarily pain relievers, is increas
G Mexican DTOs were the only DTOs oper ing, evidenced by the sharp rise in the percent
ating in every region of the country. age (4.6% in 2007 to 9.8% in 2009) of state
G Mexican DTOs increased their cooperation and local law enforcement agencies reporting
with U.S.based street and prison gangs to CPDs as the greatest drug threat in their area.
distribute drugs. In many areas, these gangs G Increased abuse of CPDs has led to elevat
were using their alliances with Mexican ed numbers of deaths related to prescription
DTOs to facilitate an expansion of their opioids, which increased 98 percent from
midlevel and retail drug distribution opera 2002 to 2006.
tions into more rural and suburban areas.
G Unscrupulous physicians who operate
G In 2009, midlevel and retail drug distribu !,"!*"-#2)!%<')(&<'<(4)<')O&*"<2%5?.<(.)
tion in the United States was dominated by until recently did not have a Prescription
more than 900,000 criminally active gang K",3)N*'<-*"<'3)P"*3"%0)6PKNP>5%"#)%)
members representing approximately 20,000 4<3'</(%'-)4*,"(#)*+)4,!!&;)+*")!"#4("<!-<*')
street gangs in more than 2,500 cities. opioids distributed in numerous states.
G N#=<(%')KLM4)<'("#%4#2)-.#)H*?)*+)4#$ National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)
eral drugs (heroin, methamphetamine, and analysts estimate that the overall threat posed
marijuana) into the United States, primarily by illicit drugs will not diminish in the near
because they increased production of those term. Although NDIC believes that sustained
drugs in Mexico. shortages of cocaine will persist in some U.S.
G Drugs smuggled into the United States by markets in 2010, the availability of heroin,
Mexican DTOs usually are transported in methamphetamine, and marijuana will in
private or commercial vehicles; however, crease, largely the result of increased produc
Mexican DTOs also use crossborder tun tion of the drugs in Mexico. The growing
nels, subterranean passageways, and low strength and organization of criminal gangs,
H;<'3)40%&&)*"),&-"%&<3.-)%<"("%+-)-*)0*$#) including their alliances with large Mexican
drugs from Mexico into the United States. DTOs, will make disrupting illicit drug avail
G Mexican DTOs smuggled bulk cash drug %Q<&<-;)%'2)2<4-"<Q,-<*')<'("#%4<'3&;)2<+/(,&-)
proceeds totaling tens of billions of dollars for law enforcement agencies. The increased
from the United States through the South enforcement against illegal pain clinics and
west Border and into Mexico. Much of the the growing number of PDMPs will disrupt
bulk cash (millions each week) was consoli the supply of CPDs to prescription opioid
dated by the DTOs in several key areas, in users in some areas, with the result that some
cluding Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New users will seek opioids from other sources and
York City, and North Carolina, where it was some will switch to heroin.
2
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
3
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Colombian Cocaine Producers Increase Use of a Harmful Cutting Agent
Since late 2007, cocaine has increasingly contained levamisole, a pharmaceutical agent that
typically is used for livestock deworming. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Cocaine Signature Program data, before 2008, less than 10 percent of the tested wholesale
level cocaine samples contained levamisole. By 2009, approximately 71 percent of the tested
cocaine samples contained levamisole. Because levamisole is being found in kilogram quanti
!"#$%&'%(&()"*#+%"*,#$!"-)!&.$%).#%(&*/0#*!%!1)!%2&3&45")*%!.)'/(6#.$%).#%)00"*-%"!%)$%7).!%&'%!1#%
production process, possibly to enhance the effects of the cocaine. However, levamisole can be
hazardous to humans, especially those with weakened immune systems. Ingesting levamisole
can cause a person to develop agranulocytosis, a serious, sometimes fatal, blood disorder. At
3#)$!%89%(&*/.4#0%)*0%7.&5)53#%()$#$%&'%)-.)*:3&(;!&$"$+%"*(3:0"*-%!<&%0#)!1$+%1),#%5##*%
associated with cocaine adulterated with levamisole. The consequences of abusing levamisole
are serious enough that in September 2009, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA) issued a nationwide public alert on its effects.
4
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
A 2007 DAWN survey of 63 metropolitan %&4*)-*)/"#48)#=!&*4<*'48)%'2)!.;4<(%&).#%&-.)
areas found an average of 12.1 deaths per hazards such as toxic chemicals. In 2009, 980
100,000 persons related to drug use.5 Rates children were reported to the El Paso Intel
of drugrelated deaths range from 1.1 per ligence Center (EPIC) as present at or affected
100,000 in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, to 26.1 by methamphetamine laboratories, including
per 100,000 in the New Orleans area. DAWN 8 who were injured and 2 who were killed at
also records the number of drugrelated suicide the laboratories. These statistics do not include
deaths. In 2007, the number of drugrelated (.<&2"#')D<&)Q;)"%'2*0)3,'/"#)%44*(<%-#2)
suicides per 100,000 persons ranged from less with drug activity or who were physically or
than one in several jurisdictions (including sexually abused by a “caretaker” involved in
Chicago, DallasFort Worth, and Minneapolis) 2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)*"),'2#")-.#)<'H,#'(#)*+)2",34E
to 6.2 per 100,000 in Fargo, North Dakota. To
put these statistics in perspective, the Centers IMPACT ON CRIME AND
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
reports other nonnatural death rates as follows:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Motor vehicle accidents, 15.1 per 100,000; The consequences of illicit drug use im
nontransport accidents (e.g., falls, accidental pact the entire criminal justice system, taxing
drownings), 24.4 per 100,000; suicide, 11.1 per resources at each stage of the arrest, adjudi
100,000; and homicides, 6.2 per 100,000. cation, incarceration, and postrelease su
pervision process. Although drug courts and
The consequences of drug use usually are diversion programs in many jurisdictions have
not limited to the user and often extend to helped to alleviate this burden (see text box on
the user’s family and the greater community. page 6), substance abuse within the criminal
According to SAMHSA, combined data from justice population remains widespread.
2002 to 2007 indicate that during the prior
year, an estimated 2.1 million American chil The most recent annual data from the Fed
dren (3%) lived with at least one parent who eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) show that
was dependent on or abused illicit drugs, and 12.2 percent of more than 14 million arrests in
1 in 10 children under 18 lived with a sub 2008 were for drug violations, the most com
stanceaddicted or substanceabusing parent.6 mon arrest crime category. The proportion of
Moreover, the U.S. Department of Health and total drug arrests has increased over the past
Human Services estimated in 1999 that sub 20 years: in 1987, only 7.4 percent of all ar
stance abuse was a factor in twothirds of all rests were for drug violations. Approximately
foster care placements. 4 percent of all homicides in 2008 were drug
related, a percentage that has not changed
Many states have enacted drugendangered 4<3'</(%'-&;)*$#")-.#)4%0#)AB:;#%")!#"<*2E
children laws to protect children from the con
4#R,#'(#4)*+)2",3)!"*2,(-<*'8)-"%+/(D<'38)%'2) The characteristics of populations under
abuse. Typically associated with methamphet (*""#(-<*'%&)4,!#"$<4<*')"#H#(-)-.#4#)%""#4-)
amine production, drugendangered children patterns. According to the Bureau of Justice
are exposed not only to abuse and neglect but Statistics (BJS), 20 percent of state prisoners
and 53 percent of federal prisoners are incar
["# OC\N#)&'(&,#).:+B.&60/&)#)&0/%,#0,#)&0/%,#/%0/#0.&#
cerated because of a drug offense. Moreover,
(0/:.06#3.#055*)&(/06#?*/%#).:+#*(;36;&1&(/>#)&0/%,#*(B
;36;*(+#%31*5*)#).:+>#0()#)&0/%,#?*/%#).:+#*(;36;&B 27 percent of individuals on probation and 37
1&(/#?%&(#/%
((&.#38#)&0/%#)&(3/&)#27#/%&)*506# percent of individuals on parole at the end of
&401*(&.#*,#]53:6)#(3/#2&#)&/&.1*(&)"^ 2007 had committed a drug offense.
H"# O0/0#*(56:)ʍ%36#)&-&()&(5.#0653%36#02:,&"
5
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Drug Courts
To alleviate the burden that drug use and abuse have caused to the nation’s criminal justice
system, most jurisdictions have developed drug courts or other diversion programs aimed at
breaking the drug addiction and crime cycle. In these nonadversarial, coordinated approach
es to processing drug cases, participants receive a full continuum of treatment services, are
subject to frequent urinalyses, and experience strict judicial monitoring in lieu of traditional
incarceration. Once the offender successfully completes treatment, charges may be dropped.
="*(#%!1#%/.$!%0.:-%(&:.!%5#()4#%&7#.)!"&*)3%"*%>")4"%"*%?@A@+%!1#%*:45#.%&'%0.:-%(&:.!$%1)$%
grown each year, and such courts now exist in all 50 states as well as the District of Columbia,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Indian Country. As of July 2009, there were 2,038
active drug court programs and 226 in the planning stages. Research has shown that drug
courts are associated with reduced recidivism by participants and result in cost savings. For
instance, a 2006 study of nine California drug courts showed that drug court graduates had
recidivism rates of 17 percent, while a comparison group who did not participate in drug court
had recidivism rates of 41 percent. A study of the drug court in Portland, Oregon, found that the
program reduced crime by 30 percent over 5 years and saved the county more than $79 million
over 10 years. With success stories abundant, drug courts have gained approval at the local,
state, and federal levels.
L.#)2",3:("<0#)&<'D)<4)%&4*)"#H#(-#2)<')
arrestee data. In 2008, the Arrestee Drug Abuse
IMPACT ON PRODUCTIVITY
Monitoring (ADAM) II program found that the Premature mortality, illness, injury leading
median percentage of male arrestees who tested to incapacitation, and imprisonment all serve
positive in the 10 ADAM II cities for any of to directly reduce national productivity.
10 drugs, including cocaine, marijuana, P,Q&<()/'%'(<%&)"#4*,"(#4)#=!#'2#2)<')-.#)
methamphetamine, opioids, and phencycli areas of health care and criminal justice as a
dine (PCP), was 67.6 percent, down slightly "#4,&-)*+)<&%&)2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)%'2),4#)%"#)
+"*0)ZUEA)!#"(#'-)<')ABBCE)M-.#")2%-%)"#H#(-) resources that would otherwise be available
the link as well. In 2002, a BJS survey found for other policy initiatives.
that 68 percent of jail inmates were depen
There is a great loss of productivity associ
dent on or abusing drugs and alcohol and that
ated with drugrelated premature mortality.
55 percent had used illicit drugs during the
In 2005, 26,858 deaths were unintentional or
month before their offense. In 2004, a
undeterminedintent poisonings; in 2004, 95
4<0<&%")[\F)4#&+:"#!*"-)4,"$#;)<2#'-</#2)-.#)
percent of these poisonings were caused by
drugcrime link more precisely: 17 percent of
2",34E)I&-.*,3.)<-)<4)2<+/(,&-)-*)!&%(#)%)2*&
state prisoners and 18 percent of federal prison
lar value on a human life, a rough calculation
ers had committed their most recent offense to
of lost productivity can be made based on the
acquire money to buy drugs. Property and drug
present discounted value of a person’s lifetime
offenders were more likely than violent and
earnings.
publicorder offenders to commit crimes for
drug money. There are also healthrelated productivity
losses. An individual who enters a residential
drug treatment program or is admitted to a
6
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
hospital for drug treatment becomes incapaci *+-#')&#%2)-*)/"#4)%'2)#=!&*4<*'4)%-)(&%'2#4
tated and is removed from the labor force. tine laboratories. Additionally, the process
According to TEDS data, there were approxi used to produce methamphetamine results in
mately 1.8 million admissions to statelicensed -*=<()(.#0<(%&45Q#-?##')Y)%'2)C)!*,'24)*+)
treatment facilities for illicit drug dependence ?%4-#)!#")!*,'2)*+)0#-.%0!.#-%0<'#5-.%-)
or abuse in 2007. Productivity losses in this %"#)-;!<(%&&;)2<4(%"2#2)<0!"*!#"&;)<')/#&248)
area alone are enormous. Healthrelated pro streams, forests, and sewer systems, causing
ductivity losses are higher still when lost pro extensive environmental damage.
ductivity associated with drugrelated hospital
admissions (including victims of drugrelated Currently, there are no conclusive estimates
crimes) is included. regarding the nationwide cost of methamphet
amine production site remediation because
The approximately onequarter of offenders many of the methamphetamine laboratories
in state and local correctional facilities and the and dumpsites in the United States are un
more than half of offenders in federal facilities discovered due to their clandestine locations.
incarcerated on drugrelated charges represent However, in California alone, from January
an estimated 620,000 individuals who are not through December 10, 2009, the Califor
in the workforce. The cost of their incarcera nia Department of Toxic Substance Control
tion therefore has two components: keeping responded to and cleaned up 232 laboratories
them behind bars and the results of their non and dumpsites at a cost of $776,889, or ap
productivity while they are there. proximately $3,349 per site.
Finally, there is productivity lost to drug Outdoor cannabis cultivation, particularly
related unemployment and drugrelated on public lands, is causing increasing envi
absenteeism. According to the 2008 NSDUH, ronmental damage. Grow site operators often
19.6 percent of unemployed adults may be contaminate and alter watersheds, clearcut
2#/'#2)%4)(,""#'-),4#"4)*+)<&&<(<-)2",34E)[%4#2) native vegetation, discard garbage and non
on population estimates from the same study, biodegradable materials at deserted sites,
this translates into approximately 1.8 million ("#%-#)?<&2/"#).%J%"248)%'2)2<$#"-)'%-,"%&)
unemployed individuals who were current water courses. For example, cultivators often
drug abusers. Further, approximately 8 percent dam streams and redirect the water through
of individuals employed full time and 10.2 plastic gravityfed irrigation tubing to supply
percent of individuals employed parttime water to individual plants. The high demand
were current users of illicit drugs. Individuals for water often strains small streams and
who are employed but have chronic absentee damages downstream vegetation that depend
ism resulting from illicit drug use also accrue *')(*'4<4-#'-)?%-#")H*?E)]')%22<-<*'8)&%?)
substantial lost productivity. #'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(<%&4)%"#)<'("#%4<'3&;)#'
countering dumpsites of highly toxic insecti
IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT cides, chemical repellants, and poisons that
are produced in Mexico, purchased by Mexi
The environmental impact of illicit drugs is can criminal groups, and transported into the
largely the result of outdoor cannabis cultiva country for use at their cannabis grow sites.
tion and methamphetamine production. Many These toxic chemicals enter and contaminate
of the chemicals used to produce methamphet 3"*,'2)?%-#"8)!*&&,-#)?%-#"4.#248)D<&&)/4.)
%0<'#)%"#)H%00%Q)%'2)-.#)<0!"*!#")4-*"%3#8) and other wildlife, and eventually enter
use, and disposal of such chemicals that are residential water supplies. Moreover, the
typical among methamphetamine producers
7
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
National Parks Conservation Association
(NPCA) reports that while preparing land for
cannabis cultivation, growers commonly
clear the forest understory, which allows
nonnative plants to supplant native ones,
adversely affecting the ecosystem. They also
-#""%(#)-.#)&%'25#4!#(<%&&;)<')0*,'-%<'*,4)
%"#%45?.<(.)"#4,&-4)<')"%!<2)#"*4<*'E)
Limited research on the environmental
impact of the improper disposal of pharma
ceuticals7 indicates that contamination from
dissolved pharmaceutical drugs is present in
extremely low levels in most of the nation’s
water supply. The harm to aquatic life and the
environment has not been determined, and
according to the Environmental Protection
Agency, scientists have found no evidence of
adverse human health effects from the minute
residue found in water supplies. Nonetheless, as
a precaution based on environmental research
to date, the ONDCP and the Food and Drug
Administration suggest that consumers use
takeback programs to dispose of unused
prescription drugs (see text box on page 52 in
Vulnerabilities section).
_"# $%&#.&,&0.5%#06,3#*(56:)&)#0(/*2*3/*5,>#,/&.3*),>#0()#13.&#
/%0(#!TT#-%0.105&:/*506,"
8
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
9
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
!"#$%&'"()*+,%!"#$%-"'./0123$%4"$'325'(263+,%&"2723'*%8"6#9+,%'3:%8'3$+
Drug cartels are large, highly sophisticated organizations composed of multiple DTOs and
(#33$%<"!1%$7#("/(%)$$"-*4#*!$%$:(1%)$%0.:-%!.)*$7&.!)!"&*+%$#(:."!;B#*'&.(#4#*!+%&.%4&*#;%
laundering. Drug cartel commandandcontrol structures are based outside the United States;
however, they produce, transport, and distribute illicit drugs domestically with the assistance
of DTOs that are either a part of or in an alliance with the cartel.
!"#$%("'./0123$%6"$'325'(263+%;!-4+<%).#%(&473#C%&.-)*"D)!"&*$%<"!1%1"-13;%0#/*#0%
commandandcontrol structures that produce, transport, and distribute large quantities of
one or more illicit drugs.
&"2723'*%$"6#9+ operating in the United States are numerous and range from small to moder
ately sized, loosely knit groups that distribute one or more drugs at the retail level and midlevel.
Street gangs%).#%0#/*#0%5;%!1#%E)!"&*)3%F33")*(#%&'%G)*-%H*,#$!"-)!&.$I%F$$&(")!"&*$%)$%
groups or associations of three or more persons with a common identifying sign, symbol, or
name, the members of which individually or collectively engage in criminal activity that cre
ates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.
Prison gangs are highly structured criminal networks that operate within the federal and state
prison system and in local communities through members who have been released from prison.
4#(*'=%76(6"0>0*)%$'3$+%;4?8+< are highly structured criminal organizations whose
4#45#.$%#*-)-#%"*%(."4"*)3%)(!","!"#$%$:(1%)$%,"&3#*!%(."4#$+%<#)7&*$%!.)'/(6"*-+%)*0%0.:-%
!.)'/(6"*-J%K>G$%4)"*!)"*%)%$!.&*-%(#*!.)3"D#0%3#)0#.$1"7%!1)!%"473#4#*!$%.:3#$%.#-:3)!"*-%
membership, conduct, and criminal activity.
