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Name:

Felix de Jongh (10124470).

Course:

Citizens and Public Opinion

Supervisor:

C.M. Brenes MSc

19-12-2015

Assignment: Final Essay


Word count:

3618 words
4318 including tables and graphs

Political Television Shows and Political Trust;


The Effects of TV-Media in Democratic Corporatist Countries

Abstract
Watching politically-oriented television programs has been blamed for negative effects on
social capital since the 1970s. The negative character of the news is often pointed to as the
reason people distrust politicians. Others theorized that the causal relationship runs much
deeper. With the decline of TV in favour of the internet as a primary source for political
information gathering, the older age groups lag behind in adapting to and using of the
internet. Based on data from the European Social Survey, this study investigates whether a
correlation between political TV-watching and political trust can be found in five democratic
corporatist countries. A mild positive correlation was found, meaning that (at least for these
countries) watching politically-oriented broadcast actually somewhat improves trust among
individuals born before 1961.
Introduction

Political TV and Political Trust


In 1970s United States of America, peoples trust in political institutions was dwindling. On
the other hand, television started to become the center of the household with many families
clustered in front of the screen. A theory was coined, blaming particular features of political
television shows as the culprit of the political malaise, which was dubbed the videomalaisetheory by Michael J. Robinson (Robinson, 1976: p.412; Holtz-Bacha, 1990: p.73). Robinson
discovered that, in a case study of political broadcasting regarding the 1968 presidential
election, television journalists themselves created political discontents and frustrations to
dramatize the elections (1976: p.421). He concluded that the publics growing dependence on
video journalism resulted in (a) social distrust, (b) political cynicism, (c) political inefficacy,
(d) partisan disloyalty and (e) third party viability (ibid: p.425). Robinson admitted that he
could not prove a causal relationship, but stated that the evidence does point towards
television being the cause of declining political trust (ibid).
Since Robinson could not provide definitive proof of his theory, it remained relatively
unimportant. Some studies even proved the opposite, finding that exposure to political
information both in print and on television led to less alienation and more political
participation in Western-Germany (Holtz-Bacha, 1990: p.81). Interest in the theory resurfaced
however, when Robert Putnam published a series of articles on the decline of social capital,
parting blame on certain aspects of television programming (1995a: pp.678-680; 1995b:
p.75). His works even spawned a counter-theory, the Virtuous Circle-theory, which blames
long-term distrust in American society (Norris, 1996: p.479). Research has been inconclusive
as of yet, with some finding evidence for the videomalaise-theory (Mutz & Reeves, 2005:
p.12), while others find limited support and still doubt the causal relationship the theory
asserts (Avery, 2009: p.426).

Political TV and Political Trust


With the recent rise of the internet, a serious competitor for politically oriented news
has emerged. As a news platform, it offers previously unheard of characteristics such as
interactivity, discussion and sharing which are found to increase political efficacy (Moeller, et
al, 2013: p.8), and have shown the potential of growth for social capital (Bakker & de Vreese,
2011: p.15). This is contrary to Putnams belief that the technological transformation of
leisure will bring about a more individualized society, making our communities wider and
shallower (Putnam, 1995b: p.75). However, not everyone is as quick to adapt to using new
technologies. For instance, at the end of 2010, only 40% of Americans over the age of 65 was
online, while the age group 50 64 had 70% using the internet (Zickuhr & Madden, 2012:
p.4).
To this population, the internet might not be substituting TV-watching, with television
remaining as the most important source for political news. Hence, some important questions
still remain unanswered which, in context with the videomalaise-theory, merit answers. This
paper will aim to answer the following research question: does watching more politically
oriented TV-programming have an effect on political trust in countries with a democratic
corporatist media system among citizens over 50?
Further in this essay, the videomalaise-theory will be explicitly explained, followed
by the method this essay will use to answer the research question above. The results of the
research will be presented, concluded by a discussion of the results and some lessons which
might be learned from said results.

