On Spiritual CrisisoGlobalization, and Planetarv Rule
Tom Darby
Becauseof the incessantchatterwe have heard about what is in store for us as we enter a new century and cross the threshold into the third millennium of Western civilization, one must apologizefor bringing up this subject.Yet apology doesnot just have to be a plea for forgiveness.An apology also can be the offering of an explanation, a defense,or, literally, a going forth with words (apo-logosl-with new words about the way things are, or are not. Apologies are about forgiving the pastand thereforeabout new beginnings.And new beginningscome when one has a crossedover that threshold,that boundary that separates world where experience can be taken for granted, in that its parts tacitly can be related and hence made senseof in a broader context or whole. This boundary itself is a no-man's land, an in-between that is both tenible and magical. The experience of crossing this boundary constitutesthe true meaningof crrsls.A crisis occurswhen the categories for making senseofour experienceno longer work for us and our experienceis renderedmeaningless. A crisis, in the above sense,is at the sametime a spiritual crisis, or, if you will, a crisis of the spirit, in that spirit has to do with purpose.Crisis is about an acute disjrurction betweenthat which most concemsus and the common or overarching metaphorswe embraceto find somethingcommon in the manifold of this varied and denseexperience.Crisis then occurswhenour sharedoroverarchingmetaphor becomesuprooted from our shared underlying concerns-when, as we might say figuratively, the sky above us no longer connectsto the earth below us. It seems that in the West there always has been a relation between crisis and new ways of seeing and doing, thinking and acting, knowing and making. But it is the crisis itself that has given rise to the new perceptions and practices, summed up as an "apology."


Tom Darby

Plato's own dialogue on Socrates'apology comesto mind, as does his more extensiveapology,his Republic,his attemptto address Athens' spiritual crisis. And then there is St. Augustine's City of God, his apology as an explanation to the Romanswho thought the sacking of the "Etemal City" was a result of the wrath of the pagangods for Rome's having forsakenthem for Christianity. Plato's apology is the beginning of philosophy, and Augustine's apology-his blending of Hellenism and Hebrewism-marks both the beginning of Western time and the defining explanation of the West itself: time as history and history as progress. At the end of this period we call the West standsHegel and Nietzsche, who provided their own apologies, and in doing so, when consideredtogether, set the template for both the upheavalsofthe twentieth century and the reflections on this century by such thinkers as Alexandre Kojdve, Leo Strauss,Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger. These four are the most important thinkers of the last and our new century, for just as the thoughts of Hegel and Nietzschehave best informed us as to what our own time is about, the thoughts of these four will define the boundariesof thought for the future. The hinge that holds the thoughts of thesefour togetheris the Hegel-Nietzsche relation itself, and it is this relation that leads to the heart of their common reflections, reflections that center on the question: "who has the right to rule the planet?" It is well-known that for Hegel the slavehaswon the right to rule, but for Nietzsche the rule of the slave is the greatestof all scandals, it is tantamountto for the transformation of the planet into the vulgar world of the Last Man. But this tension between Hegel and Nietzsche has proved to be more than a mere philosophical disagreement, their conflicting theoreticalvisions were to become for the theater of the actual contest for the rule of the planet in the twentieth century. I refer to that which best describesthis passingcentury-to that which Nietzsche foretold in Beyond Good and Ew7-global technologicalwarfare. Global war is impossible without global technology. Technology is the independent variable of modernity, and the contest for the planet is impossible without technology. Whether in the form of global exploration, conquest, colonialization, or in this century, world war, the contestalways has been about who has had the bestmeans-the best technology-to rule the planet. This contest has beenjustified and explained in various ways throughout modemity, but now it has entereda phasethat we, only in the last decadeof this century,have come to call "globalization." Just as the destruction of Hellenic culture was brought about by Athenian imperialism-the "globalization" of the smaller world of Socrates'day-and the many sackingsofRome spelledthe endto Romancivilization-the "globalization" of that day-the visions of Hegel and Nietzsche pertain both to the eclipse of the West and to the eclipse of the notion of unilinear time: time as history and history as progress.Likewise, it is during the actual and spiritual disasterof the twentieth century that Kojdve, Strauss,Schmitt, and Heideggerboth begin a searchfor meaningat the heartof suchcalamityand makcan itllcllpt lo rnovcheyorrd. Thesefour contemporarics---and, all cxlclrl,colllrlrolrrlols irr trllcrnpting to to

( ) r rS lr ir r trr;rl :;, k rl r;rl rz :rl ro rr,;rrrtl .l :rry e ( l :;i (i l ' l ;rrrt l l rrl


rrr,'r,crcy ont l, r ll lr c c t lc tl i c tz s c h c ' s o l tl s : ..o n cn ru ststop hack l r N w hcl i l rc onc l, ,r|r;" ('orrsidorirrg wlrcrer to caclrstcpshlck or.bcgirrs and t6 whcroeachleaps Alcxanclrc Ko-iivebecause is he "i' rl y()rlwill, lilnds,wc slx)uldlirst consitlcr it dircctly and concrctoly addrcsscs qucstions that are at the background , ' l Fh rl rrl r r t c s t : ques t i o n s c o n c c rn i(l )h o w a n d w h y h i storyended,(2)w ho cr ng r rrlt'', rhccnd ol'history,and (3) what this means termsof the transformation :rr in ,,1rlrr'pLurcttlrroughglobal technology.Thus, we begin this essayin threeparts rr rtlr l'..jcvc, who beginswith Hegel, for like Hegel,who camewith the dawn of rlr, l.r:;r ct:'rury, and Nietzschewho camewith its dusk, Kojdve opensthe door to rlr', ( ('rrury as we crossthe thresholdinto the third millennium according to the \ r'.11'111 of recognizingtime. Strauss way and Schmittcloseit, and as we careen r rrrrr rlrt' nL:xt millennium, Heideggerthen cracksopenthe door to the next.

The End of History: Kojive's SeriousJoke
\ li r;rrrtl't:Ko.ieve'soriginal name was Alexandre Kojdveikoff. He was bom in lr r ."r.rrr l()02, fled the Bolshevik Revolution,was imprisonedin poland, and in | 't 'u rrr:rtlc way to Germany,wherehe studiedwith Karl Jaspers his at Heidelberg to 'r,, I rrr I lcr lirr was exposed Husserland Heidegger. receivedhis doctorate He in l"'(, I'v('.tually, Kojdve went to paris and there becameknown as a man of l' tt{ r'.. ir tclcher of philosophy,and later,as a bureaucrat. \ ' .r r*r of letters, Kojdve's musings on subjects ranging from politics, liri r;rrrrrt'. even to the paintingof his day made him a public ;rrd figure in the | ,'l voltaire, yet he was more playful, more ironic, and more radical than ',:rrrr,
tl rr , ' llrl lirX.

| 'I'r, \ (' lrr-:ciuns seriousteacherin 1931when he took over a course a on Hegel fi' 'rrrlrr',f r icrrdAlexandreKoyre attheEcolepratique desHautes Etudes,section !, r, ttr't'.\ Religieuses. Therehis reflectionson the particulareventsof his time =ir'l", r11qlf generaldefined much of what was to becomefwentieth-cenfury in "l Many of Kojdve's sfudents 1'l,il,'.,'|,lrv. would becomeluminaries, somebetter I r',',r s;r11.111 K..idvehimself.But in the lastdecade this centurythis haschanged of ' 'r, rrlr.rr,tluc largely to Francis Fukuyama's popular book about the end of |' i i ' 'i \ | Irrs book was popular because Fukuyamatord westerners in generaland '.!!,, I ri .rr in particularwhat r:i theywantedtohear.Ironically,althoughF-ukuyama's ",, lii.rlrrs rrhoutthe Americanized"future" has alreadybegun to look rather rr!:,,,,r tlr. lransformation of this serious (and for some, grim) notion into i t, ii, \ r '.{rrc cntertainment given "the end of history" has the cacheof an urban ':' rlr 1.,';i'vc-who died during the high seriousness the studentrevoltsof of i ". 'r,'r r k lhav elov edt h i s .l ! |,, r,,rr t' rlrrcemore seriousreasons why Kojeve becamebetterknown during , l, i .i r,l ,r ; r t lc of t helas t c e n tu ry .F i rs t,i th a s b e e n d i s c overedthatthesfudentsof ri'i '1q1 .hscure Marxist-atheistjoke teller were all , reacting to his startling ' 'i liiiri' , tlrrrtlristorywas over and that his erstwhilestudents were eithertimidlv


'l'om Darby

maneuvering around Kojdve's conclusionsor brazenly trying to further elaborate the logic ofthese conclusions.In the camp of the former I refer to his studentssuch as Jean-PaulSartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and in the latter camp, the likes of Raymond Aron and GeorgesBataille. Furthermore,by extension,I also refer to studentsof students.There was Louis Althusser, who studiedwith Merleau-Ponty and whose studentwas Michael Foucault, and then there is JacquesDerrida, who was much influenced by Bataille, names we have come to associatewith poststructuralism or postmodemism.Ah, what incestuousbusiness! But then incest is the story of philosophy.2To be clear, without an understandingof the teachingsof This explainsthe it not Kojdve,postmodernism only makesno sense, is impossible. embarrassing academic fad of "postmodernism," a fad mercifully now out of fashion. And then there is the third reason Kojdve becamewell-known during the last days of the last century. I will be blunt. In October of 1999 it was revealedby Le Monde that according to the French SecretService Alexandre Kojdve had been a spy for the U.S.S.R. since the 1940s.I will return to this on severaloccasions. However, for now I will say that this was one ofKojdve's jokes. And Kojdve loved jokes-well, ironic jokes. Typical ofKojdve, hejoked that he had grown tired ofteaching philosophy and so became a bureaucrat, for after all, why would one want to be a teacher of philosophy when he could stay at the finest hotels and drink the finest wines, so he joined the Ministry of Finance. In 1948 Kojdve was posted to Japan,and after a long sojourn there,he went on to begin the negotiationsfor what would becomethe World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Eventually, Kojdve went to Brusselsand becameone of the architectsfor what was to becomethe EuropeanUnion (EU). As we shall see,although it appears contradictory,this self-professedStalinist-Marxist practicedwhat he preached.So, to this also, we shall retum.

Although he wrote on varied subjects,Kojdve is best known for the collection of his and his students' notes taken from his seminar on Hegel. The notes were published under the title Introduction a la Lecture de HegeLt It is significant that Kojdve did not bother to write a book on this subject and rather left it to his studentsto documenthis thoughts. But even more important, Kojdve was-by his own seemingly flippant admission-lazy. Surprisingly, Kojdve's laziness is an interpretive key to his work. Kojdve, like the gods who lived on timelessOlympus, saw himself as living at the end of time or history, and that as a philosopherhis task was to explain the world that had come to be in terms of the complete and final in philosophy-the Science ofHegel. This world for Ko.icvcwasposthistorical that and there was nothing left to do exceptto complctolhc ttrskttl'ttttivcrsalizing bcl il i h o m ogeniz ingt h e p l a n Ct. s j d v c l ri n rs c l l ' prrttt rrni rtl cl vi (!w .i ust orehi s e )ra Ko N ol rrl l d cat h:" s ir r c ct his d a tc(l tt0 6 ), w h l l l ri rs ri rp p c rrctl ' / l ttttp' , i rl l ,l hc al i gl trncnt

Rule and Crisis, Globalization, Planetary On Spiritual


of the provinces.The Chineserevolution is only the introduction ofthe Napoleonic Code into China."o The term "the alignment of the provinces" is a referenceto none other than the progressiveelaborationofthe technological world system,what Kojdve called the Universal and HomogeneousState(U.H.S.) or what we now call "globalization." The date 1806 refers to the eve of the battle of Jena, when Hegel says that he realized the significance of Napoleon's historic action, the date when Hegel's realization that Napoleon's action brought into the concrete,historical world the principles that have been elaboratedinto the global system.Thus, Hegel saw that Napoleon's action was the last action, in that everything that has come after it has been, is, and will be a mere elaborationof it. This is what Kojdve meanswhen he says that nothing new has occurred since 1806. Indeed, what appearedto be a flippant remark is now seento be deadly serious,for since there is nothing left to do or say except to elaborateHegel's system,like the gods on timeless Olympus, Kojdve merely plays. And yes, he is playing with us. Long before Kojdve's serious encounterwith Hegel he was influenced by thc thought of Vladimer Soloryov, a fellow Russian, who gave and later published a seriesof lectureson what he called "God-manhood" ( 1878)and published his last work called War, Progress and the End of History (1899). Solovyov's notion of God-manhood is an extrapolation of his religiopolitical vision of a unified planet and man becoming god. While Kojdve's Introduction was influenced by Solovyov's reading of Hegel, Sololyov also influenced Dostoyevsky, who modeledAlyosha in TheBrothers Karamazov afterhim. While Solovyov's vision of the end of history is an obvious influence on Kojdve, above all, Solovyov's most preciselyin Kojdve's filtering Hegel's notions influenceon Kojdve appears of time through Solovyov's mysticism and gnosticism found most explicitly in his unfinished work,The Foundations of Theoretical Philosophy (1899).5 Although Kojdve never mentions his erstwhile Russian compatriot in his Introduclfutn, Kojdve wrote his doctoral dissertation on him, and the shadow of Solovyov is everywhere presentin Kojdve's reading of Hege1.6 Another early but lessprofound influence ofKojdve was polymath-philosophor, physician, science-fiction writer, and embalmerof Lenin-Alexander Bogdanov' Bogdanov,also guidedby Sololyov's vision ofplanetaryuniversality,developcd what he called "tectology" ( 1922),the guiding principle behind which is that Truth is the totality of experienceand Truth, therefore,becomesa method for organizing experience,leading to the construction ofa coherentsystembasedon the control of experienceitself. The circular logic is underscored by the fact that Truth hcrc that Kojdve himself would adopt eccentricity is spelledwith an uppercase'oT,n'an to indicate universalify, totality, and circularity. Much that seemsesotericor even manic about Kojdve's thought becomesclearerand calmerwhen one considersthc extentofBogdanov on Kojdve's work. Thus, influenceofSolovyov and to a lesser Kojdve's ctrmefrom we gain insight into thc vision that by steppingback to where and Kojdve'snotionof lhc Univcrsal of guides interpretation Hcgcl,prilrcipally his antl g,noslic anii iorr lo lcclrn<lklgy its rnystical llomggcncousStateand its rclirl


Tom Darby

foundation. Many today who call themselvespostmodems natter on about how Hegel's philosophyis the most totalizing,hencemost hegemonicof all Western But it was Kojeve. the father of late twentieth-centurypostmodernism, discourses. who revealedthat Hegel's philosophy indeedis the epitomeof logo-centrism in that it is a discoursethat containsall of western discourse.Yet Kojdve also shows us that for it to be rational it must be complete,and if complete,it must contain its opposite.Hence, the completediscourseat the end of history is undergirdedby the irrational.

Kojdve's reading of Hegel is an interpretation and not a commentary. both begins outside its text and transcendsit. Interpretation. unlike commentary,T All interpretation.for this reason,is deliberatemisreading,in that it entails playful revision, and in Koieve's readingof Hegel, eventheiettisoningof largeportions of Hegel's philosophy,suchashis philosophyof nature.This is not to saythat any text can be read in any manner one wishes to read it; on the contrary, while commentary entails the attempt to faithfully render what an author meant, interpretation is an interplay between what an author meant and what an author means.Thus, interpretation is about the past, the present,and the future. This is the what I meantwhen I said that interpretationtranscends text, and for this reason it also is about time-the transcendingof time. Kojdve's lnlroduction is not about Hegel as such, but about Kojdve's reading of Hegel and what it means for the twentieth century and beyond. It is this to which we areto be "introduced," and this is capturedin the sheerirony of the title itself. It is not an introduction to Hegel but to Kojdve's readingof Hegel. Kojdve's Introduction is a form of "seriousplay." Kojdve's own serious introduction to Hegel came when Alexandre Koyre convinced him that Hegel's philosophy was aboveall elsea philosophy oftime and that for Hegel to have known this, and in turn for Koyre and then Kojdve to come to know it, time or history somehow had to have stopped.tThus, Kojdve's introduction to Hegel began with this seemingly absurd claim by Koyre, a claim based on his own conclusions,conclusions Koyre neither understood nor could in were the following: (l) that Hegel had experienced deny. Koyre's conclusions of by himself all stages consciousness rethinking them, and in doing so had attained completeknowledge or wisdom, or put boldly, nonrelative and thereforeAbsolute and thesestagesofconsciousness, Knowledge,(2) sinceHegel had experienced since the experienceconstituteda totality ofconsciousness,then he, Hegel, had to exist at the moment when actual historical events gave rise to the consciousness that he experienced,and (3) since experienceis historical, and since Hegel all experienced moments(the reflectionson all previousevents)that gave rise to then Hegel had to exist, at leastin principlc, at lhc cnclof time in his experience, order to know what he knew. In other words, lintc or lrislory luril crrdcdwith w hctthe t u t lc gc l' s r e a l i z .a ti uN . w I w i l l p rc s c rrl skt' l t' l ol .rvl l tl I..o;i ' vr' l i rrrrrtl no r' l l l ri :; I r r nt c d r I l c g c li rrh i sa t(c l n pllo rrrrtl c rs l r rrrtl t orrtl u' ,rorr ;rtl tt' rl ry K oyl c. l ,cl k

