North American Policy

135 years old landscape of bilateral relations: Romania

and America

Teacher: Tiago Moreira de S

Student: Vasile Nicoleta

The New University of Lisbon

December, 2015

Abstract The installation of US missile shield starting with 2015 in Romania and the expansion
of strategic partnership are the latest aims in a series of events that were meant to tight the
political, military and economical relations between Romania and USA, above all the
impiedments that the two countries met in time. More specifically, this paper reviews a 135 years

history of Romanian- American relationship starting with the year 1880 till nowadays, following
the most important ups and downs during this period. It does so with a view on the American
foreign policy towards east European countries around the WWI, during the Cold War and within
the frame of a new world order after the Cold war, especially on the Romanian case. Similarly,
the Romanian approach towards the US in the same period and its main objectives in this
concern are discussed.

Contents
1. Introduction.3
2. 100 years of instability.4
2.1 From 1880 to 19414
2.2 The struggle for Most Favoured Nations clause5
2.3 Ceausescu give up to Most Favoured Nations clause6

3. The evolution from dispute to partnership.7

3.1 US towards the east European countries7
3.2 US towards Romania8
3.3 Romania towards US9
3.4 The new struggle for the Most Favoured Nations clause10

4. Romanian adherence to NATO..11

4.1 The Partnership for peace..11
4.2 The NATO Summit in 1997 new hope for Romania.11
4.3 Romanias sacrifices to join NATO13
4.4 New approach to the Romanias inclusion in north-atlantic structures.13

5. The road that led the US missile shield to Romania.15

6. Conclusion.16
1. Introduction

On 29th of June 2015, Romania and US were celebrating together 135 of diplomatic
relations, which were initiated barely in June 1880. From that moment on we can talk about a
multilateral development of these relations also in areas as economical and political ones. As I
will present in this paper, the relations that nowadays follow a natural course of bilateral help,
understanding and support were not the same in the closed history.
There were more factors that impeded the two countries to have a prosperous contact, at
least in the first 100 years of bilateral relations. As I will argue in the 2nd Chapter of this paper,
the reasons varied from one country to another. For example, US position of non-ratification of
the League of Nations by the US Senate favored a certain isolationist tendency in US with
consequences towards the relations with Romania. Of course, we are also talking about Romania
caught in the two world wars and of a Romanian communist regime that was neglecting the
human rights, against the US principles.
Further, in the 3rd Chapter I will explain how the Romanian American relations
evoluated and improved after the fall of the communism after a bloody national revolution in
Romania. The framework is the ending of the Cold war which left America the winner. Its
influence in the Eastern countries included also Romania. The relation between the two will get
better in 1992, with the first democratic elections in Romania, after the revolution.
In the 4th and 5th I will concentrate my arguments in the purpose of a better understanding
of the Romanian efforts for its adherence to NATO and EU, but also the political actions that led
to the installation of the American mission shield on Romanian territory, at Deveselu, in
December 2015, seen by Russia initially as a threat.
The relations between Romania and US had on their basis political, economical and
social objectives that were partly fulfilled, but there are other more whose courses are
still

unknown and is yet to see how will they shift in the actual international frame.

2. 100 years of instability

Communication between Romanian and American culture occurred relatively late,

especially since the Romanian Countries were more linked to the Black Sea and Eastern
Mediterranean region, than Western Europe. In general, the Romanians image about the New
World of the two Americas was formed gradually, rather representing humanists reports
submitted by geographers from the West and translated from French or Greek.
2.1 From 1880 to 1941
About Romanian-American relations we can only speak from June 14, 1880 until
nowadays. At first, they were not very intense. In addition, they were marked by a certain
American dissatisfaction linked to some provisions of the 1866 Constitution, regarding
naturalization and acquisition "of rural buildings".
Unfortunately, the status of non-ratification of the League of Nations by the US Senate
favored a certain isolationist tendency in US with consequences towards the relations with
Romania. Many diplomats and Romanian historians fined US absence from the League of
Nations, absence due to an unfavorable vote in the US Senate that facilitated the birth of
isolationist tendency of US foreign policy towards the problems of the European continent, with
significant consequences for relations with Romania. On the other hand, the attitude of President
Wilson during and after WWI, had a major role in building "Greater Romania".
The evolution of bilateral relations must be characterized by an increased presence of
large American companies on the Romanian market and increased cultural exchange at that time.
In November 1925, Titulescu made a visit to Washington, where he met with President Calvin
Coolidge. And Queen Mary visited the United States participating in the International Exhibition
from Chicago. In 1934, the Ford company opened an assembly line in Bucharest.
Only in 1930 was signed a Romanian American trade agreement. MFN clause was
included, and was meant to strengthen long-term relations between the two countries. The decade
that followed showed some economic and trade force in the Romanian-American relations,
situation interrupted by the outbreak of World War II. In December 1941, Romania enter into the
Soviet sphere and declared war on US, which led to the breaking of relations; diplomatic
relations were resumed in 1946 and elevated to the rank of embassy in 1964.
2.2 The struggle for MFN
4