E2,'-%!&.2%9'F:%:=C'-?:?%09:,"%,-;# (POEs) along the U.S.–Canada border, as evi
:-*:%-'0,1-'774%,-%":*:-0%4:'"2%34%0"'()*+ denced by seizure data that show a substantial
ing MDMA and highpotency marijuana— increase in the amount of MDMA seized along
drugs that do not put them in direct the Northern Border from 2004 (312,389
*16C:0,0,1-%@,09%<:=,*'->%517163,'->%1"% dosage units) to 20098 (2,167,238 dosage
!16,-,*'-%!&.2D%% units). While Asian DTOs continue to produce
highpotency marijuana in Canada, they have
L.#)"<4<'3)<'H,#'(#)*+)I4<%')KLM4)-.%-) decreased their reliance on foreign production
was observed and reported by law enforce by establishing marijuana grows in the United
ment agencies in 2008 continued to increase States, further reducing associated smuggling
<')ABBUE)I4<%')KLM4)-"%+/(D#2)?.*%&#) risks and costs. Consequently, the amount of
quantities of drugs in 24 of the 32 HIDTAs (see marijuana seized along the U.S.–Canada bor
Map A2 in Appendix A), compared with 22 der decreased from 10,447 kilograms in 2005
HIDTAs in 2007. Asian DTOs that had previ to 3,423 kilograms in 2009.
*,4&;)-"%+/(D#2).<3.:!,"<-;)F*,-.#%4-)I4<%')
heroin have become the predominant distribu I4<%')KLM4).%$#)/&)%)'<(.#)Q;)-"%+/(D<'3)
tors of MDMA and highpotency marijuana, .<3.:!*-#'(;)0%"<1,%'%)%'2)NKNI52",34)
drugs typically associated with low crimi '*-)-;!<(%&&;)-"%+/(D#2)Q;)N#=<(%'8)@*&*0Q<
'%&)!#'%&-<#4)%'2).<3.)!"*/-)0%"3<'4E)I4<%') an, or Dominican DTOs. This factor has con
DTOs increasingly smuggle large quantities tributed to their success; however, their success
of MDMA through and between ports of entry X"# N0/*3(06#F&*=:.&#F7,/&1#)0/0#0,#38#O&5&12&.#!>#LTTI"
10
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
is largely due to their ability to estimate the 3"*,!4)<')2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)4.*,&2)#=!%'2)+,"
risk and cost of engaging in any given criminal ther in the near term, although the threat posed
activity. Asian DTOs are willing to cooperate by these groups will remain much lower than
with other criminal groups to increase their that posed by Mexican, Colombian, Domini
!"*/-)%'2)?*"D)?<-.)@%,(%4<%'8)_<4!%'<(8)%'2) can, and Asian DTOs.
African American DTOs or criminal groups in
most major cities in an effort to expand their
drug distribution and customer base.
5#3'-%!&.2%'-?%*",6,-'7%$"1#C2%'":%
271@74%:=C'-?,-$%09:,"%?"#$%0"'()*+,-$%'*0,F,
0,:2%3:41-?%09:%G71",?'H5'",33:'-%I:$,1->%,-%
C'"0%34%C'"0-:",-$%@,09%<:=,*'-%!&.2D%
L.#)<'H,#'(#)*+)@,Q%')KLM4)%'2)("<0<'%&)
groups is expanding, albeit at a slower rate
than that of Asian DTOs. The number of
HIDTAs reporting Cuban DTO or criminal
group activity increased from three in 2007
-*)#<3.-)<')ABBUE)L.#)#=!%'2<'3)<'H,#'(#)*+)
Cuban DTOs and criminal groups is largely
the result of their ability to exploit Cuban
émigrés to establish and tend indoor marijuana
3"*?)4<-#4)<')&*(%-<*'4)-."*,3.*,-)-.#)O&*"<2%T
@%"<QQ#%')%'2)F*,-.#%4-)b#3<*'4)64!#(</(%&&;)
in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina).
Cuban DTO and criminal group activity also
appears to be expanding in the Southwest
Region, where law enforcement agencies
in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas report
Cuban DTO or criminal group involvement in
cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and mari
1,%'%)-"%+/(D<'3E)L.<4)#=!%'2<'3)<'H,#'(#)*+)
Cuban DTOs and criminal groups can also be
attributed to their close working relationships
with Mexican DTOs. Many Cuban émigrés
are brought illegally into the United States by
smugglers who are associated with a Mexican
DTO. Moreover, communities composed of
both Cubans and Mexicans allow for the de
velopment of personal relationships between
criminal groups. The full extent of these rela
tionships is unknown. However, if they follow
patterns similar to the relationships established
between Mexican and Dominican DTOs, the
involvement of Cuban DTOs and criminal
11
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
I"# M(56:)&,#*(50.5&.0/&)#+0(+#1&12&.,"
12
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
J,2C'-,*%C",21-%$'-$2>%C",6'",74%,-% L*)#'4,"#)%)(*'4<4-#'-)!"*/-)4-"#%0)+"*0)-.#)
B1#09@:20%L1"?:"%20'0:2>%'":%$',-,-$% wholesale drugs that they purchase from Mex
20":-$09%34%@1"+,-$%?,":*074%@,09%<:=,*'-% ican DTOs, Hispanic prison gangs distribute
!&.2%01%'*K#,":%@917:2'7:%K#'-0,0,:2%1(% drugs through street gangs that they largely, if
drugs and by controlling most street gangs not entirely, control. Through force or intimi
in areas along the Southwest Border. 2%-<*'8)_<4!%'<()!"<4*')3%'34)#=#"(<4#)4<3'</
cant control over local gangs that distribute
Prison gangs are active in all 50 states and their drugs in the Southwest Border region.
%"#)<'("#%4<'3)-.#<")<'H,#'(#)*$#")2",3)-"%+ For example, Barrio Azteca prison gang mem
/(D<'3)<')%"#%4)%&*'3)-.#)F*,-.?#4-)[*"2#") bers operating in El Paso, Texas, collect drug
(see Table B4 in Appendix B). Prior to 2001, payments and taxes from 47 streetlevel gangs
-.#)("<0<'%&)<'H,#'(#)*+)!"<4*')3%'34)?%4) %'2)<'2#!#'2#'-)2",3)2#%&#"4)-"%+/(D<'3)2",34)
limited primarily to retaillevel drug distri in El Paso.
bution. However, since that time, Hispanic
prison gangs have become increasingly in
volved in the transportation and wholesale
distribution of drugs.
Hispanic prison gangs such as Hermanos
de Pistoleros Latinos (HPL) and Raza Unida
operating in Southwest Border states have
increased their involvement in wholesale drug
distribution activities through cooperative
relationships with Mexican DTOs. Through
these relationships, Hispanic prison gangs are
able to gain access to wholesale quantities of
drugs. For example, in September 2009, 21
members of HPL were convicted in the South
ern District of Texas (Houston) of conspir
ing to distribute more than 150 kilograms of
cocaine and laundering millions of dollars in
drug proceeds. In April 2009, 15 members and
associates of the Raza Unida prison gang were
<'2<(-#2)+*")-"%+/(D<'3)0,&-<D<&*3"%0)R,%'-<
ties of cocaine and methamphetamine weekly
in McAllen and Houston, Texas.
13
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
AND VIOLENCE
operations of the Sinaloa Cartel, concluded
in November 2009 and resulted in 781 arrests
and the seizure of more than 12,000 kilograms
Most illicit drugs available in the United of cocaine, 17,000 pounds of marijuana, 1,200
States and thousands of illegal immigrants are pounds of methamphetamine, 1.3 million
smuggled into the United States across the MDMA tablets, $61 million in U.S. currency,
nearly 2,000mile Southwest Border, includ four aircraft, and three maritime vessels.
ing through the Tohono O’odham Reservation
64##)-#=-)Q*=)*')!%3#)SX>E)@*'$#"4#&;8)%)4<3'</ <:=,*'-%!&.2%":74%1-%1F:"7'-?%0"'-2C1"0'
(%'-)%0*,'-)*+)<&%&)/"#%"04)%'2)?#%!*'4) tion methods to smuggle drugs into the United
as well as bulk currency are smuggled from States but also use alternative methods.
the Southwest Border region into Mexico.
]'-#'4</#2)(*,'-#"2",3)*!#"%-<*'48)<')%22<-<*') In addition to customary land smuggling
to intracartel and intercartel warfare and plaza practices, Mexican DTOs use alternative
competition, have resulted in unprecedented means to move contraband north across the
violence in northern Mexico and the potential border. These means include the construction
for increasing violence in the United States. and use of crossborder tunnels and subter
ranean passageways (see text box on page 15),
Counterdrug operations on both sides of %'2)4*0#)<'("#%4#2),4#)*+)&*?:H;<'3)40%&&)*")
09:%B1#09@:20%L1"?:"%9'F:%,-0:-2,):?%,-% ultralight aircraft, which most often are used
":*:-0%4:'"2>%":2#70,-$%,-%,-*":'2:?%C":22#":% to smuggle marijuana. For example, in the
1-%<:=,*'-%!&.2D% Yuma, Arizona, area, at least eight ultralight
aircraft have been spotted since October 2008,
Several recent, large counterdrug initia after only sporadic reporting of such incidents
tives in the United States and Mexico have along the entire border area in previous years.
been implemented to directly disrupt Mexi Additionally, in midNovember 2009, at least
can cartel operations. For example, in March three suspected ultralight incursions were re
2008, the GOM initiated Operation Chihua !*"-#2)<')`#?)N#=<(*5-?*)<')e,'%)@*,'-;)
hua in response to increased drugrelated and one in Hidalgo County.
violence between the Juárez and Sinaloa
Cartels over drug smuggling plazas in the Of some concern to law enforcement of
Mexican border state of Chihuahua. Since /(<%&4)<4)-.#)!*-#'-<%&)+*"),4<'3)2",3)40,3
then, more than 7,500 soldiers and 2,000 gling routes to move terrorists or transport
federal agents have been deployed to cities weapons of mass destruction into the United
within the state, including Asunción, Bue States. However, there have been no inci
naventura, Casas Grandes, Chihuahua City, dents of this type documented, and accord
Ciudad Juárez, Janos, Ojinaga, Nuevo Casas <'3)-*)+#2#"%&)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(<%&48)-.#)
Grandes, and Palomas. Operation Chihuahua involvement of Mexican DTOs in this type
most likely resulted in seizures of drug ship of activity is very unlikely.
ments before they reached the U.S.–Mexico
14
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
-"'./01)"+@%A+)%6.%B#C()""'3)'3%-#33)*+%D*63$%(E)%B6#(E=)+(%F6":)"
The number of tunnels extending from Mexico into the United States has increased, suggest
ing that DTOs consider these tunnels as useful investments to smuggle drugs into the United
=!)!#$J%H*%/$()3%;#).%LMNO%899A+%PJ=J%2:$!&4$%)*0%Q&.0#.%R.&!#(!"&*%L2QRO%&'/(#.$%)3&*-%!1#%
U.S.–Mexico border discovered 16 subterranean tunnels, the majority of which were in the
Tucson Sector, which encompasses a border area of 262 miles from the New Mexico state
3"*#%!&%N:4)%2&:*!;+%F."D&*)J%H*%MN899@+%):!1&."!"#$%0"$(&,#.#0%8S%$:5!#..)*#)*%!:**#3$+%89%
of which were in the Tucson Sector, primarily in the area of Nogales. During this same period,
2QR%&'/(#.$%0"$(&,#.#0%T%!:**#3$%"*%2)3"'&.*")+%U%&'%<1"(1%<#.#%3&()!#0%"*%!1#%=)*%V"#-&%
Sector. In February 2009, CBP initiated a program designed to impede the construction of
tunnels in Nogales’s extensive drainage system. The initiative involved the construction of a
12footdeep steel and concrete underground wall that extends 100 yards along the border
near the DeConcini POE in Nogales.
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy 2009.
<:=,*'-%!&.2%#2:%B1#09@:20%L1"?:"% In 2009, between 6,500 and 8,000 individu
gangs to enforce and secure smuggling %&4)6%((*"2<'3)-*),'*+/(<%&)#4-<0%-#4>)?#"#)
1C:"'0,1-2%,-%<:=,*1%'-?>%01%'%7:22:"% murdered in Mexico as cartels battled for con
:=0:-0>%09:%A-,0:?%B0'0:2>%C'"0,*#7'"74%,-% trol over smuggling corridors and responded
California and Texas border areas. to increased pressure from the GOM. This
.<3.)',0Q#")*+)(%"-#&:"#&%-#2)0,"2#"4)"#H#(-4)
Mexican DTOs employ gang members a steep increase over previous years. The
who collect unpaid debts by using threats, 0*4-)$<*&#'-)(*'H<(-)<4)(*'(#'-"%-#2)<'8)Q,-)
extortion, and intimidation and who murder not limited to, the Juárez Plaza. The Joaquín
"<$%&)-"%+/(D#"4)*")'*'(*0!&<%'-)0#0Q#"4)<') GuzmánLoera Organization is challenging
Mexico and, to a far lesser extent, the United -.#)\,g"#J)@%"-#&)+*")(*'-"*&)*+)2",3)-"%+/(D
States. Mexican DTOs also use gang members ing in the Juárez Plaza. Actions on the part of
-*)#'+*"(#)(*'-"*&)*+)2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)"*,-#4) the Joaquín GuzmánLoera organization and
from Mexico into the United States. Mexican efforts by the Juárez Cartel to exercise greater
DTOs have reportedly increased their efforts control over the Juárez Plaza have resulted in
to recruit gang members along the Southwest increased violence between the two cartels.
Border. Gang members who are U.S. citizens
are a particularly valuable asset to Mexican Although much of the violence attributed
DTOs because they can normally cross the -*)(*'H<(-4)*$#")(*'-"*&)*+)40,33&<'3)"*,-#4)
U.S.–Mexico border with less law enforce .%4)Q##')(*'/'#2)-*)N#=<(*8)4*0#).%4)*(
ment scrutiny and therefore are less likely to curred in the United States. Violence in the
have illicit drug loads interdicted. United States (see text box on page 16) has
been limited primarily to attacks against alien
Competition among rival Mexican drug smuggling organization (ASO) members and
cartels for control of several prominent -.#<")+%0<&<#454*0#)*+)?.*0).%$#)4*,3.-)
26#$$7,-$%C7'/'2%9'2%*'#2:?%'%2,$-,)*'-0% refuge from the violence in Mexico by moving
rise in the level of violence in Mexico and a to U.S. border communities such as Phoenix.
potential rise in the United States. For example, in recent years, kidnappings in
Phoenix have numbered in the hundreds, with
260 in 2007, 299 in 2008, and 267 in 2009.
15
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Often, the U.S. kidnapping victims have some drug smuggling. Assaults against U.S. Border
connection to alien smuggling or local drug Patrol (USBP) agents increased 46 percent
-"%+/(D<'3)%(-<$<-<#48)%&-.*,3.)4*0#)%"#)<' from 752 incidents in FY2006 to 1,097 inci
nocent family members or relatives of alien dents in FY2008. Contributing most to this in
40,33&#"4)*")2",3)-"%+/(D#"4E)h<2'%!!<'34) crease were rocking10 assaults, which rose 77
related to alien smuggling often occur because percent from 435 incidents in FY2006 to 769
smugglers demand more money for their ser incidents in FY2008. However, some assaults
$<(#4E)h<2'%!!<'34)"#&%-#2)-*)2",3)-"%+/(D<'3) against USBP agents in California have been
usually occur only as a direct result of local deadly, including the January 2008 murder
<J#2)2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)%(-<$<-<#4E)O*")#=%0!) *+)%)^F[P)*+/(#")?.*)?%4)4-",(D)%'2)D<&)
an individual or individuals may be kidnapped Q;)-.#)%,-*0*Q<&#)*+)%)H##<'3)2",3)4,4!#(-)
because of a lost drug load or failure to pay in Imperial County and the fatal shooting of a
a drug debt. The number of U.S. kidnapping ^F[P)*+/(#")<'$#4-<3%-<'3)4,4!<(<*,4)%(-<$<-;)
incidents is most likely underreported because in Campo in July 2009.
many victims’ families are unwilling to re
port the crime for fear that the victim will be Weapons smuggled from the Southwest
killed, the kidnappers will retaliate against the Border region to Mexico have contributed
family, or law enforcement will discover the to the escalating violence in Mexico.
+%0<&;i4)2",3)-"%+/(D<'3)%(-<$<-<#4)*")<&%&) Thousands of weapons are smuggled from
alien status. the United States to Mexico every year, ac
cording to the ATF. It is unclear how many
G26*)30)%23%(E)%A32():%B('()+
of these weapons are smuggled into Mexico
V".#(!%,"&3#*(#%$"4"3).%!&%!1#%(&*W"(!$%&((:. by DTOs or how many ultimately come into
ring among major DTOs in Mexico is rare in the possession of DTOs. Nevertheless, some
the United States. Incidents of direct inter
percentage of this weapons smuggling is
cartel or intracartel violence have not mate
rialized in the United States in a manner that
orchestrated by DTOs. The U.S. weapons that
in any way resembles the widespread cartel these DTOs acquire originate in cities in Ari
violence in Mexico. Nevertheless, some re zona, California, and Texas. Mexican DTO
ports of DTO or cartel violence occasionally linked enforcement groups and gang members
emerge, including some incidents in 2009. !,"(.%4#)/"#%"04)%'2)%00,'<-<*')+"*0)
More typical, however, is indirect violence Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers at gun
within DTOs or cartels. Indirect violence stores, gun shows, and pawn shops and from
takes many forms: drug customers who owe unlicensed dealers at gun shows, often using
money are kidnapped until payment is made straw purchasers11 to insulate themselves from
and cartel employees who fail to deliver the -.#)-"%'4%(-<*'4E)L.#)/"#%"04)%'2)%00,'<-<*')
contraband or the expected proceeds are are then smuggled from the United States to
disciplined through beatings, kidnappings, Mexico on behalf of Mexican DTOs.
torture, or death.