On Spiritual Crisis, Globalization, Planetary Rule and


us begin as did Kojdve by asking the following question: What are the conditions that had to pertain for Koyre to reach such conclusions? And here is a sketch of the answer.e First, if Hegel had to have thought all momentsof consciousness, then he would have had to account for the beginning as well as the end ofhuman consciousness. Next Hegel would have to have accounted for all moments of consciousness between this beginning and this end, thereby accounting for how and why one moment leads to the next. Kojdve explains that Hegel does this by showing the difference between animals and humans. Humans, like all animals, have both consciousnessand desire, but unlike other animals humans are conscious of the difference betweenthemselvesand that of which they are conscious,togetherwith the difference between themselves and the objects of their desire. Humans are thereby self-conscious,consciousofthe self the desiring consciousself. Humans also are conscious of the presenceof other selves,whose desire they desire. This is to say that all humans desire to be recognized (recognized, remembered) and it is from the desire for recognition that both intemal time (past-present-future) extemaltime consciousness (history) arise. consciousness and The former appearsbecauseone must recognizein the future and must remember (in the past) in order to do so. History appears becauseofthe fight to the deaththat results from the desire to be recognized. In the fight for recognition both must remain alive and one must yield to the other.The one who yields becomesthe slave and the victor becomesthe master. As slavescunningly observetheir masters,it appearsto them that their masters can do whateverthey desire.This the slavecalls "freedom," and this freedom arises becauseofthe slave's bondage and the fact that the slave is forced to transform nature as the masterdesires.This hansformation of nature is called "labor." Thus. freedom is tied to bondageand labor. Furthermore,it is the labor of the slave that allows the master'freedom to do what masters do: to eat, drink, copulate, and fight. Masters are good at fighting, but fighting, if it has no point, is even more meaninglessthan eating or drinking or sex, which at least sustainor produce life. But fighting that has a point (a purpose,an end, hencea meaning) is called "war." War is organized fighting directed toward an end, and politics is a subspecies of war. But politics must occur in a common space,and this common spaceis called the "city." Slavesbuild cities through "work." Thus, it is the work ofthe slavethat constructsthe relatively permqnent commonspacecalled the city, a theaterwhere mastersexercisepower through speakingand acting before their peers and are in tum recognized and perhaps even rememberedto the extent that they become immortalized. It is through and because of politics that freedom increasingly appears. This progressiveappearance freedomresulting from politics is what we of call the "historical process." Having sketched the above, Kojdve's interpretation of Hegel reveals that if lieedom is the engine that powers history, then it is the slave whose power progresses along with his liccdurn as hc drives history to its final battlebetween 'l'his llnirl battlc is thc Frcnch Rcvolution.with its slavcsand thcir nrastcrs.


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principlessummedup in thc battlecry, "riberra, ag(rrirc,.fiurarnitc.,,,ilrcbattre is final because principles,when ma<te its con.r"G, do away with aotualmastcryand slavery, and because everything that fotows is just an elaboration of the progressively actualized principlesthemselves. Alas, ihe FrenchRevolution,on its own, fizzled out. But t{r yf{ it took Napoleon to make the principles actual, concrete,or historical, for ir is Napoleon's it dnal action and Hegel's reilization of the meaning of it that bring knowLag" u.ra'u"ilon together. Since Hegel's knowledge is inal k:nowing nonrelative knowing or wisdom-and Napoleon'r a"tion is final action, the system is, in pnnciple, complete. So all there is left to do is to make the systemprogressively comprete. And complete meansconcrete, ergo,real.This eralorafi* ,yrt'.ri i, ,nud" possible through that copenetrationof "?tn" knowing and making *" tectrnotogy. Through technology the abstract(possible) "uil and"theactual (concrete)becomeone.


classically, the difference betweentheory and fantasyis that, with the former, our desires, our ideas or ideals,our principles, are possible.But there is nothing ofthe classical today. The classical pertains to defi'nitive uou"o*i"r. fo ,f"* or rrr" classical is to speak ofa realitylhat can be classified. Thus, to sfeak o?ctassis to speak of boundaries. Today class does not exist, *'i"rr ir i" ,"v that those boundariesseparatingthe possible flom the actual have been erased. Asked if one thought it possible that everyoneon the planet could be made free from want, able to reach his or her potential, could be made equal despite differences, and live together like the membersof a happy family, one might answerthat yes, given the right conditions, this is possible. b.unt"a, ihis couta entail removing from the planet all those who could not be transformed into happy ,.humans.',This is not likely. Prozac would be more efficient. By whatever method, it would be possible because technorogyis that which, our by my definition, is capable of mating both the unequal equal and the equal nonequal-and by its ability to etat" und to reconstruct boundaries,to arter the relation between the actuar and the possibre. Technology can transform literally anything. Without technology (or modern science, wtriCtris but its other name) Kojdve's vision of the u.H.s. wourd be but a rantasy.So what did Kojdve think this globalizedworld-his u.H.S-would rook iiL.z R, one mightguess,Kojdve described this concept. Kojdve's clearestpictyg of the u.H.s. is prcsented in a now famousfootnote appearing onpage 157ofthepresentEngrish cdition of hisln troduction.Hewrites of what he calls the "re-animalizedmrir," rcscrnbring Nietzsche,slast man and Nietzsche'sdescriptionof the timelcsslirL.t'animars as found inhis ]lsesand ltyadvlntases of History for Li/'e. ilis dcscription is not too far from the Disneyfied consumerdemocracychanrpi.rrcd hy r.'ukuyama. then, in typical But form, after having lived in Japan *l,it., tcrrtliirgto his duties as a high_level

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l rtrtci ttt c rwit h t hc M ir r i s l ry l l " i i l ri l r(' cl,r i r s u l )s e q u c r rt at o i c(l i ti oDw i tl r0ut l l l cri ng , i tl rco ri g inalnot cby a. iot ,K rl i c v ci rp p c rrtl l rcn o te ls : . Il c tc ll susaboutw l rathc cul l s ''lrrPilltizcd man,"a posthiskrricitl crcitlurc wlro hasfilr sonrc ccnturics livctl al rhc t'rtl .l'history, a creature somchowass.ciarod with the code ol. honor .1. lhc srrrrurai warriorandwho is capable o|committing a,.perfectly graiuit.-, suicidc.,, s. who lives after history, the re-animalized man i.;upunrr_""J,nuni u,,t', ,r,,. I lrc rc-animalizedman and the japanized man are posthistoricar archctypcs,r. vrcrrriousslavesand nonreconstructed masters. usuaily takenas o* nr-rn";cu",, llrPpantriddles,this again is one of Kojdve's serious;ot"r. H"." rr" gives us t'c of what lies betweenthe end of history and its concrete realizition. Ars., 'ierure an echoofthe tensionbetween rlrisis but Hegei's slaveandNietzsche,s that --master lrrrs playeditself out during this centuryorgtouat technologicar .'ui. professor Fukuyama's greeful S. contrary to conclusio"ns ."ruiiinn from our victory of the cold war, that war was but a civil *u.-u a,nili?ii. tsut aras, cclroing a statementof Heidegger's in The Introduction n urtopnyri"s, Kojdvcr lrirnself said that "Americans are just rich Russians, and R,irriunr, p,u,,. Arrericans."r0 onthebasisofthisandttherstatementsbyKojdve,itisnosurprisc, rh.the was a Soviet spy. I think his political action is *rroily with his tcachingand would make evenmore sense we "*ri*", if somedaylearnthat Ko.ydvc hirrl hccn a double agent. As we shall see, what Kojirlg was describing in the abovequoteis the tcnsi.rr I)otween re-animalized man andNietzsche's lastman asthatwhich lies in betwcon thc globalizing slavesand the remnant of masters who refuse to ue gtotarizca betweencivilization and culhue, betweentotalitarianism ano ty.uiivl rrri, *irr us to Strauss and his discussion with Kojdve of this very ,rt:""i, a Schnritt rrsrelatedto both Kojdve and to Strauss, and ihen to Heidegger una *nut hc calrs our "age of the world picfure."

Power and Wisdom: politics as Destiny
As noted in the first part of_this essay,Kojdve, Strauss, Schmitt, and Heideggcr were,by varying degrees, collaborators.This clearly is true for Kojd;; una sr.uurr, whoseassociation beganin Berrin andparis in the 1930s. Thereis a recordof their sustained conespondence beginningin r932and endingin r965. anJ, or"ourr", there is the "strauss-Kojdve Debatei'published in strauis's o, iir"rri.r, As we shall see, despite their fundamental differences, Kojdve and strauss shared concems' passions' and even visions. There are nrmors of an extant body of correspondencebetween schmitt and Kojdve, but as of yet notrring-tas been published. However' Kojdve had commented that-along witt' i?uu* una Heidegger-schmitt was among his few contemporaries with whom he cared to discussphilosophy.'2 And then there was the shorter but intenserelation between Schmitt and one who soon was to becomehis erstwrrilepupil, tr,rtrr"i-yo*g I_* Strauss. This relationis documented Strauss's by publisheo .oo,r.nt, ori ichmitt,s


Tom Darby

best known work, The Concept of the Political (1932).t3 This collaboration took place at the time Kojdve was beginning his lectures in Paris, roughly at the same time Heidegger was writing his essayson technology, and, of course, at the time Hitler was coming to power. It was a time of unprecedented danger and anticipation. So, let us begin here by stating the obvious: twentieth-century politics is unprecedentedin human history. Western global exploration, leading to global conquest,and then to the global wars of the twentieth century, has made way for the planetary transformations that we now are experiencing with increasing rapidity and thoroughness. This tmly global politics-what Kojdve called the U.H.S. and what we now have come to call the processof globalizationra-is the particular context for thosequestionspertaining to the statusandrelation ofpolitics and philosophy and their effect on man. So from such observations arise the following questions: If Aristotle was correct when he said that man was a zoon politikon, or a political animal, and if epistemic or philosophical man constitutes humanity's most developed, and therefore highest form, then what happens to humans if politics and philosophy (1) change their relation, (2) disappear altogether, or (3) metamorphosize?