In May 1964, they restart the trade talks and Romanians scored on the agenda the MFN
clause. The US side admitted to seek most liberal commercial terms, but the subject clause was
still considered too sensitive. Even in 1965, after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, Bucharest has
taken up the subject of the clause, but Congress continue to maintain the same policy, especially
because ethnic groups who came from Eastern Europe pressured Congressmen to oppose any
trade with Eastern European countries. Nixon opposed, but the theme reappeared during his visit
to Bucharest (early August 1969), when the Romanian authorities have reiterated subject clause.
On that occasion, the US president accepted that MFN for Romania would be desirable, but
avoided to detail by saying that ultimate decision belong to Congress.
Moscow's rejection of US-Soviet trade agreement from 1972 has created a more
favorable context concerning the development of US-Romanian relations. The bilateral talks
concerning the clause could be removed from the trade negotiations between the US and the
USSR. So, in April 2, 1974, representatives of the USA and Romania have signed a trade
agreement. Once they have clarified issues about "resolving humanitarian problems" (including,
of course, and migration), the US president has tested the Congress, and on 24th April 1974
submitted a set that included legislative and MFN for Romania. On the same day, both the Senate
and the House of Representatives have introduced resolutions calling for approval of USRomanian trade agreement and MFN. On 25 July 1975 the Senate vote was 88-2 to approve the
trade agreement clauses for Romania.
Romania was the first country in the Eastern Bloc which has been granted with MFN.
Analysts explained at that time that the US decision was fitting also with Washington's relations
with Moscow. Romania was perceived as a country trying to print out the attributes of
independence in relation to the USSR, and encouraging this attitude may be given by expanding
relations with the West in general and the US in particular. However, it was the only communist
country that had good connections simultaneously with Moscow and Beijing. It made the
connection between US and China, the process that led to the meeting between Nixon and Mao,
and the ties between Vietnam and the US, which were negotiating after that the Paris peace.
The subject clause for Romania was one of the most prominent positions in the agenda
concerning the Romanian-American relations in the last two decades until 1989. Although
international trade was concerned, the clause constituted a political instrument, on the one hand
5

in the relationship between Congress and The US administration, but also in relations between
the US and some countries.

2.3 Ceausescu give up to MFN

The policy of "differentiation", particularly practiced by US against the Eastern Bloc
states, used extensively MFN. We could say that Romania has differentiated truly in an excessive
way. Romania was not only the first country in the Eastern Bloc was granted Clause (1975), but
it was the state which lost it twice (1951 and 1988), once at the beginning of the communist
regime, and again at the end the same regime. So it can be said that in US relations with
communist Romania, the clause played a special political and diplomatic role.
At the same time, asymmetrical component of decision making process in the RomanianAmerican bilateral relations made the politico-diplomatic expressions to record different shades.
While in Bucharest the decision basically belonged to one person, in Washington was an
institutional processing within the government, which had to take into account the factor
Congress. Many times, between the Administration and Congress frictions have arisen due to the
clause for Romania and its fate depended sometimes on how the relations between the two
constitutional powers were running.
Moreover, after Gorbachev was installed in Kremlin, Romania's image in US has
deteriorated more and more, and US-Romanian relations have declined visibly in the second
half of the 80s. Before overthrow of the Ceausescu regime, the Romanian-US relations were
practically frozen, at the end of a badly deterioration process which lasted almost an entire
decade. The climax of the Romanian-US divergences happened when Ceausescu gave up on 5th
of February 1988 to the MFN. Consequently, on 26th of February, the US State Department made
public Romanias decision and officially notified clause expired on 3rd of July 1988. In addition,
from the same date, July 3, Romania became ineligible for any export credits granted by the US
administration and for the credit facilities programs of Eximbank.
Losing the clause and, especially, the export credits have dramatically affected the
Romanian-US exchanges. As Kirk and Mircea Rceanu demonstrates extensively in their book,
Romania versus The United States - Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985 - 1989, the rigid policy of
6