Theory
Late 1960s, political trust was dwindling in the United States, exemplified by the 1968
elections between Wallace and Nixon (Robinson, 1976: p.409). Spurred by footage of the

Political TV and Political Trust


Vietnam War, people became more skeptic of politicians (ibid: p.410). By 1972, 64% of
Americans reported they felt that television provided most of their knowledge of current
political affairs, both nationally and internationally (ibid: p.409). Combined with
hypothesized links between televised public affairs and a change in political climate (first
conceived by Kurt and Gladys Lang in 1955) (ibid: p.410), Robinson believed to have found
proof that television was detrimental to the level of trust in politicians by the public.
In his theory, which he dubbed the videomalaise-theory, he suggests six interrelated
characteristics which explain the growth of videomalaise. The first being the abnormal size
and shape of the of the television news audience. Other than newspapers, television is able
to reach people who are not willing to put in the effort of reading to stay in touch with current
affairs. This means, according to Robinson, that the less wealthy or less well educated are not
only more likely to watch TV-news, they more heavily rely on it. Because of this, TV
audiences are more susceptible to media effects (Robinson, 1976: p.426).
The second characteristic are the public perceptions of the credibility of networks.
Combined with the aforementioned audience characteristic, people are more eager to believe
whatever is broadcast (Robinson, 1976: p.427). This is also due to the content, which is
Robinsons third characteristic of videomalaise: in order to catch audiences, networks use
more interpretive news reporting (ibid). Television journalism needs to be thematic, with a
continuous narrative a beginning, a middle and an ending to maintain the interest of the
audience (ibid: pp.427-428). Fourth, there is too much of a negativistic emphasis in television
reporting, Robinson states. Bad news is pushed up front, emphasizing what is wrong with the
world instead of focusing on the good (ibid: p.428). The fifth characteristic is closely related
to the fourth. TV has a tendency to focus on conflict and violence. TV-news tends to favor
aggressive news items, to address the predilection for action of the audience (ibid: p.429).

Political TV and Political Trust


The sixth and final characteristic is the anti-institutional theme in network news.
Robinson calls network news broadcasting anti-institutional and disestablishmentarian.
With democrats and republicans equally negatively treated by the news, Robinson
hypothesizes the message the audience will gain from this: none of our policies work, none
of our institutions respond, none of our political organizations succeed (Robinson, 1976:
p.429). On top of that, Robinson finds that most media look at the current state of affairs with
nostalgia to earlier times, where none of the current problems existed, implicitly blaming
these problems on current politicians (ibid).
In his closing statement, Robinson that perhaps the videomalaise theory was only
applicable in the period between 1963 and 1972 (Robinson, 1976: p.431), which
inadvertently resulted in no further development of the theory until the mid-90s, when
Putnam re-discovered it when trying to find an explanation for the decline of civil society
and social capital, a construct that consists of features of social organization (like networks,
norms and social trust) that cause the conditions for coordination and cooperation which
result in mutual benefit for the public, in the United States (Putnam, 1995b: p.66; Norris,
1996: p.474). He proposed three additional general effects television has had on the
population of the United States:
Time displacement: social and media participation are positively correlated, however,
the act of watching television is an exception to this. Watching TV as a leisure activity
inhibits participation in society outside of the home since the television sits at the center of
the private domain; the home (Putnam, 1995a: p.678). It replaces social activities, such as
social gathering and informal conversations (ibid: p.679). Television, over the years, has
reduced participation in social, recreational, and community activities among people of all
ages (Putnam, 1995a: p.679).

Political TV and Political Trust


Effects on the outlooks of viewers: also called the mean world effect, people who
watch more television are unusually skeptical about the benevolence of other people, for
instance overestimating crime rates in their neighborhood. Putnam acknowledges that this
causal pattern disputed, since misanthropy may encourage staying at home and watching
television (Putnam, 1995a: p.679). In other words, people who already have a negative
outlook on society, might already have the tendency to seclude themselves to the safety of
their house. Putnam refutes this by mentioning lots of studies finding that the act of watching
television increases pessimism about human nature (ibid). This may induce passivity among
the public, and Putnam warns this may also change our fundamental physical and social
perceptions permanently (ibid).
Effects on Children: watching television is especially prevalent with children, with the
amount of time spent watching TV taking up as much time as all other activities an average
child might do, such as sports, hobbies, or just generally hanging out, combined among the
9-14 age group (Putnam, 1995a: p.679). This results in a decrease in childhood socialization,
an essential part of the development of a childs social skills, which results in an increased
level of aggressiveness towards others, reduces school achievements among children, and is
statistically associated with psychological malfunctioning later in life (Condry, 1993: pp.272273).
Putnams conclusions of the negative effects of television on social capital were met
with widespread critical acclaim among political scientists. Some, most notoriously Pippa
Norris, disagreed with his message. Her conclusion was that the causal relationship Putnam
put forth between civic engagement and television viewership was too complex to simply
conclude that the one causes the other (Norris, 1996: p.479). Certain programs dont
necessarily cause a decline in the democratic health of society, and might even have