Adding to the violence are assaults against
^EFE)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(#"4)%44<3'#2)-*) !T"# `35K*(+#*,#)&'(&)#0,#/%&#/%.3?*(+#38#.35K,#0/#a3.)&.#
posts along the Southwest Border. While most V0/.36#0+&(/,#27#).:+#3.#06*&(#,1:++6&.,#?*/%#/%&#*(/&(/#
38#/%.&0/&(*(+#3.#50:,*(+#-%7,*506#%0.1#/3#/%�+&(/"
of these assaults are related to alien smuggling 11.# F/.0?#-:.5%0,&.,#0.&#*(/&.1&)*0.*&,#?%3#059:*.(.#
activities, it is likely that some of the incidents 13.&#'.&0.1,#8.31#0#6*5&(,&)#'.&0.1,#)&06&.#3(#2&%068#
are perpetrated by individuals involved in 38#0(3/%&.#-&.,3("#$%&#-:.-3,&#*,#/3#%*)&#/%&#*)&(/*/7#38#
/%&#/.:&#-:.5%0,&.#3.#:6/*10/&#-3,,&,,3.#38#/%&#'.&0.1<,@"
16
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
The Southwest Border is a principal entry Pakistan, and members from transnational
point into the United States for illegal aliens. gangs such as Barrio Azteca, Mara Salvatrucha
(MS 13), transnational Sureños (including 18th
The Southwest Border region is the principal Street, Florencia, and Los Wonders), who also
entry point for undocumented aliens smuggled illegally cross the U.S.–Mexico border annually.
from Mexico, Central America, and South Available reporting indicates that some ASOs
America by ASOs. These ASOs often pay specialize in smuggling specialinterest aliens
fees to Mexican DTOs for the right to operate into the United States. Of those undocumented
%&*'3)4!#(</()"*,-#4)<')(#"-%<')Q*"2#")%"#%4E) aliens from specialinterest countries that have
Of particular concern is the smuggling of been interdicted, none have been documented
criminal aliens and gang members who pose to be known or suspected terrorists. Moreover,
public safety threats to communities through according to law enforcement and intelligence
out the border region and the country. These reporting, DTOs have demonstrated no interest
individuals include hundreds of undocumented in engaging in terrorist smuggling from Mexico
aliens from specialinterest countries, primarily into the United States.
China, but also Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and
17
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
-E)%H**202(%!"#$%-E")'(%23%H3:2'3%&6#3(">
X1#%"33"("!%0.:-%!1.#)!%"*%H*0")*%2&:*!.;%,)."#$%5;%.#-"&*%)*0%"$%"*W:#*(#0%5;%!1#%"33"("!%0.:-$%
available in major cities near the reservations. Most illicit drugs available throughout Indian
Country are transported to reservations by Native American criminal groups and independent
dealers who travel to nearby cities to purchase drugs, primarily from Mexican DTOs and
(."4"*)3%-.&:7$J%X.)'/(6#.$%)3$&%$4:--3#%3).-#%)4&:*!$%&'%"33"("!%0.:-$+%7."4)."3;%4)."Y:)*)+%
into the United States from Canada and Mexico through reservations that border these
(&:*!."#$+%*)4#3;%!1#%=!J%Z#-"$%>&1)<6%Z#$#.,)!"&*%"*%E#<%N&.6+%(&44&*3;%.#'#..#0%!&%)$%
the Akwesasne, and the Tohono O’odham Reservation in Arizona.
Multiple tons of highpotency marijuana are Québec !
smuggled through the St. Regis Mohawk Reser
IO
R
TA
vation each week by Native American DTOs that
C
O
BE
are supplied by Canadabased DTOs. Native
É
Ottawa Montréal
U
!
Q
!
^
!
American DTOs also smuggle multithousand
tablet quantities of MDMA into the United States Akwesasne Akwesasne
and multikilogram quantities of cocaine into
Canada through the reservation. As much as 20 Toronto
VT
percenta of all highpotency marijuana produced !
NH
in Canada each year is smuggled through the NY
St. Regis Mohawk Reservation, which accounts
for less than half a percent of the U.S.–Canada MA
border. The shared international border and
CT RI
geography of the reservation make it conducive PA
!&%(.&$$[5&.0#.%0.:-%!.)'/(6"*-%)(!","!;%<1"3#%)3$&% NJ
inhibiting law enforcement interdiction efforts.
An estimated 5 to 10 percentb of all the marijua
na produced in Mexico is transported by highly
UT CO
organized and compartmentalized Mexican NV
DTOs each year through the Tohono O’odham
Reservation, which accounts for less than 4
percent of the U.S.–Mexico border. These
!.)'/(6#.$%)3$&%$4:--3#%3#$$#.%)4&:*!$%&'%
AZ
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Drug
NM
!.)'/(6#.$%#C73&"!%!1#%,)$!%$!.#!(1#$%&'%.#4&!#+% CA
Phoenix
sparsely populated desert, the 75 miles of !
Tohono
largely unprotected border with Mexico, and the O'odham
highways that connect the reservation to major !
!
Tucson
metropolitan areas to distribute illicit drugs in Sonoita
TX
markets throughout the United States. !
Caborca
ME XI C O
a. NDICderived estimate based on law enforcement reporting and Royal Canadian Mounted Police production
estimates.
b. NDICderived estimate based on law enforcement reporting and production estimates for Mexico.
18
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 1. B:,/#":2%1(%!"#$2%,-%&"'-2,0>%N,09,-%09:%A-,0:?%B0'0:2%
,-%O,71$"'62>%PQQRS
1,800,000
1,588,703
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
24,737 12,413
0
Land Maritime Air
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009; table includes seizures of cocaine, methamphetamine,
marijuana, heroin, and MDMA.
19
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Table 1. Drug Seizures Along the Southwest and Northern Borders
in Kilograms, 2005–2009*
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Cocaine
Southwest Border 22,653 28,284 22,656 16,755 17,085
Northern Border >1 2 >1 >1 18
Total 22,654 28,286 22,657 16,756 17,103
Heroin
Southwest Border 228 489 404 556 642
Northern Border 3 2 <1 <1 28
Total 231 491 405 557 670
Marijuana
Southwest Border 1,034,102 1,146,687 1,472,536 1,253,054 1,489,673
Northern Border 10,447 4,177 2,791 3,184 3,423
Total 1,044,549 1,150,864 1,475,327 1,256,238 1,493,096
MDMA
Southwest Border 23 16 39 92 54
Northern Border 479 351 240 616 303
Total 502 367 279 708 357
Methamphetamine
Southwest Border 2,918 2,798 1,860 2,201 3,478
Northern Border >1 >1 136 >1 10
Total 2,919 2,799 1,996 2,202 3,488
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009; totals are rounded to the nearest kilogram.
multiple factors—including a sharp decline %)"#4,&-)*+)-.#)3"*?<'3)N#=<(%')<'H,#'(#)<')
in cocaine production in 2008 (see Figure 7 heroin production and transportation. This
on page 30) and enhanced GOM counterdrug increase in Southwest Border heroin seizures
efforts—likely contributed to the decrease in coincides with a decrease in heroin seizures from
amounts being transported from South Amer commercial airlines. In 2008, the total amount of
ica to Mexico and ultimately to the Southwest heroin seized along the Southwest Border (556.1
Border. Moreover, several exceptionally large kg) exceeded the total amount of heroin seized
seizures of cocaine destined for Mexico from +"*0)(*00#"(<%&)%<"&<'#4)67UXES)D3>)+*")-.#)/"4-)
South America in 2007 may have initiated the time (see Table 2 on page 24). This shift appears to
trend. These seizures coincide with the de be directly related to production trends and the
cline in seizures along the Southwest Border changing roles of DTOs. For the past several
and were followed by an unprecedented de years, production estimates for Mexican heroin,
cline in cocaine availability in many markets which is transported primarily overland across
in the United States. the Southwest Border, steadily increased to
record levels in 2008. Furthermore, Mexican
Conversely, heroin seizures along the South DTOs have become increasingly involved in
west Border have been increasing, most likely as the transportation of South American heroin.
20
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Meanwhile, production estimates for South +%(-*"454*0#)*+)?.<(.)%"#)<'-#""#&%-#2)%'2)
American heroin, historically transported into 4*0#)*+)?.<(.)%"#),'<R,#)-*)-.#)2",35-.%-)
the United States via commercial air, have affect modes and methods used to transport
steadily declined (see Figure 2 on page 24). This drugs into the United States. Nonetheless, it
increased availability of Mexican heroin, is possible that seizures of large quantities of
coupled with increased involvement of Mexi cocaine en route to Mexico and counterdrug
(%')KLM4)<')-"%+/(D<'3)F*,-.)I0#"<(%') efforts may have impacted the ability of
.#"*<'8)&<D#&;).%$#)"#4,&-#2)<')4<3'</(%'-&;) major DTOs to smuggle cocaine from South
greater quantities of heroin being transported America to Mexico. These factors may also
across the Southwest Border. explain the decrease in seizures along the
Southwest Border, the decline in cocaine
Methamphetamine and marijuana seizures availability in portions of the United States,
have also increased along the Southwest and the lack of similar longterm declines in
Border, partly because of increased produc the availability of methamphetamine, heroin,
tion. As with heroin, the increase appears to be and marijuana.
4!#(</()-*)-.#)2",3E)N#-.%0!.#-%0<'#)!"*
duction in Mexico appears to be increasing
again after a sustained period of limited
MARITIME SMUGGLING
production resulting from laws that eventually DIRECTLY INTO THE
banned pseudoephedrine in Mexico. Multiple UNITED STATES
factors may be contributing to an increase in
marijuana smuggling, particularly decreased F<3'</(%'-&;),#")R,%'-<-<#4)*+)2",34)%"#)
GOM cannabis eradication efforts, which have smuggled directly into the United States by
resulted in elevated production levels. -"%+/(D#"4),4<'3)0%"<-<0#)(*'$#;%'(#4)-.%')
Q;)-"%+/(D#"4),4<'3)*$#"&%'2)"*,-#4E)]')ABBU8)
&67763%4I)"*'3:%B7#$$*23$%?)(E6:+ less than 3 percent of all arrival zone drug
Mexican DTOs dominate the transportation seizures occurred on commercial and noncom
of illicit drugs across the Southwest Border. mercial maritime conveyances. Nevertheless,
They typically use commercial trucks and pri some DTOs continue to use maritime smug
vate and rental vehicles to smuggle cocaine, gling methods to move illegal drugs into the
marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin
United States (see text box on page 22), and like
through the 25 land POEs as well as through
overland smugglers, some of these maritime
vast areas of desert and mountainous terrain
5#!<##*%RK\$J%F$")*%!.)'/(6#.$+%K>G$+%)*0% smugglers shifted their operations in 2008 and
H*0&[2)*)0")*%0.:-%!.)'/(6#.$%!.)*$7&.!%$"- 2009 in response to law enforcement pressure
*"/()*!%]:)*!"!"#$%&'%1"-1[7&!#*(;%4)."Y:)*)% or gaps in interdiction coverage.
and MDMA into the United States across the
&"'()*+:"2%#2:?%C",F'0:%6'",0,6:%F:22:72%01%
U.S.–Canada border. They use commercial
trucks and private and rental vehicles to smuggle drugs into the United States during
transport these drugs through more than 100 PQQR%09"1#$9%T#:"01%I,*1>%B1#09%G71",?'>%
land POEs. They also use allterrain vehicles B1#09%&:='2>%'-?%21#09:"-%5'7,(1"-,'>%'-?%
(ATVs), aircraft, maritime vessels, and couri <:=,*'-%!&.2%216:0,6:2%26#$$7:%?"#$2%34%
ers on foot to smuggle drugs through vast maritime means to avoid law enforcement
areas between POEs. scrutiny along the Southwest Border.
The primary threat from drug smuggling via
A review of the smuggling patterns for private vessels is from Caribbeanbased traf
each of the major drug types reveals myriad /(D#"4)#=!&*<-<'3)-.#)P,#"-*)b<(*)%'2)O&*"<2%)
21
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
(*%4-&<'#4E)L"%+/(D#"4)-"%'4!*"-#2)0*4-&;)(* in the region during 2008. Federal investiga
caine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto tors believe that the smugglers typically depart
Rico, although they smuggled lesser amounts from Tamaulipas State in northern Mexico and
of heroin and MDMA, sometimes commin make short hops to the Texas coastline. Mexi
3)?<-.)(*(%<'#)&*%24E)@%"<QQ#%')-"%+/(D#"4) (%')-"%+/(D#"4)%&4*),4#2)!"<$%-#)$#44#&4)<')ABBU)
also smuggled cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to smuggle marijuana from the northern Mexi
from the Bahamas to areas of South Florida co state of Baja California to southern Califor
between Miami and Palm Beach. Seizure nia. In fact, in 2009, more than 3.1 metric tons
totals and routes remained relatively constant of marijuana were reported to have been seized
compared with those of previous years. from private vessels arriving in southern Cali
fornia, primarily the San Diego area.
&67763%?'"2(27)%B7#$$*23$%?)(E6:+
5166:"*,'7%6'",0,6:%F:22:72>%:2C:*,'774%
Various DTOs—most notably Colombian but 6'",0,6:%*1-0',-:"2>%":6',-%'%F,'37:%*1-
also Dominican, Jamaican, Puerto Rican, veyance for smuggling drugs directly into
and Venezuelan—transport cocaine and
09:%A-,0:?%B0'0:2>%3#0%2:,/#":%?'0'%'-?%7'@%
lesser amounts of heroin and marijuana to
enforcement reporting indicate that this
the United States using a variety of convey
ances, including container ships, cruise smuggling method continues to account for
$1"7$+%(&44#.(")3%/$1"*-%,#$$#3$+%.#(.# a relatively small portion of the nation’s il
ation vessels, and gofast boats. The drugs licit drug supply.
are typically concealed in hidden compart
L"%+/(D#"4),4#)(*00#"(<%&)0%"<-<0#)$#44#&4)
ments, commingled with legitimate goods,
or couriered by passenger or crew members to smuggle sizable quantities of drugs into the
&*%4)."!"4#%,#$$#3$J%X.)'/(6#.$%)3$&%1),#% United States, but data suggest that other con
increasingly used selfpropelled semisub veyance methods are preferred by smugglers.
mersibles (SPSSs)a to transport cocaine L"%+/(D#"4)*+-#').<2#)2",34)%0*'3)<-<0%-#)
from South America to Mexico. The use of cargo in maritime containers, a fraction of
=R==$%)''&.0$%!.)'/(6#.$%!1#%)5"3"!;%!&%(& which are inspected. Analysis of commercial
vertly transport large quantities of drugs. maritime seizure data for 2004 through 2009
a. Selfpropelled semisubmersible vessels are maritime vessels used indicates that cocaine and marijuana are most
Q;)-"%+/(D#"4)-*)-"%'4!*"-)<&&<(<-)2",34E)L.#4#)$#44#&4)-;!<(%&&;)!"* often smuggled in commercial maritime ves
trude only a few inches above the surface of the water, making them
$#";)2<+/(,&-)-*)2#-#(-)$<4,%&&;E)FPFF4)-;!<(%&&;).%$#)%)+*,":0%') sels from Caribbean locations, such as the
crew and are capable of carrying multiton quantities of cocaine. Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, into
East Coast ports in Florida and New Jersey.
N#=<(%')-"%+/(D#"4)4##D<'3)-*)%$*<2)4(", L"%+/(D#"4)%&4*),4#)(*00#"(<%&)$#44#&4)-*)
tiny along the Southwest Border used private smuggle cocaine from the Dominican Re
vessels to smuggle marijuana and cocaine public into Puerto Rico. Smaller amounts of
into the United States during 2009. Incidents heroin, typically 2 kilograms or less, are oc
involving kilogram packages of cocaine and casionally smuggled by cruise ship passengers
marijuana washing up or being found aban ?*"D<'3)+*")@%"<QQ#%')-"%+/(D<'3)*"3%'<J%
doned along the South Texas coastline in tions into East Coast ports; however, this smug
creased, particularly in the South Padre Island gling technique appears to have declined since
%"#%8)2,"<'3)-.#)/"4-).%&+)*+)-.#);#%"E)[;)-.#) 2006. Seizure data indicate that methamphet
end of December, more than 114 kilograms of amine is rarely smuggled into the United States
cocaine had been recovered in the region. In on commercial maritime vessels.
comparison, only 1 kilogram was recovered
22
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
-E)%J6$2+(20+%6.%-"'3+96"(23$%!"#$%BE297)3(+%
DTOs have wellestablished transportation networks and often transport illicit drug ship
ments directly to drug markets throughout the United States. Some DTOs relinquish control
5;%0"$!."5:!"*-%"33"("!%0.:-$%'.&4%$!)$1%3&()!"&*$%!&%!.)'/(6#.$%<1&%7:.(1)$#%!1#$#%0.:-$%)*0%
then transport the shipments themselves to distribution areas. DTOs often hire independent
drug transportation groups to transport drugs, insulating themselves from law enforcement
"*,#$!"-)!"&*$%)*0%(&47).!4#*!)3"D"*-%!.)'/(6"*-%&7#.)!"&*$J%X1#$#%!.)*$7&.!#.$%).#%1".#0%'&.%
the sole purpose of moving drug shipments, and they operate in cells that are separate from
other DTO operations. As a result, seizures of illicit drugs from transporters often yield little
&.%*&%"*'&.4)!"&*%!&%3)<%#*'&.(#4#*!%&'/(")3$%)5&:!%&!1#.%VXK%4#45#.$%&.%VXK%&7#.)!"&*$J%
M&.%#C)473#+%2&3&45")*%VXK$%&'!#*%#473&;%>#C"()*%!.)'/(6#.$%<1&$#%$:((#$$':3%!.)*$7&.
tation networks allow these DTOs to circumvent the problems caused by law enforcement
disruption of their own transportation routes.
Drug shipments are typically stashed in ranches, warehouses, residences, and trailers near
primary points of entry into the United States for consolidation, distribution, and subsequent
!.)*$7&.!%!&%0.:-%4).6#!$%!1.&:-1&:!%!1#%P*"!#0%=!)!#$J%X&%!.)*$7&.!%0.:-$+%!.)'/(6#.$%7."
marily use commercial trucks and privately owned and rental vehicles equipped with hidden
compartments and natural voids in the vehicles. Additionally, bulk quantities of illicit drugs are
$&4#!"4#$%(&44"*-3#0%<"!1%3#-"!"4)!#%-&&0$%"*%(&44#.(")3%!.:(6$J%>)*;%0.:-%!.)'/(6#.$%:$#%
postal and package delivery services to transport illicit drugs within the United States and, to
a much lesser extent, use couriers and cargo shipments on aircraft, buses, and trains.
