G.R. No.

185715

January 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the May 27, 2008 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215, affirming with modification the April 3,
2006 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found Erlinda Capuno y Tison
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that
states:
That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram
which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and which substance produces a
physiological action similar to amphetamine or other compound thereof providing similar physiological effects.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 The prosecution presented Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1
Fortunato Jiro III at the trial. The appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense.
PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant
arrived and told him that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal.
Upon receiving this information, he, PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1 Antonio) was
designated as the poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act as back-up. Before leaving the police station, they asked the desk
officer to record their operation.5 They went to Manggahan Street, and when they were near this place, the informant pointed to them
the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and told her, "Paiskor ng halagang piso"; he then
handed the pre-marked one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a plastic sachet from her left pocket and gave it to PO1
Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held the appellants arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her constitutional rights. It was at this
time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached them; PO1 Jiro recovered the marked money from the appellant. They brought the
appellant to the police station for investigation.6 According to PO1 Antonio, the police forwarded the seized item to the Eastern Police
District Crime Laboratory for examination.7
PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a confidential asset called
and informed the police that he saw one "alias Erlinda" selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust operation wherein they
prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money, and designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro,
PO1 Antonio, PO1 Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and proceeded to Manahan Street. On their arrival there,
the confidential asset pointed to them the appellant.8 PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and talked to
her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to the appellant; the appellant took "something" from her pocket and handed it
to PO1 Antonio.9 Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro) and PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant;
he recovered the marked money from the appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked the duty
officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory
examination.10
On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1 Antonio when the latter was transacting with the
appellant. He maintained that the buy-bust operation took place outside the appellants house.11 He recalled that the appellant had two
other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the appellant, some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to
grab her.12
The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist, was dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result
of the examination conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory.
On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits:
Exhibit "A" the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez
Exhibit "B" the request for laboratory examination
Exhibit "C" Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E
Exhibit "D" the buy-bust money
Exhibit "E" Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03
Exhibit "F" the specimen confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit "G" Police Blotter13

The defense presented a different version of the events.

The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was inside her house and lying on the bed, together with her 15year old daughter, when two persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They wore maong pants and
sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she answered in the affirmative, they searched her house.14 They invited
the appellant and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did not find anything in the house. Upon arriving
there, the police told her to reveal the identity of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea what they
were talking about, the police put her in jail.15 The appellant further stated that she saw the seized specimen only in court.16
On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal drugs. She explained that she consented to the search
because she believed that the two persons who entered her house were policemen.17
Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on material points, but stated that the two policemen did not
search their house but merely "looked around."18
The RTC, in its decision19 of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days. The RTC
likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P100,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The CA, in its decision20 dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the amount of fine be increased
to P500,000.00.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution witnesses were not credible due to their conflicting statements
regarding the place of the buy-bust operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they conducted the entrapment operation
on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it was held on Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip of
the tongue as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal.21
The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they
were ever motivated by any ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added that the appellants denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a
regular manner.22
Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been established.23
In her brief,24 the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave conflicting statements on how they
came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On one hand, PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told
them that the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand, stated that a civilian informant called the police
and informed them of the appellants illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two witnesses differ as
regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized
specimen. She claims that the apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover, there was no showing
that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.25
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimonies of the police officers prevail
over the appellants bare denial, more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were motivated by any evil motive
other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade.26
The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002, there was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the
Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002.27 It further claimed that the failure to comply with
the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to the prosecution of drug cases.28
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.29 The burden lies on
the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the
required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption
prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.30
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21
of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the
object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.31

