UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) — Digging Deeper CXIX: April 5, 2010, 7:00 p.m.

Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983 [ms. completed in April 1983 (423)]), 481 pp. Updated version: Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), 578 pp., with a foreword by Edward Said, a new preface, and three new chapters (8-10).
[Thesis. "Israel and the United States—especially the latter [for Israel is "a state that survives largely on gifts and grants from the West" (48)]—are rejectionists opposed to peace, whereas the Arabs, including the PLO, have for years been trying to accommodate themselves to the reality of Israel" (vii [Said], emphasis added). "As long as the United States remains committed to an Israeli Sparta as a strategic asset [as it has been since the early 1970s]. . . the prospects are for further tragedy" (469).] Foreword by Edward W. Said. A "great and important book"; sources "staggeringly complete" (vii). "There is something profoundly moving about a mind of such noble ideals repeatedly stirred on behalf of human suffering and injustice. One thinks here of Voltaire, of Benda, of Russell, although more than any one of them, Chomsky commands what he calls 'reality'—facts—over a breathtaking range" (vii). Preface to the Updated Edition. [March 1999] The Middle East is "the most strategically important area in the world," to quote Eisenhower (ix). Iran is pushing for a U.S. confrontation with Iran (x-xi). The fear of "Islamic fundamentalism" is propaganda with a farcical element, given U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and Afghan rebels (xi-xii). The U.S. continues to regard Israel as a strategic asset; this "seems stable in the foreseeable future" (xiii; xii-xiii). Israel continues to develop weapons of mass destruction under the aegis of the U.S. (xiii-xiv). The international framework, though, is "fraught with danger and uncertainty" (xiv; xiv-xvi). The U.S. and Israel continue to "implement the extreme rejectionist program they have maintained since the early 1970s" (xvi). In 1999, the U.S. was continuing to greenlight settlements; comments on the Wye Memorandum (Oct. 23, 1998) with almost total indifference to the welfare of Palestinians (xvii-xix). Hizbollah resistance is "increasingly sophisticated" (xixxx). Because of Netanyahu's recalcitrance, "Oslo is dying" (xx). But perhaps Hillary Clinton's endorsement in running for the Senate of a Palestinian state—albeit "tiny, disarmed, poor, dominated by Israel"—can be regarded as a hopeful sign (xxi). Ch. 1: Fanning the Flames. Critics of Israel are generally charged with hypocrisy, and this is in part justified (1-2). This book is not "an attempt at a general history," merely an attempt "to bring out certain elements of the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel, and of their relationship to the original inhabitants of the land, which I think have been insufficiently appreciated or addressed and often seriously misrepresented" (3). There is a focus on Israeli actions, but "my real concern" is U.S. policies (34). Chomsky calls himself a "supporter of Israel," though "with much reluctance" (4). The reaction to the Sabra and Shatila massacres in West Beirut in September 1982 reflected settled narrative patterns (4-6). The problem predates Likud and Begin (6). Abandon hypocrisy: either support Greater Israel or oppose it (6). Notes. (7). Ch. 2: The Origins of the "Special Relationship." 1. Levels of Support: Diplomatic, Material, Ideological. Diplomatic support (9). Military and economic aid in quantities vast but unknown, and effectively unmonitored (9-11). Contrast tight monitoring of Egyptian aid (11). Ideological support in the U.S., including "vilification, abuse, and sometimes outright lying directed against" critics of Israel (11-12). 2. Causal Factors. The emphasis on "the Israeli lobby" in the U.S. (Seth Tillman's phrase) "underestimates the scope of the 'support for Israel'" (Chomsky emphasizes right-wing evangelical support and critiques the Perlmutters' The Real Anti-Semitism in America, which calls anti-Zionism either anti-Semitism or Jewish selfhatred) (13; 13-17). Elie Wiesel in 1982: "I support Israel—period. I identify with Israel—period. I never attack, never criticize Israel when I am not in Israel" (16). 2.1. Domestic Pressure Groups and Their Interests. Claims about the Israel lobby also overestimate the role of political pressure groups in decision-making and the degree of pluralism in the U.S.; in fact "No pressure group will dominate access to public opinion or maintain consistent influence over policy-making unless its aims are close to those of elite elements with real power" (17). 