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Argumentation Theory

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Contents
Articles
Argumentation theory

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Argument

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Charles Arthur Willard

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Social epistemology

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Sociology of knowledge

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Doug Walton

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Informal logic

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Joseph W. Wenzel

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Daniel J. O'Keefe

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G. Thomas Goodnight

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Robin Rowland

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Dale Hample

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C. Scott Jacobs

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Sally Jackson

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David Zarefsky

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Ralph Johnson (philosopher)

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Michael Scriven

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John Woods (logician)

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References
Article Sources and Contributors

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Article Licenses
License

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Argumentation theory

Argumentation theory
Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisciplinary study of how conclusions can be reached through
logical reasoning; that is, claims based, soundly or not, on premises. It includes the arts and sciences of civil debate,
dialogue, conversation, and persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural rules in both artificial and
real world settings.
Argumentation includes debate and negotiation which are concerned with reaching mutually acceptable conclusions.
It also encompasses eristic dialog, the branch of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal.
This art and science is often the means by which people protect their beliefs or self-interests in rational dialogue, in
common parlance, and during the process of arguing.
Argumentation is used in law, for example in trials, in preparing an argument to be presented to a court, and in
testing the validity of certain kinds of evidence. Also, argumentation scholars study the post hoc rationalizations by
which organizational actors try to justify decisions they have made irrationally.

Key components of argumentation
• Understanding and identifying arguments, either explicit or implied, and the goals of the participants in the
different types of dialogue.
• Identifying the premises from which conclusions are derived
• Establishing the "burden of proof" — determining who made the initial claim and is thus responsible for
providing evidence why his/her position merits acceptance
• For the one carrying the "burden of proof", the advocate, to marshal evidence for his/her position in order to
convince or force the opponent's acceptance. The method by which this is accomplished is producing valid,
sound, and cogent arguments, devoid of weaknesses, and not easily attacked.
• In a debate, fulfillment of the burden of proof creates a burden of rejoinder. One must try to identify faulty
reasoning in the opponent's argument, to attack the reasons/premises of the argument, to provide counterexamples
if possible, to identify any fallacies, and to show why a valid conclusion cannot be derived from the reasons
provided for his/her argument.

Internal structure of arguments
Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising the following
1. a set of assumptions or premises
2. a method of reasoning or deduction and
3. a conclusion or point.
An argument must have at least one premise and one conclusion.
Often classical logic is used as the method of reasoning so that the conclusion follows logically from the
assumptions or support. One challenge is that if the set of assumptions is inconsistent then anything can follow
logically from inconsistency. Therefore it is common to insist that the set of assumptions be consistent. It is also
good practice to require the set of assumptions to be the minimal set, with respect to set inclusion, necessary to infer
the consequent. Such arguments are called MINCON arguments, short for minimal consistent. Such argumentation
has been applied to the fields of law and medicine. A second school of argumentation investigates abstract
arguments, where 'argument' is considered a primitive term, so no internal structure of arguments is taken on
account.
In its most common form, argumentation involves an individual and an interlocutor/or opponent engaged in
dialogue, each contending differing positions and trying to persuade each other. Other types of dialogue in addition

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to persuasion are eristic, information seeking, inquiry, negotiation, deliberation, and the dialectical method (Douglas
Walton). The dialectical method was made famous by Plato and his use of Socrates critically questioning various
characters and historical figures.

Argumentation and the grounds of knowledge
Argumentation theory had its origins in foundationalism, a theory of knowledge (epistemology) in the field of
philosophy. It sought to find the grounds for claims in the forms (logic) and materials (factual laws) of a universal
system of knowledge. But argument scholars gradually rejected Aristotle's systematic philosophy and the idealism in
Plato and Kant. They questioned and ultimately discarded the idea that argument premises take their soundness from
formal philosophical systems. The field thus broadened.[1]
Karl R. Wallace's seminal essay, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech
(1963) 44, led many scholars to study "marketplace argumentation" - the ordinary arguments of ordinary people. The
seminal essay on marketplace argumentation is Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen,"Logic and
Marketplace Argumentation" Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 143-150.[2][3] This line of thinking led to a
natural alliance with late developments in the sociology of knowledge.[4] Some scholars drew connections with
recent developments in philosophy, namely the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Rorty has called this
shift in emphasis "the linguistic turn".
In this new hybrid approach argumentation is used with or without empirical evidence to establish convincing
conclusions about issues which are moral, scientific, epistemic, or of a nature in which science alone cannot answer.
Out of pragmatism and many intellectual developments in the humanities and social sciences, "non-philosophical"
argumentation theories grew which located the formal and material grounds of arguments in particular intellectual
fields. These theories include informal logic, social epistemology, ethnomethodology, speech acts, the sociology of
knowledge, the sociology of science, and social psychology. These new theories are not non-logical or anti-logical.
They find logical coherence in most communities of discourse. These theories are thus often labeled "sociological"
in that they focus on the social grounds of knowledge.

Approaches to argumentation in communication and informal logic
In general, the label "argumentation" is used by communication scholars such as (to name only a few: Wayne E.
Brockriede, Douglas Ehninger, Joseph W. Wenzel, Richard Rieke, Gordon Mitchell, Carol Winkler, Eric Gander,
Dennis S. Gouran, Daniel J. O'Keefe, Mark Aakhus, Bruce Gronbeck, James Klumpp, G. Thomas Goodnight, Robin
Rowland, Dale Hample, C. Scott Jacobs, Sally Jackson, David Zarefsky, and Charles Arthur Willard) while the term
"informal logic" is preferred by philosophers, stemming from University of Windsor philosophers Ralph H. Johnson
and J. Anthony Blair. Harald Wohlrapp developed a criterion for validness (Geltung, Gültigkeit) as freedom of
objections.
Trudy Govier, Douglas Walton, Michael Gilbert, Harvey Seigal, Michael Scriven, and John Woods (to name only a
few) are other prominent authors in this tradition. Over the past thirty years, however, scholars from several
disciplines have co-mingled at international conferences such as that hosted by the University of Amsterdam (the
Netherlands) and the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Other international conferences
are the biannual conference held at Alta, Utah sponsored by the (US) National Communication Association and
American Forensics Association and conferences sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA).
Some scholars (such as Ralph H. Johnson) construe the term "argument" narrowly, as exclusively written discourse
or even discourse in which all premises are explicit. Others (such as Michael Gilbert) construe the term "argument"
broadly, to include spoken and even nonverbal discourse, for instance the degree to which a war memorial or
propaganda poster can be said to argue or "make arguments." The philosopher Stephen E. Toulmin has said that an

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argument is a claim on our attention and belief, a view that would seem to authorize treating, say, propaganda
posters as arguments. The dispute between broad and narrow theorists is of long standing and is unlikely to be
settled. The views of the majority of argumentation theorists and analysts fall somewhere between these two
extremes.

Kinds of argumentation
Conversational argumentation
The study of naturally-occurring conversation arose from the field of sociolinguistics. It is usually called
conversation analysis. Inspired by ethnomethodology, it was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally
by the sociologist Harvey Sacks and, among others, his close associates Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson.
Sacks died early in his career, but his work was championed by others in his field, and CA has now become an
established force in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech-communication and psychology.[5] It is particularly
influential in interactional sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and discursive psychology, as well as being a coherent
discipline in its own right. Recently CA techniques of sequential analysis have been employed by phoneticians to
explore the fine phonetic details of speech.
Empirical studies and theoretical formulations by Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, and several generations of their
students, have described argumentation as a form of managing conversational disagreement within communication
contexts and systems that naturally prefer agreement.

Mathematical argumentation
The basis of mathematical truth has been the subject of long debate. Frege in particular sought to demonstrate (see
Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithemetic, 1884, and Logicism in Philosophy of mathematics) that arithmetical
truths can be derived from purely logical axioms and therefore are, in the end, logical truths. The project was
developed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica. If an argument can be cast in the form of
sentences in Symbolic Logic, then it can be tested by the application of accepted proof procedures. This has been
carried out for Arithmetic using Peano axioms. Be that as it may, an argument in Mathematics, as in any other
discipline, can be considered valid only if it can be shown that it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.

Scientific argumentation
Perhaps the most radical statement of the social grounds of scientific knowledge appears in Alan G.Gross's The
Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Gross holds that science is rhetorical "without
remainder," meaning that scientific knowledge itself cannot be seen as an idealized ground of knowledge. Scientific
knowledge is produced rhetorically, meaning that it has special epistemic authority only insofar as its communal
methods of verification are trustworthy. This thinking represents an almost complete rejection of the foundationalism
on which argumentation was first based.

Legal argumentation
Legal arguments are spoken presentations to a judge or appellate court by a lawyer, or parties when representing
themselves of the legal reasons why they should prevail. Oral argument at the appellate level accompanies written
briefs, which also advance the argument of each party in the legal dispute. A closing argument, or summation, is the
concluding statement of each party's counsel reiterating the important arguments for the trier of fact, often the jury,
in a court case. A closing argument occurs after the presentation of evidence.

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Political argumentation
Political arguments are used by academics, media pundits, candidates for political office and government officials.
Political arguments are also used by citizens in ordinary interactions to comment about and understand political
events.[6] The rationality of the public is a major question in this line of research. Political scientist Samuel L. Popkin
coined the expression "low information voters" to describe most voters who know very little about politics or the
world in general.
In practice, a "low information voter" may not be aware of legislation that their representative has sponsored in
Congress. A low-information voter may base their ballot box decision on a media sound-bite, or a flier received in
the mail. It is possible for a media sound-bite or campaign flier to present a political position for the incumbent
candidate that completely contradicts the legislative action taken in Washington D.C. on behalf of the constituents. It
may only take a small percentage of the overall voting group who base their decision on the inaccurate information,
a voter block of 10 to 12%, to swing an overall election result. When this happens, the constituency at large may
have been duped or fooled. Nevertheless, the election result is legal and confirmed. Savvy Political consultants will
take advantage of low-information voters and sway their votes with disinformation because it can be easier and
sufficiently effective. Institutions such as factcheck.org [7] have come about in recent years to help counter the
effects of such campaign tactics. Factcheck.org's stated goal is "We aim to reduce the level of deception and
confusion in U.S. politics, for voters".[8]

Psychological aspects
Psychology has long studied the non-logical aspects of argumentation. For example, studies have shown that simple
repetition of an idea is often a more effective method of argumentation than appeals to reason. Propaganda often
utilizes repetition.[9] Nazi rhetoric has been studied extensively as, inter alia, a repetition campaign.
Empirical studies of communicator credibility and attractiveness, sometimes labeled charisma, have also been tied
closely to empirically-occurring arguments. Such studies bring argumentation within the ambit of persuasion theory
and practice.
Some psychologists such as William J. McGuire believe that the syllogism is the basic unit of human reasoning.
They have produced a large body of empirical work around McGuire's famous title "A Syllogistic Analysis of
Cognitive Relationships." A central line of this way of thinking is that logic is contaminated by psychological
variables such as "wishful thinking," in which subjects confound the likelihood of predictions with the desirability of
the predictions. People hear what they want to hear and see what they expect to see. If planners want something to
happen they see it as likely to happen. Thus planners ignore possible problems, as in the American experiment with
prohibition. If they hope something will not happen, they see it as unlikely to happen. Thus smokers think that they
personally will avoid cancer. Promiscuous people practice unsafe sex. Teenagers drive recklessly.

Theories
Argument fields
Stephen E. Toulmin and Charles Arthur Willard have championed the idea of argument fields, the former drawing
upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of language games, (Sprachspiel) the latter drawing from communication and
argumentation theory, sociology, political science, and social epistemology. For Toulmin, the term "field" designates
discourses within which arguments and factual claims are grounded.[10] For Willard, the term "field" is
interchangeable with "community," "audience," or "readership."[11] Along similar lines, G. Thomas Goodnight has
studied "spheres" of argument and sparked a large literature created by younger scholars responding to or using his
ideas.[12] The general tenor of these field theories is that the premises of arguments take their meaning from social
communities.[13]

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Field studies might focus on social movements, issue-centered publics (for instance, pro-life versus pro-choice in the
abortion dispute), small activist groups, corporate public relations campaigns and issue management, scientific
communities and disputes, political campaigns, and intellectual traditions.[14] In the manner of a sociologist,
ethnographer, anthropologist, participant-observer, and journalist, the field theorist gathers and reports on real-world
human discourses, gathering case studies that might eventually be combined to produce high-order explanations of
argumentation processes. This is not a quest for some master language or master theory covering all specifics of
human activity. Field theorists are agnostic about the possibility of a single grand theory and skeptical about the
usefulness of such a theory. Theirs is a more modest quest for "mid-range" theories that might permit generalizations
about families of discourses.

Stephen E. Toulmin's Contributions
By far, the most influential theorist has been the late Stephen E. Toulmin, the Cambridge educated philosopher and
student of Wittgenstein.[15] What follows below is a sketch of his ideas.
An Alternative to Absolutism and Relativism
Toulmin has argued that absolutism (represented by theoretical or analytic arguments) has limited practical value.
Absolutism is derived from Plato's idealized formal logic, which advocates universal truth; thus absolutists believe
that moral issues can be resolved by adhering to a standard set of moral principles, regardless of context. By contrast,
Toulmin asserts that many of these so-called standard principles are irrelevant to real situations encountered by
human beings in daily life.
To describe his vision of daily life, Toulmin introduced the concept of argument fields; in The Uses of Argument
(1958), Toulmin states that some aspects of arguments vary from field to field, and are hence called
"field-dependent," while other aspects of argument are the same throughout all fields, and are hence called
"field-invariant." The flaw of absolutism, Toulmin believes, lies in its unawareness of the field-dependent aspect of
argument; absolutism assumes that all aspects of argument are field invariant.
Toulmin's theories resolve to avoid the defects of absolutism without resorting to relativism: relativism, Toulmin
asserted, provides no basis for distinguishing between a moral or immoral argument. In Human Understanding
(1972), Toulmin suggests that anthropologists have been tempted to side with relativists because they have noticed
the influence of cultural variations on rational arguments; in other words, the anthropologist or relativist
overemphasizes the importance of the "field-dependent" aspect of arguments, and becomes unaware of the
"field-invariant" elements. In an attempt to provide solutions to the problems of absolutism and relativism, Toulmin
attempts throughout his work to develop standards that are neither absolutist nor relativist for assessing the worth of
ideas.
Toulmin believes that a good argument can succeed in providing good justification to a claim, which will stand up to
criticism and earn a favourable verdict.
Components of argument
In The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin proposed a layout containing six interrelated components for analyzing
arguments:
1. Claim: Conclusions whose merit must be established. For example, if a person tries to convince a listener that he
is a British citizen, the claim would be "I am a British citizen." (1)
2. Data: The facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim. For example, the person introduced in 1 can support
his claim with the supporting data "I was born in Bermuda." (2)
3. Warrant: The statement authorizing our movement from the data to the claim. In order to move from the data
established in 2, "I was born in Bermuda," to the claim in 1, "I am a British citizen," the person must supply a
warrant to bridge the gap between 1 & 2 with the statement "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British

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Citizen." (3)
4. Backing: Credentials designed to certify the statement expressed in the warrant; backing must be introduced
when the warrant itself is not convincing enough to the readers or the listeners. For example, if the listener does
not deem the warrant in 3 as credible, the speaker will supply the legal provisions as backing statement to show
that it is true that "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British Citizen."
5. Rebuttal: Statements recognizing the restrictions to which the claim may legitimately be applied. The rebuttal is
exemplified as follows, "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen, unless he has betrayed Britain
and has become a spy of another country."
6. Qualifier: Words or phrases expressing the speaker's degree of force or certainty concerning the claim. Such
words or phrases include "possible," "probably," "impossible," "certainly," "presumably," "as far as the evidence
goes," or "necessarily." The claim "I am definitely a British citizen" has a greater degree of force than the claim "I
am a British citizen, presumably."
The first three elements "claim," "data," and "warrant" are considered as the essential components of practical
arguments, while the second triad "qualifier," "backing," and "rebuttal" may not be needed in some arguments.
When first proposed, this layout of argumentation is based on legal arguments and intended to be used to analyze the
rationality of arguments typically found in the courtroom; in fact, Toulmin did not realize that this layout would be
applicable to the field of rhetoric and communication until his works were introduced to rhetoricians by Wayne
Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger. Only after he published Introduction to Reasoning (1979) were the rhetorical
applications of this layout mentioned in his works.
The Evolution of Knowledge
Toulmin's Human Understanding (1972) asserts that conceptual change is evolutionary. This book attacks Thomas
Kuhn's explanation of conceptual change in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn held that conceptual
change is a revolutionary (as opposed to an evolutionary) process in which mutually exclusive paradigms compete to
replace one another. Toulmin criticizes the relativist elements in Kuhn's thesis, as he points out that the mutually
exclusive paradigms provide no ground for comparison; in other words, Kuhn's thesis has made the relativists' error
of overemphasizing the "field variant" while ignoring the "field invariant," or commonality shared by all
argumentation or scientific paradigms.
Toulmin proposes an evolutionary model of conceptual change comparable to Darwin's model of biological
evolution. On this reasoning, conceptual change involves innovation and selection. Innovation accounts for the
appearance of conceptual variations, while selection accounts for the survival and perpetuation of the soundest
conceptions. Innovation occurs when the professionals of a particular discipline come to view things differently from
their predecessors; selection subjects the innovative concepts to a process of debate and inquiry in what Toulmin
considers as a "forum of competitions." The soundest concepts will survive the forum of competition as
replacements or revisions of the traditional conceptions.
From the absolutists' point of view, concepts are either valid or invalid regardless of contexts; from a relativists'
perspective, one concept is neither better nor worse than a rival concept from a different cultural context. From
Toulmin's perspective, the evaluation depends on a process of comparison, which determines whether or not one
concept will provide improvement to our explanatory power more so than its rival concepts.