the Bucharest regime led to the isolation of Romania even within the communist camp, in
parallel with the deterioration of relations with US, those with USSR underwent even more.
Thus, in his last years of existence, Ceausescu regime managed the counter not only to break ties
with America - built with great difficulty during the dissent towards Moscow - but to completely
isolate Romania from the world centers of power right in the moment they were preparing a new
transformation of the world1.

3. The evolution from dispute to partnership

3.1 US towards the east European countries
American influence over peoples and leaders in Eastern Europe in the period after 1989,
derived from the common perception that they were representing the winner of the Cold War, the
initiator of democratic revolutions in these countries, the winner of the war with the "invader"
Iraq in January 1991 - in fact the only superpower that survived the Cold War. In these
circumstances, US exercised in those years a strong influence on the policies of the new
governments, both in terms of "foreign policy guidelines" and "national reform programs". This
influence was strongest in Poland, weaker in Bulgaria and Hungary, while in the case of
Romania, a country considered "recalcitrant", the pressure had to be maintained2.
Analysts evaluations and of those who took the decisions at the time in US started from
certain aspects considered essential - for Hungary, opening the borders to East German citizens;
Eastern Germany, the Berlin Wall fall; for Bulgaria, "the transition from a coup to the
revolution"; for Czechoslovak "Velvet Revolution".
In the book of Robert L. Hutchings, "American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War
an inside story from the US policy in Europe 1989 - 1992", published in 1997, we find out in
what consisted the "American Grand Strategy" launched in April-May 1989, by the President
1 Kirk, Richard and Mircea Rceanu, Romania versus The United States - Diplomacy
of the Absurd, 1985 1989, 113.
2 Robert L. Hutchings, "American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War an
inside story from the US policy in Europe 1989 - 1992", 1997, 214.
7

George Bush, concerning the end of the Cold War. It was based on a few key ideas: The Cold
War began in Eastern Europe, there still must end; relationship with the Soviet Union must
exceed the period of the "damming", founded upon the doctrine Truman / Eisenhower; Europes
future must shape the "new atlantism - and must retake the efforts toward the arms control. This
strategy should have as main objective the US policy of "differentiation" through trade
concessions or political gestures between the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In
addition, in 1989, US conditioned its relations with the Soviet Union on the Soviet behavior in
the area.
At the end of 1989, as the issue of Eastern Europe entered the US priority list of the
international agenda, they test the new Soviet approach. US did not want in the area a "reformed
communism" or "finlandization" but at the same time did not want to undermine "the Soviet
legitimate security interests "3. In their view, the reforms had to be made from the top down, but
also pushed upwards and therefore were encouraged communist leaders in Poland and Hungary
to advance political liberalization, as the two countries were visited by the President Bush in July
1989.

3.2 US towards Romania

For Romania, the basic idea, was "from the Revolution to the coup". However, after a
closer analysis, despite some doubts and some questions, the conclusion was: "From our
perspective, the Romanian revolution, like those that preceded it in autumn 1989, (in other
countries was communist note) was a genuine democratic revolution "4, fueled by the discontent
of the impoverished, humiliated, lied masses, which no longer put any hope in the regime's
ability to further solve the problems they were facing. Of course the internal problems of the
country after the takeover of the power by the groups and individuals from secondary echelons
of the old regime have deeply unsatisfied the Americans. As a result, the White House decide the
immediate suspension of all aid to Romania, excepting the humanitarian purposes.

