You are on page 1of 23

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

United States vs Ang Tang Ho


Facts: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor
General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of
such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53
which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should
be sold at 63 centavos per ganta.
On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of 80 centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The
sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of
the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation
of power to the Governor General.
Issue: Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Held: By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is
left to the discretion of the Governor-General. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in
any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment
and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is
or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule
or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

PANAMA v RYAN
Facts: Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the
President of the United States to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer,
or other duly authorized agency of a State.
Any violation of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection
shall be punishable by a fine, not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six
months, or both.
The President issued the foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the
Secretary of Interior to exercise all of the powers vested in the President under
Section:9(c). The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations to carry out the Presidents
orders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements, under oath,
with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior. Further, the President
approved a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and designated the
Secretary of Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code.
Section:9(c) was challenged on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power by Congress.
Issue: Was the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
Held: Yes. The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be
delegated was legislative power, but nowhere in the statute did Congress declare or
indicate any policy or standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the
delegation.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court


Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement
of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it
violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in
order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president
under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing
law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president underAmendment number
6.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said that
it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the
purpose sought has a gap.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his
defense and punished immediately.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company


Facts: The General Electric Company owned and was operating a broadcasting station at
Schenectady, N. Y., when the Radio Act of 1927 went into effect. Thereafter it sought and
obtained from the commission successive licenses under that act for the further operation
of the station
January 14, 1928, the company made application for a renewal of that license. The
application was not acted upon until October 12, 1928, and then the commission ordered
that a license be not issued with terms like those of the existing license, but that one be
issued with other terms much less advantageous to the company and the communities
which it was serving; the chief change being a pronounced reduction in the admissible
hours of service
The act of 1927, c. 169, 44 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1162 (47 USCA 81-119), was enacted as a
regulation of interstate and foreign radio communication; and it is in such activities that
the company's broadcasting station is used.
The act authorized the commission to determine the question of public convenience,
interest, or necessity; declares that decisions of the commission in all matters over which it
has jurisdiction 'shall be final, subject to the right of appeal' therein given; provides
( section 16) that any applicant for a station license or the renewal of such a license, whose
application is refused by the commission, may appeal from such decision to the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia
We think it plain from this re sume of the pertinent parts of the act that the powers
confided to the commission respecting the granting and renewal of station licenses are
purely administrative, and that the provision for appeals to the Court of Appeals does no
more than make that court a superior and revising agency in the same field. The court's
province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the legislation
which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions of the
Commissioner of Patents.
ISSUE: Our jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is challenged.
HELD: A proceeding in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under the Radio Act
of 1927, to review an order of the Radio Commission refusing an application for the
renewal of an existing license for full time operation of a broadcasting station, is not a case
or controversy within the meaning of the judiciary article of the Constitution, but is an
administrative proceeding, and the decision therein is not reviewable by this Court.
The court's province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the
legislation which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions
of the Commissioner of Patents

'The decision of the Court of Appeals under section 9 of the act of 1905 2 is not a judicial
judgment. It is a mere administrative decision. It is merely an instruction to the
Commissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the Patent
Office for administrative purposes.'
In the cases just cited, as also in others, it is recognized that the courts of the District of
Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislative
courts, and therefore that Congress may invest them with jurisdiction of appeals and
proceedings such as have been just described.
It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with
judicial power only, and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies
falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are
merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative.
MERALCO v PASAY TRANSPORTATION
Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift
to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and
operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an
easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act
provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the
grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of
way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court requesting the members of
the SC sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Meralco.
Copies were sent to affected transportation companies including Pasay Tanspo
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is
attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A
submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not
oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar
rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, can act in that capacity.
Held: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administering of judicial functions.
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or
authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in
the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require
or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other
duty.
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section
11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority
of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the
members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
Facts: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President Ferdinand
Marcos issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of
the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of
Congress.

If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred
from being created by the President.
He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power
to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President
by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities
referred to.

SUFFICINECY OF STANDARDS
People v. Rosenthal & Osmena
Facts: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O.
Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market,
buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products.
Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to
individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the
Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.
Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation
attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds
one of which is:
1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer
Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional?
Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL.
The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision
regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit
The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person
,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the
provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions
of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when
the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit
is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In
view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of
stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
fraudulent exploitations, we hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard
to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance
or cancellation of certificates or permits.

The maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has
beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all
modern governments.
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
Facts: Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation (NAFCO) with annual salary of P15,000.00. The NAFCO Board of Directors
granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.
On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned
and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947,
promulgated Executive Order No. 93
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise
council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and
concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void because it is as an illegal
delegation of legislature power to executive, and was promulgated beyond the period of
one year limited in said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and
void. And R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.
HELD: The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation.
Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make
reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and
policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of
the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The
President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.