2.2. U.S. Strategic Interests. "[E]nergy reserves in the region," not Israel, is the U.S.'s "major interest in the Middle East" (17). 2.2.1. Threats to U.S. Control of Middle East Oil. First post-war counterinsurgency was in Greece in 1947 against forces deriving from peasants' and workers' anti-Nazi resistance; there was no real Soviet threat (18-19). Europe, rather, was the U.S. main adversary in the region (19-20). 2.2.2. The Indigenous Threat: Israel as a Strategic Asset. A third threat is radical nationalism, and "[i]t is in this context that the U.S.Israel 'special relationship' has matured" (20). Israel also served American interests in the region in various ways (21-23). 2.2.3. Subsidiary Services. And Israel "renders service to U.S. power"—e.g. in Zaire, Honduras, Central America, Indonesia (27; 23-27). 2.3. American Liberalism and Ideological Support for Israel. Liberal support strengthened in the U.S. after the 1967 war as "questioning of Israeli policies has largely been silenced," as reaction to the bombing of the USS Liberty illustrates (29; 27-32). Notes. (33-37). Ch. 3: Rejectionism and Accommodation. 1. A Framework for Discussion. Chomsky's "assumptions": "Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are human

beings with human rights, equal rights . . . Each group has a valid right to national selfdetermination in [the territory of the former Palestine]. . . . the State of Israel within its pre1967 borders had, and retains, whatever one regards as the valid rights of any state within the existing international system" (39, emphasis added). 1.1. The Concept of Rejectionism. the above assumptions constitute what Chomsky calls "accommodation," as opposed to "rejectionism," the denial that, on the one hand, either the State of Israel has no right to exist or that Jews lack the right of national self-determination within the former Palestine, or, on the other hand, that Palestinian Arabs lack the right of national selfdetermination (to use it only for the former is "racist" (39-40, emphasis added). 1.2. The International Consensus. The broad consensus interpretation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 that has prevailed since 1967 "was rejectionist, in that it denied the national rights of Palestinian Arabs" (41; 40-41). Since the mid-1970s, the consensus has been modified to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination in a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the "two-state settlement")—this constitutes "accommodation" (41-42; but see 558). 2. The Stands of the Major Actors. 2.1. The United States. The U.S. supported the international consensus, then switched "by 1970" under Kissinger to the rejectionist "Greater Israel" position (43-44). 2.2. Israel. Labor ["basically the party of the educated Europe-oriented elite— managers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, etc." (49)] and Likud [whose "mass base" is "largely the underclass, the lower middle class, and the workforce, the Sephardic population of Arab origin, along with religious-chauvinist elements, including many recent immigrants from the U.S. and the USSR; it also includes industrialists and many professionals" (50)] are the "two major political groupings in Israel" (44). 2.2.1. The Rejectionist Stands of Labor and Likud. Both Labor and Likud "have been consistently rejectionist" on unconvincing security grounds (45; 44-47). With respect to the occupied territories, Labor has sought to maintain control of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, parts of eastern Sinai, much of the West Bank, an expanded area around Jerusalem, and various corridors, while Likud "has been moving towards extension of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza," though not annexation, "at least in the short run" (48, 49; 47-51). Their position statements have not been explicit, however (49-51). 2.2.2. The Legacy of the Founding Fathers. These positions reflect the clear rejectionism of the founders of Israel (51-52). 2.2.3. The Disguise. This is disguised in the U.S. by (1) limiting the meaning of rejectionism to rejection of Israel's right to exist and (2) emphasizing Israel's willingness to negotiate with Arab states (5254). 2.3. The Population of the Occupied Territories. Both Labor and Likud speak of "Judea and Samaria," not the "West Bank" (54). 2.3.1. Attitudes under Occupation. In the early years of occupation the population was ignored; from 1976 it has been clear the PLU has wide support (54-57). 2.3.2. The Carrot and the Stick. The Village Leagues (57-61). 2.3.3. The "Peace Process." Inhabitants of the occupied territories have almost no interest or belief in the "peace process," with good reason (61-63). 2.3.4. The U.S. and the Conquered Population. Willful ignorance (63-

64). 2.4. The Arab States and the PLO. 2.4.1. The Erosion of Rejectionism and the U.S.-Israeli Response. Nasser in 1970 and Sadat in 1971 offered peace but Israel ignored them, but under Kissinger U.S. policy embraced Israeli rejectionism (64-66). The 1973 war was a response to Israeli rejectionism (66-67). After the war Israeli refusal to make peace continued, with increasing focus on the PLO Covenant (67-70). 2.4.2. Sadat's Trip to Jerusalem and the Rewriting of History. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 offers an example of the rewriting of history with a view to "the manufacture of consent" (Walter Lippmann's phrase, 1922 [Chomsky says 1921 (86n.103)]); other examples (7075). 3. The Continuing Threat of Peace. There have been many Arab offers of peace; historically they have induced "panic" among Israeli leaders; they are stricken from Israeli propaganda that dominates U.S. media (75-80). Notes. (81-88). Ch. 4: Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds. 1. The Pre-State Period. The indigenous population of Palestine naturally opposed Jewish immigration; most Israeli immigrants might have preferred to go to the U.S., but they were not offered the choice (90-94). 2. The War of Independence/Conquest. 1947-1948 (94-98). 3. The Israel-Arab Wars. Statements that Israel's wars before 1982 were defensive are "untrue—indeed, astonishing" (99; 98-103). 4. After the 1967 Conquest. Quiet years except on the Syrian border (103). 4.1. The Settlement Policy of the Labor Governments. Settlement began immediately and a military occupation was imposed (103-07). 4.2. Settlement under Begin and Reagan. 4.2.1. Policies. Settlement accelerated under Begin, and again when Reagan said he regarded settlements in the West Bank as "legal" (107-08). 4.2.2. Reactions. In reporting on settlement policy the U.S., "illusions are put forth as undisputed facts" (113; 107-13). 4.2.3. Policies (continued). A study by former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti says Israel's policies in the West Bank are "an outgrowth of an imperial concept" (114; 113-16). 4.3. The Demographic Problem and Its Solution. It is often said that given Israel's policies, transfer of the population is "the only real solution" to its demographic problem (116-18). 4.4. The Workforce and the Labor Alignment. In addition to "a growing reliance on force and violence, alliance with 'pariah states' such as South Africa, increased chauvinism, irrationality and religious fanaticism, and grandiose conceptions of Israel's global mission," the post-1967 period also saw resentful Sephardic Jews (usually called "Oriental Jews" by Chomsky) assert themselves politically (118-23). 5. The Ways of the Conqueror. 5.1. The West Bank. Settlers have created "a pogromlike atmosphere" with beatings, abuse, torture ("To my knowledge, [Seth Kaplan's defense of torture in the July 23, 1977, New Republic] is the first explicit defense of torture to have appeared in the West apart from the ravings of the ultra-right in France during the Algerian war" [127]), prisons, corruption, humiliation (123-32). 5.2. The Golan Heights. Oppression of Druze villagers to general indifference beginning in December 1981 (132-33). 5.3. The Attack on Palestinian Culture. Fanatical persecution (134-40). 5.4. "The Opportunity to Work in Israel." Shameful work conditions for Palestinian laborers (140-41). 5.5. Israeli Inquiries and American Suppression. The results of human rights

inquiries are generally suppressed (142-43). 6. The Testimony of the Samidin. Rajah Shehadeh's journal of life in the West Bank—The Third Way (1982)—analyzes responses to occupation: 1) blind hate; 2) mute submission; 3) being a 'steadfast one,' or Samid (14346). Bitter comments on remarks by Saul Bellow and Irving Howe (146). 7. The Cycle of Occupation, Resistance, Repression and Moral Degeneration. All these developments flowed from the 1967 victory (147). 7.1. Americans Hear the News. Mocks Irving Howe's lament (147-50). 7.2. The Rise of ReligiousChauvinist Fanaticism. Warning of incipient Jewish fascism (151-56). 8. Conflicts within Israel. 8.1. Within the Jewish Community. The divide in Israeli society is growing (156). 8.2. Non-Jews in the Jewish State. Israel "is not the state of its citizens, but of the Jewish people, those in Israel and in the diaspora. There is no Israeli nationality" (156-57). "'[N]ational institutions' serve the interests of Jews, not citizens of Israel, 15% [in 2009, approx.24%] of whom are not Jews" (158). "The notorious UN Resolution identifying Zionism as a form of racism can be properly condemned for profound hypocrisy . . . but restricted to [the policies of the State of Israel], the resolution cannot be criticized as inaccurate" (158). The notion of a democratic Jewish State contains a "fundamental internal contradiction" (159). 9. The Zionist Movement and the PLO. In the pre-state period, Labor and "the Revisionists, the pre-cursors of Begin's Herut . . . in fact an offshoot of European fascism," were "often in bitter conflict" (160). 9.1. "The Boundaries of Zionist Aspiration." They differed in their tactics, but shared a broad vision that excluded partition as an ultimate aim (Chomsky quotes Ben-Gurion extensively) (161-63). 9.2. Moderates and Extremists. The PLO has divisions similar to pre-state Zionism, and in general "the PLO has the same sort of legitimacy that the Zionist movement had in the pre-state period" (164; 163-64). 9.3. The Use of Terror. Among these similarities is the use of terror, making the "constant denunciation" of the PLO for terrorism an example of "cynicism" (16467). 10. The Problem for Today. Protestations that Americans and Europeans are guilty of crimes just as great as those committed in the establishment of Israel misses the point that such "brutal and inhuman practices" are no longer "tolerated" in "the real world of today" (167). To view the present conflict as "right against right" is "defensible" (168). In any case, Israel is "a reality, a fact that few now contest despite increasingly desperate pretense to the contrary on the part of its numerous supporters and apologists" (168). Notes. (169-80). Ch. 5: Peace for Galilee [longest chapter]. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon is an extension of Israel's effort since 1949 "to remove the displaced Palestinian refugees from the border areas and to destroy their emerging political and military structures"; attacks on civilian populations have been deliberate (181). 1. The Rational Basis for Attacking the Civilian Population. Dispersal and embitterment of relations between them and the local population were the "rational" (Abba Eban) goals of this policy (182-83). 2. The Northern Border of Greater Israel. Zionists have long hoped to extend the border to the Litani River (183-84). 3. The Background in Lebanon. 3.1. The PLO and the Civil War. The PLO was drawn into Lebanon's civil war in the 1970s (184-85). 3.2. Syria and Israel in Lebanon.

Syria intervened on the side of the Christians, with Israeli support (185). Syria later turned against the Christians, but Israel continued to support them (18586). 3.3. The Population under the PLO and the Phalange. Stories of PLO violence and terrorism were greatly exaggerated as Israel moved into Lebanon in 1982 (186-88). 3.4. Israeli Military Occupation in Lebanon in the 1970s. Though reported as retaliatory, Israeli military operations were in pursuit of its "rational" goals (188-92). 4. From July 1981. 4.1. The July Bombardments and the Habib Cease-Fire. Israeli planes initiated hostilities in July 1981 (193). 4.2. The Occupied Territories. Re-elected Begin appointed Ariel Sharon defense minister; he "at once began to plan for the invasion; a harsher regime was instituted in the West Bank and Gaza, and in December and January "the Golan Heights were in effect annexed to Israel" (193). 4.3. The Sinai Withdrawal. The April 1982 withdrawal from Sinai "appears to have been largely staged for a domestic and American audience" (193; 193-95). 4.4. Israeli Provocations and the U.S. Response. A series of provocative actions (195-96). 4.5. The Pretext for the Invasion of Lebanon. PLO wrongly blamed for an attempt on the life of the Israeli ambassador in London on Jun. 3; Israeli "retaliation" 196-98). 4.6. The Reasons for the Invasion of Lebanon. 4.6.1. The Imperatives of Rejectionism. The invasion's political goal—destruction and delegitimation of the PLO—was dictated by "the increasing isolation of the leaders of the rejectionist camp," the U.S. and Israel (203; 198-207). It was accompanied by "heightening the repression in the occupied territories" (207-08). Critique of defenses of the invasion in U.S. media (20809). 4.6.2. Achieving National Unity. Another motive was to unite Israeli opinion behind Begin through war and propaganda (209-10). 4.6.3. A New Order in Lebanon. A further motive was to give Israel leverage in Lebanon (210-12). 4.7. The Green Light from Washington. The U.S. greenlighted the invasion; Reagan's expressed displeasure was for show (213-16). 5. War Is Peace. The name of the operation was Orwellian (216). 5.1. Extermination of the Two-Legged Beasts. Thousands of civilians killed (217-24). 5.2. Beirut: Precision Bombardment. Bombing of hospitals, orphanages, a school bus... (224-28). 5.3. Caring for the Victims: Prisoners, Patients, Refugees. Abuse and torture of prisoners, attacks on medical personnel, blockage of supplies (228-41). 5.4. The Grand Finale. Attacks continued through July and August (241-42). 6. The Taste of Victory. 6.1. The Victors. Biting comments about articles in the New Republic (242-43). 6.2. The Liberated. Contradicting the line Americans heard that the Lebanese were glad to liberated, testimony by Lebanese ambassador to the U.N., Ghassan Tueni, in a statement made in New York but not reported there, and in his Foreign Affairs article; the Lebanese press (243-49). Yasser Arafat left Beirut on Aug. 30 (249-50). Fears of what Phalangists would do were widespread (250-51). The PLO did behave "in a disgraceful and stupid fashion in southern Lebanon (251). 6.3. Israelis. Most Israelis celebrated, but some found disturbing similarities to Nazi practices (254-58). The government and supporters promulgated the Israeli "purity of arms" myth while lying about the PLO (258-61). Labor was supportive, opposing only entry into Beirut (261-62). 6.4. The American Scene. The U.S. media were full of absurdities from "modern stateworshipping intellectuals" (265; 262-66). Criticism was

extremely muted, and there was fervent support for "the Big Lie" from "the extreme left of mainstream politics"—e.g. Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda (271; 266; 266-72). Jacobo Timerman's harsh criticism of the war (including, however, many "standard myths" about Israel) was discussed and tolerated as "a cry of anguish" and a "personal testimony" (273; 272-78). Chomsky summarizes his own writings on the PLO, showing that Timerman's characterization of academics "is a fantasy from beginning to end" (27677). Polls show the success of media as indoctrination, since "less informed" people were more critical (27880). 7. The Critique of the Media. 7.1. The American Media. Media, especially TV, were charged with being "pro-PLU and anti-Israel" in 1982 (280). The criticism was of a new sort; Martin Peretz was especially egregious; an ADL study purporting to demonstrate anti-Israel bias was "in fact absurd" (289; 281-89). 7.2. The "Broad-Scale Mass Psychological War" against Israel. Anguish in Israel at the ineffectiveness of the hasbara (propaganda) campaign (289-97). 7.3. The Israeli Media. Israeli media were criticized by the Israeli public for reporting on the Sabra and Shatila massacres (297-98). 8. The Image Problem. 8.1. In Lebanon. Israeli soldiers destroyed and vandalized archives, university offices, laboratories, etc, (298300). 8.2. Solving the Problem. 8.2.1. Extraordinary Humanitarian Efforts. Fury of people in Lebanon at Israeli humanitarian relief (300-04). 8.2.2. Flowers and Rice. The debate over whether people in Lebanon "welcomed" the invasion was grotesque (304-09). 8.2.3. "The Biggest Hijacking in History." The accusation that the PLO was holding Beirut "hostage" is an example of the propaganda technique of "accus[ing] your enemies of the crimes you carry out or support" (309; 309-12). 8.3. The Image of the Fighters. 8.3.1. The Palestinians. Israeli soldiers expressed admiration for the Palestinian fighters (31214). 8.3.2. The IDF. Martin van Creveld's pessimistic analysis of the IDF's performance (314-15). Notes. (316-28). Ch. 6: Aftermath. 1. A Chapter of Jewish History. The pogrom in Kishinev (Bessarabia [today Moldova]) that killed 45 Jews in 1903 and its influence on opinion (329-32). 2. A Glorious Victory. 2.1. The Achievements of Operation "Peace for Galilee." The Israeli government was flush with success in late August 1982 (333-35). 2.2. The Syrian Phase of the War. Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel's most knowledgeable military correspondent," judges that Israel need not have fought with Syria (335-37). 2.3. The West Falls into Line. As comments by Kissinger showed, Israel's premises had been accepted in the West (337-41). 3. The Taste of Victory Turns Sour. "Traumatic and complex" events in September 1982 (341). 3.1. Reagan's Peace Plan. Reagan's calls for a freeze on new settlements, some from of autonomy, and a Jordanian solution was immediately rejected; media response analyzed (342-48). 3.2. The Israeli Response. 3.2.1. The Incorporation of the Occupied Territories. Begin announced new settlements (348-51). Gaza (352-54). 3.2.2. The March on West Beirut. Israel broke the cease-fire (354-56). 3.3. Ungrateful Clients. Bashir Gemayel, the Maronite Christian who was Israel favored for Lebanon's presidency, came into conflict with Israel (356-59). 4. The Invasion of West Beirut. 4.1. The Gemayel Assassination. Sept. 14 (359-60).

