CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA

H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD
Facts: Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the
settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, claiming that they were
the only heirs of Ricardo (died a bachelor). TC appointed Cesar as administrator. After the
petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, they promptly executed real estate
mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola.
Honoria Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings, alleging that Honoria Empaynado had
been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943
to 1971, and that during this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores
Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral
relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said
three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
The lower court declared Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo and the only surviving legal heirs.
As such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria
Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired
thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife.
CA affirmed
Issue: I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S.
ABAD ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE
MESA ABAD.
Ruling: No
Prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao,
their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of
Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that
he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and
Marian are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
Petitioners presented as evidence the enrolment forms of his children, joint affidavit of Juan
Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971,
and affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935, he had

examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had
become sterile as a consequence thereof.
But the Court said that these evidences are far from conclusive.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the
least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is "deceased"
is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being
accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the
supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at
that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have
been the best evidence as to when the latter died. As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was
objected to by private respondents as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they
are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.
In RIcardos individual statements of income and assets and in all his individual income tax returns
and he has declared as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent
children, Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad. He also opened a trust fund account with Cecilia
and Marian
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners
are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988.
In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003.
If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Therefore, petition is denied.
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN
Facts: It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were
born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero
was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5)
that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six

minor natural children to

Anselma Diaz and two
Pacursa.

wit: four minor children with

minor children with Felixberta

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal heirs of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the
issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father
Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art.
990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of
the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941,
Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and
inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by
Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti).
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of
the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is
changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the
Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish
Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our
Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more
in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as
the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that
from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of
Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED

TOMAS CORPUS vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R.

Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS,
ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO
Facts: Teodoro R. Yangco. He had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives
were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio
(3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo
Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita
died.
Luis

Ramona

Teodoro

Paz

Luis

Tomas

Pablo

Amalia, Jose A, Ramon

Jose

Juanita

Project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco
whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not
contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita
Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz
appeared as her counsel.Probate court approved the project of partition.
Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that
the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void
under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the
decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
TC- dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches.that the intrinsic validity of
Yangco's will was passed upon in its order approving the project of partition.
Issue: whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has
Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's
estate?
Ruling: To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation. The basis of the trial
court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate

child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that
Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children.
The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco is incontestable. It is part of a public or official
judicial record.
The children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is
presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. It is disputably presumption "That a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since
Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold
that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of
Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives"Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas
Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated
child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are
alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the
rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of
intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of
the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of
her natural mother
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA
PUERTA
Facts: Dominga Revuelta died with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children,
namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in
addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.

Probate of the will was opposed by her brothers who averred that their mother was already senile
at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning.
Vicente filed a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted.
However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case
Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the
payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente.
Issue: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta?
NO.
Ruling: The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the
second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
1)In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases:
first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented
is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by
the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the
children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her
directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by
Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been
different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have
inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a
lawful heir.
2) As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of
Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the

family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga
Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal
ties to bind them either. If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The
adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by
fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters
can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred.
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for
the settlement of her own fathers estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga
Revuelta's Will.