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record
suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the evidence. The
deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL:
Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do?
PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO:
A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our civilian asset pointed to us the suspect.
Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group do?
A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who talked to Erlinda Capuno.
Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when you approached her?
A: I told her "Paiskor ng halagang piso."
Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu, what did he do? [sic]
A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled out something from her pocket.
Q: What is the denomination of the marked money?
A: One Hundred Peso bill.
Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next?
A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two companions who [were] then seeing me
approached me. [sic]
Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received this plastic sachet?
A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that I introduced myself and explained to her
Constitutional rights. [sic]
Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed?
A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave her full name and also turned over the suspected
items[.]
Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money?
A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir.
Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda. Do you have that buy bust money with you?
A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket the suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero
recovered the money. [sic]
xxxx
Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now?
A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination.
Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination?
A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result.32
From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant
and the seized specimen to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of
the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1 Antonios
testimony was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team, PO1 Jiro, who narrated that after arresting the appellant,

they brought her and the seized item to the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even intimate that they
inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions
for failure to follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the
procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of
1974.33 Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to
immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the
passage of R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Lorenzo,34 we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and
inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia35 likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no
photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,36 we also
acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds.
We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,37 People v. Denoman,38 People v. Partoza,39 People v. Robles,40 and People v. dela
Cruz,41 where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1,
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.42
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to
follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items.
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the
crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.43
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." As a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as evidence, such that every person who
handled the same would admit as to how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the
evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from
the accused.44
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court
was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and
joint affidavit of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon confiscation. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed
of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.45
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to the police station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified
that they brought the appellant and the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify the person to whose custody
the seized item was given. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by
the Chief of Police, Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the
marked plastic sachet from PO1 Antonio.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory by a certain PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said specimen only on the
next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug
after it left the hands of PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had custody of the specimen in the interim. We
also stress that the identity of the person who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified.
Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a
reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution witnesses by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts
ruling, the inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not trivial. To recall, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro

and PO1 Fernandez stated in their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay46 that a civilian asset arrived at the police station on July 21,
2002, and informed them that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1
Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified in court that a civilian informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and told them
that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however,
changed his story in court and testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed then that one "alias Erlinda" was
selling illegal drugs.
We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different accounts regarding how the confidential asset informed
them of the appellants illegal activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002. What baffles us even
more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and
declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.47
Presumption of Regularity in the
Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable.48 The presumption, in
other words, obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of
official duty as provided for in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.49 As we explained in People v. Sanchez:
While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption
cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that - a mere presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable
doubt." The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In
short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.50
All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, due to the unreliability of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 30215. Appellant Erlinda Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate
implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO,petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO, accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time
when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other
public fora by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2)
groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging
them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon;
Criminal Case No. 86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790
against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 8648931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano
and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.

The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and
Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the
prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken
during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they
applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them
gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and
delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and
asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The
loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat
ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and
truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually,
the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. 1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer,
a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their
dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the
fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists
replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo
ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the
"Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting
"Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They
caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on
him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician
at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers
pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to
Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos
emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice
on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of
his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" 5Sumilang tried to pacify
Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once
more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly
boxed him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. 7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps 8 and
then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued
him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried:
"Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness.
Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused
admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures
as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side;
5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0
cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid. 10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a
video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted
President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give information
leading to the arrest of the killers.11 Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and
on the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis.
Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986,
he was in his house in Quezon City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the

incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be
developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things
forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that he
merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs.18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo
Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful
day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the
pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because
he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and
Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20
days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an
accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul
Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits
them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes
on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20)
DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to
TWENTY (20) YEARS ofReclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los
Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an indeterminate
penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20)
DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said
charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual
damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito
Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency of these cases shall be credited to them provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and
Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the
Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but
increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them
guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him
did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said
cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the
four accused-appellants sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO
CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO
HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN
SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE,
DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT,
THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS
MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W"
TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN
THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE
FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses,
Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to

them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by
General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved
version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused
Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several
times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of
them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the
police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. 29 He
informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were
made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and
evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his
testimony. On the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances.
Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual view
of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal
dimensions of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does
not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be
expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some
facts but disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant
details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are
supported by the medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his
body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have
been caused by punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in
Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden
instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his
assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave
evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat.
Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified
Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely
reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to
impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta starting from a grassy portion
to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat
pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local
newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The
admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took
the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production
and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of
the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who
made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs,
therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo
Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty.
Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were
not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by
appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all
the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings,
the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their
admissibility.57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not
presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in
the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling
incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave
reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los
Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the
victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the

victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does
not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the
pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
Banculo 61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them
of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a
confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such
person or persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty ofprision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon
the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled
and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
injuries or who used violence can be identified. 62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray,
in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have
occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa
Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual
and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel
or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident. 64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number 65 and were armed with stones with
which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to
escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him
mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against
the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend
himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him,
hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate
and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was
deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on
Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he
allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo had
the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity
against the so-called "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is
proved, a showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the
conspirators is liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act of one is the
act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one
half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4,
1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow
and three small children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must
also be awarded for the death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayoras minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum;

3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following
amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLAND TACIPIT, accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 24, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, Branch 12,
finding accused-appellant Roland Tacipit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, as defined under
paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, without the use of a deadly weapon, and
hereby imposes on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and further
sentences him to pay moral damages to one Onelia Pamittan in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency and to pay the costs. . . . (Rollo, p. 32).
The records of the case disclose that the complainant, Onelia Pamittan, was a 17-year old high school student at the Abulug School of
Fisheries in Abulug, Cagayan at the time of he commission of the offense. She had a friend, Eden Molina, who studied at the same
school and lived about two (2) kilometers from the school.
In the afternoon of January 3, 1991, Eden invited some of her friends, including the complainant, over to her house. When the group
arrived at Eden's house, at about 4:30 p.m., the accused-appellant Roland Tacipit was already there with Eden's brother, Elmer Molina,
the latter being a friend and co-worker of the accused. Previous to this meeting, the complainant already knew the accused since he
lived only a few meters from her home. She also knew the accused to be a married man.
After partaking of a snack of tinubong (native rice cakes), the group decided to go home. At this point, the version given by the
prosecution and the defense differed. According to the complainant, as she was about to leave the Molina house, the accused
restrained her, held her left hand and her notebooks and told her friends to go ahead. Despite her cries and pleas for help, the owners
of the house did nothing to help her. On the other hand, defense witness Elmer Molina alleged that the complainant and the accused
were sweethearts. They left the house together, with their hands over each other's shoulders. At any rate, it is undisputed that the
complainant left the Molina household with the accused.
On the way, they passed through a coconut plantation of a certain Guillermo Agustin. By then, it was already getting dark. There, the
accused took hold of the wrists of the complainant and wrestled her down to the ground. He tore off the T-shirt and skirt she was
wearing and pinned her hands across her stomach. The accused then removed her shorts and panty and ravished her. After the carnal
act, the accused accompanied the complainant to a point near her home and before leaving her, threatened to kill her or her family if
she reports the matter to anyone. The complainant, however, did not heed the warning and immediately upon arriving at her house,
reported the incident to her uncle, Ernesto Marantan, with whom she was residing. Marantan looked for the accused that same
evening, but after failing in his search, he reported the matter instead to the barangay captain.
The following day, the complainant accompanied by her mother, aunt and cousin, reported the incident to the police at the municipal
building. She submitted her clothing for examination and after being investigated, submitted herself for medical examination.
On January 5, 1991, the complainant executed a sworn statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime and filed the corresponding complaint for rape. After a thorough investigation which resulted in the finding of probable cause, the
municipal trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused.
On February 18, 1991, an information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor against the accused, as follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, upon complaint filed by the offended party, Nelia T. Pamittan, in the
Municipal Trial Court of Abulug, Cagayan, appearing on page 1, the record of the case, and forming an integral part of
this Information, accuses Roland Tacipit y Manglapuz of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335,
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about January 3, 1991, in the municipality of Abulug, province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Roland Tacipit y Manglapuz, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, and with the use of deadly weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the offended party, Onelia T. Pamittan, a minor, seventeen (17) years of age, against her will and
consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p, 7)