*** By the time Leo Straussmet Alexandre Kojdve he already had begun to take the position that despite the sweeping changesmodemity had brought to the human condition, humansessentiallyhave remainedthe same,and for this reasonare able to find accessto truths that remain more or less constant. Thus, this classical approachto reality, whether it be the reality of the antiqueworld or the globalizing world of the late twentieth century, could reveal certain truths about man, his ofthe two. rsThe first complete politics and his philosophy, and the interrelatedness study Strausspublished of a work of classicalpfrilosophy was his interpretationof Xenophon's dialogue, Hiero or Tyrannicus. To some extent we already have become familiar with Kojdve's position about the relation of action to thought, together with his vision of the future; however,'whenwe contrastwhat we already have learned about Kojdve's perspectivewith that of Strauss,the questionsasked above concerning the statusofpolitics and philosophy today, and hencequestions conceming the status of humanity, become sharp and grave. It is the sheer ofthese questionsthat kept this "debate" between Straussand Kojdve seriousness becoming partisan. Despite the stark difference between Strauss's and from Kojdve's positions, both realize that the other's position is the only other plausible and Kojdve exhibit an urgency to find one besideshis own. Thus, both Strauss and a dctermined answers to these questionsthat arise from their ex<;hangc what ever answers thcy rniglrt.yicltl. to openness understand l w provi rl csri rrr rl l t i r tl i rcctw ay o S t r aus s 'c l ro i c c l ' X o n o p h o n ' s h u rtd ial ogtrc s pl l rr lit r r ais ir rgh c t;rrc s l i o o l ' (h cn a l rrrcn tl rc l i rl i ottol tol tl tt' :r:rrrtlri l osol thy.' l ' hi s l l

( ) r r S P i r i l rr :r l( 1 r .,r .,, ilo llr liz:r tio r r ,;r r r tlI' l:r r r t. l l rry {rrl t: ( l


rs th c th c nlc ol' X c r ur pl l rn ' s(l i i tl o g u c .l ' h c tl i l l o g u r:i s bctw ccnthe tyrant ol Syracusc, llioro, atrdSirrrotridcs,p()ctwho was rcputcdto bc wise,henceakind a ol l.roct-phikrsophcr-'l discussion lirst aboutthe burdens rulershipand lreir is of rvhat the tyrant can d<l to makc his rule more satisfactory himself and to his to :;rrl'r.jccts, therebybringing himself and his subjects more happiness. while the But tlrrrlogue also is about the lessons wise teachermay bring to a corrupt pupil, the a :rrlvise not given for the purposeof transforming is Hiero into anotherkind ofruler about transforming his regime into anotherkind ofrule. Rather, it is advice that 'r r:isupposed make him a "better" tyrant, hencea happier or more satisfiedtyrant, to rrrrtlin this way, a more virtuous tyrant. I say "supposed," for we never leam if, rrtlced,Hiero becomes 'obetter," that is, more satisfiedor virtuous,for the lessons rrrcrclyare dispensed the teacherand the resultssimply promisedto the pupil by ,rrrtl readerssuch as ourselvgs. to So the dialogue is about the relation of theory to practice, knowledge to virtue. l lrc poet-philosopherthus acts as advisor to the young tyrant, thereby guiding his irr'tions. And what kind of guidancedoesthe wise man offer the unhappytyrant? I lrc advise can be describedas a combination of the pedeshian and the abstract. I lrc advise is pedestrian in that it would not take a wise man to imagine that rt'rvarding subjects for actions that increasethe wealth and honor of the regime rvorrldboth please (satisff) and honor (recognize) them, and honor and thereby the tyrant. While recognizing subjects, and in tum having the subjects 1'lt'rrsc rt'tognize the tyrant, may make both happier,this does not make either better. I Irrrs,happiness doesnot necessarilybegetvirtue. The advice is far from delivering tlrt' r'csultsit promises,thus it is abstract,or as we might say today, ideological or rrt')l)ian. The real questionis this: is thereany advicepertainingto actionthat can 1.,'r'p promises? its Stnrussdoes not think so. He holds that there always must remain a distance lrr'lrvcontheory and practice, and furthermore,that this relation is a constant,as is | |rr' | 1Ildap"ntal nature of suchpracticesas tyranny and virtue. Tyranny and virtue I manifestations the political, which is a Westem perceptionof a of t):rrticular 'r( rrr,llnt human experience. tyrant can leam to be virtuous no matterwho his No ' I' ir(hcr might be. There has not been and cannot be a good tyranny. Yet this is not t. ,;1y11.tu1 Strausstheory has no relation to practice, that there is nothing for 1 'lrtrcalabout philosophyor anything philosophicalabout politics. For Strauss, ', 1g5 are ; r,rl1l is alwaysphilosophicaland philosophyalwayspolitical. Philosophers l,irrrrrn and humanslive in cities and cities are communities that are held together 1,1 , by 'pirrionsthat soonerof laterwill becomethreatened philosophy.This is so lrrr ,urSo philosophersare skepticsand skepticsquestioneverything, including that '.lrrtlr lhe city takes for grantedand is likely to hold dear, if not sacred.This ,.'trl.rirrsboth why there must remain a gap betweenthe philosopherand the , r\ lhcory and practice, philosophy and politics-and why the two must exist ' r,'1.r'rlrr:r eitherto existat all. for | .r Strauss, gap betweentheory and practice is not permanentlybridgeable. the i r,,1. lcast,for a few, it is temporallyleapable. is the rhetoricianwho teaches .lt It


Tom Darby

the few who are fit for philosophy to leap over this gap, and in doing so, gain limited insights into the relation of theory to practice. I do not refer to the rhetoric of those who are reputed to be wise, such as Gorgias, but to the philosophical rhetoric employed by Socratesin the dialogue named for Gorgias himself. One leams from this nonreflective and self-satisfiedGorgias that his kind of rhetoric is usedfor the single purposeofincreasing one's power. Socrates'philosophical rhetoric makes possible what becomesthe classical understandingof politics. It begins there, but it does not end by bringing philosophy and politics together in such a way as to canceltheir differences.Philosophicalrhetoric begins in the city, hence it begins with commonsenseobservations, expressedas opinions. Thus, philosophy itself begins with opinion, and, for a few, transcends city and leads the to a quest for wisdom. But the philosopher, becausehe is a man, never leavesthe city for long, and it is to the city that always he must return. Thus, the thinker and the actor remain forever apart.This is why philosophy is a love of wisdom, for we only love that which we do not possess. Thus, the philosopher by definition can never possess wisdom, for if he does, his quest is over, and, like Gorgias, he becomesnonreflective and self-satished. Let me stateunequivocally that we concluded in the first part of this essaythat for Kojdve the history of man is also the progressivecancellationof the difference betweenthought and action. For Kojdve, the gap betweenphilosophy and politics is bridged by Hegel. Hegel is the possessorof wisdom, the wise man, and after Hegel, the principles of the U.H.S. become elaboratedin reality. But whereas Strauss and his classical approach employ the rhetorician for a limited form of transcendence, gap betweentheory and practice, or philosophy and politics, is the bridged, and the difference betweenthem eradicated.According to Kojdve, this is accomplishedby the "political intellectual." But the political intellectual doesnot use rhetoric. He uses technology to replace deeds and propaganda to replace speech.Unlike the poet-philosopherSimonides,the political intellectual can both account for his words and deliver his promises. He is a thinker-actor. Plato's Philosopher-King comes to mind, as does the twentieth-century thinker who describedthe processof globalization before we invented the name, that architect of the EU and archspy, Alexandre Kojdve himself. Oh well, if not Alexandre at leastAlcibiades. Let me repeat: for Straussit is impossible either to be a good tyrant or to have a good tyranny. For Straussand his classicalperspectivetyrants and tyranny are always bad. But this is not so for Kojdve and his modem (Hegelian) perspective. Indeed, good fyrants and good tyrannies are possible. But the best and therefore final tyranny is the U.H.S. It is good becausein it everyone is (or at least can be transformed into) a free citizen. The citizen is free in the negative sensein that he is provided with at least the necessitiesof life. First, he is free fiom need and as sooneror later,fiom want. And he is fiee in the positivesense well, in that each thc citizen is capableof realizinghis potential.FIeis free to pursrrc "lif-e-style"he wishes(providcdhe can pay for it). All choiccs cclrurl, errc llrrrs worth of cach lhc ) l indiv iduali s h o n o rc d(rc c o g n i z c dc q u a l l y .l 1 i s thi s l i cctl orrrl rrrlrrrrrkcs thcse

Rule and On SpiritualCrisis,Globalization, Planetary


citizens of the U.H.S. happy, and for them happinessis virtue. Since there are no external standardssuch as the Good or God by which can be measuredeither the truthfulness of what we say or the virtue or wickednessof what we do, then both philosophy and politics are over. Thus, the end ofhistory is beyond good and evil. So the question becomes:what of man?