3 Ibid., 52.
4 Ibid. 87.
8

3.3 Romania towards US

The resumption and normalization of relations with the US will soon be accomplished as
Romania was important in redefining the influence spheres in Europe in terms of political and
economic liberalization but also in terms of "guidelines" of the foreign policy. For example, on
1st of August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The crisis finds as president of the Security Council the
Romanian ambassador to UN, Aurel Dragos Munteanu. The right way that Romania supports the
policy and the actions of the United Nations throughout the conflict in the Gulf, despite the fact
that Iraq represented at that time its main trading partner in the Middle East5 will enjoy
immediate appreciation from Washington. On August 31, a delegation led by Senator Robert
Dole visited Bucharest, signaling the American businessmen that Romania is again desirable for
the investment and trade shifts. At the same time, there is an event of paramount importance for
Romania's destiny: on 31st of December1991, the USSR disintegrated, ceasing to be a subject of
the international law.
From this moment on, even if sometimes marked by several accidents along the way,
some hesitation and refolding, more or less diplomatic, bilateral relations will always follow an
upward way. In 1991, Sam Gibbons, Chairman of the Committee for Ways and Means of the US
Congress, returned from a visit to Bucharest, notified Washington that following the meetings
with President Ion Iliescu and Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, he believes that Romania
chooses a clear cooperation with the West, wanting to exit the buffer zone located between
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The following year was one of the elections: local,
parliamentary and presidential. Observers from 20 countries scattered throughout Romania.
Their conclusion was presented by US Senator DeConcini, who considered romanian elections
as "a positive step in the transition to democracy". This was the beginning of a long process that
led gradually, after several ballots, to a new constitution, structural reforms and to the installation
of a democratic regime. Also the State Department found in Romania a permanent evolution,
even if, in its view, slow, towards democracy and capitalist economy.
5 Only respecting the embargo against Baghdad, for example, damaged Romania with over
three billion USD.http://www.armyacademy.ro/buletin/2_2000/articol18.html

At the same time, the situation of the neighbour Yugoslavia was getting worse. On 30
May 1992, the Security Council vote to the establishment of economic sanctions against
Yugoslavia. Even if Belgrade was the main economic partner of Romania in the Balkans,
Bucharest support again the UN policy. Despite these evolutions, on 30th of September, the vote
in the House of Representatives about the restoration of the clause for Romania, was negative.

3.4 The new struggle for MFN

The Romanian-American relations will develop in 1993. Barbara Kennely, member of the
Congress, introduced into the House of Representatives a bill, proposing to give the MFN to
Romania for a period of three years. As a main arguments that supported this project "must take
into account that Bucharest plays an important role in diplomatic efforts to ensure stability in
Central and Eastern Europe". In parallel, the new re-elected President Iliescu accepted the
invitation to attend the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, an event that occurs
while in the Romanian Danube sector were arriving US military forces in order to supervise the
compliance with the embargo against Yugoslavia. Connected, the two events focus the attention,
through media means, to the Romanian-American relations. Iliescu used the events from
Washington to meet his american counterpart Bill Clinton and the vice President Al Gore, each
time reiterating Romania's determination to develop the cooperation with US.
Romania acquires effectively the clause, starting with November 8, 1993. With the
restoration of the clause at the end of 1993, the bilateral relations are experiencing a great
acceleration at all the levels of activity. 1994 is a year full of events in economic, military,
cultural and, above all, political field. A message for the President Iliescu from Washington says,
for the first time, as clear as possible that "Romania's security is on direct and material support of
the United States"6. As a natural consequence of full normalization of bilateral relations and,
moreover, as a preamble of a strategic partnership between the two countries on 18 July 1996
takes place the permanent clause for Romania.

6 Madeleine Allbright, the US ambassador to the UN in a letter to Ion Iliescu.

10

4. Romanian adherence to NATO

4.1 The Partnership for peace
A significant part of Romanian American relations in the recent history has been
marked by the Romanian accession to NATO. In this concern, on 26th of January 1994, Romania
was the first country in the world signing the Partneship for Peace (PfP) Framework. From that
moment it was obvious the intensifying military cooperation between Romania and US, both in
terms of official contacts, but also common exercises or activities in theaters of operations.
Romania's participation in the Partnership for Peace was the main instrument through which the
interoperability of the armed forces could have been achieved. To this purpose, the decision of
the permanent clause for Romania, not only had an impact on romanian american trade
relations, but it also represented a sign of recognition of all efforts and a way to encourage the
process of Romanias integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. It meant the end of differentiation
of Romania compared with other central - east European countries. However, the message
conveyed clearly the political acceptability in the West. And the Romanian-American relations
were not having any legal or political impediments in their evolution.