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
As his defense, the accused claimed that he and the complainant were sweethearts since October 3, 1990 and that the complainant
voluntarily yielded herself to him. As proof of their relationship, the accused presented a ring engraved with the name "Onelia" and
alleged that it was given to him by the complainant as a token of her love. Defense witness Elmer Molina corroborated the testimony of
the accused, stating that he courted the complainant but was spurned by her because she was already the accused's sweetheart.
On the other hand, these contentions were firmly denied by the prosecution. The complainant testified that she knew the accused to be
a married man and he never visited her house to court her. She also denied that Elmer Molina courted her or that she told him that he
was the accused's girlfriend. As for the ring, the complainant denied ownership thereof. True enough, when the ring was tried on her
hand, it was loose and did not fit her finger (Rollo, p. 23).
The trial court, after consideration of the evidence presented, rendered the forequoted judgment against the accused. Hence, the
present appeal wherein the following assigned errors are raised:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 1N GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE OTHERWISE DOUBTFUL THEORY
OF THE PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Rollo,
p. 56).
The defense argues that the weight of the evidence presented by the prosecution is grossly inadequate to overthrow the presumption of
innocence granted by law to the accused. It is the contention of the accused-appellant that the testimony of complainant relied upon by
the trial court in convicting him is incredible and not worthy of belief. There are inconsistencies in said testimony. It is also saddled with
flaws which show her tendency to exaggerate things (Rollo, p. 61-64).
Secondly, the accused argues that the physical evidence as well as the actuations of the parties concerned are not consistent with the
allegation of rape but with carnal knowledge done with the consent of both the accused and the complainant. As proof, the accused
pointed out the lack of external injuries on the body of the complainant. This fact negates the employment of force by the accused on
the complainant and rules out struggle or any other form of resistance on the part of the complainant.
The accused likewise points to the absence of an out cry on the part of the complainant which bolsters the position of the accused that
the sexual intercourse was consensual. The rationale given by the complainant that she had a sore throat which prevented her from
shouting was characterized by the defense as incredible.
Finally, the accused argues that if rape had indeed been committed by him, he would not have accompanied the complainant to a place
near her house, thereby exposing himself to the risk of being seen, but would have instead fled for safety, which is more consistent with
he commission of an offense.
In reviewing the evidence of this case, this Court was guided by the three(3) settled principles in reviewing rape cases, namely, (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]). On
these bases, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed.
There is present in this case clear, convincing and competent physical and testimonial evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused. The testimony of complainant Onelia Pamittan, was found by the trial court to be replete with
details, negating the probability of fabrication. Although the trial court did not accord credence to that part of her testimony relating to
how she ended up leaving the Molina household with the accused, the same did not militate against the credibility of the complainant as
a prosecution witness.
As far as alleged inconsistencies in her testimony are concerned, this Court has ruled time and again that a few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the basic aspects of the
whys and wherefores of the crime, do not impair their credibility (People vs. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538 [1991] citing People vs. Muoz,
163 SCRA 780]. This is especially true in the crime of rape where the victim cannot be expected to remember with accuracy the details
of her humiliating experience. At best, this Court relies upon the fact that the trial court found the complainant to be a credible witness.
As often repeated by this Court:
. . . the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor,
conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true
and the false. Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court of the testimony of
witnesses unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and
circumstances of significance in the case (People vs. Simbulan, 214 SCRA 537 [1992]).
The appeal at hand presents no compelling reason to deviate from this general rule.
Moreover, considering that the accused and the complainant are at most acquaintances, there appears to be no motive on the part of
the complainant to testify against the accused which could render suspect her testimony in court. It is clear that her only intent was to