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Rejection of Certainty
In Cosmopolis (1990), Toulmin traces the Quest for Certainty back to Descartes and Hobbes, and lauds Dewey,
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Rorty for abandoning that tradition.

Pragma-dialectics
Scholars at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands have pioneered a rigorous modern version of dialectic
under the name pragma-dialectics. The intuitive idea is to formulate clearcut rules that, if followed, will yield
rational discussion and sound conclusions. Frans H. van Eemeren, the late Rob Grootendorst, and many of their
students have produced a large body of work expounding this idea.
The dialectical conception of reasonableness is given by ten rules for critical discussion, all being instrumental for
achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion (from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002,
p. 182-183). The theory postulates this as an ideal model, and not something one expects to find as an empirical fact.
The model can however serve as an important heuristic and critical tool for testing how reality approximates this
ideal and point to where discourse goes wrong, that is, when the rules are violated. Any such violation will constitute
a fallacy. Albeit not primarily focused on fallacies, pragma-dialectics provides a systematic approach to deal with
them in a coherent way.

Artificial intelligence
Efforts have been made within the field of artificial intelligence to perform and analyze the act of argumentation
with computers. Argumentation has been used to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for non-monotonic logic,
starting with the influential work of Dung (1995). Computational argumentation systems have found particular
application in domains where formal logic and classical decision theory are unable to capture the richness of
reasoning, domains such as law and medicine. In Elements of Argumentation, Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter
introduce techniques for formalizing deductive argumentation in artificial intelligence, emphasizing emerging
formalizations for practical argumentation.[16] A comprehensive overview of this area can be found in a recent book
edited by Iyad Rahwan and Guillermo R. Simari.[17]
Within Computer Science, the ArgMAS workshop series (Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems), the CMNA
workshop series,[18] and now the COMMA Conference,[19] are regular annual events attracting participants from
every continent. The journal Argument & Computation[20] is dedicated to exploring the intersection between
argumentation and computer science.

Notes
[1] Bruce Gronbeck. "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity Crisis." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, ed.s Proceedings of the
Summer Conference on Argumentation. 1980.
[2] See Joseph W. Wenzel "Perspectives on Argument." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, ed.s Proceedings of the Summer Conference on
Argumentation. 1980.
[3] David Zarefsky. "Product, Process, or Point of View? Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, ed.s Proceedings of the Summer Conference on
Argumentation. 1980.
[4] See Ray E. McKerrow. "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions."
[5] Psathas, George (1995): Conversation Analysis, Thousand Oaks: Sage Sacks, Harvey. (1995). Lectures on Conversation. Blackwell
Publishing. ISBN 1-55786-705-4. Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel A., & Jefferson, Gail (1974). A simple systematic for the organization
of turn-taking for conversation. Language, 50, 696-735. Schegloff, Emanuel A. (2007). Sequence Organization in Interaction: A Primer in
Conversation Analysis, Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ten Have, Paul (1999): Doing Conversation Analysis. A
Practical Guide, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
[6] Michael McGee. "The 'Ideograph' as a Unit of Analysis in Political Argument." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. Proceedings of the
Summer Conference on Argumentation. 1980.
[7] http:/ / factcheck. org/
[8] http:/ / factcheck. org/ about/
[9] Jacques Ellul, Propaganda, Vintage, 1973, ISBN 0-394-71874-7 ISBN 978-0394718743.

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[10] Stephen E. Toulmin. The uses of argument. 1959.
[11] Charles Arthur Willard. "Some Questions About Toulmin's View of Argument Fields." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. Proceedings of
the Summer Conference on Argumentation. 1980. "Field Theory: A Cartesian Meditation." George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds.
Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation.
[12] G. T. Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument." Journal of the American Forensics Association. (1982)
18:214-227. See also: http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Public_sphere
[13] Bruce E. Gronbeck. "Sociocultural Notions of Argument Fields: A Primer." George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds. Dimensions of
Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation. (1981) 1-20.
[14] Robert Rowland, "Purpose, Argument Fields, and Theoretical Justification." Argumentation. vol. 22 Number 2 (2008) 235-250.
[15] Loui, Ronald P. (2006). "A Citation-Based Reflection on Toulmin and Argument" (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=3xE5ichwr5MC&
lpg=PA31& ots=gGspeEoAs-& dq=A Citation-Based Reflection on Toulmin and Argument& pg=PA31#v=onepage& q=A Citation-Based
Reflection on Toulmin and Argument& f=false). In Hitchcock, David; Verheij, Bart. Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument
Analysis and Evaluation. Springer Netherlands. pp. 31–38. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_3. ISBN 978-1-4020-4937-8. . Retrieved
2010-06-25. "Toulmin's 1958 work is essential in the field of argumentation"
[16] P. Besnard & A. Hunter, "Elements of Argumentation." MIT Press, 2008. See also: http:/ / mitpress. mit. edu/ catalog/ item/ default.
asp?ttype=2& tid=11482
[17] I. Rahwan & G. R. Simari (Eds.), "Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence." Springer, 2009. See also: http:/ / www. springer. com/
computer/ artificial/ book/ 978-0-387-98196-3
[18] Computational Models of Natural Argument (http:/ / www. cmna. info)
[19] Computational Models of Argument (http:/ / www. csc. liv. ac. uk/ ~comma/ )
[20] Journal of Argument & Computation (http:/ / www. tandf. co. uk/ journals/ tarc)

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• Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1987). The current state of informal logic. Informal Logic 9, 147-51.
• Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R.
Grootendorst, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory. (pp. 383–86). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
• Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2000). "Informal logic: An overview." Informal Logic. 20(2):
93-99.
• Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In D.
Gabbay, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods (Eds.). Handbook of the logic of argument and inference:
The turn towards the practical. (pp. 339–396). Elsivier: North Holland.
• Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, Notre Dame, 1970.
• Stephen Toulmin. The uses of argument. 1959.
• Stephen Toulmin. The Place of Reason in Ethics. 1964.
• Stephen Toulmin. Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts. 1972.
• Stephen Toulmin. Cosmopolis. 1993.
• Douglas N. Walton, The Place of Emotion in Argument. 1992.
• Joseph W. Wenzel 1990 Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on
argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide. 9-26 Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, IL
• John Woods. (1980). What is informal logic? In J.A. Blair & R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First
International Symposium .(pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress.
• John Woods. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic? Informal Logic. 20(2): 139-167. 2000
• Charles Arthur Willard Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy.
University of Chicago Press. 1996.
• Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press. 1989.
• Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of KnowledgeUniversity of Alabama Press. 1982.
• Harald Wohlrapp. Der Begriff des Arguments. Über die Beziehungen zwischen Wissen, Forschen, Glaube,
Subjektivität und Vernunft. Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann, 2008 ISBN 978-3-8260-3820-4

9

Argumentation theory

Further reading
Flagship journals:





Argumentation
Informal Logic
Argumentation and Advocacy (formerly Journal of the American Forensic Association)
Social Epistemology
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology
Journal of Argument and Computation

External links
• Universiteit Utrecht (http://www.cs.uu.nl/people/henry/research/argtheory.html) (Dutch)
• Universiteit Twente (http://www.tcw.utwente.nl/theorieenoverzicht/Levels of theories/micro/Argumentation
Theory.doc/) (Dutch)
• L'Argumentation: Introduction à l'étude du discours (http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/lls/
MarianaTutescu-Argumentation/sommaire.htm) (French) Free on-line book by Mariana Tutescu previously
published in 1998 as ISBN 973-575-248-4
• Argumentum.ch (http://www.argumentum.ch), E-course of Argumentation Theory for the Human and Social
Sciences
• Interview with Stephen Toulmin in JAC (http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/
V13_I2_Olson_Toulmin.htm)

Argument
In philosophy and logic, an argument is an attempt to persuade someone of something, by giving reasons or
evidence for accepting a particular conclusion.[1][2] The general structure of an argument in a natural language is that
of premises (typically in the form of propositions, statements or sentences) in support of a claim: the
conclusion.[3][4][5] Many arguments can also be formulated in a formal language. An argument in a formal language
shows the logical form of the natural language arguments obtained by its interpretations.*
In a typical deductive argument, the premises are meant to provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion, while
in an inductive argument, they are thought to provide reasons supporting the conclusion's probable truth.[6] The
standards for evaluating other kinds of arguments may rest on different or additional criteria than truth, however,
such as the persuasiveness of so-called "indispensability claims" in transcendental arguments[7] or even the
disclosure of new possibilities for thinking and acting.[8]
The criteria used in evaluating arguments and their forms of reasoning are studied in logic.[9] Ways of formulating
arguments effectively are studied in rhetoric (see also: Argumentation theory).

Formal and informal arguments
Further information: Informal logic and Formal logic
Informal arguments as studied in informal logic, are presented in ordinary language and are intended for everyday
discourse. Conversely, formal arguments are studied in formal logic (historically called symbolic logic, more
commonly referred to as mathematical logic today) and are expressed in a formal language. Informal logic may be
said to emphasize the study of argumentation, whereas formal logic emphasizes implication and inference. Informal
arguments are sometimes implicit. That is, the logical structure –the relationship of claims, premises, warrants,
relations of implication, and conclusion –is not always spelled out and immediately visible and must sometimes be

10

Argument

11

made explicit by analysis.

Standard argument types
There are several kinds of arguments in logic, the best-known of which are "deductive" and "inductive." These are
sometimes referred to broadly as "truth-preserving" arguments, because they assert something about the truth of a
particular claim. A deductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the
premises. An inductive argument, on the other hand, asserts that the truth of the conclusion is supported by the
premises. Each premise and the conclusion are truth bearers or "truth-candidates", capable of being either true or
false (and not both). While statements in an argument are referred to as being either true or false, arguments are
referred to as being valid or invalid (see logical truth). A deductive argument is valid if and only if the truth of the
conclusion is entailed by (is a logical consequence of) the premises, and its corresponding conditional is therefore a
logical truth. A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises; a valid argument may well have false
premises.

Deductive arguments
A deductive argument is one that, if valid, has a conclusion that is entailed by its premises. In other words, the truth
of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises—if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be
true. It would be self-contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion, because the negation of the
conclusion is contradictory to the truth of the premises.

Validity
Deductive arguments may be either valid or invalid. If an argument is valid, and its premises are true, the conclusion
must be true: a valid argument cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.
The validity of an argument depends, however, not on the actual truth or falsity of its premises and conclusions, but
solely on whether or not the argument has a valid logical form. The validity of an argument is not a guarantee of the
truth of its conclusion. A valid argument may have false premises and a false conclusion.
Logic seeks to discover the valid forms, the forms that make arguments valid arguments. An argument form is valid
if and only if all arguments of that form are valid. Since the validity of an argument depends on its form, an
argument can be shown to be invalid by showing that its form is invalid, and this can be done by giving another
argument of the same form that has true premises but a false conclusion. In informal logic this is called a counter
argument.
The form of argument can be shown by the use of symbols. For each argument form, there is a corresponding
statement form, called a corresponding conditional, and an argument form is valid if and only its corresponding
conditional is a logical truth. A statement form which is logically true is also said to be a valid statement form. A
statement form is a logical truth if it is true under all interpretations. A statement form can be shown to be a logical
truth by either (a) showing that it is a tautology or (b) by means of a proof procedure.
The corresponding conditional of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so the
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid
argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument
need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premises.
For example:
Some Greeks are logicians; therefore, some logicians are Greeks. Valid argument; it would be
self-contradictory to admit that some Greeks are logicians but deny that some (any) logicians are Greeks.
All Greeks are human and all humans are mortal; therefore, all Greeks are mortal. : Valid argument; if the
premises are true the conclusion must be true.

Argument

12
Some Greeks are logicians and some logicians are tiresome; therefore, some Greeks are tiresome. Invalid
argument: the tiresome logicians might all be Romans (for example).
Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved; therefore, we are all doomed. Valid
argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that this does not mean the conclusion has to be
true; it is only true if the premises are true, which they may not be!)

Premise 1: Some men are hawkers. Premise 2: Some hawkers are rich. Conclusion: Some men are rich.
This argument is invalid. There is a way where you can determine whether an argument is valid, give a
counter-example with the same argument form.
Counter-Example: Premise 1: Some people are herbivores. Premise 2: Some herbivores are zebras. Conclusion:
Some people are zebras. (This is obviously false.)
Note that the counter-example follows the P1. Some x are y. P2. Some y are z. C. Some x are z. format. We can now
conclude that the hawker argument is invalid.
Arguments can be invalid for a variety of reasons. There are well-established patterns of reasoning that render
arguments that follow them invalid; these patterns are known as formal fallacies.

Soundness
A sound argument is a valid argument whose conclusion follows from its premise(s), and the premise(s) of the
argument are true.

Inductive arguments
Non-deductive logic is reasoning using arguments in which the premises support the conclusion but do not entail it.
Forms of non-deductive logic include the statistical syllogism, which argues from generalizations true for the most
part, and induction, a form of reasoning that makes generalizations based on individual instances. An inductive
argument is said to be cogent if and only if the truth of the argument's premises would render the truth of the
conclusion probable (i.e., the argument is strong), and the argument's premises are, in fact, true. Cogency can be
considered inductive logic's analogue to deductive logic's "soundness." Despite its name, mathematical induction is
not a form of inductive reasoning. The problem of induction is the philosophical question of whether inductive
reasoning is valid.

Defeasible arguments
An argument is defeasible when additional information (such as new counterreasons) can have the effect that it no
longer justifies its conclusion. The term "defeasibility" goes back to the legal theorist H.L.A. Hart, although he
focused on concepts instead of arguments. Stephen Toulmin's influential argument model includes the possibility of
counterreasons that are characteristic of defeasible arguments, but he did not discuss the evaluation of defeasible
arguments. Defeasible arguments give rise to defeasible reasoning.