4.2 The NATO Summit in 1997 new hope for Romania

In July 1997 took place the NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain. Despite the Romanian
efforts to their cause, NATO addressed only to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland countries supported by United States - an invitation to begin talks for membership. The reason
was that only these three countries had reached the necessary progress in military, political,
economic and social reforms. This attitude placed Clinton in contradiction with West European
Countries. Madrid summit nominated Romania and Slovenia as favorites of the next wave,
announcing an extremely important fact, namely that Alliance doors remain open. This was
encouraging Romania to continue its reforms. Only two days after the Summit, US President Bill
Clinton came in Romania for a few hours, giving a message of hope and encouragement to
resolve the problems that were impieding at that time the country to be perfectly compatible
with Alliance membership. The encouragement of President Clinton's statements contributed to
maintainance of the Romanians positive attitude regarding Euro-Atlantic integration and the
11

political and economic reforms aimed to continue the process of modernization and transform
Romania into a stable and prosperous country.
Another important element of the visit of President Bill Clinton in Bucharest was
launching the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the United States. This partnership
was conceived as an advanced cooperation mechanism, having as priority the strengthening of
relations in areas of strategic interest for both countries (military, economic, regional security,
unconventional risks). The partnership was an important milestone in the evolution of bilateral
relations, browsing into the context of the accession process of Romania in Euro-Atlantic
structures.
Assuming full and exemplary obligations within the strategic partnership meant for
Romania to join the American position in the Iraqi crisis and the situation in Kosovo, but also the
participation of an increased contingent within the forces for peacekeeping in Bosnia. The
attitude was highly valued in Washington, as US ambassador in Bucharest, James Rosapepe
shows7. The crisis in Kosovo, in particular, tested this partnership, but Bucharest managed to
stay close to Washington, despite serious misgivings among the population of Romania. And yet,
at a meeting in July 1988, of the Joint Romanian US Commission Action, the President Emil
Constantinescu would harshly criticizes Washingtons treatment towards Romania during the
Yugoslav crisis and beyond. The main problem, as shown by the Romanian president, was the
extremely frail support of Western powers in general and the US in particular, given that
compliance with the embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia strongly affected Romania's
trade with the EU and CEFTA countries (88% country exchanges). "Basically - said Emil
Constantinescu - at the American potential and Romanian one, one might say, slightly
exaggerating, that US investment in Romania do not exist! Because they are so small relative to
the existing potential (...) that it remains a theoretical discussion "8.

7 We hope that the new government will give to Romania a new chance, Curentul, 8 th of
April 1988. http://www.curentul.net/?s=relatii+romano+americane

8 Constantinescus outburst, Evenimentul zilei, 15 th of July 1988.

http://www.evz.ro/istoria-alegerilor-prezidentiale-de-dupa-1989-cu-robert-turcescusi-cristian-tudor-popescu.html
12

The summit in Washington (1999) was a new milestone in Romanias road to NATO.
Even if it was not launched any invitation to join in the final communique of the summit,
Romania was nominated in the top of the candidates list, along with Slovenia. Besides this
achievement, it was launched Membership Action Plan (Membership Action Plan - MAP), which
was intended to support the efforts of training aspirants for NATO membership.

4.3 Romanias sacrifices to join NATO

Romanian Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2000 were again to change the
paradigm of Romanian-American bilateral relations. Immediately after the change of power in
Bucharest, Romania began to act as a de facto member of NATO and a US ally. The prime
minister Nastase paid a visit in Washington in the fall of 2001, immediately after the terrorist
attacks of 11 September. Romanias decisive position on supporting US efforts to combat
international terrorism was, in fact, highly appreciated in Washington. Zbigniew Brezinski,
former presidential adviser on security issues, said so "Romania's reaction to the terrorist attacks
of September 11 demonstrated a sense of identity with democratic values, which speaks for
itself. Romania has shown that it is considered a member of the West, an important and loyal
partner to the West. (...) Also, through its attitude towards the conflict in Kosovo, Romania
succeeded to prevent its expansion and transformation into an international issue more deep.
Romania is an important country in Europe and through the role of stability that it has in a
turbulent region of the continent (...) how Romania is now working demonstrates that it wants to
participate to the construction of the new Europe, but also to the future structure of NATO "9.