Political TV and Political Trust


beneficial effects not yet explored. On that basis, Norris concludes that the lack of trust in the
American democratic institutions is unproven, and deeply implausible (ibid), hinting at
similar studies which have instead found positive links between regularly watching television
news and characteristics associated with social capital, such as political knowledge,
participation, and efficacy (Norris, 1996: p.475). Norris later expanded upon her theory,
which was dubbed the virtuous circle-theory, concluding that the videomalaise theory was
just blaming the messenger, whereas her theory urges the understanding of deep-rooted
flaws in the institutional democratic systems (Norris, 2000: p.3-4).
The debate between these two theories has been inconclusive, with more recent
studies finding both statistical proof for the videomalaise theory on the one hand, but on the
other also for the virtuous circle theory (Avery, 2009: pp.425-426): those who are already
mistrusting of government, will not be influenced by news media of which they are also
distrusting; whereas people who do trust the government develop greater trust by political
news exposure (ibid: p.426). What most research has in common though, is that they all find
definitive proof of a correlation existing between exposure to watching political
programming on television, This paper will not aim to answer which direction this correlation
takes either negative or positive but whether there is still significant statistical proof to be
found of its existence in a vastly changing society subject to technological developments.

Method & Analysis


In order to investigate the research question, data from the European Social Survey was used.
This dataset consists of numerous variables relating to watching television and political trust,
as well as many other variables unrelated to this study. It results from a survey held by
European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC, from now on referred

Political TV and Political Trust


to as ESS) in about 27 countries, sometimes more, sometimes less. Every two years, the ESS
publishes a new dataset. Respondents are selected by strict random probability methods,
aiming to get at least 800 respondents from every country, with a maximum of 1500
respondents based on population (Sampling European Social Survey, 2012: p.2-5). For the
first part of this study, rounds 5 (2010), 6 (2012) and 7 (2014) were used, to investigate
whether a change in political TV-news watching patterns was discernible, to see if there was a
significant change of people switching off their TVs in favor of other forms of media, or
watching less political broadcasts.
Of these ~27 countries, a selection was made which will be used to investigate
whether there is still a correlation. This selection was made on the basis of Hallin &
Mancinis typography of media systems, using one of their proposed models, the democratic
corporatist model. This model consists of the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria
and Switzerland), the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark), Belgium
and the Netherlands (Brggeman et. al, 2014: pp.1042 - 1043). The model, and the countries
within, are characterized by a high reach of the press market, relatively high degrees of
political parallelism, strong professionalization, and strong state intervention, in the form of
strong public service broadcasters and subsidies for the press (ibid: p.1043) causing them to
be the least vulnerable to media effects among the three proposed models, the others being
the Liberal model and the Polarized Pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: p.299).
Based on this premise, five countries were selected: Belgium, Germany, Denmark,
The Netherlands and Sweden. Austria was disregarded, since it was not included in the 2010
ESS dataset. Switzerland was not included as well, since its political institutions and
demographic make-up are bordering on the Polarized Pluralist model. Finally, Norway and

Political TV and Political Trust


Finland were not included as to not make Scandinavia overrepresented in the resulting
dataset, instead focusing on the geographical center of this media system model.
Taking into account Zickuhr and Maddens results, a further distinction was made.
They found that in October of 2010, 70% of people aged 50-64 used the internet at least once.
This is distinctly less than the 80% of people in the age group 30-49 they found (Zickuhr &
Madden, 2012: p.4). The rise they found in internet usage (in 2012, 77% age 50-64)
points towards increased adaption of the internet, but these results might be slightly skewed
since individuals aged 48 in 2010 suddenly found themselves in a different age group in
2012. And, as they conclude, once online, internet use becomes a regular part of seniors
lives
p.5),

was
People
the year

Year
2010
2012
2014
Total respondents - Belgian
4518 - 743
4569 - 768
4295 - 679
(& nationality)
- German
- 1390
- 1342
- 1327
- Danish
- 751
- 740
- 607
- Dutch
- 909
- 907
- 890
- Swedish
- 725
- 812
- 792
Gender (%m:%f)
50.1:49.9
49.2:50.8
49.8:50.2
Average age
64.74 y/o
66.06 y/o
67.31 y/o
Table 1: basic sample characteristics (data from: ESS5, ESS6 and ESS7)

