Table of Context


Sectarian violence..................................................................1

Birth of Religious Extremism ...............................................................................................2
Timeline..............................................................................................................................7 1990s...............................................................................................................................7 2000s...............................................................................................................................7 Conclusion........................................................................................................................10

Sectarian violence
Pakistan, the country with the second largest Muslim population in the world, has seen serious Shia-Sunni sectarian violence. Almost 77% of Pakistan's population is Sunni, with 20% being Shia, but this Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country, larger than the Shia majority in Iraq.1 In the last two decades, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, 300 in 2006. Amongst the culprits blamed for the killing are Al Qaeda


Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival (Norton), 2006, p.160


working "with local sectarian groups" to kill what they perceive as Shi'a apostates, and "foreign powers ... trying to sow discord."2

Some see a precursor of Pakistani Shia-Sunni strife in the April 1979 execution of deposed President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on questionable charges by Islamic fundamentalist General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Ali Bhutto was Shia, Zia ul-Haq a Sunni. 3 The "Islamization" of General Zia ul-Haq that followed was resisted by Shia who saw it as "Sunnification" as the laws and regulations were based on Sunni fiqh. In July 1980, 25,000 Shia portested the Islamization laws in the capital Islamabad. Further exacerbating the situation was the dislike between Shia leader Khomeini and General ul-Haq. Shia formed student assocations and a Shia party, Sunni began to form sectarian militias recruited from Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith madrasahs. Preaching against the Shia in Pakistan was radical cleric Israr Ahmed. Muhammad Manzour Numani, a senior Indian cleric with close ties to Saudi Arabia published a book entitled ``Iranian Revolution: Imam Khomeini and Shiism. The book, which "became the gospel of Deobandi militants" in the 1980s, attacked Khomeini and argued the excesses of the Islamic revolution were proof that Shiism was not the doctrine of misguided brothers, but beyond the Islamic pale. Anti-Shia groups in Pakistan include the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, offshoots of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The groups demand the expulsion of all Shias from Pakistan and have killed hundreds of Pakistani Shias between 1996 and 1999.4 As in Iraq they "targeted Shia in their holy places and mosques, especially during times of communal prayer." From January to May 1997, Sunni terror groups assassinated 75 Shia community leaders "in a systematic attempt to remove Shias from positions of authority." Lashkar i Jhangvi has declared Shia to be `American agents` and the `near enemy` in global jihad. 5

Birth of Religious Extremism
Religious extremism began in earnest during the second jihad which was the extension of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets to Kashmir as a low-intensity conflict with India after 1989. The first jihad had empowered the Jamaat Islami and its Pushtun leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad. The sojourn of the Afghan jihadi leaders in Peshawar had begun a crucible
2 3 4

"Shiite-Sunni conflict rises in Pakistan," by David Montero, February 02, 2007

Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.89 Rashid, Taliban (2000), p.194 5 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Secterian voilance in Pakistan.