4.4 New approach to the Romanias inclusion in north-atlantic structures

During the meeting on 29 September, Romanian Prime Minister and US Secretary of
State, Colin Powell signed the Military Cooperation Agreement between the two countries
(SOFA), which was defining NATO status of forces that were to participate in military operations
9 Deepening and strengthening the strategic partnership with the US, Curierul
national, 1st ofNovember 2001. http://www.curierulnational.ro/Opinii/2002-1230/Lumea+in+care+traim&hl=Brzezinski%20despre%20romania&tip=toate
13

in Romania. The agreement offered a range of facilities to the Alliance troops for transiting
Romania, granted diplomatic and security elements of communication, and also allowed US
forces to conduct operations training with the Romanian Army. Bucharest went even further and,
despite the opposition of the European Union, on 1 August 2002, offer to the US military forces
the exemption from the provisions of the Agreement concerning the International Criminal
Court. In November2002, President George W. Bush came to Bucharest, met the President
Iliescu and addressed to Romania an invitation to join NATO. Then he had a speech in
Revolution Square, form Bucharest, on a terrible rain mixed with snow. Despite the weather,
thousands of people applauded the speech that made world tour10. Bush was to remember this
moment and bring it in several of his speeches. This was coming after the financial support
decided on 17th of May 2002, when the US Senate has sent to the White House the law through
which they were supporting the extention of NATO and authorizing military assistance to the
Vilnius Group consisting in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and
Romania. The amount of military aid amounted to $ 55.5 million, the highest amount, 11.5
million, with Romania11. This was the moment when the partnership between Romania and the
US has entered a new stage. Bilateral contacts at various levels - political, cultural, economic,
military and others - have increased exponentially. Zbigniew Brezinski affirmed that ,
"Romania's strategic role has been redefined"12 Bucharest is now heavily involved in the
management of global security and become "spearhead of NATO to the East"13.

10 Neikirk, William, Clinton Soothes Romanians' Sting Of Rejection, Chicago Tribune,

July 12, 1997. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-0712/news/9707120120_1_romanians-nato-membership-emil-constantinescu
11 Romania supported by the US Senate for NATO, Mediafax, 20th of May
2002.http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/cronologie-romania-a-aderat-la- nato-in-2004-dupa-oprima-tentativa-nereusita-in-1997-foto-12350569

12 Romanian-American Dialogue Summit, the National Courier, October 29, 2003.

https://internationalfreemedia.wordpress.com/2013/01/14/relatiile-romanoamericane-de-la-razboiul-absurd-la-fratia-in-nato/
13 Romania, the poor sponsor of USA?, Adevarul, April 28, 2004.
http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/romania---sponsorul-sarman-americii1_50ac03f77c42d5a66383eab3/index.html
14

5. The road that led the US missile shield to Romania

Romanias final inclusion in NATO in 2004 marks the end of the process but a beginning
of a new way, especially from the perspective of Romania's EU accession amid disputes arisen
between the US and its old west European allies.
Often, responding positively to US demands, Romania unintentionally found itself in the
position to "upset" Europe, being harshly rebuked for doing the will of its ally overseas. And vice
versa. Many observers and members of the public opinion have become quite skeptical and
critical related to this position of Romania. Even NATO went through a crisis during the war in
Iraq, when members of Alliance had divergent positions, well pronounced as intervention met
increasing criticism from international public opinion. That had created a serious breach between
US and some traditional European allies such as Germany and France, even Spain, which created
an embarrassing situation with possible consequences on long term. Romania, accustomed to the
monolithic unity of the West Euro-Atlantic integration, it was surprised by these developments
and suffered enough negative consequences.
Between 1997-2004, the reform demands required by the candidacy to NATO coincided
on political and economic segments with those required by the EU. There were no conceptual
contradictions between the two processes, but complementary and the objectives assumed by
Romania and US in the strategic partnership focused directly or indirectly on both processes. In
the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, Romania appreciated that security is indivisible and the
Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Atlantism-Europeanism dilemma is false, given that the United States
was at the same time, our ally and partner strategic, and strategic ally and partner of the
European Union.
On July 18 to 21, 2004 takes place the visit of the Romanian prime minister Nastase in
the US. The program of the bilateral component included meetings with the President George W.
Bush, State Secretary Colin Powell, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Energy Secretary
Spencer Abraham, members of the US Senate. Nastase and Bush talked for forty minutes in the
Oval Office of the White House, the main topics of interest in Romania-US relationship. On the
agenda were the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, bilateral relations, the elections in Romania
and US and international adoptions. They also discussed about placing US military bases in
15