Despite the fact that sizable quantities of shipments concealed in commercial mari
drugs are seized annually from commer time containers by Caribbean and South
cial maritime vessels arriving in the United I0#"<(%')-"%+/(D#"4)%"#)<'-#"(#!-#2)Q;)^EFE)
F-%-#48)-.#)2*0<'%'(#)*+)N#=<(%')-"%+/(D authorities as they transit the United States
ing organizations as the primary transporters en route to markets in Europe and Asia.
of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and meth
amphetamine to the United States results AIR SMUGGLING INTO THE
in commercial maritime seizure totals that
are far less than Southwest Border seizure
UNITED STATES
totals. Seizure data for 2009 show that the The amount of drugs smuggled into the
amount seized from commercial maritime United States by couriers and in cargo
vessels remains less than 1 percent (6,015 %Q*%"2)(*00#"(<%&)%<"("%+-)<4)4<3'</(%'-&;)
kg of 828,223 kg) of the amount seized at less than the amount smuggled by other
the Southwest Border. Law enforcement means. In 2009, the total amount seized
"#!*"-<'3)(*'/"04)-.%-)@%"<QQ#%')%'2)F*,-.) from commercial aircraft for cocaine,
I0#"<(%')-"%+/(D#"4)%"#)0*"#)&<D#&;)-.%') heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and
N#=<(%')-"%+/(D#"4)-*)-%D#)%2$%'-%3#)*+) MDMA was less than for any other convey
commercial maritime vessels as a smuggling ance. Drug seizure data show that only 24
conveyance to supply their much smaller percent of heroin seizures, 15 percent of
U.S. distribution networks. Moreover, large MDMA seizures, 6 percent of cocaine sei
quantities of drugs seized at U.S. ports are zures, and less than 1 percent each of meth
often destined for distribution in countries amphetamine and marijuana seizures were
other than the United States. Many drug from commercial air conveyances.
23
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Table 2. J:"1,-%B:,/#":2%'0%B1#09@:20%L1"?:"%E":'%'-?%
5166:"*,'7%E,"%T.U2>%,-%O,71$"'62>%PQQVWPQQRS
Column1 Column2
2002 2004
8.5 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Southwest Border
2003 386
7.8 229 489 362 556 642
Commercial 2004 Air POEs 909
3.8 740 529 424 398 199
2005 NA
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009.
2006 4.6
2007 1.9
2008 NA Figure 2. T10:-0,'7%T#":%J:"1,-%T"1?#*0,1-%U20,6'0:2>%517163,'>%
,-%<:0",*%&1-2>%PQQPWPQQXS%
.! .!
Source: U.S. Government estimate.
jW4-<0%-#2)/3,"#)+*")ABBC)Q%4#2)*')!%"-<%&)2%-%)Q#(%,4#)*+)<'(*0!&#-#)4,"$#;k)#4-<0%-#4)+*")ABBY)%'2)ABBX)'*-)%$%<&%Q&#E)
Table 3. <:0"1C17,0'-%E":'2%<120%.(0:-%Y?:-0,):?%'2%.",$,-'0,1-%'-?%!:20,-'0,1-%
T1,-02%(1"%B:,/:?%!"#$%B9,C6:-02>%34%!"#$>%PQQXWPQQRS
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Methamphetamine MDMA
McAllen McAllen Denver Phoenix Los Angeles
Phoenix Los Angeles Phoenix Los Angeles New York
Origination Tucson Phoenix Miami McAllen Seattle
Rio Grande City Houston Chicago San Bernardino Lynden (WA)
Laredo Laredo Orlando Seattle Detroit
Houston Atlanta Chicago Atlanta New York
Chicago Chicago New York Sacramento Houston
Destination Atlanta New York Miami Las Vegas Baton Rouge
Tucson Miami Newark Denver Ocala (FL)
Detroit Houston Tacoma Chicago Atlanta
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of June 30, 2009.
24
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
The use of commercial air to smuggle to the major drug markets within the United
heroin into the United States is rapidly States. (See Figure 3 on page 26.)
?:*7,-,-$>%@9,7:%9:"1,-%26#$$7,-$%1F:"%09:%
Southwest Border is increasing. Among the eight principal drug corridors,
Corridor A is particularly vital to DTOs.
The amount of heroin seized at commercial Corridor A is the primary route for DTOs
air POEs decreased 56.2 percent (909 kg to 398 transporting multiton quantities of cocaine,
kg) from 2004 through 2008. The decrease is heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine from
partially attributable to a shift in the smuggling the Southwest Border to eastern U.S. drug
of South American heroin by couriers on markets, many of the largest drug markets in
(*00#"(<%&)H<3.-4)-*)*$#"&%'2)-"%'4!*"-%-<*') the country. Within Corridor A, Interstate 10 as
across the Southwest Border as well as in well as Interstates 8 and 20 are among those
creased airport interdiction activities in Colom most used by drug couriers, as evidenced by
bian airports. Colombian DTOs are now, to a drug seizure data showing that from 2008
large extent, relying on Mexican DTOs to through October 2009, nearly 19 percent of all
smuggle heroin overland into the United States reported interstate cocaine seizures and 7
rather than conducting their own air courier percent of all reported interstate heroin sei
smuggling operations. At the same time that zures occurred on these routes.
heroin seizures decreased at commercial air
POEs, heroin seizures at Southwest Border Corridor B is also important to DTOs, es
POEs increased 44.0 percent (386 kg to 556 pecially those moving methamphetamine and
kg), and preliminary seizure data indicate that marijuana produced in California or Mexico to
Southwest Border heroin seizures reached a major market areas in western, central, or east
record high in 2009 (see Table 2 on page 24). ern states. Interstates 15, 80, 70, and 40 are the
leading routes through Corridor B, and seizures
The decline in commercial air smuggling for on these interstates accounted for 46 percent of
heroin is attributable to a number of factors, all reported methamphetamine seizures and 31
including decreasing South American heroin percent of all marijuana seizures on interstates
production and a shift to smuggling routes from 2008 through October 2009.
across the Southwest Border. Most of the her
oin seized at air POEs in previous years was Drug couriers moving drugs through the
seized from South American heroin couriers. various corridors are often destined for one of
However, South American heroin production the relatively few primary U.S. drug markets,
appears to have decreased sharply since 2003 where there are large drug user populations and
(see Figure 2 on page 24). where drugs are further distributed to smaller
markets. There are relatively little data available
THE FLOW OF DRUGS WITHIN to objectively rank cities as leading or lesser
drug markets. Nevertheless, analysis of national
THE UNITED STATES seizure data that identify the destination and
L.#"#)%"#)7AC)*+/(<%&)^EFE)&%'28)0%"<-<0#8) origination of drug shipments shows that seven
and air POEs; however, a relatively few POEs city areas (Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Houston,
%((*,'-)+*")0*4-)*+)-.#)2",3)H*?)<'-*)-.#) N<%0<8)`#?)a*"D8)%'2)L,(4*'>)%"#)<2#'-</#2)
United States. In fact, 88 percent of all drug more often than any other cities as major points
seizures occurred at just 20 POEs. From these of both origination12 and destination for drug
and other POEs, drug shipments are transport shipments (see Table 3 on page 24).
ed to dozens of national and regional distribu
tion centers through eight principal corridors 12.# S456:)&,#5*/*&,#?*/%*(#/%&#F3:/%?&,/#a3.)&.#C..*;06#
b3(�.&0#<?*/%*(#![T#1*6&,#38#/%&#P"F"cG&4*53#23.)&.@"#
25
Figure 3. Drug Transportation Corridors in the United States
" "
)
13
)
5 "
)
23
"
)
19
"
)
9 "
) )6
77 "
132
!
³
! "
)
1 "
)
97 Regional Drug Transportation Corridors
11
Blaine
"
)
95
"
)
1 ¦
¨
§
"
)
3 "
)
16 "
)
10
"
)3 113
!
³
Seattle "
)
93 134
!
³
" "
)4 "
)
11
"
)
17
"
)
6 "
"
)1 175
)
!
³
! "
)
5
35 39
¦
¨
§ Spokane
"
)
75
"
)
71 Houlton !
117 "
)2
!
³
!
³ 155
Portland 82
"
)
11
"
)
17 "
)1
" ¦
¨
§ 117 173
!
³
!
³
90
¦
¨
§ 144 95
!
³
¦
¨
§29
105
¦
¨
§
¦
¨
§ 94
Duluth
!
Sault
Ste. Marie
! !
³
¦
¨
§84 Billings
! "
)
69 93
D 89
¦§
¨
§ ¦
¨
15 ¦
¨
§ 87
¦
¨
§ 401
!
³
C 81
¨
§
! 91
Buffalo ! Minneapolis 75
¦Syracuse ¦
¨
§ "
Boston
¦
¨
§ !
¦
¨
§5 88
86
¦
¨
§43 Port
Huron ! ¦
¨
§
¦
¨
§ 90
¦
¨
§ ! 402
! Buffalo
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
¦
¨
§25
401
³³
!
Detroit "
Salt
35
¦
¨
§ Chicago Cleveland
78
"
! ¦
¨
§80 ¦
¨
§ New York
80
¦
¨
§ Lake City
!
" Pittsburgh 83
Sacramento E ! !
¦
¨
§ " Philadelphia
! Des 39 71
San Omaha ! Moines ¨
§
¦ ¨
§
¦ 57 ¨
§ ¦
¨
§
69
68
Francisco "
¦
¨
§76
¦ §
¦
¨ 75 §
¦
¨ " Baltimore
74 77
! Denver
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ 66 " Washington
70 B 72 79
¦
¨
§ Kansas
¦
¨
§ ! Cincinnati ¦
¨
§
City !
70
¦
¨
§ 64
St. Louis ! G ¦
¨
§
26
Las 64
¦
¨
§
Vegas ¦
¨
§81
! ¦
¨
§ 65
75
44 24
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ 95
Barstow
!
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§
Knoxville !
40
¦
¨
§
Los " ¦
¨
§ 26
Oklahoma
Angeles ! City 65
San 10
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ 17 Albuquerque
40
! Little
¦
¨
§ 77
¦
¨
§ H
Diego Phoenix ¦
¨
§ Rock
¦
¨
§85
" !
" ¦
¨
§ 27 F ! Atlanta
¦
¨
§8
55
¦
¨
§ A
30
¦
¨
§
Las Dallas 16
10
¦
¨
§ Cruces
!
¦
¨
§
¦
¨
§19 "
20
" El Paso
"
)2 ¦
¨
§ 65
¦
¨
§49 ¦
¨
§59 ¦
¨
§ Jacksonville
45
¦
¨
§ "
Corridors 10 35
A E "
)
45
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§10
75
¦
¨
§
Houston !
New Orleans
B F " 4
C G
"
)
15 " San ¦
¨
§
Antonio ! 95
D H
Tampa ¦
¨
§
37
¦
¨
§
Major Cities !
Laredo
Miami
" 1,000,000 + !
"
)
49 "
)
85
" 500,000 999,999 "
)
15
"
)
40 "
)
40
! less than 500,000
"
)
40 "
)
57
Source: Federal, state, and local law enforcement data and reporting.
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 4. G:?:"'7%51*',-:%B:,/#":%&10'72>%,-%O,71$"'62>%PQQZWPQQRS
60,000
53,220 53,755
48,335
50,000
40,449
40,000
30,000
19,324
20,000
10,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Source: National Drug Intelligence Center analysis of FederalWide Drug Seizure System data.
*Data as of June 2009.
Note: Federalwide Drug Seizure System totals have been adjusted to exclude seizures that did not occur within the United States or its
territorial waters.
13.# C;0*602*6*/7#*()*50/3.,#;0.7#27#).:+#/7-�()#*(56:)&#
).:+#0()#6023.0/3.7#,&*=:.&#)0/0>#OC\N#&1&.+&(57#
)&-0./1&(/#)0/0>#d:&,/#O*0+(3,/*5,#?3.K-605&#/&,/*(+#
)0/0>#N0/*3(06#J3.&(,*5#e023.0/3.7#M(83.10/*3(#F7,/&1#
<NJeMF@#)0/0>#0()#OSC#-.*5�()#-:.*/7#)0/0"##
27
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Figure 5. Cocaine Price and Purity Data
89:&/;.+1.5.45(5<51).2=.47>,.)?@+<+(1.1)'(.(2./;A.
*5<275(27+)1.=72B.(@)./;AC.DE&C.FEGC.&F;C.H8FIC.5'4.
All Cocaine Purchases 651@+',(2'.JG/K..89:&/;.+1.'2(.5.7)L7)1)'(5(+0).
15BL*).2=.47>,1.505+*5<*).+'.(@).H'+()4.8(5()1C.<>(.
Domestic STRIDE Data 7)=*)-(1.5**.)0+4)'-).1><B+(()4.(2./;A.*5<275(27+)1.=27.
5'5*M1+1K..89:&/;.45(5.57).'2(.-2**)-()4.(2.7)=*)-(.
January 2006 September 2009 '5(+2'5*.B57N)(.(7)'41K..O2')(@)*)11C.89:&/;.45(5.
7)=*)-(.(@).<)1(.+'=27B5(+2'.->77)'(*M.505+*5<*).2'.
-@5',)1.+'.-2-5+')..L7+-).5'4.L>7+(MK
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Jan D9" Jul 40( Jan D9" Jul 40( Jan D9" Jul 40( Jan D9" Jul
?'"KL M#3KL B)9KL !)0KL ?'"KN M#3KN B)9KN !)0KN ?'"KO M#3KO B)9KO !)0KO ?'"KP M#3KP B)9KP
QQ8R7)'3 SPTULV SPTUPL SPTUNW SPKUXO SPPUYT SXXPUKO SXWKUWT SXXVUYL SXYYUOX SXYLUKL SXOWULW SXPOUTN SXNTUWO SXNWUXP SXNTUKW
Q#"2(>R7)'3 LOUL LOUP LOUX LPUO LNUT VPUW VNUX LXUY VNUL VNUT TLUT TTUO TOUX TOUL TLUY
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0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Source: Quest Diagnostics Incorporated. *(U) Percent differences may not equal the average calculated from the quarterl
*Data as of December 9, 2009. * Jan-June 2009
Source: QUEST Diagnostics Incorporated extracted December 9, 2009
28
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Workplace drug tests also indicated a re U.S. drug markets where cocaine availability
duction in cocaine availability; the percentage <4)(&*4#&;)0*'<-*"#28)*+/(<%&4)<')AA)2",3)0%"
of positive tests for cocaine among samples kets (primarily markets east of the Mississippi
submitted to Quest Diagnostics declined sub River and along the Southwest Border) report
stantially between the end of 2006 and midyear -.%-)2,"<'3)-.#)/"4-).%&+)*+)ABBU8)%$%<&%Q<&<-;)
2009 (see Figure 6 on page 28). In addition, all was below 2006 levels; the cocaine short
14 cities monitored by DAWN reported that the ages have been attributed to several factors
proportion of drugrelated emergency depart 64##)-#=-)Q*=>E)M+/(<%&4)<')*'&;)9)*+)-.#)YS)
ment admissions attributed to cocaine has 0%"D#-45[*<4#8)]2%.*k)M0%.%8)`#Q"%4D%k)
declined since 2006. P*"-&%'28)M"#3*'k)%'2)F%&-)e%D#)@<-;8)^-%.5
reported that cocaine availability levels were
Anecdotal reporting from law enforcement higher than in 2006.
*+/(<%&4)-."*,3.*,-)-.#)(*,'-";)4,!!*"-4)-.#)
-"#'2)"#H#(-#2)<')-.#)'%-<*'%&)2%-%E)M+)-.#)YS)
Q6()3(2'*%&'#+)+%.6"%&60'23)%BE6"('$)+%23%AUBU%!"#$%?'"1)(+
F3!1&:-1%*&%$"*-3#%')(!&.%'&.%!1#%0#(3"*#%"*%(&()"*#%),)"3)5"3"!;%()*%5#%"0#*!"/#0+%)%(&4
bination of factors, including increased law enforcement efforts in Mexico and the transit
zones, decreased cocaine production in Colombia, high levels of cartel violence, and co
()"*#%W&<%!&%*&*[PJ=J%4).6#!$%3"6#3;%(&*!."5:!#0%!&%0#(.#)$#0%)4&:*!$%5#"*-%!.)*$7&.!#0%
to the U.S.–Mexico border for subsequent smuggling into the United States. Cocaine
7.&0:(!"&*%#$!"4)!#$%'&.%2&3&45")%0#(.#)$#0%$3"-1!3;%"*%899^%)*0%$"-*"/()*!3;%"*%899A%
(see Figure 7 on page 30), reducing the amount of cocaine available to world markets.
X.)'/(6#.$%"*%Q&3",")%)*0%R#.:%7.&0:(#0%$"D)53#%]:)*!"!"#$%&'%(&()"*#%0:."*-%!1#%8[;#).%
7#."&0+%5:!%!1#".%#$!"4)!#0%7.&0:(!"&*%()7)5"3"!;%)*0%<#33[#$!)53"$1#0%!.)'/(6"*-%*#!<&.6$%
<&:30%*&!%5#%)53#%!&%]:"(63;%/33%,&"0$%"*%!1#%PJ=J%(&()"*#%$:773;%():$#0%5;%!1#%0#(3"*#%"*%
Colombian production. Moreover, during 2007, several exceptionally large seizures of co
()"*#%0#$!"*#0%'&.%>#C"(&%4);%1),#%"*"!")!#0%!1#%/.$!%.#7&.!#0%(&()"*#%$1&.!)-#$%"*%PJ=J%
drug markets. These seizures coincided with the decline in seizures along the Southwest
Border and were followed by an unprecedented decline in cocaine availability, a trend
that continued through 2009. Helping to sustain the shortages were counterdrug efforts
on both sides of the border, which most likely diminished the ability of one or more ma
jor DTOs to obtain cocaine from South America for subsequent distribution in the United
=!)!#$J%M"*)33;+%#C7)*0"*-%<&.30%4).6#!$%'&.%(&()"*#%"*%\:.&7#%L)%1"-13;%7.&/!)53#%4).
ket) and South America may be further reducing the already reduced amount available
from Colombian sources to distribute in the United States.
29
2006 515.0
2007 485.0
2008 295.0
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Figure 7. T10:-0,'7%T#":%51*',-:%T"1?#*0,1-%,-%517163,'>%,-%<:0",*%&1-2>%PQQVWPQQX
600.0
500.0 515.0
485.0
500.0
410.0
400.0
295.0
300.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: U.S. Government estimate.
