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IN THE 12 JUDICIAL COUNTY COURT

OF BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS


EX PARTE
DENISE MCVEA,
Petitioner.

HABEAS NO.

2613

TRIAL CAUSE NO. 443420

________________________________________________________________
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
__________________________________________________________________
SUBMITTED BY:
DENISE MCVEA
PETITIONER PRO SE
1006 WYOMING STREET
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAAS 78203
(210)460-0104

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and to be release immediately
from bond restraint of liberty based on constitutional due process
grounds pursuant to Article 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner brings this petition on three constitutional grounds:
GROUND 1: The charging instrument is invalid and void. Absent a valid
charging instrument, the continued restraint of petitioner under bond is
a violation of constitutional law.
GROUND 2: There is a complete and utter absence of probable cause
to believe that Petitioner committed an offense. The facts of the case
supported by clear and unassailable proof of Petitioners actual
innocence - are such that the absence of probable cause cannot be
cured. Consequently, Petitioner must be immediately released from
bond and this prosecution dismissed by operation of law.
GROUND 3: Petitioner asserts that this prosecution is solely brought to
gain strategic advantage over Petitioner, in violation of state and
federal law. Petitioner is a published author, journalist and human
rights advocate who has documented widespread criminality and
corruption within the Bexar County judiciary. Petitioner asserts that
Bexar Countys sole purpose in holding Petitioner to bond despite the
complete absence of probable cause is an effort to pressure Petitioner
to waiver her constitutional rights through a coerced plea bargain.
JURISDICTION
Both the district and county courts have original jurisdiction to issue
the writ of habeas corpus even though the criminal proceeding under
attack is a misdemeanor.1
Additionally, Article 11.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that a person confined under a misdemeanor charge may
apply to the county judge of the county in which the misdemeanor is
charged to have been committed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.09;
Ex parte Schmidt, 109 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (When
they are read together, Article V, section 16 of the Constitution,
Section 25.0003(a) of the Government Code, and Article 11.05 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure give the statutory county court at law, and
the judges of that court, the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus
1 Ex parte Johnson, 561 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr. App.1978); Ex parte Phelper, 433 S.W.2d
897 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).

when a person is restrained by an accusation or conviction of


misdemeanor. See also Ex parte Jordan, 659 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (appeals from denial of relief sought in a
misdemeanor post conviction writ of habeas corpus should be directed
to the courts of appeals. (emphasis in original). Therefore, this court
has jurisdiction over this petition for writ of habeas corpus.
COGNIZABILITY
A Petitioner may use a pretrial writ of habeas corpus only in very
limited circumstances. First, the accused may challenge the State's
power to restrain him at all. Second, the accused may challenge the
manner of his pretrial restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions
attached to bail. Third, the accused may raise certain issues which, if
meritorious, would bar prosecution or conviction.2
TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN., Art. 11.01 describes the writ
of habeas corpus as "the remedy to be used when any person is
restrained in his liberty." This extraordinary writ is "an order issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction, directed to anyone having a person
in his custody, or under his restraint, commanding him to produce such
person ... and show why he is held in custody or under restraint."
(Emphasis added.)
Additionally, Art. 11.22 defines the term restraint as:
"the kind of control which one person exercises over
another, not to confine him within certain limits, but to
subject him to the general authority and power of the
person claiming such right."
Habeas corpus is a proper remedy when a defendant is subject to
conditions of bond because these conditions restrain his liberty within
the meaning of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.01. 3
Because Petitioner has been on bond in Bexar County since November
16, 2013, this petition is cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus.
Further a defendant may challenge even unpreserved errors in a
charging instrument for the first time.on habeas.4
STANDARD FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
Petitioners claims meet the standard for habeas corpus relief. An
applicant for habeas corpus relief has the burden of proving facts
2 Ex parte Smith (October 19, 2005, No. PD-0616-04).
3 Ex parte Robinson, 641 SW 2d 552 Tex: Crt. Of Crim. App. 1982.
4 Studer v. State, 799 SW 2d 263, 271 (Tex. Crim. App 1990).