(ibid:
deep line
drawn.
born

in

1960

(being 50 in 2010) and

earlier were included, while people born after 1960 were excluded from the dataset. This
ensures that the random probability sample ESS takes is the same for rounds five through
seven.
This resulted in three datasets, each with well over 4000 respondents. Unsurprisingly,
the average age grows with ~1.3 years for each subsequent dataset, as can be seen in Table 1.

Political TV and Political Trust


This can easily be explained due to the fact that a respondent eligible for the dataset would be
50 in 2010, and 54 in 2014. Furthermore, older respondents are more likely to have died of
old age or age-related diseases, meaning that the average age doesnt change equivalently to
the year the survey was held. This does make the total number of respondents in 2012
remarkable, with the dataset being larger by 51 respondents in 2012 than in 2010. This can be
explained by the Swedish sample, which was taken from a total population of 1497
respondents in 2010, and 1847 in 2012. Likewise, the Danish population in 2014 consisted of
1502 respondents, whereas it previously was 1650. Other, more minor inconsistencies in the
sample, can therefore be explained by inconsistencies in the population.
To see if there was a transitional effect away from watching television among people
over 50 in 2010, the samples for each country and each dataset were grouped by the amount
of hours they themselves reported watching political news on television. The results of this
can be seen in table 2. The Danish watch the most political broadcasting, followed by the
Netherlands, while Germans reported the lowest hours. As can be seen in the table, there is no
significant decline in watching political programming with the exception of Denmark.
Looking at the mean hours, most stayed roughly the same or even increased when comparing
2014 results to 2010. Combining all countries together shows a net increase in reported hours
of watching political broadcasting, which leads to the assumption that people over 50 in 2010
Amount of hours watching political TV-programming (in %)
0
0-0.5
0.5 1 1 1.5 1.5 2 2 2.5 2.5 3
3.55
21.17
46.45
18.03
5.60
2.05
1.23
4.14
16.31
50.53
18.32
5.75
3.07
1.20
4.33
19.13
46.34
18.83
6.58
2.99
0.89

Country
Belgium

Year
2010
2012
2014

Germany

2010
2012
2014

2.41
1.76
1.93

30.48
25.00
20.99

40.72
44.11
45.76

14.84
18.35
18.06

7.09
6.42
7.72

2.34
2.29
3.47

Denmark

2010
2012
2014

1.21
0.82
1.67

9.50
10.44
12.52

38.04
37.50
34.39

25.54
25.55
27.55

14.11
14.84
13.69

6.45
6.04
5.01

>3
1.91
1.20
0.89

Mean*
1.117
1.137
1.110

1.10
1.45
1.31

1.02
0.61
0.77

1.056
1.095
1.145

2.15
2.20
2.00

2.96
2.61
3.17

1.437
1.429
1.406

10

Political TV and Political Trust

Netherlands

2010
2012
2014

2.27
3.15
2.39

16.53
19.78
14.48

37.83
34.27
35.01

21.40
22.92
24.40

9.97
10.90
13.34

5.78
3.93
5.59

2.49
2.81
2.39

3.74
2.25
2.39

1.346
1.276
1.362

Sweden

2010
2012
2014

2.53
1.25
2.20

16.85
20.97
16.34

46.21
44.82
45.01

19.38
19.10
19.71

9.97
9.24
9.99

2.81
1.75
3.76

1.40
1.75
1.43

.84
1.12
1.56

1.182
1.165
1.227

2010
2.39
20.48
41.52
19.19
9.06
3.74
1.62
2012
2.19
19.42
42.28
20.56
9.07
3.26
1.81
2014
2.42
17.28
41.86
21.15
9.97
4.11
1.59
Table 2: Percentage of people reporting amount of hours watching political TV-programming