So now we will tum to Carl Schmitt. Schmitt was a jurist and political theorist who taught at the University of Berlin, joined the Nazi Party in 1933, and who, despite the fact that he later was denounced by the parfy, rightly has been associatedwith the Hitler regime in particular and with antiliberal thinking in general. It is understandablewhy Schmitt's political theory largely had been ignored from the time of the Allied victory until almost the last decade of the twentieth century.16 But not only does the passageof time erode prejudices, it also seemsthat the great shifts in global politics that led up to the collapse of the U.S.S.R., together with the eroding of the categorieswith which we, for so long, have attemptedto make senseof political life, have clearedthe way for the legitimation of interestin this "theorist of the Reich."r? The single best example of Schmitt's recent legitimation camein 1987when Telos,the long-standingpremier English-language journal of the "left," published an issue featuring the thought of this erstwhile archpariah of the "right." Since the beginning of the decade,like a great well of revelation pent up for half a century, mounting interestin Schmitt has burst forth, giving buoyancy to theoristsof whateverpolitical stripe.The journals----especially the English-languageones-are inundated.r8 Schmitt's early concerns are reflected in his works that first lay the ground for and then developed into a theme that would serve as the underpinning for his subsequentwritings-the theme of sovereignty and his famous Friend/Enemy distinction, the base for the extension of his theory of sovereignty into a general theory of politics. The political fate that had befallen Germany betweenthe wars, the humiliation of defeat, the economic woes, and most of all the "Weimar Imposition," was the experiential ground for the developmentof the theory. In his Politische Romantic, Political Romqnticism (1919)'e Schmitt sought the roots of Germany's troubles in the nineteenthcentury with thinkers such as Shelling and Novalis. Thesethinkers Schmitt named "Aesthetic Romantics," who despisedthe modem world and sought to escapeit by immersing the "self in the medieval or classical past. However, these Aesthetic Romantics only were interestedin their private experience and were incapable of action. Alas, while the Aesthetic Romantic may experiencea sovereigntyof the self, this sovereigntywas (is) a dead letter. It was (is) a self-indulgent, impotent, and unmanly sovereignty.It was (is) personal,thercbyprivate and antipolitical. Politician," who the Romantic, Schmitl.juxtaposed "Romantic To thc Aosthctic


lir r r r | )i


.", b;;;,;ffi;?_ says, "neutralizes depoliticizes" it and manan;;;;;,""" world.In a word,liberalism attempts makeman a nonpolitical to,, unirnui,lna ceases be to human'Politicsmetamorphizes t""rr""i,[r."rh" as such, i*" hu-un worldbecomes bereft of seriousness.becomes world .,entertlinment.,,25 It a of But this,,virtual world,, is only what we seeon the surface, r"r l"li, interior,the obriteration of the difference between public lpotiii<;f ,,r,a"i.iuu," the (economicsfactingand

:o:neTtolle schmin it is riberarism that ,rt,,*'."ffi

at enemies, greatest wh.ich riberarism,i"r"-i.s are directed schmin,s the of is b'utafterthe bellicose wordsthereis a deeper meaning. Thus,Schmittstheory--i[i unyt u" theory-is aboutwhathe meantandwhathe means. schmittctaims ttraitnereis no moraldimension to his theory, but Strauss arzugs thisis buttie surfac" that Schmittcorrectlyon"-*ill nnc tr,ati"r,-itt ''"uning,-ro#oli,nr"rpr"r, irl""il, concerned the..order with humanthings."23 makehis claim of To ;i"* i;;"rs. anempts show to rharmanis "dangerous" because has"a neea he Because will to dominate this in themodern (Machiavellian; "r0".iii"".,,2a" ir ,'unoi" theclassical sense, a vice is and the basisof a ty,rannical "rt nature,S"h;;;

and enemieslwt tt friends and enemiesglare at each other from across the creek, politi.r "n "r" ir uo* the birth of pilitics these creaturesbecome ,.dangerous -with and dynamic.,,22They b.."r;;r;;;."' Strauss beginshis critiqueby noti;g th;by Schmitt,sown admission Schmitt,s theory,in beingpolitical,.it-iot",niclui.-inJ

no. rooks n",r,*v:;in,e.oup, ror arii. u un;;ff:l#jj,fri1n#'*l#il; nonmembers-friends

For schmin,from a pi""ii."r, ,rgo stlnapoint, liberalism ttre imposed Germany on "*irlnil au.irs'r;w"imar years constituted ofthe a case "exception," and thus was an-,bmerge"ncy,, requiring action. This reads directrv ro^schmin's"g.ri"*i irr"o.i poiiti"s.Reflecting Hobbes's of nature, on state Schmitt ro"u:t", o.iginof "r irr. sovereignty poritics in politics "thepossibility combat,"ti;; and in of int; state ofnatural enmity war. or But unlikethe fearfulandsolitary or nouu"r,r-rtutJ;;;#", Schmin,s creaturerecognizesdanger (a fear "."u*.. that does

is not concsrncd with rirc as scr:indurgcnt, cr)btcpoctry but with trans*rnning life-through action-into a work ;i;.'F'rom the actions of the Romantic Politician is derived-Schmitt's notion oi l.o""isionism,,,an idea based on thc decisiveexercise ofthe wilr resultingin ge;uine actionthat alwaysentairs risk and danger. "Decisionism" becomes",t for Schmitt,s theme of sovereignty,2' which, in turn, is "- "oir"rrtone tne rounaation for his concept of the politicar, and as we shall see,his theory.of the poritical alters, to trr" out, the difference between the thinker "*t"nioi""""i,,rg ,f,. Decisionism also forms the basis ""A ".io..' ror sctrmiu's critique of liberalism, which he saw assubvertingaction tfuough incessant defate, comprise,and its obsession with bureaucratic processes.rne irrviteging-;;;ono-ics, securigr, and procedural justice he saw as akin to AesiheticF.oiranticism.It was but anotherinstanceof feminization, but worse, it was a systematic form of ..neutralization and depolitization."

or p ar jiticar ph'osophy, ;;;;r;;i:1iilj'1,,::!il,.lf il.l*,;llf

(' r O r rS pir it rri rli s i s ( i l o b l l i z a ti on n dl )l l rrcl aryul c , , ll


tlrrrking-has vanishcd. liurthermore, Strauss claimsnot only that Schmitt'stheory contains moral dimension,but alsothat Schmittfails to transcend horizon of a the lrbcralism.So, at leastfor now, liberal speechis the only legitimate,.discourse." I lrrt lbr later? strauss,in his 1932critique,asked, "which men will rule the worldslrrtc'1"26 Kojdve in a lg52letter to Strauss And answered question: the If the westemers remaincapitalists (that is alsoto say nationalists), they will be defeated Russia, that is how the End_State by and will comeabout.If, however, they,,integrate', economies politics their and (theyarenowon theway of doingso)thentheywill defeat Russia. And that is how the End-State will be reached (the sameUniversaland Homogenous State).But in the first caseit will be spokenaboutin "Russian". . . andin the second case-in ,.European.'.i7 Agai.n,this shedslight on Kojdve the thinker who acts. Kojdve seeshimself as practicingwhat Nietzschecalls "Great politics." And Greatpolitics is beyond eood and evil.

Reading Strauss'scritique starkly reminds one that Schmitt was a studentof Max weber, for while there are major differences betweenhim and his teacher,in the darkest corner of the heart of Schmitt's theory is a profound concem about the "iron cage" of technology and the "disenchantment of the world.,' schmitt's political philosophy is, at least on the surface, an attack on liberalism or on the liberal state; but the deepermeaning is that Schmitt's real enemy is the state that is everywhere,the world-State, the End-State,the U.H.S. without this processof "globalization" all this would be a fantasy. But it is technology that makes the process itself possible. Thus, Schmitt's theory-at its most profound depth-is about technology: technology, the new sovereign, the thing that authors the appearance of the "new," and the only thing that we do not question. Thus, Schmitt's gravest concem is about technology, this new authority. schmitt argued in Politicql rheologt that "[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the stateare secularizedtheological concepts." ,t whin putting Schmitt's own political theory in this context one must concludethe following: thi End-State,world-State, or u.H.S. is God, and sincetechnologywill saveus by bringing us to God, then technology is the new christ. But the new christ is the Antichrist. while the inference is clear, perhapsit is too clear. on the surface,the Antichrist (technology), like christ, appears to be the Savior. In his essay, "The Age of Neutralizations and Depolitizations," Schmitt makes a distinction between technolog,tand "the spirit of technicity which has lead to a massbelief in an antireligious activism." He goes on to say that technicity is an ,.evil" and .,demonic" spirit, and that "[t]he process ofcontinuous neutrarizationofvarious spheresof cultural life has reached its end becausetechnology is at hand.,,zeHe adds that


Tom Darby

technology no longer is neutral, and that the way we will eventually understand technology will dependon the appearance a politics strong enough to master it. of Thus, Schmitt's stanceon technology is ambiguous,but so is technology-at least provisionally it is. Technology is our destiny, but it also is our fate, and as we will seein part 3, this ambiguity is a key to its meaning.