4.2. "To Prevent Bloodshed and Acts of Revenge." The IDF moved into West Beirut (360-62). The Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj el-Brajneh camps of Palestinians (362-63). 5. A Chapter of Palestinian History. The massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camps of perhaps 2000 people on Sept. 16 (364-75). 6. Who Is Responsible? 6.1. The Background of the Inquiry. Israeli denials (375-77). 6.2. The Charges. It blamed the Phalange (377-78). 6.3. "We" and "They": Defiling the Beautiful Israel. In the response, the false idea that Begin and Sharon were responsible for something not seen before in Israeli history was promulgated (37885). 6.4. On "Moral Idiocy." Mordant comments on the response, focusing on Elie Wiesel (385-87). 6.5. "Putting a Snake into a Child's Bed": The U.S. and Its Commitments. 6.5.1. The Defenseless Remnants. The U.S.'s reaction was most restrained (388-90). 6.5.2. The "Brought-in." The U.S. expressed no concern (39091). 6.5.3. More on Hypocrisy. The ultimate responsibility lies with the U.S. 6.6. The "Principal Culprits." Journalists who have dehumanized Palestinians bear responsibility (392-93). 6.7. Reactions: Israel and Elsewhere. Israeli "race hatred" toward Palestinians must be due to the threat they are felt to represent to the legitimacy of the State of Israel (394-97). 6.8. The Commission of Inquiry (The Kahan Commission). The Kahan Commission was the occasion for Israeli self-congratulation, though despite "overwhelming evidence" that it whitewashes the Israeli leadership (405; 397-09). 7. Elsewhere in Lebanon. Chomsky denies the commission demonstrates Israel's "sublime moral qualities" (409). 7.1. The South. There is evidence that Palestinian males were systematically eliminated by forces under Maj. Sa'ad Haddad, the Israeli client (410-14). Indifference to the humanitarian disaster in southern Lebanon (414-16). Israel began to arm other militias, regarding Haddad as a "dubious client" (416-17). Simultaneously, moves toward "normalization" (41718). 7.2. The Chouf. In the Druze homeland SE of Beirut, which had remained peaceful during the civil war, Israel provoked Phalange-Druze hostilities in order to justify an Israeli presence (418-20). 7.3. Beirut under the Israeli Invasion. The Muslim population was disarmed; the Phalange tortured Palestinians; the PLO Research Center was destroyed (420-23). 7.4. Under Syrian Control. The remainder of Lebanon was under Syrian control (423). 8. Israel's Moral Lapse. Ironic comments about Reagan's discovery of Israel's "moral" obligation to leave now that the U.S. desires this (42330). Notes. (431-40). Ch. 7: The Road to Armageddon. 1. The Fateful Triangle. Though absurdly disparate in power, the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinians "have become locked into a fateful triangular relationship, and within it they are drifting towards disaster" (441). 2. The Threat to Local Parties. For the Palestinians, these are "too obvious for further comment" (441). 2.1. The Logic of Occupation. "Sooner or later, Israel will face military defeat . . . or the need to resort to a nuclear threat . . . Short of that, it will drift towards internal social, moral, and political degeneration"; so-called supporters of Israel are really "supporters of Israel's moral degeneration and ultimate destruction" (442). Demoralization of soldiers (442-43). Consequences of adopting an anti-democratic and anti-Enlightenment ideology based on the Bible: "The sense that the age

of the Enlightenment is over and that it was based on fundamental misconceptions of human nature and needs has significant roots in Zionist thinking, even among liberal Zionists" (445). Examples of ugly, extremist, murderous views (446-47). 2.2. The Next Round. Another war seems likely (448-49). 3. The Threat to the United States and the World. 3.1. The Risk of Superpower Confrontation. A considerable risk (449-51). 3.2. The Evasions of the Peace Movement. Even the peace movement acts to protect Israel, as Chomsky learned when the example of the Israel invasion of Lebanon was edited out when an article of his own the danger of superpower confrontation was reproduced in Worldview, a journal of the Council on Religion and International Affairs (451-52). 