2.00
1.41
1.61

1.209
1.202
1.237

Mean

*= mean is calculated by multiplying the percentage with amount of hours, taking the larger number as factor;
i.e. 0-0.5=*.5, 0.5-1=*1, etc, and >3=*4. The resulting mean is therefore an approximation, not a definitive nr
.

have not stopped watching political broadcasts on television in favor of the internet. This
means that, to answer the research question, there will not have to be accounted for a
longitudinal effect resulting in further analysis only being based off data from ESS7.
To understand the effects of political TV-news watching on political trust, political
news watching was used as an independent variable. It was measured against three different
dependent variables based on democratic actors, namely trust in parliament, trust in
politicians and trust in political parties. These dependent variables were conceived by
asking respondents how much they trusted these actors with options ranging from 0 (no trust
at all) to 10 (complete trust).
Table 3 shows the results of this analysis for trust in parliament. Swedes are most
trusting of their parliament, followed by Denmark. Their levels of trust are significantly
different from the other three countries. Trust in politicians is highest in Denmark, with both
Germany and Belgium reporting very low levels of trust in their politicians as can be seen in
table 4. Trust in political parties is once again highest in Denmark, with both Belgium and
Germany reporting distinctly lower levels of trust (table 5).

11

Political TV and Political Trust


Looking at the amount of hours reported affecting trust, it is remarkable that all
dependent variables report a peak in trust at the 1.5 2 hours of watching political TV. Only
the 2.5 3 hours group reported higher a higher average trust in their parliament. Also
notable is that the >3 group reported higher levels of trust than the 0 hours group in all three
variants of political trust. This seems to discredit the videomalaise theory; watching less
political television does not increase levels of political trust. The results of this analysis are
better visualized looking at graph 1, which shows a steady increase up until the 2-2.5 hour
Country
Hours
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
The Nthrlnds Sweden
0
3.45
4.33
4.50
4.42
4.87
00.5
4.30
4.38
5.91
4.67
5.75
0.51
4.66
4.92
5.86
4.99
6.28
11.5
4.76
5.06
5.77
5.13
5.99
1.52
5.11
5.39
5.22
5.20
6.16
22.5
5.00
5.27
5.90
5.18
5.93
2.53
4.50
5.82
6.67
4.71
6.45
>3
5.50
4.5
5.89
4.29
4.83
mean
4.60
4.88
5.75
4.98
6.03
Table 3: average trust in parliament and amount of hours watching political TV-programming
Country
Hours
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
The Nthrlnds Sweden
0
2.62
2.96
3.11
3.28
3.56
00.5
3.45
3.51
4.69
4.43
4.24
0.51
4.05
3.83
4.91
4.68
4.89
11.5
4.26
3.89
4.90
4.78
4.96
1.52
4.67
4.25
4.82
4.99
5.14
22.5
4.40
3.91
5.17
4.92
3.97
2.53
4.00
4.71
4.08
3.67
4.09
>3
3.83
3.40
5.39
4.00
4.33
mean
3.96
3.80
4.85
4.65
4.74
Table 4: average trust in politicians and amount of hours watching political TV-programming

Mean*
4.31
5.00
5.34
5.34
5.42
5.26
5.63
5.00

Mean*
3.11
4.06
4.47
4.56
4.77
4.47
4.11
4.19

Country
Hours
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
The Nthrlnds Sweden
Mean
0
2.64
3.80
3.33
3.68
4.00
3.49
00.5
3.46
3.52
5.03
4.53
4.43
4.19
0.51
4.00
3.72
4.99
4.70
5.02
4.49
11.5
4.16
3.88
5.12
4.71
4.88
4.55
1.52
4.23
4.00
5.05
4.94
5.42
4.73
22.5
4.25
3.91
5.57
4.82
4.07
4.52
2.53
5.00
4.65
4.33
4.00
4.70
4.54
>3
2.50
3.50
4.61
4.57
4.00
3.84
mean
3.89
3.75
5.01
4.67
4.86
Table 5: average trust in political parties and amount of hours watching political TV-programming