Life in the Age of the World Picture
The above title is taken from Heidegger's 1938 essay,"The Age of the World Picture," appearing in English since 1977 as part of the collection called The But, as you see, I am Question Concerning Technolog,t and Other Essays.3o qualifying the title. I do so to indicate that what a few decades ago was esotericand abstractnow has come to be part of life for an increasingnumber of people on this planet. Our experienceofthis shrinking world and our expandingpicture of it, like the very breath of our lives, have become a kaleidoscopeof the real as imagined and the imagined as real. It is a world in which the non-West is progressively transformed into versions of the West, and the West shapedby that very Other it transforms. But this world, which, not so long ago would have beenunimaginable, deludes us. It deludes us because it increasingly embraces us, smothering the mysterious under the cloak of the everyday, denying us the experience of astonishment. progressivelybecoming our common,virhral, yet empirical world, In it also is becoming a more vulgar world, for in this world everyone is either in or is clamoring to get into the picture. Heidegger's aforementioned essay is not only about the "world picture" (Weltbild), it also is about what Heidegger calls the New Time (das Neuzeit),this age3r the world picture. While rooted in the pastof the West, this age----our of time, modernity and especially late modemity-is different from previous ages in that only in our time can one have a picture of the world as a whole. But this should not surprise those who recall Alexandre Kojdve's vision of the Universal and HomogeneousState(U.H.S.), Leo Strauss'svision of the World State,or Carl Schmitt's vision of the End State,each examined in parts I and2 of this essay. Indeed, Kojdve was an ironic, self-professed Marxist, Strauss a Jew who embraced the "West" and its late heir, liberalism of the American variety, and Schmitt, to his last day, an unrepentantNazi. I sayvisions and not-as we are wont to saytoday-values. Nietzsche,who invented the term "value" (Wert),taughtthat value is about willing, while vision is about seeing.And yet, I will argue, while different, value and vision form part of the samepicture. Differences aside, not only were thesethree men collaborators,their visions reinforce eachother, and, as we shall see, reinforce Heidegger's own vision, for what they see is the same world, albeit from different perspectives. Perspective has to do with where one stands.These four perspectives our of world alfow us to socmore clcarly wherewe stand,for they uncovcrthe meaning ol'thc roccnt, alrcadyhlckncycdtcrm,"globaliztliorr," yct lrrtl ulkrw us to scoour

On Spiritual Crisis, Globalization, Planetary and Rule past, our present, and perhaps our future in a new light-and, darkness.
,8*{ <

51 alas, in a new

In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger makes the startling claim that the West-the Occident-is dis-Oriented.32 This, Ithink, is akeyto ourunderstanding of the meaning of Heidegger's position conceming the origin and destiny of the West. If the destiny of the West results in the West's disorientation,then the West at one time must have been oriented, and thus, this destiny-this "loss of its way"-u1ro is tied to, and lies at, the origins of the West. As stated in the general introduction to this essay, with the blending of philosophy and Judeo-Christianreligion, the West appeared an evolving relation as of perceptions andpractices that have defined its boundariesby setting it apart from how other people on this planet have seenboth the world and have lived in it. The origins of the West are to be found in the origins of these other ways of seeing and doing-the non-West-as objectified and constituted by the West as Other. And the West-from its origins-repeatedly oriented itself in opposition to everything it deigned non-Western. Thus, its original orientation resulted in increasing disorientation. Specifically, metaphysics,as it emergedfrom Socrates'critique ofthe Olympian gods,andChristianity, emergingasacritique oflate-Hebrewism, gatheredtogether the form that was to becomethe West and set it on its way along its path. This twothousand-yearjourneythat hasresultedin the "disorientation" is both temporal and spatial, in that this result is the samecluster of phenomenathat has been identified here as "the end of history" and "globalization." The destiny of the West is to be found in its origins, in that the Western perception of space lies with metaphysics, and the perception of time with the Hebrew notion of history as unilinear time, togetherwith the Christian perception that time as history is providential, thereby has a purpose,and from this is derived the notion of progressive ages, culminating in an apocalyptic end (e.g., in the "fullness oftime"). The intersectionofmetaphysical spaceand Christian time rests on our attempt to transform the world in which we live in relation to a projected beyond.This results in the copenehationof what we seewith what we endeavorto do-knowledge with action, wisdom with power. Thus, with the eruption of modernity, time or history becomesprogress,and spacea merefixed ground plan33 for objectified ideas, thereby transforming ideas into ideals, willed projects or values. As we have seen in part 2 of this essay, at their origin, knowledge and action were unbridgeable,but now we seethat the dynamic of Westem time and the eventualuprootedness and consequent malleability ofideas have progressively brought them together. Together they culminate in the disorientation and the dissolutionof the West. This is the destinyof the West. Destiny must have both an origin and an end. For Heidegger,the beginningof the West lics witlr thr: appcarance Westem time and space and with our of


Tom Darby

forgetting that everything that we perceive in time (beings) must have a spacein which to be (Being), and that Being, empty of beings, is simply nothing.3a Moreover, in forgetting Being, we also have forgotten the beings who we are, and thus busy (auf betriebung) ourselveswith the task of transforming whoever we may be along with the other beings who dwell on the planet, together with whatever may lie beyond. So, while we may have gained a planet (and perhaps we more), in losing our way we have forgotten Being. But also,because transform the beyond (the future) into the present,in turn, we forget the future, and with no future, there is no past, and so, with the eclipsing of the future and the past, we forget not only Being but Time as well. Bereft of Being and Time we are left with our present.This presentis our legacy, for the presentlies with its origins and its ofthe western /ogos incarnatedas destiny. This legacy is the concreteappearance our technology. Thus, technology is both our destiny and ourfate.

{.** Now we must ask the question: what is our technology? As Heidegger does, we must begin with a question,rather than with a problem. Metaphysicshas led to the transformation of questions into problems-problems to be solved, things to be fixed-but what Heidegger means is that a true question is about what stands before us as it is and not otherwise. For those of us living today, the question is about the presenceof our technology, that which defrnesus most, but that which we question least. For us, it is technology that is nearestto us, or, as Heidegger says,for us "technologyis at hand."3s Most today take technology to be neutral and thereby"value free," to be, in other And, indeed,were words, the mere application of those ideaswe call "science."36 we to perceive of technology differently, it would not work as it does,or it would notbe correct, not efficienr, and therebywould not be technology. But on the other hand, here we want to question the appearance of the boundaries of technology-technology just as it presentsitself to us as it ls. Questions are but means to ends, in that answers are mere ends or boundaries. But we will not question in order to find a way of altering the boundariesof technology-to view technology as a problem to be fixed-and thereby making of ourselvespart of the problem we set out to solve. We question in order to leam of the astonishing (thaumazein) presenceof technology, and do so in order to learn what it ls. So what is technology?One canbegin with this thoroughly modern word and try to recover its meaning synthetically. Technology is a compound of the two Greek words techne and logos. Techne pertains to making and logos to knowing, to practices and to perceptions.But technology is not a compound in word only, for it is compounded from the copenetrationof making and knowing. Technology is rational(fficient) arrangement meansand ends(for humans) of the progressively has to do with practices, and causeand effect (for nature).The former, therefore, of thc Technology as its pro.iect lranslitrnration has andthc lattcrwitlr perccptions.

On Soiritual Crisis. Globalization. and Planetarv Rule


nature both human and nonhuman. Efficiency, the goal of the projection of technology, is and can only be measured as the progressively diminishing difference betweenthose meansand endsor causesand effects. Thus, technology is (1) self-referential,(2) relatively autonomous,(3) progressivelysovereign,and, being so, (4) tends toward the systemizationof natureboth human and nonhuman. Ifthe relative difference ofmeans and ends(or causeand effect) were everreduced to zero, or to complete efficiency, then technology would become a totality (i.e., a total or complete system)37; here, of course,come to mind the visions of the and Universal and HomogenousState,the World State,the End State,and, as we shall see,Heidegger's Neuzeit.

Although in our time technology is embracedby not only the West but by the nonperceptions andpractices.The West aswell, technologt is a compoundof Western perceptionspoint to the radically revised relations of God, Nature, and Man that crystallized in early modemity, but go further back, and to practices of radically which, in turn, dynamically shapeand are shapedby those increasing prowess,3s radically revised perceptions.First, I refer to the perceptionsofBacon, who urged us to put nature on the rack and to vex and torture it so as to force its "reasonsfor being," and to Hobbes, who told us that man's artificial creation, the World, is of superior to God's natural creation-the Earth and the beings upon it----except, course,for man. Bacon was amongthosewhose observationsofnature led to what we call the "scientif,rcmethod," which, in turn, enhancedour control over nature, qua nature, through developing a way of transforming it and eventually systematizingit. But, as Heidegger notes, Bacon's new perception of nature was not enough, in that it pertained exclusively to perception. What was neededto bring about the scientific method was a practice coupled with this changed perception. This practice-a practice that allowed man to act upon nature-resided in imitating God's action, in creating the world and His eruption into the Earth and the World, that resulted in His embodiment within the realm of nature (Space) and history (Time). I refer to what lies at the heart of Christianity itseli to the doctrine of the incarnation of Christ. This doctrine became a practice with the medieval Schoolmenwho attempted,throughtheirinterpretation ofthe Word, to embodythe divine Will itself. But I suspect that these roots lie even further back, in the cabalistic and gnostic practicesof both Jews and early The perceptions of men such as Bacon, together with those practicesrooted in Christianity, result in attempts to systematizenature qua nature, while Hobbes systematizeshuman nature. Hobbes begins by his attack on God's creation and Aristotle's doctrineof causality. "artificial mann"Leviathan,is a systemization His of human nature, in that it is a system built by man, the Maker who makes nor Ilut with ncither c<lnscience a longing Flimscll.a') this"ncw rnan"is a creaturc



for transcendence. exchangesconsciencefor the rational calculation of selfHe interest and the longing for transcendencefor his immanent safety. Bacon and Hobbes were among the men who discovered that the power of modem science (technology) lay in its tendency toward systemization.Becauseof this, they are harbingers of the new age for the West. But, according to Heidegger, this still is not enough, for in order for it to be, technology requires the advent of research, for without research, there is no procedure,or way (lo modo), as Machiavelli calls it (mode: the way of today, hence what is the modern, e.g., the present). However, research is not just procedure,it is the projection into nature (into what ls) of that "fixed grown plan" (Grundriss) mentioned above. The projection draws (wills) the boundaries, in advance, and the way of knowing must adhere to these orders or boundaries. Heidegger calls this "binding adherence"of research,o'rigor." Projection of the fixed ground plan is the first commqnd of research."Science becomesresearch through the projected plan, and through securing that plan in the rigor of procedure."al Its second command is methodology. Methodology is the way of clariffing the known and relating the unknown to it, thereby increasingthe sphereof the known as facts. This is at the heart of what I call metaphor. This leads to explanation, explanation to law, and law to experiment;the latter itself mirroring-albeit in a disembodied or abstractway-learning itself. "The more exactly the ground plan is projected, the more exact becomesthe possibility of experiment."a2Exactness leadsto the objective knowledge we call facts or information, becausethe ground plan that is willed and projected is controlled before the experiment itself, yet continually adjustsitself to its results.Thus, the way of method is what I identified above as the self-referenial, self-adjusting aspectoftechnology. The third command of researchis that it be what Heidegger calls "ongoing" (Betrieb), that its activity both pertain to its proper (ordered : bound = fixed) sphere,that it, in other words, be specialized,and that the facts be coordinatedso that the methodology can be adjustedto the results. This simply means that one must specialize and that specialistsneed to communicateand cooperate,This is why the businessof researchmust be ongoing.a3 Research brought technology to this point. But becauseof what became an overwhelming massof facts (facts = information = decontexturalizedknowledge) generatedby it, a new way of ordering, storing, and explaining was necessary. Since explanation is a relation of the known to the unknown, or what I identified in our general introduction as the relation of our Underlying Concern to our Overarching Metaphor, new metaphors were needed for ordering this mass of information.