process with the help of Saudi money. The High Church Afghans mixed with the local Deobandi consensus and tacitly agreed to oppose the Low Church trends in Pakistan. It was a 'hard' Islam Pakistanis knew nothing about. It came mixed with the even tougher tribal code called Pushtunwali that the 'settled' Pushtuns of Pakistan had gradually forgotten even in the Tribal Areas. The presence of the Arabs - especially the Egyptian runaways like Al Zawahiri acted to further radicalise local Islam with salafi ideals overlaid with Qutbite concept of the jahiliyya violence.6 The Deobandi seminaries became powerful on receiving their share of Zakat from the government of General Zia. After 1989, the empowerment of the Deobandis took up momentum as the jihad in Kashmir was restricted to Deobandis and Ahle Hadith. The surrender of internal sovereignty to these militias happened first in the NWFP and the Tribal Areas; it later extended to a number of cities in Punjab and, in particular Karachi, where the centre of the Deobandi consensus emerged at the Banuri Complex of seminaries. Increasingly the youth joining the jihad were made conscious of the fact that somehow Pakistan had not enforced true Islam and that Pakistanis were living like infidels. More animus was shown towards the Shia community and to some extent the Ismailis.7 According to a report by Islamabad's Institute of Policy Studies, Pakistan has 6,761 religious seminaries where over a million young men are taking religious training. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has given out similar numbers in its report. But Herald (November 2001) says: 'According to the Interior Ministry, there are some 20,000 madrasas in the country with nearly 3 million students'. In 1947, West Pakistan had only 245 seminaries. In 1988, they increased to 2,861. Between 1988 and 2000, this increase comes out to be 136 percent. The largest number of seminaries are Deobandi, at 64 percent, followed by Brelvi, at 25 percent. Only 6 percent are Ahle Hadith. But the increase in the number of Ahle Hadith seminaries or madrasas has been phenomenal, at 131 percent, going up from 134 in 1988 to 310 in 2000. Out of the total number of youth taking religious training in the seminaries, 15 per cent are foreigners. Among the Ahle Hadith, there are 17 organisations active in Pakistan, looking after their own seminaries. Out of them, six actually take part in politics, three take part in jihad, and three are busy spreading their mazhab or school of thought. They are all puritans who do not follow the state fiqh and are also called wahabi. Most of them follow the lead of the ulema of Saudi Arabia and receive assistance from rich Saudi citizens.8 The grand Deobandi alliance is probably the biggest force in Pakistan after the state's armed forces.9 Based in Karachi, the Banuri Complex housed leaders that sat in the shuras of the various Deobandi jihadi militias. Its religious scholars sat in the shura of Sipah Sahaba as well as the shura of the two militias, Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-eMuhammad. The Deobandi leaders think nothing of issuing fatwas of death against foreigners coming to Pakistan on business. It is these fatwas in part that caused the

Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, The Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam, (University Press of America, 2003). 7 Daily Khabrain Lahore (22 March 2003) published a brief biographical note on late Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer of Jamiat Ahle Hadith who was killed by a bomb on 23 March 1987 in Lahore near Qila Lachchman Singh. Along with him four other Ahle Hadith scholars had also died. 8 Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad Kashmir wa Afghanistan: Jihadi Tanzimun aur Mazhabi Jamaton ka aik Jaeza, (Mashal Books Lahore, 2002). 9 John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, (Pluto Press London, 1998).


embassies in Islamabad to issue advisories to their nationals not to visit Pakistan. The Harkatul Mujahideen was once Harkatul Ansar which was banned by America because of its terrorist character. In 2000, it was split between two leaders, Fazlur Rehman Khaleel and Masood Azhar. Their organisations were trained in Afghanistan and were payrolled by Osama bin Laden. Both the commanders were close to Osama and had accompanied him to Sudan for some time in early 1990s. When Masood Azhar was arrested in India, Osama financed the hijack of an Indian airliner to spring him from jail. Along with him was sprung another man close to Osama bin Laden, Sheikh Umar. Umar had opened the office of Al Qaeda in Lahore in 2000 for a brief period before going underground once again.10 After his release in 1999 Masood Azhar no longer wanted to work under the Harkat leadership of Fazlur Rehman Khaleel. He founded Jaish-i-Muhammad, helped by his Banuri Mosque elders. True to Deobandi tradition, he began shooting off his mouth against General Musharraf which embarrassed his handlers among the intelligence agencies. The Harkat was split and its assets divided between the two leaders. But when the double-cabin vehicles were returned by Jaish to Fazlur Rehman Khaleel in bad repair, the two factions began to fight each other. Osama bin Laden ended the dispute by sending a dozen brand new double-cabin vehicles to Khaleel from Afghanistan.11 Maulana Azam Tariq of Sipah Sahaba had built up his power outside Jhang where he was the virtual ruler. A French lady scholar writing his biography says he gave administrative orders for the area of Jhang from his house.15 His sectarian party has produced a violent offshoot, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, whose killings Azam Tariq disavowed by saying that the Lashkar has been removed from the umbrella of his party. Yet when Lashkar activist Haq Nawaz was about to be hanged he tried all means at his disposal, including threats to the state, to get him absolved from the crime of killing an Iranian diplomat. Sipah is not only very powerful in Karachi it is also influential in Kurram Agency and in Gilgit, both areas being concentrations of Shia population. Azam Tariq announced in 2001 that he would select 20 cities in Pakistan and enforce his Deobandi shariah there, mainly in the shape of compulsory business shut-down during namaz and the compulsory attendance at namaz of all Muslims. In addition, he promised to impose hijab (veil) on all women venturing out of the house. Hardline injunctions against women are also issued by his Deobandi colleague Maulana Samiul Haq who vows to treat the women with the same severity as the Taliban.