People v. Jolliffe (1959)


Facts: William Ernest Jolliffe is a canadian, born in China, permanently residing in HK. Son
of former Chancellor of West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner for
Canada in Shanghai and HK. He made several trips to manila for business or to meet his
wife and children.
One day he came to Manila to collect on a debt from Woo. He was paid in cold cash which
he hid under his shirt. On his way to his hotel room, he was acoosted by a secret service
agent, Amanda Arimbay. The 4pcs of gold bullion and $100 travellers check was found on
him.
He does not deny he had no license to export the gold. He was arrested for violationg RA
265: An act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines
SEC 34: whenever anyone willfully violates this act or any order legally issued by Monetary
board, he shall be punished by imprisonment.
CB Circular 21: any person desiring to export gold bullions must obtain license from
Central Bank
Jolliffe was arrested. He questioned validiy of Circular 21 for being an undue delegation of
legistlative power.
ISSUE: Whether or not CB 21 vaild?
HELD: Yes. The rule is that the delegated power, if the law authorizing the delegation
furnishes a reasonable standard which sufficiently marks the field within which the
administrator is to act so that it may be known wheteher he has kept within it in
compliance with the legislative will.
In this case, Sec 74 of RA 265 conferred upon Monetary board and President the power:
subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to protect the
international reserve of central bank
take such apporpirate remedial measures to protect the international stability of the
peso
These powers must be exeriesed in relation to the objectives of the law creating the central
bank which is to maintain monetary stability & promoto a rising level of production,
employment, and income.
These standards are sufficiently definite to vest in the deleagated authority the characther
of administraive details in the enforcment of the law.

Balbuna v Secretary of Education


Facts: Members of the Jehovas Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the
enforcement of Dept. Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and
regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.
The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of worship
and of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

it is an undue delegation of legislative power


Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power


Held: The requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an
adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the
National Anthem.
Specifically, to observe daily flag ceromony which shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem and rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony.
In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit,
simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem
specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public
interest"
The Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy
that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency
To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power
would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States


Facts: In 1935 the FDR administration sought to regulate the poultry industry through the
National Industrial Recovery Act procured by the executive branch.
Section:3 of the Act authorized the President to approve codes of unfair competition for
trades and industries, and a violation of any code provision in any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce was made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine.
The relevant portion of the law regulated the price of chickens as well as the eventual sale
of unhealthy chickens Under this regulation, Plaintiff was convicted of 18 counts of selling
unhealthy chickens.
Petitioners contended that the Code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutional
delegation by Congress of legislative power.
Issue: Did Congress, in authorizing the codes of unfair competition establish the
standards of legal obligation, thereby performing its essential legislative function?
Held: No. The code-making authority conferred was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
Under Title 1, Section:1 of the Act there was a broad Declaration of Policy, and the
Presidents approval of a code was simply conditioned on his finding that it would tend to
effectuate the policy of this title. The Act imposed no limitations on the scope of the new
laws, and there was a very wide field of legislative possibilities.
Section:3 of the Act was without precedent in that it supplied no standards for any trade,
industry or activity. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the President to
make the codes to prescribe them. Congress made an unconstitutional delegation because
it vested in the President a clearly legislative function without imposing necessary
standards and restrictions.

PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
EDU v ERICTA
Facts:
1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which implements it.
Under the law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device
prior to being registered at the LTO.
2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as
an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. This he
followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy
that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner,
implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n AO2 is valid
HELD:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution
to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all
its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether
or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of
his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion
as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be

carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance
of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection
is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation
Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress
and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this
character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land
Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and
translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no
abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
CRUZ v YOUNGBERG
FACTS: Cruz filed for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton
Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof.
The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the
importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into
the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate
Bill No. 328
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the
importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to
import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided,
however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the
presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the
country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the
agriculture and live stock of the lands.
The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit
for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.
Petitioner conteds that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not,
at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers?

Held: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made.
SOLICITOR GENERAL v MMA

FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled
that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the
sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it
allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses
and removal of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among those that
may be imposed under PD 1605.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach
the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and
the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.
ISSUE & HELD: WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
RATIO:
The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question the
SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for
traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at