Law enforcement reporting indicates that hero Increased availability in some markets can be
in remains widely available and that availability partly attributed to increased heroin production
is increasing in some areas, as evidenced by high in Mexico. From 2004 through 2008, heroin
wholesale purity, low prices, increased levels of production estimates for Mexico increased 342
abuse, and elevated numbers of heroinrelated percent, from 8.6 metric tons pure to 38 metric
overdoses and overdose deaths. For instance, tons pure (see Figure 8 on page 31).
according to DEA Heroin Signature Program Increased heroin availability has led to in
(HSP) data, the wholesale purity of Mexican creased heroin abuse and, consequently, an
heroin was 40 percent in 2008, the highest aver increase in heroinrelated overdoses and overdose
age purity for Mexican heroin analyzed under deaths. Law enforcement reporting from the
the HSP since 2005 (47%). Additionally, Mexi Great Lakes, MidAtlantic, New England, New
can heroin represented 39 percent (by weight) of a*"DT`#?)\#"4#;8)F*,-.#%4-8)%'2)c#4-)@#'-"%&)
all heroin analyzed through the HSP, the highest OCDETF Regions suggests that heroin abuse is
percentage since 1987 (42%). The wholesale increasing, particularly among younger abusers.
purity of South American heroin stabilized at Moreover, in mid2009, law enforcement and
YC)!#"(#'-)<')ABBX)%+-#")4<3'</(%'-&;)2#("#%4<'3) public health agencies in 29 drug markets span
from 2000 to 2006. However, South American ning 17 states began reporting elevated levels of
heroin representation under the HSP decreased heroinrelated overdoses, which in many areas
markedly to 58 percent (by weight) in 2008 from began to increase in 2008 (see Figure 9 on page
a high of 88 percent in 2003. The decreased rep 31). The degree to which heroin overdoses in
resentation of South American heroin under the ("#%4#2)<')-.#4#)2",3)0%"D#-45?.<(.)"%'3#2)<')
_FP)"#4,&-#2)+"*0)%)4<3'</(%'-)<'("#%4#)*+)N#= size from Burlington, Vermont, to Dallas, Tex
ican heroin samples seized and analyzed under %45$%"<#2)?<2#&;8)Q,-)+*")#%(.)%"#%)-.#)<'("#%4#)
the program, 300 kilograms in 2008 compared ?%4)4<3'</(%'-)"#&%-<$#)-*)?.%-)&*(%&)*+/(<%&4)
with 136 kilograms in 2007, rather than an over
30
2005 8.0
2006 13.0
2007 18.0
Product No. 2010Q0317001
2008 38.0 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 8. Potential Pure Heroin Production in Mexico
in Metric Tons, 2004–2008
40.0 38.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0 18.0
15.0 13.0
8.6 8.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: U.S. Government estimate.
Figure 9. Counties Reporting Increases in HeroinRelated Overdoses, 2008–2009
gin
scog
Andro
!
(
!
( n
nde ork ord
Chitte (Y
( Straffingham
!
!
( Rock
!
( ssex
!
!
( E
Midd lesex
Dane Milwauk ee
!
( !
( folk
( Racine
! !
(
( Suf
!
( Lak e u
!
Dauph
in Nassa
y
Lak e ( ( La Porte
(!
!! Alleghen !
(
Porter !
(
Franklin !
(
ton
Washing
!
(
St. Louis City !
(
burg
( Meck len
!
( Bernalillo
!
( Pima
!
Tarrant !
(!( Dallas
Source: Federal, state, and local
law enforcement reporting.
31
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Q")+0"29(263%49262:%A+)"+%Z'I)%B=2(0E):%(6%Z)"623
Some opioid abusers use prescription opioids or heroin, depending on availability and the price
of each drug, and heroin availability is increasing in many regions in response to higher demand.
Treatment providers in some areas of the United States reported in 2008 that prescription opioid
abusers switch to heroin as they build tolerance to prescription opioids and seek a more euphoric
high. Further, treatment providers are reporting that some prescription opioid abusers are switch
ing to heroin in a few areas where heroin is less costly or more available than prescription opioids.
It is also common for some heroin abusers to use prescription opioids when they cannot obtain
heroin. Diverted CPDs are often more readily available than heroin in all drug markets; however,
heroin use increased in many areas of the country in 2009, possibly because of increased demand
among abusers of prescription opioids who could no longer afford CPDs. Prescription opioids are
typically more expensive than heroin. For example, oxycodone abusers with a high tolerance may
"*-#$!%U99%4"33"-.)4$%&'%!1#%0.:-%0)"3;%L/,#%A9[4-%!)53#!$O%'&.%)*%),#.)-#%0)"3;%(&$!%&'%_U99J%X1#$#%
abusers could maintain their addictions with 2 grams of heroin daily, at a cost of onethird to one
half that of prescription opioids, depending on the area of the country and the purity of the heroin.
normally observe. Although a variety of the United States are based primarily in Afghani
factors have been associated with the increase, stan, Pakistan, West Africa, and India. Similarly,
including some prescription opioid users even though Southeast Asian (SEA) opium and
switching to heroin (see text box), the only heroin production estimates marginally increased
commonality appears to be an overall increase from 2007 to 2008, only limited quantities of
in heroin availability. the drug are available in the United States. Most
SEA heroin is consumed regionally in Southeast
The capacity of Mexican DTOs to occupy a I4<%)%'2)-.#)W%4-)I4<%lP%(</()"#3<*'E
0*"#)4<3'</(%'-)4.%"#)*+)-.#).#"*<')0%"D#-)<')
cities historically dominated by South Ameri
can heroin may be evolving. In addition to
METHAMPHETAMINE
N#=<(%')KLM4)-"%+/(D<'3)%'2)2<4-"<Q,-<'3) AVAILABILITY
greater quantities of South American heroin, From mid2008 through 2009, methamphet
investigative reporting and heroin signature amine availability increased in the United States.
analysis indicate the possibility of white heroin Drug availability indicator data show that meth
being produced in Mexico using Colombian amphetamine prices, which peaked in 2007, de
processing techniques, as well as the distribu (&<'#2)4<3'</(%'-&;)2,"<'3)ABBX)%'2)ABBU8)?.<&#)
tion of “mixed” heroin containing both South methamphetamine purity increased (see Figure
American and Mexican heroin. However, 10 on page 33). Methamphetamine seizures also
%22<-<*'%&)<'+*"0%-<*')<4)'##2#2)-*)(*'/"0)-.#) increased in 2008 after dropping in 2007, and
existence of and to understand the potential 2009 data indicate that seizures continue to rise
threat posed by these two heroin forms. (see Figure 11 on page 33).
Despite record estimates of opium and heroin Analysis of available data indicates that
production in Afghanistan, the United States methamphetamine availability in the United
remains a secondary market for Southwest Asian States is directly related to methamphetamine
(SWA) heroin. SWA heroin is smuggled into production trends in Mexico, which is the
the United States in relatively small quantities, primary source of methamphetamine consumed
!"<0%"<&;)Q;)(*,"<#"4)*')-"%'4%-&%'-<()H<3.-4)%'2) in the United States. That is, as methamphet
through the international mail system. Organiza amine production declined in Mexico in 2007
-<*'4)"#4!*'4<Q&#)+*")-"%+/(D<'3)FcI).#"*<')<'-*) and early 2008 as a result of precursor chemical
32
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 10. Methamphetamine Price and Purity Data
89:&/;.+1.5.45(5<51).2=.47>,.)?@+<+(1.1)'(.(2./;A.
*5<275(27+)1.=72B.(@)./;AC.DE&C.FEGC.&F;C.H8FIC.5'4.
All Methamphetamine Purchases 651@+',(2'.JG/K..89:&/;.+1.'2(.5.7)L7)1)'(5(+0).
15BL*).2=.47>,1.505+*5<*).+'.(@).H'+()4.8(5()1C.<>(.
Domestic STRIDE Data 7)=*)-(1.5**.)0+4)'-).1><B+(()4.(2./;A.*5<275(27+)1.=27.
5'5*M1+1K..89:&/;.45(5.57).'2(.-2**)-()4.(2.7)=*)-(.
January 2006 September 2009 '5(+2'5*.B57N)(.(7)'41K..O2')(@)*)11C.89:&/;.45(5.
7)=*)-(.(@).<)1(.+'=27B5(+2'.->77)'(*M.505+*5<*).2'.
-@5',)1.+'.B)(@5BL@)(5B+')..L7+-).5'4.L>7+(MK
SWKK XKKUK
SYNOUPN%
SYLTUPT%
SYVK
SYTYUPN%
OKUK
SYYVUNK%
SYXPUOP%
SYXKUVK%
Q"20)%Q)"%Q#")%8"'7
Q#"2(>%23%Q)"0)3(
SYKK LWUW
SXOVUVY% LXUL
SXNWUPY% VNUK VLUL LKUK
VYUY SXNPUKW%
SXLOULX%
SXVK TVUO VWUL
SXKK
D72B.P5'>57M."$$Q.(@72>,@.8)L()B<)7."$$%C.(@).L7+-).L)7.L>7).,75B.2=.J)(@5BL@)(5B+'). YKUK
SVK 4)-7)51)4.!VKRTC.=72B.U!SQK!".(2.U!"QK"YC.W@+*).(@).L>7+(M.+'-7)51)4.""K!TC.=72B.RQT.(2.X%TK..
SK KUK
Jan D9" Jul 40( Jan D9" Jul 40( Jan D9" Jul 40( Jan D9" Jul
?'"KL M#3KL B)9KL !)0KL ?'"KN M#3KN B)9KN !)0KN ?'"KO M#3KO B)9KO !)0KO ?'"KP M#3KP B)9KP
QQ8R7)'3 SYKNULN% SYTYUPN% SXNWUPY% SXWKUXL% SXTNUXY% SYXKUVK% SYLTUPT% SYNOUPN% SYXPUOP% SYYVUNK% SXOVUVY% SXLOULX% SXNPUKW% SXYOUPX% SXYNUYO%
Q#"2(>R7)'3
2005
WNUT WNUN 2006
TPUK VNUK 2007
VLUL TYUP 2008 2009*
WOUO TKUN TVUO VYUY VWUL LXUL LWUW LOUN LPUX
Methamph
&'()**+,)'-)./+0+1+2'.3 6,246 7,613 4,974 6,318 6,568
&'4+-5(+2'1.5'4.657'+',.8)-(+2' !"#$%#"$$%
*Data run 12/2/09
Figure 11. <:09'6C9:0'6,-:%B:,/#":%E61#-02%,-%09:%A-,0:?%B0'0:2>%,-%O,71$"'62
PQQZWPQQRS
8,000 7,613
7,000 6,568
6,246 6,318
6,000
4,974
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009.
33
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
?)(E'79E)('723)%&E)720'*%[)+("20(263+%23%?)\206
Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine import restrictions in Mexico resulted in decreased Mexican
4#!1)471#!)4"*#%7.&0:(!"&*%"*%899^%)*0%899AJ%H*%899T+%!1#%GK>%5#-)*%"473#4#*!"*-%7.&-.#$
sively increasing restrictions on the importation of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. In 2007, the
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
GK>%)**&:*(#0%)%7.&1"5"!"&*%&*%7$#:0G#0."*#%)*0%#71#0."*#%"47&.!$%"*!&%>#C"(&%'&.%899A%
meth 2,918 2,798 1,860 2,201 3,477
and a ban on the use of both chemicals in Mexico by 2009.
Figure 12. B1#09@:20%L1"?:"%<:09'6C9:0'6,-:%B:,/#":%E61#-02>%,-%O,71$"'62%
PQQZWPQQRS
4,000
3,477
3,500
2,918
3,000 2,798
2,500
2,201
2,000 1,860
1,500
1,000
500
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009.
restrictions (see text box), methamphetamine chemical derivatives such as nacetyl ephedrine
availability declined in the United States. By late and methylamine that are not regulated in
2008, however, Mexican DTOs had adapted Mexico, but can be used to produce metham
their operating procedures in several ways phetamine precursor chemicals and ultimately
including the smuggling of restricted chemicals methamphetamine. Limited access to ephedrine
via new routes, importing nonrestricted chemical and pseudoephedrine has also prompted meth
derivatives instead of precursor chemicals, and amphetamine producers in Mexico to increas
using alternative production methods. For ingly use nonephedrinebased methamphetamine
example, Mexican DTOs smuggle ephedrine and production methods. According to DEA report
pseudoephedrine from source areas in China and ing, Mexican DTOs conduct largescale non
India using indirect smuggling routes that ephedrinebased production operations in Mexi
include transit through Central Africa, Europe, co, particularly using the phenyl2propanone
and South America. In addition, packages (P2P) method. In fact, the GOM has reported
containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are several seizures of phenylacetic acid, a chemical
commonly mislabeled as other items during used to produce the methamphetamine precursor
transit to avoid law enforcement inspection at air chemical P2P. Circumventing the chemical
and seaports in Mexico. Methamphetamine control laws in Mexico has enabled an upsurge in
producers in Mexico also have begun importing methamphetamine production in Mexico and
34
2006 3977
2007 3096
2008 3931
2009 4571
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 13. <:09'6C9:0'6,-:%]'31"'01"4%B:,/#":2>%PQQZWPQQR
7,000
6,015
6,000
5,000 4,571
3,977 3,931
4,000
3,096
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: National Seizure System.
[)+("20(263+%63%(E)%[)('2*%B'*)+%6.%Q+)#:6)9E):"23)
In September 2006, the federal Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA) of 2005
became effective nationwide, setting restrictions on the retail sale of pseudoephedrine prod
ucts. As of December 2009, 45 states had passed measures establishing or enhancing restric
tions on overthecounter sales or purchases of pseudoephedrine products in addition to those
set forth by the CMEA. Of those states, 20 made pseudoephedrine a scheduleda drug, 43 have
imposed pointofsale restrictions, and 26 have enacted pseudoephedrine tracking laws (see
Table B5 in Appendix B).
a. The legal implications of a given schedule may vary from state to state; states that classify the same substance in the same schedule do not
necessarily regulate that substance the same way. Some states that schedule pseudoephedrine also exempt certain forms, such as those in liquid
form or those a designated state authority has determined cannot be used to make methamphetamine. As a result, in some cases, states that do
not schedule pseudoephedrine may still regulate it as strictly as or more so than states that do.
<'("#%4#2)-.#)H*?)*+)0#-.%0!.#-%0<'#)<'-*)-.#) especially in the Southeast Region; however,
United States as evidenced by methamphetamine methamphetamine superlabs14 in California
seizures at or between POEs along the U.S.– also increased in scale and number during the
Mexico border (see Figure 12 on page 34). same period. The increase in domestic meth
amphetamine production in 2008 and 2009
When methamphetamine production in Mex was fueled primarily by individuals and crimi
ico was disrupted in 2007 and 2008, produc nal groups that organized pseudoephedrine
tion in the United States increased as users and 40,"/'315 operations to acquire large amounts
distributors compensated for the reduced foreign of the chemical.
supply. However, even as production in Mexico
increased in 2009, production in the United 14.# F:-&.602,#0.ជ.0/3.*&,#50-026&#-.3):5*(+#!T#3.#13.&#
States showed no decline. In fact, U.S. metham -3:(),#38#1&/%01-%&/01*(&#*(#0#,*(+6&#-.3):5/*3(#5756&"
phetamine laboratory seizures in 2009 exceeded 15.# F1:.'(+#*,#0#1&/%3)#:,&)#27#,31&/%01-%&/01*(&#
0()#-.&5:.,3.#5%&1*506#/.08'5K&.,#/3#059:*.<.+	:0(B
seizures in 2008 (see Figure 13). /*/*&,#38#-,&:)3&-%&).*(&"#M()*;*):06,#-:.5%0,&#-,&:B
)3&-%&).*(&#*(#9:0(/*/*&,#0/#3.#2&63?#6&+06#/%.&,%36),#
The increase in domestic production was 8.31#1:6/*-6&#.&/0*6#6350/*3(,"#$.08'5K&.,#38/&(#&(6*,/#/%&#
realized primarily in smallscale methamphet 0,,*,/0(5&#,&;&.06#0,,35*0/&,#*(#,1:.'(+#3-&.0/*3(,#/3#
amine laboratories throughout the country, *(5.&0,&#/%&#,-&&)#?*/%#?%*5%#5%&1*506,#0.;:*.&)"
35
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
36
2004 10400.0
2005 10100.0
2006 15500.0
2007 15800.0
Product No. 2010Q0317001
2008 21500.0 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 14. T10:-0,'7%<'",M#'-'%T"1?#*0,1-%,-%<:=,*1>%,-%<:0",*%&1-2>%PQQ^WPQQX
25,000
21,500
20,000
15,500 15,800
13,500
15,000
10,400 10,100
10,000
2005 1034102
2006
5,000 1146687
2007 1472536
2008 0 1253054
2009* 1489673
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: U.S. Government estimate.
Figure 15. B1#09@:20%L1"?:"%E":'%<'",M#'-'%B:,/#":2>%,-%O,71$"'62>%PQQZWPQQRS
F<3'</(%'-)R,%'-<-<#4)*+)(%''%Q<4)%"#)(,&-< 1,013,088 plants in 2004 to 4,043,231 plants
vated on public lands, particularly by Mexi in 2008. Public lands are often used for can
can DTOs and criminal groups, as evidenced '%Q<4)(,&-<$%-<*')Q#(%,4#)KLM4)Q#'#/-)+"*0)
Q;).<3.)%'2)<'("#%4<'3)#"%2<(%-<*')/3,"#4E) the remote locations that seemingly limit the
Over the past 5 years, more than 11 mil chance of detection and allow them to main
lion marijuana plants (see Table 5 on page tain such activities without ownership of any
38) have been eradicated from federal public land that can be seized by law enforcement
&%'245-.#)0%1*"<-;)?#"#)#"%2<(%-#2)+"*0) or traced back to a participating member.
public lands in western states. In addition, The increased prevalence of these grow sites
the number of plants eradicated from these on publicly accessible lands has resulted in
lands increased more than 300 percent from numerous armed confrontations with hikers,
37
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
hunters, and passersby unwittingly entering *,-2**")#"%2<(%-<*'E)_*?#$#"8)4*0#)3"*,!45
active cultivation sites. !%"-<(,&%"&;)I4<%')3"*,!45.%$#)#4-%Q&<4.#2)
largescale operations in, or shifted operations
More growers are establishing indoor to, the United States to avoid seizure of the
grow sites to produce better marijuana and shipments at the Canadian border and to attain
avoid outdoor detection and eradication. better access to drug markets. In addition to
Indoor cannabis cultivation that allows for in the increased sense of security that indoor sites
creased security and potentially higherquality !"*$<2#8)(,&-<$%-*"4)Q#'#/-)+"*0);#%":"*,'2)
0%"<1,%'%).%4)Q#(*0#)0*"#)!*!,&%"5!%"-<(, production and controlled environmental condi
larly with Caucasian independents and criminal tions such as lighting and nutrients. Controlling
3"*,!45?<-.)-.#)!"*&<+#"%-<*')*+)(**"2<'%-#2) these factors allows for increased growth and
outdoor eradication efforts nationwide (see maturation times, as well as potentially higher
Table 4 and Table 5). Law enforcement at quality marijuana that can command a much
tributes the increased interest in cultivating higher price.
indoors partially to the heightened levels of
Table 4. [#63:"%1(%T7'-02%U"'?,*'0:?%G"16%Y-?11"%'-?%.#0?11"%B,0:2%
,-%09:%A-,0:?%B0'0:2>%PQQVWPQQX
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Indoor 203,896 270,935 400,892 434,728 450,986
Outdoor 2,996,225 3,938,151 4,830,766 6,599,599 7,562,322
Total 3,200,121 4,209,086 5,231,658 7,034,327 8,013,308
F*,"(#m)K*0#4-<()@%''%Q<4)W"%2<(%-<*'TF,!!"#44<*')P"*3"%0)6K@WTFP>E)
`*-#m)KWI)0#-.*2*&*3;)+*")(*&&#(-<'3)K@WTFP)2%-%)(.%'3#2)<')ABBCE)F<'(#)ABBC8)!,Q&<()&%'24)2%-%).%$#)Q##')<'(&,2#2)<')-.#)
number of outdoor plants eradicated and therefore should not be compared with previous years’ data.