Argument by analogy
Argument by analogy may be thought of as argument from the particular to particular. An argument by analogy may
use a particular truth in a premise to argue towards a similar particular truth in the conclusion. For example, if A.
Plato was mortal, and B. Socrates was like Plato in other respects, then asserting that C. Socrates was mortal is an
example of argument by analogy because the reasoning employed in it proceeds from a particular truth in a premise
(Plato was mortal) to a similar particular truth in the conclusion, namely that Socrates was mortal.[10]

Argument

13

Transitional arguments
In epistemology, transitional arguments attempt to show that a particular explanation is better than another because it
is able to make sense of a transition from old to new. That is, if explanation b can account for the problems that
existed with explanation a, but not vice versa, then b is regarded to be the more reasonable explanation. A common
example in the history of science is the transition from pre-Galilean to Galilean understandings of physical
motion.[11]

Other kinds of arguments
Other kinds of arguments may have different or additional standards of validity or justification. For example, Charles
Taylor writes that so-called transcendental arguments are made up of a "chain of indispensability claims" that
attempt to show why something is necessarily true based on its connection to our experience,[12] while Nikolas
Kompridis has suggested that there are two types of "fallible" arguments: one based on truth claims, and the other
based on the time-responsive disclosure of possibility (see world disclosure).[13] The late French philosopher Michel
Foucault is said to have been a prominent advocate of this latter form of philosophical argument.[14]

Argument in informal logic
Argument is an informal calculus, relating an effort to be performed or sum to be spent,
to possible future gain, either economic or moral.
In informal logic, an argument is a connexion between
a) an individual action
b) through which a generally accepted good is obtained.
Ex :
1. a) You should marry Jane (individual action, individual decision)
b) because she has the same temper as you. (generally accepted wisdom that marriage is good in itself,
and it is generally accepted that people with the same character get along well).
1. a) You should not smoke (individual action, individual decision)
b) because smoking is harmful (generally accepted wisdom that health is good).
The argument is neither a) advice nor b) moral or economical judgement, but the connection between the two. An
argument always uses the connective because. An argument is not an explanation. It does not connect two events,
cause and effect, which already took place, but a possible individual action and its beneficial outcome. An argument
is not a proof. A proof is a logical and cognitive concept; an argument is a praxeologic concept. A proof changes our
knowledge; an argument compels us to act.
Logical status of argument
Argument does not belong to logic, because it is connected to a real person, a real event, and a real effort to be made.
a) If you, John, will buy this stock, it will become twice as valuable in a year. b) If you, Mary, study dance, you will
become a famous ballet dancer.
The value of the argument is connected to the immediate circumstances of the person spoken to. If, in the first
case,(a) John has no money, or will die the next year, he will not be interested in buying the stock. If, in the second
case (b)she is too heavy, or too old, she will not be interested in studying and becoming a dancer. The argument is
not logical, but profitable.

Argument

World-disclosing arguments
World-disclosing arguments are a group of philosophical arguments that are said to employ a disclosive approach, to
reveal features of a wider ontological or cultural-linguistic understanding – a "world," in a specifically ontological
sense – in order to clarify or transform the background of meaning and "logical space" on which an argument
implicitly depends.[15]

Explanations and arguments
While arguments attempt to show that something is, will be, or should be the case, explanations try to show why or
how something is or will be. If Fred and Joe address the issue of whether or not Fred's cat has fleas, Joe may state:
"Fred, your cat has fleas. Observe the cat is scratching right now." Joe has made an argument that the cat has fleas.
However, if Fred and Joe agree on the fact that the cat has fleas, they may further question why this is so and put
forth an explanation: "The reason the cat has fleas is that the weather has been damp." The difference is that the
attempt is not to settle whether or not some claim is true, it is to show why it is true.
Arguments and explanations largely resemble each other in rhetorical use. This is the cause of much difficulty in
thinking critically about claims. There are several reasons for this difficulty.
• People often are not themselves clear on whether they are arguing for or explaining something.
• The same types of words and phrases are used in presenting explanations and arguments.
• The terms 'explain' or 'explanation,' et cetera are frequently used in arguments.
• Explanations are often used within arguments and presented so as to serve as arguments.[16]
Explanations and arguments are often studied in the field of Information Systems to help explain user acceptance of
knowledge-based systems. Certain argument types may fit better with personality traits to enhance acceptance by
individuals.[17]

Fallacies and nonarguments
A fallacy is an invalid argument that appears valid, or a valid argument with disguised assumptions. First the
premises and the conclusion must be statements, capable of being true and false. Secondly it must be asserted that
the conclusion follows from the premises. In English the words therefore, so, because and hence typically separate
the premises from the conclusion of an argument, but this is not necessarily so. Thus: Socrates is a man, all men are
mortal therefore Socrates is mortal is clearly an argument (a valid one at that), because it is clear it is asserted that
Socrates is mortal follows from the preceding statements. However I was thirsty and therefore I drank is NOT an
argument, despite its appearance. It is not being claimed that I drank is logically entailed by I was thirsty. The
therefore in this sentence indicates for that reason not it follows that.
Elliptical arguments
Often an argument is invalid because there is a missing premise--the supply of which would render it valid. Speakers
and writers will often leave out a strictly necessary premise in their reasonings if it is widely accepted and the writer
does not wish to state the blindingly obvious. Example: All metals expand when heated, therefore iron will expand
when heated. (Missing premise: iron is a metal). On the other hand, a seemingly valid argument may be found to
lack a premise – a 'hidden assumption' – which if highlighted can show a fault in reasoning. Example: A witness
reasoned: Nobody came out the front door except the milkman; therefore the murderer must have left by the back
door. (Hidden assumption- the milkman was not the murderer).

14

Argument

Notes
[1] "Argument", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." (http:/ / www. iep. utm. edu/ argument/ ) "In everyday life, we often use the word
"argument" to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement. This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophy. However, the two uses are
related. Normally, when two people verbally disagree with each other, each person attempts to convince the other that his or her viewpoint is
the right one. Unless he or she merely results to name calling or threats, he or she typically presents an argument for his or her position, in the
sense described above. In philosophy, "arguments" are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or
present reasons for accepting a given conclusion."
[2] Ralph H. Johnson, Manifest Rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum, 2000), 46-49.
[3] Ralph H. Johnson, Manifest Rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum, 2000), 46.
[4] The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. CUM, 1995 "Argument: a sequence of statements such that some of them (the premises)
purport to give reason to accept another of them, the conclusion"
[5] Stanford Enc. Phil., Classical Logic (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ logic-classical/ #3)
[6] "Deductive and Inductive Arguments," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http:/ / www. iep. utm. edu/ ded-ind/ ).
[7] Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments", Philosophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995), 20-33. "[Transcendental] arguments
consist of a string of what one could call indispensability claims. They move from their starting points to their conclusions by showing that the
condition stated in the conclusion is indispensable to the feature identified at the start… Thus we could spell out Kant's transcendental
deduction in the first edition in three stages: experience must have an object, that is, be of something; for this it must be coherent; and to be
coherent it must be shaped by the understanding through the categories."
[8] Nikolas Kompridis, "World Disclosing Arguments?" in Critique and Disclosure" (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 116-124.
[9] "Argument", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." (http:/ / www. iep. utm. edu/ argument/ )
[10] Shaw 1922: p. 74.
[11] Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reasoning", Philosophical Arguments, 34-60.
[12] Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments", Philosophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995), 20-33.
[13] Nikolas Kompridis, "Two Kinds of Fallibilism", Critique and Disclosure (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 180-183.
[14] In addition, Foucault said of his own approach that "My role ... is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept
as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be
criticized and destroyed." He also wrote that he was engaged in "the process of putting historico-critical reflection to the test of concrete
practices… I continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty."
(emphasis added) Hubert Dreyfus, " Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault (http:/ / socrates. berkeley. edu/ ~hdreyfus/ html/ paper_being.
html)" and Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" (http:/ / foucault. info/ documents/ whatIsEnlightenment/ foucault.
whatIsEnlightenment. en. html)
[15] Nikolas Kompridis, "World Disclosing Arguments?" in Critique and Disclosure, Cambridge:MIT Press (2006), 118-121.
[16] Critical Thinking, Parker and Moore
[17] Justin Scott Giboney, Susan Brown, and Jay F. Nunamaker Jr. (2012). "User Acceptance of Knowledge-Based System Recommendations:
Explanations, Arguments, and Fit" 45th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, January 5–8.

References
• Shaw, Warren Choate (1922). The Art of Debate (http://books.google.com/books?id=WgtKAAAAIAAJ&
pg=PA74&dq="argument+by+analogy"&as_brr=0#PPA74,M1). Allyn and Bacon. p. 74.
• Robert Audi, Epistemology, Routledge, 1998. Particularly relevant is Chapter 6, which explores the relationship
between knowledge, inference and argument.
• J. L. Austin How to Do Things With Words, Oxford University Press, 1976.
• H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation in The Logic of Grammar, Dickenson, 1975.
• Vincent F. Hendricks, Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression, New York: Automatic
Press / VIP, 2005, ISBN 87-991013-7-8
• R. A. DeMillo, R. J. Lipton and A. J. Perlis, Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs,
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1979. A classic article on the social process of acceptance of proofs
in mathematics.
• Yu. Manin, A Course in Mathematical Logic, Springer Verlag, 1977. A mathematical view of logic. This book is
different from most books on mathematical logic in that it emphasizes the mathematics of logic, as opposed to the
formal structure of logic.
• Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, Notre Dame, 1970. This classic was originally
published in French in 1958.

15

Argument








Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, Dover Publications, 1952
Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, Foris Publications, 1984.
K. R. Popper Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, Methuen and Co., 1948. An account of logic that covers the
classic topics of logic and argument while carefully considering modern developments in logic.
Douglas Walton, Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation, Cambridge, 1998
Carlos Chesñevar, Ana Maguitman and Ronald Loui, Logical Models of Argument, ACM Computing Surveys,
vol. 32, num. 4, pp. 337–383, 2000.
T. Edward Damer. Attacking Faulty Reasoning, 5th Edition, Wadsworth, 2005. ISBN 0-534-60516-8
Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. 1989.
Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge. 1982.

Further reading



Salmon, Wesley C. Logic. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (1963). Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 63-10528.
Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics. Ed. and trans. John Warrington. London: Dent (1964)
Mates, Benson. Elementary Logic. New York: OUP (1972). Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 74-166004.
Mendelson, Elliot. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. New York: Van Nostran Reinholds Company (1964).

• Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (1980).

External links
• Argument (http://philpapers.org/browse/argument) at PhilPapers
• Argument (https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/idea/1437) at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• Argument (http://www.iep.utm.edu/argument) entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

16

Charles Arthur Willard

Charles Arthur Willard
Charles Arthur Willard (born 1945) is an American argumentation and rhetorical theorist.
He received his doctorate at the University of Illinois, Urbana, USA, in 1972. From 1974 to 1982 he was the
Director of Forensics at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire (USA). He has lectured in Austria, Canada,
France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. He is Professor and University Scholar at the University of
Louisville in Louisville, Kentucky, USA.
His published works include Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge (1982) [1] and A Theory of
Argumentation (1988).[2] He has published monographs in and served on editorial boards for Communication
Monographs, Informal Logic, Journal of the American Forensics Association, Argumentation, Social Epistemology
and the Quarterly Journal of Speech. He has published more than 50 articles and book chapters on topics in rhetoric
and argumentation. He was a co-director of the International Association for the Study of Argumentation based at
the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. He has received distinguished scholarship awards from the
National Communication Association, the American Forensics Association, and the Universities of Illinois and
Louisville.
His Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy (1996) debunks the
discourse of liberalism, arguing that its exaggerated ideals of authenticity, unity, and community have deflected
attention from the pervasive incompetence of the rule by experts. He proposes a ground of communication that
emphasizes common interests rather than narrow disputes.

Selected works
This is an incomplete list, which may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can
help by with reliably sourced entries.



1982 — Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge, University of Alabama Press
1982 — Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (with J. Robert Cox)
1988 — A Theory of Argumentation, University of Alabama Press
1996 — Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy, [3] Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 10-ISBN 0226898458/13-ISBN 9780226898452; OCLC 260223405 [4]
• 2004 — Critical problems in Argumentation: Proceedings of the Thirteenth NCA/AFA Conference on
Argumentation, Washington, DC: National Communication Association
• “Argument,” in Theresa Enos, Ed., Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition. New York: Garland, 1996,
pp. 16–26.
• "L'Argumentation et les Fondements Sociaux de la Connaissance," in Alain Lempereur, ed. L'Argumentation.
Liege: Pierre Mardaga, 1992.
• "The Problem of the Public Sphere: Three Diagnoses," in David Cratis Williams and Michael David Hazen, eds.,
Argumentation Theory and the Rhetoric of Assent. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990.
• "Argumentation and Postmodern Critique," in J. Schuetz and R. Trapp, eds., Perspectives on Argument.
Waveland, 1990.
• "Argument Fields: A Cartesian Meditation," in George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds., Dimensions of
Argument: Proceedings of the Second S.C.A./A.F.A. Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annadale: Speech
Communication Association, 1981.
• "On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Argument," Communication
Monographs, 64 (1976), 308-319.

17

Charles Arthur Willard

Notes
[1] "On Fields and Rational Enterprises: A Reply to Willard," Ray E. McKerrow, Rhodes, Jack, and Sara Newell, eds. Proceedings of the
Summer Conference on Argumentation, (Annadale: Speech Communication Association, 1980), Robert Rowland, "Argument Fields."
Ziegelmueller, George, and Jack Rhodes, eds. Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argument.
Annandale VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981.
[2] "Reflections on the Revolution in Willard’s Theory of Argument," Joseph W. Wenzel, 6th Annual Conference of the American Forensic
Association and Speech Communication Association, (Annadale: Speech Communication Association, 1989.
[3] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=OU75AafuhvcC& dq=Liberalism+ and+ the+ Problem+ of+ Knowledge:+ A+ New+ Rhetoric+ for+
Modern+ Democracy& source=gbs_navlinks_s
[4] http:/ / www. worldcat. org/ title/ liberalism-and-the-problem-of-knowledge-a-new-rhetoric-for-modern-democracy/ oclc/ 260223405

Social epistemology
Social epistemology is a broad set of approaches to the study of knowledge, all of which construe human knowledge
as a collective achievement. Another way of positioning social epistemology is as the study of the social dimensions
of knowledge.[1] One of the enduring difficulties with defining social epistemology is defining what knowledge
means in this context. There is also a challenge in arriving at a definition of social which satisfies academics from
different disciplines.[2] Social epistemologists may be found working in many of the disciplines of the humanities
and social sciences, most commonly in philosophy and sociology. In addition to marking a distinct movement in
traditional, analytic epistemology, social epistemology is associated with the interdisciplinary field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS).