seek redress for the injustice committed against her by appellant a married man. As held in People v. Guibao, (217 SCRA 64
[1993]):
No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of herself by being subjected to a public trial, if
she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.
Anent the contention of the accused that the sexual act was committed with the mutual consent of the parties, the evidence presented
by the prosecution sufficiently rebutted his point.
For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of the complainant, the clothes worn by her at the time of the
offense speak well of the use of force and the presence of a struggle. As the trial court noted:
Her T-shirt was torn which corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly removed. It also proves that she offered
resistance to the criminal advances of the accused. Her shorts, like her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was
detached from her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it was forcibly removed. These physical evidence . . .
are consistent only with the force and compulsion applied on her; they prove she offered resistance and her
defloration was against her will. (Rollo, p. 27)
The actuations of the complainant subsequent to the commission of the crime are likewise consistent with her allegations of rape. Her
immediate revelation of the incident to her uncle upon arrival as well as her swift recourse to the barangay Captain and the police
authorities are not acts of a woman savoring an illicit tryst but that of a maiden seeking retribution for the outrage committed against
her.
Thus, the accused's reliance on the defense that he and the complainant were lovers is unfounded. But even if it were true, such
relationship would not give the accused the license to deflower the complainant against her will, and will not exonerate him from the
criminal charge for rape. Furthermore, there is nothing in the testimonies of either the complainant or even the accused himself which
could indicate any sort of special relationship between the two. The alleged proof of such relationship, the ring with complainant's name
engraved on it, does not even fit the fingers of the complainant. Their actuations with respect to each other before, during and even
after the commission of the crime were consistent with the contention of the complainant that they are nothing more than
acquaintances. The evidence of the prosecution, therefore, completely negates the existence of any relationship between the accused
and the complainant.
Finally, the accused's act of accompanying the complainant up to a point near her house does not appear to be a gesture of love. If the
accused was not obsessed with a sense of guilt, he could have accompanied the complainant to the home since it was already dark at
night. Rather than a demonstration of his freedom from guilt, the actuation of the accused in the premises appears to be no less than a
calculated move to ensure that the complainant will keep her silence about the sordid incident perpetrated against her will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, Branch 12, dated November 24, 1992 in Criminal
Case No. 2190-S finding the accused-appellant Roland Tacipit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties, to pay the complainant Onelia Pamittan moral damages in
the amount of fifty house and pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174198

January 19, 2010

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which affirmed in toto the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Paraaque City4 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida5 Kamad y Ambing (accusedappellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession of shabu, the accused-appellant was
charged under an Information6 that reads:
The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer
for P300.00 pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance (shabu) weighing 0.20 gram,
which when examined were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the abovecited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecutions version of events is summarized below.
On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
(Taguig police) received information from an asset that a certain "Zaida" was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV, Silverio
Compound in Paraaque City. The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Antonio Parillas,7 PO3 Christopher