Table 5. [#63:"%1(%T7'-02%U"'?,*'0:?%G"16%G:?:"'7%]'-?2>%PQQVWPQQXS
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Forest Service 718,447 992,264 1,245,324 2,176,952 3,079,923*
U.S. Department of the Interior 294,641 263,005 590,352 715,071 963,308*
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service; U.S. Department of the Interior.
*Forest Service data as of February 12, 2009; U.S. Department of the Interior data as of January 21, 2009.
38
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
&"2723'*%8"6#9+%'3:%!-4+%]\9'3:23$%!67)+(20%&'33'C2+%&#*(2I'(263%49)"'(263+%
'(%F6(E%H3:66"%'3:%4#(:66"%B2()+
>#C"()*%!.)'/(6#.$%).#%#C7)*0"*-%)*0%$1"'!"*-%&:!0&&.%(:3!",)!"&*%&7#.)!"&*$%#)$!<).0%)(.&$$%
the United States into areas that they believe are less subject to law enforcement scrutiny.
These Mexican DTOs have established cultivation operations in areas outside their traditional
strongholds of California, Washington, and Oregon. Since 1999, law enforcement reporting
has noted this eastward shift and expansion from these western states to Arizona, Arkansas,
G#&.-")+%H0)1&+%E&.!1%2).&3"*)+%X#**#$$##%)*0+%4&$!%.#(#*!3;+%`"$(&*$"*%)*0%>"(1"-)*J%
These groups appear to be moving to these areas in response to improved outdoor grow site
detection capabilities and heightened eradication efforts.
F$")*%!.)'/(6#.$%).#%&7#.)!"*-%)*%"*(.#)$"*-%*:45#.%&'%"*0&&.%-.&<%$"!#$J%=&4#%PJ=J[5)$#0%
and Canadabased Asian groups (primarily ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese) engage in large
$()3#%"*0&&.%(:3!",)!"&*+%&7#.)!"*-%4:3!"!1&:$)*0%73)*!%$"!#$+%7.#0&4"*)*!3;%"*%!1#%R)("/(%
Northwest and throughout much of California. Within the past decade, these tightknit and of
ten familyoriented groups have expanded their network throughout the country to numerous
states, including Texas and several New England states, to avoid law enforcement detection
and to gain better access to drug markets.
2:5)*%!.)'/(6#.$%).#%!1#%7."4).;%&7#.)!&.$%&'%"*0&&.%4)."Y:)*)%-.&<%$"!#$%"*%!1#%=&:!1#)$!%
Region. Cubanoperated indoor sites are of a smaller scale than Asianoperated grows. Can
*)5"$%(:3!",)!"&*%$"!#$%&7#.)!#0%5;%2:5)*%!.)'/(6#.$%).#%4&$!%7.#,)3#*!%"*%$&:!1#.*%M3&."0)+%
5:!%$:(1%)(!","!;%1)$%#C7)*0#0%*&.!1<).0%"*!&%*&.!1#.*%M3&."0)+%G#&.-")+%)*0%E&.!1%2).&3"*)%
to move operations closer to potential drug markets. Cuban immigrants are often exploited by
DTOs and criminal groups to cultivate highpotency cannabis at these indoor sites, and the
problem appears to be growing. Law enforcement reporting and eradication data indicate an
increase in the seizure of indoor cannabis grow operations that cultivate highpotency mari
juana, and the number of indoor grow sites seized in Florida rose each year between 2004
(246 sites) and 2008 (1,022 sites). (See Table 6.)
Table 6. [#63:"%1(%Y-?11"%8"1@%B,0:2%'-?%T7'-02%U"'?,*'0:?%,-%G71",?'>%PQQVWPQQX
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Grow Sites 246 384 480 944 1,022
Plants 21,879 45,217 36,172 74,698 78,489
F*,"(#m)K*0#4-<()@%''%Q<4)W"%2<(%-<*'TF,!!"#44<*')P"*3"%0E
39
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
15,000
13,004
10,000
5,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: National Forensic Laboratory Information System Annual Reports.
!X"# GOGC#/026&/,#;0.7#*(#,*=�()#?&*+%/#)&-&()*(+#3(#/%&#
10(:805/:.*(+#-.35&,,>#/%&#/7-&#-*66#-.&,,#2&*(+#:,&)>#
0()#/%
:(/#38#0):6/&.0(/,#*(53.-3.0/&)#*(/3#/%&#/026&/"#
$%&.&83.�#,/0()0.)#)3,0+&#:(*/#38#!ZT#1*66*+.01,#-&.#
Source: National Forensic Laboratory Information System Annual Reports
/026&/#*,#:,&)#/3#53(;&./#3/%&.#:(*/,#38#1&0,:.&>#,:5%#0,#K*63B
+.01,>#83.#53(,*,/&(57#0()#&,/*10/&,#3(#/3/06#)3,0+&#:(*/,"
40
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
MDMA 3,424,844 2,507,577 1,715,153 4,399,014 2,167,238
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 17. [1"09:"-%L1"?:"%<!<E%B:,/#":2>%,-%!12'$:%A-,02>%PQQZWPQQRS
5,000,000
4,399,014
4,500,000
4,000,000
3,424,844
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,507,577
2,500,000 2,167,238
2,000,000 1,715,153
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009.
MDMA seizures along the Southwest Bor American and Hispanic users. Asian DTOs
der and through commercial air have also have begun distributing MDMA to African
increased, albeit on a much smaller scale. American and Hispanic street gangs, which
Seizures at or near the Southwest Border show distribute the drug along with other illicit
an increase from 114,286 dosage units in 2006 drugs in markets throughout the United States,
to 387,143 dosage units in 2009. Furthermore, most notably in the Southeast, Southwest, and
commercial air seizures spiked in 2008, with Great Lakes Regions. Moreover, MDMA is no
a 91.4 percent increase from 2007 to 2008 longer exclusively viewed as a “rave” or club
(433,571 dosage units to 829,857 dosage units); drug, which also aids distributors in selling it
MDMA commercial air seizure totals for 2009 to nontraditional abusers.
decreased, resulting in levels comparable to
2007 levels.
Ready availability of MDMA has enabled
distributors to expand their customer base to
include new user groups, most notably African
41
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
CONTROLLED Q")+0"29(263%49262:+
42
2001 3994.0
2002 5547.0
2003 6524.0
2004 7547.0
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
2005 8541.0
2006 11001.0
Figure 18. Number of Reported Unintentional Poisoning Deaths With
<:-0,1-%1(%.C,1,?%E-'7$:2,*2>%PQQ_WPQQ`
12,000
11,001
10,000
8,541
7,547
8,000
6,524
5,547
6,000
3,994
4,000
2,000
2005 3.9
2006 0 3.9
2007 4.6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2008 8.1
2009 9.8
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics.
Figure 19. Percentage of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting
5T!2%'2%&9:,"%8":'0:20%!"#$%&9":'0>%PQQZWPQQR
12.0
9.8
10.0
8.1
8.0
6.0
4.6
3.9 3.9
4.0
2.0
0.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: National Drug Threat Survey 2009.
A higher percentage of law enforcement #'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(#"4)Q%4#)-.#<")%44#440#'-)*+)-.#)
agencies in all nine OCDETF regions respond threat on several factors, two of which are
ing to the NDTS 2009 reported diverted pharma diversion and abuserelated crime rates and
ceuticals as their greatest drug threat in 2009 gang involvement in drug distribution. For both
than they did in 2008 (see Figure 19). Law of these factors, a higher percentage of agencies
43
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Table 7. Percentage of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting
B0"::0%8'-$%Y-F17F:6:-0%,-%T9'"6'*:#0,*'7%!,20",3#0,1-%'-?%'-%E221*,'0,1-%
2008 2009
L:0@::-%T9'"6'*:#0,*'7%!,F:"2,1-%'-?%5",6:>%PQQXWPQQR
Florida/Caribbean 10 20
Great Lakes 16 22
2008 2009
Mid-Atlantic
Street Gang Involvement 13 17
44.2% 48.0%
New England 25 25
Property Crime 6.0% 8.4%
New York/New Jersey 6 9
Violent Crime 3.5% 4.8%
Pacific 2 6
Source: National Drug Threat Survey.
Southeast 6 10
Southwest 4 1
Figure 20. Percentage of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting an
West Central 3 7
Association Between Pharmaceutical Diversion and Violent and Property Crimes
34%.5!U&G%I:$,1->%PQQXWPQQR
30
25 25 2008 2009
25
22
20
20
16 17
15
13
10 9 10
10
6 6 7
6
5 4
3
2 1
0
Source: National Drug Threat Survey.
reported an increase in 2009 (see Table 7). The Nonmedical personnel, primarily investors, are
percentage of agencies reporting that pharma operating numerous purported pain clinics23 in
ceutical diversion and abuse contribute to other Broward and Palm Beach Counties, Florida. A
crime in their areas trended upward in seven of Florida grand jury found that from 2007 through
the nine OCDETF regions in 2009 (see Figure 2009, the number of pain clinics in those coun
20). The percentage of agencies reporting street ties grew from 4 to 115, and in one 6month
gang involvement in pharmaceutical distribution span, these pain clinic doctors dispensed more
also trended upward in six of the nine OCDETF than 9 million tablets of oxycodone. The grand
regions in 2009 (see Figure 21 on page 45). jury also found that the Broward and Palm Beach
Unscrupulous pain clinic physicians in 23.# OSC#*(;&,/*+0/*3(,#*()*50/&#/%0/#):2*3:,#-0*(#56*(*5,#
Florida dispense or prescribe large quantities %0;&#:(*9:%0.05/&.*,/*5,>#,31&#?%*5%#*(56:)&#/%&#
02*6*/7#/3#9:*5K67#.&6350/&>#;0+:.#1*,6&0)*(+#3?(&.B
of prescription opioids to dealers and abusers ,%*-#.&53.),>#83.1#(&0.67#&456:,*;�,,35*0/*3(#?*/%#
and are a source of supply for opioids distrib ,-&5*'5#-%0.105*&,>#:,&#,-&5*'5#-%7,*5*0(,>#50,%B20,&)#
uted in numerous states that have PDMPs. -071&(/#1&/%3),>#0()#.0-*)#&401*(0/*3(,"
44
Pacific 45 58 45% 58%
Southeast 52 54 52% 54%
Southwest 53 58 53% 58%
West Central 41 43 41% 43%
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 21. Percentage of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting
%B0"::0%8'-$%Y-F17F:6:-0%,-%T9'"6'*:#0,*'7%!,20",3#0,1->%34%.5!U&G%I:$,1->%PQQXWPQQR
70
2008 2009 58
58
60
55 55 54 53
52
50
44 46 45 45 43
41 40 41
40
35 35
28
30
20
10
Source: National Drug Threat Survey.
County clinics attract drug seekers from Ken limited what regulators could do with regard
tucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia. to closing clinics or disciplining investors. For
example, the Department of Health regulated
^'4(",!,&*,4)!.;4<(<%'454*0#)?<-.) healthcare professionals but not facilities; the
("<0<'%&)"#(*"245#0!&*;#2)%-)O&*"<2%)(&<'<(4) Agency for Health Care Administration
supply the constant demand for prescription provided oversight on clinics that accept
opioids among distributors and abusers in insurance, but illegal clinics usually accept
Florida as well as among individuals from only cash. Enacted in July 2009, Florida’s new
states in the Great Lakes, MidAtlantic, New law establishing a PDMP requires that pain
England, and Southeast OCDETF Regions, management clinics register with the Depart
where operational PDMPs have made acquir ment of Health. Moreover, under the law, the
<'3)@PK4)0*"#)2<+/(,&-E)L.#4#)!.;4<(<%'4) state medical and osteopathic medicine boards
dispense or prescribe large quantities of must set standards of practice for all physi
prescription opioids to customers who have no cians and osteopaths who prescribe controlled
legitimate need for the drugs; the physicians substances from those clinics.
usually charge an upfront fee for this service
and accept only cash payments. Florida law
45
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
[)0)3(%&'+)+%H3I6*I23$%(E)%A3*'=.#*%!2+9)3+23$%6.%&Q!+
A Freeport, Florida, physician was sentenced in January 2009 to 292 months in prison and
/*#0%_8T9+999%)'!#.%1#%<)$%'&:*0%-:"3!;%&'%Ua%(1).-#$+%"*(3:0"*-%1#)3!1().#%'.):0b%0"$7#*$"*-%
controlled substances, including fentanyl, hydrocodone, diazepam, clonazepam, morphine, and
alprazolam, the use of which resulted in the death of two persons; and unlawfully dispensing
controlled substances, including oxycodone, morphine, fentanyl, hydrocodone, alprazolam, diaz
epam, clonazepam, and carisoprodol. He also forfeited $260,000 in cash and his medical building
for a total civil forfeiture of more than $835,000. The physician had owned and operated a clinic
and prescribed CPDs to patients in quantities that made abuse and misuse likely. The physician
')"3#0%!&%0#!#.4"*#%)%$:'/("#*!%4#0"()3%*#(#$$"!;%'&.%!1#%7.#$(."5"*-%&'%!1#$#%$:5$!)*(#$J%\,"
dence suggested that he had prescribed controlled substances to patients from across the south
eastern United States, knowing that the patients were addicted to the substances, were misusing
them, or were doctorshopping.
The manager of two Florida pain management clinics and three prescribing physicians were
sentenced in April 2009 for their roles in a prescription drug conspiracy. The manager was
sentenced to 240 months in prison; one physician was sentenced to 30 months in prison, and
the other two were sentenced to 72 months in prison. The manager of the clinic and the three
physicians had purported to provide pain management treatment for chronic pain patients;
however, they engaged in a conspiracy to unlawfully dispense hundreds of thousands of
controlled pain medications, including OxyContin, Dilaudid, Roxicodone, oxycodone, Lortab,
4#!1)0&*#+%)*0%&!1#.$%"*%#C(1)*-#%'&.%()$1%'##$%'&.%&'/(#%,"$"!$J%X1#%4)*)-#.%<)$%)3$&%
(&*,"(!#0%&'%7&$$#$$"*-+%()..;"*-+%)*0%:$"*-%)%/.#).4%"*%!1#%':.!1#.)*(#%&'%!1#%(&*$7".)(;J
M#0#.)3%3)<%#*'&.(#4#*!%):!1&."!"#$%"*%E&,#45#.%899@%0"$4)*!3#0%)%M3&."0)%!.)'/(6"*-%."*-%
that had sent more than 190,000 oxycodone tablets from South Florida pain clinics to abus
ers in Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. At least 20 people
were indicted on distribution charges; the ring had allegedly operated for 3 years and used at
3#)$!%'&:.%&.%/,#%(3"*"(%0&(!&.$%7#.%0);%!&%&5!)"*%!1#%0.:-$J%>#45#.$%&'%!1#%."*-%$1"77#0%!1&:
sands of pills per day by vehicle or overnight delivery services and allegedly made at least $5
million over the 3 years.
Kentucky State Police detectives and troopers along with FBI agents, armed with 518 felony
arrest warrants, conducted a drug roundup in October 2009 that stemmed from Operation
M3)4"*-&%Z&)0J%X1"$%"*,#$!"-)!"&*%!).-#!#0%c#*!:(6;%0.:-%!.)'/(6#.$%"*%)!%3#)$!%aa%(&:*!"#$%<1&%
had traveled to South Florida to obtain CPDs from pain clinic doctors and returned to Kentucky
!&%0"$!."5:!#%!1#%0.:-$J%R#*)3!"#$%'&.%'#3&*;%(1).-#$%&'%!.)'/(6"*-%"*%(&*!.&33#0%$:5$!)*(#$%.)*-#%
from 18 months to 20 years in prison.
46
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
47
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
@%'%2<%')KLM4)40,33&#)4<3'</(%'-) account balances and transaction records, or
amounts of cash generated from the U.S. seizing funds stored on prepaid cards. As a re
distribution of Canadaproduced drugs into 4,&-8)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)%3#'-4)(%''*-)#+/(<#'-&;)
Canada. The Akwesasne Territory, which determine whether the total value associated
straddles the U.S.–Canada border, is one of ?<-.)%)(%"2)<4)4,4!<(<*,4E)]-)<4)%&4*)2<+/(,&-)+*")
the most important smuggling corridors for &%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(<%&4)-*)4#<J#)+,'24)4-*"#2)
Canadabound bulk cash. Overall, the topog on prepaid cards, because those funds can be
raphy of the U.S.–Canada border facilitates removed from the card by the criminal or a
bulk cash smuggling because currency inter coconspirator while the card is in the posses
2<(-<*')Q;)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(<%&4)<4)*+-#') sion of a law enforcement agency and before a
hampered by the border’s length and vast seizure warrant can be obtained and executed.
expanses of rugged terrain.
M+/(<%&4)<')`#$%2%).%$#)%--#0!-#2)-*)%22"#44)
&9:%7122%1(%J1-$%O1-$%B9'-$9',%L'-+ these challenges with SB82, which took ef
,-$%51"C1"'0,1-%bJBL5c%<:=,*1%(1"%09:% fect July 1, 2009. This law makes it easier for
placement of licit and illicit U.S. curren `#$%2%)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)*+/(<%&4)-*)<'$#4-<3%-#)
cy has had no longterm effect on BMPE prepaid card money laundering and fraud cases
C7'*:6:-0%'*0,F,04%,-%<:=,*1>%2,-*:% that occur in the state each year. For example,
money launderers have repeatedly dem SB82 allows Nevada law enforcement to freeze
1-20"'0:?%09:,"%'3,7,04%01%K#,*+74%'?'C0% the funds on a prepaid card for up to 10 days, un
to actions on the part of law enforcement til a judge authorizes a warrant, to prevent crimi
and financial institutions. nals from removing the funds while the card is
in the possession of law enforcement authorities.