The emergence of social epistemology
The term "social epistemology" was first used by the library scientists Margaret Egan and Jesse Shera in the 1950s.
Steven Shapin also used it in 1979. But its current sense began to emerge in the late 1980s. In 1987, the
philosophical journal Synthese published a special issue on social epistemology, which would include two authors
that have since taken the discipline in two divergent directions: Alvin Goldman and Steve Fuller3. Fuller founded a
journal called Social Epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture, and policy in 1987 and published his first book,
Social Epistemology, in 1988. Goldman's Knowledge in a Social World came out in 1999; he is currently editor of
the journal Episteme: a journal of social epistemology, which was founded in 2004. While the aims and scope of
these two journals overlap in many respects, Social Epistemology is more open to science studies in addition to
philosophy, while "the principal style [of Episteme] is that of analytical philosophy". Goldman advocates for a type
of epistemology which is sometimes called veritistic epistemology because of its large emphasis on truth.[3] This
type of epistemology is sometimes seen to side with "essentialism" as opposed to "multiculturalism".[4] But Goldman
has argued that this association between veritistic epistemology and essentialism is not necessary.[5]
The basic view of knowledge that motivated the emergence of social epistemology can be traced to the work of
Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault, which gained in prominence at the end of the 1960s. Both brought historical
concerns directly to bear on problems long associated with the philosophy of science. Perhaps the most notable issue
here was the nature of truth, which both Kuhn and Foucault described as a relative and contingent notion. On this
background, ongoing work in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the history and philosophy of science
(HPS) was able to assert its epistemological consequences, leading most notably to the establishment of the "Strong
Programme" at the University of Edinburgh. In terms of the two strands of social epistemology, Fuller is more
sensitive and receptive to this historical trajectory (if not always in agreement) than Goldman, whose self-styled
'veritistic' social epistemology can be reasonably read as a systematic rejection of the more extreme claims
associated with Kuhn and Foucault.

18

Social epistemology

Present and future concerns
At this stage, both varieties of social epistemology remain largely "academic" or "theoretical" projects. But both
emphasise the social significance of knowledge and therefore the cultural value of social epistemology itself. Both
journals, for example, welcome papers that include a policy dimension. More practical applications of social
epistemology can be found in the areas of library science, academic publishing, knowledge policy and debates over
the role over the Internet in knowledge transmission and creation.

Notes
1. "What Is Social Epistemology? A Smorgasbord of projects", in Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public,
Oxford University Press, Pg:182-204, ISBN 0-19-517367-8
2. "Relativism, Rationality and Sociality of Knowledge", Barry Barnes and David Bloor, in Rationality and
Relativism, Pg:22 ISBN 0-262-58061-6
3. A comparison of Goldman and Fuller can be found in Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve
Fuller's Social Epistemology, Francis Remedios, Lexington Books, 2003. pp. 106 –112.
4. Social Epistemology, Steve Fuller, Indiana University Press, p. 3.

References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ epistemology-social/
http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ epistemology-social/
http:/ / www. ed. uiuc. edu/ EPS/ PES-Yearbook/ 95_docs/ goldman. html
http:/ / www. ed. uiuc. edu/ EPS/ PES-Yearbook/ 95_docs/ goldman. html
http:/ / www. ed. uiuc. edu/ EPS/ PES-Yearbook/ 95_docs/ goldman. html

• Berlin, James A. Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College English Studies, Indiana: Parlor Press,
2003. ISBN 0-9724772-8-4
• Egan, Margaret and Jesse Shera. 1952. "Foundations of a Theory of Bibliography." Library Quarterly 44:125-37.
• Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02051-5
• Longino, Helen. 2001. The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-08876-4
• Remedios, Francis. 2003. Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller’s Social
Epistemology. Lexington Books. ISBN 0-7391-0667-8
• Schmitt, Frederick F. 1994. Socializing Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-8476-7959-4
• Solomon, Miriam. 2001. Social Empricism. Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-19461-9

External links
• Social epistemology (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social) entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
• Social epistemology (http://philpapers.org/browse/social-epistemology) at PhilPapers
• Social epistemology (https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/taxonomy/2379) at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
Project
• The journal Social Epistemology (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02691728.asp)
• The journal Episteme (http://www.episteme.us.com)

19

Sociology of knowledge

Sociology of knowledge
The Sociology of knowledge is the study of the relationship between human thought and the social context within
which it arises, and of the effects prevailing ideas have on societies. It is not a specialized area of sociology but
instead deals with broad fundamental questions about the extent and limits of social influences on individual's lives
and the social-cultural basics of our knowledge about the world.[1]
The sociology of knowledge was pioneered primarily by the sociologists Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss at the
end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Their works deal directly with how conceptual thought,
language, and logic could be influenced by the sociological milieu out of which they arise. In Primitive
Classification Durkheim and Mauss take a study of “primitive” group mythology to argue that systems of
classification are collectively based and that the divisions with these systems are derived from social categories.[2]
While neither author specifically coined nor used the term 'sociology of knowledge', their work is an important first
contribution to the field.
The specific term 'sociology of knowledge' first came into widespread use in the 1920s, when a number of
German-speaking sociologists, most notably Max Scheler, and Karl Mannheim, wrote extensively on it. With the
dominance of functionalism through the middle years of the 20th century, the sociology of knowledge tended to
remain on the periphery of mainstream sociological thought. It was largely reinvented and applied much more
closely to everyday life in the 1960s, particularly by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in The Social
Construction of Reality (1966) and is still central for methods dealing with qualitative understanding of human
society (compare socially constructed reality). The 'genealogical' and 'archaeological' studies of Michel Foucault are
of considerable contemporary influence.

Schools
Émile Durkheim
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) is credited as having been the first professor to successfully establish the field of
sociology, institutionalizing a department of sociology at the Université de Bordeaux in the 1890s.[3] While his
works deal with a number of subjects, including suicide, the family, social structures, and social institutions, a large
part of his work deals with the sociology of knowledge. In 1902, he published, with Marcel Mauss, De quelques
formes primitives de classification, an essay that examines how the various ways in which a society is organized
structurally impacts the formation of a society's categories and logical grouping systems.
Building on his early work with Mauss, Durkheim's definitive statement concerning the sociology of knowledge
comes in his magnum opus The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. This book has as its goal not only the
elucidation of the social origins and function of religion, but also the social origins and impact of society on
language and logical thought. In it, Durkheim argues that religious beliefs require people to separate life into
categories of the sacred and the profane, and that rites and rituals are necessary to mark the transition between these
two spheres.[4] Here, Durkheim outlines how totemism within an Australian aboriginal religion is an example of how
collective representations are enacted through religion.[5] A totem is a representation of the clan, which embodies all
the characteristics of the group and around which rites and rituals take place.[6] It is through these rituals that religion
is enacted and reinforced, creating a collective understanding of reality.
One of the most important elements of Durkheim's theory knowledge is his concept of représentations collectives
(collective representations), which is outlined in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Représentations
collectives are the symbols and images that come to represent the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a
collectivity and are not reducible to individual constituents. They can include words, slogans, ideas, or any number
of material items that can serve as a symbol, such as a cross, a rock, a temple, a feather etc. As Durkheim elaborates,

20

Sociology of knowledge
représentations collectives are created through the intense interaction of religious rituals. They are products of
collective activity and as such these representations have the particular, and somewhat contradictory, aspect that they
exist externally to the individual (since they are created and controlled not by the individual but by society as a
whole), and yet simultaneously within each individual of the society (by virtue of that individual's participation
within society).[7] Through représentations collectives the group exerts pressure on the individual to conform to
society's norms of morality and thought. As such, collective representations help to order and make sense of the
world, but they also express, symbolize and interpret social relationships.

Karl Mannheim
The German political philosophers Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) argued in Die
deutsche Ideologie (1846, German Ideology) and elsewhere that people's ideologies, including their social and
political beliefs and opinions, are rooted in their class interests, and more broadly in the social and economic
circumstances in which they live:
"It is men, who in developing their material inter-course, change, along with this their real existence, their
thinking and the products of their thinking. Being is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by
being" (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe 1/5).
Under the influence of this doctrine, and of Phenomenology, the Hungarian-born German sociologist Karl
Mannheim (1893–1947) gave impetus to the growth of the sociology of knowledge with his Ideologie und Utopie
(1929, translated and extended in 1936 as Ideology and Utopia), although the term had been introduced five years
earlier by the co-founder of the movement, the German philosopher, phenomenologist and social theorist Max
Scheler (1874–1928), in Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens (1924, Attempts at a Sociology of Knowledge).
Mannheim feared that this interpretation could be seen to claim that all knowledge and beliefs are the products of
socio-political forces since this form of relativism is self-defeating (if it is true, then it too is merely a product of
socio-political forces and has no claim to truth and no persuasive force). Mannheim believed that relativism was a
strange mixture of modern and ancient beliefs in that it contained within itself a belief in an absolute truth which was
true for all times and places (the ancient view most often associated with Plato) and condemned other truth claims
because they could not achieve this level of objectivity (an idea gleaned from Marx). Mannheim sought to escape
this problem with the idea of 'relationism'. This is the idea that certain things are true only in certain times and places
(a view influenced by pragmatism) however, this does not make them less true. Mannheim felt that a stratum of
free-floating intellectuals (who he claimed were only loosely anchored to the class structure of society) could most
perfectly realize this form of truth by creating a "dynamic synthesis" of the ideologies of other groups.

Phenomenological Sociology
Phenomenological Sociology is the study of the formal structures of concrete social existence as made available in
and through the analytical description of acts of intentional consciousness. The "object" of such an analysis is the
meaningful lived world of everyday life: the "Lebenswelt", or Life-world (Husserl:1889). The task, like that of every
other phenomenological investigation, is to describe the formal structures of this object of investigation in subjective
terms, as an object-constituted-in-and-for-consciousness (Gurwitsch:1964). That which makes such a description
different from the "naive" subjective descriptions of the man in the street, or those of the traditional, positivist social
scientist, is the utilization of phenomenological methods.
The leading proponent of Phenomenological Sociology was Alfred Schutz [1899-1959]. Schutz sought to provide a
critical philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology through the use of phenomenological
methods derived from the transcendental phenomenological investigations of Edmund Husserl [1859-1938].
Husserl's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of intentional consciousness. Schutz's work was
directed at establishing the formal structures of the Life-world (Schutz:1980). Husserl's work was conducted as a
transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Schutz's work was conducted as a mundane phenomenology of the

21

Sociology of knowledge
Life-world (Natanson:1974). The difference in their research projects lies at the level of analysis, the objects taken as
topics of study, and the type of phenomenological reduction that is employed for the purposes of analysis.
Ultimately, the two projects should be seen as complementary, with the structures of the latter dependent on the
structures of the former. That is, valid phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the Life-world
should be wholly consistent with the descriptions of the formal structures of intentional consciousness. It is from the
latter that the former derives its validity and truth value (Sokolowski:2000).
The phenomenological tie-in with the sociology of knowledge stems from two key historical sources for Mannheim's
analysis: [1] Mannheim was dependent on insights derived from Husserl's phenomenological investigations,
especially the theory of meaning as found in Husserl's Logical Investigations of 1900/1901 (Husserl:2000), in the
formulation of his central methodological work: "On The Interpretation of Weltanschauung" (Mannheim:1993:see
fn41 & fn43) - this essay forms the centerpiece for Mannheim's method of historical understanding and is central to
his conception of the sociology of knowledge as a research program; and [2] The concept of "Weltanschauung"
employed by Mannheim has its origins in the hermeneutic philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, who relied on Husserl's
theory of meaning (above) for his methodological specification of the interpretive act (Mannheim: 1993: see fn38).
It is also noteworthy that Husserl's analysis of the formal structures of consciousness, and Schuetz's analysis of the
formal structures of the Life-world are specifically intended to establish the foundations, in consciousness, for the
understanding and interpretation of a social world which is subject to cultural and historical change. The
phenomenological position is that although the facticity of the social world may be culturally and historically
relative, the formal structures of consciousness, and the processes by which we come to know and understand this
facticity, are not. That is, the understanding of any actual social world is unavoidably dependent on understanding
the structures and processes of consciousness that found, and constitute, any possible social world.
Alternatively, if the facticity of the social world and the structures of consciousness prove to be culturally and
historically relative, then we are at an impasse in regard to any meaningful scientific understanding of the social
world which is not subjective (as opposed to being objective and grounded in nature [positivism], or inter subjective
and grounded in the structures of consciousness [phenomenology]), and relative to the cultural and idealization
formations of particular concrete individuals living in a particular socio-historical group.

Michel Foucault
A particularly important contemporary contribution to the sociology of knowledge is found in the work of Michel
Foucault. Madness and Civilization (1961) postulated that conceptions of madness and what was considered
"reason" or "knowledge" was itself subject to major culture bias - in this respect mirroring similar criticisms by
Thomas Szasz, at the time the foremost critic of psychiatry, and himself now an eminent psychiatrist. A point where
Foucault and Szasz agreed was that sociological processes played the major role in defining "madness" as an
"illness" and prescribing "cures". In The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception (1963), Foucault
extended his critique to institutional clinical medicine, arguing for the central conceptual metaphor of "The Gaze",
which had implications for medical education, prison design, and the carceral state as understood today. Concepts of
criminal justice and its intersection with medicine were better developed in this work than in Szasz and others, who
confined their critique to current psychiatric practice. The Order of Things (1966) and The Archeology of Knowledge
(1969) introduced abstract notions of mathesis and taxonomia to explain the subjective 'ordering' of the human
sciences. These, he claimed, had transformed 17th and 18th century studies of "general grammar" into modern
"linguistics", "natural history" into modern "biology", and "analysis of wealth" into modern "economics"; though
not, claimed Foucault, without loss of meaning. According to Foucault, the 19th century transformed what
knowledge was.
Perhaps Foucault's best-known claim was that "Man did not exist" before the 18th century. Foucault regarded
notions of humanity and of humanism as inventions of modernity. Accordingly, a cognitive bias had been introduced
unwittingly into science, by over-trusting the individual doctor or scientist's ability to see and state things

22

Sociology of knowledge
objectively. Foucault roots this argument in the rediscovery of Kant, though his thought is significantly influenced
by Nietzsche - that philosopher declaring the "death of God" in the 19th century, and the anti-humanists proposing
the "death of Man" in the 20th.
In Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, Foucault concentrates on the correlation between knowledge and
power. According to him, knowledge is a form of power and can conversely be used against individuals as a form of
power.[8] As a result, knowledge is socially constructed in order to maintain the power of the ruling class.[9] He
argues that knowledge forms discourses and discourses form the dominant ideological ways of thinking which
govern our lives.[10] For him, social control is maintained in ‘the disciplinary society’, through codes of control over
sexuality and the ideas/knowledge perpetuated through social institutions.[11] In other words, discourses and
ideologies subject us to authority and turn people into ‘subjected beings’, who are in turn afraid of being punished if
they sway from social norms.[12] Foucault believes that institutions overtly regulate and control our lives. Institutions
such as schools reinforce the dominant ideological forms of thinking onto the populace and force us into becoming
obedient and docile beings.[13] Hence, the dominant ideology that serves the interests of the ruling class, all the while
appearing as `neutral`, needs to be questioned and must not go unchallenged.[14]

Knowledge ecology
Knowledge ecology is a concept originating from knowledge management and that aimed at "bridging the gap
between the static data repositories of knowledge management and the dynamic, adaptive behavior of natural
systems",[15] and in particular relying on the concept of interaction and emergence. Knowledge ecology, and its
related concept information ecology has been elaborated by different academics and practitioners such as Thomas H.
Davenport,[16] Bonnie Nardi,[17] or Swidler.

New Sociology of Knowledge
The New Sociology of Knowledge introduces new concepts that dictate how knowledge is socialized in the modern
era by new kinds of social organizations and structures.[18][19]

Robert K. Merton
American sociologist Robert K. Merton (1910–2003) dedicates a section of Social Theory and Social Structure
(1949; revised and expanded, 1957 and 1968) to the study of the sociology of knowledge in Part III, titled The
Sociology of Knowledge and Mass Communications.[20]

References
[1] http:/ / www. stthomasu. ca/ academic/ soci/ weeks/ 3523. htm
[2] Durkheim, Emile, and Marcel Mauss. (1963). Primitive classification. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[3] Calhoun, Craig, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Steven Pfaff, Kathryn Schmidt, and Intermohan Virk. (2002). Classical sociological theory.
Malden, Mass: Blackwell
[4] Giddens, Anthony. (1978). Durkheim. Hassocks: Harvester, p. 85
[5] Calhoun, Craig, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Steven Pfaff, Kathryn Schmidt, and Intermohan Virk (2002). Classical sociological theory.
Malden, Mass: Blackwell, p. 106
[6] Giddens, Anthony. (1978). Durkheim. Hassocks: Harvester, p. 87
[7] Durkheim, Emile. (1964). The elementary forms of the religious life. London: Allen & Unwin.
[8] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 27.
[9] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 28.
[10] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 187.
[11] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 138.
[12] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 138.
[13] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 138.
[14] Foucault, Michel (1975). Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House. pp. 187.
[15] Pór, G. (2000). "Nurturing Systemic Wisdom through Knowledge Ecology". The Systems Thinker 11 (8): 1–5.