Due to the radical and rapid changes compounded into the perceptions and practicesthat constitutetechnology,the modern world has had thrcc phases, or

Rule and On SpiritualCrisis,Globalization, Planetary


what I elsewherehave called "waves."aaEach wave has its own metaphor rooted in its own experienceand its own symbol that bestallow for ordering, storing, and explaining eachphaseof the experienceof modernity. Each metaphor,along with its symbol, has been technological. The experiencesof Bacon and Hobbes's day required amechanical metaphor, which was encapsulatedwithin the symbol of the clock. Becausesymbols are wholes, they too are systems,as is the very machine we call the mechanicalclock. The day of Kant, Hegel, Marx-and to a lesserextent of Nietzsche-needed an hydraulic metaphor, symbolized by the engine. During all the previous centu4/, and for most of the twentieth century, the hydraulic metaphor and its symbol, the engine,have sufficed, and indeed,most people are still stuck with the vocabulary basedon these older metaphorsand symbols, in that we still describeboth nature processes,and movements. Our and human nature in terms of forces, pressures, everyday assumptionsabout natureboth nonhumanand human are thosemechanical perceptions granted by Galileo and Newton and the hydraulic perceptions associatedwith the secondlaw of thermodynamics. While most people today (including philosophers and scientists) still rely on these metaphors and symbols for explaining their experience, I think that Heidegger, Schmitt, Strauss,and Kojdve anticipateda changethat did not become apparentuntil the last decadeof the twentieth cenfury. Heidegger, especially, and to a lesserextent the others, realized that, while all technology pertainedto a summoning forth of energy from nature,transforming it and storing it for future use, somethingfundamentalhad changed.Heideggercalls this process of extraction and transformation Enframing (das Ge-stell), and its Although still in embryonic form, what storagefor future use,standing reserve.ot Heidegger saw as so basically different was that energy could be extracted, transformed, and stored differently, and that which in his part of this century was manifest only nascently, at the end of this century now is commonplace. First mechanicalenergy was extractedfrom natureand storedin the weights and springs of the frame of machinessuchas clocks-machines that held the energy of nature in reseryeuntil transformedby setting it on its way by winding a spring or releasinga weight. Next, hydraulic energywas extractedfrom nature,transformed and reservedwithin the walls of a frame called an engine and set it on its way by releasingwater, steam,or a regulated explosion to drive a turbine, a piston, a jet engine, a rocket engine, or, at the end of this wave, crude nuclearpower. But what fundamentally has changedis thatnow we are able to extract,transform, store,and set ori their way the less apparent,even invisible, yet fundamental energies of nature. I refer to what lies within our inner spacesuch as the DNA of our bodies and to that energy within the atomic structure of all bodies (beings), electricity-the spark of life, and one might say, its spirit.I speakof the wave of theelectric metaphor, the symbol of which is the electric computer,without which the presentphaseof the Westernproject, the "end of history" and "globalization," would not have becomepossible,much lessapparent. of Thc univcrsaluseofthe elcctricalcomputermarkstheappearanc:e the coming


Tom Darby

: the together of perception (knowing) and practice (action making) through = (its ofthe computer's superstructure software perception)with its colpenetration infrastnrcture (its hardware: practice). I sayappearance,as this coming together only appearsto be, in that the spacebetween them is relatively but progressively invlslUte.This is so becauseln the spacein betweenis Time itself. Granted,we see and neither force nor pressure,but we seetheir effects,relate them to their causes, is becoming so swift that we see call this change.Iiut the changewe seein our time the it lessand less,and we areprogressivelybecoming to seechangeasnormal, for therefore not questioned.Time is Being. normal is precisely what is nearest,and And both Time and Being are progressivelybecoming invisible' whereas, the power (efficiency) of mechanismis measuredas force, and that of in hydraulicism u, pr"rrur., the power of the computer lies in the difference off pulse o1 a charge of electricity, and thus is measuredby bet*een the on and in the speed. Hence, the technology of mechanism and hydraulicism is manifest in that it ripresentation(Vorstellefi of tne apparentas objective, ergo concrete, pressure in demands the centralization, hence the massification, of force and of money in economies' machines; and in human technologies,the massification governedby the massification ofpeople in societiesof large nations in great cities, great armies' So the power of the extensive bureaucraciei, all protected by rate ol' technology of our day is derived from the relative but progressive of of disappearance the representation the time diminishii time, with tire apparent that the West has called history. Thus, electronic technology demands not the overstatement of appearancc (representation) that in the time of the mechanical and hydraulic metaphor in which il"iA"gg", calls the "gigantic,"a6but the dissolution of the boundaries previously iontained, hence the decentralization and dispersion ol' po*"r-iu, po*"r. Ardsls, as usual, realized this first. Witness the dissolution of the imagc itt and impressionist and abstractpainting, and then there is our present antireality While artists need tlol hence reactionary movem.nt-to called postmodemism. account for whaithey seeand do, unlike those modernists,most "postmodemists" ,s, thoy are not artists, nor are they philosophers. Rather than questioning what try to conjure it away, but in their reactiott lrt resent it and so. with their rhitoric, ntt modemity, they are, in tum, conditioned by it, and hence, unwittingly' are the engine that drives it' integral part of it, And sometimes ttf But interms of the serious demandsof our technology today, I am thinking andhow withorrt tlte in scientific and humanisticresearch, the level of coordination electrottlu advent of the computer this would not be possible. I am thinking of in general,but specifically oftelevision andthe Internet, atld ltow communications Antl I ttltt these two modes oi communication are destined to come together. ecltltre thinking ofhow all of this makesus witnessto the everswiftly, disorienting political arclltt ntltl of the sivereignty of the nation-state,creating,asit were, a new to lllllll€ a new political actor,the form of which we areyet to imagine,much less Mtl|umttlthtt'sis. of Ah, shades Machiavel|l,sPrince and Ovid's ttF hy at Our technology the end of this ccnturyis rnarrilcst thc discnrhrldirrre'ttl

On Spiritual Crisis, Globalization, planetary and Rule


l)ower in the form of the appearance the invisible. This is why the power of of tcchnology during the time of globalization often is referred to as io0t power, soft hccause is both malleableand boundless. is a technologythe powir of which it It t'itherappears benign or, because its stealth,appears to exist at all. Its use of not ;rlwaysis justified by that abstraction called"values."This power is as soft and as rlltrsiveas the electronicimageitself. Mass communications both decentralized is rrrd dispersedpower. It also is mass illusion and delusion in that tne more ,lt'centuralized and dispersedit becomes,the less natural and historical reality , r.ists. Given the "world picfure," more and more people are coming to take the ' ' r'rrtual" as an improvement over the "givens" ofnature and history, or they simply ,rrt' taking the "virtual" itself as the given, and therefore,not questioningihe th lr rr'l rl r€ e vs ee.