The January 2009 implementation of the new In limited circumstances, SB82 authorizes the
HSBC Mexico AML policy, which stopped seizure of funds without a warrant.
the deposit and exchange of foreign currency,
has had no longterm effects on U.S. currency Changes to SWIFT25 Message Format MT
placement activity in Mexico. Drug proceeds 202 will reduce money launderers’ ability
in the form of bulk cash continue to be smug to disguise the origin and destination of
gled from domestic drug market areas to and wire transfers when wiring money through
across the U.S.–Mexico border as a principal intermediary accounts.
placement method for BMPE transactions.
Launderers operating in Mexico on behalf of Until recently, drug money launderers were
BMPE peso brokers most likely have placed able to take advantage of a vulnerability that
^EFE)(,""#'(;)%-)N#=<(%')/'%'(<%&)<'4-<-,-<*'4) existed in the wiring of money between banks
other than HSBC Mexico. without a direct banking relationship. When
a bank needs to wire a customer’s money to
The potential for increased drug money another bank, one of the several types of SWIFT
laundering through the use of prepaid cards messages may be used as instructions for the
has prompted Nevada to enact state law transfer. This message is sent through SWIFT
SB82 to aid law enforcement investigations separately from the actual settlement of the
involving this method of money laundering. funds. When a customer’s bank does not have
Prepaid card investigations and prosecutions 25.# F\MJ$5F35*&/7#83.#\3.6)?*)&#M(/&.20(K#J*(0(5*06#
%"#)(.%&&#'3<'3)Q#(%,4#)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)*+/ $&6&5311:(*50/*3(5*,#3(&#,&;&.06#-071&(/#1&,B
cials must often secure warrants before access ,0+*(+#,7,/&1,#3-&.0/*(+#*(#/%&#P(*/&)#F/0/&,"#F\MJ$#
ing prepaid card account information, such as -.3;*)&,#0#,&5:.ᒿ:(*50/*3(,#-60/83.1#83.#20(K,#
2:/#)3&,#(3/#05/:0667#%36)#3.#/.0(,8&.#8:(),"
48
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
a direct relationship with the ultimate receiv This money laundering vulnerability has been
ing bank (a situation that occurs frequently, eliminated by the new SWIFT Message Format,
especially in international transfers), banks called MT 202 COV, which took effect Novem
may use either cover payments26 or serial ber 21, 2009. The new format retains both origi
payments27 to send the money through one or '%-*")%'2)Q#'#/(<%";)<'+*"0%-<*')*')%&&)-"%'4+#"4)
more intermediate banks.28 made through intermediary banks, allowing
intermediary banks to better investigate or block
In cases where cover payments are used, two suspicious transactions.
separate SWIFT message instructions are sent.
L.#)/"4-)4#-)*+)<'4-",(-<*'48)(%&)NL)SB78) &9:%":*:-0%'*K#,2,0,1-%1(%'%3'-+,-$%7,*:-2:%
contains all of the originating customer and by a virtual world company (online role
,&-<0%-#)Q#'#/(<%";)<'+*"0%-<*'8)Q,-)<4)4##') C7'4,-$%$'6:c%1((:"2%?"#$%61-:4%7'#-?:"
*'&;)Q;)-.#)*"<3<'%-<'3)Q%'D)%'2)-.#)Q#'#/ :"2%09:%'3,7,04%01%'**:22%09:%$713'7%)-'-*,'7%
ciary bank. A second message, the MT 202, is 2420:6%'-1-461#274\%91@:F:">%7'"$:a2*'7:%
sent to the intermediary banks. Previously, the #2:%1(%F,"0#'7%@1"7?%3'-+2%01%7'#-?:"%?"#$%
SWIFT MT 202 messages that accompanied 61-:4%,2%#-7,+:74>%2,-*:%7'#-?:":"2%":6',-%
cover payments between intermediary banks encumbered by placement of drug proceeds.
2<2)'*-)"#-%<')*"<3<'%-*")%'2)Q#'#/(<%";)%(
count information. In March 2009, a virtual world company
(see text box on page 50) received a license
This lack of information allowed money from the Swedish Financial Authority to con
launderers to disguise their identity by send duct banking activities. This license enables
ing wire transfers through intermediary banks. the game’s virtual economy to interact with
When a SWIFT 202 was used, only the origi and carry out the functions of realworld
'%-<'3)%'2)Q#'#/(<%";)Q%'D8)?.<(.)(*,&2)Q#) banks, such as offering interestbearing sav
foreignbased banks, could see the originator ings, Automated Clearing House (ACH)
%'2)Q#'#/(<%";)<'+*"0%-<*'E)L.#)<'-#"0#2<%";) transactions, and lending.29 The ability to
banks, which would typically be U.S. banks, %'*';0*,4&;)%((#44)-.#)<'-#"'%-<*'%&)/'%'
would not know this information. cial system through this virtual world’s bank
creates a money laundering threat, particularly
because rigorous knowyourcustomer pro
(#2,"#4)?<&&)Q#)2<+/(,&-)-*)#'+*"(#E)]')$<"-,%&)
environments, roleplaying games are built
around the premise of players pretending to be
other people. Establishing the actual identity
*+)!&%;#"4)?<&&)Q#)$#";)(.%&&#'3<'3)+*")/'%'
LH"# $%5&.#-071&(/#1&/%3)#)*;*)&,#/%&,,0+&#*(/3# cial institutions and law enforcement.
/?3#-0./,"#O&/0*6&)#8:(),B/.0(,8&.#*(,/.:5/*3(,#0.&#,&(/#
)*.&5/67#/3#/%&(&'5*0.7i,#20(K#;*0#0#F\MJ$#G$#!TR>#
?%*6�#,&53()#1&,,0+&>#/%&#F\MJ$#LTL>#*,#,&(/#/%.3:+%#
066#*(/&.1&)*0.7#20(K,"
LI"# M(#/%&#-0,/>#3/%&.#;*./:06#?3.6),#%0;&#*(56:)&)#];*./:06#
27.# P,*(+#,&.*06#-071&(/,>#3(&#'(0(5*06#*(,/*/:/*3(#/.0(,B 20(K,>^#2:/#/%&,:(5/*3(&)#3(67#0,#0(#&6&1&(/#38#/%&#+01&#
1*/,#/%:(),B/.0(,8&.#*(,/.:5/*3(,#;*0#0#F\MJ$#G$# 0()#?&.&#(3/#-0./#38#/%&#.&06B?3.6)#'(0(5*06#,7,/&1"#V.*3.#
!TR#1&,,0+&#/3#/%&#*(/&.1&)*0.7#20(K"#S05%#*(,/*/:/*3(# /3#/%&#*,,:0(5&#/%*,#20(K*(+#6*5&(,&>#-607&.,#38#/%*,#;*./:06#
*(;36;&)#*(#/%*,#-.35&,,#.&5&*;&,#/%&#,01&;&6#38#)&/0*6# ?3.6)#53:6)#&45%0(+&#.&06#13(&7#83.#/%&#;*./:06#5:..&(57#
023:/#/%&#/.0(,05/*3(#0/#&05%#,/&-" :,&)#*(#/%&#+01&"#V607&.,#53:6)#06,3#&0.(#13(&7#*(#/%&#+01&#
LX"# M(/&.1&)*0.7#20(K,>#06,3#5066&)#53..&,-3()&(/#20(K,># 27#2:7*(+#0()#,&66*(+#32A&5/,#3.#531-6&/*(+#/0,K,#,:5%#0,#
0663?#20(K,#/3#)3#2:,*(&,,#?*/%#&05%#3/%&.#*8#/%&7#)3#(3/# %:(/*(+#0()#1*(*(+"#S0.(&)#;*./:06#5:..&(57#53:6)#22,%&)#
%0;�#)*.&5/#.&60/*3(,%*-" 3:/#38#/%&#+01�/#0#'4&)#&45%0(+&#.0/&#/3#/%&#P"F"#)3660."
49
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
^E'(%2+%'%G2"(#'*%^6"*:_ A U.S. Supreme Court decision that dif
(:":-0,'0:2%3:0@::-%3#7+%*'29%26#$$7,-$%
Virtual worlds, also referred to as Massively
>:3!"73);#.%K*3"*#%Z&3#[R3);"*-%G)4#$+% '-?%61-:4%7'#-?:",-$%@,77%7,+:74%,-9,3,0%
are Internetbased computer games char future money laundering prosecutions of
acterized by a player assuming the role of a 3#7+%*'29%*1#",:"2D%
/(!"&*)3%(1).)(!#.%<"!1"*%!1#%-)4#+%(:$!&4
On June 1, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled
izing that character, and interacting with
other players of the game. Most games that a suspected bulk cash courier who was
involve players cooperating with other play arrested while transporting $81,000 to Mexico
ers to complete tasks or quests in order in the hidden compartment of a passenger
to develop and advance their characters. vehicle was not guilty of money laundering.
However, some games are based around The decision establishes a separation between
social interaction and have few, if any, spe bulk cash smuggling and money laundering.
("/(%!)$6$%!&%(&473#!#%&.%<);$%!&%)0,)*(#% In the ruling, the court wrote, “Although the
character development. evidence showed intent to avoid detection
while driving the money to Mexico, it did not
Many online games have some form of in
game economy that allows players to buy show that the petitioner intended to create the
and trade virtual items within the game. A few appearance of legitimate wealth, and accord
games let players transfer realworld money ingly no rational trier of fact could have found
into and out of the virtual world, usually by the petitioner guilty.”
means of credit card payments. This function
has allowed players to start businesses in The ruling will most likely limit prosecu
!1#%,".!:)3%<&.30%)*0%!&%!.)*$'#.%!1#%7.&/!$%&:!% tions against bulk cash smugglers; therefore,
of the game to the real world. bulk cash smuggling in the United States will
likely continue unabated. Despite this ruling,
DTO leaders are unlikely to challenge bulk
Although there is a risk of abuse by drug cash seizures or arrests for fear of exposing
money launderers, that risk is somewhat -.#<")/'%'(<%&)<'+"%4-",(-,"#4)-."*,3.)%&)
lessened because this virtual world bank will proceedings. Currently, most couriers who
be subject to the same regulations and AML are stopped during suspected drug cash in
controls as real world banks. The usefulness of terdictions deny knowledge of the cash and
this virtual world’s bank to money launderers are released, at which point law enforcement
%&4*)<4)&<0<-#2)Q;)-.#)'##2)-*)/"4-)!&%(#)(%4.) *+/(<%&4)%"#)%Q&#)-*)4#<J#)-.#)(,""#'(;E)
<'-*)-.#)/'%'(<%&)4;4-#0)%'2)-.#)4<J#)*+)-.#)
online economy. In 2008, this game’s econo
my was about $420 million generated from
820,000 players. Typically, users spend be
tween $.50 and $1.50 per hour in the game.
Large or very frequent transactions would
stand out from normal players’ transactions.
50
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
VULNERABILITIES sustained interdiction efforts could increase
the amount of drugs seized domestically.
Largescale methamphetamine production is The activities of Mexican DTOs are par
very dependent on a consistent supply of bulk ticularly vulnerable to detection when they
precursor chemicals such as ephedrine, pseu attempt to expand drug distribution into new
doephedrine, and P2P. Such supplies are avail markets. When DTOs expand into new drug
able from companies producing the chemicals markets, they often lack a reliable network of
in relatively few countries, including China distributors and security personnel in those
and India. Increased cooperation from these new markets. As a result, they are more likely
countries and the companies producing the to deal with new, unproven local dealers, ren
chemicals could greatly disrupt methamphet dering the organization vulnerable to under
amine production and availability. cover law enforcement operations.
Drug shipments entering the United States Highly addictive prescription opioids are
are vulnerable to detection and interdiction at primarily acquired by users through doctor
POEs. Wholesale seizures at POEs are typi shopping. In states that have implemented
cally larger than seizures in the interior of the comprehensive PDMPs,30 doctorshopping
country because loads have not been divided for has decreased. However, many individu
midlevel or retail distribution. However, DTOs als continue to acquire the drugs by simply
#0!&*;)4!*--#"4)-*)(&*4#&;)0*'<-*")-.#)H*?)*+) travelling to doctors in nearby states where
-"%+/()-."*,3.)PMW4E)L.#4#)4!*--#"4)2<"#(-)&*%2) there are no such programs. State PDMPs that
$#.<()<')"#%&)-<0#)-*)4!#(</()&%'#4)-.%-)-.#;) require nationwide data sharing would curtail
believe will have the highest chance for success the practice of traveling to neighboring states
ful entry into the United States without inspec for prescription opioids and would most likely
tion. Denying spotters clear visibility of the POE "#2,(#)2*(-*":4.*!!<'3)4<3'</(%'-&;E
lanes through the use of lights or visual barriers Many prescription drug abusers, especially
would reduce the success of smugglers. Alter younger abusers, acquire CPDs through theft
natively, implementing a process that would from family members or acquaintances who
"%'2*0&;)2<"#(-)$#.<()-*)4!#(</()&%'#4)?*,&2) have legitimate prescriptions for the drugs.
also deny spotters any advantage. Often these drugs are unused and unneeded pills
Seizures of illicit drugs from stash sites along prescribed to treat pain for a temporary condition
the Southwest Border region result in a much such as recovery from a surgery. Implementing a
greater loss to Mexican DTOs than seizures that national incentive program for patients to return
take place after the drugs have been broken into unused pills to collection facilities for proper
smaller shipments for distribution in retail drug disposal would reduce the diversion and misuse
markets. Identifying load vehicles at POEs and of CPDs (see text box on page 52).
then conducting controlled deliveries or simply Bulk cash shipments of illicit drug proceeds
tracking them to Southwest Border stash sites are at risk of seizure at stash houses in consoli
might be an effective method of detecting such dation cities and in transit to and across the
sites and increasing drug seizures. Southwest Border. DTOs have developed
Domestic drug transportation in commer elaborate countermeasures to minimize this
cial tractortrailers is vulnerable to highway risk, such as choosing unassuming locations,
interdiction. Because tractortrailers typically limiting the number of individuals who have
travel interstates or larger U.S. highways to knowledge of the stash house sites, and moving
transport large drug shipments to domestic
drug markets, nationally coordinated domestic RT"# D:..&(/67>#ZT#,/0/&,#&*/%&.#%0;-&.0/*(+#VOGV,#3.#
surge operations to bring about intense and %0;&#-0,,&)#6&+*,60/*3(#/3#*1-6&1&(/#/%&1"
51
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Q")+0"29(263%!"#$%!2+96+'*%Q"6$"'7+
Concerns regarding drug diversion and environmental pollution resulting from uncontrolled disposal
7.&47!#0%)%W:..;%&'%)(!","!;%)!%!1#%$!)!#+%3&()3+%)*0%'#0#.)3%3#,#3$%"*%899@J%>)*;%$!)!#%)*0%3&()3%3)<%
enforcement agencies followed Florida law enforcement’s lead by conducting medicine takeback
programs. Through these programs, people with leftover medications were encouraged to turn them
"*%!&%3)<%#*'&.(#4#*!%&'/(#.$%)!%$7#("/(%3&()!"&*$J%X1#%!)6#[5)(6%7.&-.)4$%.#$:3!#0%"*%!1#%(&33#(!"&*%
of tens of thousands of pounds of prescription drugs. Broward County, Florida, law enforcement of
/(#.$%1#30%!1#%/.$!%K7#.)!"&*%>#0"("*#%2)5"*#!%LK>2O%7.&-.)4%"*%899AJ%="*(#%!1#*+%K>2%7.&-.)4$%
1),#%5#(&4#%"*(.#)$"*-3;%7&7:3).%)*0%1),#%5##*%1#30%"*%$!)!#$%$:(1%)$%G#&.-")+%H*0")*)+%H&<)+%)*0%
New Jersey. Other states have held takeback programs similar to OMC using various names for the
programs. Maine established a yearround takeback program using the mail service. The majority
of drugs collected at all takeback events are noncontrolled substances, but many of the drugs are
CPDs. Quantities of prescription drugs turned in during takeback events include the following:
d% G.#)!%e)6#$+%\).!1%V);%899@f%U%4"33"&*%7"33$
d% Illinois, 2008–2009: 90,000+ pounds of pills
d% Iowa, 2008: 1,029 pounds
d% Maine, 2009: 2,123 pounds noncontrolled and 252 pounds CPDs
d% Michigan, 2009: 6,866 noncontrolled pills and 1,483 CPDs (2week span)
d% New Jersey, 2009: 9,000 pounds (3.5 million pills)
d% Salisbury, North Carolina, 2009: 157 pounds
d% Washington State, 2006–2009: 11,000 pounds
d% Watauga County, North Carolina, 2009: 40,000 pills, 12 gallons of liquid medication
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), ultimate usersa do not have DEA registration numbers
permitting them to distribute controlled substances; therefore, users are not permitted to distribute
:*:$#0%0.:-$%#,#*%!&%!1&$#%&'/(#.$%(&*0:(!"*-%!)6#[5)(6%7.&-.)4$J%g&<#,#.+%"!%<)$%0#!#.4"*#0%!1)!%
current takeback programs could use an exemption from registration that permits law enforcement
&'/(#.$%!&%1)*03#%(&*!.&33#0%0.:-$%<1"3#%)(!"*-%"*%)*%&'/(")3%()7)("!;J%H*%#).3;%899@+%!1#%V\F%K'/(#%
of Diversion Control began to seek comments on options to CSA amendments addressing individual
disposal of patientowned controlled substances. To amend the CSA, DEA is awaiting congressional
action on several related pieces of legislation.
At the federal level, several bills (HR 1191 and companion SB 1336, and HR 1359 and companion SB
1292) were introduced in the House of Representatives in 2009 to amend the CSA. HR 1191 provides
for disposal of CPDs through state takeback programs, while HR 1359 permits the consumer to deliver
drugs for disposal. HR 1191 also recommended amending the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prohibit
7.&0:(!%3)5#3"*-%!1)!%7.&7&$#0%W:$1"*-%&'%:*:$#0%7.#$(."7!"&*%0.:-$J%Q&!1%5"33$%<#.#%.#'#..#0%!&%!1#%
House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on the Judiciary in 2009. DOJ
1)$%#*0&.$#0%gZ.?aT@%)*0%=Q%?8@8+%$"*(#%!1#;%)''&.0%!1#%4&$!%W#C"5"3"!;J
At the state level, legislators in Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington introduced bills in
2009 that would require drug manufacturers to operate and pay for systems that facilitate the collection,
transportation, and disposal of leftover prescription drugs. In California, a senate bill was being consid
ered in 2009 that would require the state’s Board of Pharmacy to work with other state agencies, local
governments, drug manufacturers, and pharmacies to develop sustainable programs to manage the
disposal of prescription drugs.
a. )L.#)@FI)2#/'#4)%')n,&-<0%-#),4#"o)%4)%)!#"4*')?.*)*Q-%<'4)%)2",3)%&&;)%'2)!*44#44#4)<-)+*").<4)*").#")*?'),4#8)+*")%)+%0<&;)
member’s use, or for use in an animal in the household.