4. Prospects. The Palestinians are "so weak and their options are so few that their impact on events will be slight" (452). 4.1. Assuming U.S. Rejectionism. 4.1.1. The Spectrum of Israeli Political Thinking. Rejectionism is overwhelmingly supported by the Israeli Jewish population (453-55). 4.1.2. "From Coexistence to Hegemony." The logic of Israeli development implies embrace of preemptive war and a "drive for a kind of Ottomanization of the [Mideast] region," including Iran (459; 455-61). Chomsky seems to endorse an analysis by Yoram Peri, a high-level Israeli adviser, published in Davar in October 1982, according to which Israel has moved to a "new conception" of its basic military and diplomatic situation: "No longer a status quo power, having achieved military dominance as the world's fourth most powerful military force, and no longer believing in even the possibility of peace or even its desirability except in terms of Israeli hegemony, Israel is now committed to 'destabilization' of the region, including Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In accordance with the new conception, Israel should now use its military dominance to expand its borders and 'to create a new reality,' a 'new order,' rather than seek recognition within the status quo" (462). But the U.S. is "a status quo power," so opposition between the two seems inevitable in the future (462-63). 4.2. Assuming an Abandonment of U.S. Rejectionism. 4.2.1. The Effect on Israeli Policy. At first glance, it would appear that if the U.S. abandoned rejectionism, Israel as a dependent power would have to yield (46364). 4.2.2. Israel's Secret Weapon. This may still be so, but Israel's military is so strong that it may no longer be possible to hold it back form actions contrary to U.S. interests (464-66). Israel's nuclear weapons (about 200 operational weapons) (466-67). The existence of a "Samson complex," according to which if pressed Israel would be willing to "kill and bury all the Gentiles around us while we ourselves shall die with them" (peace activist Aryeh Eliav's words) (467-68). Israel's "secret weapon" is that it may "go crazy" (468). "Sooner or later, the time will come when even a switch in U.S. policy away from the rejectionism of the past years will be too late" (468). Notes. (470-71). Ch. 8: The Palestinian Uprising. [Based on a chapter intended for but not included in Deterring Democracy (Verso, 1991), and apparently written in late 1988 and early 1989.] Suspended sentence for Shimon Yifrah, a Gaza settler who murdered a Palestinian girl in a schoolyard in December 1987 (47375). 1. "Let Us Cry." "[R]epression of the Intifada rose to new levels of racist brutality," including house destruction as collective punishment, expulsions,

reconstruction of a collaborator network (when collaborators are caught and killed, media describe this as "inter-Arab violence," etc.), and humiliation (47580). 2. The Reality of the Occupation. Endless degradation has produced despair; Israeli racism toward Arabs even as supporters celebrate Israel's "decency" (481-84). 3. Scenes from the Uprising. Chomsky visited Israel & the occupied territories in April 1988 (484-85). 3.1. Repression and Resistance. Israel's founders employed terror and their successors continue to do so in an occupation marked by severe oppression (485-90). 3.2. Some Personal Observations. Praise for Palestinian resistance Chomsky witnessed in West Bank (490-500). 3.3. Elsewhere under Occupation. Spirited resistance (50003). 3.4. Israel's Peace Movement. Only in late 1988 did Peace Now (with which Abba Eban is associated) abandon its extreme rejectionist position (503-04). The PLO is much accommodationist than Peace Now or the U.S. (505). Uncritical embrace of the contradictory notion of "Israel's democratic, Jewish character" characterizes mainstream discussion in the U.S. (50609). Notes. (510-13). Ch. 9: "Limited War" in Lebanon. [Taken from "'Limited War' in Lebanon," Z Magazine, September 1993.] 1. The Rules of the Game. Israeli assault on Lebanon in July 1993 (515-16). A response to Hizbollah's decision to respond to Israeli strikes after Israel's assassination of leader Sheikh Abbas Mussawi (516-19). 2. The Logic of Terror. Israel's policy is terroristic in nature (519-25). 