rvti Zop the TV. There is cNN. well, maybe not. perhaps a talk show in ". l' , l;rrrdic, Slovak,or Urdu. But for now, most arein English.Tomorrow?perhaps, rrr ( '11111s5s. crudely put, news or talk aboutthe news is "history asjournalismj'a7 'r . llt'idcgger termed it. This is the world picture-the world as a picture-the ', , 'r LI lricturedas a whole in which the pastand future are zappedinto an electrical ilr',,p't' .l'the present.The specificlanguage mattersless and less,for the format i tIr, II ;1111s) increasinglyis the same,for the contentis conditionedby the context ',i'l rlrt'crlntextby the perspective. "Truth is relative," so they say,but this is not from which the world is being '|l,i r,.rrt. while truth is relativeto the perspective " ', , , I . Iirniting, thereby, both what one "sees" and how one interpretsit, greater " ', ' rl 'r'r'; .l' peopleare seeingversionsof the samepicfure.Thus, more and more 1", ';rl, ;rrc becominglessand lesstied to their "little corners"of their necessarily lii,rrrrrl' st.ndpoints"-andcomingclosertowhatHeideggercallsa.,standpoint ' rrlr,,rrr rrl:rrrtlpoint."as point is so obviousthat it likely is to be missed(and This riii r rl rr'p . int ) , f or it is abo u tth a tw h i c h d e fi n e s u s mo s t ,butw hi chw equesti on r',r { It r:; ub.ut our "Archimedean point," our technology in general, and ! ' , rr,,q 1tc c hnology par ti c u l a r. 11 in l' | .r('rcpcat myself from part I of this essay: technologyis our common ! ',"''',rr.rr. r , our indepen d e n tv a ri a b l e .T h u s ,i tb o th d efi nesthew orl duponw hi ch '| .,,,1 rr(l orrr view of that world. Simply put, no thought of our world makes rtIr' rrI ruk i ng into accountthe phenomenon technology. major reason of Its t ' r" ,,'' ,lt'|'1'11115 perception on our that all therers thereis only in relationto us, ' i rl'ii r'; rlrr.'rc our lilr But because technology,we are ableto do/make of !, :r , ,, r' (o rcprcsent universe we a as *i,r ,, l,r('r;(.'l;tlioncntails negation, in that it is the given that is ! ' .!!r'i l l' r r lr t lr chis k r ri c aa n dn a trrra l i v e n .T h e ma gi cof negati oni es i n l g l r;.';rI,rl rr i. r r r v ( ' l) ( ) wc r ri l c g l o b a l i z a ti o in a b o u tth e tr ansformati on wl . s of the , . ' .,,rl l l l r.r tlr : r s bc c r r l3iv c rrl o rrs i s rro ty c n s l i rrrn c d .' f l rrrs,usK o.j dvetaught, l ra l
f (frly f rcrc il lt , it t t ' i1t l< r,r r r t lllr t : I ( ) 99 wr r ' lt l l n r r l e ( ) r g i r n i z a t i o n '



(WTO) messproves his point. Under presentconditionsthe various uncoordinated transformed, and contradictory groups protesting in Seattlecannotbe represented, globalization may be in principle boundless and hence recognized, for while (universal)much ofthe planethasnot beentransformed(homogenized)in practice. Thus, globalization is not everywhereactualized,andthis meansthat under present conditions these contradictory groups represented at the WTO cannot be assimilatedby the "system." Thus, the U.H.S. is here only in principle. But this is another way of saying that the "system" does not yet contain everything, and because of this, is not yet complete. Globalization is the actualization of technology. It is technology's concrete universal. Hence, globalization, like the technology that makes it possible, is self-referential, relatively autonomous, progressively sovereign,and tendstoward the systemizationof natureboth human and nonhuman. both by the spontaneous What I am suggestingis that the interestsrepresented feminists, farmers, labor and NGOs, the Americas, protesters,environmentalists, b*op., and the rest of the planet are now too contradictoryto be transformed,and that while the U.H.S. may well be our future in the sensethat we have eliminated all other possibilities savethat one, we are not there yet, and that globalization is but the processthat may take us there. But piocesses,while they are occurring, appearto be without logic. Thus, while undergoing a process,process appearsas randomness,but when it is over, it is revealed to have been inevitable. And in the sense that it is revealed to be hence inevitable, it is logical. But the logic of globalization is meaningless, nihilistic.

In 1946when Europe was digging itself out from under the rubble, Kojdve wrote that every good Hegelian knows that the daysofthe nation-statearenumberedand that we titull *ittt"tt yet again the rising star of I must confessthat I did not understandwhat Kojdve meant until I read Samuel P. Huntington's The ctash of civilizations and the Remaking of world order. Unbeknownst to the rightly celebrated political scientist, however, when you transform a civilization into a power unit you get an empire. Empires are what his book is about, not civilizations. Huntington implores us in the West to "hang together" lest "we hang alone." But the West itself may not hang together,in fact, it may split into a European'oWest"and a "West" of the Americas. While this is unthinkable for the likes of Huntington, there are signs that such is already developing. The first is the afore mentioned WTO mess in Seattle;the next is a closely related sign. Made moie urgent by the other messthat is Kosovo, a decision was taken by the EuropeanUnion (EU) in the Helsinki talks of December 1999 to establish an EU rapid responsecorps to be the germ of a future EU military arm. This marksnot only what may likely be the beginningof,thccnclol'NATO but also I be: ol'tlrcI.lUinto a p()wcrurrit.Lot ttttr clt:itr. lrrnwriting about thc translilrmatign

Rule and On SpiritualCrisis,Globalization, Planetary


the EU becoming an empire, and, in response, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) becoming the same(AFTA), and perhapsthe "rest" of the non-West forming imperial power units similar to those describedby Huntington. (2) Let us look at the range ofpossibilities: ( I ) the statusquo, e.g., nation-states, power units along cultural (: ethnic) lines, the kind of radically decentralized balkanization that leads to chaos, (3) civilizational economic and social blocks transformed into empires, or (4) planetary rule. At the dawning of the new millennium, the answersappearto be the following: 1. Nation-stateshave been both the actors in and the stageof politics for four andthenationhundredyears.Butnomore.Thepoliticalquestionofhomogeneity the statewas first settledwhen WWI emasculated Europeannobility by eradicating hereditary rule, andhenceclass,which ledthe way forblack Americansto become combatantsin the next war and then in 1964,"legally equal." And then there was o.Rosieo" who, in wwII, proved herself by doing "man's work" behind the lines. Yet, the last days of the nation-statemarched to the New Speak swan song of o'class, race' and gender"-the last and political correctness multiculturalism called century, a mere elaborationof, or a concretizingof, our recent gaspofthe trventieth puri. Itt principle, the political questionswere answeredby the Western global cirril *ats, wwl and wwIL and, at the century's end, the west's victory in the third Western global civil war-the Cold War-has settledthe economicquestion as to whether the state or the market could more efficiently produce more wealth and afford a higher standardof living (: life-style, i.e., consumerism).This having been settled, sovereignty and power begins to shift. But where and how? 2. Radical decenhalization of power? Perhaps.But unlikely. why? Because even though frail, the nation-stateis still too strong to allow it. Russia,Canada, Mexico. and other stateswith rebel movementsare still strong enoughto play by become political rules, and power both rules and deftnespolitics. As nation-states l*g"t civilizational or imperial units they will continue to resistreactionary purt of popular movements who see themselves as trying to protect thek culture by resisting globalization. 3. But nation-statescan begomeHuntingtonesque"core States"that can exert power so as to lead and restrain other "States" in an empire and, at the sametime, ifncientty assimilategroups into a "system" in sucha way that globalization on its own is unable to accomplishat this time. I am proposing that perhapsempireswill be but a stage along the way to the U.H.S. But no one can know how long this stagewill lastorwhatitwill bring. Empire is probablythe onlytemporary deterrent to planetary rule, and I think this is what Kojdve's statement conceming empire and his essayon that subject really means. 4. Considering the above, barring the recycling of nation-statesas the power units in our future or the free-fall into chaos,it seemsthat only a period of empire stands between us and planetary rule. But, of course, I speak of technological empires, empires shaped and bound by technology-hence by effrciency-for effrciencyrulestechnology,andglobalizationis but the reificationoftechnology, is and hencl cflicicncy. I lannahArcndt saidthatbureaucracy the"rulc of nobody'"


Tom Darby

Globalization is the processthat may lead to the universal and homogeneousrule of nobody. It is at once Hegel's "Cunning of Reason" (: efficiency) and Marx's "Specter" (: socialism as "each according to his abilities; each according to his needs" : If you can pay for it, its yours, if you need it). But reason, however cunning, is not yet concrete,and Marx's "Specter," while it now looms over the globe,ratherthanjust over Europe,still merely looms.So, the U.H.S. is still here only in the abstract,or, again, it is here only in principle. But this meansthat the U.H.S. is more than a dream.It now is nossible.

While the West beganwith the blending of the Greek view of the whole that Plato called the Good with the Judeo-Christian whole called God, the center of this whole, this world (and indeed,of any whole or world) is that in-betweenwhere the heavens meetthe earth.Previously,because humanswere earthboundbeings,every view of the whole was limited to the ground upon which they stood, constituting their various centers,or worlds bound by spaceand time. Today, becauseof our technology, the centeris wherever man deignsto stand,and thus the boundariesof our world now are constitutedonly by whatever we willto do and can do. And we will do whatever we can. So, for ill or good, our technology provides us with a view of the "patterned change" that is necessaryfor our picture of the whole. Through technology the planet has become our eternity in non-Time, our everywhere in no-Where. So, who has the right to rule the planet? Since rule is about setting limits or boundariesand right dependson adherence thoserules, then our technology has to the right to rule becauseit progressively setsits own rules and adjusts its rules to whateveris efficient at any moment.Nobody knows if our time--our Neuzeit-will result in the complete transformations visioned by Kojdve, Strauss,Schmitt, or Heidegger. Nobody knows if the entire planet eventually will fit into the selfadjusting frame ofthe self-adjustingpicture, or if somethingaltogetherunforseen will occur. But we do know this: at leastfor this age,and for the life of the West, technology is here to stay, as are its temporal and spacial offspring-the end of history and globalization. So we are left only with an old question that is both philosophical and political-philosophical becauseit is uselessand political becauseit is practical. This is the question: how ought we to live and what are we to do? But, then, since our technology rules and has the right to rule, how can we find an answerto this questionwhen we cannot seea horizon over which an answermight dawn on us? We can take the safe way and call the darkness light, or we can embrace our destiny and accept our fate, taking the dangerousway, trying to see and do what we can, and, along whatever way, continue to question.