23

Sociology of knowledge
[16] Davenport, Thomas H.; Prusak, Laurence (1997). Information Ecology (http:/ / argus-acia. com/ content/ review001. html). Oxford
University Press. pp. 288. ISBN 0-19-511168-0. .
[17] Nardi, Bonnie; O’Day, V. (1999). Information Ecology: Using Technology with Heart. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 288.
[18] Swidler, A., Arditi, J. 1994. The New Sociology of Knowledge. Annual Review of Sociology , 20, pp. 205-329
[19] McCarthy, E. Doyle. 1996. Knowledge as Culture: The New Sociology of Knowledge . New York: Routledge.
[20] Merton, Robert K. (1957). Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

• Foucault, Michel (1994). The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception. Vintage.

Doug Walton
For the rugby league footballer of the 1960s and '70s for Great Britain, Yorkshire, and Castleford, see
Douglas "Doug" Walton
Douglas Neil Walton is a Canadian academic and author, well known for his many widely published books and
papers on argumentation, logical fallacies and informal logic. Walton teaches logic, published numerous books, and
has written many papers. He holds the Assumption Chair in Argumentation Studies and Distinguished Research
Fellow of the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric at the University of Windsor, Canada.
He gained his BA at University of Waterloo, Ontario (1964) and his PhD at University of Toronto (1972). He taught
for many years at the University of Winnipeg, in Manitoba.
Walton's work has been used to better prepare legal arguments and to help develop artificial intelligence. His books
have been translated worldwide and he attracts students from many countries to study with him. A festschrift
honoring his work was published in 2010.[1]
Most of Walton's books are about logical fallacies, some of them co-authored with John Woods. According to Frans
H. van Eemeren, who calls this body of work the Woods-Walton approach, this is "the most continuous and
extensive post-Hamblin contribution to the study of fallacies".[2]

Books
The list of titles, from most recent to oldest are:














Argumentation Schemes
Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach
Witness Testimony Evidence: Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence and Law
Dialog Theory for Critical Argumentation
Media Argumentation: Dialectic, Persuasion and Rhetoric
Character Evidence: An Abductive Theory
Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation
Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law
Abductive Reasoning
Relevance in Argumentation
Ethical Argumentation
Legal Argumentation and Evidence
Scare Tactics: Arguments that Appeal to Fear and Threats
Appeal to Popular Opinion
One-Sided Arguments: A Dialectical Analysis of Bias

• . (1997), Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority, University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania
State University, ISBN 0-271-01694-9  Paperback ISBN 0-271-01695-7
• Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam
• Historical Foundations of Informal Logic

24

Doug Walton
















Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory
Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning
Arguments from Ignorance
Fallacies Arising from Ambiguity
Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning
A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy
The Place of Emotion in Argument
Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation
Slippery Slope Arguments
Begging the Question: Circular Reasoning as a Tactic of Argumentation
Practical Reasoning: Goal-Driven, Knowledge-Based, Action-Guiding Argumentation
Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation
Question-Reply Argumentation
Informal Fallacies
Courage: A Philosophical Investigation
Arguer's Position: A Pragmatic Study of Ad Hominem Attack
Criticism, Refutation, and Fallacy




Physician-Patient Decision-Making
Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies
Ethics of Withdrawal of Life Support Systems
Topical Relevance in Argumentation, and Brain Death: Ethical Considerations.

References
[1] Reed, Christoph; Christopher W. Tindale (2010). Dialectics, Dialogue and Argumentation: An Examination of Douglas Walton's Theories of
Reasoning and Argument. London: College Publications.
[2] F. H. van Eemeren (2001). Crucial concepts in argumentation theory (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=JpgfSPmaVFkC& pg=PA154).
Amsterdam University Press. p. 154. ISBN 978-90-5356-523-0. .

External links
• Personal webpage (http://www.dougwalton.ca/index.htm)

25

Informal logic

Informal logic
Informal logic, intuitively, refers to the principles of logic and logical thought outside of a formal setting. However,
perhaps because of the informal in the title, the precise definition of informal logic is a matter of some dispute.[1]
Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair define informal logic as "a branch of logic whose task is to develop
non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of
argumentation."[2] This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others[3][4][5] were doing
in their informal logic texts.
Informal logic is associated with (informal) fallacies, critical thinking, the Thinking Skills Movement[6] and the
interdisciplinary inquiry known as argumentation theory. Frans H. van Eemeren writes that the label "informal logic"
covers a "collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the
practice of argumentation than formal logic."[7]

History
Informal logic as a distinguished enterprise under this name emerged roughly in the late 1970s as a sub-field of
philosophy. The naming of the field was preceded by the appearance of a number of textbooks that rejected the
symbolic approach to logic on pedagogical grounds as inappropriate and unhelpful for introductory textbooks on
logic for a general audience, for example Howard Kahane's Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, subtitled "The Use of
Reason in Everyday Life", first published in 1971. Kahane's textbook was described on the notice of his death in the
Proceedings And Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2002) as "a text in informal logic, [that] was
intended to enable students to cope with the misleading rhetoric one frequently finds in the media and in political
discourse. It was organized around a discussion of fallacies, and was meant to be a practical instrument for dealing
with the problems of everyday life. [It has] ... gone through many editions; [it is] ... still in print; and the thousands
upon thousands of students who have taken courses in which his text [was] ... used can thank Howard for
contributing to their ability to dissect arguments and avoid the deceptions of deceitful rhetoric. He tried to put into
practice the ideal of discourse that aims at truth rather than merely at persuasion. (Hausman et al. 2002)"[8][9] Other
textbooks from the era taking this approach were Michael Scriven's Reasoning (Edgepress, 1976) and Logical
Self-Defense by Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, first published in 1977.[8] Earlier precursors in this tradition
can be considered Monroe Beardsley's Practical Logic (1950) and Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument
(1958).[10]
The field perhaps became recognized under its current name with the First International Symposium on Informal
Logic held in 1978. Although initially motivated by a new pedagogical approach to undergraduate logic textbooks,
the scope of the field was basically defined by a list of 13 problems and issues which Blair and Johnson included as
an appendix to their keynote address at this symposium:[8][11]








the theory of logical criticism
the theory of argument
the theory of fallacy
the fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach
the viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy
the ethics of argumentation and logical criticism
the problem of assumptions and missing premises
the problem of context
methods of extracting arguments from context

• methods of displaying arguments
• the problem of pedagogy
• the nature, division and scope of informal logic

26

Informal logic
• the relationship of informal logic to other inquiries
David Hitchcock argues that the naming of the field was unfortunate, and that philosophy of argument would have
been more appropriate. He argues that more undergraduate students in North America study informal logic than any
other branch of philosophy, but that as of 2003 informal logic (or philosophy of argument) was not recognized as
separate sub-field by the World Congress of Philosophy.[8] Frans H. van Eemeren wrote that "informal logic" is
mainly an approach to argumentation advanced by a group of US and Canadian philosophers and largely based on
the previous works of Stephen Toulmin and to a lesser extent those of Chaïm Perelman.[7]
Alongside the symposia, since 1983 the journal Informal Logic has been the publication of record of the field, with
Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the University
of Windsor—Christopher Tindale and Hans V. Hansen.[12] Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal
logic include Argumentation (founded in 1986), Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy (the journal
of the American Forensic Association), and Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines (founded in 1988).[13]

Proposed definitions
Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following definition: "Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose
task is to develop non-formal2 standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and
construction of argumentation in everyday discourse." Their meaning of non-formal2 is taken from Barth and Krabbe
(1982), which is explained below.
To understand the definition above, one must understand "informal" which takes its meaning in contrast to its
counterpart "formal." (This point was not made for a very long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained
opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) Here it is helpful to have recourse[14] to Barth and Krabbe
(1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the term "form." By "form1," Barth and Krabbe mean the sense of
the term which derives from the Platonic idea of form—the ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe claim that
most traditional logic is formal in this sense. That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could
naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or Aristotelian) forms. In this first sense of "form," almost all
logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding informal logic this way would be much too broad to be useful.
By "form2," Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems
of logic. Here validity is the focus: if the premises are true, the conclusion must then also be true. Now validity has
to do with the logical form of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of "formal," most modern and
contemporary logic is "formal." That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form, and the notion of validity
plays the central normative role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is not-formal, because it abandons the
notion of logical form as the key to understanding the structure of arguments, and likewise retires validity as
normative for the purposes of the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a
requirement, that there are good arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the premises even though it does
not follow necessarily from them (as validity requires). An argument in which the conclusion is thought to be
"beyond reasonable doubt, given the premises" is sufficient in law to cause a person to be sentenced to death, even
though it does not meet the standard of logical validity. This type of argument, based on accumulation of evidence
rather than pure deduction, is called a conductive argument.
By "form3," Barth and Krabbe mean to refer to "procedures which are somehow regulated or regimented, which take
place according to some set of rules." Barth and Krabbe say that "we do not defend formality3 of all kinds and under
all circumstances." Rather "we defend the thesis that verbal dialectics must have a certain form (i.e., must proceed
according to certain rules) in order that one can speak of the discussion as being won or lost" (19). In this third sense
of "form", informal logic can be formal, for there is nothing in the informal logic enterprise that stands opposed to
the idea that argumentative discourse should be subject to norms, i.e., subject to rules, criteria, standards or
procedures. Informal logic does present standards for the evaluation of argument, procedures for detecting missing
premises etc.

27

Informal logic
Johnson and Blair (2000) noticed a limitation of their own definition, particularly with respect to "everyday
discourse", which could indicate that it does not seek to understand specialized, domain-specific arguments made in
natural languages. Consequently, they have argued that the crucial divide is between arguments made in formal
languages and those made in natural languages.
Fisher and Scriven (1997) proposed a more encompassing definition, seeing informal logic as "the discipline which
studies the practice of critical thinking and provides its intellectual spine". By "critical thinking" they understand
"skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information and
argumentation."[15]

Criticisms
Some hold the view that informal logic is not a branch or subdiscipline of logic, or even the view that there cannot be
such a thing as informal logic.[16][17][18] Massey criticizes informal logic on the grounds that it has no theory
underpinning it. Informal logic, he says, requires detailed classification schemes to organize it, which in other
disciplines is provided by the underlying theory. He maintains that there is no method of establishing the invalidity
of an argument aside from the formal method, and that the study of fallacies may be of more interest to other
disciplines, like psychology, than to philosophy and logic.[16]

Relation to critical thinking
Since the 1980s, informal logic has been partnered and even equated,[19] in the minds of many, with critical thinking.
The precise definition of "critical thinking" is a subject of much dispute.[20] Critical thinking, as defined by Johnson,
is the evaluation of an intellectual product (an argument, an explanation, a theory) in terms of its strengths and
weaknesses.[20] While critical thinking will include evaluation of arguments and hence require skills of
argumentation including informal logic, critical thinking requires additional abilities not supplied by informal logic,
such as the ability to obtain and assess information and to clarify meaning. Also, many believe that critical thinking
requires certain dispositions.[21] Understood in this way, "critical thinking" is a broad term for the attitudes and skills
that are involved in analyzing and evaluating arguments. The critical thinking movement promotes critical thinking
as an educational ideal. The movement emerged with great force in the 80s in North America as part of an ongoing
critique of education as regards the thinking skills not being taught.

Relation to argumentation theory
The social, communicative practice of argumentation can and should be distinguished from implication (or
entailment)—a relationship between propositions; and from inference—a mental activity typically thought of as the
drawing of a conclusion from premises. Informal logic may thus be said to be a logic of argumentation, as
distinguished from implication and inference.[22]
Argumentation theory (or the theory of argumentation) has come to be the term that designates the theoretical study
of argumentation. This study is interdisciplinary in the sense that no one discipline will be able to provide a complete
account. A full appreciation of argumentation requires insights from logic (both formal and informal), rhetoric,
communication theory, linguistics, psychology, and, increasingly, computer science. Since the 1970s, there has been
significant agreement that there are three basic approaches to argumentation theory: the logical, the rhetorical and the
dialectical. According to Wenzel,[23] the logical approach deals with the product, the dialectical with the process, and
the rhetorical with the procedure. Thus, informal logic is one contributor to this inquiry, being most especially
concerned with the norms of argument.

28

Informal logic

Footnotes
[1] See Johnson 1999 for a survey of definitions.
[2] Johnson, Ralph H., and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), "The Current State of Informal Logic", Informal Logic, 9(2–3), 147–151. Johnson & Blair
added "... in everyday discourse" but in (2000), modified their definition, and broadened the focus now to include the sorts of argument that
occurs not just in everyday discourse but also disciplined inquiry—what Weinstein (1990) calls "stylized discourse."
[3] Scriven, 1976
[4] Munson, 1976
[5] Fogelin, 1978
[6] Resnick, 1989
[7] Frans H. van Eemeren (2009). "The Study of Argumentation" (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=RYRf2JACLGkC& pg=PA117). In
Andrea A. Lunsford, Kirt H. Wilson, Rosa A. Eberly. The SAGE handbook of rhetorical studies. SAGE. p. 117. ISBN 978-1-4129-0950-1. .
[8] David Hitchcock, Informal logic 25 years later (http:/ / www. humanities. mcmaster. ca/ ~hitchckd/ 25. pdf) in Informal Logic at 25:
Proceedings of the Windsor Conference (OSSA 2003)
[9] JSTOR 3218569
[10] Fisher (2004) p. vii
[11] J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium, 3-28. Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress
[12] http:/ / ojs. uwindsor. ca/ ojs/ leddy/ index. php/ informal_logic/ about/ editorialTeam
[13] Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 100
[14] As Johnson (1999) does.
[15] Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 95
[16] Massey, 1981
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]

Woods, 1980
Woods, 2000
Johnson (2000) takes the conflation to be part of the Network Problem and holds that settling the issue will require a theory of reasoning.
Johnson, 1992
Ennis, 1987
Johnson, 1999
Wenzel (1990)

References
• Barth, E. M., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (Eds.). (1982). From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and
argumentation. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
• Blair, J. A & Johnson, R.H. (1980). The recent development of informal logic. In J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H.
Johnson (Eds.). Informal logic: The first international symposium, (pp. 3–28). Inverness, CA: Edgepress.
• Ennis, R.H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J.B. Baron and R.J. Sternberg
(Eds.), Teaching critical thinking skills: Theory and practice, (pp. 9–26). New York: Freeman.
• Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
• Fisher, A. and Scriven, M. (1997). Critical thinking: It's definition and assessment. Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress
• Fisher, Alec (2004). The logic of real arguments (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 978-0-521-65481-4.
• Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
• Govier, T. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
• Groarke, L. (2006). Informal Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, from http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/logic-informal/
• Hitchcock, David (2007). "Informal logic and the concept of argument". In Jacquette, Dale. Philosophy of logic.
Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-444-51541-4. preprint (http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~hitchckd/informal.pdf)
• Johnson, R. H. (1992). The problem of defining critical thinking. In S. P. Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of
critical thinking (pp. 38–53). New York: Teachers College Press. (Reprinted in Johnson (1996).)
• Johnson, R. H. (1996). The rise of informal logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press
• Johnson, R. H. (1999). The relation between formal and informal logic. Argumentation, 13(3) 265-74.