which would entitle the applicant to the relief sought. Ex parte


Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.Crim. App.1993). Petitioner must also
establish that she is either "confined" or "restrained at the time of the
application for writ"5 and show that she has no other adequate
remedy.6 Applicant is precluded from appealing an interlocutory order
until after trial and the court has already denied petitioners motion to
set aside indictment or information and motion to dismiss. See trial
record. Finally, the applicant has been under continuous criminal bond
in Bexar County pursuant to Magistrate Intake No. 1631569 since
November 16, 2013.7

5 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 769 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (restraint


required before writ relief can be granted); TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 11.01.
6 Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim. App.1978).
7 Exhibit A: Intake #1631569, Magistrate NO. 208330, November 16, 2013.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND


1. Petitioner is a published journalist, author, and human rights
advocate. In 2010, she began research for a book project about pro se
litigants in America, focusing her research on the Bexar County
Courthouse. She began documenting unexpected but widespread
improprieties in the civil district courts, especially as they related to
the constitutional rights and guarantees of pro se litigants. This
journalistic work gained the ire of the district judges. The verified letter
to Bexar County District Judge Antonia Arteaga from Denise McVea is
attached as Exhibit B and herein incorporated by reference.8
2. On May 8, 2013, Petitioner wrote a letter to Bexar County Civil
District Court Staff Attorney Dinah Gaines protesting the civil court
judges policy of allowing young assistant staff attorneys to contest
and then summarily rule on pro se litigants requests to proceed with
their cases without paying court costs. Petitioner complained that the
judges systematic default judgments against pro se litigants were
unconstitutional because the judges and their staff denied them access
to a hearing on the matter Petitioner estimated that more than a
thousand Bexar County residents had their civil cases dismissed in this
manner.9
3.Almost immediately, Petitioner began to experience protracted and
intense official oppression from judges, police, lawyers, city and county
officials, and others. However, Petitioner continued to document the
actions of these public servants. She now has a treasure trove of
documentation outlining numerous official acts by county and city
officials and employees that were unlawful, unethical, and often
criminal in nature.10
4.A key target of the oppression was 1614 Martin Luther King
Boulevard, a former abandoned crack house and drug den that
Petitioner took possession of pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Article 16.001. Petitioners purpose in adverse possession of the
property was in essence a social experiment; the objective was to
recover blighted inner city property and transform it into an asset for a
neglected neighborhood. After spending thousands of dollars, she was
well on her to completing a civil rights information center, complete
with bookstore and library.11
8 Exhibit B: Verified letter from Denise McVea to District Judge Antonia Arteaga, July
21, 2015.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Arteaga.

5. On January 21, 2013, Petitioner became the first San Antonio


resident in recent city history to be arrested and criminally prosecuted
for a garage sale violation. The arrest occurred on Martin Luther King
Day, while Petitioner and volunteers were conducting an information
and sales event at 1614 Martin Luther King for participants in the citys
Martin Luther King March.12
6. On the evening of September 7, 2013, absent writ of possession,
Kristina Combs, Texas notary public Ofelia Lisa Hernandez and others
broke into 1614 Martin Luther King Blvd. and began removing items
under cloak of darkness. San Antonio Police Department Offense Case
#SAPD13196530 is hereby attached as Exhibit C and herein
incorporated by reference.13 Although this act is an offense under
Texas Penal Code Art. 31.03 and other crimes, police refused to
properly investigate.
7.On September 15, 2013, Petitioners alarm company notified her that
the MLK property was again broken into. This time, absent writ of
possession, notary Ofelia Lisa Hernandez and others, in constant
telephonic contact with Kristina Combs, broke into another building on
the property and removed more documents and items. Again, the
police refused to properly investigate. SAPD Call for Service Sheet
SAPD-2013-0887108 is hereby attached as Exhibit D and incorporated
by reference.14
8. On November 13, 2013, former Bexar County Judge Barbara
Nellermoe, despite her court having no jurisdiction over the matter,
and requiring no proof of actual title from Combs, essentially awarded
Combs the real property, improperly awarded attorneys fees to Combs,
and ordered the illegal eviction of Petitioner and her organization from
the property.15
9. On November 16, 2013, Combs attacked Petitioner when Petitioner
attempted to video record Combs and others illegally removing
12 The local federal court would later rule in summary judgment that police could
arrest citizens for any non-criminal reason, and that citizens arrested for non-criminal
reasons could be detained and prosecuted without probable cause, Miranda
warnings, a hearing before a magistrate or any other constitutional protections.
13 Exhibit C: SAPD Offense Report SAPD13196530.
14 Exhibit D: SAPD-2013-0887108, September 15, 2013.
15 Cause No. 2103-CI-14927, Bexar County District Court, San Antonio, Texas. In her
order, Nellermoe gave Petitioner 2 hours to remove property worth thousands of
dollars, including an entire bookstore and an entire law library. Nellermoe denied
Petitioners ex parte request to allow inventory, but then refused to sign her own
order denying that relief.