Romania. In march 2005, President Traian Basescu, who was in US, met George W. Bush. The
presence of American bases in the Black Sea were taking shape. In the next year, he would made
another visit to US to give insurances about its alliance in Iraq and Afganistan.
On 1st of January 2007, Romania officially joined EU and in the next year, with the US
support hosted the first NATO Summit on its territory. Regarding new geostrategic position of
Romania, by joining the EU, after joining NATO, Romania has become a border country of both
Euro-Atlantic structures. Accordingly, Romania can have an important contribution to the
interest issues for US and NATO, such as: a) relations with the countries of Eastern Europe,
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova; b) Western Balkans c) The Black Sea area.
US Vice President Joe Biden visit in October 2009 and the meeting with President Traian
Basescu change the status of US missile shield in Romania from a hypothesis to a future
achievement. In September 2011, during the President Traian Basescu meeting with President
Barack Obama at the White House, the documents about the installation of US missile shield
from 2015 in Romania and the expansion of strategic partnership were signed. This events were
coming after the deeply diminuation of Romania's importance with the beginning of the
economic crisis and after the period of Bush Jr., when Obamas administration drew a new
regional policy into new strategic thinking, known as the "New Index", which followed the
tendencies of withdrawing from areas considered non-essential for the new administration.

Conclusion
16

Romania may address relations with the US from a triple aspect - as an ally within
NATO, with rights and obligations - as a partner in an international action to combat terrorism as a partner, with rights and obligations under the bilateral Strategic Partnership.
In a subjective analysis with reference to the Romanian-American relations, an analyst
who signed himself Theophyle wrote for a popular page-mail from Romania that US relations
with any other country in the world, are based on six postulates that proved real over a century14.
To follow:
1) America does not give anything unless you ask;
2) America does not give anything if it does not receive anything in return;
3) America wants to receive as much and as cheaply;
4) The key word in a bilateral relationship is "worthy" - whether
5) American foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy;
6) "Common Values" really matter, with all the cinism and skepticism above.
Beyond the utopia and realism, American foreign policy has a number of strategic
objectives that can be easily identified and representing the boundaries between which runs any
relationship with the US. Among these include: maintaining and strengthening NATO; a
"functional" relationship with Russia; the establishment of strategic contacts with BRIC
countries; the goals achievement of Pax Americana in the Middle East; the resistance to the Third
World pressure (environmental issues, development issues, Africas problems); the controlable
organization of the international community (especially the UN). Among American foreign
policy areas that directly concerned and Romania, I believe that we can introduce: US policy
towards Russia; US policy towards the Balkans (including to Turkey); US policy in the Black
Sea; American policy in the Middle East and US policy towards the EU. And between the
internal mechanisms of American policy, which we must take into account, I would mention: the
American public and the media; think-tanks and lobby groups; interpersonal relationships.
14 Theophyle, A subjective analysis. Romanian American relations, September 13,
2011. http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-10117277-analiza-subiectiva-relatiileromano-americane.htm
17

Regarding Romania, the main difficulty in the way the external action was constructed, it
was linked mainly to the definition of "national interest", especially in the period following
Romania's accession to NATO and the EU. In my opinion, national interests are an expression of
four vital goals combined: 1) rapid economic development; 2) prosperity; 3) national security; 4)
the increasing role and prestige in the international arena. That is why I agree with the politicodiplomatic objectives with priority in the strategic bilateral relationship with the US as they were
defined by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs: strengthening of political dialogue with the
Administration, the Congress and with the major opinion makers in US, from their posture as
ally in NATO and as US strategic partner; magnification of the parliamentary component of
bilateral political dialogue; - achievement of an extensive dialogue with US political power
poles; remove US visa for Romanian citizens; -Ensure a strong and continue support of the US
administration to internal efforts (reform); US support of interests and regional initiatives in
Romania (the Black Sea, Moldova, the Balkans) and internationally; Romanian support towards
the transatlantic relationship, from the position of EU membership; with special attention paid to
avoid possible negative effects that could arise between the US-EU approaches on different
issues; foster coordination / concentration of EU and US approaches aimed at finding solutions
to sensitive issues on the international agenda15.

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15 Bogdan Aurescus speech, 135 years of political-diplomatic relations between

Romania and USA, Press release, June 29, 2016. http://www.mae.ro/node/32667
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