Origin of Sectarian Violence
After coming to power, General Zia took over the populist slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa and imposed shariah on Pakistan. It really meant the imposition of the Sunni Hanafi fiqh or jurisprudence followed by the majority population from which the Shias were excluded. Two early laws under shariah enforced by him, failed miserably: the first, abolition of riba

The writer succeeded in arranging for a meeting with him through a third party but Umar Sheikh had to leave Lahore urgently for an unknown place on the appointed day 11 Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad Kashmir wa Afghanistan: Jihadi Tanzimun aur Mazhabi Jamaton ka aik Jaeza, (Mashal Books Lahore, 2002).


(interest), failed because of the inability of the Islamic scholars to reinterpret Islam for modern conditions; the second, zakat, failed because the Shia jurisprudence, called Fiqh-iJaafaria, had a conflicting interpretation of zakat. In 1980, an unprecedented procession of Shias, led by Mufti Jaafar Hussain, laid siege to Islamabad and forced General Zia to exempt the Shia community from the deduction of zakat. The concept of Sunni ushr (poordue on land) is also rejected by Shia jurisprudence. It appears that, when the anti-Shia movement started in Jhang in the 1980s, General Zia not only ignored it but saw it as his balancing act against the rebellious Shia community. This was worsened by Imam Khomeini's criticism of General Zia. The rise of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in the stronghold of big Shia landlords in Punjab changed the sectarian scene in Pakistan. There is evidence that General Zia was warned of Jhangvi's anti-Shia and anti-Iran movement, but he ignored the warning and allowed it to blossom into a full-fledged religious party called Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahaba of Pakistan (ASSP). In small towns, the old Shia-Sunni debate restarted with the fury that had become dampened in the past. The tracts which carried this debate were scurrilous in the extreme and helped the clerics to whip up passions. Meanwhile, in 1986, General Zia allowed a 'purge' of Turi Shias in the divided city of Parachinar (capital of Kurram Agency on the border with Afghanistan) at the hands of the Sunni Afghan mujahideen in conjunction with the local Sunni population. Parachinar was the launching-pad of the Mujahideen attacks into Afghanistan and the Turis were not cooperative. Tehrike-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqha-i-Jaafaria had come into being during the dispute over zakat in 1980. When the Parachinar massacre occurred, the party was led by a Turi leader, Allama Arif-ul-Hussaini, a companion of Imam Khomeini during his exile in Najaf. (He is celebrated as a martyr in Iran with a postage-stamp portrait.) Allama Hussaini was murdered in Peshawar in August 1988, for which the Turis held General Zia responsible. That was also the year of General Zia's death (within a fortnight of Hussaini's murder) in an air-crash in Bahawalpur, and for a time there was rumour of Shia involvement in his assassination although no solid evidence supporting this speculation was ever uncovered. The NWFP governor, General Fazle Haq, whom the Turis accused of complicity in the murder of Allama Hussaini, was ambushed and killed in 1991. In 1989, the Afghan mujahideen government-in-exile came into being in Peshawar after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. At the behest of Saudi Arabia, the exiled Shia mujahideen of Iran were not included in this government. The Saudis paid over 23 million dollars a week during the 519-member session of the Mujahideen shura as bribe for it.12 In 1990, Maulana Jhangvi was murdered at the climax of his anti-Iran and anti-Shia campaign of extreme insult and denigration. The same year, as if in retaliation, an activist of Sipah-i-Sahaba shot the Iranian consul Sadiq Ganji dead in Lahore. The tit-for-tat killings were thus started. Maulana Isar-ul-Qasimi, chief of the Sipah, was gunned down in 1991. Since then, the state of Pakistan has had to answer for the killing of more Iranians in Pakistan. Another consular officer was gunned down in Multan and a number of Iranian air force trainees were ambushed in Rawalpindi on inside information received by the killers,

Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: from a Buffer State to Failed State, (Yale University Press, 1995


thus implying involvement from sectarian officers from within the army. Most commentators in Pakistan are scared of telling the truth. Most inter-sectarian dialogue is fake since its great facade of speech-making is nothing but divine-sounding rationalisation. Almost all Muslim clerics lie when it comes to sectarian deaths. General Zia allowed the Deobandi lashkars to attack Gilgit and put under challenge the historical domination there of Ismaili and Shia communities.13 In 2003, the anti-Shia violence was extended to Balochistan where the Hazara Shia community was targeted in two incidents killing over 50 men. The Pakistan government, speaking through prime minister Mir Zafrullah Jamali and interior minister Faisal Saleh Hayat, claimed that the act of terrorism could have been planned and executed by India through its freshly opened consulates in Afghanistan. It later came to light that the action was coordinated by the banned sectarian organisations, Jaish-eMuhammad, Sipah Sahaba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.14 Jaish-i-Muhammad, as an offshoot of Sipah Sahaba, had carried out the murders of Shia doctors in Karachi in 1998. Its Al Qaeda-backed activist Sheikh Umar executed the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl in 2002. Pakistan's jihad in Kashmir has created an alternative state apparatus in the outfits that fight there as surrogate warriors. The price that civil society pays for this deniable covert war has been climbing over the years and has now become almost intolerable. During the latest round of war in Afghanistan most of these outfits have opposed General Musharraf's policy of joining the world coalition against terrorism. All religious leaders of these jihadi outfits know their activity can easily fall in the category of terrorism and therefore try to scare the common citizen by predicting that the next American target will be Pakistan. They see hazily the possibility of a takeover, not by themselves, as that would be impossible given their internecine nature, but by someone else from within the establishment, that will give them a new lease of life an earlier lease having seen foreclosure the day Osama bin Laden decided to attack New York and Washington. In 2001 the state of Pakistan had to effect a volte face in its jihadi policy after the UN Security Council resolution 1373 which banned the jihadi militias in Pakistan and took action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Local politics earlier aligned to the pro-Taliban policy has been severely disrupted as a result.15 The reaction of the Pakistani people and intellectuals against the United States for what ensued in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, has given fresh legitimacy to the militias dubbed terrorist by the UN resolution. The Pakistan army's policy of 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan against India, Iran, Uzbekistan and the Northern Alliance, deliberately sacrificed the earlier doctrine of the Durand Line that had divided the Pushtun nation in 1893, as a result of which the map of Pakistan was legitimised in 1947. After 2001, as a reaction to the defeat of the 'strategic depth' policy, the Pushtun vote in Pakistan brought a government of a predominantly Deobandi consensus in the NWFP. It is the vote of a nation that wants to be reunited at the cost of the integrity of Pakistan. The public opinion in


K.M. Ahmed in daily Dawn (21 December, 2002): 'In April 1988, armed rioters from outside entered the Gilgit environs 14 GEO TV (12 September, 2003) had host Hamid Mir interviewing the imam of the Hazara Imam Bargah at Quetta where the Shiite community was blown up by suicide bombers 15 Geo TV (12 September 2003) Hamid Mir investigated the well known mystery of the perfumed soil of Kohat after Al Qaeda mujahideen were gunned down there.