Petitioners books from the property. 16 Despite video evidence of


Combs attack against Petitioner, video and eyewitness proof of
Combs theft of Petitioners personal property, police officers arrested
Petitioner and charged Petitioner with the offense of misdemeanor
assault - bodily injury, based solely on allegations made by the
complainant, Kristina Combs. Exhibit E, SAPD Offense Report No.
SAPD13252834, is hereby attached as Exhibit E and herein
incorporated by reference. 17 A copy of the video recording of the
incident, taken by Petitioner, is hereby attached as Exhibit F and herein
incorporated by reference.18
10. No arraignment has been held in this case.
11. On June 4, 2014, Court-certified Forensic Document Examiner
Wendy Carlson issued a report stating that the signatures on the
quitclaim deeds Combs used to gain control of Petitioners property
were forged. The Carlson Report is hereby attached as Exhibit G and
herein incorporated by reference.19
1.On July 14, 2014, the court heard Defendants motion for discovery
and inspection.
12. On August 28, 2014, Petitioner filed an amended motion to set
aside indictment of information and motion for dismissal and requested
that the case be dismissed on the grounds that prosecutors had shown
no probable cause to support the prosecution, had no evidence in their
possession that would support the prosecution, and that prosecutors
had been provided exculpatory evidence that showed that Kristina
Combs had, in fact, attacked Petitioner to cover up criminal activity,
documented by Petitioner. The Court denied Petitioners request to set
aside information and motion for dismissal. Petitioner made a timely
objection to the courts denial of her motion to dismiss. However, the
Court did not rule on the objection.
PRESERVATION OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS
In accordance with Texas Appellate Rule of Procedure Rule
33.1(2)(B), Petitioner now OBJECTS and EXCEPTS to any and all
refusals/failures of the court to rule on Petitioners objections in pretrial
hearings.
16 Even if Judge Nellermoes order evicting Petitioner was not void on its face,
Combs; theft of nearly all of Petitioners personal property is still a violation of state
criminal property laws.
17 Exhibit E: SAPD 13252834, November 16, 2013.
18 Exhibit F: Video-recording of November 16, 2013 assault incident.
19 Exhibit G: Carlson Forensic Report, June 4, 2014.

a.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, the
Court did not allow Petitioner to show exculpatory videotape evidence
during the proceeding. Petitioner objected, but the Court failed to rule
on Petitioners objection. Petitioner OBJECTS and EXCEPTS to judges
refusal to rule on her objection to judges ruling to not allow Petitioner
to show videotape evidence in her motion for dismissal/set aside
b.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, the
Court limited Petitioners arguments to 15 minutes. Petitioner objected,
but the Court failed to rule on Petitioner s objection. Petitioner
OBJECTS and Excepts to judges refusal to rule on her objection to
judges limiting her argument to 15 minutes during the dismissal/set
aside hearing.
c.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, the
Court did not require the State to show probable cause for the
continued prosecution of Petitioner. Petitioner objected, but the Court
failed to rule on the objection. Petitioner objects and excepts to judges
refusal to order the STATE to show probable cause during the
dismissal/set aside hearing.
d.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing,
Petitioner objects to the judges refusal to allow testimonial evidence.
Petitioner objected, but the Court failed to rule on the objection.
Petitioner objects to the judges refusal to rule on Petitioners objection
to the courts refusal to allow testimonial evidence during the
September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing.
e.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing,
Petitioner objected to the validity of the charging instrument against
Petitioner because it was not notarized, verified or certified, and the
name of the issuer was illegible. The Court failed to rule on the
objection. Petitioner objects to the judges refusal to rule on
Petitioners Objections related to the invalidity of the charging
instrument.
f.
Defendant objects to the courts ruling that prosecutors provide
all relevant discovery only 30 days before trial and asserts that order is
a violation of the Brady and Morton Acts, and abuse of discretion.
GROUNDS
1.