12

Political TV and Political Trust


category, and an overall net-decline afterwards except for the 2.5-3h peak for trust in
parliament.
Is there any merit then, to the claims that watching political broadcasting has an effect
on levels of trust in political institutions? To discover that, the correlation coefficient has to
be calculated. The results of said calculation can be found in table 6. A weak positive
correlation was found, with the lone exception of the effects on Swedish trust in their parlia6
5
4
Average trust (0-10)

Parliament
Politicians
Pol.parties

3
2
1
0
0h

0 - 0.5h 0.5 - 1h 1 - 1.5h 1.5 - 2h 2 - 2.5h 2.5 - 3h

>3h

Graph 1: average trust in political instutions

ment, where a very weak negative correlation was found to exist. Overall, with all countries
combined, a weak positive correlation remained. Results for this calculation, however, also
indicated that the correlation was not significant for Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden,
but when combined the results were still significant. The strongest correlation between
watching political TV-news and political trust was found in Belgium.

Variable
Parliament

Test
P
Sig.

Politicians

Country
Belgium
.116
.003**

Germany
.105
.000**

Denmark
.000
.991

Netherlands
.029
.401

Sweden
-.028
.436

Combined
.064
.000**

.146

.084

.048

.028

.035

.093

13

Political TV and Political Trust

Pol. Parties

Sig.

.000**

.003**

.247

.412

.333

.000**

P
Sig.

.107
.006**

.063
.024*

.016
.695

.031
.356

.020
.594

.079
.000**

Table 6: measurement of correlation and significant for all three dependent variables per country
*= a significant correlation tested at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**= a significant correlation tested at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Discussion
The positive correlation found in the analysis means that proof is found in the data against the
videomalaise theory. However, because the sample was decided upon based on the
videomalaise theory being the least likely theory to be proven, this does not mean the
videomalaise theory does not exist elsewhere in the world, namely the United States, where
the theory originated. Robinson himself stated that the European TV-media were much less
focussed on exposing what is wrong, and are more satisfied with the status quo (Robinson,
1976: p.428). The selection of the five countries based on the democratic corporatist model
by Hallin & Mancini, in which media is subjected to government over watch to provide
certain standards in reporting (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: p.299), further enhanced the
unlikeliness proof for the videomalaise theory could be found. It would have been interesting
to include the United States in the results to compare differences, but since the data used was
from the European Social Survey, this was impossible.
On the other hand, some evidence for elements of Norris virtuous circle theory could
be found. While watching no political broadcasts at all gave low results for trust, it steadily
increased up until the 1.5 2 hour category. This amount of daily political news-watching
seems to give the best results for political trust. Watching for longer periods tended to give
increasingly lower results for trust, providing evidence for her statement that misanthropists

14

Political TV and Political Trust


were much more likely to stay at home and watch (political) broadcast for extensive periods
(Norris, 1996: p.479). Further study is needed to analyze whether there is a causal
relationship between a more negative outlook on life and time spent behind a television.
To definitively answer the research question does watching more politically oriented
TV-programming have an effect on political trust in countries with a democratic corporatist
media system among citizens over 50, this study has gone a long way. There is a slightly
positive correlation, meaning that watching more politically oriented TV-programming
increases trust in political actors and institutions. A caveat has to be placed though, since
watching more than two hours seems to have a negative effect.
While the dataset(s) used were sufficient to answer the research question, an
important variable was missing. Even though there was a variable pertaining to usage of the
internet for personal means, there was no variable measuring internet-use for political
information gathering. It could be hypothesized that the sample used did not substitute TV in
favor of the internet, but rather uses the internet to supplement their intake of political news.
If such a variable were available in the dataset, this study could have taken a more
meaningful and interesting direction. Since people born in or before 1960 are slowly adapting
to using the internet (Zickuhr & Madden, 2012: p.4), it would be interesting for future
research to investigate whether this is the case.
Even though people born in or before 1960 are diminishing in number as time goes
on, older people still make up a large part of the electorate and are often found to be more
likely to vote than the average citizen (Stemgedrag stemgerechtigden Tweede
Kamerverkiezingen, 2011). They might be less impressionable and thus less subject to
sweeping changes in behavior and beliefs, but keeping tabs on gradual changes in their views
remains important for at least another twenty years. The impact of generation Baby-boom on

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election results is still there, and to keep them most trusting of political actors and institutions
they should watch 1.5 to 2 hours of political programming on their television daily.

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Life Project, 6.

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