29

Informal logic
• Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
• Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (1987). The current state of informal logic. Informal Logic 9, 147-51.
• Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, &
F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of argumentation theory (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates
• Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In D. Gabbay, R. H.
Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods (Eds.). Handbook of the logic of argument and inference: The turn towards
the practical (pp. 339–396). Elsivier: North Holland.
• MacFarlane, J. (2005). Logical Constants. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Massey, G. (1981). The fallacy behind fallacies. Midwest Studies of Philosophy, 6, 489-500.
• Munson, R. (1976). The way of words: an informal logic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
• Resnick, L. (1987). Education and learning to think. Washington, DC: National Academy Press..
• Walton, D. N. (1990). What is reasoning? What is an argument? The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 399-419.
• Weinstein, M. (1990) Towards a research agenda for informal logic and critical thinking. Informal Logic, 12,
121-143.
• Wenzel, J. 1990 Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on
argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide, 9-26 Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, IL
• Woods, J. (1980). What is informal logic? In J.A. Blair & R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First
International Symposium (pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress.

Special journal issue
The open access issue 20(2) (http:/ / www. phaenex. uwindsor. ca/ ojs/ leddy/ index. php/ informal_logic/ issue/
view/277) of Informal Logic from year 2000 groups a number of papers addressing foundational issues, based on the
Panel on Informal Logic that was held at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, including:
• Hitchcock, D. (2000) The significance of informal logic for philosophy. Informal Logic 20(2), 129-138.
• Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (2000). Informal logic: An overview. Informal Logic 20(2): 93-99.
• Woods, J. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic? Informal Logic 20(2): 139-167. 2000

Textbooks
• Kahane, H. (1971). Logic and contemporary rhetoric:The use of reasoning in everyday life. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Still in print as Nancy Cavender; Howard Kahane (2009). Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason
in Everyday Life (11th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-80411-6.
• Scriven, M. (1976). Reasoning. New York. McGraw Hill.
• Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. US Edition. (2006).
New York: Idebate Press.
• Fogelin, R.J. (1978). Understanding arguments: An introduction to informal logic. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich. Still in print as Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Fogelin, Robert (2010), Understanding Arguments: An
Introduction to Informal Logic (8th ed.), Belmont, California: Wadsworth Cengage Learning,
ISBN 978-0-495-60395-5
• Stephen N. Thomas (1997). Practical reasoning in natural language (4th ed.). Prentice Hall.
ISBN 978-0-13-678269-8.
• Irving M. Copi; Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996). Informal logic (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-229048-7.
• Woods, John, Andrew Irvine and Douglas Walton, 2004. Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the Fallacies.
Toronto: Prentice Hall
• Groarke, Leo and Christopher Tindale, 2004. Good Reasoning Matters! (3rd edition). Toronto: Oxford University
Press

30

Informal logic
• Douglas N. Walton (2008). Informal logic: a pragmatic approach (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 978-0-521-71380-1.
• Trudy Govier (2009). A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-60340-5.

External links
• Informal Logic (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal) entry by Leo Groarke in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Joseph W. Wenzel
Joseph W. Wenzel (1933--) is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar. He is Professor Emeritus at the
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.[1]
He has lectured in Austria, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. He has published in
Communication Monographs, Journal of the American Forensic Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and
Argumentation.
His students include Dale Hample, Daniel J. O'Keefe, and Charles Arthur Willard. His seminal contribution to
argument theory appears in 1979: ‘Jurgen Habermas and the Dialectical Perspective on Argumentation’, Journal of
the American Forensic Association 16, 83–94. He has published 30 articles and book chapters on topics in rhetoric
and argumentation. He received awards for publications from the Midwest Forensic Association and the American
Forensic Association. He has been a frequent presenter at conferences in America and abroad, including a keynote
address at the First International Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam in 1986. He was Editor of the Journal
of the American Forensic Association, 1983–86, and has served on the editorial boards of Argumentation, Central
States Speech Journal, Communication Monographs, Informal Logic and Quarterly Journal of Speech. [2]

References
[1] http:/ / www. communication. illinois. edu/ faculty/ people/ jwenzel/
[2] http:/ / www. mocktrialacademy. com/ printpop. asp?Id=18

31

Daniel J. O'Keefe

Daniel J. O'Keefe
Daniel J. O'Keefe (born 1950) is an American communication and argumentation theory scholar. He is the Owen L.
Coon Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Northwestern University. His research concerns
persuasion and argumentation, with a focus on meta-analytic synthesis of research concerning persuasive message
effects..[1] This program of work often addresses the question of whether normatively good argumentation
contributes to persuasive success.
O'Keefe is the author of Persuasion: Theory and Research (ISBN 0-761-92539-2), a review of empirical research on
persuasion. His work has been published in the Journal of Communication, Human Communication Research,
Communication Monographs, Communication Theory, Communication Yearbook, Argumentation, Quarterly
Journal of Speech, Argumentation and Advocacy, and other journals.

Awards
From the National Communication Association[2]:
• Charles Woolbert Research Award, 1986
• Golden Anniversary Monograph Award, 1982
• Rhetorical and Communication Theory Division Distinguished Scholar Award, 2005
From the American Forensic Association[3]:
• Daniel Rohrer Memorial Research Award, 1977
From the International Communication Association[4]:
• Health Communication Division Article of the Year Award, 2008
• Best Article Award, 2004
• Division 1 John E. Hunter Meta-Analysis Award, 2000
From the International Society for the Study of Argumentation[5]:
• Distinguished Scholar Award
From the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign[6]:
• Humanities Council Teaching Excellence Award, 1999
From Northwestern University[7]:
• Galbut Outstanding Faculty Award, School of Communication, 201

References
[1] Northwestern University School of Communication Faculty Page (http:/ / www. communication. northwestern. edu/ faculty/
?PID=DanielOKeefe)
[2] National Communication Association Award Winners (http:/ / www. natcom. org/ uploadedFiles/ Content/ About/
PastAwardWinnersUpdatedFeb2011. pdf)
[3] American Forensic Association Award Winners (http:/ / www. americanforensics. org/ node/ 40)
[4] International Communication Association Award Winners (http:/ / www. icahdq. org/ about_ica/ awards/ allwinners. asp)
[5] Insternational Society for the Study of Argumentation Award Winners (http:/ / cf. hum. uva. nl/ issa/ about_issa-awards. html)
[6] University of Illinois College of LAS faculty award winners (http:/ / www. las. uiuc. edu/ faculty/ awards/ recipients/ )
[7] Northwestern University School of Communication Newsletter (http:/ / www. communication. northwestern. edu/ publications/
DialogueFall2010. pdf)

32

G. Thomas Goodnight

G. Thomas Goodnight
G. Thomas Goodnight is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar.
He is a professor and director of doctoral studies in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of
Southern California. He has published essays in Communication Monographs, Communication Theory, Journal of
the American Forensic Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and Argumentation.He has lectured in France,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands. His seminal contribution to the field of argumentation
theory lies in his approach to "spheres of argument," an idea that has sparked many scholarly studies. Before joining
USC full-time in 2004, Goodnight taught undergraduate and graduate courses in Northwestern University's
Communication Studies department in contemporary rhetorical theory, criticism, theory of argumentation, and the
public sphere. His current research interests include deliberation and postwar society, science communication,
argument and aesthetics, public discourse studies, and communicative reason in controversy.
Professor Goodnight has been named by the American Forensics Association as one of the top 5 scholars in
argumentation in the twentieth century.[1]

References
[1] Peterson's graduate programs in the humanities, arts, & social sciences, 2006, p. 922

External links
• USC homepage (http://annenberg.usc.edu/Faculty/Communication/GoodnightG.aspx)

Robin Rowland
Robin Rowland (Robert C. Rowland) is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar. He is a professor in the
Department of Communication Studies at the University of Kansas.[1][2][3] He has published in Communication
Monographs, Journal of the American Forensic Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and Argumentation.[4]
Rowland was named the winner of the 2011 Douglas W. Ehninger Distinguished Rhetorical Scholar Award by the
National Communication Association.
As a student at the University of Kansas Rowland and his partner Frank Cross won the National Debate Tournament,
defeating Georgetown University. Rowland was named eighth outstanding speaker for the tournament.

References
http://www.news.ku.edu/2011/october/7/rowland.shtml
[1] "Faculty Communication Studies at the University of Kansas" (http:/ / www2. ku. edu/ ~coms/ faculty/ rowland. shtml). University of Kansas.
. Retrieved 6 October 2010.
[2] "KU News - Experts Guide" (http:/ / www. experts. ku. edu/ ~kunews/ cgi-bin/ expert/ view. shtml?id=962). University of Kansas. . Retrieved
6 October 2010.
[3] "Top-tier talkersKU Features -" (http:/ / www. features. ku. edu/ debate/ ). University of Kansas. . Retrieved 6 October 2010.
[4] "ROBERT C. ROWLAND Curriculum Vitae" (http:/ / www2. ku. edu/ ~coms/ faculty/ cv/ RowlandCV. pdf). University of Kansas. .
Retrieved 6 October 2010.

33

Dale Hample

Dale Hample
Dale Hample is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar, associate Professor at the University of
Maryland . He has published many peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and written one book and edited
another.
After receiving a PhD at the University of Illinois in 1975, he taught at Western Illinois University until 2007, when
he took a teaching position at Maryland. Some of his major accomplishments include developing measures for the
ways in which people edit arguments (cognitive editorial standards), discussing how people produce argumentative
discourse (inventional capacity), and how they view arguments (argument frames and taking conflict personally).
He is currently the editor of Argumentation and Advocacy,[1] and editor of the Issues Forum of Communication
Monographs, and is on the editorial boards for ten other journals in his subject.

Publications
Books
• Hample, D Arguing: Exchanging Reasons Face to Face Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 2005. ISBN
0-8058-4854-1.
• Benoit, W.L., Hample, D., & Benoit, P. (Eds.) (1992). Readings in Argumentation. Berlin: Foris.

Journal articles
Hample, D., Warner, B., & Norton, H. (2006). The effects of arguing expectations and predispositions on
perceptions of argument quality and playfulness. Argumentation and Advocacy, 43(1), 1-13.
Hample, D., Thompson-Hayes, M., Wallenfelsz, K., Wallenfelsz, P., & Knapp, C. (2005). "Face-to-face arguing is
an emotional experience: Triangulating methodologies and early findings." Argumentation and Advocacy, 42, 74-93.
Cortes, C., Larson, C., & Hample, D. (2005). Relations among message design logic, interpersonal construct
differentiation, and sex for Mexican and U.S. nationals. Journal of Intercultural Communication Research, 34,
108-118.
Hample, D. (2000). Cognitive editing of arguments and reasons for requests: Evidence from think-aloud protocols.
Argumentation and Advocacy, 37, 98-108.
Hample, D. (1999). The life space of personalized conflicts. Communication Yearbook, 22, 171-208.
Hample, D., Benoit, P. J., Houston, J., Purifoy, G., VanHyfte, V., & Wardell, C. (1999). Naive theories of argument:
Avoiding interpersonal arguments or cutting them short. Argumentation and Advocacy, 35, 130-139.
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J. M. (1998). On the etiology of the rebuff phenomenon: Why are persuasive messages less
polite after rebuffs? Communication Studies, 49, 305-321.
Dallinger, J.M., & Hample, D. (1995). Personalizing and managing conflict. International Journal of Conflict
Management, 6, 287-289.
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J.M. (1995). A Lewinian perspective on taking conflict personally: Revision, refinement,
and validation of the instrument. Communication Quarterly, 43, 297-319.
Dallinger, J. M., & Hample, D. (1994). The effects of gender on compliance gaining strategy endorsement and
suppression. Communication Reports, 7, 43-49.
Hample, D. (1992). Writing mindlessly. Communication Monographs, 59, 315-323.
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J.M. (1992). The use of multiple goals in cognitive editing of arguments. Argumentation
and Advocacy, 28, 109-122.

34

Dale Hample
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J.M. (1991). Message design logic, goal structure, interpersonal construct differentiation,
and situation. In D. W. Parson (Ed.), Argument in Controversy (pp. 188–192). Annandale, VA: Speech
Communication Association.
Hample, D. (1990). Debate as a civic act. Applying Research to the Classroom, 8, 1-2.
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J.M. (1990). Arguers as editors. Argumentation, 4, 153-169.
Dallinger, J.M., & Hample, D. (1988). Supervisor accessibility and job characteristics. Communication Research
Reports, 5, 4-9.
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J.M. (1987). Self-monitoring and the cognitive editing of arguments. Central States Speech
Journal, 38, 152-165.
Hample, D., & Dallinger, J.M. (1987). Cognitive editing of argument strategies. Human Communication Research,
14, 123-144.
Hample, D. (1987). The role of the unconscious in nonverbal information processing. Semiotica, 67, 211-231.
Hample, D. (1986). Argumentation and the unconscious. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 23, 82-95.
Hample, D. (1986). Logic, conscious and unconscious. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 50, 24-40.
Hample, D. (1985). Refinements on the cognitive model of argument. Western Journal of Speech Communication,
49, 267-285.
Hample, D. (1985). Teaching the cognitive context of argument. Communication Education, 34, 196-204.
Hample, D. (1985). A third perspective on argument. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 18, 1-22.
Hample, D. (1984). On the use of self-reports. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 20, 140-153.
Hample, D. (1982). Dual coding, reasoning and fallacies. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19, 59-78.
Hample, D. (1981). Forensics research in the 1980s. Forensic, 66, 20-25.
Thompson, W.N., Hample, D., Hunt, S., & Pruett, R. (1981). What Is CEDA Debate? Forensic, 66, 4-9.
Hample, D. (1981). The cognitive context of argument. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 45, 148-l58.
Hample, D. (1980). A cognitive view of argument. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 17, 151-158.
Hample, D. (1980). Purposes and effects of lying. Southern Speech Communication Journal, 46, 33-47.
Hample, D. (1980). Motives in law: An adaptation of legal realism. Journal of the American Forensic Association,
15, 156-168.
Blimling, G. S., & Hample, D. (1979). Structuring the peer environment in residence halls to increase academic
performance in average-ability students. Journal of College Student Personnel, 20, 310-316.
Hample, D. (1979). Predicting belief and belief change using a cognitive theory of argument and evidence.
Communication Monographs, 46, 142-146.
Hample, D. (1978). Are attitudes arguable? Journal of Value Inquiry, 12, 311-312.
Hample, D. (1978). Predicting immediate belief change and adherence to argument claims. Communication
Monographs, 45, 219-228.
Hample, D., & Hample, J. (1978). Evidence credibility. Debate Issues, 12, 4-5.
Hample, D. (1977). Testing a model of value argument and evidence. Communication Monographs, 14, 106-120.
Hample, D. (1977). The Toulmin model and the syllogism. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14, 1-9.
Wenzel, J.W., & Hample, D. (1975). Categories and dimensions of value propositions: Exploratory studies. Journal
of the American Forensic Association, 11, 121-130.

35

Dale Hample

Other publications
He has also published over two dozen chapters in specialized books and encyclopedias, and over 50 conference
presentations.

References
• "Argument as Cognition: A Putnamian Criticism of Dale Hample’s Cognitive Conception of Argument" in
Argumentation Springer Netherlands, Volume 18, Number 3 331-348 / January, 2004 Abstract [2]

External links
• Curriculum Vitae [3]

References
[1] http:/ / www. americanforensics. org/ AA/ aa_info. html#Editors
[2] http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ qt2526733382752g/
[3] http:/ / www. comm. umd. edu/ faculty/ documents/ HampleF072. pdf

C. Scott Jacobs
Curtis Scott Jacobs, (Scott Jacobs), is an American argumentation, communication, and rhetorical scholar.
He graduated from the University of Illinois with a Ph.d. He taught for many years at the University of Arizona. He
is now Professor of Communication at the University of Illinois.[1] He has lectured in France, Belgium, Germany,
Italy, and the Netherlands. He has contributed to the field of argumentation theory.
His work appeared in Communication Monographs, Communication Theory, Journal of the American Forensic
Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and Argumentation.