Ground 1: State has failed to return a valid information.

Petitioner has been held to criminal bond in Bexar County for


nearly two years on the authority of a facially invalid charging
instrument. The information and the attached complaint are fatally
defective, because they do not meet the requisites of valid charging
instruments.
A.
Information does not adequately allege reckless or
criminally negligent acts.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 21.15. requires that whenever
recklessness or criminal negligence enters into or is a part or element
of any offense, or it is charged that the accused acted recklessly or
with criminal negligence in the commission of an offense, the
complaint, information, or indictment in order to be sufficient in any
such case must allege, with reasonable certainty, the act or acts relied
upon to constitute recklessness or criminal negligence, and in no event
shall it be sufficient to allege merely that the accused, in committing
the offense, acted recklessly or with criminal negligence. However,
the information fails to allege with reasonable certainty the acts relied
upon to constitute recklessness, an essential element of the offense. 20
According to the Texas Penal Code, an act is defined as a bodily
movement, whether voluntary or involuntary.21 A person acts
recklessly, or is reckless with respect to the circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.22 The information and
complaint alleged no facts or circumstances surrounding the alleged
act that would show that the act was done in a reckless manner. The
failure to allege an element of an offense in an information or
indictment is a defect of substance.23
An instrument which does not contain every essential element
of an offense does not charge the commission of an offense and
therefore is not a charging instrument under the constitution and does
not invest the trial court with jurisdiction.24 Because there is no valid
information filed in this case, and the time to file a valid information
has expired, the immediate release of Petitioner is required by
operation of law.
B. The document accompanying the information fails to meet the
standard of a viable affidavit.
20 Smith v. State, 309 S.W. 3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
21 Tex. Penal Code Ann. Art. 1.07(a)(10)(Vernon 2003).
22 Ibid. Art.6.03(c) (Vernon)2003
23 Studer v. State, 799 SW 2d 263(Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
24 Murk v. State, 775 SW2d 415 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989).

CCP Article 21.22 makes clear that no information shall be


presented until affidavit has been made by some credible person
charging the defendant with an offense. The affidavit shall be filed with
the information. It may be sworn to before the district or county
attorney who, for that purpose, shall have power to administer the
oath, or it may be made before any officer authorized by law to
administer oaths. The affidavit in this case does not even meet the
standards of an unsworn affidavit pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code 132.001.
(a)
Except as provided by Subsection (b), an unsworn
declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration,
verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by statute or
required by a rule, order, or requirement adopted as provided by
law.
(b) This section does not apply to a lien required to be filed with
a county clerk, an instrument concerning real or personal
property required to be filed with a county clerk, or an oath of
office or an oath required to be taken before a specified
official other than a notary public.
(c) An unsworn declaration made under this section must be:
(1) in writing; and
(2) subscribed by the person making the declaration as true
under penalty of perjury.

The complaint fails both the standard of an affidavit and unsworn


declaration. There is no certification, verification or seal, no credible
person identified, and no evidence that the unidentified person making
the allegations has any personal knowledge of the facts behind the
charge. A copy of the Clerks Original Complaint and Information are
hereby attached as Exhibits H and I25, respectively, and hereby
incorporated by reference.26
Because the document filed as an
affidavit in this case fails to meet the standard of an affidavit, oath or
unsworn declaration and fails both standards of statute and rule, it is
void. And without a valid affidavit attached pursuant to CCP Art. 21.22,
no valid information has been presented in this case.
When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to
bail for his appearance to answer any criminal accusation, the
prosecution, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for good
cause shown, supported by affidavit, shall be dismissed and
the bail discharged, if indictment or information be not
presented against such defendant on or before the last day of
the next term of the court which is held after his commitment
or admission to bail or on or before the 180th day after the