all times the will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.
There is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the
imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of
Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction
therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
ALEGRE v COLLECTOR
FACTS:
Act No. 2380 entitled "An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of abaca, maguey,
sisal, and other fibers" was enacted by the Philippine Legislature. The PURPOSE and INTENT of the
law was to provide in detail for the inspection grading and baling of abaca and other fibers, and for
a uniform scale for grading, and to issue official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp,
so that an intending purchaser from an examination of the certificates might be assured and know
the grade and quality of the hemp offered for sale. It was later amended to provide for the creation
of Philippines Fiber Inspection Service, which shall have charge of the classification, baling, and
inspection of Philippine fibers
Alegre, who is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets, applied to
the Collector of Customs for a permit to export 100 bales of abaca to England. However, his
application was denied and he was advised that he would not be permitted to export the abaca
without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. Alegre filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus, alleging that the said certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244
of the Admin Code, are unconstitutional and void for the authority vested in the board is an undue
delegation of legislative power.
ISSUES: WoN the there is undue deleagtion of legislative power
DECISION: NO. It is a delegation of administrative power. The maxim that power conferred upon
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority does not preclude the
Legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
This means that the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles, which
are to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be invested with the power
to apply principles. This is done not only to avoid confusion in the laws, but also not to miss
sufficiency both in provision and execution in an effort to detail and to particularize
IN OTHER WORDS, though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the
Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute

and various governmental power for the more efficient administration of the laws. Congress
legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable. However, the necessities of the case
compelled them to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by
the statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would amount to declaring that
the power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted
IN THIS CASE, the Legislature, by enacting Act No. 2380, is saying that before any hemp is exported
from the Philippines it must be inspected, graded and baled, and it has created a board for that
purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. Applying the principles
mentioned above, such a delegation is not a delegation of legislative power. Rather, it is a delegation
of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. That is
because in the very nature of things, the Legislature could not perform such tasks.
MUN. Of CARDONA v MUN. Of BINANGONAN
Facts: This action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit the municipality of Binangonan from
exercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang
Parang, Nagsulo, and Bonot. Municipality of Binangonan claims authority on the basis of Executive
Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1st
day of July, 1914. The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quoted
and the Act under which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in that said Act confers on the
Governor-General legislative authority. The Municipality of Cardona also claims that the EO is void
because it does not contain a statement that the change in the division line between the said
municipalities was required by the public good; and that it does not appear in said order itself that
there was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of such an order.
Issue: Whether the said Executive Order of the Governor General confers an authority to fix the
boundary line of a certain municipality?
Held: We do not think that plaintiff's objections are well founded. No reason has been given why the
Act is unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on that
subject. Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constituted until the contrary is clearly
shown; and no showing of unconstitutionality having been made in this case, the objection to the
order of the Governor-General based on that ground must be overruled.
The other two objections are frivolous. Although it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the
Governor-General ought not to make such an order unless the public good requires it, that fact need
not be stated in the order. The same may be said with regard to its urgency. The Governor-General
having full authority to promulgate such an order this court will assume, if it should act on the
matter at all, that there was public necessity therefor and that the matter was of such urgency as
properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.

CALALANG v WILLIAMS
Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. It was later modified and
approved to the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted.
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the
Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila
Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?
Held: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer
legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest.
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is
to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how
long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function
which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

EASTERN SHIPPING v POEA


FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2,
issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers.
ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of the Memorandum is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
HELD:No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions
of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

OSMENA v ORBOS
" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended
by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices
or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of
sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an
undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since
a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts
belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it
was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the
view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the
taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is
plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and
while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless
remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA.
The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the
provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the
general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific
limit on how much to tax." 19 The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the
premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the
case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the
provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the
power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the
delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the
police power of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust
the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed
by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or
avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed,
suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the
circumstances under which it is to be exercised.

For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1)
complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must
fix a standard limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform.
This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express
purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund
are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of
power may be justified.
GUINGONA v CARAGE
The 1990 budget totals P233.5B in automatic appropriation. It consists of P155.3B appropriated by
Congress under RA6831 (General Appropriations Act of 1990 or GAA 1990), of which 27B will go to
DECS, the highest among all departments; and P98.4B in automatic appropriations (P86B for debt
servicing) pursuant to:PD81 (which amends RA4860, Foreign Borrowing Act),PD1177 (entitled
Revising the Budget Process in Orderto Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society), and PD1967 (An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Rep. of the Phil. On Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds for the Purpose)
Petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides
as follows
Sec. 29(l).
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise
it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the
amount appropriated for the debt service.
ISSUES: W/N there is undue delegation of legislative power
HELD: On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta,14 this
Court had this to say
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in
which legislative process can go forward . . .
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy . . .
The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as whole . . .

In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled,
the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid
delegation.16
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the
Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need
to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws
is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and
maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by
the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the
amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive
implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the
Treasury.indebtedness. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the
exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
Section 29(1), Article 6 merely states that appropriation should be made by law. It does not provide
or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be done by law. This is precisely what the
decrees did, it made appropriations by law
ere being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown, petitioners insist
nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of legislative power to
the executive on the alleged ground that the appropriations therein are not exact, certain or
definite, invoking in support therefor the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution under which
the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the Constitution of
Nebraska, however, our Constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact or "specific
appropriation made by law." Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of these
words and simply states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons,
an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization
may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.
272), whether in the past or in the present.