Pakistan is close to the thinking of this consensus as demonstrated by the 'million marches' in favour of the clergy.16

An example of an early Shia-Sunni fitna shootout occurred in Kurram, one of the tribal agencies of the Northwest Pakistan, where the Pashtoon population was split between Sunnis and Shia. In September 1996 more than 200 people were killed when a gun battle between teenage Shia and Sunni escalated into a communal war that lasted five days. Woman and children were kidnapped and gunmen even executed out-of-towners who were staying at a local hotel. 17

The violence worsened after September 11th and the expulsion of the Taliban from Afghanistan. On March 2, 2004, at least 42 persons were killed and more than 100 wounded when a procession of the Shia Muslims was attacked by rival Sunni extremists at Liaquat Bazaar in Quetta. Separately, on October 7, 2004, a car bomb killed 40 members of an extremist Sunni organization in Multan. 300 people died during 2006.18

Parachinar is the capital of Kurram Agency, FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) of Pakistan. It is about 290 km west of the capital, Islamabad. It is situated on a neck of Pakistani territory south of Peshawar, that juts into Paktia Province in Afghanistan and is the closest point in Pakistan to Kabul and borders on the Tora Bora region in Afghanistan. Parachinar originated as a summer residence for nomdic tribes who wintered their livestock at lower altitudes, and the district had originally been a summer residence for Moghul emperors from Delhi. The Parachinar region was part of Afghanistan before the Second Afghan War of 1878-79, but was not firmly annexed by the British due to resistance from local tribes until 1892. During the colonial era between then and 1947 Parachinar became a hill station for people from Peshawar as it is relatively cool in the summer and very easy to reach from the plains despite its high altitude since there are no steep ascents on the route from Peshawar.
16 17

Khaled Ahmed, “Islamic extremism”, south asian media.

Kaplan, Robert, Soldiers of God : With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, New York : Vintage Departures, 2001, p.242
Shiite-Sunni conflict rises in Pakistan |



The name of this region is Parachinar as there was a big tree of Chinar (Maple tree) in the headquarters of Kurram Agency. In Kurram Agency there is a famous tribe known as "Parikhel " this tribe used to get together under this Chinar tree to resolve their social matters. This is why this region is called Parachinar.19 Although it was a well-known travel destination in the years before the PDPA(People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) came to power, since that time Parachinar has become a hotbed of Islamic terrorism and sectarian violence. The town and its surrounds are believed to be a major staging point for Osama bin Laden and his accomplices during the years when the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were planned. The population are largely of the Turi tribe of Pashtuns who are mostly Shia Muslims and speak Pashto. About half the population are Shia and half Sunni Muslims. Because of its proximity to the border it has been an important staging point for mujahadeen and Taliban fighters entering Afghanistan.20

Violance in Parachinar
In the city of Parachinar, in the tribal northern areas, sectarian strife has at times virtually taken the form of a tribal civil war, with the army and paramilitary forces having to be called in to restore order. For Example, Parachinar, a city of five hundred thousand inhabitants and capital of Kurram Agency bordering Afghanistan, was torn by sectarian clashes on 5 September 1996, following an incident of wall chalking by sectarian students. Confrontation between rival student groups escalated into nine days of sectarian war, in which some two hundred people were killed and many more injured.20 While the army moved in and took control of Parachinar, “free use of missiles, mortars, and rocket launchers forced residents of several villages to take shelter in nearby mountains.” There were also reports of missile attacks from the Paktia province of Afghanistan bordering the strife-torn area, hitting the Shia villages of Paiwar, Kharlachi, Burki and Bughday in the upper Parachinar. As the army recovered illegal weapons in Parachinar during a house-tohouse search23 after it clamped a curfew, Interior Minister General. Naseerullah Babar publicly expressed his dismay in the national assembly for the government’s failure in protecting people because “two neighboring countries (Iran and Afghanistan) were fighting their war in Pakistan.” He also blamed the religious schools as “the main cause of bloodshed in Parachinar,” and regretted that the government had given land to the two countries for building their madrassas. Even so, General Babar was only partly right in attributing disturbances to Iran and Afghanistan and their madrassas, given that the tactical use of the sectarian factor in this strategic region had been perfected by General Zia-ul Haq during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: in 1986, for example, General Zia allowed the Sunni Afghan mujahideen and their local Sunni supporters to mow down the Turi Shias of upper Parachinar for obstructing the use of their territory as a launching pad against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. 21
19 20 21

Gazetteer of Parachinar by Rose Keppel, Political agent Kurram 1903-05. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Parachinar.
Khaled Ahmed, “When the State Kills,” Friday Times, September 2001.