25 Exhibit I: Information
26 Exhibit H: Clerks Original Complaint, Magistrate Case No. 1604556.

date of commitment or admission to bail, whichever date is


later.27

By operation of law, article 32.01 prevents citizens from being


left in jail or on bail for long periods of time without being indicted. Ex
parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). The statute gives
a person held in custody without indictment a means to obtain his
release, because the statute requires the State to indict within the
period set by article 32.01, show good cause for the delay, or suffer
the dismissal of the charges.28 Id.
Since there is no valid charging instrument on file, and the time
period for filing a valid charging instrument has expired, Petitioner
must be released immediately by operation of law. Petitioner seeks
immediate release from bond on the ground that the charging
instruments in Cause No. 443420 are invalid, pursuant to Tex.Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32.01.
Ground 2: No probable cause to believe Petitioner is guilty of
the charged offense.
Under Texas law, the prosecutor has substantial discretion in
determining whether to prosecute and, if so, the nature of the charges
to bring IF, and only if, the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
that the accused committed a statutory offense. 29 Criminal
prosecutions are supposed to be brought in good faith. Even at this
late stage, prosecutors have no probable cause to believe that the
Petitioner is guilty of an offense.30
Under constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment requires a
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint of liberty following arrest.31 A state ... must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any
significant pretrial restrain of liberty and this determination must be
made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. 32 This
courts refusal to require prosecutors to show probable cause for the
27 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 32.01.
28 Ibid.
29 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (after Petitioner declined a plea
bargain agreement, the State also charged him as a recidivist).
30 Art. 11.46. IF PROOF SHOWS OFFENSE. Where, upon an examination under
habeas corpus, it appears to the court or judge that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed by the prisoner, he shall not be
discharged, but shall be committed or admitted to bail.Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p.
317, ch. 722.

31 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) U.S. Supreme Crt.


32 Ibid.

prosecution of Petitioner has substantially degraded Petitioners


constitutional rights to be free from unfair restraint.
Plaintiff provided to prosecutors an early 2014 hearing the video
recording, Exhibit F, that she recorded on November 16, 2013. The

The video, Exhibit H, in raw, unedited form, shows


Ground 3: Prosecution is effort to gain unfair advantage of
Petitioner
Petitioner asserts that this prosecution is being maintained in
the absence of probable cause for one reason only: To gain an unfair
advantage over the Petitioner, a journalist and civil rights advocate
who has documented widespread corruption and criminality on the part
of Bexar County judicial officers and officers of the court for the past
five years. The verified Arteaga letter, attached as Exhibit, outlines just
a portion of the official oppression Petitioner has suffered at the hands
of judicial officers, officers of the court, and others.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES


A. Cognizability

Petitioner pro se Denise McVea is the party for whom this petition is intended and
prosecuted. Ms. McVea has been unlawfully restrained of her liberty, being held to bond
by Bexar County and the State of Texas since November 16, 2013.
Generally, a claim is cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if, resolved in
the defendant's favor, it would deprive the trial court of the power to proceed and
result in the appellant's immediate release.
-

in Ex parte Barnett, 2014 and 2 similar citations

Pretrialhabeasshouldbereservedforsituationsinwhichtheprotectionoftheapplicantssubstantiverights
ortheconservationofjudicialresourceswouldbebetterservedbyinterlocutoryreview.Id.

Ex parte Ormsby, 676 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (holding state habeas
statute applies to people who are in any way restrained in their personal liberty); Ex parte
Robinson, 641 S.W.2d. 552, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that habeas corpus may
be used to challenge bond);
TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN., Art. 11.01 describes the writ
of habeas corpus as "the remedy to be used when any person is
restrained in his liberty." This extraordinary writ is "an order issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction, directed to anyone having a person
in his custody, or under his restraint, commanding him to produce such
person ... and show why he is held in custody or under restraint."
Additionally, Art. 11.22 defines the term restraint as: "the kind of
control which one person exercises over another, not to confine him
within certain limits, but to subject him to the general authority and
power of the person claiming such right." Consequently, under the
definitions set out in those articles a writ of habeas corpus filed
pursuant to TEX. CONST., Art. V, 8 has much broader availability to
applicants than a writ filed pursuant to Art. 11.07. [5] Even though an
applicant may not be confined, TEX. CONST., Art. V, 8 provides an
avenue by which collateral legal consequences of a conviction may be
challenged.[6]
JURISDICTION.
Both the district and county court have original jurisdiction to issue the
writ of habeas corpus even though the criminal proceeding under attack is
a misdemeanor. Ex parte Johnson, 561 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr. App.1978); Ex
parte Phelper, 433 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).