Works
• Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs (1992). "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the
Enthymeme" [2]. In William L. Benoit, Dale Hample, Pamela J. Benoit. Readings in argumentation. Walter de
Gruyter. ISBN 978-3-11-013576-3. (appeared in The Quarterly Journal of Speech. LXVI, 251-265.)
• Karen Tracy (1991). "Digressions in Argumentative Discourse" [3]. In Karen Tracy. Understanding face-to-face
interaction: issues linking goals and discourse. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-8058-0907-7.
• Mark L. Knapp, John Augustine Daly, ed. (2002). "Language and Interpersonal Communication" [4]. Handbook
of interpersonal communication. SAGE. ISBN 978-0-7619-2160-8.
• F. H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard, ed. (2003). "Two Conceptions of Openness in
Argumentation Theory" [5]. Anyone who has a view: theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation.
Springer. ISBN 978-1-4020-1455-0.

36

C. Scott Jacobs

References
[1] http:/ / www. communication. illinois. edu/ faculty/ people/ csjacobs/ index. html
[2] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=fIoCW2_RgWIC& pg=PA681& dq=%22Scott+ Jacobs%22& cd=4#v=onepage&
q=%22Scott%20Jacobs%22& f=false
[3] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=moNnQXT7J80C& pg=RA1-PA43& dq=%22Scott+ Jacobs%22& cd=1#v=onepage&
q=%22Scott%20Jacobs%22& f=false
[4] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=t97fuAcjS-YC& pg=PA213& dq=%22Scott+ Jacobs%22& cd=2#v=onepage&
q=%22Scott%20Jacobs%22& f=false
[5] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=VvirJxSCkA4C& lpg=PA1& dq=%22C. %20Scott%20Jacobs%22& pg=PA147#v=onepage& q=&
f=false

Sally Jackson
Sally Jackson is an American scholar of argumentation, communication, and rhetoric.
Dr. Jackson served as the chief information officer for the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.[1], but
resigned from the position on April 8, 2011 due to disagreement with a change in administrative reporting lines.[2]
She will remain at the university as a professor and associate provost.[3]
Previously, she worked for the University of Arizona as the vice-president for information technology and professor
in the Department of Communication in the College of Social and Behavioral sciences.[4] She has published in
Communication Monographs, Communication Theory, Journal of the American Forensic Association, Quarterly
Journal of Speech, and Argumentation. Her seminal contribution to the field of argumentation appears in: Sally
Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme" in The
Quarterly Journal of Speech. LXVI, 251-265.

References
[1] Sharita Forrest (News release, 11 May 2007). "New chief information officer at Illinois held similar job at Arizona" (http:/ / www. news.
uiuc. edu/ news/ 07/ 0511cio. html). News Bureau of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. .
[2] Darshan Patel (27 April 2011). "Administrative restructuring raises tensions among faculty" (http:/ / www. dailyillini. com/ index. php/
article/ 2011/ 04/ administrative_restructuring_raises_tensions_among_faculty). Daily Illini. .
[3] Julie Wurth (24 April 2011). "UI official resigns over changes" (http:/ / www. news-gazette. com/ news/ politics-and-government/
2011-04-24/ ui-official-resigns-over-changes. html). News-Gazette. .
[4] University Communications (News release, 18 January 2007). "Jackson Steps Down as Chief Information Officer" (http:/ / uanews. org/
node/ 12985). UA News. .

37

David Zarefsky

David Zarefsky
David Zarefsky (1946-) is an American communication scholar with research specialties in rhetorical history and
criticism. He is professor emeritus at Northwestern University. He is a past president of the National Communication
Association (USA) and the Rhetoric Society of America. Among his publications are six books and over 70
scholarly articles concerned with American public discourse (both historical and contemporary), argumentation,
rhetorical criticism, and public speaking are books on the Lincoln-Douglas debates and on the rhetoric of the war on
poverty during the Johnson administration. His lectures on argumentation and rhetoric can be heard in a course for
The Teaching Company.

Early Education and Forensics Career
As a member of the forensics team at Bellaire High School [1] in Houston, Texas, Zarefsky won first place in the
National Forensic League's [2] Oratory competition in 1964.[3] His brother, also a Bellaire [4] and Northwestern
alumus, is U.S. Magistrate Judge Ralph Zarefksy. [5]. He enrolled as an undergraduate student at Northwestern
University later that year, beginning a highly successful career as an intercollegiate debate competitor. Zarefsky
earned National Debate Tournament (NDT) individual top speaker honors in 1968.[6] While pursuing a major from
Northwestern's Department of Communication Studies, Zarefsky also took courses in English, Political Science, and
History.[7]
Following completion of his B.S., Zarefsky stayed at Northwestern to pursue advanced degrees in Speech and coach
the debate team. During this period, his teams were regularly recognized as among the best in the nation, with the
pair of Eliot Mincberg and Ron Marmer winning the 1973 NDT.[8] As a debate coach and judge, Zarefsky earned a
reputation for his systematic and thorough approach. For example, he "sat for a full half hour reviewing his flow
chart" before rendering the pivotal decision in the 1969 NDT semifinal round between Harvard University and
Loyola University.[9] He made up for difficulty in spotting differences in the makes and models of cars by scanning
university parking lots to find the license plate of his team's vehicle at any given tournament.[10]
Zarefsky pioneered a policy debate "judging paradigm" called "hypothesis testing," which spells out how debate
judges can draw metaphorically upon the scientific method's process of weighing scientific conjectures and
refutations.[11] Upon his retirement as Director of Forensics in 1975, Zarefsky was voted by his peers as the second
best coach of the decade during the 1970s.[12]

Research and Teaching
Two of Zarefsky's books have won the Winans-Wichelns Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Rhetoric Rhetoric
and Public Address, an award of the National Communication Association.[13][14]
Zarefsky has taught courses in the study of American public discourse, with a special focus on the pre-Civil War
years and on the pre-Civil War years and on the 1960s. He also has taught courses in argumentation theory,
persuasion, and public speaking. On thirteen different occasions he was named to the student government's honor
roll for distinguished teaching. Zarefsky also has two video courses, "Abraham Lincoln: In His Own Words" and
"Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning," marketed by The Teaching Company.
Some of Zarefsky's more notable students include: University of California, Irvine Founding Law School Dean
Erwin Chemerinsky; United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit federal appellate judge
Merrick B. Garland; and former White House Chief of Staff and current Mayor of Chicago Rahm Emanuel. Asked
about Emanuel's reputation for ruthlessness, Zarefsky was quoted in The Daily Northwestern as saying, "I think it
can be applied to him in a positive sense because he's just very determined to achieve his goals."[15]

38

David Zarefsky

Administrative Leadership
Zarefsky joined the Northwestern faculty in 1968 and rose through the ranks, achieving promotion to Professor in
1982. He also has held a series of administrative appointments, including Chair of the Department of
Communication Studies (1975-83), Associate Dean of the School of Speech (1983-88), and from 1988-2000, Dean
of the School of Speech (later renamed the School of Communication), a 12-year tenure notable for its length among
Northwestern deans serving during that era.[16] In 1993 Zarefsky served as president of the National Communication
Association and in 2001 he received its Distinguished Service Award. He held the presidency of the Central States
Communication in 1986-87. In 2006-2007 he served as president of the Rhetoric Society of America. He has held
numerous leadership positions in the American Forensic Association, whose journal he edited from 1977-80. From
1984-89 he was the Director of the National Debate Tournament.

Recent Publications
• “Making the Case for War: Colin Powell at the United Nations,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 10 (Summer 2007),
275-302.
• “Strategic Maneuvering through Persuasive Definitions: Implications for Dialectic and Rhetoric,” Argumentation,
20 (2006), 399-416.
• “The U.S. and the World: Unexpressed Premises of American Exceptionalism,” Proceedings of the Sixth
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), 1567-1571.
• Sizing Up Rhetoric, co-edited with Elizabeth Benacka (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2008).
• Public Speaking: Strategies for Success, 5th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2008).

References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

http:/ / www. bellaire. org/
http:/ / www. nflonline. org/ Main/ HomePage
Bellaire Debate Website (http:/ / www. bellairedebate. com/ ChapterHistory. html). NFL Chapter History. Bellaire High School. Bellaire, TX.
(http:/ / www. bellairedebate. com/ Alumni. html)
(http:/ / www. cacd. uscourts. gov/ cacd/ CivilConsent. nsf/ 45f3d005cfb8da0e882574f6005fc51a/
525d1eff5ea2cda1882574f60070d0e1?OpenDocument)
[6] National Debate Tournament. Ross K. Smith Top Speaker Award (http:/ / groups. wfu. edu/ NDT/ HistoricalLists/ speakers. html),
1948-2009.
[7] David Zarefsky, " Alumnus and Former Dean Consider His Fulfulling Life at the University by the Lake (http:/ / www. northwestern. edu/
magazine/ northwestern/ spring2001/ purpleprose. htm)," Northwestern Magazine, Spring 2001.
[8] National Debate Tournament. "Champions, Runners-Up and Semi-Finalists 1947-2005," (http:/ / groups. wfu. edu/ NDT/ Articles/ 1970s.
html) NDT Website.
[9] Joel S. Perwin, "1969 NDT - Harvard vs. Houston," (http:/ / groups. wfu. edu/ NDT/ HistoricalLists/ 1969DebateFinals/ 1969NDTFinals.
htm) NDT Website.
[10] Gordon R. Mitchell and Kathleen M. McTigue, "Promoting Translational Medicine through Deliberation." Justification, Reason and Action
Conference in Honor of David Zarefsky. Northwestern University. Evanston, IL. May 29-30, 2009.
[11] David Zarefsky. "Argument as Hypothesis-testing." In David A. Thomas (Ed.), Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and
Teaching (pp. 427-437). Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1979.
[12] William Southworth, "The Decade's 'Best' in Debate - The 1970s," (http:/ / groups. wfu. edu/ NDT/ Articles/ 1970s. html) NDT Website.
[13] David Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1986)
[14] David Zarefsky, Lincoln, Douglas, and Slavery: In the Crucible of Public Debate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
[15] Nathalie Tadena, "Profs Reflect on Former Student, now Chief of Staff, The Daily Northwestern, (http:/ / www. dailynorthwestern. com/ 2.
13894/ profs-reflect-on-former-student-now-chief-of-staff-1. 1919527) November 17, 2008.
[16] Sheila Burt, "Dean Tenures Shorten as Rules Change," (http:/ / www. dailynorthwestern. com/ 2. 13924/
dean-tenures-shorten-as-roles-change-1. 1991380) The Daily Northwestern, January 14, 2004

39

David Zarefsky

40

External links
• David Zarefsky - Communication Studies, School of Communication, Northwestern University (http://www.
communication.northwestern.edu/faculty/?PID=DavidZarefsky)

Ralph Johnson (philosopher)
Ralph H. Johnson
Born

Detroit, Michigan

Nationality USA
Occupation Professor
Known for

One of the founding members of the informal logic movement in North America

Ralph H. Johnson is a native of Detroit, Michigan.[1] Johnson has been credited as one of the founding members of
the informal logic movement in North America, along with J. Anthony Blair who co-published one of the
movement’s most influential texts, “Logical Self-Defense,” with Johnson.[2] As Johnson and Blair write in the
preface to the newest edition of Logical Self-Defense on the influential nature of the text:
We might note that the theoretical perspective introduced in Logical Self-Defense has proved quite influential among
textbook authors. It is to be found in modified form in A Practical Study of Argument by Trudy Govier, in Attacking
Faulty Reasoning by T. Edward Damer, in Logic in Everyday Life and Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning by
Zachary Seech, in Thinking Logically by James B. Freeman, and in Good Reasoning Matters by Leo Groarke and
Christopher W. Tindale.[3]
He earned an Honors Bachelor of Arts at Xavier University and received his doctorate in philosophy from the
University of Notre Dame[4] in 1972.[5] He has been a University Professor and University Professor emeritus[6] at
the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada, where he had taught since 1966.[7] He retired in Fall 2006 after 39
years, during which he served two terms as Head of Department.[8] Ralph H. Johnson was a co-founder of the
Newsletter of Informal Logic which has since become the Journal of Informal Logic in 1985, he also served as its
co-editor along with J. Anthony Blair since its inception.[9]
He has been a co-chair for the International Symposium on Informal Logic in Windsor in 1978, 1983, and 1989.[10]
Ralph H. Johnson has lectured and published widely on informal logic, fallacy theory, argumentation, and critical
thinking. He is a founding member and has been a previous member of the Executive Committee of the Association
for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT); as well as of the National Council for Excellence in Critical
Thinking (NCECT), and of the Canadian Research Group on Argumentation (Carga).[11] In 2004 he co-founded the
Network for the Study of Reasoning, a cluster of Canadian experts researching the theory and its applications of
reasoning and argument.[12] He has given workshop presentations and has been a consultant on informal logic and
critical thinking across the United States and Canada.[13]
According to the University of Windsor’s website, “His articles have appeared in such journals as American
Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Argumentation, Philosophy and Rhetoric and Informal Logic. In 1996, a
collection of his articles and papers was published by Vale Press under the title The Rise of Informal Logic. In 2000,
his book, Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Study of Argument, was published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Johnson has conducted seminars and workshops on informal logic and critical thinking across North America and in
Europe. In 1993, Johnson received a 3M Teaching Fellowship for outstanding university teachers, one of ten such
awards conferred that year in Canada. In 1994, he was awarded the rank of University Professor by the University of
Windsor. In 2000, he was awarded the Distinguished Research Award by the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation. In 2003, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. In 2005, he received the Career

Ralph Johnson (philosopher)
Achievement Award from the University of Windsor. Johnson is listed in Who’s Who in Canada.”[14]
Currently, Johnson is working on a book about Dialectical Adequacy, which will be a follow up to his recently
published work Manifest Rationality (2000).[15]

Personal life
From Johnson’s website, “I love to read, especially contemporary fiction. Among my favourite authors: John Updike,
Alistair MacLeod, Joan Barfoot, Michael Connelly, Robert B. Parker. I love the plays of Shakespeare (especially
King Lear), and attend the plays at Stratford every year. This year, I look forward to seeing Oliver and Much Ado
about Nothing. I love to listen to music, especially classical. Currently I am in a Chopin phase. I also am drawn to
the music of Bach, Beethoven , Haydn, Schubert and Dvorak. I belong to The Mankind Project (www.mkp.org) — a
worldwide organization dedicated to calling men to consciousness and lives of service. I serve as an Elder and Board
member in our local community. I exercise (jog, walk or bike) almost everyday. I have been married to my wife
Maggie for 38 years; have three children (Mary, Sean and Matthew) and two grandchildren— Brandin, 11, and Ivy
Grace b. January 27 2006!”[16]