Maulit8 (PO3 Maulit), PO1 Manfoste,9 SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez10 (SPO2 Sanchez), as members. SPO2
Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso bills for use as marked money.
After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00 p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area
where they immediately saw the accused-appellant and Leo. The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the rest of the
buy-bust team watched from a distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of shabu and the accused-appellant asked
him how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money; the accused-appellant
thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the
pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to approach. SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her
the P300.00 marked money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also suspected to
contain shabu.
The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their office for investigation. The recovered
plastic sachets, marked as "ES-1-161009" and "ES-2-161002," were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative
examination; the tests yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 11
The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.
The accused-appellant12 denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At around 2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002,
the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leos cousins house. Since Leos cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After
waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and introduced themselves as police
officers. The accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police officers asked the accusedappellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu. Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police
headquarters where they were again frisked and asked the same question to which they gave the same response. The police detained
Leo and the accused-appellant for about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutors Office for inquest without showing them any
shabu.
The RTC Ruling
After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences
Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165
xxxx
SO ORDERED.13
The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTCs reliance on the presumption of regularity that the
RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation by the police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could
arise considering that the police violated NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit the deputation of private persons as
PNP civilian agents.14 The accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2 Sanchez regarding the time the buy-bust team was
dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of PO3 Maulit on the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted
mistake of PO3 Maulit that only the recovered plastic sachet was marked "ES" (standing for the initials of SPO2 Sanchez), while the
marked money was marked "MF" (standing for the initials of P/Insp. Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer); and (d) the
contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit who testified that it was Leo who sold the shabu and that of SPO2 Sanchez who testified that it
was the accused-appellant who sold him the shabu.
The CA Ruling
The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled that the prosecution satisfactorily
established the accused-appellants guilt based on the positive testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation;
his testimony bore badges of truth. Accordingly, the CA found the accused-appellants uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight.
The CA brushed aside as a minor inconsistency the uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust operation
took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that the accused-appellant was arrested in
flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu committed in the presence of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers. Moreover,
the CA held that the use of assets to aid police officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized. The CA found that while
the asset brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search and seizure of
the shabu from the accused-appellant.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.
The Courts Ruling
We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the appeal throws the whole case open for review
and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.15 We find the present appeal meritorious on the basis of such review.
As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and
material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.16 After due consideration of
the records of this case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation from the general rule
is warranted.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or
sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.17 Proof of the corpus delicti in a buybust situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and
examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a condition sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are the main subject of
the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss below,
the special characteristics of prohibited drugs necessitate their strict identification by the prosecution.18
Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of
the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took place, we find that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities
in the prosecutions case: (1) the serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-bust team in handling the seized
shabu; and (2) the failure of the police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu, resulting in the
prosecutions failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu seized from the accused-appellant on October
16, 2002.
Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
In People v. Garcia,19 we emphasized the prosecutions duty to adduce evidence proving compliance by the buy-bust team with the
prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. This provision reads:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [emphasis
supplied]
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further details on how RA 9165 is to be applied,
and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no strict compliance with the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.20 Hence, the rules on the
measures to be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up
to their presentation in court.
In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu. The records show that his testimony and the
identification he made in court constitute the totality of the prosecutions evidence on how the police handled and preserved the integrity
of the seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:
Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the poseur buyer, gave the money to Zaida?
A: We brought them to our office.
xxxx
Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance?
A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.21
Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the evidence shows that the shabu was
marked as "ES-1-161009" before it was sent to a forensic laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the
shabu was done immediately after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation. His testimony likewise
failed to disclose if a physical inventory and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had, whether these were
undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and of an
elective official.
In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the item seized had been preserved; no
explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed
procedures. In fact, the records clearly reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the procedural lapses
committed by the buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu.
The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution under the rule that penal laws, such as RA
9165, are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.22 One consequence is to produce doubts on
the origins of the illegal drug presented in court,23 thus leading to the prosecutions failure to establish the corpus delicti.24 Unless
excused by the saving mechanism, the acquittal of the accused must follow.
The non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule

Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an unbroken link in the chain of
custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in establishing the necessary links in the handling of the seized
prohibited drug from the time of its seizure until its presentation in court.
In Mallillin v. People,25 we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient compliance with this rule:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. [emphasis supplied]26
We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,27 People v. Gum-Oyen,28 People v. Denoman29 and People v. Coreche30 where we recognized
the following links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
(a) The first link in the chain of custody
We observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled immediately after the accusedappellants arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez testified that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the
accused-appellant, he never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the shabu after its seizure, nor
that he retained possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they reached the police station.
SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who made the markings on the two (2)
plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.
(b) The second link in the chain of custody
We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed to provide particulars on whether
the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The records only identify the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro before
whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002.31 Thus, a big gap exists on who had
custody and possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and how the shabu was stored,
preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by the forensic laboratory.
(c) The third link in the chain of custody
The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution consisting of the letterrequest dated October 17, 200232 of Police Superintendent Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug
Enforcement Group and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic
chemist.33
These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002" were
sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP
Crime Laboratory received this letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were then subjected to qualitative
examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
They also fail to clearly identify the person who received the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated
October 17, 2002, and who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined and before it was presented in court.
Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its presentation
in court.
(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody
The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecutions evidence in this case. Although the forensic chemist was
presented in court, we find that his offered testimony related to a shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of
October 16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October 12, 2002. This is borne by the
following exchanges:
FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the one who cause [sic] the examination of
the physical evidence subject of this case containing with white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet weighing
0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I reduced findings after the examination conducted.
xxxx
Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a letter request relevant to this case
specifically a drug test request, dated October 12, 2002 from PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter request with
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12, 2002 for purposes of identification,
respectfully request that it be marked in evidence as Exhibit A. In this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the