Additionally, Article 11.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure


provides that a person confined under a misdemeanor charge may
apply to the county judge of the county in which the misdemeanor is
charged to have been committed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.09;
Ex parte Schmidt, 109 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (When
they are read together, Article V, section 16 of the Constitution,
Section 25.0003(a) of the Government Code, and Article 11.05 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure give the statutory county court at law, and
the judges of that court, the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus
when a person is restrained by an accusation or conviction of
misdemeanor. See also Ex parte Jordan, 659 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (appeals from denial of relief sought in a

misdemeanor post conviction writ of habeas corpus should be directed


to the courts of appeals. (emphasis in original).

STANDARD FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF


An applicant for habeas corpus relief has the burden of proving facts
which would entitle the applicant to the relief sought. Ex parte
Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.Crim. App.1993).
1.
2.
3.
4.

The applicant must establish that he is either "confined" or


"restrained."33
Additionally, the applicant must show that he or she is under
the confinement or restraint at the time of the filing of the writ
application.34
The applicant must further show that he or she has no other
adequate remedy.35
Finally, the applicant must show that the confinement or
restraint is unlawful. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. arts.
11.14, 11.23 (Vernon 1977).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY


1. The charge of assault-bodily injury was brought on November 16,
2013.
2. A review of the records shows a plea?? No arraignment
proceeding in this cause has been held?
3. On ________Petitioner fired her attorney Joe Gonzales and elected
to proceed pro se in the matter.
4. On September 29, 2014, the court heard Petitioners Amended
Motion to Set Aside Indictment or Information and Motion for
Dismissal. (See Objections List).
5. On May 27, 2015, 18 months after the charge, Petitioner filed an
application for writ of habeas corpus. This is the matter before
the Court today.
6. Petitioner respectfully objects to the delay in hearing the request
for habeas corpus and asserts that the delay is a violation of
33 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 769 S.W.2d 554, 558
(Tex.Crim.App.1989) (restraint required before writ relief can be granted); TEX.CODE
CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 11.01.
34 See Rodriguez, 769 S.W.2d at 558.
35 Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim. App.1978).

MERITS OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF UNDER TEXAS CONSTITUTION V. 8 AND


11 OF TCCCP (Laying the Foundation/Predicate):
UNDER PROBABLE CAUSE:
A Petitioner may use a pretrial writ of habeas corpus only in very
limited circumstances. First, the accused may challenge the State's
power to restrain him at all. Second, the accused may challenge the
manner of his pretrial restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions
attached to bail. Third, the accused may raise certain issues which, if
meritorious, would bar prosecution or conviction. Ex parte Smith
(October 19, 2005, No. PD-0616-04)

On November 16, 2013, the Petitioner was charged with the offense of
misdemeanor assault - bodily injury based on allegations made by the
complainant, Kristina Combs. On May 29, 2014, Petitioner requested
that the case be dismissed on the grounds that prosecutors had shown
no probable cause to support the prosecution, had no evidence in their
possession that would support the prosecution, and that prosecutors
had been provided exculpatory evidence that showed that Kristina
Combs had, in fact, attacked Petitioner to cover up criminal activity,
documented by Petitioner, that she had engaged in with local jurists,
attorneys and others. The Court denied Petitioners request to set aside
information and motion for dismissal. Petitioner made a timely
objection to the courts denial of her motion to dismiss. However, the
Court did not rule on the objection.
In accordance with Texas Appellate Rule of Procedure Rule 33.1(2)(B),
Petitioner
now objects to the Courts refusal to rule on Petitioners objection to
the Courts denial of her motions to dismiss and set aside information
heard on May 29, 2014.