Philosophy
As Johnson explains both in Logical Self-Defense as well as his journal article Making Sense of “Informal Logic,”
that Informal Logic is the philosophical practice of understanding and evaluating natural language argumentation.
Here fallacies are used in order to evaluate arguments. However, more simply the idea is to evaluate arguments
based upon three essential criteria, again as explained in both Making Sense of “Informal Logic,” and more
thoroughly explained in Logical Self-Defense, the premises of arguments must be relevant to the conclusion,
sufficient to support it, and acceptable to the audience.[17] In this approach to logic, fallacies such as the straw man,
red herring etc. point to a deficiency in the premises in one of these three criteria.
Johnson and Blair also place emphasis on how to identify arguments in everyday life, so that evaluators do not
misinterpret the author’s intention. In this way Logical Self-Defense identifies several different ways of interpreting
arguments and their ‘look-alikes’. For instance Johnson and Blair explain the distinctions between mere opinion,
proto-argument, argument, case, and explanation as well as provide criteria for helping to identify which is which,
including: context, verbal cues and logical structure.[18]
In his article “Charity Begins at Home” in Informal Logic Johnson combines and creates unified form of the
‘Principle of Charity’ which he found to exist in four other forms in the following works: Thomas’s Practical
Reasoning in Natural Language (1973), Baum’s Logic (1975) and in Scriven’s Reasoning (1976). In doing so
Johnson created a more developed ‘Principle of Charity’ which Informal Logicians could reference. [19]
Accordingly, in this article Section II attempts to unify these four versions by making one the foundation, while the
others work as its corollaries. Then, after creating a better account of the ‘Principle of Charity’ Johnson spends
Section III of the article addresses some of the issues involved in the application of the ‘Principle of Charity’ and
finally Section IV addresses a proposed restriction for the use of the ‘Principle of Charity’.[20]
In his article “The Principle of Vulnerability” in Informal Logic seeks to offer defence to the principle that all
arguments should be considered susceptible to criticisms. As such Johnson argues that the arguer of an argument
should not seek to “immunize” their argument from criticism. The article also takes considerations both in support of,
and opposed to the principle into account.[21]
In this article one of the more notable ideas presented is the notion of ‘manifest rationality’ which Johnson described
in this way:
The practice (of arguing) is characterized by a trait I call manifest rationality. In the practice of argumentation,
rationality is not merely the inner reality but also the outward appearance of the practice. The practice must not just
be rational; it must also appear rational. This is why the Arguer is expected to respond to objections and criticisms

41

Ralph Johnson (philosopher)
from others, and not ignore them or sweep them under the carpet. It's not just that sweeping them aside would not be
rational and hence not be in keeping with the spirit of the practice. It’s that it would be such an obvious violation of
it—and it would be seen to be such.[22]

References
[1] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pg. v
[2] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5 Accessed January
21st 2010
[3] Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. 2006. New U.S. Edition. New York: IDEBATE Press. Preface xii
[4] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pg. v
[5] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5 Accessed January
21, 2010
[6] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5
[7] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pg. v
[8] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5 Accessed January
21, 2010
[9] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill.
[10] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pg. v
[11] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pg. v
[12] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5 Accessed January,
21st, 2010
[13] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pg. v
[14] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5
[15] http:/ / web4. uwindsor. ca/ units/ CRRAR/ main. nsf/ SubCategoryFlyOut/ 178BBCA140BB501D85257299005D8BA5
[16] http:/ / web2. uwindsor. ca/ courses/ philosophy/ johnsoa/ home. htm Accessed January 21st, 2010
[17] 2006 “Making Sense of ‘Informal Logic,’” Informal Logic, Vol. 6, No. 23, pg. 237
[18] 1994 Logical Self-Defense, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. First U.S. Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. Pp. 5 - 28
[19] 1981 "Charity Begins at Home: Some Reflections on the Principle of Charity," Informal Logic Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 4-9.
[20] 1981 "Charity Begins at Home: Some Reflections on the Principle of Charity," Informal Logic Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 4-9.
[21] 1995 “The Principle of Vulnerability,” Informal Logic, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 259 - 269
[22] 1995 “The Principle of Vulnerability,” Informal Logic, Vol. 17, No. 2, pg. 259

42

Michael Scriven

Michael Scriven
Michael Scriven (born 1928[1]) is a British-born polymath and academic, best known for his contributions to the
theory and practice of evaluation.

Background
Scriven has a first degree in mathematics from the University of Melbourne and a doctorate in philosophy from the
University of Oxford.[2] He has spent most of his career in the United States.
Scriven is a past president of the American Educational Research Association and the American Evaluation
Association. He is also an editor and co-founder of the Journal of Multidisciplinary Evaluation. He is currently a
professor at Claremont Graduate University.

Scholarly contributions
Scriven has made significant contributions in the fields of philosophy, psychology, critical thinking, mathematics,
and, most notably, evaluation methods in public policy and the social sciences (he invented checklists for
programme evaluation).
He has produced over 400 scholarly publications and has served on the editorial review boards of 42 journals.

Notes
[1] Michael John Scriven: Information and Much More from Answers.com (http:/ / www. answers. com/ topic/ michael-scriven)
[2] Michael Scriven (http:/ / www. cgu. edu/ pages/ 4745. asp)

External links




http://www.michaelscriven.info personal webpage]]
Michael Scriven's Faculty Page at Claremont Graduate University (http://www.cgu.edu/pages/4745.asp)
The Journal of Multidisciplinary Evaluation (http://evaluation.wmich.edu/JMDE)
EPAA Bio (http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/board/scriven.html)
Scriven interview (http://www.gse.harvard.edu/hfrp/eval/issue24/expert.html)

43

John Woods (logician)

John Woods (logician)
John Hayden Woods (1937–) is a Canadian logician and philosopher, currently Director of the Abductive Systems
Group at the University of British Columbia (UBC) and The UBC Honorary Professor of Logic. He has also been
affiliated with the Group on Logic, Information and Computation, of the Department of Informatics from King's
College London, where he hold the Charles S. Peirce Visiting Professorship of Logic position since 2001.
Woods is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and Life member of the Association of Fellows of the
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, and President Emeritus of the University of Lethbridge.
Woods education includes an B.A. and M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto, and a 1965 Ph.D. in
Philosophy from the University of Michigan where his adviser was Arthur Burks.
Together with Douglas Walton, Woods has authored a number of books and papers on fallacies. According to Frans
H. van Eemeren, who calls this body of work the Woods-Walton approach, this is "the most continuous and
extensive post-Hamblin contribution to the study of fallacies".[1]
A festschrift honoring and discussing Woods' work was published din 2005 by University of Toronto Press; it also
contains respondeos of Woods to the various papers and a profile of him in the form of an introduction.[2]

Selected books
Woods edited or co-edited a large number of books. Together with Dov Gabbay, Woods has been a co-editor of the
eleven-volume Handbook of the History of Logic, published by North-Holland (now Elsevier), as well as editor, with
Gabbay and Paul Thagard, of the sixteen-volume Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, by the same publisher.
Below are a some books authored by Woods.
• (1974) Proof and Truth, xiv, 192, Toronto: Peter Martin Associates
• (1974) The Logic of Fiction: A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic, iii, 152, The Hague and Paris: Mouton
and Co. A second edition was published in 2009 by College Publications, ISBN 1-904987-99-0
• (1978) Engineered Death: Abortion, Suicide, Euthanasia, Senecide, xiv, 170, Ottawa: The University of Ottawa
Press/Editions de l’Université d’Ottawa. ISBN 0-7766-1020-1
• (1982) Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies, xiv, 273, Toronto and New York: McGraw-Hill (with Douglas
Walton) ISBN 0-07-548026-3
• (1989) Fallacies: Selected Papers, 1972-82, iv, 320, Dordrecht and Providence: Foris (with Douglas Walton). A
selection was translated in French and published with a new introduction in 1992 as Critique de l’Argumentation:
Logiques des sophismes ordinaires, xii, 233, Paris: Éditions Kimé
• (2000) Argument: Critical Thinking Logic and The Fallacies, viii, 344, Toronto: Prentice-Hall (with Andrew
Irvine and Douglas Walton). A 2nd edition was published in 2004: ISBN 0-13-039938-8
• (2001) Aristotle’s Earlier Logic, xiii, 216, Oxford: Hermes Science Publications. ISBN 1-903398-20-7
• (2003) Paradox and Paraconsistency: Conflict Resolution in the Abstract Sciences, xviii, 362, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-00934-0
• (2003) Agenda Relevance: An Essay in Formal Pragmatics, xv, 508 volume 1 of A Practical Logic of Cognitive
Systems, Amsterdam: North Holland (with Dov M. Gabbay) ISBN 0-444-51385-X
• (2004) The Death of Argument: Fallacies in Agent-Based Reasoning, xxvii, 375. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer.
ISBN 1-4020-2663-3
• (2005) The Reach of Abduction: Insight and Trial, xvii, 476, volume 2 of A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems,
Amsterdam: North Holland (with Dov M. Gabbay) ISBN 0-444-51791-X

44

John Woods (logician)

References
[1] F. H. van Eemeren (2001). Crucial concepts in argumentation theory (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=JpgfSPmaVFkC& pg=PA154).
Amsterdam University Press. p. 154. ISBN 978-90-5356-523-0. .
[2] A. D. Irvine; Kent A. Peacock; John Hayden Woods (2005). Mistakes of reason: essays in honour of John Woods. University of Toronto
Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-3866-1.

• 12/7/09 CV (http://www.johnwoods.ca/cv.pdf)

External links
• Home page (http://www.johnwoods.ca/)

45

Article Sources and Contributors

Article Sources and Contributors
Argumentation theory  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=522619834  Contributors: Aerojmac, Analogisub, Andycjp, Anomalocaris, Antonielly, Arthur Rubin, Arthur chos,
Banno, Beland, BenDoGood, BigrTex, Bitplane, Brad7777, Byelf2007, CRGreathouse, CSTAR, Cathalwoods, ChrisGualtieri, Cic, Ckatz, Clan-destine, Cnilep, Colonies Chris, Ctbolt, D6,
DCDuring, David Johnson, Dedalus, DerHexer, DragonRidr, Eastlaw, Ed Poor, Edward, El C, EvanHarper, Fioravante Patrone en, Fiziker, Fjbex, Gamkiller, Giftlite, Giovanni33, GraemeL,
Gregbard, Grumpyyoungman01, Halber, Hallenrm, Hectorthebat, Henninb, Hu, Ibbn, Jandalhandler, Jason Quinn, Jdcanfield, Jjron, Joarsolo, JonDePlume, JonasRH, Josephprymak, K.salo.85,
KGBarnett, Koavf, Lindsay658, Lotje, Machine Elf 1735, Markhurd, Materialscientist, MeUser42, Michael Hardy, Miskin, Moomot, Mr. Billion, MrOllie, N2e, Naraht, Nbarth, Oli Filth,
Pacogo7, Paulscrawl, Pisharov, Qwerty Binary, RJFJR, RayBirks, Rbellin, Reddi, Rexroad, Rexroad2, Rich Farmbrough, Rick Norwood, RickardV, Rjwilmsi, Robertbowerman, Ruud Koot,
Sandius, Schweinsberg, ShakingSpirit, ShelfSkewed, SimonP, Spencerk, Spidern, Tassedethe, Tautologies, Teemu Ruskeepää, Tfine80, Tijfo098, Tired time, TreasuryTag, Trickstar, Velho,
Wavelength, Winterst, Woohookitty, Yayay, 194 anonymous edits
Argument  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=522319075  Contributors: 5 albert square, 5000tut, AxelBoldt, BD2412, Bfigura's puppy, Bigjonstuff, Bjones, Bobo192,
Bongwarrior, CRGreathouse, Capricorn42, Ckatz, Cnilep, Correogsk, Cxz111, Cybercobra, DRosenbach, Darth Panda, Discospinster, Download, Dreadstar, E235, Enti342, Flewis, FrankTobia,
Fuzzform, Gaurav, Gerhardvalentin, Gilliam, Go2slash, Gogo Dodo, Grayfell, Graymornings, Gregbard, Gregkaye, Hallenrm, Harlequinjelly, Infinite Loop-Maker, J.delanoy, Jimmaths,
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Scwlong, Shadfurman, Shlomke, Sky Attacker, Sokari, Sonawin, Steelstring, Steven Zhang, Suntag, Tangoleader, Tcncv, Techman224, The Evil IP address, The Thing That Should Not Be,
Tijfo098, Trbdavies, Trickstar, Twinsday, TyA, Velella, Walkinxyz, Wesniel, Wikiresearchman, 224 anonymous edits
Charles Arthur Willard  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=491563435  Contributors: Crusoe8181, Emtee10, Fabrictramp, Fastily, Jake Wartenberg, Johnpacklambert,
Juliancolton, Ken Gallager, Malcolma, MarkAtRoutledge, Merodack, Next-Genn-Gamer, Rexroad, Rexroad2, Synergy, Tenmei, Waacstats, 21 anonymous edits
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Charles Matthews, Conversion script, D6, Deodar, Deville, Downchuck, ElectricRay, Erebus555, Francisr10, Graham87, Gregbard, Hans Mayer, HarcourtArms, JK the unwise, JenLouise, John
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Mu, Peloria, Phronetic, Piotrus, Realitydog, RiskAverse, SlimVirgin, Srich32977, Subsurd, Sunray, Sysdt, Tassedethe, Thomas Basboll, Timothy J Scriven, Tom Morris, Tomsega, Zzuuzz, 25
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Trechane, WpZurp, Xme, Yo lenin1, Yvegao, Zzuuzz, 89 anonymous edits
Doug Walton  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=509149219  Contributors: Action potential, Cbustapeck, Cuiabah-noh, Decathlete, Disambiguator, DynamoDegsy, Gregbard,
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Wotnow, 5 anonymous edits
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Tijfo098, Tomchiukc, Velho, Wotnow, 46 anonymous edits
Joseph W. Wenzel  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=491563074  Contributors: Clan-destine, DGG, Decathlete, LadyofShalott, MarkAtRoutledge, Mrgates, Otisjimmy1,
Rexroad, Rexroad2, 2 anonymous edits
Daniel J. O'Keefe  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=516959624  Contributors: Alansohn, Closedmouth, Djokeefe, Frongle, Iciac, Jackol, Marek69, Noebse, Rexroad,
Sallyajackson, Sisyph, Tellyaddict, 6 anonymous edits
G. Thomas Goodnight  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=491563209  Contributors: Jonathan.s.kt, MarkAtRoutledge, Noebse, PStrait, Rexroad, Rexroad2, Skier Dude,
Waacstats, 6 anonymous edits
Robin Rowland  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=511719925  Contributors: Closedmouth, Gary King, Hut 8.5, Johnpacklambert, Rexroad, Rexroad2, Snovak132, 2
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Dale Hample  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=516915537  Contributors: Aversnot, Carlossuarez46, Cryptic, DGG, David Schaich, Fram, GoTeamVenture, Gonzo fan2007,
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C. Scott Jacobs  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=520963771  Contributors: Burzmali, DGG, Johnpacklambert, Mandarax, Noebse, Pohick2, Rexroad, Waacstats, 5 anonymous
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Sally Jackson  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=520237068  Contributors: Athaenara, Grutness, Gstafford11, Johnpacklambert, Katharineamy, Noebse, Rexroad, Rexroad2,
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David Zarefsky  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=522120244  Contributors: Oddharmonic, Reconsider the static, Rexroad2, Rich Farmbrough, Rtm65359 adm,
Splashgordeaux, Tomwsulcer, Waacstats, 6 anonymous edits
Ralph Johnson (philosopher)  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=504633606  Contributors: Aodaam, Cathalwoods, Epbr123, Gregbard, Mandarax, Masterwinks,
MendelKramer, Morgankevinj, Rlendog, 1 anonymous edits
Michael Scriven  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=517139863  Contributors: Arciei, Candorwien, Charles Matthews, Dwane UnRuh, Esowteric, Magioladitis, Mol5136, Nadya
Kuznetsova, Nesbit, Omnipaedista, Thismightbezach, Waacstats, Wildcursive, Williamkrieger, 13 anonymous edits
John Woods (logician)  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=503004207  Contributors: InverseHypercube, Johnpacklambert, PamD, Tijfo098, Waacstats

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