52
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
bulk cash quickly through stash houses. How heroin and marijuana production in Mexico
ever, a dedicated investigative team capable of and greatly reduced efforts to eradicate drug
developing and exploiting organizational crops in that country. The production esti
intelligence in each of the leading bulk cash mates are supported by Southwest Border drug
(*'4*&<2%-<*')(<-<#4)(*,&2)"#4,&-)<')4<3'</(%'-) seizure data showing sharp increases in heroin
bulk cash seizures in those cities. Moreover, and marijuana seizures in 2009. Southwest
enhanced interdiction efforts and rigorous Border seizure data also indicate that metham
outbound inspections of vehicles leaving the phetamine production has increased sharply in
United States would very likely result in a N#=<(*)%4)?#&&)Q#(%,4#)*+)-"%+/(D#"4i)%Q<&<-;)
sharp increase in bulk cash seizures. to circumvent precursor chemical restrictions
and employ alternative production methods
OUTLOOK despite strong GOM restrictions on ephedrine
and pseudoephedrine imports. Only cocaine
The growing strength and organization of production estimates show decreasing produc
criminal gangs, including their growing alli -<*')<')@*&*0Q<%8)%'2)-.%-)-"#'2)<4)"#H#(-#2)
ances with large Mexican DTOs, has changed in availability data, including cocaine seizure
the nature of midlevel and retail drug distri data, which show relatively low availability of
bution in many local drug markets, even in the drug.
suburban and rural areas. As a result, disrupt The increased enforcement against illegal
ing illicit drug availability and distribution pain clinics and the growing number of
?<&&)Q#(*0#)<'("#%4<'3&;)2<+/(,&-)+*")4-%-#)%'2) PDMPs will increasingly disrupt the supply of
local law enforcement agencies. In many of CPDs to prescription opioid users who typi
these markets, local independent dealers can cally acquire these drugs through doctor
no longer compete with nationallevel gangs shopping and from unscrupulous physicians.
that can undersell local drug distributors. Many users will seek CPDs from other sourc
Previously, state and local law enforcement es, including pharmacy robberies. The number
agencies could disrupt drug availability in of pharmacy armed robberies has increased
their areas, at least temporarily, by investigat over the past 5 years, and in many states,
ing and dismantling local distribution groups. &%?4)%"#)'*-)4,+/(<#'-)-*)2#-#")4,(.)("<0#4E)
But wellorganized criminal gangs are able to Other prescription opioid users will increas
maintain a stronger, more stable drug supply ingly switch to heroin because, according to
to local markets and to quickly replace distrib reporting from law enforcement and treatment
utors when individual gang members or entire providers, in many instances heroin is less
2<4-"<Q,-<*')(#&&4)%"#)%""#4-#2E)F<3'</(%'-&;) expensive than diverted prescription opioids.
disrupting drug distribution in smaller drug
markets will increasingly require largescale
multijurisdictional investigations, most likely
necessitating federal law enforcement support.
c<-.*,-)%)4<3'</(%'-)<'("#%4#)<')2",3)<'-#"
diction, seizures, arrests, and investigations
that apply sustained pressure on major DTOs,
availability of most drugs will increase in
2010, primarily because drug production in
Mexico is increasing. The most recent drug
production estimates show sharp increases in
53
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
54
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Appendix A: Maps
Map A1. [,-:%.5!U&G%I:$,1-2%
55
Map A2. !"#$%!,20",3#0,1-%34%B:7:*0%!&.2>%34%JY!&E%I:$,1-S
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Drug Trafficking Area reports.
*Map depicts presence only, not level of activity.
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National Drug Threat Survey 2009.
"
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National Drug Intelligence Center
Map A4. 8'-$%<:63:"29,C%34%51#-04%
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
58
Number of
Gang Members
10,001 or More
3,50110,000
2,5013,500
5012,500
1500
0
No Reporting
Source: Federal, state, and local law
enforcement reporting January 1, 2006,
through April 8, 2008.
Map A5. PQQR%8":'0:20%!"#$%&9":'0%34%I:$,1->%'2%I:C1"0:?%34%B0'0:%'-?%]1*'7%E$:-*,:2%
Pacific
% % % % %
.6 .2 0.8 6.2 3.9
West Central 29 39 1 1
Product No. 2010Q0317001
New
Great Lakes England
% % % % %
.6 .8 0.0 3.0 8.0
40 27 2
MidAtlantic
New York /
New Jersey
5% 3% 5% 7% 2% % % % % %
% % % % % .8 .8 .0 .7 .7
5. 1. 79. 5. 7. .3 4.8 0.3 7.9 7.3 38 16 15 15 12
19 6
% % % 5% 3%
.0 .9 .0 . .
40 30 2 14 12
59
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% % % % % C H M M C
% % % % % .2 1.1 2.8 5.3 9.6
.8 .6 .0 .0 3.2 60 2
23 2 57 12
Pacific
Florida / Caribbean
Source: National Drug
% % 2% 4% 9% Intelligence Center's
.1 .4 . 9. 7. National Drug Threat
62 0 10 1 Survey 2009.
National Drug Intelligence Center
Map A6. PQQR%8":'0:20%!"#$%&9":'0>%'2%I:C1"0:?%34%B0'0:%'-?%]1*'7%E$:-*,:2%
36.9%
27.6%
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
12.9% 12.1%
9.8%
60
Cocaine Heroin Methamphetamine Marijuana Controlled Prescription
Drugs
Source: National Drug
Intelligence Center's
National Drug Threat
Survey 2009.
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Appendix B: Tables
Table B1. &":-?2%,-%T:"*:-0'$:%1(%T'20%d:'"%!"#$%A2:>%PQQVWPQQX
Drug 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cocaine (any form)
Individuals (12 and older) 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1
Adolescents (12-17) 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.2
Adults (18-25) 6.6 6.9 6.9 6.4 5.5
Adults (26 and older) 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.6
Crack
Individuals (12 and older) 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4
Adolescents (12-17) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1
Adults (18-25) 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6
Adults (26 and older) 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4
Heroin
Individuals (12 and older) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Adolescents (12-17) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Adults (18-25) 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Adults (26 and older) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Marijuana
Individuals (12 and older) 10.6 10.4 10.3 10.1 10.3
Adolescents (12-17) 14.5 13.3 13.2 12.5 13.0
Adults (18-25) 27.8 28.0 28.0 27.5 27.6
Adults (26 and older) 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 7.0
Methamphetamine
Individuals (12 and older) 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.3
Adolescents (12-17) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4
Adults (18-25) 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.8
Adults (26 and older) 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3
Prescription Narcotics
Individuals (12 and older) 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.8
Adolescents (12-17) 7.4 6.9 7.2 6.7 6.5
Adults (18-25) 11.9 12.4 12.4 12.1 12.0
Adults (26 and older) 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.3
LSD
Individuals (12 and older) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Adolescents (12-17) 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7
Adults (18-25) 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.5
Adults (26 and older) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
61
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
(Table continued from previous page.)
Table B1. &":-?2%,-%T:"*:-0'$:%1(%T'20%d:'"%!"#$%A2:>%PQQVWPQQX
Drug 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
MDMA
Individuals (12 and older) 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Adolescents (12-17) 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4
Adults (18-25) 3.1 3.1 3.8 3.5 3.9
Adults (26 and older) 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
PCP
Individuals (12 and older) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Adolescents (12-17) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Adults (18-25) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Adults (26 and older) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 *
Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health.
*Low precision; no estimate reported.
Table B2. Admissions to Publicly Funded Treatment Facilities
34%T",6'"4%B#320'-*:>%PQQ^WPQQe
Drug 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Cocaine 254,687 249,478 266,420 262,720 234,772
Heroin 273,996 261,610 259,462 264,599 246,871
Marijuana 291,470 287,121 301,263 299,692 287,933
Methamphetamine 114,451 125,361 154,447 152,561 137,154
Barbiturates 1,337 1,303 1,380 1,046 1,013
Other opiates/synthetics 52,840 61,340 70,268 80,131 90,516
Tranquilizers 8,164 8,212 8,458 9,334 9,949
Source: Treatment Episode Data Set.
62
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Table B3. !"#$2%!,20",3#0,1-%,-%09:%A-,0:?%B0'0:2>%34%!&.2%'-?%.5!U&G%I:$,1-
OCDETF/DTO Mexican Asian Colombian Dominican Cuban
Florida/ Cocaine
Cocaine Cocaine
Caribbean Heroin Marijuana Cocaine
Heroin Heroin
Marijuana MDMA Heroin
Marijuana Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine Cocaine
Heroin Heroin Cocaine Cocaine
Great Lakes —
Marijuana Marijuana Heroin Heroin
Methamphetamine MDMA
Cocaine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana Cocaine
Mid-Atlantic Heroin —
Marijuana MDMA Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Marijuana Cocaine Cocaine
Heroin
New England MDMA Heroin Heroin —
Marijuana
Methamphetamine Marijuana Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Cocaine
Heroin Heroin Cocaine
New York/ Heroin
Marijuana Marijuana Heroin —
New Jersey Marijuana
MDMA MDMA Marijuana
MDMA
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Marijuana
Heroin
Pacific MDMA — — —
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana Cocaine
Southeast — Marijuana
Marijuana MDMA Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine Cocaine Cocaine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana Heroin
Southwest Cocaine Marijuana
Marijuana MDMA Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine Methamphetamine Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana
West Central — — —
Marijuana MDMA
Methamphetamine
Source: Federal, state, and local law enforcement reporting.
63
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Table B4. 8'-$2%@,09%B,$-,)*'-0%Y-;#:-*:%1-%ADBD%!"#$%<'"+:02
Name Primary Areas of Operation Drugs Trafficked Affiliations (DTOs)
Pacific Sinaloa
18th Street Methamphetamine
Southwest Tijuana
Cocaine
Southwest Heroin
Bandidos Juárez
Pacific Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Heroin
Barrio Azteca Southwest Juárez
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Pacific Cocaine
Black Guerilla Family Sinaloa
Mid-Atlantic Marijuana
New England
Cocaine
New York/New Jersey Tijuana
Heroin
Bloods Southeast Sinaloa
Marijuana
Southwest
MDMA
Pacific
New England Cocaine
Southeast Heroin
Crips Juárez
Southwest Marijuana
Pacific MDMA
Cocaine
Pacific
Heroin Tijuana
Florencia 13 Southwest
Marijuana Sinaloa
Southeast
Methamphetamine
Great Lakes
Cocaine
Pacific
Gangster Disciples Heroin Sinaloa
Southeast
Marijuana
West Central
Pacific
Cocaine
Southwest Sinaloa
Hells Angels Marijuana
New England Tijuana
MDMA
New York/New Jersey
Cocaine Gulf Coast
Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos Southwest
Marijuana Zetas
Florida
Great Lakes
New England
Cocaine
New York/New Jersey Juárez
Heroin
Latin Kings Mid-Atlantic Sinaloa
Marijuana
Pacific Gulf Coast
MDMA
Southeast
Southwest
West Central
64
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
(Table continued from previous page.)
Table B4. 8'-$2%@,09%B,$-,)*'-0%Y-;#:-*:%1-%ADBD%!"#$%<'"+:02
Name Primary Areas of Operation Drugs Trafficked Affiliations (DTOs)
Southeast
Mid-Atlantic Cocaine
Ñeta Unknown
New England Marijuana
New York/New Jersey
Mid-Atlantic
New England
Cocaine
New York/New Jersey Sinaloa
Heroin
Mara Salvatrucha Southeast Gulf Coast
Marijuana
Southwest Zetas
Methamphetamine
West Central
Pacific
Sinaloa
Southwest Cocaine
Mexican Mafia Tijuana
Pacific Marijuana
Zetas
Cocaine
Gulf Coast
Mexikanemi Southwest Marijuana
Zetas
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Pacific Sinaloa
Norteños Marijuana
Southwest Tijuana
Methamphetamine
Pacific
Cocaine
Southwest
Heroin Sinaloa
Sureños West Central
Marijuana Tijuana
Southeast
Methamphetamine
Southeast
Cocaine Gulf Coast
Tango Blast Southwest
Marijuana Zetas
Cocaine Gulf Coast
Texas Syndicate Southwest
Marijuana Zetas
New England Marijuana
Tiny Rascal Gangsters Asian DTOs
Pacific MDMA
Pacific Cocaine
Vagos Tijuana
Southwest Marijuana
Source: United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Report to Congress on Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas,
I!"<&)ABBBk)_<3.)]'-#'4<-;)K",3)L"%+/(D<'3)I"#%)"#!*"-<'3E
65
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Table B5. Pseudoephedrine Scheduling by State
Currently Has
Currently Has Point-of-Sale
State Currently Schedules Pseudoephedrine Pseudoephedrine
Restrictions
Tracking Laws
AK No Quantity, Packaging No
AL No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
AR Schedule V Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
AZ Schedule V Quantity In Legislature
CA No Quantity No
CO No Packaging No
CT No No No
DC No No No
DE No Quantity, Display/Offer No
FL No Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
GA Exempt Schedule V Quantity, Packaging In Legislature
HI No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
IA Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
ID Schedule II Display/Offer No
IL Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
IN No Quantity, Display/Offer In Legislature
KS Schedule V Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
KY No Quantity Yes
LA Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
MA No No No
MD No No In Legislature
ME Maine designates its four schedules of
controlled substances as W, X, Y, and Z. Quantity, Packaging, and Display No
Pseudoephedrine is classified as Z.
MI No Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
MN Schedule V Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
MO Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
MS No Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
MT No Quantity, Display/Offer No
1
NC Schedule VI Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
ND No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
NE No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer No
NH No No No
NJ No Quantity No
NM Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
66
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
(Table continued from previous page.)
Table B5. Pseudoephedrine Scheduling by State
Currently Has
Currently Has Point-of-Sale
State Currently Schedules Pseudoephedrine Pseudoephedrine
Restrictions
Tracking Laws
NV Schedule III2 No No
NY No No No
OH No Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
OK Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
OR Schedule III No No
PA No Quantity, Packaging, and Display In Legislature
PR/USVI No No No
RI No Quantity Yes
SC No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
SD No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer No
TN Schedule V Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
TX No Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
UT No Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
VA No Quantity, Display/Offer In Legislature
VT No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer No
3
WA Schedule II Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer Yes
WI Schedule V Quantity Yes
WV Schedule V Quantity, Display/Offer Yes
WY No Quantity, Packaging, Display/Offer No
1. NC Code 9094.
2. Excludes drug products approved under federal law for overthecounter sale.
3. Excludes “any drug or compound containing Pseudoephedrine … that [is] prepared for dispensing or overthecounter distribution and [is] in
compliance with the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and applicable regulations.”
67
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
68
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Appendix C: Scope and Methodology
The National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 is a comprehensive assessment of the threat posed
-*)-.#)^'<-#2)F-%-#4)Q;)-.#)-"%+/(D<'3)%'2)%Q,4#)*+)<&&<(<-)2",34E)]-)?%4)!"#!%"#2)-."*,3.)2#-%<)
analysis of the most recent law enforcement, intelligence, and public health data available to
NDIC through the date of publication.
The National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 includes information provided by 3,069 state and
local law enforcement agencies through the NDIC National Drug Threat Survey 2009. State and
local law enforcement agencies also provided information through personal interviews with
`K]@)O<#&2)]'-#&&<3#'(#)M+/(#"4)6O]M4>8)%)'%-<*'?<2#)'#-?*"D)*+)&%?)#'+*"(#0#'-)!"*+#44<*'%&4)
assembled by NDIC to promote information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforce
ment agencies.
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substances of abuse, the nonmedical use of CPDs, and the laundering of proceeds generated
through illicit drug sales. It also addresses the role that DTOs and organized gangs play in domestic
2",3)-"%+/(D<'38)-.#)4<3'</(%'-)"*&#)-.%-)-.#)F*,-.?#4-)[*"2#")!&%;4)<')-.#)<&&<(<-)2",3)-"%2#8)%'2)
the societal impact of drug abuse. Analysts considered various quantitative data (data on seizures,
investigations, arrests, drug purity or potency, and drug prices; law enforcement surveys; labora
tory analyses; and interagency production and cultivation estimates) and qualitative information
(subjective views of individual agencies on drug availability, information on the involvement of
organized criminal groups, information on smuggling and transportation trends, and indicators of
change in smuggling and transportation methods) in the preparation of this report.
The evaluation of societal impact was based in part on analysis of national substance abuse data
measuring prevalence of drug use among various age groups, ED information, information on
admissions to treatment facilities, and information on drugrelated crimes. The societal impact of
drugs was also evaluated through analysis of health care, criminal justice, workplace productivity,
and environmental data and reporting.
NDTS data used in this report do not imply that there is only one drug threat per state or region
or that only one drug is available per state or region. A percentage given for a state or region
represents the proportion of state and local law enforcement agencies in that state or region that
<2#'-</#2)%)!%"-<(,&%")2",3)%4)-.#)3"#%-#4-)-."#%-)*")%4)%$%<&%Q&#)%-)&*?8)0*2#"%-#8)*").<3.)&#$#&4E)
This assessment breaks the country into nine regions as shown in Map A1 in Appendix A. For
representation of survey data by regions, see Map A5 in Appendix A. For nationallevel data, see
Map A6 in Appendix A.
69
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
70
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Sources
Numerous state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States provided
valuable input to this report through their participation in the NDTS and interviews with NDIC
FIOs. These agencies are too numerous to thank individually.
71
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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72
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
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73
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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74
Product No. 2010Q0317001 National Drug Intelligence Center
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75
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
76
Cover Photo © PhotoDisc
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER
National
Drug Threat
Assessment
2010
Questions and comments may be directed to
National Drug Threat Assessment Unit, National Threat Analysis Branch
National Drug Intelligence Center
!"#$%&'()*+,-*$.,/00,$1,($23--/4$5-(*',-6*4$78$"1#9":";<<$=$>?"@A$1!<:@;9"
NDIC publications are available on the following web sites:
INTERNET www.usdoj.gov/ndic ADNET http://ndicosa.adnet.sgov.gov RISS ndic.riss.net
LEO https://www.leo.gov/http://leowcs.leopriv.gov/lesig/ndic/index.htm
032410