evidence submitted specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with signature containing with white crystalline substance
inside and with markings EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-1 12/10/02. After you received this specimen what action did you take or
do?
A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after which, I stamped and marked the letter request
and then record it on the logbook and after recording it on the logbook, I performed the test for determination of the presence
of dangerous drug on the specimen.
xxxx
Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?
A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown envelope with markings D-1487-02, and the
signature and the date 12 October 02, now Mr. Witness tell us who placed these markings on this brown envelope?
A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.
Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio and the signature and the date 12
October 2002. Do you know who placed who placed those markings?
A I have no idea.
Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown envelope. May I respectfully request that this
brown envelope be marked in evidence as Exhibit B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic sachets inside
which are white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and EPC-1 12 October 02. May I respectfully request
that these plastic sachets with white substance inside be marked in evidence as Exhibit B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic
sachets with white crystalline inside is a masking tape with the signature and letters are RAM, do you know who placed those
letters?
A I am the one who placed that markings sir.
Q And what RAM stands for?
A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.
Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official finding with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science report no. D-1487-2 for purposes of
identification respectfully request that this specimen be marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a
signature above the typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you whose signature is this Mr.
Witness? 34 [Emphasis supplied]
A That is my signature sir.
Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in evidence as Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that
you cause the weight of the white crystalline substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white crystalline
substance?
A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.
Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report now mark in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I
have no further questions to the witness your Honor.
xxxx
Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in court as evidence through the testimony of
the forensic chemist, showed characteristics distinct from the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:
First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu recovered on October 12, 2002. As testified to,
one plastic sachet of shabu was marked, "EBC 12 October 02," while the other plastic sachet of shabu was marked, "EBC-1
12 October 02";35
Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name and signature of one "PO1 Edwin Plopino"
and the date "12 October 2002" were written; 36
Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made pursuant to a different letter-request for
examination dated October 12, 2002 written by one P/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon;37 and
Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was contained in a different forensic laboratory
report known as Physical Science Report No. D-1487-2.38

We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence the prosecution formally
offered39 consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 200240 and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02.41 The testimonies of
SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well as the submitted documentary evidence referred to the plastic sachets of shabu through their
markings of "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002."42
From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the presentation of the prosecutions evidence. The
prosecution, however, left the discrepancies fully unexplained. To reiterate, the forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October
12, 2002, or one secured way before the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence documents relating to the specimen of
October 16, 2002. Strangely, even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of evidence, the defense
simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that "the forensic chemical officer only conducted a qualitative examination of the
specimen he examined and not the quantitative examination."43 Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances with markings "ES-1 16/10/02" and "ES-2 16/10/02," and the Physical Science
Report No. D-1502-02,44 the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the prosecutions offer of evidence.
But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for the prosecution and the offered evidence,
as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the glaring flaws in the prosecutions evidence. Apparently, because the parties did not
point out these discrepancies while the appellate court did not closely review the records of the proceedings, the discrepancies were
not taken into account in the decision now under review.
These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Courts ruling on the kind and extent of review that an
appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the appeal opens the whole case for review, with the appellate court charged with the
duty to cite and appreciate the errors it may find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are assigned or unassigned. This is
one such instance where we are duty bound to rectify errors that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by the parties, are clearly
reflected in the records of the case.
The Conclusion
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of
its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law
enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the
presumption cannot arise.45 In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and examined shabu and that formally
offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in
the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.1avvphi1
From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecutions failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to
identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused
enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in
deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March 28, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision of conviction dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259,
Paraaque City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accusedappellant ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING is hereby declared ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she
is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.