3. Safeguarding the Occupation. Labor pursues territorial arrangement (as opposed to Likud's pursuit of sovereignty); despite talks of a "peace process," the U.S. is committed to rejectionism (525-28). 4. Post-Oslo Lebanon. Further attacks on Lebanon in April 1996 (528-30). Airstrikes in November 1998 (530). Notes. (531-32). Ch. 10: Washington's "Peace Process." [Taken from "The Israel-Arafat Agreement," Z Magazine, October 1993.] 1. Oslo I. Background to the Aug. 30,1993: continued Israeli & U.S. rejectionism and declining popularity for the PLO (533-36). The agreement is a complete victory for the rejectionists, offering "little hope" for Palestinians (536-40). 2. Oslo II. Oslo II (Sept. 28, 1995) saw the division of the West Bank into three zones, "rescind[ing] the position of virtually the entire world that the settlements are illegal and that Israel has no claim to the territories acquired by force in 1967" and amounting to a "peace of the victors" (541; 552; 540-53). Enthusiastic media coverage (553-55). Dubbed a "martyr for peace" when he was assassinated in November 1995, Yitzhak Rabin was really anything but (555-57). Oslo II signified "a very impressive power play" on the part of the U.S., a "remarkable testimony to the rule of force in international affairs and the power of doctrinal management in a sociocultural setting in which successful marketing is the highest value and the intellectual culture is obedient and unquestioning" (558). 3. "Another Crushed Nation"? In the eyes of thinkers like Irving Kristol, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, Martin Peretz, Walter Laqueur, and Ruth Wisse, the Palestinians are merely another "insignificant nation" whose "delusions of significance" must on occasion be driven from their minds (558 [Kristol]; 558-59). Something like the

Bantustan model seems likely to prevail in the occupied territories, with exploitative links to the larger system (559-65). Notes. (566-68). Index. 9 pp. About the Author. Noam Chomsky was a professor of linguistics at M.I.T. when he wrote this book; a longtime activist, he had already written many books, including Toward a New Cold War and The Political Economy of Human Rights (2 vols., with Edward S. Herman). [Additional information. Noam Chomsky was born on Dec.. 7, 1928, in Philadelphia. His parents were from Ukraine and Belarus; his father was a professor of Hebrew and a member of IWW. Chomsky graduated from the Univ. of Pennsylvania in 1949 and continued his studies their, completing his Ph.D. in linguistics in 1955. He took a position at M.I.T. and has remained there. His doctoral work led to Syntactic Structures (1957), a seminal work introducing the notion of transformational grammar that revolutionized his field. Chomsky began to write and speak on political matters during the Vietnam war. His February 1967 essay "The Responsibility of Intellectuals" and his 1969 book American Power and the New Mandarins established his reputation. His political philosophy tends toward

anarcho-syndicalism. Chomsky married linguist Carol Schatz in 1949; she died in 2008. They had two daughters and a son. They lived briefly in a kibbutz in Israel in 1953.] [Critique. This book is not really "updated." It consists in the 1983 volume reprinted with a new preface and foreword and adaptations of three more articles from the 1990s. Chomsky acknowledges this in a single sentence (xvi). Except for a not very satisfactory account of a visit to the West Bank in 1988 (484-500), the book is based entirely on Chomsky's reading, including, valuably, the Hebrew-language Israeli press. Published in 1983, it foreshadows the analysis of the U.S. media system Chomsky published five years later (Manufacturing Consent). Chomsky's trademark mordancy is most unbridled when skewering the hypocrisy of so-called "liberal supporters of Israel." Despite its length, its treatment of subjects is somewhat haphazard and often superficial; Chomsky is right to warn the reader that this is not "an attempt at a general history" (3). The volume has only passing remarks on Hezbollah and never mentions Hamas, though this organization was founded in 1987. In retrospect, it seems surprising that the clear-sighted Chomsky did not foresee the replacement of Communism with Islamic fundamentalism as the bogeyman of the U.S. national security state.]

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