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Aratuc vs.

88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of
the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the
KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

G.R no. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no.
the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm
ERBs provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the
issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said
hearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated
due process for having been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.
HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the board
from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether or not: to
make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e is akin
to temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree
a price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order the price
increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The
Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however,
it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.

GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of
a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of prequalification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened
on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm
of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,
petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming
that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to
accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December,
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited
from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by
PD No. 1818, which provides: Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project of the government to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project
Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a
state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the
prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like
the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it
would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
GOCCs. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to
any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent
that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the
anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly
issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed
these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants. Second, PBAC was required to
issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the
project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between
P1M and P5M.

Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

207 SCRA 689

FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor
in 1975 and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the
General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for
grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively
suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for
region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On
December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager
also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was
also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was
redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it
to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two
days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was
created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.
Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the
DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control
and administrative supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program
coordination. With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency
from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an
agency under a Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law
impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to subject
petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the
DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision
in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA
whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.

Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)

Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the CSC
passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board (CESB) to Office
for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission (OCES).
W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and transferring its
budget to OCES
CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was created by law, it
can only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the power to reorganize under Sec. 17,
Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with
sec. 16, which enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. This
essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination.


De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to
enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of
this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution
has been ignored and disregarded.
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided
for under the Constitution.
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from
their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano

G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967
Sanchez, J.
Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said
land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his
rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same
piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise
denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor
of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond
appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of
power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential
power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary and
whether it can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action
taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule
on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the
right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive
departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in
person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his
Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person.
Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue