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ONG, JOHN PATRICK C.

TOPIC: CITIZENSHIP
TECSON V COMELEC
GR NO. 161434, MARCH 3, 2004

FACTS:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of
and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that
under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the
latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en

masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation
of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

MO YA LIM YAO V COMM. OF IMMIGRATION


41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She
was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or
his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the

contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and


order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and
speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance
of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if
the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to
be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon
to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or
business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to
native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or

indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court


or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

IN RE: MALLARE 59 SCRA 45


AZNAR V COMELEC AND OSMENA, 185 SCRA 1990
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a
Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR)
No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at
Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is
a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a
Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that
he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone
out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered
voter in the Philippines since 1965. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First
Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed
and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dualcitizenship?

HELD:
SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner
failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization
in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose
his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other
mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of
allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country
since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private
respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

ANTONIO BENGSON III, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL


TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.

Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view
of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the
lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE


LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of


Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President,
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on
January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private
respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American
citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.
They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really
for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and
election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the
public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was
not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public
office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the
Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.

Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of

the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter
alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of
any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification
from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot
agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American
citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he
was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points
out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our
laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a
jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with
eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by
an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition
Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to
the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final
and executory.

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991 ANTONIO Y. CO, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991 SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.

Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional
election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates
who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds
that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of
the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in
1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court
an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the
private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984
and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted
there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required
that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It
is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of
afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence
requirements.

TABASA VS CA
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when
his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the
Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and
detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a
request with the BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a
standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The
only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who
lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino,
including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at
the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second
place. However, Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen. In his

answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of


Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of
a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San
Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US
laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did
not lose his Filipino citizenship. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a
dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are
disqualified from running for any position. The COMELEC en banc reversed the
divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC
found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

HELD:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION Dual Citizenship vs. Dual
Allegiance To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: Those
born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli; Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; Those
who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced

Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the


Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but
the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition. LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual Citizenship The phrase dual
citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate
forswear Allegiance to the Other Country By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. PETITIONERS
ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that
Manzanos act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality
Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a
political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to
determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. But this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. To
recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of

entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Jacot vs. Dal


[G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008]
Facts:
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from
running for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a
naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
ISSUE:
Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run
as a vice-mayor?
HELD:
No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation
of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.