The Parachinar paradigm of sectarian violence marked by the use of heavy weapons by both sides, support of Afghan settlers and Taliban for the local Sunnis, and the deployment of the army for restoring order, has been replicated in several other clashes in the tribal areas.22 In 2001, the Parachinari community did not offer shelter to Al Qaeda and Taliban elements fleeing from Afghanistan. In fact, one tribe agreed to shelter the “Arab mujahideen” fleeing from Tora Bora while another betrayed them to the Pakistani authorities who brought them to a jail in Kohat where a gunfight killed 10 of them. A monument to Al Qaeda warriors in Kohat still stands, memorialising also the sectarian violence that unfolded in that city in the days that followed. The new wave of violence in Parachinar erupted in the month of April 2007, when a gunman fired shots on a procession carried out by a particular sect on April 6. This incident triggered the violence between two sects in the area and despite the presence of security forces, the violence has continued unabated through the year.23 On February 16, 2008, a bomb in Parachinar killed 37 members of the Pakistan People's Party after they returned to party headquarters from a rally. There have been numerous other bombings in recent years due to the conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Pakistan has inherited the Kurram Valley vendetta. As the Afghan war loosened its control over the areas, and as Sunnis took part in the war as mujahideen, and the Shias abstained, the administrative competence of the Pakistani officers in the Agency was eroded. The periodic battles that have taken place are also a Pakistani legacy, the Lower Kurram Valley being controlled completely by the anti-Shia organisation earlier called Sipah Sahaba (SSP). Azam Tariq, the Punjabi chief of SSP, became a leader of these Pushtuns more than in Jhang in Punjab from where he had started, and the Kurram Valley factor was clearly the cause of his strength vis-à-vis the Pakistan government. Under General Zia, the trend to attack the Shia began in Parachinar in 1986, when the mujahideen felt hampered by the Turis while marching into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet forces. It was in 1986 that General Zia allowed a “purge” of the Turi Shias in the divided city of Parachinar at the hands of the Sunni Afghan mujahideen in conjunction with the local Sunni population. The Shia organization Tehrike-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaafaria (TNFJ) had come into being under the leadership of a Turi Shia of Parachinar, Allama Ariful Hussaini in 1983. When the Parachinar massacre occurred, the party was led by him. Allama Hussaini was murdered in Peshawar in August 1988, for which the Turis held General Zia responsible. That was also the year of General Zia’s death (within a fortnight of Hussaini’s murder) in an air-crash in Bahawalpur, and for a time there was rumour of Shia involvement in his assassination although no solid evidence supporting this speculation was

Suroosh Irfani, Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence: Between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture, Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, chapter 07.

Abhishek Behl, Merinews, 27 November 2007,


ever uncovered. But the NWFP governor General Fazle Haq, whom the Turis accused of complicity in the murder of Allama Hussaini, was ambushed and killed in 1991. (Mehram Ali, the Shia terrorist who blew up the Sipah leader Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi at the sessions court in Lahore, was trained in Parachinar). 24

There are some people with little knowledge who have resorted to the Kufr slogans against each other. Some Sunnis have called Shi’ahs Kafirs and some Shi’ahs have called Sunnis Kafir. Some people use these slogans for their own political aims and objectives. It is the duty of recognized scholars from among the Sunnis and Shi’ahs both to condemn such slogans. We may explain our respective positions but we must not abuse each other. We should respect each other’s life, property and institutions. There is no place in Islam for religious or sectarian violence. The sectarian violence in Pakistan cannot be the act of any sensible Muslim. This is either done by some foolish Pakistanis or by the enemies of Pakistan. It is painful, shameful, criminal, most disgusting and horrible to see Muslims being killed in a Muslim country in their Masajid. It is the responsibility of the Government of Pakistan and all the people of Pakistan to see that those who committed such crimes are brought to justice immediately.


The daily Times, Islamabad, Monday, November 19, 2007


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